Tag: JUDGE JANE B. STRANCH

On the other hand, importing Pereira’s holding on the stop-time rule into the jurisdictional context would have unusually broad implications. According to the Government, “almost 100 percent” of NTAs issued during the three years preceding Pereira did not include the time and date of the proceeding. Id. at 2111.

Pereira’s emphatically “narrow” framing, id. at 2110, 2113, counsels in favor of distinguishing between the two contexts. Pereira confronted a specific question: “If the Government serves a noncitizen with a document that is labeled ‘notice to appear,’ but the document fails to specify either the time or place of the removal proceedings, does it trigger the stop-time rule?” Id. at 2110. Hernandez-Perez’s case does not present the same narrow question; no one disputes that he satisfies the ten-year requirement regardless of when the stop- time rule was triggered. We find persuasive the Board’s reasoning that, “[h]ad the Court intended to issue a holding as expansive as the one advanced . . ., presumably it would not have specifically referred to the question before it as being ‘narrow.’” Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 443.

Other components of Pereira counsel against applying its NTA rule in the context of jurisdiction. Like the BIA, we find it significant that, in Pereira, “the Court did not purport to invalidate the alien’s underlying removal proceedings or suggest that proceedings should be terminated.” Id.; see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012) (requiring courts to examine their own jurisdiction even if the parties “have disclaimed or have not presented” theissue). If Pereira’s holding applied to jurisdiction, there also would not have been jurisdiction in in Pereira itself. But the Court took up, decided, and remanded Pereira without even hinting at the possibility of a jurisdictional flaw.

We agree with the Board that Pereira is an imperfect fit in the jurisdictional context and it does not mandate a different conclusion than the one already reached by this court and all our sister circuits. See Herrera-Orozco, 603 F. App’x at 473–74 (collecting cases). We therefore conclude that jurisdiction vests with the immigration court where, as here, the mandatory information about the time of the hearing, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), is provided in a Notice of Hearing issued after the NTA.

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Points of interest;

• The 6th Circuit is the first circuit to rule on Bermudez-Cota;
• The court noted that approximately 100% of the cases commenced by ICE over the past three years did not contain the specific notice of date. time and place of hearing set forth in the statute;
• Even assuming that Bermudez is upheld, the way in which cases have been processed by DHS and EOIR has made tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands of individuals eligible for “Cancellation of Removal;”
• What does this say about the management competency of both agencies?
• Contrary to the drift of the BIA and the 6th Circuit, initial proper notice of time, place, and date of hearing is critically important;
  • Whereas “Notices to Appear” are sometimes served in person, the subsequent “Notice of Hearing” by EOIR never is — this significantly increases the chances for improper “in absentia” hearings based on faulty notice from EOIR;
  • Most notices in Immigration Court are served manually by regular U.S. Mail, an incredibly error-fraught process given the state of disorder in the Immigration Courts (which has been mindlessly ramped up under Sessions’s gross mismanagement);
  • Thus, failing to provide accurate initial notice actually greatly increases the chances of improper in absentia orders and actual removals if an individual is picked up and can’t figure out how to file a “Motion to Reopen and Rescind” the in absentia order;
  • Would you be able to do that?” Would most Article III judges (particularly if operating in a different language, from ICE Detention, with no lawyer)?
• Although “winning” on the “big issue,” the DHS actually lost this case; it was remanded because the BIA screwed up in denying the respondent’s Motion to Reopen;
• As one of my former colleagues pointed out to me recently, if the BIA is wrong in Bermudez-Cota, it could potentially invalidate not only almost every removal order and pending removal proceeding, but most affirmative grants of relief by Immigration Judges;
  • So, maybe this is a case where the practical consequences will shape the legal interpretation;
  • But, then, there’s always the issue of retroactivity — could an invalidation of Bermudez be applied “prospectively only” to new and pending proceedings or in some other manner that did not disrupt “settled expectations;”
• Historical Trivia:  I wrote Matter of L-O-G-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 413, 413 (B.I.A. 1996) (en banc) which was extensively discussed by the 6th Circuit.

PWS

12-18-18