Tag: Elizabeth J. Stevens

Moving the immigration courts out of the executive branch
would help alleviate the perception that they are not independent tribunals with DHS and the respondents as equal participants. This would also cure the perception that the immigration courts have become so politicized that decisions change not with the law but with the politics of the current administration. Moreover, due to
the number of immigration judges who are former DHS attorneys and the co-location of some immigration courts with Immigration and Customs Enforcement offices, a broad perception exists that immigration judges and DHS attorneys are working together. This perception leads to significant lapses in perceived due process; for example, individuals don’t appear because they think the system is rigged, don’t appeal a bad decision because they lack resources after the long wait for a merits hearing, or don’t pursue potential relief for which they might be eligible. Plus, such a move would allow DHS the opportunity to appeal the Article I appellate division’s decisions to the circuit courts of appeals—providing those courts with a broader, more balanced view of issues and decisions of the trial-level immigration court.21 EOIR’s FY 2016 Statistics Yearbook indicates that one quarter of the initial cases decided were grants—none of which were ever reviewed by the courts of appeals.22

With a move to an Article I court, both trial level and appellate di- vision judges would have fixed terms of office and tenure protections that would facilitate judicial decisions without fear or favor. (If one believes that current members of the Board of Immigration Appeals are truly independent, one should research the “streamlining” of
the board down to just 11 members.23) Current board members and immigration judges are arguably government attorneys with the same client as DHS attorneys.24 They are subject to case completion goals—with or without express reliance on numerical goals—and may be subject to discipline by the attorney general.25 The currently proposed performance metrics are not new—most have been in place in one form or another since 2002.26

Last but not least, removing the immigration courts from the Department of Justice should speed the courts’ ability to regulate itself. First and foremost, the individual immigration judges would have control over their dockets and not be subject to decisions by headquarters to prioritize case A over case B (and then back again)—or send trial judges off to border courts to handle a few cases when their backlogged dockets have to be re-scheduled.27 The Article I court as a whole would be able to issue rules and regulations without the current byzantine requirements for consultation with a number of different offices and agencies. And, finally, hiring an immigration trial judge would not take two years.28