Miranda v. Barr, U.S.D.C. D. MD., U.S. District Judge Catherine C. Blake, 05-29-20
KEY QUOTES:
. . . .
A. Likelihood of success on the merits
i. Due process claim: burden of proof
The lead plaintiffs claim that Fifth Amendment due process entitles them, and all members of the proposed class, to a bond hearing where the government bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, dangerousness or risk of flight. As explained above, neither the INA nor its implementing regulations speak to the burden of proof at § 1226(a) bond hearings, and the BIA has held that the burden lies with the noncitizen. See Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 37, 40. But, as the lead plaintiffs point out, when faced with challenges to the constitutionality of these hearings, district courts in the First, Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have concluded that due process requires that the government bear the burden of justifying a noncitizen’s § 1226(a) detention. See, e.g., Singh v. Barr, 400 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1017 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires the Government to bear the burden of proving . . . that continued detention is justified at a § 1226(a) bond redetermination hearing.”); Diaz-Ceja v. McAleenan, No. 19-CV-00824-NYW, 2019 WL 2774211, at *11 (D. Colo. July 2, 2019) (same); Darko v. Sessions, 342 F. Supp. 3d 429, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (same); Pensamiento, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 692 (same). While jurisdictions vary on the standard of proof required, compare, e.g., Darko, 342 F. Supp. 3d at 436 (clear and convincing standard) with Pensamiento, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 693 (“to the satisfaction of the IJ” standard), the “consensus view” is that due process requires that the burden lie with the government, see Darko, 342 F. Supp. 3d at 435 (collecting cases).
The defendants concede that “a growing chorus of district courts” have concluded that due process requires that the government bear the burden of proof at § 1226(a) bond hearings. (Opp’n at 22). But the defendants also point out that some courts to consider the issue have
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concluded otherwise. In Borbot v. Warden Hudson Cty. Corr. Facility, the Third Circuit analyzed a § 1226(a) detainee’s claim that due process entitled him to a second bond hearing where “[t]he duration of [] detention [was] the sole basis for [the] due process challenge.” 906 F.3d 274, 276 (3d Cir. 2018). The Borbot court noted that the detainee “[did] not challenge the adequacy of his initial bond hearing,” id. at 276–77, and ultimately held that it “need not decide when, if ever, the Due Process Clause might entitle an alien detained under § 1226(a) to a new bond hearing,” id. at 280. But, in analyzing the detainee’s claims, the Borbot court stated that it “perceive[d] no problem” with requiring that § 1226(a) detainees bear the burden of proof at bond hearings. Id. at 279. Several district courts in the Third Circuit have subsequently concluded that Borbot compels a finding that due process does not require that the government bear the burden of proof at § 1226(a) bond hearings. See, e.g., Gomez v. Barr, No. 1:19-CV- 01818, 2020 WL 1504735, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2020) (collecting cases).
Based on its survey of the case law, the court is more persuaded by the reasoning of the district courts in the First, Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. “Freedom from imprisonment— from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (citation omitted). While detention pending removal is “a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process,” such detention must comport with due process. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). Although the Supreme Court has not decided the proper allocation of the burden of proof in § 1226(a) bond hearings, it has held, in other civil commitment contexts, that “the individual’s interest in the outcome of a civil commitment proceeding is of such weight and gravity that due process requires the state to justify confinement by proof more substantial than a mere preponderance of the evidence.” See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979)
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(addressing the standard of proof required for mental illness-based civil commitment) (emphasis added).
Application of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test lends further support to the lead plaintiffs’ contention that due process requires a bond hearing where the government bears the burden of proof. In Mathews, the Supreme Court held that “identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors”: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). While the court acknowledges that requiring the government to bear the burden of proof at § 1226(a) hearings would impose additional costs on the government, those costs are likely outweighed by the noncitizen’s significant interest in freedom from restraint, and the fact that erroneous deprivations of liberty are less likely when the government, rather than the noncitizen, bears the burden of proof. (See Decl. of Former Immigration Judge Denise Noonan Slavin ¶ 6, ECF 1-8 (“On numerous occasions, pro se individuals appeared before me for custody hearings without understanding what was required to meet their burden of proof. . . . Pro se individuals were rarely prepared to present evidence at the first custody hearing[.]”))
With respect to the quantum of proof required at § 1226(a) bond hearings, the court notes that “the overwhelming majority of district courts have . . . held that, in bond hearings under § 1226(a), due process requires the government to bear the burden of justifying detention by clear and convincing evidence.” Hernandez-Lara v. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Acting Dir., No.
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19-CV-394-LM, 2019 WL 3340697, at *3 (D.N.H. July 25, 2019) (collecting cases). As the Hernandez-Lara court reasoned, “[p]lacing the burden of proof on the government at a § 1226(a) hearing to show by clear and convincing evidence that the noncriminal alien should be detained pending completion of deportation proceedings is more faithful to Addington and other civil commitment cases,” id. at *6, “[b]ecause it is improper to ask the individual to ‘share equally with society the risk of error when the possible injury to the individual’—deprivation of liberty—is so significant,” id. (quoting Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 2011)) (further citation omitted).
Moreover, on the quantum of proof question, the court finds instructive evolving jurisprudence on challenges to prolonged detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). As noted in note 2, supra, § 1226(c) mandates detention of noncitizens deemed deportable because of their convictions for certain crimes. See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 846. Although § 1226(c) “does not on its face limit the length of the detention it authorizes,” id., the Supreme Court has not foreclosed the possibility that unreasonably prolonged detention under § 1226(c) violates due process, id. at 851. Indeed, many courts have held that when § 1226(c) becomes unreasonably prolonged, a detainee must be afforded a bond hearing. See, e.g., Reid v. Donelan, 390 F. Supp. 3d 201, 215 (D. Mass. 2019); Portillo v. Hott, 322 F. Supp. 3d 698, 709 (E.D. Va. 2018); Jarpa, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 717. Notably, courts in this district and elsewhere have ordered § 1226(c) bond hearings where the government bears the burden of justifying continued detention by clear and convincing evidence. See Duncan v. Kavanagh, — F. Supp. 3d —-, 2020 WL 619173, at *10 (D. Md. Feb. 10, 2020); Reid, 390 F. Supp. 3d at 228; Portillo, 322 F. Supp. 3d at 709–10; Jarpa, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 721. As the Jarpa court explained, “against the backdrop of well-settled jurisprudence on the quantum and burden of proof required to pass constitutional muster in civil detention
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proceedings generally, it makes little sense to give Mr. Jarpa at this stage fewer procedural protections than those provided to” civil detainees in other contexts. See Jarpa, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 722 (citing United States v. Comstock, 627 F.3d 513 (4th Cir. 2010)).
In light of the above, the court is satisfied that the lead plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that due process requires § 1226(a) bond hearings where the government must bear the burden of proving dangerousness or risk of flight. As to the quantum of proof required at these hearings, the court is persuaded that requiring a clear and convincing standard is in line with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Addington, as well as consistent with the bond hearings ordered in cases involving § 1226(c) detention.
ii. Due process claim: ability to pay and suitability for release on alternative conditions of release
The lead plaintiffs also claim that Fifth Amendment due process entitles them, and all members of the proposed class, to a bond hearing where the IJ considers the noncitizen’s ability to pay a set bond amount and her suitability for release on alternative conditions of supervision. The defendants counter that due process does not so require, and also asserts that at Mr. de la Cruz Espinoza’s bond hearing, the IJ did consider his ability to pay, (Opp’n at 26).
As an initial matter, the court considers whether the IJ at Mr. de la Cruz Espinoza’s bond hearing considered his ability to pay. According to the Complaint, there is no requirement that IJs in Baltimore Immigration Court consider an individual’s ability to pay when setting a bond amount. (Compl. ¶ 27 & n.8). The defendants assert that because Mr. de la Cruz Espinoza’s motion for bond included arguments about his financial situation, the IJ did, in fact, consider his ability to pay. (Opp’n at 26). The court is not persuaded. The fact that an argument was raised does not ipso facto mean it was considered. Neither the transcript of Mr. de la Cruz Espinoza’s bond hearing, (ECF 15-11), nor the IJ’s order of bond, (ECF 1-18), suggest that the IJ actually
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considered ability to pay. Accordingly, without clear evidence to the contrary, the court accepts the lead plaintiffs’ allegation that the IJ did not consider Mr. de la Cruz Espinoza’s ability to pay when setting bond.
The question remains whether due process requires that an IJ consider ability to pay and suitability for alternative conditions of release at a § 1226(a) bond hearing. As explained above, detention pending removal must comport with due process. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 523. Due process requires that detention “bear[s] [a] reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual [was] committed.” See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)). Federal regulations and BIA decisional law suggest that the purpose of § 1226(a) detention is to protect the public and to ensure the noncitizen’s appearance at future proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19, 1236.1; Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 38. But, the lead plaintiffs argue, when IJs are not required to consider ability to pay or alternative conditions of release, a noncitizen otherwise eligible for release may end up detained solely because of her financial circumstances.
Several courts to consider the question have concluded that § 1226(a) detention resulting from a prohibitively high bond amount is not reasonably related to the purposes of § 1226(a). In Hernandez v. Sessions, the Ninth Circuit held that “consideration of the detainees’ financial circumstances, as well as of possible alternative release conditions, [is] necessary to ensure that the conditions of their release will be reasonably related to the governmental interest in ensuring their appearance at future hearings[.]” See 872 F.3d at 990–91. While the Hernandez court did not explicitly conclude that a bond hearing without those considerations violates due process, see id. at 991 (“due process likely requires consideration of financial circumstances and alternative conditions of release” (emphasis added)), the court in Brito did reach that conclusion, see 415 F.
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Supp. 3d at 267. The Brito court held that, with respect to § 1226(a) bond hearings, “due process requires an immigration court consider both an alien’s ability to pay in setting the bond amount and alternative conditions of release, such as GPS monitoring, that reasonably assure the safety of the community and the alien’s future appearances.” Id. at 267. Relatedly, in Abdi v. Nielsen, 287 F. Supp. 3d 327 (W.D.N.Y. 2018), which involved noncitizens held in civil immigration
9
detentionpursuantto8U.S.C.§1225(b), thecourt—relyingontheNinthCircuit’sreasoningin
Hernandez—held that “an IJ must consider ability to pay and alternative conditions of release in setting bond for an individual detained under § 1225(b).” Id. at 338. To hold otherwise, the Abdi court reasoned, would implicate “the due process concerns discussed in Hernandez, which are equally applicable to detentions pursuant to § 1225(b).”10
The court is persuaded by the reasoning of Hernandez, Brito, and Abdi. If an IJ does not make a finding of dangerousness or substantial risk of flight requiring detention without bond (as in Mr. de la Cruz Espinoza’s case), the only remaining purpose of § 1226(a) detention is to
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that an individual may not be imprisoned “solely because of his lack of financial resources.” See
9 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) authorizes indefinite, mandatory detention for certain classes of noncitizens. See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 842 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2)).
10 The court notes that both Hernandez and Abdi reference now-invalidated precedent in both the Ninth and Second Circuits requiring the government to provide civil immigration detainees periodic bond hearings every six months. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1089 (9th Cir. 2015), abrogated by Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 852; Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 616 (2d Cir. 2015), abrogated by Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 852. But Jennings, which was decided on statutory interpretation grounds, explicitly did not include a constitutional holding. See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 851 (“[W]e do not reach th[e] [constitutional] arguments.”). And, as the Hernandez court noted, “the Supreme Court’s review of our holding . . . that noncitizens are entitled to certain unrelated additional procedural protections during the recurring bond hearings after prolonged detention does not affect our consideration of the lesser constitutional procedural protections sought at the initial bond hearings in this case.” 872 F.3d at 983 n.8.
11 The defendants offer no purpose for § 1226(a) detention beyond protecting the community and securing a noncitizen’s appearance at future proceedings.
The set bond amount, then, must be reasonably related to this purpose. But where a bond amount is set too high for an individual to pay, she is effectively detained without bond due to her financial circumstances. It is axiomatic
secure a noncitizen’s appearance at future proceeding.
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Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 661–62, 665 (1983) (automatic revocation of probation for inability to pay a fine, without considering whether efforts had been made to pay the fine, violated due process and equal protection); cf. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971) (“The Constitution[’s equal protection clause] prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.”). In the pretrial detention context, multiple Courts of Appeals have held that deprivation of the accused’s rights “to a greater extent than necessary to assure appearance at trial and security of the jail . . . would be inherently punitive and run afoul of due process requirements.” See Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir. 1974)) (quotation marks omitted); accord ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 157 (5th Cir. 2018); see also Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998, 999 (7th Cir. 1976); accord Villarreal v. Woodham, 113 F.3d 202, 207 (11th Cir. 1997).
There is no suggestion that the IJs in Baltimore Immigration Court impose prohibitively high bond amounts with the intent of denying release to noncitizens who do not have the means to pay. But without consideration of a § 1226(a) detainee’s ability to pay, where a noncitizen remains detained due to her financial circumstances, the purpose of her detention—the lodestar of the due process analysis—becomes less clear. As the Ninth Circuit explained,
Setting a bond amount without considering financial circumstances or alternative conditions of release undermines the connection between the bond and the legitimate purpose of ensuring the non-citizen’s presence at future hearings. . . . [It is a] common-sense proposition that when the government detains someone based on his or her failure to satisfy a financial obligation, the government cannot reasonably determine if the detention is advancing its purported governmental purpose unless it first considers the individual’s financial circumstances and alternative ways of accomplishing its purpose.
Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 991.
The defendants assert that an IJ need not consider a noncitizen’s ability to pay a set bond
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amount because it had a “reasonable basis to enact a statute that grants the Executive branch discretion to set bonds to prevent individuals, whose ‘continuing presence in the country is in violation of the immigration laws,’ from failing to appear,” and that § 1226(a) passes muster under rational basis review. (Opp’n at 25–26 (quoting Reno v. American-Arab Anti- Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999)). But the appropriate analysis for a procedural due process challenge is the Mathews balancing test, not rational basis review, which is used to analyze equal protection claims, see, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234–35 (1981), and substantive due process claims, see, e.g., Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732, 739 (4th Cir. 1999). And, in applying the Mathews test, the court agrees with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that “the government’s refusal to require consideration of financial circumstances is impermissible under the Mathews test because the minimal costs to the government of [] a requirement [that ICE and IJs consider financial circumstances and alternative conditions of release] are greatly outweighed by the likely reduction it will effect in unnecessary deprivations of individuals’ physical liberty.” See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 993.
Accordingly, the court is satisfied that the lead plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that due process requires a § 1226(a) bond hearing where the IJ considers a noncitizen’s ability to pay a set bond amount and the noncitizen’s suitability for alternative conditions of release.
Y. . . .
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Thanks and congratulations to Judge Denise Slavin for “making a difference.” It’s a true honor to serve with you and our other colleagues in the Round Table of Former Immigration Judges! Judge Slavin’s Declaration is cited by Judge Blake at the end of the first full paragraph above “17” in the quoted excerpt.
To be brutally honest about it, Denise is exactly the type of scholarly, courageous, due-process-oriented Immigration Judge who in a functioning, merit-based system, focused on “using teamwork and innovation to develop best practices and guarantee fairness and due process for all” would have made an outstanding and deserving Appellate Immigration Judge on the BIA. Instead, in the totally dysfunctional “World of EOIR,” the “best and brightest” judges, like Denise, essentially are “pushed out the door” instead of being honored and given meaningful opportunities to use their exceptional skills to further the cause of justice, establish and reinforce “best judicial practices,” and serve as outstanding role models for others. What an unconscionable waste!
It’s a great decision! The bad news: Because the Immigration Courts remain improperly captive within a scofflaw, anti-immigrant, and anti-due-process DOJ, respondents in many other jurisdictions will continue to be denied the fundamentally fair bond hearings required by Constitutional Due Process.
Due Process Forever!
PWS
05-30-20