Tovar v. Sessions, 9th Cir., 02-14-18, Published
PANEL: Dorothy W. Nelson and Stephen Reinhardt, Circuit Judges, and George Caram Steeh,* District Judge.
* The Honorable George Caram Steeh III, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
OPINION BY: Judge Stephen Reinhardt
SUMMARY (BY COURT STAFF):
“Immigration
The panel granted and remanded Margarito Rodriguez Tovar’s petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision rejecting his application for adjustment of status.
Relying on the BIA’s published opinion in Matter of Zamora-Molina, 25 I. & N. Dec. 606 (BIA 2011), the immigration judge and BIA rejected Rodriguez Tovar’s application for adjustment of status. The agency held that, because Rodriguez Tovar was over 21 years old in biological age on the date of his father’s naturalization, his F2A visa petition (for a minor child of a lawful permanent resident) immediately converted to an F1 visa petition (for an adult child of a U.S. citizen), and not to an immediate relative petition. The agency came to this conclusion even though Rodriguez Tovar was classified by statute as under 21 years old for purposes of his F2A petition, pursuant to the age calculation formula set forth by the Child Status Protection Act. The BIA concluded that Rodriguez Tovar was not eligible for adjustment of status because no visa was immediately available and that Rodriguez Tovar would be subject to removal forthwith.
The panel observed that if Rodriguez Tovar’s father had remained an LPR instead of becoming a citizen, Rodriguez Tovar would have been eligible for a visa in the F2A category
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
RODRIGUEZ TOVAR V. SESSIONS 3
in 2007, at which point his age under the statute would have been 20. Similarly, had he been afforded his statutory age when his father became a citizen, he would have been eligible for a visa immediately. The panel also noted that the government’s position would lead to the absurd result that Rodriguez Tovar would have to wait in line for a visa abroad and not become eligible for an F1 visa until more than twenty years after he would have been eligible for an F2A visa but for his father’s naturalization.
Concluding that Congress had clear intent on the question at issue, the panel did not defer to the BIA’s opinion in Matter of Zamora-Molina. Reading the statue as a whole, the panel concluded that Congress intended “age of the alien on the date of the parent’s naturalization,” 8 U.S.C. § 1151(f)(2), to refer to statutory age—that is, age calculated according to 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1). Under that statute, Rodriguez Tovar’s age was only 19 on the date of his father’s naturalization. Accordingly, the panel concluded that Rodriguez Tovar’s visa application must be treated as one for an immediate relative of a U.S. citizen, for which visas are always immediately available.”
KEY QUOTE:
“[I]nterpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available.” Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982). Accordingly, we conclude “that Congress had a clear intent on the question at issue,” The Wilderness Soc’y, 353 F.3d at 1059: children of LPRs may take advantage of the age- calculation formula in 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1) for purposes of converting to immediate relative status under § 1151(f)(2) when their parents naturalize.
22 RODRIGUEZ TOVAR V. SESSIONS
In other words, “age” in 8 U.S.C. § 1151(f)(2) refers unambiguously to age as calculated under 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1). We reject the BIA’s contrary holding in Matter of Zamora-Molina, 25 I. & N. Dec. 606, as well as the district court’s parallel reasoning in Alcaraz v. Tillerson, No. 2:17- cv-457-ODW (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2017). The petition for review is granted and the case is remanded to the BIA with instructions to find that Rodriguez Tovar has an immediately available visa as the immediate relative of a U.S. citizen and to conduct further proceedings regarding the other requirements for adjustment of status.”
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As I have pointed out before, the BIA generally chooses the interpretation of law that is most favorable to DHS and least favorable to the individual. Rather than the BIA acting to protect individual rights under the Due Process clause of our Constitution, today’s BIA basically engages in a “tag team match” with the DHS to defeat individual interests, even those as compelling as the rights of immigrant families and children!
Meanwhile, as these glaring problems with pro-DHS bias and poor quality work from a supposedly “expert tribunal” fester, Sessions actively pushes to have Immigration Judges at all levels “pedal faster” so that more mistakes are made and more individuals are deported in violation of our laws. Remember, very few of the individuals wronged by poor work by Immigration Judges or the BIA can afford to go to the Courts of Appeals for vindication! The problems that my colleague Hon. Jeffrey Chase and I, along with others, have been highlighting are literally just the “tip of the iceberg” of the monumental legal quality and fairness issues working against individual migrants in today’s out of control, failing, U.S. Immigration Courts.
Another thing to consider: take a look at the complexity of this decision, charts and all. How would an unrepresented individual, particularly a child, fairly be able to represent him or herself in Immigration Court and before the BIA. The obvious answer: They wouldn’t!
How will these glaring Due Process, fairness, and quality control problems be solved by Sessions’s anti-Due Process “round ’em up and move ’em out” policies? Answer: They won’t!
We need an independent Article I U.S. Immigration Court. Harm to our most vulnerable is harm to all of us!
PWS
03-01-18