UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: Professor Richard Price Tells Us Why The Immigration Courts Are Unconstitutional Under The Due Process Clause & Why It’s Past Time For The Supremes To “Confess Error” & End This Mockery Of Our Constitution!

https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/publications/judges_journal/2019/spring/the-scope-the-removal-power-ripe-reconsideration/

Professor Richard J. Price, Jr., writes for the ABA’s Judges Journal:

May 01, 2019 FEATURE

The Scope of the Removal Power Is Ripe for Reconsideration

By Richard J. Pierce Jr.

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I have been teaching and writing about the power of the president to remove officers of the United States for over 40 years. Until recently, however, I have been content to describe the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinions that address the scope issue without attempting to persuade the Court to change its approach to the issue.

The issue has become particularly important in the last few years for two reasons. First, the scope issue has become particularly important because of the increasing controversy that surrounds the scope of the removal power in the context of officers who perform purely adjudicatory functions. In its 2018 opinion in Lucia v. SEC, the Supreme Court held that Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) administrative law judges (ALJs) are officers of the United States.¹ The holding is broad enough to encompass virtually all ALJs and administrative judges (AJs).² In a brief filed in the Supreme Court in that case, the solicitor general (SG) tried to persuade the Court to hold that the longstanding limits on the power to remove an ALJ are either invalid or meaningless.³ Those limits are based on due process. The Court decided not to address the removal issue in that case, but it is only a matter of time until the Court addresses the issue.The second reason the scope issue has become particularly important is tied to the growing movement to broaden the scope of the power of the president to remove officers who perform executive functions. That effort is motivated by concern that limits on the removal power interfere impermissibly with the president’s responsibility to perform the functions vested in the president by Article II of the Constitution.Thus, for instance, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of the removal power and reduced the power of Congress to limit the removal power in its 2010 opinion in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.⁴ The Court held that Congress cannot limit the president’s removal power by imposing two or more layers of for-cause limits on the removal power. Because the president can only remove a member of the SEC for cause, the Court wrote that the for-cause limit on the SEC’s power to remove members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) violated Article II.

A panel of the D.C. Circuit took a step beyond Free Enterprise Fund in 2016, holding that the single layer for-cause limit on the president’s power to remove the director of the Consumer Financial Protection Board (CFPB) violated Article II.⁵ The en banc D.C. Circuit overturned that decision, but there are reasons to believe that final resolution of the issue is far from over. The judge who wrote the panel opinion, Judge Brett Kavanaugh, was appointed to the Supreme Court, where he will be in a better position to influence the outcome of the inevitable future disputes about the scope of the removal power. In 2018, a panel of the Fifth Circuit renewed the dispute in an analogous context by holding unconstitutional the for-cause limit on the president’s power to remove the director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).⁶

This article looks at the history of Supreme Court cases addressing removal power. Based on a discussion of those cases, including a landmark opinion written by former chief justice (and former president) William Howard Taft, the article concludes that the Supreme Court should hold that the president must have the power to remove at will any officer who performs executive functions to enable the president to perform the functions vested in the president by Article II. By contrast, the article concludes that the Court should hold that due process precludes the president from having the power to remove at will an officer whose sole responsibilities are to adjudicate disputes between private parties and the government.

Methodology and Findings

I began my effort to understand the scope issue by reading and studying with care all of the major judicial decisions that have addressed the scope issue. I came away from that effort with two pleasant surprises. First, with two exceptions, the opinions are better reasoned than I remembered. Second, with the same two exceptions, the opinions form a coherent and consistent pattern. Courts consistently protect the president’s power to perform the functions vested in him by Article II by holding that he or one of his immediate subordinates must have the power to remove at will any officer who performs purely executive functions. At the same time, courts consistently protect the due process rights of parties to disputes with the government by limiting the power of the president or an agency head to remove any officer who performs purely adjudicatory functions.

The President Must Have the Power to Remove At Will Officers Who Perform Executive Functions

The logical starting point in any attempt to understand the opinions that address the scope of the removal power is the 1926 opinion of Chief Justice William Howard Taft in Myers v. United States.⁷ That opinion upheld President Woodrow Wilson’s decision to remove a postmaster from office. It is often described as holding that Congress cannot limit in any way the president’s power to remove any officer. That description is incomplete in ways that are misleading. Taft’s 71-page opinion addressed many issues with care.

Taft did not focus on President Wilson’s removal of postmaster Myers in the 1920s. He focused primarily on President Andrew Johnson’s decision to remove the Secretary of War in the 1860s. He also did not address explicitly the issue that has drawn most of the attention of courts—whether Congress can limit the president’s removal power by requiring a statement of cause for removing an officer. The restriction on removal at issue in Myers was the Tenure in Office Act, a statute that Congress enacted in 1867. That statute purported to limit the president’s removal power by requiring the president to obtain the permission of the Senate before removing any officer. The opinion in Myers was the logical antecedent to modern opinions like INS v. Chadha⁸ and Bowsher v. Synar,⁹ in which the Court held that Congress cannot aggrandize itself by giving itself a role in performing functions that are vested in the president by Article II.

Taft discussed in detail the controversy that led Congress to enact the Tenure in Office Act and to impeach and attempt to remove from office President Johnson for refusing to comply with that statute by firing the Secretary of War without first obtaining the permission of the Senate. Congress and President Johnson differed dramatically with respect to the most important question at the time—how to reconstruct the country after the Civil War. Congress enacted the Tenure in Office Act in an effort to make it impossible for President Johnson to exercise the powers vested in him by Article II in the context of his attempt to reunite and reconstruct the country.

In the course of his lengthy opinion, Taft described and supported three broad propositions that are important to an understanding of the removal power. First, he explained why the president must be able to appoint many officers to be able to perform effectively the functions vested in the president by Article II. The task is far too massive to be accomplished by a president without the aid of agents. Second, he explained why the president must have the discretion to remove officers at will. If an officer attempts to move the nation in a direction that is inconsistent with the president’s policies, the president cannot perform the functions vested in him by Article II unless he has the discretion to remove that officer. Third, if Congress wants to make it impossible for the president to perform the functions vested in him by Article II, it can do so most effectively by limiting the power of the president to remove an officer. To Chief Justice (and former president) Taft, it followed that Congress cannot limit the president’s discretion to remove officers with executive functions.

I find Taft’s explanation of his three broad propositions persuasive, particularly coming from a former president. Many of the most important later opinions repeat and build on Taft’s reasoning and conclusions in Myers. Thus, for instance, the opinion in Free Enterprise Fund supports its ban on multiple levels of for-cause limits on the removal power with reference to the reasoning in Myers.¹⁰The Free Enterprise Fund opinion supplements the reasoning in Myers with reasoning based on political accountability, such as the public cannot know who is responsible for a government policy decision unless the president has the power to remove a policymaking official at will.

Similarly, Judge (now Justice) Kavanaugh used reasoning like the reasoning in Myers, supplemented by reasoning based on political accountability, in his opinion that held unconstitutional the for-cause limit on the president’s power to remove the director of the CFPB. Thus, for instance, he emphasized that the director “unilaterally implements and enforces [19] federal consumer protection statutes, covering everything from home finance to credit cards to banking practices.”¹¹ He reasoned that anyone with that broad range of executive responsibilities must be removable by the president at will to allow the president to perform the functions vested in him by Article II and to allow the public to hold the president accountable for the policies the government adopts and attempts to further in each of the many contexts in which the director has the unilateral power to make and implement policy on behalf of the government. The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in support of its holding of the for-cause limit on the president’s power to remove the director of the FHFA¹² is virtually identical to the reasoning in Judge (now Justice) Kavanaugh’s opinion with respect to the director of the CFPB.

Taft’s opinion in Myers also includes another discussion that is important to an understanding of the Court’s views with respect to the appropriate scope of the removal power. He devoted several pages of his opinion to discussion of the postmaster’s argument that he could not be removed at will because the Court had upheld limits on the power of the president to remove territorial judges.¹³ After discussing the conflicting opinions in which the Court had addressed that question, the chief justice referred with apparent approval to the opinion of Justice John McLean:

He pointed out that the argument upon which the decision rested was based on the necessity for presidential removals in the discharge by the President of his executive duties and his taking care that the laws be faithfully executed, and that such an argument could not apply to the judges, over whose judicial duties he could not properly exercise any supervision or control after their appointment and confirmation.¹⁴

The chief justice then explicitly disavowed any intent to apply the reasoning and holding in Myers to non-Article III judges: “The questions, . . . whether * * * Congress may provide for [a territorial judge’s] removal in some other way, present considerations different from those which apply in the removal of executive officers, and therefore we do not decide them.”¹⁵

The opinion in Free Enterprise Fund includes a similar explicit disavowal of any intent to apply its reasoning or holding to officers who perform adjudicative functions, noting that “administrative law judges perform adjudicative functions rather than enforcement functions.”¹⁶

Due Process Limits the Power to Remove Officers Who Perform Only Adjudicative Functions

A few years after it issued its opinion in Myers, the Court issued its famous opinion in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States.¹⁷ The Court upheld the statutory for-cause limit on the president’s power to remove a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) commissioner. The opinion in Humphrey’s Executor has traditionally been interpreted to be inconsistent with the opinion in Myers and to authorize Congress to create agencies with vast power that are “independent” of the president. Neither of those interpretations is supported by the reasoning in the Humphrey’s Executor opinion and the context in which the opinion was issued. The opinion in Humphrey’s Executor can support an interpretation that reconciles it with the opinion in Myers and that does not legitimate the concept of multifunction agencies that are independent of the president.

The FTC of 1935 was nothing like the modern FTC or the agencies that have been the subject of the recent decisions that have held invalid restrictions on the removal of officers—PCAOB, CFPB, and FHFA. Each of those agencies has the power to make policy decisions on behalf of the government by issuing legislative rules that have the same legally binding effect as a statute. By contrast, the FTC of 1935 had no power to make policy through the issuance of rules or through any other means.

The Court distinguished the functions performed by the FTC from the executive functions performed by the officers who were the subject of the holding in Myers. The Court characterized the FTC of 1935 as a “quasi legislative and quasi-judicial” body.¹⁸ In its capacity as a quasi-legislative body, the FTC of 1935 performed the functions that are performed by congressional staff and the Congressional Research Service (CRS) today. Congress had little staff support until 1946, and CRS was not created until 1970.¹⁹ In 1935, Congress had to rely on the FTC to study the performance of markets and to make recommendations with respect to the need to enact legislation to authorize regulation of markets. FTC reports to Congress were the basis for many statutes, including the Natural Gas Act and the Federal Power Act.²⁰ It made sense for Congress to insulate the officers in charge of conducting research for Congress from at-will removal by the president.

In its capacity as a quasi-judicial body, the FTC acted as a specialized forum to adjudicate trade disputes. The Court analogized it to the Court of Claims.²¹ In its adjudicative capacity, the FTC of 1935 was also analogous to the Territorial Courts that the MyersCourt distinguished from agencies that perform executive functions. As the Myers Court recognized, the president “could not properly exercise any supervision or control” over judges who were appointed to the Territorial Courts.²² It follows that a for-cause limit on the power of the president to remove a commissioner of the FTC of 1935 was entirely consistent with the holding in Myers that the president must have the power to remove at-will officers who perform executive functions.

The Court followed its opinion in Humphrey’s Executor with its 1958 opinion in Wiener v. United States.²³ The Court held that the president could not remove a member of the three-member War Claims Tribunal without stating a cause for removal. Wiener can be interpreted to support the proposition that due process limits the power of the president to remove an officer with adjudicative responsibilities. There was no statutory limit on the president’s power to remove a member of the War Claims Tribunal. The Court adopted a construction of the statute that included such a limit because the Tribunal was tasked only with “adjudicating [claims] according to law, that is on the merits of each claim, supported by evidence and governing legal considerations.”²⁴ The Court reasoned that Congress intended the members of the Tribunal to have the same freedom from potential outside influences that the judges of the district courts and the Court of Claims had.²⁵ It followed that the president could not remove a member of the Tribunal without stating a cause for removal.

In the meantime, Congress was engaged in a lengthy investigation and debate to devise and implement means of ensuring that the hearing examiners (later renamed ALJs) who presided in hearings to adjudicate disputes between private parties and the government did so in an unbiased manner.²⁶ Many parties who participated in those adjudications complained that ALJs behaved in ways that reflected a powerful bias in favor of the government. Many studies supported the claims of bias.

After 17 years of investigation and debate, Congress addressed the problem of bias in 1946 by enacting the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by unanimous voice vote in both the House and Senate.²⁷ The most important provisions of the APA are designed to ensure that ALJs preside over adjudicatory hearings in an unbiased manner. They include provisions that prohibit an agency from determining the compensation of an ALJ,²⁸ assigning an ALJ responsibilities that are inconsistent with the duties of an ALJ,²⁹and, most important, removing or otherwise punishing an ALJ. An ALJ can be removed only for cause found by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) after conducting a formal hearing.³⁰

In its 1950 opinion in Wong Yang Sun v. McGrath,³¹ the Court praised Congress for investigating the serious problem of bias in hearings conducted to adjudicate disputes between private parties and the government. The Court also praised Congress for including in the APA provisions that greatly reduced the risk of bias by protecting ALJs from agency pressure to conduct hearings in a manner that reflected bias in favor of the agency.³² The Court compared the blatantly biased hearing that the immigration service had provided the private party in the case before the Court with the unbiased hearing that the APA assures.³³ The Court held the APA applicable to immigration hearings even though Congress had not explicitly incorporated the APA safeguards of independence in the Immigration Act.³⁴ The Court adopted a saving construction of the Immigration Act to avoid having to hold the statute unconstitutional as a violation of due process.³⁵

Congress reacted angrily to the decision in Wong Yang Sun. It amended the Immigration Act to make it explicit that the APA safeguards of the independence of ALJs did not apply to immigration judges (IJs). Faced with a direct conflict between its views of due process and those of Congress, the Court backed down and upheld the constitutionality of the amended Immigration Act over an argument that it violates due process in its 1955 opinion in Marcello v. Bonds.³⁶ That opinion is one of only two opinions on the removal power that were not well-reasoned and that do not fit the otherwise consistent pattern of opinions that resolve scope of removal disputes based on the functions performed by the officer whose removal is at issue.

In every other opinion, the Court distinguished clearly between officers who perform executive functions and officers who perform adjudicative functions. The Court concluded that officers who perform executive functions must be removable at will in order to ensure that the president can perform the functions vested in him by Article II. The Court concluded that officers who perform adjudicative functions must be protected from at-will removal in order to reduce the risk that they will conduct adjudicatory hearings in ways that reflect pro-government bias in violation of due process. The Court should overrule its holding in Marcello v. Bonds based on the powerful reasoning in its opinion in Wong Yang Sun.

Asylum cases provide the context in which it is most important to ensure that officers with adjudicative responsibilities are able to perform their duties without fear that they will be removed or otherwise punished if they do not act in ways that reflect whatever bias the president and the attorney general might have. Denial of a meritorious application for asylum is almost always followed by removal of the alien from the United States. Thus, denial of a meritorious application for asylum has devastating effects on the applicant, often including a high risk that the applicant will be killed when the applicant is forced to return to the applicant’s country of origin.

The present circumstances illustrate the extreme risk of bias particularly well. Both the president and the attorney general have expressed powerful antipathy toward aliens who seek asylum and have applied extraordinary pressure on IJs to deny applications for asylum. That pressure is virtually certain to influence at least some IJs to deny applications for asylum in some cases in which their unbiased view of the merits would yield a decision granting the application.³⁷ The attorney general has the power to evaluate the performance of IJs and to remove an IJ at will.³⁸ It is unrealistic to believe that all IJs will have the extraordinary courage and strength of character required to act in a manner that is inconsistent with the expectations of the president and the attorney general. The Supreme Court should put an end to the blatantly unconstitutional practice of pressuring IJs to deny applications for asylum.

The only other opinion in which the Court departed from the important principles of constitutional law that underlie most of its decisions was its 1988 opinion in Morrison v. Olson.³⁹ The Court upheld the statutory for-cause limit on the power of the attorney general to remove an independent counsel who had the power to investigate and potentially prosecute a high-ranking executive officer for allegedly engaging in criminal conduct. The Court held that the limit on the removal power was permissible even though the Court characterized prosecution as an executive function.⁴⁰

As I have explained at length elsewhere, the opinion in Morrison did no harm because, as the Court emphasized repeatedly, the independent counsel had no power to make any policy decision.⁴¹ The Court has never upheld a limit on the power to remove an officer who has the power to make policy decisions on behalf of the government. That is by far the most important function that is vested in the president in Article II.

Conclusion

I hope that the Supreme Court holds that the president must have the power to remove at will any officer who performs executive functions to enable the president to perform the functions vested in the president by Article II. I also hope that the Court holds that due process precludes the president from having the power to remove at will an officer whose sole responsibilities are to adjudicate disputes between private parties and the government. With one glaring exception, the Court’s opinions are consistent with those principles when they are read with care and in the context in which they were decided. I hope that the Court eliminates the one outlier by overruling its 1955 decision in Marcello v. Bonds and holding that immigration judges cannot be removed at will.

Endnotes

1. 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).

2. The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) has solicited several reports that describe in detail the functions performed by the roughly 2,000 ALJs and 11,000 AJs who preside in hearings conducted by federal agencies. Those studies are available on the ACUS website.

3. Brief for Respondent Supporting Petitioners at 39–56, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (Feb. 2018) (No. 17-130).

4. 561 U.S. 477 (2010).

5. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bd., 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’d en banc, 881 F.3d 75 (2018).

6. Collins v. Mnuchin, 908 F.3d 151 (5th Cir. 2018).

7. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).

8. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).

9. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).

10. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).

11. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bd., 839 F. 3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’d en banc, 881 F.3d 75 (2018).

12. Collins v. Mnuchin, 908 F. 3d 151 (5th Cir. 2018).

13. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 154–59 (1926).

14. Id. at 156–57 (emphasis added).

15. Id. at 157–58.

16. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 507 (2010).

17. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).

18. Id. at 629.

19. See the descriptions of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 and the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 in Wikipedia.

20. See Ewin L. Davis, Influence of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigations on Federal Regulation of Interstate Electric and Gas Utilities, 14 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 21 (1945).

21. Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 629.

22. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 156–57 (1926).

23. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).

24. Id. at 353–56.

25. Id. at 355–56.

26. The Court described this process of debate and investigation in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 37–41 (1950).

27. The Court described the process of enacting the APA in Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 131–32 (1953).

28. 5 U.S.C. § 5372.

29. Id. § 3105.

30. Id. § 7521.

31. 339 U.S. at 40.

32. Id. at 41.

33. Id. at 45–46.

34. Id. at 51.

35. Id. at 49–50.

36. 349 U.S. 302 (1955).

37. Catherine Y. Kim, The President’s Immigration Courts, 68 Emory L. Rev. 1, 3–6 (2018).

38. Kent Barnett, Logan Cornett, Malia Redick & Russell Wheeler, Non-ALJ Adjudicators in Federal Agencies: Status, Selection, Oversight and Removal, Final Report to Administrative Conference of the United States 52–61 (2018).

39. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).

40. Id. at 691.

41. Richard J. Pierce Jr., Morrison v. Olson, Separation of Powers, and the Structure of Government, 1988 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1. See also Richard J. Pierce Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive Theory from Those Who Would Distort and Abuse It, 12 Penn. J. Const. L. 593 (2010) (explaining why political limits on the power to remove a special counsel are far more effective than legal limits).

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Seems to me that the bottom lime here is that ALL so-called “Administrative Courts” established within the Executive Branch are unconstitutional. They either 1) violate the Appointments Clause, if the President can’t remove the judge; or 2) violate the Due Process Clause, if the President can remove the judge.

So, either way, the Supremes have been complicit in a constitutional travesty.

Conclusion: all Administrative Courts within the Executive Branch, including the U.S. Immigration Court are unconstitutional. They must be abolished and reestablished as independent courts under either Article I or Article III of the Constitution. “Courts” are simply not an Executive function under Article I. And this Administration is giving us a vivid demonstration of why no legitimate court system can function under its authority.

Many thanks to my colleagues retired Judges Denise Slavin and Jeffrey Chase of the “Roundtable” for bringing this to my attention.

PWS

06-02-19

OUR AMERICAN GULAG: As Cowardly Trump Whines About The “Threat” Posed By Individuals Exercising Their Legal Rights At Border, His Administration Continues To Illegally Hold Children In Substandard Conditions — ABA President Bob Carlson Speaks Out Against This Violation Of Human Rights!

James Hohmann reports for the Washington Post’s “Daily 202:”

— Hundreds of minors are being held at U.S. facilities at the southern border beyond legal time limits. Abigail Hauslohner and Maria Sacchetti report: “Federal law and court orders require that children in Border Patrol custody be transferred to more-hospitable shelters no longer than 72 hours after they are apprehended. But some unaccompanied children are spending longer than a week in Border Patrol stations and processing centers, according to two Customs and Border Protection officials and two other government officials. … One government official said about half of the children in custody — 1,000 — have been with the Border Patrol for longer than 72 hours, and another official said that more than 250 children 12 or younger have been in custody for an average of six days. …

“The McAllen Border Patrol station, a facility near the southern tip of Texas that is routinely overwhelmed, was holding 775 people on Tuesday, nearly double its capacity. The Washington Post this week made a rare visit inside the facility, where adults and their toddler children were packed into concrete holding cells, many of them sleeping head-to-foot on the floor and along the wall-length benches, as they awaited processing at a sparsely staffed circle of computers known as ‘the bubble.’ … Experts say transferring children out of detention facilities as quickly as possible is critical, especially for ‘tender age’ children — those 12 or younger, who face physical and mental health issues even during short periods in detention. They sleep fitfully, do not eat well and suffer anxiety, said Amy Cohen, a child psychiatrist and expert witness in the Flores case.”

— Border agents apprehended 1,036 migrants in a record roundup near El Paso earlier this week. The apprehensions, which included 63 children traveling alone, reflect an uptick in the number of large groups trying to cross the border. Border agents apprehended a group of 424 migrants, the previous record, just last month. (NBC News)

Here’s the statement of ABA President Bob Carlson:

May 31, 2019

Statement of ABA President Bob Carlson, Re: Improper Detention of Immigrant Children

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WASHINGTON, May 31, 2019 — The American Bar Association is deeply disturbed by reports that hundreds of unaccompanied children seeking refuge in the United States are being held by the U.S. Border Patrol in violation of the law and federal policies.According to federal law and court orders, immigrant children generally cannot be held by law enforcement for more than 72 hours before being transferred to shelters that are better equipped to care for their physical and psychological needs. Yet news reports cite recent federal data that hundreds of children, many aged 12 and younger, have been held in Border Patrol custody for an average of six days, in facilities that are intended to be short-term processing stations.The current situation is unacceptable. Leaders at every level of the federal government, including the White House and Congress, must immediately find legal and humane alternatives that relieve the suffering of these children – and then work to create and fund comprehensive, long-term solutions.

With more than 400,000 members, the American Bar Association is one of the largest voluntary professional membership organizations in the world. As the national voice of the legal profession, the ABA works to improve the administration of justice, promotes programs that assist lawyers and judges in their work, accredits law schools, provides continuing legal education, and works to build public understanding around the world of the importance of the rule of law. View our privacy statement online. Follow the latest ABA news at www.americanbar.org/newsand on Twitter @ABANews.

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How “gonzo” has our country become? Our dishonest and unqualified “President” makes idiotic threats against our “friends” because his Administration has been too maliciously incompetent to deal with a relatively predictable flow of individuals merely seeking to exercise their legal rights. Somehow, the mess in Central America, for which we share a great part of the blame, becomes Mexico’s problem to solve. But, while the vast majority of those arriving at our borders are surrendering themselves to apply under our laws, the Trump Administration is violating the law on a grand scale by mistreating children and others in detention.

In a rational country, there would be a massive, bipartisan, expedited movement to remove this unqualified demagogue from office before he does more damage to our country and our world. But not in today’s America.

Sadly, that appears to be the real meaning of “American exceptionalism.”

PWS

06-01-19

LORELEI LAIRD @ ABA JOURNAL: Judges Make The Case For An Independent Article I U.S. Immigration Court, Featuring Interviews With “Our Gang” Members Judge Carol King & Me!

http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/immigration-judges-executive-politicizing-courts

Lorelei writes in the ABA Journal:

There was no reason to think that the relatively routine immigration case of Reynaldo Castro-Tum would make headlines.

Castro-Tum, a Guatemalan national who entered the United States at 17, was one of thousands who were part of 2014’s “surge” of unaccompanied minors. Like most of those minors, he was eventually released to the custody of a relative—in this case, a brother-in-law who lived outside Pittsburgh. The government repeatedly sent notices to appear at immigration court hearings to that address, but Castro-Tum never showed up.

Normally, that’s the end of the story, since failure to appear in immigration court generally results in a deportation. But Judge Steven Morley of the Philadelphia immigration court suspected the address on file for Castro-Tum was not correct, in part because that’s a common problem with addresses provided for unaccompanied minors. So Morley administratively closed the case, essentially pausing it to look into the address problem. The government appealed it, along with about 200 similar cases, and the Board of Immigration Appeals, the court of next resort in immigration cases, instructed Morley to deport Castro-Tum.

But before he could do that, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions assigned the case to himself, a power the attorney general has as the head of the federal agency that controls the immigration courts. His opinion in Matter of Castro-Tum, issued in May 2018, says immigration judges have no legal authority to administratively close cases. That alone would have been a big deal in the immigration law world because it took away a well-established tool for managing the already overwhelmed immigration court dockets.

Photo of Former Attorney General Jeff Sessions by Shutterstock.

But what came next drew widespread attention among immigration lawyers as well as the national media, catapulting the otherwise unknown case of a single teenage immigrant into the spotlight. On remand, Morley continued the case to resolve the address problem—and immigration court leadership promptly took it away from him, reassigning it to an administrative judge. Then they reassigned 86 more of his cases. According to a grievance filed by the National Association of Immigration Judges, the union that represents Morley, a supervisor told him that he had been expected to order Castro-Tum deported if he didn’t appear.

NAIJ President A. Ashley Tabaddor says that’s not actually in Sessions’ opinion—and if it were, it would violate federal regulations on immigration judges’ independence. (Morley, like most sitting immigration judges, could not comment on the case per Justice Department policy. Tabaddor, who is also a sitting judge, stresses that she is speaking only in her role as union president.)

“We think that is a clear, clear violation of a judge’s decisional independence,” says Tabaddor, who presides in Los Angeles. “When you tell a judge how the process … should be handled, by definition, that is going to have an impact, and a significant impact, on the outcome.”

The Executive Office for Immigration Review, the DOJ agency that controls the immigration courts, declined to comment, citing pending litigation. Tabaddor said in January that she was unaware of litigation related to the matter.

Before Sessions’ opinion, the ABA had urged in an amicus brief to the DOJ that the attorney general continue to allow administrative closure in immigration cases, citing it as a “practical necessity” for judges to deal with the courts’ huge backlog.

Immigration courts have always been susceptible to politics; presidents have, for example, rearranged dockets to suit their political needs. But the NAIJ and others are concerned that the Trump administration has moved from reprioritizing cases to deliberately trying to affect case outcomes. Changes that have caused concern include unilateral changes to case law, like the one Sessions made in Castro-Tum; pressure on judges to rule faster; and even allegations that the DOJ is considering political affiliation in hiring new immigration judges.

“It’s all part of what our association has referred to as ‘the deportation machine,’ ” says Jeremy McKinney, treasurer of the American Immigration Lawyers Association. “In other words, transforming a court that is supposed to be an independent and neutral trier of law and fact into an arm of law enforcement.”

A TROUBLED HOME

For critics, a major problem with the immigration courts is where they’re housed: within the Department of Justice, an executive-branch department headed by a politically appointed leader. That’s unlike the Article III federal courts or most of the federal administrative law courts.

Immigration law observers have long worried that this exposes the courts to political interference—and recent history supports that. In 2008, the Justice Department’s Office of the Inspector General found that political appointees had hired only politically connected Republicans as immigration judges between 2004 and 2006, despite knowing judges were part of the civil service system. Over the past 30 years, several attorneys general have referred themselves cases in order to overturn the decisions of predecessors from a different party. Presidents of both parties have reprioritized dockets for political reasons.

Most of that is perfectly legal and within the political leadership’s powers—and to some observers, that’s a problem. Take the fact that attorneys general may certify Board of Immigration Appeals cases to themselves. There’s no requirement that they follow precedent or consult anyone else. This permits an attorney general to change case law unilaterally.

“Just allowing that kind of interference compromises the integrity of the court,” Tabaddor says. “Because that’s not how a court is supposed to run. That’s not how law is supposed to be developed.”

Asked for comment on the matter, Justice Department speechwriter Steven Stafford noted that the attorney general’s legal authority to refer himself cases, and authority to control the immigration courts and their judges, is clear under the Immigration and Nationality Act.

“Further, the acting attorney general’s exercise of this authority has been entirely appropriate in each particular case,” Stafford said in an emailed statement. “Those who oppose the use of this authority have a problem not with the acting attorney general, but with the INA.”

If this power of the attorney general is obscure, that might be because most—from both parties—have used it sparingly. Using DOJ archives of agency decisions, the ABA Journal determined that over three eight-year presidencies, former President Barack Obama’s two attorneys general referred themselves a total of four cases; George W. Bush’s three AGs referred themselves 10 cases; and Bill Clinton’s one AG referred herself one case. The ABA Journal found no record of any self-referrals during new Attorney General William Barr’s first time in the job, from 1991 to 1993.

By contrast, Sessions referred himself seven cases during 21 months in office, though he was able to publish decisions on only five before President Donald Trump asked him to resign.

Any hope that former Acting Attorney General Matthew Whitaker would take a lighter touch were dashed in December, when Whitaker certified two cases to himself: Matter of Castillo-Perez, concerning intoxicated driving and the good moral character standard in immigration law, and Matter of LEA, on whether a family connection can be the basis of an asylum claim. The cases were waiting for Barr after he was sworn in.

And the decisions Sessions handed down are not small tweaks. Take Matter of AB, in which Sessions decided that asylum should only rarely be available to people fleeing serious crimes not sponsored by a government. (“AB” are the initials of a woman who said she suffered prolonged domestic violence in El Salvador.) Essentially, Sessions ruled that when the persecution doesn’t come from the government itself, asylum claimants must work harder to show that the home government couldn’t or wouldn’t protect them.

“In practice, [nongovernmental violence] claims are unlikely to satisfy the statutory grounds for proving group persecution that the government is unable or unwilling to address,” Sessions wrote. “The mere fact that a country may have problems effectively policing certain crimes—such as domestic violence or gang violence—or that certain populations are more likely to be victims of crime, cannot itself establish an asylum claim.”

Infographic by Sara Wadford

In making that ruling, Sessions swept away precedents set by the Board of Immigration Appeals and the federal appeals courts on what constitutes a “particular social group” under asylum law.

“The attorney general did not rewrite the underlying test for who qualifies for asylum and who does not,” says McKinney, who also runs McKinney Immigration Law in Greensboro, North Carolina. “He just announced that he would have applied the test differently, and his result would have been different. It’s a very, very strange way to issue sweeping precedent decisions.”

Photo of Jeremy McKinney by Shelli Craig Photography

The ruling also removed the basis for asylum claims from thousands of Central Americans who arrived in the United States in recent years to flee uncontrolled domestic abuse or gang violence in their home countries. Retired immigration Judge Paul Wickham Schmidt does not believe that’s a coincidence.

“The grounds that some people have been succeeding on are domestic violence and family-based claims,” says Schmidt, who belongs to the ABA Judicial Division’s National Conference of the Administrative Law Judiciary.” So it’s basically in my view a race-based attack on Central American asylum seekers.”

Because of this, Matter of AB attracted substantial attention. Sessions invited amicus briefs, and the ABA was one of many organizations that filed one, urging the attorney general to let the case law stand. That brief argues that federal appeals courts and the board of appeals have repeatedly found non-state-sponsored crimes—organized crime, “honor killings,” female genital mutilation—adequate for granting asylum. It also pointed out that the attorney general may not unilaterally overturn decisions of the federal appeals courts; the American Civil Liberties Union later cited this theory when it sued the federal government over AB. It won an injunction in that case in December.

It’s still possible to grant asylum on gang or domestic violence grounds, says retired immigration Judge Carol King, also part of the National Conference of the Administrative Law Judiciary, but everyone doesn’t see it that way.

“The danger is that the agency has been now encouraging judges not even to hold hearings if the cases are based on domestic violence,” says King, now a Berkeley, California-based consultant to immigration lawyers.

GUMMING UP THE WORKS

And that’s just asylum. For the immigration court system as a whole—and especially for working immigration judges—bigger problems have emerged from three decisions from Sessions that constrain judges’ ability to end or pause cases. That could worsen the already substantial backlog of cases in immigration court, which totaled more than 829,000 pending cases as of February, according to Syracuse University’s Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse.

Chief among these is Castro-Tum, the administrative closure case. Administrative closure ends a case without a decision, which permits judges to take cases off their dockets if they’re not ready to go forward. This was Morley’s intention in Castro-Tum, where the judge was concerned that the young man’s address was unreliable. Indeed, Tabaddor says the notice to appear was returned to the court after Castro-Tum was ordered deported; immigrant advocates suspect he may have returned to Guatemala.

There are multiple reasons why a pause might be desirable, McKinney explains. Many immigration cases depend on outside agencies’ actions; the State Department issues visas, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services confers green cards and citizenship. Some benefits are also available through state courts, and cases may hinge on a decision from a police agency or an expert of some kind.

For example, McKinney cites special immigrant juvenile status. That’s an immigration status granted to minors who were abandoned, abused or neglected by one or both parents, and recipients must get a court order saying so.

“You go through state court, and then you submit an application to USCIS,” McKinney says. “So what we would see generally is these cases would be either administratively closed or given extended continuances, and then the person would pursue the status. Those kids are now being ordered deported.”

Continuances could have helped, but three months after Castro-Tum, Sessions handed down another decision, Matter of LABR, that requires judges to write a full decision every time they grant a continuance.

“I probably got five to 40 requests for continuances daily when I was on the bench,” King says. “It discourages granting continuances because they’re not requiring the same sort of diligence if a judge denies the continuance.”

Photo of Carol King by Allan Brill

That’s why King believes LABR weighs the decision-making in favor of deportation. It’s also likely to drastically limit judges’ ability to end or postpone cases, along with Castro-Tum and a third decision from Sessions—Matter of SOG and FDB, which limits judges’ ability to terminate or dismiss deportation cases. In addition to making it harder for judges to manage their workloads, King says it’s bad for the system as a whole.

“It means that every case has to come into court, and if it’s not ready to go for some reason, it has to be reset in court,” she says. “It encourages double-booking of cases … which means that parties are not encouraged to be prepared.”

For clients and practitioners, McKinney says the end result is likely to be a flood of appeals.

“We had a 10-year-old ordered deported [while waiting for a USCIS decision],” he says. “Do you think we just said, ‘OK, judge,’ with the 10-year-old and then just took our order of deportation? No, we appealed!” After the Board of Immigration Appeals, litigants can take their cases to the federal appeals court for their circuits, and McKinney believes many will. Thus, he predicts that much of the immigration court backlog will filter up to the appeals courts in a few years.

CARROT OR STICK?

The DOJ is well aware of the backlog and has hired judges aggressively to address it. Several of the actions Sessions took on immigration were announced as ways to address that backlog.

That includes another of his controversial decisions: imposing quotas on immigration judges. Starting with the 2019 fiscal year, judges who want to be rated “satisfactory” on their performance reviews must complete at least 700 cases per year. No more than 15 percent of those cases should be overturned on appeal. There are also completion requirements for specific types of cases. A software dashboard allows judges to check their progress daily.

Asked about this in December, Executive Office for Immigration Review spokeswoman Kathryn Mattingly pointed the ABA Journal to a public conversation that agency Director James McHenry had in May 2018 with Andrew Arthur, executive director of the restrictionist Center for Immigration Studies. McHenry told Arthur that EOIR plans to take circumstances into account when evaluating judges under the new standards—most likely in fall 2019. However, McHenry said EOIR believes that the numbers chosen are reasonable expectations for experienced and properly trained judges.

The NAIJ and some retired judges don’t agree, in part because two judges may handle very different kinds of dockets. Cases involving serious criminal convictions, for example, might be quicker than asylum cases involving unaccompanied minors.

McHenry also testified about the changes before Congress, where he said the performance measures were “neither novel nor unique to EOIR,” and in line with measures recommended by the ABA and used by other federal administrative law systems.

Tabaddor sees that differently.

“The numbers are used as what I would say a carrot in many courts; it’s used to evaluate whether [changes] are needed,” she says. “But no legitimate court uses quotas and deadlines as a stick to put a judge’s job on the line, which directly interferes with their ability to sit impartially on a case.”

The ABA Judicial Division’s 2005 Guidelines for the Evaluation of Judicial Performance do not mention case completions. They say judges should be evaluated on legal ability, integrity, communication, professionalism and administrative ability. They also say evaluations shouldn’t compromise judicial independence and “should be free from political, ideological and issue-oriented considerations.”

King doesn’t think that’s the case here.

“To have judges evaluated on how quickly they’re pushing cases through the system is a really, really dangerous thing to do,” she says. “Because you’re basically tying the judges’ job security to whether they’re pushing cases through, and it’s clear from this administration that their idea with pushing cases through the system is to deny as many as possible.”

Tabaddor sees this as another encroachment on immigration judges’ independence.

“It’s basically psychological warfare with judges, [creating] a constant reminder of their numbers through this dashboard and a constant pressure to reach these unreasonable goals,” she says.

McKinney says he has seen this play out in practice. In one case, he discovered that his client’s minor child had been sexually assaulted in their home country, which became important to the family’s asylum application. The minor had not spoken to a mental health counselor, so McKinney moved for a continuance to allow her to do that. The judge denied it, in part because the evidence for the assault was not from a mental health professional.

“So what we got was … only half-baked consideration, because obviously in the motion we are asking for the time to talk to the precise professional that the judge wanted the minor child to talk to,” he says. “That is the pressure these judges are under.”

JOB OFFERS RESCINDED

The Justice Department actions raised earlier in this story may be concerning to some people, but they’re perfectly legal. However, there are also allegations that the Justice Department is taking politics into account in hiring immigration judges, who are part of the civil service system. The allegations have not been proved—but if true, they might break the law.

Washington, D.C., labor law attorney Zachary Henige says he has been approached by several people who were offered jobs as immigration judges or members of the Board of Immigration Appeals but had those offers rescinded after the 2016 election for what they believe are political reasons. The ABA Journal spoke to Henige about Dorothea Lay, the only client who has authorized him to discuss her case.

Photo of Zachary Henige courtesy of Kalijarvi, Chuzi, Newman & Fitch.

Lay has spent 25 years in the federal government’s immigration services agencies, and she is currently at USCIS. She was offered a job at the appeals board in October 2016. This required a fresh background check (she already has clearance at her existing job), so she understood that she would have to wait to finalize the job.

In late February 2017, Lay did hear back—but only via a two-sentence letter. It said that during the time it had taken to complete the background check, the needs of the agency had evolved, so EOIR was withdrawing the offer. However, the letter was postmarked on the same day that EOIR announced it would expand the number of seats on the board from 17 to 21—requiring four new hires. That’s one reason Lay was not convinced the agency’s needs had changed.

Another was that two of Lay’s recommenders were political appointees of Democrats. Her application also showed that she had worked on issues the Trump administration strongly opposed, including domestic violence as a basis for asylum, the issue in AB. Thus, it would have been easy to guess her politics. Asked about the allegations, EOIR spokeswoman Mattingly did not address them specifically, instead redirecting her comments about others who were hired.

Lay is pursuing a complaint through the federal government’s Office of Special Counsel, an independent agency that investigates alleged violations of the merit system for federal employees. Henige says he has been approached by others who had job offers rescinded after the election, not all of whom retained him.

Members of Congress have also gotten involved. In April 2018, Democratic Reps. Elijah Cummings of Maryland, Don Beyer of Virginia and Lloyd Doggett and Joaquin Castro of Texas wrote a letter to the Justice Department, saying multiple people had approached their offices after having job offers suspended or withdrawn for suspected political reasons.

Six people were hired not long after the letter, according to a statement from Cummings and Doggett. The DOJ did not make its response public, but that response was apparently leaked to Fox News, which said the DOJ acknowledged that 14 people were no longer under consideration for jobs, and gave nonpolitical explanations for all of those decisions.

Henige notes that there’s precedent for improperly politicized hiring, including the 2008 inspector general report from the DOJ. After that became a scandal in 2007, then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales implemented a hiring process intend-ed to insulate the immigration courts from political considerations, with final candidate recommendation duties shared by the EOIR director, a senior career employee and a senior political appointee.

In 2017, however, Sessions authorized substantial changes to that process, according to a memo uncovered by Human Rights First, a New York-based nonprofit that advocates for human rights and the rule of law, through the Freedom of Information Act. Those changes removed the EOIR director or his designee from the final recommendation stage and removed the chief immigration judge from an earlier stage. The effect is less direct oversight from the agency that will actually employ the judges, and a greater proportion of responsibility to the political appointee.

HIT THE ROAD, JUDGE

Immigration judges aren’t on the edge of revolt. Not every judge agrees with the NAIJ or the retired judges quoted for this article. Arthur, for example—a retired immigration judge—has praised both the use of self-certifications and some of the decisions Sessions made that way.

Perhaps more importantly, immigration judges have limited recourse. As career federal employees, they aren’t legally permitted to strike, Tabaddor says, and lawsuits are limited to cases of individual judges with specific grievances. She says labor union negotiations have been minimally helpful. The grievance filed after the cases were taken from Morley was denied by EOIR last fall on the grounds that EOIR’s actions were lawful, and the NAIJ has merely filed formal correspondences on other matters.

Photo of Ashley Tabaddor by Melodi Miremadi

That’s why Tabaddor wants a more permanent solution: Take the immigration courts out of the Justice Department and put them into an independent agency.

“It’s been done with the bankruptcy courts, it’s been done with the Court of Federal Claims, it’s been done with Tax Court,” she says. “Having a court within the same agency that basically has a law enforcement mandate cannot be defended.”

Mattingly says EOIR believes this is unnecessary and would take substantial resources. But it’s a long-standing goal—not just for NAIJ, but for the ABA House of Delegates, which called for independent immigration courts in 2010’s Resolution 114F. More recently, former ABA President Hilarie Bass testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Border Security and Immigration in 2018 in favor of independent immigration courts, as did Tabaddor. Arthur testified against it, citing constitutional concerns. Immigration court independence has also long been on the wish lists of AILA and the Federal Bar Association.

The four organizations have been working on legislation to make that a reality, McKinney says, though the coalition differs on details of how best to structure the agency. But the goal is the same: insulating the immigration courts from politics by moving them into an independent agency.

McKinney, who is actively involved in the effort through AILA, notes that major agency reforms don’t happen overnight—but he’s bullish about the possibilities.

“We have seen some genuine interest, and now that the Democrats are taking control of the House, we will see if that can turn into actual legislation,” McKinney says. “My heart goes out to the literally thousands of people who are going to be victims of this flawed system until the day comes that we can get it fixed. But I believe that we can get it fixed.”

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Jeremy McKinney is right. Thousands of humans have been and will continue to be victimized by this screwed up system until it finally gets fixed. Immigration Judges have become “robed pawns” in what has become a cruel parody of justice. And, to be honest about it, far, far too many Article III Judges “punt” on their oaths of office by giving unwarranted “deference” to a system that merits none. Indeed, in a “court” controlled by prosecutors and driven by overtly political, restrictionist agendas, it would make much more sense and be fairer to presume that each removal order is biased in favor of DHS unless the DOJ can establish otherwise.

PWS

03-29-19

“THE 5-4-1 PLAN FOR DUE PROCESS IN IMMIGRATION COURT” — My Speech To The Association Of Deportation Defense Attorneys, NY City, March 21, 2019

ASSOCIATION OF DEPORTATION DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (“ADDA”)

NEW YORK CITY

MARCH 21, 2019

“THE 5-4-1 PLAN FOR DUE PROCESS IN IMMIGRATION COURT”

PAUL WICKHAM SCHMIDT

U.S. IMMIGRATION JUDGE (RETIRED)

Good evening. Thanks so much for coming out tonight. As you know, I’m retired, so I no longer have to give my famous, or infamous, “super-comprehensive disclaimer.” However, I do want to hold my fellow panelists, ADDA, and anybody else of any importance whatsoever “harmless” for my following remarks.

They are solely my views, for which I take full responsibility. That’s right, no party line, no “bureaucratic doublespeak,” no BS. Just the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, of course as I define truth.

In my brief “5-4-1 program,” I’m going to tell you five horrible problems infecting justice and Due Process in today’s U.S. Immigration Courts; 4 needed reforms, and one solution.

First, the problems, with which I’m sure most of you are painfully familiar. This isn’t a “court system” as any right-thinking person would envision it.

First, unlike any normal court system, the chief prosecutor, the Attorney General selects, directs, and “supervises” the “judges.” Not surprisingly, over the last decade, over 90% of the judges have come directly from government or prosecutorial backgrounds. Well-qualified candidates from private practice, NGOs, and academia have effectively been excluded from participation in today’s immigration judiciary. As part of his “improper influence” over the Immigration Courts, the Attorney General has imposed, over the objection of all judges I’m aware of, demeaning and counterproductive “production quotas” that elevate productivity and expediency over quality, Due Process, and fundamental fairness.

Second, notwithstanding that, according to the Supreme Court, “everything that makes life worth living” might be at issue in Immigration Court, there is no right to appointed counsel. Therefore, DOJ has taken the absurd position that infants, toddlers, and others with no understanding whatsoever of our complicated legal, asylum, and immigration systems are forced to “represent themselves” in life or death matters against experienced ICE Counsel. The Government disingenuously claims that this complies with Due Process.

Obviously, these first two factors give the DHS a huge built-in advantage in removal proceedings. But, sometimes that isn’t enough. Somehow, despite the odds being stacked against them, the individual respondent or applicant prevails. That’s when the “third absurdity” comes in to play.

The chief prosecutor, the Attorney General, can reach into the system and change any individual case result that he or she doesn’t like and rewrite the immigration law in DHS’s favor through so-called “certified precedents.” As you know, former Attorney General Sessions, a committed lifelong xenophobe and the self-proclaimed “king of immigration enforcement” exercised this authority often, more than the preceding two Attorneys General over the eight years they served. Sometimes he intervened even before the BIA had a chance to rule on the case or over the joint objections of both the individual and the DHS.

Fourth, this system operates under an incredible 1.1 million case backlog, resulting largely from what we call “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” or “ADR,” by DOJ politicos and their EOIR underlings. This largely self-created backlog continues to grow exponentially, even with a significant increase in judges, without any realistic plan for backlog reduction. In other words, under the “maliciously incompetent” management of this Administration, more judges has meant more backlog.

Even more disgustingly, in an attempt to cover up their gross incompetence, DOJ and EOIR have attempted to shift the blame to the victims — asylum applicants, migrants, their hard-working often pro bono or low bono lawyers, and the judges themselves. Sophomoric, idiotic non “solutions” like “deportation quotas for judges,” limitations on legitimate continuances, demeaningly stripping judges of the last vestiges of their authority to manage dockets through administrative closing, and mindlessly re-docketing cases that should remain off docket have been imposed on the courts over their objections.

The result has been an increase in “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” the only thing that DOJ politicos and EOIR bureaucrats seem to excel in. How many of YOU have been victims of ADR?

Fifth, the Administration, DOJ, and EOIR use so-called “civil immigration detention” mostly in absurdly, yet intentionally, out-of-the-way locations, to limit representation, coerce migrants into abandoning claims or appeals, and supposedly deter future migration, even through there is scant evidence that abusive detention actually acts as a deterrent. This is done with little or no effective judicial recourse in too many cases. Indeed a recent TRAC study shows neither rhyme nor reason in custody or bond decisions in Immigration Court, even in those cases where the Immigration Judges at least nominally had jurisdiction to set bond.

Now, I’ve told you how due process and fairness are being mocked by DOJ and EOIR in a dysfunctional Immigration Court system where judges have effectively been told to act as “DOJ attorneys” carrying out the policies of their “partners” in DHS enforcement, supposedly a separate party to Immigration Court proceedings but now “driving the train.”

Here are the four essential reforms. First, and foremost, a return to the original “Due Process Focus” of the Immigration Courts: through teamwork and innovation be the world’s best courts guaranteeing fairness and Due Process for all. DOJ politicos and EOIR bureaucrats must be removed from their improper influence over this system that has turned it into a tool of DHS enforcement. Everything done by the courts must go through a “Due Process filter.”

Second, replace the antiquated, inappropriate, bloated, and ineffective “Agency-Style Structure” with a “Court-Style Structure” with sitting judges rather than DOJ politicos and EOIR bureaucrats in charge. Court administration should be decentralized through local Chief Judges, as in other systems, appointed competitively through a broad-based merit system and required to handle a case load. Sitting judges, not bureaucrats, must ultimately be in charge of administrative decisions which must be made in a fair and efficient manner that considers the legitimate needs of DHS enforcement, along with the needs of the other parties coming before the court, and results in a balanced system, rather than one that inevitably favors DHS enforcement over Due Process, quality, and fairness.

Third, create a professional administrative office modeled along the lines of the Administrative Office for U.S. Courts to provide modern, effective judicial support and planning. The highest priorities should be implementing a nationwide e-filing system following nearly two decades of wasted and inept efforts by EOIR to develop one, efforts that have once again been put “on hold” due to mismanagement. A transparent, merit-based hiring system for Immigration Judges, with fair and equal treatment of “non-government” applicants and a system for obtaining public input in the process is also a must. Additionally, the courts must be redesigned with the size of the dockets and public service in mind, rather than mindlessly jamming a 21st century workload into “mini-courts” designed for a long bygone era.

Fourth, a real Appellate Division that performs as an independent court, must replace the “Falls Church Service Center” a/k/a the BIA. The crippling Ashcroft purge-related bogus “reforms” that turned the BIA into a subservient assembly line must be eradicated. The BIA is a so-called “deliberative body” that is far removed from the public it serves and no longer deliberates in a publicly visible manner. The Appellate Division, not politicos and bureaucrats, must be responsible for promulgating precedents in controversial areas, insuring that the generous standards set forth in Cardoza-Fonseca and Mogharrabi are made realities, not just lip service, and reining in wayward judges, the worst of whom have turned some areas into veritable “asylum and due process free zones” resulting in loss of public confidence as well as denial of Due Process and unfair removals.

Some will say that these reforms only deal with two of the five glaring problems — prosecutorial control and political interference. But, an independent, judge-run, Due Process focused U.S. Immigration Court where judges control their own dockets free from political interference and bureaucratic incompetence will be able to work with both private entities and the DHS to solve the problems leading to lack of representation, “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” and backlog building, and abusive use of immigration detention.

No, all problems that have been allowed to fester and grow over decades of calculated indifference and active mismanagement won’t be solved “overnight.” Additional legislative fixes might eventually be necessary. But, fixing Due Process is a prerequisite that will enable other problems and issues to be constructively and cooperatively addressed, rather than just being swept under the carpet in typical bureaucratic fashion.

So, now the “One Solution:” Congress must create an independent Article I U.S. Immigration Court. That’s exactly what the ABA Commission on Immigration recommended in a comprehensive study and report released yesterday.

Thus, the ABA joins the FBA, AILA, and the NAIJ, all organizations to which I belong, in recommending an Article I legislative solution. Significantly, after watching this Administration’s all out assault on Due Process, common sense, truth, the rule of law, human decency, and best practices, the ABA deleted a prior “alternative recommendation” for an independent agency within the Executive Branch. In other words, we now know, beyond any reasonable doubt, that the Executive Branch is both unwilling and unable to run an independent court system in accordance with Due Process.

I highly recommend that you read the comprehensive ABA report in two volumes: Volume I is an “Executive Summary;” Volume II contains the “Detailed Findings.” You can find it on the ABA website or on immigrationcourtside.com my blog, which, of course, I also highly recommend.

In closing, we need change and we need it now! Every day in our so-called “Immigration Courts” Due Process is being mocked, fundamental fairness violated, and unjust results are being produced by a disastrously flawed system run by those with no interest in fixing it. Indeed, one of the stunning recommendations of the ABA is that no further judges be added to this totally dysfunctional and out of control system until it is fixed.

As the great Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., once said “injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.” Tell your elected representatives that you’ve had enough injustice and are sick and tired of being treated as actors in a repertory company specializing in “theater of the absurd” masquerading as a “court system.” Demand Article I now!

Thanks for listening! Join the New Due Process Army, do great things, and Due Process Forever!

(03-21-19)

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The horror stories from those actually attempting to practice in the NY Immigration “Courts,” the examples of “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” (“ADR”) from my friend, “Our Gang” colleague, and fellow panelist Retired U.S. Immigration Judge Patty McManus, and pressing need for an independent Article I Court to replace this dishonest and dysfunctional mess described by fellow panelist NY Attorney Jake LaRaus, of Youman, Mateo, & Fasano were most compelling.

Recurring complaints from the audience were the unequal treatment of private attorneys and DHS Counsel, the glaringly inappropriate deference shown by some Immigration Judges to DHS, and the unwillingness of some judges to enforce rules against the DHS. In other words, many of the things that EOIR originally supposed to “cure” are now “back in spades.” Everyone echoed the theme that this is a system in regression, where things that “worked” at one time have now been intentionally disabled by DHS and EOIR.

Independence and competent, professional, apolitical judicial management by judges would go a long way toward reducing today’s
Government-created backlogs. The problem is definitely not, as some would claim, the number of asylum seekers. Indeed legitimate asylum seekers all over this system who have been waiting years for their cases to be heard and who have time and time again been the victims of “ADR” and politicized meddling with the legal standards are among the many victims of this broken system.

We should all be ashamed of this disgraceful perversion of our Constitution and grotesque waste of Government money going on every day. The solution isn’t “rocket science;” it’s Article I. An achievable idea “whose time has come.”

PWS

03-22-19

ABA PRESIDENT BOB CARLSON PUTS DUE PROCESS CRISIS IN IMMIGRATION @ TOP OF HIS “MUST DO” LIST — Independent Article I U.S. Immigration Court & More Legal Representation Are The Keys!

http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/immigration-matters-fair-process

Immigration Matters: A fairer process is needed for those seeking entry to the United States

BY BOB CARLSON

MARCH 20

Photo of Bob Carlson by Tom Salyer

“Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free.”

These words from an Emma Lazarus sonnet, engraved on a plaque on the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty, are not policy or law. Yet they embody the ideals and spirit of America, a land of immigrants.

Despite the countless ways that immigrants have advanced our country and have helped to fuel innovation and growth, the United States cannot welcome everyone who yearns to breathe free. Our nation needs to regulate and control immigration, have secure borders and keep people safe. But developing clear, comprehensive, practical and humane immigration law is possible—and long overdue.

Policies that separate children from their parents or deny legitimate asylum-seekers due process violate both our values and established law. The ABA has made this clear in a letter sent to the U.S. Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security. The ABA has suggested guidelines and compiled thoughtful and well-researched publications such as the recently updated “Standards for the Custody, Placement and Care; Legal Representation; and Adjudication of Unaccompanied Alien Children in the United States.”

While crafting comprehensive immigration law in a divided society can be difficult, it is imperative. One place to start is immigration courts.

An independent judiciary is a hallmark of our democracy. It encompasses the principle that all people are entitled to fair and impartial legal proceedings where important rights are at stake. Immigration courts decide issues that are life-altering.

Immigration courts, however, lack the safeguards that other parts of our justice system have. Structural and procedural issues have resulted in a backlog of more than 800,000 cases even though in recent years Congress has added resources, including a sizable increase in the number of judges and support staff.

Immigration courts currently exist within the Justice Department. Their personnel and operations are subject to direct control of the attorney general. Immigration judges can be removed without cause and can be at the mercy of whatever policy the attorney general wants followed. It can change from administration to administration. This structure creates a fatal flaw to an independent, impartial judiciary.

Restructuring the immigration adjudication system into an Article I court is the best solution to promote independence, impartiality, efficiency and accountability. Article I legislative courts are established by Congress, and judges would only be subject to removal for cause and not without judicial review. The U.S. Tax Court—where judges are nominated by the president, confirmed by the Senate and serve terms of 15 years—could act as a model. The idea has been endorsed by the National Association of Immigration Judges for more than two decades. The ABA adopted policy in 2010 calling for the creation of Article I immigration courts.

Another problem is representation. Access to counsel and legal information are critical in ensuring fairness and efficiency in the immigration system, yet only 37 percent of people in removal proceedings and just 14 percent of those detained are represented by counsel. The odds of winning an asylum case without legal representation are one in 10 while those with a lawyer win nearly 50 percent of their cases.

The ABA supports the right to appointed counsel for vulnerable populations in immigration proceedings, such as unaccompanied children, and mentally ill and indigent immigrants. Budgetary challenges make this unlikely to happen soon, so access to as much information about the process is critical.

The ABA, supported by its Commission on Immigration, will continue to advocate for fairness and full due process for immigrants and asylum-seekers in the United States and ensure an equitable, effective process for adjudicating immigration cases. This serves the interest of both the government and individuals within the system.

Our efforts to solve the problems must not undermine the fundamental principles that exemplify America and our justice system. Welcoming immigrants has been a strength of America since its founding.

As President George Washington said: “The bosom of America is open to receive not only the opulent and respectable stranger, but the oppressed and persecuted of all nations and religions; whom we shall welcome to a participation of all our rights and privileges, if by decency and propriety of conduct they appear to merit the enjoyment.”

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I testified before the ABA Commission on Immigration about the “Due Process Crisis in Immigration Court,” the need for an Article I Court, the requirement for more lawyers, and the absolute Due Process disaster engendered by the intentionally misguided policies of the Trump Administration as they related to the abusive, counterproductive, and disingenuous use of the Immigration Courts as a branch of DHS Enforcement. The massive failure of Due Process in the U.S. Immigration Courts, the “retail level” of our justice system, threatens the individuals rights of all of us!

PWS

03-03-19

ABA PRESIDENT BOB CARLSON MAKES STRONG STATEMENT RECOGNIZING ESSENTIAL ROLE OF ATTORNEYS IN IMMIGRATOIN PROCESS, REBUTTING SESSIONS’S FALSE ATTACKS, AND ENDORSING AN ARTICLE I COURT!

Statement of ABA President Bob Carlson
Re: Immigration lawyers and judges

WASHINGTON, Sept. 11, 2018 — The American Bar Association applauds the work of lawyers who help assure fairness and due process in our nation’s immigration courts. During a visit last month to the border in Texas, I was very impressed by their hard work in difficult circumstances. Our Constitution guarantees certain rights to all people in the United States, including men, women and children who come here to escape lawlessness and violence in their home countries.

The ABA strongly supports the independence of immigration judges and immigration courts. These courts should not be subordinate to any executive branch agency, including the Justice Department. Instead, we support the creation of truly independent immigration courts and judges under Article I of the U.S. Constitution. Such an arrangement would remove any perception that politics can play a role in dispensing justice with matters of immigration.

Our American democracy rests upon the rule of law – and the rule of law rests upon the work of impartial, independent judges, as well as knowledgeable, hard-working lawyers, including immigration attorneys who pursue justice, both for the government and for immigrants who seek asylum.

With more than 400,000 members, the American Bar Association is one of the largest voluntary professional membership organizations in the world. As the national voice of the legal profession, the ABA works to improve the administration of justice, promotes programs that assist lawyers and judges in their work, accredits law schools, provides continuing legal education, and works to build public understanding around the world of the importance of the rule of law.

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Thanks to my good friend and colleague Judge Joan Churchill for alerting me to this item. Joan has been doing some great work in behalf of the Article I Immigration Court through the Immigration Committee of the ABA’s National Conference of the Administrative Law Judiciary. I just joined that Committee at her urging, and encourage all of my colleagues — retired and active — to do the same. Let Joan or me know if you would like information on how to join.

PWS

09-17-17

ABA JOURNAL: Superstar Reporter Lorelei Laird Exposes The Impending Disaster In The U.S. Immigration Courts! (I Am One Of Her Quoted Sources)

http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/legal_logjam_immigration_court

Lorelei reports:

“In the fall of 2016, the Executive Office for Immigration Review was busy addressing these problems by hiring aggressively, spokeswoman Kathryn Mattingly said.

As of March, she said the agency had 301 seated judges and had requested authorization for a total of 399 judgeships. Those new judges are welcomed by legal and immigration groups—including the ABA, which called for more immigration judges with 2010’s Resolution 114B.

But that effort may be overwhelmed by changes under the Trump administration. Trump’s actions since taking office emphasize enforcement; his executive orders call for 10,000 more ICE agents and 5,000 more CBP officers, and they substantially reduce use of prosecutorial discretion. In his first months in office, there were several high-profile deportations of immigrants who had previously benefited from prosecutorial discretion and had little or no criminal record.

Although the DOJ eventually said immigration judges weren’t subject to the hiring freeze, it’s unclear whether immigration courts will be funded enough to handle all the additional cases. If not, Schmidt says, wait times will only worsen.

“If they really put a lot more people in proceedings, then it seems to me the backlog’s going to continue to grow,” he says. “How are they going to take on more work with the number of cases that are already there?”

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This is just a small sample. Read Lorelei’s much lengthier and complete analysis of all of the problems, including interviews with a number of other experts and a cross-reference to the ABA’s previous work predicting just such a docket disaster at the above link.

In my view, the Trump Administration is aggravating the problem, rather than seeking to improve the delivery of due process. Given the nature of the system, they might get away with it for awhile. But, eventually, one way or another, these chickens are coming home to roost. And, when they do, it won’t be pretty for the Administration, for anyone involved with the U.S. Immigration Court system, and for the American system of justice.

PWS

03/27/17

American Bar Association Adopts Resolution Opposing President Trump’s Executive Order On Visas & Refugees!

https://us.vocuspr.com/Publish/515903/vcsPRAsset_515903_132952_3a1e221c-3f7f-4046-8513-36015233ac7e_0.jpg
American Bar Association
Communications and Media Relations Division
www.americanbar.org/news

Release: Immediate

Contact: Karen DeWitt
Phone: 202-662-1502
Email: Karen.DeWitt@americanbar.org
Online: http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2017/02/aba_urges_president.html

ABA urges President Trump to withdraw order restricting travel from seven Muslim-majority countries

MIAMI, Feb. 6, 2017 — The American Bar Association urged President Donald Trump today to withdraw the executive order “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” which restricts immigration from seven Muslim-majority countries, suspends all refugee admission for 120 days and indefinitely suspends the entry of Syrian refugees.

By voice vote, the ABA House of Delegates, the association’s policy-making body, adopted resolution 10C calling on the executive branch to ensure full, prompt, and uniform compliance with court orders addressing the executive order.

The House––made up of 589 members representing state and local bar associations, ABA entities and ABA-affiliated organizations––also urged the administration to take care that all executive orders regarding border security, immigration enforcement and terrorism:

respect the bounds of the U.S. Constitution and due process rights;

not use religion or nationality as a basis for barring an otherwise eligible individual from admission to the United States;

adhere to the U.S.’s international law obligations relating to the status of refugees and to the principle of non-refoulement; and

facilitate a transparent, accessible, fair and efficient system of administering the immigration laws and policies of the United States and ensure protection for refugees, asylum seekers, torture victims and others deserving of humanitarian refuge;

In Resolution 10B, the House also reaffirmed the ABA’s support of legal protection for refugees, asylum seekers, torture victims, and others deserving of humanitarian refuge. It urged Congress to adopt additional legislation to appropriate funds for refugee applications and processing, and mandate that refugees receive an appropriate individualized assessment in a timely fashion that excludes national origin and religion as the basis for making such determination.

The association’s policy-making body discussion took place at the James L. Knight Center of the Hyatt Regency Miami. The session concluded the 2017 ABA Midyear Meeting, which began Feb. 1.

With more than 400,000 members, the American Bar Association is one of the largest voluntary professional membership organizations in the world. As the national voice of the legal profession, the ABA works to improve the administration of justice, promotes programs that assist lawyers and judges in their work, accredits law schools, provides continuing legal education, and works to build public understanding around the world of the importance of the rule of law. View our privacy statement on line. Follow the latest ABA news at www.americanbar.org/news and on Twitter @ABANews.

If you would rather not receive future communications from American Bar Association, let us know by clicking here.
American Bar Association, 321 N Clark St, Chicago, IL 60654-7598 United States

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Thanks to my good friend Dan Kowalski over at Lexis Nexis for forwarding this to me.

PWS

02/07/17

Methodology and Findings

The President Must Have the Power to Remove At Will Officers Who Perform Executive Functions

Due Process Limits the Power to Remove Officers Who Perform Only Adjudicative Functions

Conclusion

Endnotes

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JOB OFFERS RESCINDED

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