BIA HEADNOTE:
(1) An alien provides “material support” to a terrorist organization if the act has a logical and reasonably foreseeable tendency to promote, sustain, or maintain the organization, even if only to a de minimis degree.
(2) The respondent afforded material support to the guerillas in El Salvador in 1990 because the forced labor she provided in the form of cooking, cleaning, and washing their clothes aided them in continuing their mission of armed and violent opposition to the Salvadoran Government.
PANEL: BIA APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGES COLE, PAULEY, & WENDTLAND
OPINION BY: JUDGE ROGER PAULEY
CONCURRING & DISSENTING OPINION: JUDGE LINDA WENDTLAND
KEY QUOTES FROM MAJORITY:
The Immigration Judge incorporated by reference the respondent’s credible testimony and all the documents submitted at her cancellation of removal hearing. In her August 8, 2016, decision, the Immigration Judge found that the respondent is ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal based on the material support bar in section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) of the Act. The Immigration Judge stated that, but for the material support bar, she would have granted the respondent’s asylum application on humanitarian grounds pursuant to Matter of Chen, 20 I&N Dec. 16 (BIA 1989), noting the horrific harm she experienced from the guerrillas in El Salvador because, in addition to being kidnapped and required to perform cooking and cleaning for the guerrillas under threat of death, the respondent was forced to witness her husband, a sergeant in the Salvadoran Army, dig his own grave before being killed. However, the Immigration Judge granted the respondent’s request for deferral of removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture.
KEY QUOTE FROM CONCURRING & DISSENTING OPINION:
In view of our relatively recent holding in Matter of M-H-Z-, 26 I&N Dec. 757 (BIA 2016), that the material support bar contains no exception for duress, “it is especially important to give meaning to the statutory limit of ‘material.’ That term calls for [I]mmigration [J]udges, the Board, and the courts to strike a balance written into the Act.” Jabateh v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 332, 348 (7th Cir. 2017) (Hamilton, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Individuals arriving in this country from “some of the most dangerous and chaotic places on earth . . . may not have been able to avoid all contact with terrorist groups and their members, but we should not interpret the statute to exclude on this basis those who did not provide ‘material’ support to them,” since “[m]any deserving asylum-seekers could be barred otherwise.” Id. Unlike the majority, which apparently would apply the bar without any meaningful limit, I would not decline to carry out our responsibility to strike the foregoing critical balance.
Nor do I believe that Congress intended to relegate the respondent, who did not afford support that qualifies as “material,” to the statutory waiver process under section 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Act, which is intended only for those individuals whose support did meet the threshold materiality requirement.2 And given my view that the respondent’s conduct does not come within the “material support” bar in the first place, I need not reach the question whether the respondent reasonably should have known that the guerrillas in 1990 in El Salvador were a terrorist organization.
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Once again, faced with competing possible interpretations of the law, the BIA majority chooses the interpretation most unfavorable to the applicant. So, what else is new?
The majority judges engage in a wooden, lifeless, hyper-technical analysis, devoid of any obvious understanding of either the purpose of refugee laws or the actual human situation of refugees. By contrast, Judge Wendtland shows an understanding of both the human situation of refugees and undesirability and impracticality of construing the law so as to bar deserving refugees or force them to “jump through more hoops.”
Everybody actually agrees that “but for” this obtuse application of the law, this respondent deserves asylum! So, why not just take the readily available course of construing the ambiguous provision in favor of the applicant? Why go out of the way to create bad law and hurt innocent individuals? Why would Congress have desired this absurdly unpalatable result? And, I wouldn’t count on the USCIS under the policies of this Administration to grant a waiver in this case under their even more opaque and politicized processes.
This case also demonstrates a continuing practice of the BIA to render major precedents without considering the case en banc. How many of the other Appellate Immigration Judges agree with Judge Pauley’s decision? How many agree with Judge Wendtland? On which side are Chairman Neal and Vice Chair Adkins-Blanch?
We’ll never know, because today’s Board imposes life or death decisions on respondents and changes the course of the law while allowing the vast majority the Appellate Immigration Judges to hide in anonymity in their “Ivory Tower” chambers, without any accountability or taking any legal or moral responsibility for the decisions that they impose on others. It’s a national disgrace (originating with the bogus “Ashcroft reforms”) that must be changed for the BIA to once again become a credible appellate tribunal.
Due process and fairness to individuals are fictions in today’s broken and biased U.S. Immigration Court system. We shouldn’t pretend otherwise!
PWS
06-06-18