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⚖️🗽CREAMED AGAIN! — 1st Circuit Finds Errors Galore In BIA’s Denial Of Withholding To Honduran Woman: Credibility; Corroboration; Following Precedent; CAT Claim! — Molina-Diaz v. Wilkinson

EYORE — “Eyore In Distress”
Once A Symbol of Fairness, Due Process, & Best Practices, Now Gone “Belly Up”

Four Horsemen — BIA Asylum Panel In Action
Albrecht Dürer, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

Star Chamber Justice — “Justice”
Star Chamber
Style

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/15-2321P-01A.pdf

Molina-Diaz v. Wilkinson, 1st Cir., 02-25-02

PANEL: Howard, Chief Judge, and Kayatta, Circuit Judge.**Judge Torruella heard oral argument in this matter and participated in the semble, but he did not participate in the issuance of the panel’s opinion in this case. The remaining two panelists therefore issued the opinion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).

ATTORNEYS: Nancy J. Kelly, with whom John Willshire Carrera and Harvard Immigration & Refugee Clinic of Harvard Law School at Greater Boston Legal Services were on brief, for petitioner.

Stratton C. Strand, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, with whom Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Douglas E. Ginsburg, Assistant Director, and Derek C. Julius, Senior Litigation Counsel, were on brief, for respondent.

OPINION BY: Chief Judge Howard

KEY QUOTE:

Petitioner Olga Araceli Molina- Diaz is a Honduran native and citizen who twice entered the United States without authorization. The government ordered her removed to Honduras, and an immigration judge (“IJ”) denied her subsequent application for withholding of removal (“Application”). Molina appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which affirmed the IJ’s order and denied Molina’s motion to reopen and remand. Molina now petitions this court to review the BIA’s decision. Because we agree that the IJ and BIA made legal errors, we grant the petition, vacate the removal order, and remand for further proceedings.

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Folks, we’re not talking about obtuse principles of international law, complex statutory interpretation, or “cutting edge” legal concepts. No, this is about credibility, corroboration, following your own precedents (even when they might produce a result favorable to the respondent), and adjudicating a CAT claim.

These are the “bread and butter” of basic asylum and withholding adjudication that is the staple of most Immigration Court dockets. Not rocket science! Yet, once they got below the “caption line,” the BIA, a supposedly “expert tribunal,” got pretty much everything else wrong. With human life at stake, no less!

This isn’t just an “outlier.” It reveals deep systemic problems in a dysfunctional system that has been programmed to cut corners and deny relief. After 21 years as an EOIR Judge at every level, I know an “autopilot denial” when I see one.

This is clearly the product of a judge and a BIA panel that approached the case with a “we deny almost all Hondurans, it’s just a question of how” attitude. Because “the bottom line got to no,” obviously nobody paid much, if any, attention to what was above it. I suspect that if the staff attorney had drafted this as a grant or a remand, the BIA panel would have given it a more thorough and searching review.

Following your own precedents isn’t a matter that requires profound knowledge or amazing analytical skills. It just requires some level of basic expertise and an open mind — things that appear to be sorely lacking throughout today’s broken EOIR.

The flawed EOIR approach to claims for asylum and withholding, particularly those involving the Northern Triangle and women, is very costly, not only to the humans involved, but also to our justice system. This respondent reentered the U.S. in 2009, and her merits hearing before the IJ took place in 2012. A careful, proper analysis could well have resulted in a grant at that time.

Instead, this “plethora of errors,” created by EOIR’s corner cutting and obsession with denying claims, bounced around the system for nearly a decade before being “outed” by the Circuit Court — obviously the only judges involved who took the time to actually analyze the case in accordance with the law, the facts, and the arguments made by counsel. So, after nearly a decade, at three different levels of review, we’re basically back to “square one” with this case.

The case will be returned to the BIA who inevitably will return it to to the IJ for a new hearing that actually complies with the law and due process. Given the total dysfunction in the EOIR system, it’s could easily be around for another decade.

Getting it right at the first level is critically important in a high volume, yet life determining, system like the Immigration Courts! That’s why it’s so absolutely essential that Judge Garland replace the current BIA and many of the current trial judges with “practical experts;” judges selected on a merit-basis because of their understanding of immigration and human rights laws, demonstrated analytical skills, and who by experience and reputation are overwhelmingly committed to due process, fundamental fairness, treating respondents and their lawyers with respect and dignity, and getting the right result the first time around. “The best and the brightest,” if you will!

As this case that began well before Trump shows, the deterioration at EOIR has been underway across Administrations over the past two decades. It greatly accelerated and became more acute under Trump. That’s particularly true because “Trump AGs” drastically expanded the Immigration Courts and the BIA (while exponentially increasing the backlog), and now have appointed the majority of judges in the system — after just four years!

Compare that with the Obama Administration’s practice of taking an mind-boggling average of two years to fill IJ vacancies! And, then filling them almost all with “government insiders and former prosecutors” rather than some of the many renowned “practical scholars,” experienced clinicians, and notable litigators in the private/academic/NGO immigration/human rights sectors. They actually left behind unfilled judicial vacancies for Sessions to “pounce on.” Says all you really need to know about the “priority” of immigrant justice in the Obama Administration. The “good enough for government work” attitude that has replaced “guaranteeing fairness and due process for all” as the “EOIR Vision” needs to go, now!

🇺🇸⚖️🗽Due Process Forever! Achieving it in the Immigration Courts will be the “litmus test” of whether Judge Garland succeeds or fails in his new role as Attorney General! You can’t improve justice for all in America while running a “court system” that denies justice, often ignores the law, mocks due process, eschews best practices and common sense, and routinely disrespects the humanity of those appearing before it! All while running up a stunning 1.3 million case backlog! As Justice Sotomayor would say: “This is not justice!”

PWS

02-26-21

1ST CIR. BOPS BIA’S BOILERPLATE DENIAL OF DOCUMENTED WITHHOLDING CLAIM – AGUILAR-ESCOTO V. SESSIONS!

1stCirAsy:WH16-1090P-01A

Aguilar-Escoto v. Sessions, 1st Cir., 10-27-17, published

PANEL: Howard, Chief Judge,Thompson and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: Chief Judge Howard

KEY QUOTE:

“We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact under the “substantial evidence” standard, meaning that we will not disturb such findings if they are “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Xin Qiang Liu v. Lynch, 802 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). In our review of the record, we note that while the BIA need not “discuss every piece of evidence offered,” it is “required to consider all

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relevant evidence in the record.” Lin v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). Consistent with this obligation, the Eleventh Circuit has specifically held that “an adverse credibility determination does not alleviate the BIA’s duty to consider other evidence produced by” an applicant for relief. Hong Chen v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 231 F. App’x 900, 902 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Forgue v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 2005)). Rather, where the applicant provides evidence other than her own testimony, the agency “must consider that evidence” and may not “rely solely on an adverse credibility determination.” Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1287. According to the Eleventh Circuit, the agency’s failure to fulfill this duty is grounds for vacating the BIA decision, irrespective of the merits of the adverse credibility finding. See Toska v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 194 F. App’x 767, 768 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Khattak v. Holder, 704 F.3d 197, 208 (1st Cir. 2013) (“[W]e will remand if the agency fails to state with sufficient particularity and clarity the reasons for denial of [relief] or otherwise to offer legally sufficient reasons for its decision.” (citation omitted)).

We agree with the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to this issue, which is consistent with our precedent. See Rasiah v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2009) (“An adverse credibility finding by itself would not automatically doom a claim for asylum.”). The appropriate result in this case follows easily.

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Even assuming that its credibility ruling was supportable, the BIA was required to go further and address whether, setting Aguilar’s testimony to one side, the documentary evidence entitled her to relief. See Lin, 521 F.3d at 28; Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1287. Indeed, the IJ expressly recognized that this documentary evidence, if believed, was sufficient to establish multiple acts of domestic violence against Aguilar by her ex-husband. In these circumstances, the BIA’s failure to consider or even acknowledge the evidence requires remand. See Toska, 194 F. App’x at 768; Khattak, 704 F.3d at 208. We take no position on the merits of the IJ’s holding that the abuse reflected in the documentary evidence was not sufficiently severe to warrant relief. This issue is best left to be addressed by the BIA in the first instance.

We note, for the benefit of the agency on remand, that the Board’s failure to consider Aguilar’s documentary evidence may have been rooted in its fundamental misunderstanding of her claim. Again, the Board appears to have operated under the mistaken assumption that Aguilar had applied for asylum as well as withholding of removal. These two grounds for relief are not identical. For one thing, withholding of removal requires a higher likelihood of persecution than asylum. See Romilus v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that applicants for withholding must satisfy a “more likely than not” standard (citation omitted)). There is, however, a different sense in which

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the asylum standard may be more exacting. Withholding claims “lack a subjective component and are [thus] concerned only with objective evidence of future persecution.” Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 155-56 (2d Cir. 2006); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430 (1987) (explaining that the relevant statutory language “has no subjective component”). Asylum, by contrast, has both a subjective and an objective component: it requires a showing that the applicant “genuinely fears persecution,” in addition to proof that the “fear is objectively reasonable.” Makhoul v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 75, 80 (1st Cir. 2004). Applicants “typically” seek to establish the requisite “genuineness” through their “own credible testimony.” Id. at 80-81. An adverse credibility finding thus may prove fatal to this aspect of an asylum claim. But, because withholding of removal requires no such genuine belief, a withholding claim “may, in appropriate instances, be sustained” despite an adverse credibility finding. Paul, 444 F.3d at 156.

In the present case, the BIA may well have been justified in concluding that, absent her own credible testimony, Aguilar failed to establish a subjectively genuine fear that she would be persecuted upon returning to Honduras. This failure would doom an asylum claim notwithstanding additional evidence establishing that a reasonable person in Aguilar’s circumstances would have feared persecution. See Makhoul, 387 F.3d at 80-81. But, in the withholding context, the inquiry is a strictly objective one. See

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Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430-31. Thus, even after discrediting Aguilar’s testimony, arguably the only evidence that she did in fact harbor a subjective fear of persecution, the BIA was nonetheless obliged to consider documentary evidence potentially capable of establishing her likelihood of suffering further abuse.

Rather than embarking on this objective assessment, the BIA fell back on the familiar refrain that, because “the applicant did not establish eligibility for asylum, it follows that she cannot establish eligibility for withholding of removal, which has a higher burden of proof.” Such a conclusion is unassailable where the applicant’s subjective fear is proven or assumed, and the denial of the asylum claim turns on the lack of evidence that the fear was objectively reasonable. See, e.g., Makhoul, 387 F.3d at 81. But the same is not necessarily true where an asylum claim fails due to a lack of credible testimony establishing the applicant’s subjective fear. The Board’s failure to apply the appropriate, purely objective standard to Aguilar’s withholding claim provides an independent basis for remand. See Kozak v. Gonzáles, 502 F.3d 34, 38 (1st Cir. 2007) (remanding because “the BIA applied an inappropriate legal standard”); Castañeda-Castillo v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 2007) (remanding “to allow the matter to be considered anew under the proper legal standards”).

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III.
For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the BIA’s order

dismissing Aguilar’s appeal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

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You can read the complete opinion at the link

This type of reversal does not involve a “Chevron-type” legal policy issue where the BIA and the Article IIIs might well reach different conclusions. Rather, this case is all about the BIA misapplying the “fundamental nuts and bolts” of credibility and withholding analysis in putting out a “boilerplate denial.” Why should the Article IIIs be finding “mechanical-analytical” issues that the expert BIA missed? Perhaps the EOIR system is “peddling too fast.” In that case, Sessions’s proposed “production quotas for judges” are the absolute worst thing that could happen to the Immigration Courts and Due Process.

Also, if the Article IIIs are better than the BIA at the basics of immigration and asylum law, why shouldn’t the Article IIIs, not the BIA, be getting “Chevron deference?”

Molina-Diaz v. Wilkinson, 1st Cir., 02-25-02

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