⚖️👍 CONGRATS TO JENNIFER BADE, ESQUIRE ON A RARE BIA VICTORY FOR THE “GOOD GUYS!” — Issues: Venue, Choice of Law — Matter of M-N-I-, 28 I&N Dec. 803 (BIA 2024)

Jennifer C. Bade, EsquireFounder & Managing Partner Bade Law Group Brookline, MA PHOTO: Bade Law Group
Jennifer C. Bade, Esquire
Founder & Managing Partner
Bade Law Group
Brookline, MA
PHOTO: Bade Law Group

Dan Kowalski reports for LexisNexis:  

https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-05/4076.pdf

https://www.lexisnexis.com/community/insights/legal/immigration/b/insidenews/posts/bia-on-venue-choice-of-law-matter-of-m-n-i-

Since choice of law is dependent on venue in Immigration Court proceedings, the controlling circuit law is not affected by a change in the administrative control court and will only change upon the granting of a motion to change venue. Matter of Garcia, 28 I&N Dec. 693 (BIA 2023), followed.

“In a decision dated October 24, 2023, the Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s application for deferral of removal under the regulations implementing the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The respondent, a native and citizen of Morocco, has appealed that decision. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has not responded to the appeal. Because we agree with the respondent that additional fact-finding and analysis are needed and the Immigration Judge misapplied choice of law precedent, we will remand these proceedings for the entry of a new decision. … The record reflects that the respondent has been detained at the Moshannon Valley Processing Center (“Moshannon”) in Philipsburg, Pennsylvania, throughout these proceedings. The proceedings commenced with the filing of a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) on April 18, 2023, at the Cleveland, Ohio Immigration Court, which is within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. … After the respondent’s individual hearing on October 20, 2023, the Immigration Judge applied Third Circuit law and denied deferral of removal under CAT. … The respondent argues that the Immigration Judge erroneously applied Third Circuit law rather than Sixth Circuit law. We review this issue de novo. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2020). For the reasons discussed below, we agree with the respondent that the Immigration Judge applied the incorrect circuit’s law. … On remand, the Immigration Judge should reevaluate the respondent’s claim under Sixth Circuit law and apply relevant Board precedent, with consideration to the respondent’s appellate arguments concerning the respondent’s gender identity and sexual orientation. See Matter of C-G-T-, 28 I&N Dec. 740, 745 (BIA 2023) (explaining that “when considering future harm, adjudicators should not expect a respondent to hide” the respondent’s sexual orientation).”

[Hats off to Jennifer C. Bade!]

***********************

Great job, Jennifer! Once again, it’s worth asking ourselves how successful arguments of this kind could ever be made by an unrepresented respondent. If, as is painfully obvious to even a casual observer, the answer is “they couldn’t,” then where is the due process in an overloaded, corner-cutting court system where lack of representation is actually on the increase, despite truly heroic efforts by the private and pro bono bars?

I also find the last sentence of the above summary very helpful. While it certainly states the correct rule regarding sexual orientation cases, my sense is that this part of the Matter of C-G-T- precedent is often ignored at the Immigration Court level and not always corrected by the BIA on appeal. So, it’s certainly worth re-emphasizing!

The BIA’s opinion was written by Appellate Immigration Judge Gorman for a panel that also included Appellate Immigration Judge Greer and Temporary Appellate IJ Crossett. 

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

05-30-24

⚖️VENUE, VENUE, WHO’S GOT THE VENUE? — The 4th Circuit? — Herrera-Alcala v. Garland

Ben Winograd
Ben Winograd, Esquire
Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center
Falls Church, VA

Ben Winograd reports:

The Fourth Circuit issued a decision earlier today — Herrera-Alcala v. Garland — in which it adopted a novel argument regarding the proper venue for a petition for review. As a result of the decision, a petition for review can be filed in the Fourth Circuit in any case that was decided by an immigration judge sitting at an immigration adjudication center in Richmond or Falls Church. That is not to say that the petition for review *must* be filed in the Fourth Circuit in such cases, only that it *may* be filed in the Fourth Circuit. Given that Fourth Circuit law is relatively friendly (especially in asylum cases), it is an option that you may wish to consider.

The facts of the case were very unusual. The petitioner was detained at a correctional facility in Louisiana; the NTA was filed with the immigration court in Fort Snelling, Minnesota; and the case was heard by televideo by an IJ at the Falls Church immigration adjudication center. The noncitizen filed the petition for review with the Fourth Circuit under the theory that the IJ “completed” the proceedings in Virginia for purposes of INA 242(b)(2), 8 USC 1252(b)(2). OIL moved to transfer the petition to the Fifth Circuit, arguing (ridiculously) that the IJ completed the proceedings at the correctional facility in Louisiana. I filed an amicus brief on behalf of a local immigrants’ rights organization arguing that the PFR should have been filed in the Eighth Circuit because venue lay with the immigration court in Fort Snelling. The Fourth Circuit adopted the petitioner’s argument, agreeing that the IJ completed the proceedings at the Falls Church immigration adjudication center.

As I stated above, today’s decision means that the Fourth Circuit can consider any petition for review if the underlying decision was issued by an IJ sitting at an immigration adjudication center in Richmond or Falls Church, Virginia. That being said, the Fourth Circuit’s decision does not necessarily mean that other circuits would take a contrary view or that a PFR in such a case could not be filed in another circuit. For example, if the petitioner had filed the PFR in the Fifth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit may well have agreed that it was the proper venue for the PFR. Likewise for the Eighth Circuit.

The upshot, again, is that in cases that were decided by an IJ sitting at an immigration adjudication center in Virginia, practitioners may now be able to choose from multiple circuits when filing a PFR, with the Fourth Circuit always being a safe option.

Best,

Ben

____________

My question: “So, what Circuit law applies?  If review could be in either of two Circuits, how can the IJ know which applies at the time of the hearing?”

Ben’s answer: “That’s the $64,000 (or is it $1 million?) dollar question, and I don’t think there’s a good answer.

Under current BIA precedent, IJs are supposed to apply the law of the “docketed hearing location.” Matter of R-C-R-, 28 I&N Dec. 74, n.1 (BIA 2020). The “docketed hearing location” usually is the immigration court where the IJ is sitting, but sometimes EOIR regards it as the correctional facility where the respondent is detained (as happened in Matter of R-C-R- itself). In Herrera-Alcala, OIL argued that venue was proper in the Fifth Circuit because the “docketed hearing location” was in the Fifth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit (correctly) rejected that argument, but it apparently did not realize that it’s decision would allow noncitizens to forum shop and didn’t grapple at all with what circuit law should apply.

The need for parties and IJs to know what circuit law will apply was the primary issue we raised in our amicus brief (which is attached if you’re curious), but the Court ignored our concern.”

My solution: “Two obvious solutions:

1) Limit ‘Adjudication Centers’ to hearing cases within their Circuit; or

2) Apply the Circuit law most favorable to the respondent (DHS can’t seek Circuit review).”

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

07-02-22