Tag: Matter of Sonam

Diaz-Rodriguez v. Garland, 9th Cir., 09-10-21, published

Here’s the opinion:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/09/10/13-73719.pdf

PANEL: Consuelo M. Callahan and*Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges, and Jed S. Rakoff, District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Watford; Dissent by Judge Callahan

* The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

STAFF SUMMARY:

Granting Rafael Diaz-Rodriguez’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the panel held that child endangerment, in violation of California Penal Code § 273a(a), does not constitute “a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).

In Martinez-Cedillo v. Sessions, 896 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2018), a divided panel held to the contrary, and a majority of the non-recused active judges voted to rehear the case en banc. However, after the petitioner passed away, the en banc court dismissed the appeal as moot and vacated the panel decision. The panel here observed that Martinez-Cedillo is no longer binding precedent, but explained that between its issuance and the decision to rehear the case en banc, two published opinions relied on it: Menendez v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 467 (9th Cir. 2018), and Alvarez-Cerriteno v. Sessions, 899 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2018).

The panel concluded that the unusual circumstance here led it to conclude that this case falls outside the scope of the general rule that three-judge panels are bound to follow published decisions of prior panels. The panel explained that both Alvarez-Cerriteno and Menendez simply followed Martinez-Cedillo as then-binding precedent without engaging in independent analysis of the deference issue, and

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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both decisions were effectively insulated from en banc review on that issue. The panel explained that both decisions are irreconcilable with a subsequent decision of the court sitting en banc because their reliance on Martinez-Cedillo is in conflict with the en banc court’s decision to designate that decision as non-precedential.

Applying the categorical approach, the panel identified the elements of California Penal Code § 273a(a): causing or permitting a child “to be placed in a situation where his or her person or health is endangered,” committed with a mens rea of criminal negligence. As to the federal offense, the panel explained that Congress enacted the ground of removability at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) and did not define the phrase “a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment.” In Matter of Soram, 25 I. & N. Dec. 378 (BIA 2010), however, the BIA held that the phrase encompassed child endangerment offenses committed with a mens rea of at least criminal negligence. In considering whether Soram was entitled to deference, the panel was guided by the Supreme Court’s decision in Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017), where the Court observed that the term “sexual abuse of a minor” was undefined and then looked to normal tools of statutory interpretation in concluding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the BIA’s interpretation of it.

Applying this approach, the panel concluded that deference was precluded at Chevron step one because the text of §1227(a)(2)(E)(i) unambiguously forecloses the BIA’s interpretation as encompassing negligent child endangerment offenses. First, the panel explained that contemporary legal dictionaries from the time of IIRIRA’s enactment indicate that child abuse, child neglect, and child

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abandonment were well-understood concepts with distinct meanings that do not encompass one-time negligent child endangerment offenses. Second, the panel explained that the statutory structure suggested that Congress deliberately omitted child endangerment from the list of offenses specified in § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). Third, the panel explained that the general consensus drawn from state criminal codes confirms that the phrase does not encompass negligent child endangerment offenses. The panel noted that the fourth source consulted in Esquivel-Quintana, related federal criminal statutes, did not aid its analysis.

Because a violation of California Penal Code § 273a(a) can be committed with a mens rea of criminal negligence, the panel concluded that it is not a categorical match for “a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment.” Accordingly, the panel concluded that Diaz-Rodriguez’s conviction under that statute did not render him removable under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).

Dissenting, Judge Callahan wrote that she was compelled to dissent for two reasons. First, she did not agree that the three-judge panel could disregard Menendez and Alvarez-Cerriteno. Second, Judge Callahan did not agree with the majority’s peculiar reading of the phrase as not encompassing a child endangerment offense committed with a mens rea of at least criminal negligence. Judge Callahan wrote that majority’s suggestion that § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) is unambiguous is contrary to precedent and the unanimous opinions of the court’s sister circuits. Moreover, she wrote that the majority failed to recognize that the court’s task is limited to reviewing the agency’s interpretation for “reasonableness.” Instead, the majority proffered its own definition based primarily on selected dictionary definitions and its own research.

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Who knows how this eventually will come out? But, what I can guarantee is until it is finally resolved, by the Supremes or otherwise, immigration practitioners and their clients will have a mess of inconsistency and bad decisions by EOIR on their hands.

Complicated issues involving criminal law come up all the time in EOIR “detention courts,” located in the Mayorkas/Garland “New American Gulag,” where many respondents are unrepresented or under-represented. How would an unrepresented respondent be able to prepare a “defense” like this? No way! The entire EOIR system suffers from some extreme constitutional problems that Garland has done nothing to address.

Having bad precedents like this in effect for a decade or more, almost always tilted toward DHS enforcement, results in many wrongful removals, as well as numerous remands and “redos” that help increase the astronomical 1.4 million case backlog! Having better judges on the BIA, real independent jurists with practical scholarly expertise, unafraid to interpret statutes and apply the law in favor of respondents when that is the “better view,” and to impose “best practices” on the Immigration Courts, is a necessary first step in addressing EOIR’s many legal and operational shortcomings.

It appears that Garland is disinterested in meaningful due process reforms and inserting real progressive judicial leadership into EOIR. The good news: With the vast majority of the immigration, human rights, and constitutional expertise and legal talent now in the private sector, and more talent coming out of law schools all the time, the NDPA stands a good chance of “litigating Garland’s failed EOIR to a standstill” over the next four years.

While that’s hardly the most desirable result, it would be infinitely better than the continuing due-process-denying “Clown Show” 🤡 that Garland currently runs at EOIR! Sometimes, you just have to take what the opposition gives you!

At what point will “powers that be” finally pay attention to the ongoing disaster at EOIR? When the backlog reaches 1.5 million? 2 million? 3 million? 4 million? 5 million? How many unjust and illegal removals will take place, and how many lives and futures irrevocably altered or ruined before this dysfunctional system finally reaches its “breaking point?”

 

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

09-13-21