🏴‍☠️ GARLAND BIA’S MANTRA: “WHEN IN DOUBT, THROW ‘EM OUT!” 🤮 — I Dissent From The Wrong Decision In Matter of AZRAG, 28 I&N Dec. 784 (BIA 2024)!

Star Chamber Justice
The Garland BIA’s tortured pro-DHS logic is a constant trauma for immigration practitioners!

Matter of AZRAG, 28 I&N Dec. 784 (BIA 2024)

https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-02/4073.pdf

BIA HEADNOTE:

Where a State court order granting a respondent’s motion to vacate a conviction does not indicate the reason for the vacatur, and there is no other basis in the record to independently establish the reason, the respondent has not satisfied his burden to show that the court vacated his conviction because of a substantive or procedural defect in his criminal proceedings.

FOR THE RESPONDENT: William M. Sharma-Crawford, Esquire, Kansas City,

Missouri

BEFORE: Board Panel: HUNSUCKER, PETTY, and CLARK, Appellate Immigration

Judges.

PETTY, Appellate Immigration Judge: [Opinion]

******************************

SCHMIDT, Judge of the Round Table, dissenting:

I dissent.

This respondent moves to reopen and terminate proceedings. His motion is biased on a valid order of a Kansas State Judge vacating the conviction that was the basis for his removal. I would grant the motion and terminate proceedings.

Contrary to the panel’s claim, the basis for the respondent’s motion to vacate the conviction in state court is clear on this record: the respondent was ineffectively advised by counsel during his criminal proceedings where he pled guilty. Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court has found that failing to properly advise a defendant of the immigration consequences of his conviction is ineffective assistance under the sixth amendment to the Constitution. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).

According to the record, the prosecuting attorney agreed with the respondent’s assertion. On the basis of that agreement and his review of the record, the state judge granted the motion. Thus the record shows that the reason for the action was a violation of the respondent’s sixth amendment rights during his criminal proceedings. There is no evidence that the state court acted “solely for immigration purposes” as the BIA found in Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621, 625 (BIA 2003), rev’d on other grounds, Pickering v Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2006).  Therefore, the panel’s reliance on Pickering is wrong.

Because there is no conviction supporting the DHS’s charge of removability, they have failed to meet their burden of proof. Consequently, these proceedings must be terminated.

Even if there were ambiguity in the state judge’s order, I would reach the same result. The INA places the burden of establishing removability on DHS by a very high “clear and convincing evidence” standard. INA section 240(c)(3)(A). Consequently, any ambiguities in the DHS’s proof must be construed against them. Therefore, even if I found some ambiguity as to the reason for the state judge’s order, the DHS would still fail to sustain their burden and proceedings should be terminated.

There is no evidence in this record that the state judge acted solely to eliminate immigration bars or for other rehabilitative purposes as was the case in Pickering. Therefore Pickering does not control. To get around this defect, the panel essentially invents a “presumption of immigration rehabilitative purposes” to fill the gap in their reasoning and save the DHS’s case. This attempt to overrule the statutory burden placed on DHS is clearly inappropriate.

For the foregoing reasons the DHS has not established the respondent’s removability by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, I would grant the respondent’s motion to reopen and terminate proceedings. Consequently, I dissent from the panel’s unjustified denial of the motion.

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever

PWS

02-26-24

BARR’S TWO LATEST PRECEDENTS CONTINUE TO ERODE IMMIGRATION JUDGES’ DISCRETION & INDIVIDUALS’ ABILITY TO AVOID DEPORTATION — Matter of Castillo-Perez & Matter of Thomas & Thompson!

Matter of Castillo-Perez: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1213196/download

 

Key section:

 

For the reasons set forth below, I affirm the Board’s order. I conclude that, when assessing an alien’s good moral character under INA § 101(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f), evidence of two or more DUI convictions during the relevant period establishes a rebuttable presumption that the alien lacked good moral character during that time. Because the Attorney General may only cancel removal of an alien who has been a person of good moral character during a 10-year period, see INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), such evidence also presumptively establishes that the alien is not eligible for that relief. Here, because the evidence of the respondent’s efforts to rehabilitate himself is insufficient to overcome this presumption, the Board correctly vacated the immigration judge’s decision to grant cancellation of removal.

 

Matter of Michael Vernon Thomas & Matter of Joseph Lloyd Thompson: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1213201/download

 

Key section:

The INA assigns clear immigration consequences to an alien who has been convicted and sentenced for a state crime, yet the Board has adopted multiple tests that permit state courts to change those results well after the fact. Although a state court may alter a state conviction for appropriate reasons under state law, the state court does not have the authority to make immigration-law determinations. In view of these considerations, I conclude that the Pickering test should apply to state-court orders that modify, clarify, or otherwise alter the term of imprisonment or sentence associated with a state-court conviction. As a result, such alterations will have legal effect for immigration purposes if they are based on a procedural or substantive defect in the underlying criminal proceeding, but not if they are based on reasons unrelated to the merits, such as rehabilitation or immigration hardship. Matter of Cota-Vargas, Matter of Song, and Matter of Estrada must therefore be overruled.

 

Alexei Woltornist

Public Affairs Officer

Department of Justice

Cell: (202)598-5281

Office: (202)514-2016

***********************************

Matter of Castillo-Perez effectively precludes most individuals with two (or more) DUIs from getting cancellation of removal. Obviously, the AG perceived this to be a significant problem. I don’t know how many cases like this are actually granted. Perhaps it would allow the BIA and the IJs to decline to reopen more cases if the Respondent could not show prima facie evidence that he or she could overcome the “presumption.”

Matter of Thomas & Thompson restricts a fairly common device used to avoid the harsh immigration consequences of a criminal conviction. Criminal court judges and even prosecutors are often willing to make slight “after the fact” sentence modifications to avoid deportation in sympathetic cases. Under this ruling, that will only work if there is a “non-immigration” reason for the modification — much more difficult to establish.

Taken together these cases are part of a continuing effort by the AGs under Trump to 1) limit the ability of Immigration Judges to grant discretionary relief based on hardship or equities, and 2) make it more difficult for individuals to avoid deportation. It might also allow Immigration Judges to deny more requests for relief summarily, without full hearings to consider all the equities.

To me, neither change seems “astounding” in and of itself. Rather, they are part of a continuum of efforts to restrict discretion and make it more difficult for individuals to avoid deportation based on equities in the U.S. 

Notably, the Trump AGs have never intervened to rule in favor of an individual. All of their certification rulings favor DHS enforcement. 

This is notable in a system where the prosecutor selects, directs, and can fire or reassign the judges. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of published precedents already favor DHS enforcement. Now, the prosecutor apparently intends to systematically overrule or limit those few precedents that have given individuals hope of a favorable resolution of their cases.

PWS

P10-26-19

BIA STANDS UP TO 5TH CIRCUIT‘S IDOCY ON “CONVICTIONS” — MATTER OF MARQUEZ CONDE, 27 I&N Dec. 251 (BIA 2018) — This Is How The System Could & Should Work

Marquez3923

Matter of MARQUEZ-CONDE, 27 I&N Dec. 251 (BIA 2018)

BIA HEADNOTE:

The Board of Immigration Appeals’ holding in Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621 (BIA 2003), rev’d on other grounds, Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2006), regarding the validity of vacated convictions for immigration purposes, is reaffirmed, and the decision is modified to give it nationwide application. Renteria-Gonzalez v. INS, 322 F.3d 804 (5th Cir. 2002), not followed.

PANEL; BIA VICE CHAIR JUDGE CHARLES ADKINS-BLANCH; BIA APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGES ANA MANN, EDWARD KELLY

OPINION BY: JUDGE ADKINS-BLANCH, VICE CHAIR

KEY QUOTE:

In Renteria-Gonzalez, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reasoned that because Congress was silent regarding vacated convictions when it defined the term “conviction” in section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2000), it did not intend to include an exception for vacated convictions. Id. at 813. However, as the parties have noted on appeal, Judge Benavides issued a concurring opinion in Renteria-Gonzalez v. INS that he disagreed with the majority’s analysis because it “paint[ed] with too broad a brush with respect to whether a vacated conviction falls within the purview of the definition” of a conviction. Id. at 820 (Benavides, J., specially concurring). Although he agreed with the result, Judge Benavides asserted that “any indication in the majority opinion that a conviction vacated based on the merits constitutes a conviction under [section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act] is entirely dicta in that the case at bar did not involve such a vacatur.” Id. at 823 n.4. He therefore concluded that he would distinguish the vacatur in that case “from cases involving convictions vacated because of a defect in the criminal proceedings.” Id. at 822.

*******************************************

Kudos to the BIA for providing this important guidance. Remarkably, the Immigration Judge “ran over” a joint motion by the DHS and respondent’s counsel to reach the absurd result below!

As for the two Fifth Circuit judges who ruled that a conviction vacated on the merits remains a “conviction,” as one of my bosses used to say “What did they teach you at that law school?”

As those who read this blog know, normally I’m not a fan of Chevron or Brand X. But, here they seem to have saved the day from some pretty incompetent/biased judging from some “Article IIIs.’

PWS

04-08-18