EOIR WRONG AGAIN: Split 6th Cir. Says BIA Screwed Up Corroboration, Nexus Requirements In Mexican PSG Withholding Case — GUZMAN-VAZQUEZ v. BARR!

Dan Kowalski
Dan Kowalski
Online Editor of the LexisNexis Immigration Law Community (ILC)

Dan Kowalski report from LexisNexis Immigration Community:

https://www.lexisnexis.com/LegalNewsRoom/immigration/b/insidenews/posts/ca6-on-corroboration-social-group-guzman-vazquez-v-barr

CA6 on Corroboration, Social Group: Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr

Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr

“Manuel Guzman, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an immigration judge’s denial of his application for withholding of removal. Because the IJ and BIA erred in failing to give Guzman an opportunity to explain why he could not reasonably obtain certain corroborative evidence, because substantial evidence does not support the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and BIA’s determinations regarding the unavailability of evidence to corroborate Guzman’s claim about abuse by his stepfather, and because the BIA incorrectly required Guzman to demonstrate that his membership in a particular social group was “at least one central reason” for his persecution, we GRANT the petition for review, VACATE the BIA’s order, and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

[Hats off to R. Andrew Free!]

*********************************

PANEL: MERRITT, MOORE, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

OPINION: Judge Moore

DISSENT: Judge Murphy

In looking for ways to deny protection, the BIA continues to “blow the basics.” That’s going to continue to happen as long as EOIR is allowed to operate as a branch of DHS Enforcement rather than a fair-minded, impartial court system with true expertise and which grants needed protection in meritorious cases, rather than searching for specious “reasons to deny.”

No wonder the EOIR backlog is mushrooming out of control when those responsible for doing justice waste countless time and resources “manufacturing denials,” rather than just promptly granting relief in many meritorious cases.

PWS

05-18-20

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4th CIR. NABS BIA VIOLATING DUE PROCESS, AGAIN: Yes, Guys, Believe It Or Not You Should Allow the Respondent To Actually TESTIFY Before Sustaining An “Adverse Credibility” Finding! — Atemnkeng v. Barr – Plus, Bonus Mini-Essay: “When Will Life-Tenured Judges Stop Enabling The Arrogant Trashing Of Due Process By Our Authoritarian Regime?”

4th CIR. NABS BIA VIOLATING DUE PROCESS, AGAIN: Yes, Guys, Believe It Or Not You Should Allow the Respondent To Actually TESTIFY Before Sustaining An “Adverse Credibility” Finding! — Atemnkeng v. Barr – Plus, Bonus Mini-Essay: “When Will Life-Tenured Judges Stop Enabling The Arrogant Trashing Of Due Process By Our Authoritarian Regime?”

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/181886.P.pdf

Atemnkeng v. Barr, 4th Cir. Jan. 24, 2020, published

PANEL:  GREGORY, Chief Judge, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY:  Chief Judge Gregory

KEY QUOTE:

Ngawung Atemnkeng, a citizen of Cameroon, fled her country after participating in

anti-government meetings and protests, getting arrested and was detained without trial several times, being tortured and beaten by government officers, and receiving numerous death threats. An immigration judge (“IJ”) initially noted some inconsistencies in Atemnkeng’s application, but nevertheless found her credible and her explanations plausible, and granted her asylum application. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) reversed the IJ’s determination and instructed the IJ, in reviewing the asylum application a second time, to afford Atemnkeng an opportunity to explain any inconsistencies.

On remand, Atemnkeng has now relocated to Baltimore and the new IJ (“Baltimore IJ”) permitted her to submit additional documents in support of her asylum application and scheduled a master calendar hearing. Approximately one month prior to the hearing, however, the Baltimore IJ issued a written ruling denying Atemnkeng’s applications for asylum and other reliefs. The Baltimore IJ concluded, without Atemnkeng’s new testimony, that she was not credible in light of inconsistencies in her story. On a second appeal to the BIA, the Baltimore IJ’s ruling was affirmed without an opinion. Atemnkeng now petitions for review of the BIA’s summary affirmance of the Baltimore IJ’s rulings.

In her petition for review, she raises several claims, most notably, that her due process rights were violated when the Baltimore IJ deprived her of an opportunity to testify on remand. Concluding that Atemnkeng’s claim related to her ability to testify is

meritorious, we grant the petition for review, vacate the BIA’s affirmance, and remand for 2

further proceedings. In light of our conclusion that the Baltimore IJ failed to give Atemnkeng an opportunity to testify and weigh the relevance of that testimony in conjunction with the entire record, we decline to address whether the adverse credibility determination and denials of Atemnkeng’s applications for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) were erroneous.

*******************************“

When Will Life-Tenured Judges Stop Enabling The Arrogant Trashing Of Due Process By Our Authoritarian Regime?”

By Paul Wickham Schmidt

“Courtside” Exclusive

Jan. 1, 2020

Giving someone a chance to testify in person and explain apparent discrepancies, particularly when the case was for remanded for just that reason, seems like “Law 101.” It’s so elementary, I wouldn’t even include it on a final exam!

 

After all, simple logic, unclouded by a philosophy of treating migrants as a subclass whose legal rights judges often parrot but seldom enforce, would say that “Due Process is at its zenith” when human lives are at stake, as was the case here. It’s also required not only by the Constitution, but by BIA precedents like Matter of A-S-. So, how does this “go south” at EOIR?

 

Following precedents where it might help a respondent, be it a BIA or a Circuit precedent, seems to have become largely “optional” in the Immigration Courts these days, as I have previously observed. Instead, with constant encouragement from a White Nationalist, xenophobic regime, and lots of complicit judges at all levels, Due Process has largely been wiped out in Immigration Court.

 

Thank goodness this respondent, represented by long-time practitioner Ronald Richey (an Arlington Immigration Court regular” during my tenure), had the wherewithal to get to the Fourth Circuit and to draw a panel of judges interested in setting things right.

 

Think about what might have happened if she had landed in a complicit, largely “Decency Free Zone” like the Fifth or Eleventh Circuits, known for “going along to get along” with almost any abuse of migrants’ rights by the Government.

 

When are all Article III Judges going to start “connecting the dots” and asking why a supposedly “expert tribunal” whose one and only job should be to painstakingly insure that nobody is denied relief and removed from the United States, particularly to potential torture or death, without full Due Process and fundamental fairness is making fundamental mistakes in churning out removal orders.

 

Once upon a time, EOIR, the “home” of the Immigration Courts set out to use “teamwork and innovation to become the world’s best administrative tribunals, guaranteeing fairness and due process for all.”Not only has that “noble vision” been totally trashed, but the exact opposite has become institutionalized at EOIR: “Worst practices,” badly skewed pro-prosecutor hiring, inadequate professional training, lack of expertise, speed and expediency elevated over quality and care, intentional institutionalization of anti-immigrant, anti-asylum, pro-DHS bias, demeaning treatment of respondents and their lawyers, and the extermination of judicial independence and public accountability.

 

Today’s EOIR is truly a grim place, particularly for those whose lives are being destroyed by its substandard performance and also for the attorneys trying desperately to save them. Obviously, most Article IIIs have insulated themselves from the practical humanitarian disasters unfolding in Immigration Courts every day under their auspices.

 

What do they think happens to folks who can’t afford to be represented by Ronald Richey or one of his colleagues and whose access to pro bono counsel is intentionally hampered or impeded by EOIR? Think they have any chance whatsoever of a “fundamentally fair hearing” that complies with Due Process? Hearings for unrepresented individuals in detention are so grotesquely ridiculous that EOIR and DHS have gone to extreme lengths to impede public access so their abuses will take place in secret. Just ask my friendLaura Lynch over at AILA or my colleague Judge Ilyce Shugall of our Round Table what it’s like simply trying to get EOIR and DHS to comply with their own rules.

 

Listen folks, I helped formulate and implement the Refugee Act of 1980 as a Senior Executive in the “Legacy INS” during the Carter and Reagan Administrations. I even represented a few asylum applicants in private practice, something most Article III Judges and even many Immigraton Judges have never done. In 21 years on the “Immigration Bench” at both the trial and appellate levels, I personally listened to, read, or reviewed on appeal more asylum cases than any sitting Article III Judge of whom I’m aware.

 

The various parodies and travesties of justice in today’s Immigration Courts are eerily similar to, or in some cases the same, as I used to hear and read about in some of the third-world dictatorships, banana republics, and authoritarian tyrannies I dealt with on a regular basis. It’s simply infuriating, and beyond my understanding, that privileged, life-tenured, Article III Judges in our country, sworn to uphold our laws and Constitution, can continue to permit and so “glibly gloss over” these violations of law and gross perversions of human decency.

 

And, that goes right up to the Supremes’ intentional, disingenuous “tone deaf” approach to ignoring the real unconstitutional, invidious motives and fabrications behind the Administration’s original “Travel Ban.” All of the fatal legal defects were carefully documented and explained by various lower court judges trying conscientiously to uphold their oaths of office and “do the right thing.” Instead they were “dissed” by the Supremes and their hard work was ignored and denigrated. Fake, exaggerated, or “trumped up” “national security” pretexts for abusive treatment of “others” and political or religious opponents is a staple of persecuting regimes everywhere, as it now has become a judicially-enable staple of our current regime.

 

It’s long past time for the Article IIIs to wake up and put an end to the systemic nonsense that is literally killing people in our dysfunctional Immigration Court system. Is this the type of system to which you would entrust YOUR life, judges? If not, and I severely doubt that it is, why does it pass for “Due Process” for some of the most vulnerable among us? Think about it?

 

Due Process Forever; Complicit Courts Never!

 

PWS

01-31-20

 

JUSTICE DENIED: U.S. Immigration Judge @ Stewart Detention “Court” (“Where Asylum Cases Go To Die”) Denies “Slam Dunk” Asylum Bid To Unrepresented Refugee From DRC, Threatening Him & Family With Death! — System That Once Promised To “Guarantee Fairness and Due Process for All” Is Now A Bastion Of Injustice!

https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/immigration/sd-me-separated-father-20190227-story.htm

Kate Morrissey writes in the San Diego Union-Tribune:

Constantin Bakala and his family have survived kidnapping, torture, rape, poison and a shipwreck.

Now, faced with the complexities of the U.S. immigration system, they may be on the verge of defeat.

Bakala, 48, and his family fled their home in the Democratic Republic of Congo in late 2016 after they were targeted for Bakala’s participation in an opposition party that promoted democracy in the country, according to his wife.

After traveling through more than 10 countries, the family arrived at the San Ysidro Port of Entry in November 2017. Bakala was separated from his wife and seven children and sent to an immigration detention center in Georgia while they were released to live in the San Diego area, a common practice at the time. He hasn’t seen them since.

Because they were separated physically, their cases were also handled separately in immigration court. Since the federal government prioritizes detained cases, Bakala’s finished before the family’s even began, according to their attorney.

Unable to find an attorney to represent him at the detention center in rural Georgia and with little money to even pay for phone calls to the outside world to try to get help, Bakala faced by himself an immigration court known for being tough on asylum seekers. Judge Michael Baird, who heard his case, granted 11 of the 152 asylum cases that he decided between fiscal 2013 and 2018, records show.

Bakala lost.

He tried to appeal the case by himself and was denied that as well, according to court records. Now the family, with the help of a San Diego church, has found an attorney to help him, but it may be too late.

He is convinced that if he returns to the Democratic Republic of Congo, he will be murdered by his own government.

Bakala’s party membership card shows he was part of the Rassemblement des Congolais Démocrates et Nationalistes, or RCDN, which opposed former president Joseph Kabila’s maneuvers to stay in power past his term limit. When Bakala wasn’t at his job at the Ministry of Health, he worked with the party’s youth and advised them on how to demonstrate peacefully against the ruling party, his wife Annie Bwetu Kapongo said.

Bwetu Kapongo tells their story slowly, haltingly, sometimes with painful detail and sometimes in circles, a symptom of the trauma she carries from what happened.

She remembers when her husband first told her about getting threatened, and she remembers the day he went missing in 2016.

When she went to the police to ask for help finding him, she was locked in a room that reeked of urine. Later, three policemen came in, beat her and raped her. She tried to stop them and pointed out that she was pregnant.

The men didn’t care, she said. She ended up losing the baby.

When she was eventually able to return home, her husband was still missing. The two stores she owned, one that sold fish and one that sold cakes and juice, were broken into and robbed by people looking for her husband, who had by this point escaped where he had been imprisoned and tortured, according to his attorney.

One night, Bwetu Kapongo woke up to the family dog’s aggressive barking before hearing it abruptly stop. They found the dog dead the next day.

Another night, she and the children got sick. Their heads were spinning, and they were vomiting. Eventually, they found a tool someone had used to release poison into the house, she said.

Finally, one night she heard a knock on her window. It was her husband.

Aided by people he’d brought to help the family, they scooped the children out of their beds while they were sleeping and fled in a boat down a river to the Republic of Congo, where the people helping them paid for their hotel, Bwetu Kapongo said.

They waited a couple of months there until they had travel documents to get to Brazil and left in early 2017 to begin a grueling journey to the U.S. border.

“We came because America respects the law, and they know how to protect people,” Bwetu Kapongo said through a translator.

In each of the countries they passed through, officials told them that they could not stay, she added. They were sent from Panama back to Colombia when they tried to get across the border by boat and ended up having to make the grueling 6- to 7-day walk through the jungle to Costa Rica.

In Costa Rica, they found a boat that would take them to Nicaragua.

After they’d been on it for about 45 minutes, Bwetu Kapongo heard shots fired at them. She told her children to lay down. Then, the boat broke, she said, and it began to sink.All of a sudden, her youngest child Joseph, who is now 5, was no longer in her arms.

She started to drown.

“Is this a nightmare? Is this real? Is this happening?” she recalled asking the darkness that surrounded her.

She felt other bodies in the water, hands pushing her head down as they tried desperately to reach the surface. She felt someone clutch her neck. It was David, her 12-year-old son.

When a rescue boat pulled her to safety, she found her 17-year-old daughter Marie Louise. Bwetu Kapongo began to pray, crying out the names of her five other children and asking God to find them. Her husband was soon rescued from the water and prayed with her.

When rescuers noticed bubbles moving in the water, they found Joseph along with 8-year-old Moses and 10-year-old Augustine clinging to a rope and pulled them to safety.

Emmanuel, her 15-year-old son, had been carried further away into the water with 14-year-old Daniel. They found a life preserver that had been thrown into the water and clung to it, bringing with them two girls from another family who were also nearly drowning.

When Emmanuel used the last of his strength to cry out, rescuers found them, Bwetu Kapongo said. Two people who had been on the boat died, one adult and one child.

Though the family survived, all of the documents and photos that could have been used as evidence were lost in the water.

They would have to journey by boat two more times between Costa Rica and Nicaragua before successfully making it the rest of the way up to the U.S. border.

Bwetu Kapongo said she expected to receive “protection and respect” when they arrived. Instead, her husband was quickly taken away.

It is only when she reaches this point in the story that she begins to cry.

She wouldn’t hear from him for about a month. He told her that he didn’t know how to find her, that it took that long for officials to give him information about where she was.

The family’s attorney Julie Hartlé said the family’s story is “horrific but not unusual.” Other attorneys she knows have had similar cases.

“This family meets every criteria. They were persecuted for being democracy activists, kidnapped and tortured by their own government,” Hartlé said. “It meets the exact definition of asylum for political persecution. It should’ve been straightforward. They were able to use the detention system against them.”

Bakala had to fill out his asylum application in English, a language he does not speak well. Though he told the judge verbally about three times he was taken by police, how he was beaten, interrogated and held without food, he only put information about one of the incidents in his application.

“That sounds like a pretty bad event,” the judge said in his ruling of one of the incidents Bakala described. “Unfortunately, it is never mentioned anywhere in the respondent’s application for asylum.”

The evidence that Bakala was able to gather and present — including a notice from his political party about his disappearance, another notice that the ruling party was looking for him, his voter ID card and party membership card — was not translated into English, so the judge said he couldn’t consider it, according to court records. He found Bakala’s story not credible.

The Executive Office for Immigration Review said it does not comment on judges’ decisions.

Neither Immigration and Customs Enforcement nor Customs and Border Protection were able to respond to request for comment in time for publication.

As immigration officials prepared to deport Bakala, attorneys filed emergency motions to temporarily keep him in the U.S. to try to reopen his case with new evidence. Last week, the 11th Circuit granted him a stay until Friday.

In the meantime, members of the church helping the family here in San Diego are planning a protest outside of the federal building at noon on Thursday in support of Bakala.

Bwetu Kapongo said the most important thing for her is protection for her children.

“He sacrificed his life to protect his kids,” she said in French. “If we hadn’t done what we did, they would already be dead.”

Beyond that, she wishes for her husband’s return. She tries to hide her exhaustion and her tears from her children, but she doesn’t think she can raise them alone.

“After the mountain I went through, I’ve got no more strength,” she said.

******************************************

So, how might a real judge, one committed to guaranteeing fundamental fairness, due process, and properly applying the generous dictates of U.S. asylum law have approached this case?

First, Bakala comes from a country, the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”) which is one of the most repressive regimes in the world, where persecution is rampant. For example, the DRC received a score of 17 on a scale of 100 in the latest Freedom House freedom rankings.

Here’s a quote from the most recent U.S. State Department Country Report summarizing the daily horrors of life in the DRC:

The most significant human rights issues included: unlawful killings; disappearances and abductions; torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and punishment, including sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and rape; life-threatening conditions in prisons and detention facilities; arbitrary arrests and prolonged detention; denial of fair public trial; arbitrary interference with privacy, family, and home; restrictions on freedoms of speech and the press, assembly, and association; abuse of internally displaced persons (IDPs); inability of citizens to change their government through democratic means; harassment of civil society, opposition, and religious leaders; corruption and a lack of transparency at all levels of government; violence and stigmatization against women, children, persons with disabilities, ethnic minorities, indigenous persons, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) persons, and persons with albinism, with little government action to investigate, prosecute, or hold perpetrators accountable; trafficking in persons, including forced labor, including by children; and violations of worker rights.

Authorities often took no steps to investigate, prosecute, or punish officials who committed abuses, whether in the security forces or elsewhere in the government, and impunity for human rights abuses was a problem.

Therefore, knowing that Bakala comes from a notorious “refugee producing country,” the Immigration Judge should have insisted as a matter of due process and fundamental fairness that the case be continued until the respondent could get the assistance of a competent lawyer to fully and fairly present a case for saving his life.

Asylum law has been made intentionally and unnecessarily complicated by a politicized system run with a strong enforcement bias; statistics, as well as experience, show that unrepresented individuals have virtually no realistic chance of success, particularly in a system run by an Administration clearly prejudiced against them. Human lives become mere “case completions.”

Second, Bakala’s wife also appears to have a strong asylum claim in her own right.  If granted, he could also have been protected as a derivative asylee under his wife’s application. Therefore, unless ICE were basically willing to stipulate to an asylum grant, proceeding with the cases separately was presumptively unfair. A judge committed to fairness, would have “pushed” the ICE Counsel on why this family’s cases were not being heard together.

Third, to justify an adverse credibility finding under the statute and BIA precedents, the judge’s ruling must demonstrate significant discrepancies or omissions, provide cogent reasoning, and carefully consider and give reasons for not accepting the respondent’s explanations for any problems. This judge’s ruling appears to have “flunked” all of those tests. The idea that a detained unrepresented individual’s omission of an event from the asylum application is a cogent basis for finding him not credible is facially absurd. That’s particularly true where the respondent is not a native English speaker and is held in detention where his ability to prepare, or, indeed, to even understand what is required for a successful asylum application, is intentionally impaired.

Moreover, a simple reference to the most current State Department Country Report (quoted above) would have shown the judge that the respondent’s testimony was highly plausible in light of known country conditions.  Indeed, persecution, torture, and abuse are daily occurrences in the DRC.

Additionally, the judge violated due process by requiring a detained individual to get translations of key corroborating documents. It’s simply not possible in most cases. How is a detained unrepresented individual going to find a qualified foreign language translator in the Stewart prison? A judge doing his job fairly would have asked the respondent to summarize the documents and accepted a “proffer;” or he could have had the documents read into the record by the interpreter.

For the purpose of a detained adjudication, I would have assumed that the documents were what the respondent said they were and acted accordingly. If the DHS wanted to challenge the decision, they could have the documents translated.  Just one of many problems in purporting to conduct “due process hearings:” in place where due process often can’t really be achieved.

Then, the “rubber stamp” BIA (a/k/a the “Falls Church Adjudication Center”) also “tanked” by not applying its own precedents which should have resulted in a finding that the Immigration Judge’s specious reasoning was “clearly erroneous.”

I heard a number of asylum cases from the DRC during my time on the bench in Arlington. I doubt that I denied any except for individuals who were aggravated felons, engaged in persecution of others, or had provided material support to a terrorist organization. Even those who failed to establish asylum eligibility often had valid claims for protection under the Convention Against Torture, given the prevalence of government sponsored or endorsed torture in the DRC. Most DRC asylum cases in Arlington were well-represented, well-documented, and either largely unopposed or not appealed by ICE.

Even without a lawyer, it appears that Bakala’s testimony was credible under the circumstances and that he suffered harm that should have warranted a grant of asylum on account of political opinion based on known country conditions. At one time in Arlington, a case like this with representation probably could have been granted largely by stipulation, with brief testimony, on a “short docket.”

That’s how cases can “move” on the Immigration Court’s crowded dockets without compromising due process or fundamental fairness. Instead, this Administration encourages a biased “haste makes waste” approach, issues statements of strong prejudgment against asylum seekers and their attorneys, motivates judges to cut corners, and enables judges to look for “any reason” to deny asylum and crank out final orders of removal. It’s a “cavalcade of worst practices!”

While some judges courageously resist and insist on “doing the right thing,” others choose or feel compelled to “go along to get along” with the Administration’s unethical (and incompetent) administration of these so-called “courts.” Indeed, today’s Immigration Judges are not even properly trained on how to correctly adjudicate and grant asylum under the generous standards mandated by the law, the Supreme Court, and even the BIA’s (seldom followed) precedent supposedly implementing generous standards following the Supreme Court’s admonishment. It’s an exercise in extreme intellectual dishonesty.

Allowing serious, “life or death” cases to be tried in places like Stewart, notorious for being the home of unsympathetic judges and an inherently coercive atmosphere, intentionally located in and out-of-the-way place where it is hard for attorneys to participate, is a stain on America.

The DOJ has abandoned any semblance of running its “wholly owned courts” in a fair and constitutional manner. Congress, ultimately responsible for creating and countenancing this mess, has long abdicated its duty to establish an independent system that complies with Due Process.

Article III Judges also have been largely complicit in allowing this pathetic imitation of a “court” system to continue operating in a fundamentally unfair and unreasonable manner and spewing forth skewed, unjust, often unlawful, and sometimes deadly results. It’s a national disgrace!

Sadly, the individuals being abused by the Immigration Court system are some of the weakest and most vulnerable among us. That’s what allows such systematic injustice to operate “largely below the radar screen.” However, the individuals who are participating in and enabling such outrageous contempt for the rule of law and human dignity, and thereby violating their oaths of Federal office, will not escape the judgment of history.

Fixing this unfair and intentionally broken system is well within our power as a country. It could be done for much less than $5.7 billion. Put an end to the “New American Gulag” and  the “theater of the absurd” masquerading as a “court” that operates within its bowels!

PWS

03-01-19

 

PROFESSOR KAREN MUSALO: Persecution Of Women In El Salvador On The Basis Of Gender Is Real & Endemic – The Administration’s Attempts To Skew The Law Against Women Refugees Is Totally Dishonest, Immoral, & Illegal!

https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Musalo_El%20Salvador_A%20Peace%20Worse%20Than%20War_30%20Yale%20J.L.%20&%20Fem.%203_20018.pdf

Here’s part of the conclusion of Karen’s article “EL SALVADOR–A PEACE WORSE THAN WAR: VIOLENCE, GENDER AND A FAILED LEGAL RESPONSE” published at 30 Yale Journal of Law & Feminism 3 (2018):

Historical and contemporary factors have given rise to the extremely high levels of violence that persist in El Salvador today. Many of the Salvadorans interviewed for this article referred to a “culture of violence” going back to the brutal Spanish Conquest and continuing into more recent history, including the 1932 Matanza and the atrocities of the country’s 12-year civil war. Gender violence exists within this broader context. However, as almost every Salvadoran source noted, violence against women is even more deeply rooted than other expressions of societal violence as the result of patriarchal norms that tolerate and affirm the most extreme forms of domination and abuse of women.
. . . .

Levels of violence, including the killings of women, have continued to rise, while impunity has remained a constant. Criticism of the persistent impunity for gender violence resulted in El Salvador’s most recent legal development: the enactment of Decree 286, which created specialized courts. However, the exclusion of the most commonly committed gender crimes–intrafamilial violence and sexual violence–from the specialized courts’ jurisdiction, and the courts’ hybrid structure, which requires that cases still be initiated in the peace courts, do not inspire optimism for positive outcomes.

Notwithstanding these considerable obstacles, the Salvadorans interviewed for this article, who have long struggled for access to justice and gender equality, maintain the hope and the belief that change is possible. In the course of multiple interviews over a six-year period (2010 to 2016), Salvadoran sources have expressed deep frustration and disappointment but have not articulated resignation or defeat.

. . . .

The Salvadorans who I interviewed for this article have provided information, insights, and perspectives that are simply not available in written reports or studies. Although they come from a range of backgrounds–governmental and non-governmental; legal professionals as well as grassroots activists–they all acknowledge the complex causes of societal violence. As discussed throughout this article, they also have specific critiques and prescriptions for what must be done in order to see any real progress. Discussions of the country’s crisis, as well as of the international community’s response, must start by listening to the voices of the Salvadorans who, despite the seemingly intractable situation of violence and impunity in which they live, have refused to abandon the struggle for justice and equality. They are inspiring in their courage and resilience. By quoting extensively from these sources, this article has sought to amplify their voices.

******************************************

Read Karen’s complete article at the above link.

Compare real scholarship and honest reflection of the experiences of women in El Salvador affected by this seemingly unending wave of persecution with the intentionally bogus picture painted by Jeff Sessions in Matter of A-B-. Hopefully, advocates will be able to use the research and expertise of Karen and others like her to enlighten fair-minded Asylum Officers and Immigration Judges, support their efforts to grant women the protection they merit as contemplated by the Refugee Act and the Convention Against Torture, and force the Article III Courts and eventually Congress to consign Sessions’s intentionally perverted reasoning to the dustbin of “Jim Crow Misogynist History” where it belongs.

Many thanks to my good friend and colleague in  “Our Gang,” Judge Jeffrey Chase, for passing this link to Karen’s important scholarship along.

Due Process For All Forever!

PWS

12-31-18

SESSIONS OVERRULES MATTER OF A-R-C-G-, TRASHES VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS OF GANGS SEEKING ASYLUM, DIRECTS U.S. IMMIGRATION JUDGES TO CONSIDER EVERY POSSIBLE WAY OF DENYING ASYLUM APPLICATIONS! – MATTER OF A-B-, 27 I&N DEC. 316 (AG 2018) – Decision Appears Geared To Using “Maxo Asylum Denials” As Enforcement Tool/Deterrent Along The Southern Border! – Circuit Court Battles Sure To Follow As Advocacy Groups Ramp Up To Defend Asylum System!

AB Merits 3929

EOIR HEADNOTE:

(1)Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 338 (BIA 2014) is overruled. That decision was wrongly decided and should not have been issued as a precedential decision.

(2)An applicant seeking to establish persecution on account of membership in a “particular social group” must demonstrate: (1) membership in a group, which is composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, is defined with particularity, and is socially distinct within the society in question; and (2) that membership in the group is a central reason for her persecution. When the alleged persecutor is someone unaffiliated with the government, the applicant must also show that her home government is unwilling or unable to protect her.

(3)An asylum applicant has the burden of showing her eligibility for asylum. The applicant must present facts that establish each element of the standard, and the asylum officer, immigration judge, or the Board has the duty to determine whether those facts satisfy all of those elements.

(4)If an asylum application is fatally flawed in one respect, an immigration judge or the Board need not examine the remaining elements of the asylum claim.

(5)The mere fact that a country may have problems effectively policing certain crimes or that certain populations are more likely to be victims of crime, cannot itself establish an asylum claim.

(6)To be cognizable, a particular social group must exist independently of the harm asserted in an application for asylum.

(7)An applicant seeking to establish persecution based on violent conduct of a private actor must show more than the government’s difficulty controlling private behavior. The applicant must show that the government condoned the private actions or demonstrated an inability to protect the victims.

(8)An applicant seeking asylum based on membership in a particular social group must clearly indicate on the record the exact delineation of any proposed particular social group.

(9)The Board, immigration judges, and all asylum officers must consider, consistent with the regulations, whether internal relocation in the alien’s home country presents a reasonable alternative before granting asylum.

KEY QUOTES:

For these and other reasons, I vacate the Board’s decision and remand for further proceedings before the immigration judge consistent with this opinion. In so doing, I reiterate that an applicant for asylum on account of her membership in a purported particular social group must demonstrate: (1) membership in a particular group, which is composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, is defined with particularity, and is socially distinct within the society in question; (2) that her membership in that group is a central reason for her persecution; and (3) that the alleged harm is inflicted by the government of her home country or by persons that the government is unwilling or unable to control. See M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 234–44; W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. at 209–18, 223–24 & n.8. Furthermore, when the applicant is the victim of private criminal activity, the analysis must also “consider whether government protection is available, internal relocation is possible, and persecution exists countrywide.” M-E-V- G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 243.

Generally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify for asylum.1 While I do not decide that violence inflicted by non-governmental actors may never serve as the basis for an asylum or withholding application based on membership in a particular social group, in practice such claims are unlikely to satisfy the statutory grounds for proving group persecution that the government is unable or unwilling to address. The mere fact that a country may have problems effectively policing certain crimes—such as domestic violence or gang violence—or that certain populations are more likely to be victims of crime, cannot itself establish an asylum claim.

1 Accordingly, few such claims would satisfy the legal standard to determine whether an alien has a credible fear of persecution. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) (requiring a “significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien’s claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum under section 1158 of this title [8 U.S.C. § 1158]”).

page5image3058762624

. . . .

A-R-C-G- was wrongly decided and should not have been issued as a precedential decision. DHS conceded almost all of the legal requirements necessary for a victim of private crime to qualify for asylum based on persecution on account of membership in a particular social group.8 To the extent that the Board examined the legal questions, its analysis lacked rigor and broke with the Board’s own precedents.

. . . .

When an asylum applicant makes inconsistent statements, the immigration judge is uniquely advantaged to determine the applicant’s credibility, and the Board may not substitute its own view of the evidence on appeal. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 334 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[W]here the [immigration judge]’s adverse credibility finding is based on specific examples in the record of inconsistent statements by the

341

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) Interim Decision #3929

asylum applicant about matters material to his claim of persecution, or on contradictory or inherently improbable testimony regarding such matters, a reviewing court will generally not be able to conclude that a reasonable adjudicator was compelled to find otherwise.” (quotation omitted)). Under the REAL ID Act, “[t]here is no presumption of credibility” in favor of an asylum applicant. Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, §§ 101(a)(3), 119 Stat. 231, 303 (2005) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). Furthermore, the identified inconsistencies do not have to be related to an applicant’s core asylum claim to support an adverse credibility determination: “Considering the totality of circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record . . . , without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other factor.” Id. (emphasis added). “[O]missions, inconsistent statements, contradictory evidence, and inherently improbable testimony are appropriate bases for making an adverse credibility determination,” and the existence of “only a few” such issues can be sufficient to make an adverse credibility determination as to the applicant’s entire testimony regarding past persecution. Djadjou v. Holder, 662 F.3d 265, 273–74 (4th Cir. 2011).

. .  . .

The Board also erred when it found that the respondent established the required nexus between the harm she suffered and her group membership. Whether a purported persecutor was motivated by an alien’s group affiliation “is a classic factual question,” Zavaleta-Policiano v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 241, 247–48 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted), which the Board may overturn only if “clearly erroneous.”

The Board stated that “the record indicates that the ex-husband abused [the respondent] from his position of perceived authority, as her ex-husband and the father of her children.” A-B- at *3. From this, the Board held, in a conclusory fashion, that the “record as a whole supports a finding that the respondent’s membership in the particular social group of ‘El Salvadoran women who are unable to leave their domestic relationship where they have children in common’ is at least one central reason that he ex-husband abused her.” Id. While citing the standard of review, the Board did not apply it in summarily dismissing the immigration judge’s findings. Moreover, the Board’s legal analysis was deficient. The Board, required to find “clear error” of a factual finding, pointed to no record evidence that respondent’s husband mistreated her in any part “on account of” her membership in the particular social group of “El Salvadoran women who are unable to leave their domestic relationship where they have children in common.” The Board cited no evidence that her husband knew any such social group existed, or that he persecuted wife for reasons unrelated to their relationship. There was simply no basis in the Board’s summary reasoning for overturning the immigration judge’s factual findings, much less finding them clearly erroneous.

The Board also erred when it overruled the immigration judge’s finding that the respondent failed to demonstrate that the government of El Salvador was unable or unwilling to protect her from her ex-husband. This inquiry too involved factual findings to which the Board did not give proper deference. No country provides its citizens with complete security from private criminal activity, and perfect protection is not required. In this case, the respondent not only reached out to police, but received various restraining orders and had him arrested on at least one occasion. See A-B- at *14–15 (Immig. Ct. Dec. 1, 2015).

For many reasons, domestic violence is a particularly difficult crime to prevent and prosecute, even in the United States, which dedicates significant

343

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) Interim Decision #3929

resources to combating domestic violence. See, e.g., Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence (2000). The persistence of domestic violence in El Salvador, however, does not establish that El Salvador was unable or unwilling to protect A-B- from her husband, any more than the persistence of domestic violence in the United States means that our government is unwilling or unable to protect victims of domestic violence. In short, the Board erred in finding, contrary to the record and the immigration judge’s findings, that El Salvador was unable or unwilling to protect A-B- and that she thus had no choice but to flee the country.

D.

The Board, immigration judges, and all asylum officers should consider the following points when evaluating an application for asylum. First, an applicant seeking asylum or withholding of removal based on membership in a particular social group must clearly indicate, on the record and before the immigration judge, the exact delineation of any proposed particular social group. See Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 189, 190–91 (BIA 2018); Matter of A-T-, 25 I&N Dec. 4, 10 (BIA 2009). The immigration judge has a responsibility to “ensure that the specific social group being analyzed is included in his or her decision,” as it critical to the Board’s “appellate review that the proposed social group is clear and that the record is fully developed.” Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 191. The Board must also remember that it cannot sustain an asylum applicant’s appeal based on a newly articulated social group not presented before or analyzed by the immigration judge. Id. at 192; see also, e.g., Baltti v. Sessions, 878 F.3d 240, 244–45 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding no jurisdiction to review a newly defined social group because the claim based on “membership in that narrowed social group” had not been raised below); Duarte-Salagosa v. Holder, 775 F.3d 841, 845 (7th Cir. 2014) (declining to address a particular social group raised for the first time on appeal).

Furthermore, the Board, immigration judges, and all asylum officers must consider, consistent with the regulations, whether internal relocation in the alien’s home country presents a reasonable alternative before granting asylum. Asylum applicants who have “not established past persecution . . . bear the burden of establishing that it would not be reasonable for him or her to relocate, unless the persecution is by a government or government- sponsored.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)(i). An immigration judge, “in the exercise of his or her discretion, shall deny the asylum application of an alien found to be a refugee on the basis of past persecution” if it is “found by a preponderance of the evidence” that “the applicant could avoid future

344

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) Interim Decision #3929

persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s country of nationality, . . . and under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.” Id. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i). Beyond the standards that victims of private violence must meet in proving refugee status in the first instance, they face the additional challenge of showing that internal relocation is not an option (or in answering DHS’s evidence that relocation is possible). When the applicant has suffered personal harm at the hands of only a few specific individuals, internal relocation would seem more reasonable than if the applicant were persecuted, broadly, by her country’s government.

Finally, there are alternative proper and legal channels for seeking admission to the United States other than entering the country illegally and applying for asylum in a removal proceeding. The asylum statute “is but one provision in a larger web of immigration laws designed to address individuals in many different circumstances,” and “[t]o expand that statute beyond its obviously intended focus is to distort the entire immigration framework.”Velasquez, 866 F.3d at 199 (Wilkinson, J., concurring). Aliens seeking a better life in America are welcome to take advantage of existing channels to obtain legal status before entering the country. In this case, A-B- entered the country illegally, and when initially apprehended by Border Patrol agents, she stated that her reason for entering the country was “to find work and reside” in the United States. Aliens seeking an improved quality of life should seek legal work authorization and residency status, instead of illegally entering the United States and claiming asylum.12

12 Asylum is a discretionary form of relief from removal, and an applicant bears the burden of proving not only statutory eligibility for asylum but that she also merits asylum as a matter of discretion. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1), 1229a(c)(4)(A)(ii); see also Romilus v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2004). Neither the immigration judge nor the Board addressed the issue of discretion regarding the respondent’s asylum application, and I decline to do so in the first instance. Nevertheless, I remind all asylum adjudicators that a favorable exercise of discretion is a discrete requirement for the granting of asylum and should not be presumed or glossed over solely because an applicant otherwise meets the burden of proof for asylum eligibility under the INA. Relevant discretionary factors include, inter alia, the circumvention of orderly refugee procedures; whether the alien passed through any other countries or arrived in the United States directly from her country; whether orderly refugee procedures were in fact available to help her in any country she passed through; whether she made any attempts to seek asylum before coming to the United States; the length of time the alien remained in a third country; and her living conditions, safety, and potential for long-term residency there. See Matter of Pula, 19 I&N Dec. 467, 473–74 (BIA 1987).

******************************************

As my former BIA colleague Judge Lory Rosenberg used to say “there are lots of ways to deny an asylum application.” Sessions runs through most them with a tone that clearly encourages Immigration Judges to “just find a way to say no as quickly as possible.”

Additionally, he’s basically directing Asylum Officers to find no “credible fear” in almost all domestic violence and gang-related cases, thus cutting off hearings without effective Article III judicial review under the current state of the law. That’s likely to speed up the “deportation railway.”

It’s likely that this decision also will fulfill Sessions’s dream of mass denials of asylum at the Immigration Judge stage that will be more or less summarily affirmed by the BIA. Any Immigration Judge who doesn’t “get” Session’s strong anti-asylum message would have to be pretty slow on the uptake.

It seemed totally disingenuous for Sessions to pontificate that individuals should go through the “legal immigration system” while publicly trashing legal immigrants as “job stealers” and favoring massive cuts to legal immigration. But, intellectual honesty has never been one of this Attorney General’s strong points.

The “asylum denial express” might have some difficulty in the Courts of Appeals, however. Not all such courts are eager to “rubber stamp” hasty denials. And, by encouraging Immigration Judges to look for “any reason to deny” to cut corners, and avoid having to analyze the entire case, Sessions is likely to end up with sloppy work and lots of Circuit Court remands for “do overs.” At a minimum, that’s going to add to the already out of control Immigration Court backlog.

PWS

06-11-18

 

 

AS SESSIONS DISEMBOWELS DUE PROCESS, THE REAL LEGAL PROBLEMS LEADING TO UNFAIR HEARINGS FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS AND OTHERS CONTINUE UNABATED & UNADDRESSED IN U.S. IMMIGRATION COURT – 2d Cir. Delivers A “Double Shot” Rebuke To Misapplication Of Credibility Rules By Immigration Judges & BIA Judges Who Should Know Better — HONG FEI GAO V. SESSIONS

GAO-2D CIR 16-2262_16-2493_opn

Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 2d Cir., May 25, 2018, published

PANEL: WINTER and CHIN, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN, Judge.*

  • Edward R. Korman, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

    OPINION BY: JUDGE CHIN

    SUMMARY OF HOLDING (From Decision):

    These petitions for review heard in tandem challenge two decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (the ʺBIAʺ), affirming decisions by two Immigration Judges (ʺIJsʺ), denying asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (ʺCATʺ) to two petitioners seeking relief from religious persecution in China on adverse credibility grounds. During removal proceedings, petitioners testified regarding the medical attention they received for injuries they sustained from police beatings. The IJs and the BIA relied substantially on the omission of that information from petitionersʹ initial applications and supporting documents to determine that petitioners lacked credibility.

    On appeal, petitioners principally challenge the agencyʹs adverse credibility determinations. In light of the totality of the circumstances and in the context of the record as a whole, in each case we conclude that the IJ and BIA erred in substantially relying on certain omissions in the record. Accordingly, we grant the petitions, vacate the decisions of the BIA, and remand the cases to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

     

KEY QUOTE:

For cases filed after May 11, 2005, the effective date of the REAL ID Act, Pub L. No. 109‐13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005), ʺan IJ may rely on any inconsistency or omission in making an adverse credibility determination as long as theʹtotality of the circumstancesʹ establishes that an asylum applicant is not credible,ʺ Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). The agency may base a credibility finding on an asylum applicantʹs ʺdemeanor, candor, or responsivenessʺ; the ʺinherent plausibilityʺ of his account; the consistency among his written statements, oral statements, and other record evidence; and ʺany inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicantʹs claim, or any other relevant factor.ʺ 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Even where the agency ʺrelies on discrepancies or lacunae that, if taken separately, concern matters collateral or ancillary to the claim, the cumulative effect may nevertheless be deemed consequential.ʺ Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (quoting Tu Lin v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 395, 402 (2d Cir. 2006)). To resolve the instant appeals, we first clarify the following principles that govern credibility determinations based on omissions following the REAL ID Act.

First, although the REAL ID Act authorizes an IJ to rely on ʺanyinconsistency or omission in making an adverse credibility determination,ʺ even one ʺcollateral or ancillaryʺ to an applicantʹs claims, id. at 167, the Act does not give an IJ free rein. The REAL ID Act does not erase our obligation to assess whether the agency has provided ʺspecific, cogent reasons for the adverse credibility finding and whether those reasons bear a legitimate nexus to the finding.ʺ Id. at 166 (quoting Zhou Yun Zhang, 386 F.3d at 74); accord Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010) (ʺThe REAL ID Act did not strip us of our ability to rely on the institutional tools that we have developed, such as the requirement that an agency provide specific and cogent reasons supporting an adverse credibility determination, to aid our review.ʺ). Thus, although IJs may rely on non‐material omissions and inconsistencies, not all omissions and inconsistencies will deserve the same weight. A trivial inconsistency or omission that has no tendency to suggest a petitioner fabricated his or her claim will not support an adverse credibility determination. See Latifi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 103, 105 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (remanding where we found ʺany potential discrepancies that might exist to be far from ʹsignificant and numerous,ʹ but rather insignificant and trivialʺ); accord Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1044 (noting thatʺtrivial inconsistencies that under the total circumstances have no bearing on a petitionerʹs veracity should not form the basis of an adverse credibility determinationʺ); Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 821 (7th Cir. 2007) (faulting IJ forʺfail[ing] to distinguish between material lies, on the one hand, and innocent mistakes, trivial inconsistencies, and harmless exaggerations, on the other handʺ).3

Second, although ʺ[a] lacuna in an applicantʹs testimony or omission in a document submitted to corroborate the applicantʹs testimony . . . can serve as a proper basis for an adverse credibility determination,ʺ Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166 n.3, we also recognize that ʺasylum applicants are not required to list every incident of persecution on their I–589 statement,ʺ Lianping Li v. Lynch, 839 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (quoting Pavlova, 441 F.3d at 90); see also Secaida‐Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 308 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that an applicantʹsʺfailure to list in his or her initial application facts that emerge later in testimony will not automatically provide a sufficient basis for an adverse credibility findingʺ), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; accord Pop v. INS, 270 F.3d 527, 531‐32 (7th Cir. 2001) (ʺWe hesitate to find that one seeking asylum must state in his or her application every incident of persecution lest the applicant have his or her credibility questioned if the incident is later elicited in direct testimony.ʺ); Abulashvili v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 2011). Because of this tension, although we have noted in dictum that an inconsistency and an omission are ʺfunctionally equivalentʺ for adverse credibility purposes, Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166 n.3, in generalʺomissions are less probative of credibility than inconsistencies created by direct contradictions in evidence and testimony,ʺ Lai v. Holder, 773 F.3d 966, 971 (9th Cir. 2014). Cf. Lianping Li, 839 F.3d at 150 (upholding adverse credibility determination where petitionerʹs ʺasylum application did not simply omit incidents of persecution. . . . [but rather] described the same incidents of persecution differentlyʺ).

An example of a trivial inconsistency that is entitled to little if any weight is the difference between Gaoʹs hearing testimony that he was interrogated by the police ʺfour timesʺ and his application statement that he was interrogated ʺseveral times.ʺ The BIA correctly held that this ʺdiscrepancyʺ did not support an adverse credibility determination. Likewise, the difference between September 1, 2010 and September 4, 2010 as the date when Shao contacted his cousin is a trivial discrepancy.

Although the federal evidentiary rules do not apply in immigration proceedings, Aslam v. Mukasey, 537 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), it is nonetheless instructive to analogize the use of omissions in adverse credibility determinations to the use of a witnessʹs prior silence for impeachment. In the latter context, we have indicated that ʺ[w]here the belatedly recollected facts merely augment that which was originally described, the prior silence is often simply too ambiguous to have any probative force, and accordingly is not sufficiently inconsistent to be admitted for purposes of impeachment.ʺ United States v. Leonardi, 623 F.2d 746, 756 (2d Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). In addition, the probative value of a witnessʹs prior silence on particular facts depends on whether those facts are ones the witness would reasonably have been expected to disclose. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239 (1980) (ʺCommon law traditionally has allowed witnesses to be impeached by their previous failure to state a fact in circumstances in which that fact naturally would have been asserted.ʺ(emphasis added)). In the immigration context, in assessing the probative value of the omission of certain facts, an IJ should consider whether those facts are ones that a credible petitioner would reasonably have been expected to disclose under the relevant circumstances.

Finally, the REAL ID Act requires IJs to evaluate each inconsistency or omission in light of the ʺtotality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors,ʺ8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). That requirement is consistent with our well‐established rule that review of an agencyʹs adverse credibility determination ʺis conducted on the record as a whole.ʺ Tu Lin, 446 F.3d at 402; see also Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (an applicantʹs testimony must be considered ʺin light of . . . the manner in which it hangs together with other evidenceʺ (citation omitted)); accord Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1040 (ʺ[T]he totality of the circumstances approach also imposes the requirement that an IJ not cherry pick solely facts favoring an adverse credibility determination while ignoring facts that undermine that result.ʺ). Thus, ʺan applicantʹs testimonial discrepancies ‐‐ and, at times, even outright lies ‐‐ must be weighed in light of their significance to the total context of his or her claim of persecution.ʺ Zhong v. U.S. Depʹt of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 127 (2d Cir. 2007). An IJ must also ʺʹengage or evaluateʹ an asylum applicantʹs explanations for apparent inconsistencies in the record.ʺ Diallo v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 624, 629 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Latifi, 430 F.3d at 105); see also Cao He Lin v. U.S. Depʹt of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 403 (2d Cir. 2005) (ʺAbsent a reasoned evaluation of [petitionerʹs] explanations, the IJʹs conclusion that his story is implausible was based on flawed reasoning and, therefore, cannot constitute substantial evidence supporting her conclusion.ʺ).

II. Application
In light of the foregoing principles, we conclude that in both cases, the IJs and the BIA erred by substantially relying on certain inconsistencies and omissions that had no tendency to show that petitioners fabricated their claims when considered in light of the totality of the circumstances and in the context of the record as a whole. Because we cannot confidently predict that the IJs would have adhered to their adverse credibility determinations absent these erroneous bases, we remand for further evaluation.

*******************************

So, while Jeff Sessions is busy with a “nuclear attack” on asylum law and Constitutional Due Process, some U.S. Immigration Judges and BIA Appellate Immigration Judges are equally busy just mis-applying well-established legal standards to screw asylum seekers.

Rather than looking at the record as a whole, as required by law, and giving asylum seekers the “benefit of the doubt,” too many Immigration Judges and BIA Judges are playing “gotcha” with the law — using minor or irrelevant variances in testimony or minor gaps in proof to justify bogus adverse credibility findings and asylum denials. Obviously, as backlogs stretch out, the problems inherent in “fly-specking” an applicant’s testimony about events many years in the past increases. That’s one of the reasons why Sessions’s insane bid to shove more properly administratively closed removal cases back onto “active dockets,” and to discourage the further removal of “low priority” cases from active dockets, is totally and intentionally destructive to an already failing court system.

The REAL ID ACT was effective in 2005, well over a decade ago. So, its proper application is not “rocket science.” It’s “Immigration Judging 101.”

Yet unfair applications of the law to wrongfully discredit and deny asylum seekers persists in the Immigration Courts and seems to breeze through at least some BIA “Panels” without critical review or analysis. I put “Panels” in quotes because all too often these days the appellate review is conducted by a “Panel of One” judge.

And since the BIA Appellate Immigration Judges now come almost exclusively from Government backgrounds, they are very likely to share some of the same “blind spots” as to the reality of presenting an affirmative asylum application in Immigration Court. If any of them have done it (and most haven’t), it was decades ago when conditions and the law were very different. They all too often draw inferences and reach conclusions that any competent immigration practitioner would know are way out of line with reality.

How are these endemic problems affecting fairness and Constitutional Due Process in the Immigration Courts, and potentially destroying and endangering lives of asylum applicants, solved by cranking up judicial productivity, trying to reverse long-standing precedents that aid asylum seekers pursuing legal protections, and making biased public anti-asylum statements? How is justice and Due Process served by gratuitously attacking immigration lawyers and disingenuously seeking to eliminate laws that provide the already meager and inadequate protections that asylum seekers now have? Yet this is precisely what Sessions’s program is!

The Immigration Court system needs reform to guarantee unbiased, high quality, fair treatment of asylum seekers and other individuals fighting for their very lives. Jeff Sessions is dedicated to the eradication of Due Process and turning the Immigration Courts into a “Death Railroad” for asylum seekers and other migrants. He must be stopped before he destroys our entire U.S. justice system — apparently his ultimate aim.

Join the New Due Process Army and stand up to Jeff Sessions and the other bullying, scofflaw, White Nationalists in the Trump Regime.

PWS

06-01-18

 

LAW YOU CAN USE: HON. DOROTHY HARBECK: “Objections in Immigration Court: Dost Thou Protest Too Much or Too Little?”

Objections in Immigration Court: Dost Thou Protest Too Much or Too Little?1

Hon. Dorothy Harbeck 2

5 Stetson J. Advoc. & L. 1 (2018)

I. Introduction

An objection is generally an expression or feeling of disapproval or opposition. In court, an objection is a reason for disagreeing with some introduction of evidence. 3  In most courts, the reasons and protocols for various objections are set forth in codified rules of evidence; however, the procedures in immigration courts are not so clearly defined since the Federal Rules of Evidence (F.R.E.) are not strictly applied in immigration courts. The rules of evidence applicable to criminal proceedings do not apply to removal hearings. Relevance and fundamental fairness are the only bars to admissibility of evidence in deportation cases. 4  Immigration courts are creatures of statute. They were created under the Immigration & Nationality Act (INA) as part of the Department of Justice (DOJ), specifically the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). The EOIR has a Practice Manual as well as guidance memoranda. 5  The trials are before the bench (with no jury) and a Digital Audio Recording (DAR) is made of the proceedings. Lawyers conduct direct and cross examinations and sometimes — but not often enough — make objections. The F.R.E. can provide some guidance in immigration court practice, although immigration proceedings are not bound by the strict rules of evidence. 6  The relevant F.R.E. citation for each objection has been included. Objections to questions must first be made at the trial court level, because if the objection is not made there, an argument based on that objection cannot be asserted on appeal. 7  In immigration court, as in other courts, evidentiary objections must be made in a timely fashion, and the grounds must, therefore, be identified with particularity. 8
The purpose of this article is to discuss verbal objections in immigration court removal/deportation proceedings. It is notan exhaustive and limiting list. It is merely a discussion of the main fourteen objections out of many potential objections that generally make the most sense in immigration court proceedings. This article does not include any objections based upon the potential mental capacity of a witness. The EOIR has extensive criteria for dealing with witnesses that exhibit such issues and that is well beyond the scope of this discussion. 9  Further, unlike many articles providing a “hip pocket” guide to objections at a trial court level, this article does not examine hearsay objections since hearsay is allowed in immigration court unless its use is fundamentally unfair. 10  The general rule with respect to evidence in immigration proceedings is that admissibility is favored, as long as the evidence is shown to be probative of relevant matters and its use is fundamentally fair so as not to deprive the alien of due process of law. 11
Since I was inspired to write this guide by the line from Shakespeare’s Hamlet where Queen Gertrude comments that a character in a play protests too much, I discuss each of the fourteen objections as though they were part of Shakespeare’s next best known medium, the fourteen line sonnet. 12  A Shakespearean sonnet has three four-line quatrains and then a two line “volta,” or twist, at the end. I have divided up three general groups of objections and saved the best two for the end.

II. The First Quatrain — Questions that Elicit an Organic Response

Argumentative

DISCUSSION: This is not an objection to opposing counsel making a good point. It should be used when the questioning attorney is not asking a question and is instead making an argument of law or application of law that should be argued in summation. It is only valid when the witness is not being asked a question that he or she can properly answer.
F.R.E. Reference: Argumentative (611(a))
RESPONSE: “Your Honor, I am testing the testimony of this witness.” 13

Form

DISCUSSION: An objection that the “form” is improper is a generalization; it is a sort of “catch-all” when the sense is that there is something wrong with a question. The objection is generally dealt with by a direction to counsel to rephrase. The best objections to “form” should state the specific issue.
RESPONSE: “Your Honor, may counsel be requested to inform the court in what specific way is the form of my question insufficient, so that I can remedy any problem?” (Then, when informed, restate the question to eliminate the bad form.)

Compound Question/Double Question

DISCUSSION: The question is really two questions posed as one. This objection should only be used when the question is misleading and the answer could be misconstrued by the jury.
F.R.E. Reference: Compound (611(a))
RESPONSE: Separate the question into the two parts.

Confusing/Vague/Ambiguous

DISCUSSION: Confusing/vague/misleading/ambiguous are all words that convey the objection that the question is not posed in a clear and precise manner so that the witness knows with certainty what information is being sought.
RESPONSE: “Your Honor, I can restate that question.”

Counsel is Testifying/Misstates Evidence/Misquotes Witness/Improper Characterization of Evidence

DISCUSSION: Basically, in immigration court, this is when a lawyer is leading his or her own witness on direct or deliberately misstating facts on cross. The immigration judge has inherent power to administer the trial so that it is fair. The value of making this objection is to both wake up the witness to pay attention and not mindlessly answer the question, and also to call the attention of the immigration judge to the fact that the earlier testimony was different.
RESPONSE: “Your Honor, it is not a misstatement, and certainly the court and jury have heard the evidence.” If the issue is counsel testifying, then, depending on the type of question, the best response is to revert back to non-leading who, what, where, when, how and why questions.

Narrative

DISCUSSION: This type of objection in immigration court is really only useful with expert witnesses. The point being that the immigration judge wants to hear from the respondent in a general narrative form, since so much of the respondent’s case will depend upon whether the immigration judge finds him or her credible. However, objecting to a long narrative by an expert witness has the advantage of preventing an expert witness or other verbally gifted witness from captivating the attention of the immigration judge.
RESPONSE: “Your Honor, this simply asks for a short description of the expert’s methodology.”

III. The Second Quatrain — Questions Based on What Has Happened in Court

Assumes Facts Not in Evidence

DISCUSSION: Facts which are not in evidence cannot be used as the basis of a question, unless the immigration judge allows the question “subject to later connecting up.” Generally, in the interest of good administration and usage of time, the immigration judge may allow the missing facts to be brought in later.
RESPONSE: “Your Honor, we will have those facts later in the case, but this witness is here now and it is the best use of time to ask that question now.”

Beyond The Scope of Direct/Cross/Redirect Examination

DISCUSSION: The testimony sought was not covered by the opposing counsel while questioning the witness and is not relevant to any of the previous issues covered. In the testimony of an expert, the scope of what is within the direct examination is not limited to the exact items the expert talked about. Because the expert is an expert in an entire field and is there to explain items in the field of endeavor, the scope of direct is usually understood to be everything in the expert’s field of knowledge that bears on the case in issue.
F.R.E. Reference: Beyond Scope (of Direct, Cross) (1002).
RESPONSE: “Your Honor, this is within the scope of the direct examination (cross-examination) because [explain].”

Speculative

DISCUSSION: The witness does not have first-hand knowledge of the fact about which he or she is testifying. Greater freedom is allowed with expert witnesses, but still the expert is limited by Rule 702 strictures. Expert witnesses are allowed in immigration court proceedings. 14
F.R.E. Reference: Speculation (602; 701)
RESPONSE: “Your Honor, this is an expert giving an expert opinion within the scope of her expertise.”

Foundation/Lack of Personal Knowledge

DISCUSSION: The predicate evidence has not been entered that would make this evidence admissible. This is a good objection to make when the evidence about to come in is objectionable in some way. The objecting attorney must identify what is necessary to correct the lack of foundation for the deponent to answer. 15  If the witness is a layperson, the usual foundation objection is a lack of showing that the witness has personal knowledge of the facts which the question seeks. If the witness is an expert, the usual foundation objection is a lack of showing that the expert is qualified to give the opinion sought. A (non-expert) witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but not must, consist of the testimony of the witness. With some qualifications, experts can testify to facts they used in their process of building an opinion, even if they do not have personal knowledge of the facts supporting the opinion.
F.R.E. Reference: Rule 602, 703; Lack of Foundation (602; 901(a))
RESPONSE: [Establish by preliminary questions that the person has actual personal knowledge.]

IV. The Third Quatrain — Imagery: Questions Based On Rules

Best Evidence Rule

“OBJECTION: Your Honor, this is not the best evidence. The original document is the best evidence.”
DISCUSSION: This objection can be used when the evidence being solicited is not the best source of the information. 16 It usually occurs when a witness is being asked a question about a document that is available to be entered into evidence. The document should be entered as proof of its contents. There are three aspects to the “Best Evidence Rule.” The first aspect is the one most often invoked: ordinarily a non-expert witness is not allowed to describe what is in a document without the document itself being introduced into evidence. Put the document into evidence first, and then have the lay witness talk about what is in it. The second aspect is requiring the original document to be introduced into evidence instead of a copy — if the original is available. Requiring the original document (the best evidence) to be available for examination insures that nothing has been altered in any way. The original document is not always available, especially in cases where a respondent may be fleeing persecution/prosecution. The third aspect is a summary of voluminous documents. The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation. The originals, or duplicates, shall be made available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and place. The court may order that they be produced in court.
F.R.E. Reference: Rules 1002, 1003, 1006.
RESPONSE: Dependent on the aspect of the Best Evidence rule involved in the objection: [Offer the document into evidence] [“Your Honor, this is admissible as a copy under Evidence Rule 1003”] [“Your Honor, this is a summary admissible under Evidence Rule 1006”].

Opinion

DISCUSSION: An improper lay (non-expert) opinion is when a witness is giving testimony that does not require an expertise, but is still an opinion that does not assist the jury in its understanding of the case. In regard to an expert, this objection is made to the competence of the expert due to the inability of the expert to pass the voir dire requirements for experts. If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical or other specialized expert knowledge.
F.R.E. Reference: Rule 701, 702.
RESPONSE to Objection Regarding Expert: “Your Honor, the witness is an expert and entitled to draw a conclusion.”

Privileged Communication

DISCUSSION: A privilege is a right of an individual not to testify.
Some general privileges are:
  • Attorney-Client 17
  • Attorney Work Product
  • Husband-Wife 18
  • Mental Health Records 19
  • Physician-Patient
  • Psychotherapist-Patient
RESPONSE: “Your Honor, the matter is not privileged because….”

Public Policy

DISCUSSION: The objection regarding public policy does not consist of an optional right of an individual not to testify. The objection based on public policy refers to a non-optional class of evidence that cannot be introduced, no matter that the person who holds the evidence wants to testify. Subjects forbidden by state and federal law are wide:
  • Medical Expense Payments. Evidence of the payment of medical expenses to show liability for negligence leading to the medical expenses is inadmissible.
  • Medical Review Records. Most states forbid discoverability or admissibility of the records of a medical review committee of a hospital. It is a legislative policy decision to promote the ability of a hospital to discover medical malpractice above that of the injured person to discover the malpractice.
  • Parole Evidence Rule. The “parole evidence rule” has long been a rule of law in the English speaking world. In the absence of fraud or mutual mistake, oral statements are not admissible to modify, vary, or contradict the plain terms of a valid written contract between two parties.
  • Witness is Attorney. Ethical rules prohibit a lawyer from serving simultaneously as a witness and an advocate. Generally, a party’s lawyer who attempts to testify is subject to having to choose between being a witness or continuing as a lawyer in a case.
F.R.E. Reference: 409
RESPONSE: [Depends on the statute or rule involved.]

V. The Couplet — The Volta: The Takeaway, Most Important Objections

Leading on Direct Examination

DISCUSSION: The question on direct suggests an answer. This is (1) not an objection on cross, and (2) actually allowed in some circumstances. The important factor is not whether the question is leading, irrelevant, or without foundation, but rather whether the answer would assist the immigration judge in formulating his or her opinion. The special inquiry officer should weigh this objective along with his obligation to keep the record within bounds when ruling upon objections made by either counsel for the alien or the trial attorney. 20  The problem with a leading question is that the question itself suggests the answer that the examiner wants to have. A leading question often, but not always, can be answered with a “yes.” To encourage witnesses telling facts in their own way, leading questions are not allowed on direct examination when an attorney is examining his/her own friendly or neutral witness. When an attorney has called a hostile witness (which may be someone other than the adverse party), leading questions are allowed in direct examination. Leading questions are always proper in cross-examinations.
F.R.E. Reference: Leading (611(c))
RESPONSE: “Your Honor, this question is only preliminary to move us quickly to the matters in issue.” OR “Your Honor, the witness is a hostile witness.” Depending on the type of question, the best response is often to revert back to non-leading who, what, where, when, how and why questions. 21

Rule 403 (Undue Waste of Time or Undue Prejudice/Immaterial/Irrelevant/Repetitive/Asked and Answered/Cumulative/Surprise)

DISCUSSION: The argument is that the evidence being introduced is highly prejudicial to your client and this prejudice far outweighs the probative value. An objectionable piece of evidence is one that not only hurts your case but is also not sufficiently relevant to the merits of your opponent’s case to be let in.
In immigration court, all relevant evidence should be admitted. 22  Determining “probative value” or “weight” is at the discretion of the immigration judge. 23  The amount of “unfair prejudicial effect” also is determined by the judge. The word “unfair” is the key. In determining whether to exclude evidence, immigration judges should give the evidence its maximum reasonable probative force and its minimum reasonable prejudicial value.
F.R.E. Reference: More Prejudicial Than Probative (401–403); Non-responsive (611a).
RESPONSE: “Your Honor, the exclusion of relevant evidence for unfairness is an extraordinary remedy. There is nothing unfair about this evidence.”
Do not be afraid to object in immigration court. The Federal Rules of Evidence are not strictly followed; however, evidence must be relevant and fundamentally fair. If the evidence is not, no protest is too much.

Footnotes

1 William Shakespeare, Gertrude to Hamlet, “The lady doth protest too much, methinks.”
2 Dorothy A. Harbeck is the Eastern Regional Vice President of the National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ). The views expressed here do not necessarily represent the official position of the United States Department of Justice, the Attorney General, or the Executive Office for Immigration Review. The views represent the author’s personal opinions, which were formed after extensive consultation with the membership of the NAIJ. This article is solely for educational purposes, and it does not serve to substitute for any expert, professional and/or legal representation and advice. Judge Harbeck is also an adjunct Professor of Law at Seton Hall University School of Law in trial skills.
7 See Matter of Edwards, 20 I. & N. Dec. 191, 196–197 n.4 (BIA 1990) (objections not lodged before the immigration judge are not appropriately raised first on appeal).
8 Thus, a party who fails to raise a timely and specific objection to the admission of evidence generally does not preserve such an objection as a ground for appeal. Matter of Lemhammad, 20 I. & N. Dec. 316, 325 (BIA 1991); see also Fed. Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1). See United States v. Adamson, 665 F. 2d 649, 660 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Arteaga-Limones, 529 F. 2d 1183, 1198 (5th Cir. 1976). See also 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(4) (the immigration judge shall “advise the respondent that he or she will have a reasonable opportunity to examine and object to the evidence against him or her.”).
13 The concept of suggesting a lawyer’s response to a judge after the judge has ruled on the objection was suggested to this author by the work of Leonard Bucklin from his Building Trial Notebooks series (James Publishing). Mr. Bucklin is a Felllow of the International Academy of Trial Lawyers, which attempts to identify the top 500 trial lawyers in the U.S. He served as a Director of the Academy from 1990 to 1996. He is also a member of the Million-Dollar Advocate’s Forum, which is limited to plaintiffs’ attorneys who have won million or multi-million dollar verdicts, awards, and settlements. On the other side of the table, Mr. Bucklin has been placed in Best’s Directory of Recommended Insurance Attorneys as a result of superior defense work and reasonable fees for over 35 insurers. His training materials have been used by the New Jersey Institute of Continuing Legal Education in basic skills classes.
14Matter of D-R-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 445 (BIA 2011). An expert witness is broadly defined as one who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education and who has specialized knowledge that will assist the immigration judge to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. The “spirit of Daubert” is applicable in immigration court. See Pasha v. Gonzales, 433 F. 3d 530 (7th Cir. 2005) (discussing the rubric of expert testimony and referencing the seminal expert report case under the Federal Rules of Evidence, Daubert v. Merrill Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993)). The immigration judge has the discretion to exclude expert testimony. Matter of V-K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 500, fn. 2 (BIA 2008); Akinfolarin v. Gonzales, 423 F. 3d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 2005).
16 In the Matter of M-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 484 (BIA 1953) (failure to produce reports of Communist Party activity made by the Government witness to the police department is not a violation of the best evidence rule where the sole issue is whether the respondent was a Communist Party member. Such reports did not create Communist Party membership but reflected the witness’s report of such membership; they were not used by the witness or the Government in the hearing; and there was no showing that they were relevant for the purpose of impeachment).
17 See generally Immigration Court Practice Manual, Chapter 2, Sec. 2.3(d); Matter of Velazquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 384(BIA 1986); Matter of Athanasopoulos, 13 I. & N. Dec. 827 (BIA 1971) (finding that attorney-client privilege was lost when the representative was in pursuit of a fraudulent claim); see also Ann Naffier, Attorney-Client Privilege for Non-Lawyers? A Study of Board of Immigration Appeals-Accredited Representatives, Prilege, and Confidentially, 59 Drake L. Rev. 584(2011).
18Matter of Gonzalez, 16 I. & N. Dec. 44 (BIA 1976); Matter of B-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 738 (BIA 1954).
19Matter of B-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 738 (BIA 1954). (The testimony of a physician of the United States Public Health Service in a deportation hearing is competent and not privileged since he is performing a duty provided by applicable law and regulations and the ordinary relationship of physician and patient does not exist).
21 Dorothy Harbeck, The Commonsense of Direct and Cross Examinations in Immigration Court, 304 New Jersey Law. Mag. (2017) (NAIJ capacity); Dorothy Harbeck, Terms so Plain and Firm as to Command Assent: Preparing and Conducting Optimal Direct Examination of the Respondent, Fed. Law. 13 (Jan./Feb. 2017) (primary author, NAIJ capacity).

Download PDF version
Download ePub version
Download Kindle version

********************************************

Thanks for sharing, Judge Harbeck.  “Good stuff” as usual! And, for those of you taking “Immigration Law & Policy” with me at Georgetown Law this summer, Judge Harbeck will be a “guest lecturer” at our June 14 class (along with Jones Day’s Worldwide Pro Bono Director Laura Tuell).

 

PWS

05-29-18

“GOOD ENOUGH FOR GOVERNMENT WORK” – 2d CIR. GIVES “CHEVRON DEFERENCE” TO BIA’S Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 516 (B.I.A. 2015) – Migrants Have No Right to Advance Notice Of Required Corroboration! – Wei Sun v. Sessions

CA2-WeiSunvSessions

Wei Sun v. Sessions, 2d Cir., 02-23-18, published

PANEL: LEVAL, LIVINGSTON, and CHIN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: Judge Chin

KEY QUOTE/SUMMARY:

Petitioner Wei Sun (“Sun”) seeks review of a June 26, 2015 decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying him asylum for religious persecution in China. Sun entered the United States on a visitor visa in 2007 and subsequently filed a timely application for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 and 1231(b)(3), respectively, and for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), see 8 C.F.R. § 208.16. The IJ and the BIA denied Sun’s petition on the ground that he failed to meet his burden of proof because of an absence of corroborating evidence.

The BIA interpreted the corroboration provision of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 303 (2005), as not requiring an IJ to give a petitioner specific notice of the evidence needed to meet his burden of proof, or to grant a continuance before ruling to give a petitioner an opportunity to gather corroborating evidence. On appeal, Sun argues that an IJ must give a petitioner notice and an opportunity to submit additional evidence when the IJ concludes that corroborating evidence is required, relying on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2011). We conclude that the REAL ID Act is ambiguous on this point, and that the BIA’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable and entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Accordingly, we deny the petition for review.

ANOTHER KEY QUOTE:

Moreover, the test is not whether the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation is plausible or “better” than the agency’s, as Sun suggests. Pet. Br. at 21. Rather, the test is whether the statute is “silent or ambiguous” and if so, then whether “‘the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute,’ which is to say, one that is ‘reasonable,’ not ‘arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.'” Riverkeeper Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 184 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44).

**********************************************

So, here’s what Chevron really says:

“As long as the agency has a minimally plausible interpretation, we couldn’t care less if it’s the best interpretation of the law.”

But, why shouldn’t high-ranking Federal Judges who are being paid to tell us what the law is be required to opine on what is the “best” interpretation? What are they being paid for? Sure sounds to me like a “doctrine of judicial task avoidance.” 

And, of course, given a choice of possible interpretations these days, the BIA almost invariably chooses that which is most favorable to DHS and least favorable to the respondent.

Why shouldn’t a respondent, particularly one seeking potentially life or death relief like asylum, have notice of what the Immigration Judge expects him to produce to corroborate his otherwise credible testimony? For Pete’s sake, even the “Legacy INS” and the USCIS, hardly bastions of due process, gave applicants for benefits the infamous “Notice of Intent to Deny” (“NID”) setting forth the evidentiary defects and giving the applicant an opportunity to remedy them before a final decision is made.  Seems like a combination of fundamental fairness and common sense.

There now is a conflict between the Ninth and Second Circuits, both of which get lots of Petitions to Review final orders of removal. Consequently, the issue is likely to reach the Supremes, sooner or later. Interestingly, Justice Gorsuch was a critic of Chevron deference, specifically in immigration cases, when he was on the 10th Circuit. We’ll see how he treats Chevron now that he is in a position to vote to modify or overrule it.

Here’s my previous post on Justice Gorsuch and Chevron:

https://wp.me/p8eeJm-eT

PWS

02-25-18

BIA PROVIDES FEEBLE GUIDANCE ON BORDER STATEMENTS — MATTER OF J-C-H-F-, 27 I&N DEC. 211(BIA 2018)! PLUS SPECIAL BONUS: MY “CRITICAL ANALYSIS!”

3915

Matter of J-C-H-F-, 27 I&N Dec. 211 (B IA 2018)

BIA HEADNOTE:

“When deciding whether to consider a border or airport interview in making a credibility determination, an Immigration Judge should assess the accuracy and reliability of the interview based on the totality of the circumstances, rather than relying on any one factor among a list or mandated set of inquiries.”

PANEL: BIA Appellate Immigration Judges MALPHRUS, CREPPY, and LIEBOWITZ

OPINION BY: JUDGE GARRY D. MALPHRUS

************************************************

MY ANALYSIS

  • Predictably, the respondent loses. Even though faulty analysis leading to unwarranted denial of asylum cases by the BIA and Immigration Judges is a recurring problem (see, e.g., Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, recent 4th Circuit, Blogged here  https://wp.me/p8eeJm-2aS), when was the last time the BIA explained how U.S. Immigration Judges should analyze and grant asylum? No, the BIA’s recent asylum jurisprudence is basically a one-sided “blueprint for denials that will pass appellate muster.” In reality, Due Process is supposed to be about protecting individuals (whether documented or undocumented) from Government overreach, not how to maximize DHS removals. But, you’d be hard pressed to get that from reading the BIA precedents.
  • What this decision really tells Immigration Judges: “Presume that sworn statements taken at the border are reliable. Feel free to use any inconsistencies against the asylum applicant. Go ahead and reject all efforts to explain. Deny the application based on credibility Don’t worry, we’ve ‘got your back’ on appeal.”
  • Even more seriously, although the BIA is supposed to  consider “all relevant factors,” the panel totally ignored strong, impartial, widely disseminated evidence that statements taken at the border on Form I-867A are highly unreliable. Not only that, but such evidence is in the public realm and in fact was actually presented at EOIR training conferences at which Board Judges and staff were present!
  • Let’s reprIse a recent article by Hon. Jeffrey Chase, who was both an Immigration Judge and a BIA Attorney Adviser:”

In August 2016 I [Judge Chase] organized and moderated the mandatory international religious freedom training panel at the immigration judges’ legal training conference in Washington, D.C.  One of the panelists from the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (“USCIRF”) informed me of a just-published report she had co-authored. The report, titled Barriers to Protection: The Treatment of Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal, is the follow-up to a 2005 study by USCIRF of the treatment of arriving asylum seekers in their interactions with the various components of DHS and the Department of Justice involved in the expedited removal process.  What jumped out at me from the report was the first key recommendation to EOIR: “Retrain immigration judges that the interview record created by CBP is not a verbatim transcript of the interview and does not document the individual’s entire asylum claim in detail, and should be weighed accordingly.”

The new report referenced the Commission’s 2005 findings, which it described as “alarming.”  The earlier study found that “although they resemble verbatim transcripts, the I-867 sworn statements” taken from arrivees by agents of DHS’s Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”) component “were neither verbatim nor reliable, often indicating that information was conveyed when in fact it was not and sometimes including answers to questions that were never asked.  Yet immigration judges often used these unreliable documents against asylum seekers when adjudicating their cases.”

The 2016 report found similar problems with the airport statements taken a decade later.  The study found the use of identical answers by CBP agents in filling out the form I-867 “transcript,” including clearly erroneous answers (i.e. a male applicant purportedly being asked, and answering, whether he was pregnant, and a four year old child purportedly stating that he came to the U.S. to work).  For the record, USCIRF is a bipartisan organ of the federal government.  So this is a government-issued report making these findings.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has long recognized the problems inherent in the reliability of airport statements.  In Ramseachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 179 (2d Cir. 2004), the Second Circuit held that “a record of the interview that merely summarizes or paraphrases the alien’s statements is inherently less reliable than a verbatim account or transcript.”  The court determined that the airport statement in that case bore “hallmarks of reliability, as it is typewritten, signed by Ramseachire, and initialed on each page.  The record also indicates that he was given the opportunity to make corrections to the transcription.”

But was that truly the case?  The USCIRF study (the first of which was published a year after the Ramseachire decision) shows that the Second Circuit’s reliance may have been misplaced.  The USCIRF researchers found instances in which the statement was not read back; when asked, a CBP agent stated “that he only reads back the contents if the interviewee requests it because it takes too long, and that the interviewee initialing each page only indicates that s/he received a copy of that page.”

As noted in the USCIRF study, the problems with airport statements go beyond merely summarizing or paraphrasing, to include actual misstatements and omissions.  But the I-867 statements as prepared by the CBP agents give the appearance of being verbatim transcripts, and further claim to contain multiple safeguards to guarantee their accuracy which, pursuant to the findings of the USCIRF studies, may not have actually been employed.  And based upon the appearance of those safeguards, immigration judges have relied on the contents of these statements to reach adverse credibility findings that result in the denial of asylum.  And as in Ramseachire, many of those credibility findings are being affirmed on appeal.

This is not to say that all airport statements are unreliable.  But the point is that, as in Ramseachire, courts see something that looks like a verbatim transcript, see additional signs that safeguards were employed to ensure accuracy, and as a result, afford the document more evidentiary weight than it might actually deserve.  Under such circumstances, an immigration judge might reasonably rely on an airport statement purporting that the respondent had stated he came to the U.S. to work when in fact, he or she said no such thing.  And the judge might discredit the respondent’s denial of such statement when the words are recorded in a seemingly verbatim transcript bearing the respondent’s signature and initials which says it was read back to him and found accurate.

Attorneys and immigration judges should therefore be aware of the report and its findings.  The link to the report is:  https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Barriers%20To%20Protection.pdf

 

Border Patrol agents claim that a 3-year-old boy said the reason he came to the United States was to look for work, thus making it easier for the undocumented immigrant to be deported.

The boy, hailing from Honduras and identified in court documents as Y.F., was allegedly interviewed in the summer of 2014 by Border Patrol agents trying to determine if immigrants had a credible fear of harm or death if they returned to their home countries. Those who claim such fear—and can prove it—have a shot at getting asylum in the United States, while those who say they came looking for work are most often deported.

Agents interviewed Y.F. and wrote on the appropriate form that he said he was looking for work. A brief (pdf) filed by the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) with the Justice DepartmentBoard of Immigration Appeals points out the unlikelihood of that being true. “Y-F-’s interview, so painstakingly transcribed, sworn, signed and counter-signed, almost certainly never happened in the format in which it was memorialized. The impossibility of the interview, in spite of the DHS officers’ affirmations of veracity and the rule of government regularity is plain on the face of the writings themselves: Y-F- was three years old at the time he was interrogated,” the brief said.

AILA says that information on those forms, I-867 A/B, “are not inherently reliable because they often contain fake responses, do not accurately reflect testimony presented, and were almost always created under coercive conditions,” according to AILA.

The case of Y.F. isn’t unique. Earlier this year, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) argued that a particular undocumented immigrant should be deported because she came to the United States to find work in Dodge City, Kansas, according to Elise Foley of Huffington Post. The immigrant was 11 days old at the time.

The case against the infant girl was thrown out because her mother claimed the baby was born in the United States. The boy, now 4, has been living in a detention center in Texas for a year. He has been approved for release, but his mother has not, so he remains in detention.

Maybe he can apply for a work release.

  • Let’s see what else the BIA Judges “blew by” in J-C-H-F-.
    • The Border Patrol agent acted as the Spanish interpreter. Interpretation is a professional job. It’s different from being “bilingual.” Indeed, at one past ImmigratIon Judge Conference, we actually received a graphic demonstration from the EOIR Interpretation Staff of how and why being bilingual wouldn’t necessarily qualify someone to interpret accurately in a legal setting! In one ear, out the other, I guess. The BIA gives no explanation of how and why a Border Patrol Agent would be qualified to interpret accurately.
    • Yeah, but the BIA says it’s all OK because the respondent “understands English.” I probably “understand” German. If you said something slowly and clearly to me in German I probably could “get the gist” and say “Ja,” “Nein,” or “Nicht Verstehen.” But, would that mean I really understood what was going on? Highly unlikely!
    • There is a body of evidence out there that asylum applicants are often traumatized as well as afraid of figures of authority such as “border police.” That can have something do with border statements. Indeed this respondent made such a claim. But, the panel simply blew it off, saying that the respondent was offered an opportunity to speak “confidentially with an officer.” How would that address trauma and fear of authorities? The BIA never tells us.
    • The BIA reassures us that the statement is reliable because it “contains a detailed recitation of the questions and answers relating to the applicant’s claim, including the purpose of his visit, the length of his stay, and the issue whether he feared any harm if returned to Mexico.” Yet these are the very aspects of the I-867 that the USCIRF has said are often inaccurate, manipulated, or outright falsified. 
  • The BIA could have selected as a precedent a case that illustrated the inherent shortcomings of the Form I-867 and why they should be viewed critically by Immigration Judges with at least a degree of skepticism, if not an outright presumption of unreliability.  The BIA could further have used such a decision as a forum to demand that the DHS show what steps it has taken to address the problems discovered by the USCIRF and to improve the process for insuring accuracy of border statements if they want them treated with a “presumption of reliability” in Immigration Court.
  • Instead, the BIA once again “stuck its collective head in the sand” and ignored the real due process, fairness, and integrity problems plaguing our asylum adjudication system at all levels!
  • We can only hope that some independent Court of Appeals will take a more critical and objective look at the “border statement issue” than the BIA has chosen to do in J-C-H-F.
  • I also hope that in the future, respondents’ counsel make better use of readily available public materials to challenge over-reliance on border statements than apparently was done in this case.

PWS

02-22-18

 

 

AILA URGES CONGRESS TO CREATE INDEPENDENT ARTICLE I U.S. IMMIGRATION COURT TO REPLACE CURRENT DUE PROCESS TRAVESTY! – “In fact, instead of working to improve the system, DOJ recently announced initiatives that severely jeopardize an immigration judge’s ability to remain independent and impartial. These new policies are designed only to accelerate deportations, further eroding the integrity of the court system.”

RESOLUTION ON IMMIGRATION COURT REFORM AILA Board of Governors Winter 2018

PROPONENT: AILA Executive Committee and AILA EOIR Liaison Committee

Introduction:

Our immigration court system does not meet the standards which justice demands. Chronic and systemic problems have resulted in a severe lack of public confidence in the system’s capacity to deliver just and fair decisions in a timely manner. As a component of the Department of Justice (DOJ), EOIR has been particularly vulnerable to political pressure. Immigration judges, who are currently appointed by the Attorney General and are DOJ employees, have struggled to maintain independence in their decision making. In certain jurisdictions, the immigration court practices and adjudications have fallen far below constitutional norms. Years of disproportionately low court funding levels – as compared to other components of the immigration system such as ICE and CBP – have contributed to an ever-growing backlog of cases that is now well over 600,000.

Despite the well-documented history of structural flaws within the current immigration court system, DOJ and EOIR have failed to propose any viable plan to address these concerns. In fact, instead of working to improve the system, DOJ recently announced initiatives that severely jeopardize an immigration judge’s ability to remain independent and impartial. These new policies are designed only to accelerate deportations, further eroding the integrity of the court system.

RESOLUTION: The Board hereby reaffirms and clarifies its position on immigration court reform as follows:

In its current state, the immigration court system requires a complete structural overhaul to address several fundamental problems. AILA recommends that Congress create an independent immigration court system in the form of an Article I court, modeled after the U.S. Bankruptcy Court. Such an entity would protect and advance America’s core values of fairness and equality by safeguarding the independence and impartiality of the immigration court system.

Below is an outline of the basic features that should be included in the Article I court.

Independent System: Congress should establish an immigration court system under Article I of the Constitution, with both trial and appellate divisions, to adjudicate immigration cases.

This structural overhaul advances the immigration court’s status as a neutral arbiter, ensuring the independent functioning of the immigration judiciary.

Appellate Review:

AILA recommends that the new Article I court system provide trial level immigration courts and appellate level review, with further review to the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court. To prevent overburdening Article III courts, it is necessary to include an appellate court within the Article I court system.

Judicial Appointment Process:

AILA recommends the appointment of trial-level and appellate-level judges for a fixed term of no less than 10 years, with the possibility of reappointment. These judges would be appointed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the federal circuit in which the immigration court resides. The traditional Article I judicial appointment process, which relies on Presidential appointment with Senate confirmation, would be unworkable for the immigration court system and could easily create a backlog in judicial vacancies. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court system, which uses a different appointment process than other Article I courts, is a better model for the immigration court system, due to the comparable size and the volume of cases. Like the U.S. Bankruptcy Court System, which has 352 judges, the immigration court currently has over 300 judges. Traditional Article I courts have far fewer judges than that of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court System. Therefore, AILA recommends a judicial appointment system that closely resembles that of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court.

Hiring Criteria for Judges:

Trial and appellate judges that are selected should be highly qualified, and well-trained, and should represent diverse backgrounds. In addition to ensuring racial ethnic, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, disability, religious, and geographic diversity, AILA advocates for a recruitment and selection process that is designed to ensure that the overall corps of immigration judges is balanced between individuals with a nongovernment, private sector background, and individuals from the public sector. We believe this balance best promotes the development of the law in the nation’s interest.

****************************************

Read the complete report here:

AILA Resolution Passed 2.3.2018

The proposal that U.S. Immigration Judges be appointed by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for renewable 10 year terms is particularly salutary. The current process needs to be professionalized and de-politicized. The U.S. Courts of Appeals are the “primary professional consumers” of the work product of the U.S. Immigration Judges. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court Appointment System recommended by AILA has earned high praise for producing  a fair, impartial, merit-based, apolitical judiciary.

The current ridiculous selection and appointment process within the DOJ has two stunning deficiencies.

First, it has become an “insider-only” judiciary. Over the past three Administrations nearly 90% of the newly appointed U.S. Immigration Judges have been from government backgrounds, primarily DHS/ICE prosecutors. Outside expertise, including that gained from representing individuals in Immigration Court, clinical teaching, and working for NGOs and pro bono groups has been systematically excluded from the Immigration Court judiciary, giving it a built-in “one-sided” appearance.

Remarkably, the situation at the appellate level, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) has been even worse! No Appellate Immigration Judge/Board Member has been appointed from “outside Government” since 2000, and both of those have long since been removed or otherwise moved on.

Indeed, even sitting (as opposed to “administrative”) U.S. Immigration Judges are seldom appointed or even interviewed for BIA vacancies. There is only one current Appellate Immigration Judge who was appointed directly from the trial court, and that individual had only a modest (approximately three years) amount of trial experience. Thus, a number of sources of what would logically be the most expert and experienced appellate judicial candidates have been systematically excluded from the appointment process at the DOJ.

Second, while the results produced are highly problematic, the DOJ hiring process for U.S. Immigration Judges has been amazingly glacial! According to the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) the Immigration Judge appointment process during the last Administration took an average of two years! That’s longer than the Senate confirmation process for Article III Judges!

Much of the delay has reportedly been attributed to the slowness of the “background check process.” Come on man! Background checks are significant, but are essentially ministerial functions that can be speeded up at the will of the Attorney General.

It’s not like Eric Holder, Loretta Lynch, or Jeff Sessions were willing to wait two years for background clearance for their other high-level appointees in the DOJ. No, it’s simply a matter of screwed up priorities and incompetence at the highest levels of the DOJ. And, let’s not forget that most of the appointees are already working for the DHS or the DOJ. So they currently have high-level background clearances that merely have to be “updated.”

It should be “child’s play” — a “no-brainer.” When Anthony C. “Tony” Moscato was the Director and Janet Reno was the Attorney General, background checks often were completed for Immigration Judges and BIA Members in less than 60 days. And, if Tony really needed someone on board immediately, he picked up the phone, called “downtown,” and it happened. Immediately! Competence and priorities!

Our oldest son Wick has been private bar member of the U.S. Magistrate Judge Recommendation Committee for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Their process was much more open, timely, and merit-focused than the current DOJ hiring process (whatever that might actually be) and fairly considered candidates from both inside and outside government.

Also, the slowness of the background check process unfairly prejudices “outside applicants.” Sure, it’s annoying for a “Government insider” to have to wait for clearance. But, his or her job and paycheck continue without problem during the process.

On the other hand, “outside applicants” have to make “business decisions,” — whether to take on additional employees or accept new clients; whether to commit to another year of teaching; whether to accept promotions, etc — that can be “deal breakers” as the process creeps along without much useful feedback from EOIR.

Attorney General Sessions has  claimed that he has a “secret process” for expediting appointments. But, so far, except for a “brief flurry” of appointments that were reportedly “already in  the pipeline” under Lynch, there hasn’t been much noticeable change in the timelines. Additionally, the process is often delayed because DOJ and EOIR have not planned adequately, and therefore have not acquired adequate space and equipment for new judges to actually start hearing cases.

Government bureaucrats love acronyms (so do I, in case you hadn’t noticed)! There is only one acronym that can adequately capture the current sorry state of administration of the U.S Immigration Courts under DOJ and EOIR administration: “FUBAR!”

And that’s without even getting to the all-out assault on Due Process for vulnerable respondents in the U.S. Immigration Courts being carried out by Jeff Sessions and his minions. According to my information, DOJ/EOIR “management” is pushing Immigration Judges to render twenty-minute “oral decisions;” complete “quotas” of 4-5 cases a day to get “satisfactory” ratings; and not include bond cases, administrative closure, Change of Venue, Credible Fear Reviews, or Motion to Reopen rulings in completions.

Since it takes an experienced Immigration Judge 3-4 hours to do a good job on a “fully contested” asylum decision with oral decision, that’s a “designed to fail” proposal that will undoubtedly lead to cutting of corners, numerous denials of Due Process, and remands from the U.s. courts of Appeals. But despite some disingenuous “rote references” to Due Process, it’s not even an afterthought in Sessions’s plan to turn Immigration Court into “Just Another Whistle Stop on The Deportation Railroad.”

As I say, “Bad ideas never die; they have a life of their own within the bureaucracy.” That’s why we need to get Immigration Courts out of the bureaucracy!
This Congress, which “can barely even tie its own  shoes,” so to speak, isn’t likely to get around to creating an Article I Immigration Court. But, every day that the current mal-administered and unfair  system remains within the DOJ is a Due Process and fairness disaster. That’s something that even Congress should be concerned about!   
Thanks to Attorney (and former Immigraton Judge) Sue Roy of New Jersey for  sending me the AILA Resolution.

PWS

02-07-18

 

 

 

WASHINGTON POST: “DEATH PENALTY IN TRAFFIC COURT” — BIG STAKES, LITTLE COURTS, FLAWED PROCEDURES, IMPROPER POLITICAL INFLUENCE, SOME JUDGES WHO FAIL TO PROTECT INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS LEAD TO LIFE-THREATENING ERRORS ON A DAILY BASIS IN OVERWHELMED U.S. IMMIGRATION COURTS. — What If YOU or YOUR Loved Were On Trial In This Godforsaken Corner Of Our Justice System Controlled By Jeff “Gonzo Aocalypto” Sessions!

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-mexican-journalists-life-hangs-in-the-balance/2017/12/11/9783ab1a-deac-11e7-8679-a9728984779c_story.html

The WashPost Editorial Board writes:

“As he awaits his fate in a remote Texas jail, Mr. Gutierrez, 54, remains convinced of the peril he faces if deported to his native country. “My life depends on this [appeal],” he said by telephone in a news conference organized Monday by the National Press Club. “I’m terrified to set foot in Mexico.”

The judge who denied asylum in the case, Robert S. Hough, pointed to an absence of documentary and testimonial corroboration of Mr. Gutierrez’s claim. The woman who relayed word of the alleged death threat did not come forward; neither did Mr. Gutierrez’s former boss at the newspaper for which he worked in Chihuahua. Much of Mr. Gutierrez’s case comes down to his word.

Nonetheless, the judge’s cut-and-dried application of the law fails to take into account conditions in Mexico generally and the peril faced there by journalists in particular. It’s not surprising that Mr. Gutierrez cannot recover copies of his articles, written more than a decade ago for a regional newspaper. Nor is it unusual that witnesses are reluctant to come forward, given the fear with which many Mexicans regard the security forces.

As a U.N. report published this month concluded, citing the deaths, disappearances and attacks on dozens of journalists tallied by Mexico’s Human Rights Commission, “The data . . . presents a picture for the situation of journalists in Mexico that cannot be described as other than catastrophic.” Against that background, it seems cavalier to dismiss the threat Mr. Gutierrez faces should he be deported to Mexico. He should be granted asylum.”

*********************************

Read the complete Editorial at the link.

Unfortunately, a “cut and dried application of the law” without proper regard to the facts or reality is a disturbingly accurate snapshot of what all too often happens daily in our Immigration Courts, a “wholly owned subsidiary” of the US Department of Justice and part of the “Trump Conglomerate” (formerly known as the US Government).

Our failing US Immigration Court system and its aggravation by AG “Gonzo Apocalypto’s” oft-expressed hostility to immigrants, asylum, the rule of law (except his 1950s “Jim Crow” views on the law and how it should be a tool for injustice and advancing White Nationalism), lawyers, Latinos, Mexicans, and the press has become an almost daily topic for major editorial boards. At least someone (other than me) is watching and documenting as this mockery of American justice unfolds before us.

In particular, too many U.S. Immigration Judges are tone-deaf to Mexican asylum claims, not wanting to be accused of “opening the floodgates” ( a concept that is nowhere to be found in the actual law) and knowing that “Gonzo” wants lots of  “quick removals” rather than asylum grants.  Additionally, the only administrative check on the Immigration Judges’ authority is a weak Appeals Board that never “calls out” overly restrictive Immigration Judges by name and seldom publishes precedents granting asylum. Truly, a prescription for a “Due Process Disaster!”

Judge Hough seems to have forgotten that under the law:

  • ”Corroborating evidence” can only be required if it is “reasonably available;”
  • Testimony may be corroborated by country condition information describing the same abuses that the applicant claims;
  • The standard for granting asylum is a  generous “well-founded fear” or “reasonable likelihood” of future harm which can be “significantly less than probable — as little as a 10% chance can suffice;
  • Asylum applicants are supposed to be given the “benefit of the doubt” in recognition of the evidentiary challenges of providing proof of persecution and the difficulties of relating traumatic events in the past.

It remain to be seen whether the Board of Immigration Appeals, EOIR’s “Appellate Court,” will correct Judge Hough’s life-threatening errors and, further, issue a strong precedent on asylum for foreign journalists (traditionally one of the most vulnerable and persecuted groups) to prevent further miscarriages of Justice such as this. Such a precedent would also discourage the DHS from continuing to abuse our system by pushing for removal (and needless detention) in cases such as this where a grant of asylum at the DHS  Asylum Office or at the hearing following the testimony would be the correct result.

Or, will the next major editorial describe and decry Mr. Gutierrez’s death in Mexico!

In a well-functioning justice system, this case should have been a “Short-docket, No-brainer Grant.” But, Gonzo Apocalypto seeks to use the US Immigration Courts as an extension of DHS enforcement rather than, as they were intended, as Courts guaranteeing fairness, Due Process, and equal justice for all! We need change. Lots of it!

[NOTE: For those interested, Judge Hough apparently has not decided enough asylum cases on the merits in El Paso to be listed on the statistical profile of asylum outcomes maintained by TRAC Immigration.]

PWS

12-12-17

 

US IMMIGRATION COURTS MAKE DEADLY MISTAKES: 6th CIRCUIT STOPS BIA, IJ, DHS FROM APPLYING WRONG STANDARDS TO SEND JORDANIAN WOMAN BACK TO TORTURE AND HONOR KILLING! — KAMAR V. SESSIONS, 6th CIR., PUBLISHED — While Sessions Babbles On With False Anti-Asylum Narrative & Bogus Need To Deport Law-Abiding Long-Time US Residents, He Administers a “Court System” That Denies Constitutional Due Process & Ignores Correct Legal Standards In Life Or Death Cases!

17a0260p-06

Kamar v. Sessions, 11-17-17, published

PANEL: MERRITT, MOORE, ROGERS, CIRCUIT JUDGES

OPINION: JUDGE MERRITT

KEY QUOTES:

“We now address, under the substantial evidence standard, the question of whether Kamar will be persecuted by threat of death if she returns to Jordan, which is relevant to both withholding under the Act and relief under the Convention. Kamar testified at the merits hearing that her cousins, specifically Alias, want to restore their family’s honor by killing her, and her sister confirmed this. She knows this because of letters she received and communications with family and friends. The Board expressly found Kamar to be credible. On remand, the IJ concluded the letter from Alias was not credible and did not facially threaten Kamar. The IJ reasoned that even if it was credible, there was no indication that Alias knew that Kamar had gotten married and might not want to kill her anymore. The IJ found that the intent to kill Kamar was expressed only through an “ambiguous” comment in the letter from Kamar’s mother. The Board agreed that Kamar did not establish that her fear of persecution was objectively reasonable. The probability of harm occurring in these cases is an inference based on facts in the record. Considering the evidence, it is hard to reconcile these findings with the Board’s conclusion that even if Kamar had a subjective fear of persecution, this fear was not objectively reasonable. There is nothing to cast doubt on Kamar’s testimony. Even if the letter from Alias is not considered, the letter from Kamar’s mother states that Alias wishes to kill Kamar even if it is his last act on earth, and credible testimony confirms this. Nothing indicates that Alias does not still intend to carry out the honor killing. Both Kamar and her sister testified that it did not matter that Kamar married her second husband because Alias knows that she had sexual relations outside of marriage and believes that she committed adultery. The record overwhelming supports the finding that she will be persecuted if she returns.

Finally, we consider whether the Jordanian government would be “unwilling or unable” to protect Kamar from harm. In the country reports in the record, it has been established that governors in Jordan routinely abuse the law and use imprisonment to protect potential victims of honor crimes. These victims are not released from imprisonment unless the local governor consents, the victim’s family guarantees the victim’s safety, and the victim consents. One non-governmental organization has provided a temporary, unofficial shelter as an alternative.

On the other hand, successful perpetrators of honor killings typically get their sentences greatly reduced. Additionally, if the victim’s family, who is usually the family of the alleged perpetrator as well, does not bring the charges, the government dismisses the case. See also Sarhan, 658 F.3d at 657 (“After reviewing the evidence of the Jordanian government’s treatment of honor crimes, we conclude that . . . the government is ineffective when it comes to providing protection to women whose behavior places them in the group who are threatened with honor killings.”).

The Board’s decision outlined the Jordanian government’s efforts to combat honor crimes, including placing potential victims in “protective custody.” As the Ninth Circuit concluded in an analogous case, “This observation omits the fact that such protective custody is involuntary, and often involves extended incarceration in jail.” Suradi v. Sessions, No. 14-71463, 2017 WL 2992234, at *2 (9th Cir. July 14, 2017). While victim protection is necessary, incarceration is an insufficient solution. This practice is akin to persecuting the victim as she “must choose between death and an indefinite prison term.” Sarhan, 658 F.3d at 659. Further, nothing in the record suggests that the country conditions in Jordan have changed such that the government will be able to adequately protect Kamar from being killed. This showing satisfies both of the standards for finding governmental action for purposes of withholding of removal under the Act and also those for protection under the Convention, as it amounts to “pain or suffering” that is inflicted with the acquiescence of a public official or a person acting in an official capacity.

We do not address whether Kamar can safely relocate to escape persecution, which is also relevant to withholding of removal and protection under the Convention. The Board did not mention relocation, and the parties’ briefs do not address the issue. Like the particular social group inquiry, the issue of safe relocation must be addressed in the first instance by the Board. Gonzales v. Thomas, supra.

Substantial evidence does not support the Board’s refusal to find that Kamar will probably be persecuted if she is returned to Jordan, due to her membership in the particular social group we discussed, or that the Jordanian government can or will do nothing to help her. The Board’s decision with regard to those issues is reversed.

. . . .

The Seventh Circuit has found that the Jordanian government’s “solution” to protect honor killing victims is actually a form of punishing the victims of these crimes amounting to mental “pain or suffering,” which is “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1); see Sarhan, 658 F.3d at 659. Taking into account our reasoning and findings above on the factors relating to both withholding of removal under the Act and protection under the Convention, we agree that “[d]espite the contrary conclusion of the Immigration Judge and the Board, the record here also compels the conclusion that the government of Jordan acquiesces to honor killings.” Suradi, 2017 WL 2992234, at *1.

Given the likelihood that Kamar would be subject to involuntary imprisonment at the hands of the Jordanian authorities, resulting in mental pain and suffering, the Board erred in concluding that Kamar failed to establish that it was more likely than not that she would be tortured upon removal to Jordan. We grant the petition with respect to the Board’s reasoning under the Convention.“

*************************

This should have been an easy withholding grant by the Immigration Judge. Indeed, the 6th Circuit characterized the evidence of persecution as “overwhelming.”

Instead the BIA and the Immigration Judge spent literally years passing the case back and forth and still got it wrong! No wonder the system is backlogged when judges at both the trial and appellate levels get the law requiring protection wrong time after time! How would an unrepresented individual have any chance of vindicating her rights in a system this complicated and screwed up! Skewing the system as this Administration has done to make it more difficult for individuals to get effective representation is a direct attack on due process.

Instead of making a conscientious effort to fix this system to provide due process, Sessions’s clear xenophobia and his anti-immigrant, anti-refugee rants encourage  Immigration Judges and BIA Appellate Judges to treat asylum applicants unfairly and misapply the law to deny protection.

There will be no true due process and justice for migrants until the politicized DOJ and this highly biased Attorney General are removed from control of our US Immigration Court system! How would YOU like to be on trial for your life in a court system controlled by Jeff Sessions?

PWS

11-18-17

ASYLUM: LAW YOU CAN USE: All-Star Professor Michele Pistone Of Villanova Law Writes & Directs “Must See TV” — “Best Practices in Representing Asylum Seekers”

Go on over to Dan Kowalski’s LexisNexis Immigration Community here for all the links to the 19-part series on You Tube made possible by the American Law Institute with an introduction by none other than Justice Sandra Day O’Connor:

https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/immigration-law-blog/archive/2017/11/16/video-series-best-practices-in-representing-asylum-seekers.aspx?Redirected=true

Thanks, Michele, for all you do for the cause of Due Process for migrants and better Immigration Court practices!

PWS

11-17-17

 

SESSIONS DEFENDS FAULTY MEMORY, BUT “AYATOLLAH ROY” – NOT SO MUCH!

http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-pol-sessions-russia-hearing-20171114-story.html

Joseph Tanfani and Cathleen Decker report for the LA Times:

“Atty. Gen. Jeff Sessions repeatedly denied Tuesday that he deliberately misled or lied to Congress about the Trump campaign’s multiple contacts with Russia, saying he forgot that two aides told him about their meetings with Russian government officials during the 2016 race.

In an often-contentious House Judiciary Committee hearing, Sessions sparred for more than five hours with Democrats, who faulted him for changing his story each time he has testified under oath before Congress, and some Republicans, who pushed him to appoint a second special counsel to investigate Hillary Clinton.

Sessions grew visibly angry at times, insisting again and again that he “always told the truth” as he recalled it, even as he confirmed for the first time that an aide offered to help arrange a meeting between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin last March. Sessions said he “pushed back” against the offer.

“In all of my testimony, I can only do my best to answer all of your questions as I understand them and to the best of my memory,” he said.

“But I will not accept, and reject accusations, that I have ever lied,” he added. “That is a lie.”

The nationally-televised hearing was the latest sign of how last year’s bitter presidential campaign has yet to recede. Harsh questions about the Democratic nominee’s alleged misdeeds collided with national security concerns of whether President Trump’s current or former aides helped Russia meddle in an American election — the focus of a special counsel investigation led by former FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III.

Sessions held firm against Republicans who pressed him to swiftly appoint another special counsel to focus on Clinton. Senior prosecutors at the Justice Department were reviewing the record and it would “be done without political influence,” he said.

After Rep. Jim Jordan (R-Ohio) laid out a long list of allegations that he said indicated wrongdoing, Sessions responded sharply. “I would say ‘looks like’ is not enough basis to appoint a special counsel,” he said.

Rep. John Conyers of Michigan, the House committee’s top Democrat, said the allegations against Clinton — which chiefly involve her use of a private email server as secretary of State, fundraising for the Clinton Foundation, and an Obama administration decision in 2010 to approve sales of uranium to a Russian company — have been “carefully examined and completely debunked” and said the threat of jailing political opponents after an election is something that would happen in “a banana republic.”

The often testy back-and-forth on Russia largely echoed Sessions’ three previous appearances on Capitol Hill this year, creating more heat than light as lawmakers confronted Sessions with his previous statements and other evidence that contradicted his claims, and the attorney general insisting he did “not recall” dozens of times in response.

“I have been asked to remember details from a year ago, such as who I saw on what day, in what meeting, and who said what when,” he said.

He blamed his faulty memory on the political and organizational maelstrom of Trump’s insurgent presidential campaign. The four-term senator from Alabama joined Trump’s side early on and became his top foreign policy advisor.

“It was a brilliant campaign in many ways,” he said. “But it was a form of chaos every day from Day One. We traveled all the time, sometimes to several places in one day. Sleep was in short supply.”

. . . .

Rep. Karen Bass (D-Los Angeles) challenged Sessions to explain an FBI report made public in October that said “black identity extremists” were intent on killing law enforcement officers. She said all the groups named were from decades ago, and asked him if any such groups existed today. He said he did not know of any.

He said he was aware of no similar report on white extremist groups, such as the white supremacists who rallied in Charlottesville, Va., in August. Later, he said he did not have a senior staff member who is African American, and said Trump has appointed just one African American as a U.S. attorney.

Sessions also declined to defend Roy Moore, the Republican candidate in the special election to decide Sessions’ old Senate seat in Alabama. Moore now faces charges of being a serial predator of teenage girls, with five women coming forward to describe their encounters.

“I have no reason to doubt these young women,” he said of Moore’s accusers, adding that he would consider whether the Justice Department should open an investigation. “We would do our duty,” he said. He said he has followed advice from the department’s ethics lawyers and avoided any involvement in the campaign.”

***************************************

Read the complete article at the link.

Doesn’t seem that unreasonable to expect a former Senator and a guy who got himself appointed and confirmed to the highest legal job in the country to remember key events that happened less than two years ago.

Sessions should contrast his performance with the way some U.S. Immigration Judges exercising his delegated authority treat memory lapses by barely literate individuals trying to go back into traumatic events that happened a decade or more ago. Would that our U.S. Immigration Courts were all as forgiving of others as Sessions is of himself. Perhaps, he needs to ease up a bit on the “gonzo enforcement” push and act more like a human being. Not a bad idea for someone seeking better and more sympathetic treatment for himself.

PWS

11-14-17

ROGUE U.S. IMMIGRATION JUDGE IN CHARLOTTE, NC? — BIA TWICE ORDERS JUDGE TO FOLLOW PRECEDENT & GIVE DUE PROCESS TO ASYLUM SEEKER!

https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/immigration-law-blog/archive/2017/11/10/unpub-bia-asylum-remand-insists-ij-follow-the-law-nov-6-2017.aspx?Redirected=true

Dan Kowalski reports at LexisNexis Immigration Community (quoting Respondent’s attorney Humza Kuzma):

“We appealed to the BIA, stating that the IJ was ignoring the law of the case and his direct instructions from a higher court. As Hassan noted in his FB post, we included redacted cases from a FOIA request another attorney had conducted, showing the various instances in the past two years where the IJ had been remanded in asylum proceedings. Yesterday, we got the remand, which reconfirmed that the prior rulings in the case were vacated and relying upon them was in judicial error, and instructed the IJ to grant our client a completely new hearing with an open record, and issue a new decision.”

BIA PANEL: Appellate Immigration Judges Guendelsberger, Kendall Clark, Grant

OPINION BY: Judge Edward R. Grant

)****************************

Read the full report and the BIA’s unpublished opinion at the link.

  • Why wasn’t this decision published?
  • Why wasn’t this Immigration Judge who is showing contempt for the BIA, precedent, asylum seekers, and Due Process named in the decision (a technique used by Article III Courts to deal with recalcitrant Judges)?
  • Why wasn’t this case remanded to a different Immigration Judge?
  • Why don’t we see more precedent decisions from appellate panels like this one which appears committed to a fair application of asylum law and reigning in rogue judges like this one?
  • How would an unrepresented individual ever be able to vindicate his or her statutory and constitutional rights before a biased and abusive judge like this?
  • What can be done to improve merit selection procedures for U.S. Immigration Judges so that individuals who are biased against migrants, unwilling comply with orders of higher tribunals, and uncommitted to Due Process will no longer be placed in judicial positions?

PWS

11-11-17