Matter of NEGUSIE, 27 I&N Dec. 347 (BIA 2018)
Here’s the link:
BIA HEADNOTE:
(1) An applicant who is subject to being barred from establishing eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal based on the persecution of others may claim a duress defense, which is limited in nature.
(2) To meet the minimum threshold requirements of the duress defense to the persecutor bar, an applicant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he acted under an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to himself or others; (2) he reasonably believed that the threatened harm would be carried out unless he acted or refrained from acting; (3) he had no reasonable opportunity to escape or otherwise frustrate the threat; (4) he did not place himself in a situation in which he knew or reasonably should have known that he would likely be forced to act or refrain from acting; and (5) he knew or reasonably should have known that the harm he inflicted was not greater than the threatened harm to himself or others.
BIA PANEL: APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGES GRANT, GREER, MAPPHRUS
OPINION BY: Judge Edward R. Grant
CONCURRING & DISSENTING OPINION: Judge Garry d. Malphrus
KEY QUOTE FROM MAJORITY:
In a decision dated May 31, 2005, an Immigration Judge denied the applicant’s applications for asylum and withholding of removal but granted his request for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987; for the United States Apr. 18, 1988) (“Convention Against Torture”). On February 7, 2006, we dismissed the appeals of both the applicant and the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).1 This case is now before us on remand pursuant to a decision of the United States Supreme Court in
1 The DHS does not now challenge the applicant’s grant of deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture.
347
Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 347 (BIA 2018) Interim Decision #3930
Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009). Having reviewed the record and the arguments presented by the parties and amici curiae, we will again dismiss the applicant’s appeal.2
We conclude that duress is relevant in determining whether an alien who assisted or otherwise participated in persecution is prevented by the so-called “persecutor bar” from establishing eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal under sections 101(a)(42), 208(b)(2)(A)(i), and 241(b)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(2)(A)(i), and 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) (2012), and for withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c) and (d)(2) (2018).3 In this decision, we set forth a standard for evaluating claims of duress in this context. Applying that standard to the uncontested findings of fact in the record, we conclude that the applicant has not established that he was under duress when he assisted in the persecution of prisoners who were persecuted under his guard in an Eritrean prison camp.
KEY QUOTE FROM DISSENT:
The United States Supreme Court remanded this case for us to make an “initial determination of the statutory interpretation question,” Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 524 (2009), “with respect to whether an alien who
ORDER: The applicant’s appeal is dismissed.
368
Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 347 (BIA 2018) Interim Decision #3930
was coerced to assist in persecution is barred from obtaining asylum in the United States,” id. at 525 (Scalia, J., concurring). The remand directed us to interpret the statute anew based on principles of statutory construction, free of our prior assumption that Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981), definitively resolved this question. The majority decision is artfully drafted, but it does not engage in this analysis. Instead, the majority reads a duress exception into the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the United States Nov. 1, 1968) (“Protocol”), and, by extension, the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (“Refugee Act”), that simply does not exist. And it does so essentially by deferring to international expectations of how the Protocol should be interpreted. I cannot agree with this approach.
******************************************
- Wow! Deferring to international interpretations and expert interpretations from the UNHCR that actually give an asylum applicant a very circumscribed break for actions he or she was forced to take. Very “Un-Boardy.” Could actually be “career threatening.” No wonder Judge Malphrus wanted to separate himself from any such rational and reasonable actions in the “Age of Sessions & Trump.”
- 9 years in the making, during which the DHS position changed several times, is a pretty good argument against “Chevron deference” (a/k/a “task avoidance by life-tenured Article III Judges”). What were Immigration Judges supposed to do during those 9 years?
- Odds on whether or how long it will take “Gonzo” to intervene?
PWS
06-29-18