Second Circuit – immigrationcourtside.com

🏴‍☠️🤮👎🏻RACISM IN AMERICA: With Racially Tone-Deaf Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson & His Righty Buddy Judge Paul Niemeyer Leading the Way, Split 4th Circuit Panel, Says “Yes” To Trump/Miller White Nationalist Attack On Public Benefits For Immigrants of Color!

Dean Kevin Johnson @ ImmigrationProf Blog reports:

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2020/08/fourth-circuit-vacates-injunction-against-public-charge-immigration-rule.html

Thursday, August 6, 2020

Fourth Circuit Vacates Injunction Against Public Charge Immigration Rule

By Immigration Prof

Share

Courthouse News Service reports that the Fourth Circuit yesterday ruled 2-1 (opinion by Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, with Judge Robert B. King dissenting) in favor of a Trump administration policy that makes it more difficult for noncitizens to become lawful permanent residents if they have received public benefits.

The ruling does not, however, change an injunction issued last week by a federal judge in New York barring enforcement of the so-called public charge rule.

The Second Circuit affirmed the injunction but limited its scope to New York, Connecticut and Vermont. The appeals court found the government’s justification for the rule is “unmoored from the nuanced views of Congress.”

KJ

****************

Judge Wilkinson’s racially insensitive judging recently was publicly “called out” by Fourth Circuit Chief Judge Roger Gregory in a remarkably honest and incisive opinion. https://immigrationcourtside.com/2020/07/16/%e2%9a%96%ef%b8%8fcalling-out-white-nationalist-judging-in-a-remarkable-opinion-4th-cir-chief-judge-roger-gregory-blasts-colleagues-retrograde-views-on-race-judging-policing-communiti/

Perhaps, dissenting Judge Robert B. King best sums up his colleagues’ willingness to distort the law and pervert rationality in support of the regime’s racist-driven, White Nationalist Immigration agenda:

In the face of the extensive history accompanying the term “public charge,” to conclude that the DHS Rule’s definition of “public charge” is reasonable makes a mockery of the term “public charge,” “does violence to the English language and the statutory context,” and disrespects the choice — made consistently by Congress over the last century and a quarter — to retain the term in our immigration laws. See Cook Cty., 962 F.3d at 229. For those reasons, the Rule’s “public charge” definition ventures far beyond any ambiguity inherent in the meaning of the term “public charge,” as used in the Public Charge Statute, and thus fails at Chevron’s second step. In light of the foregoing, the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Rule is unlawful, and the majority is wrong to conclude otherwise.

Equal justice for all, due process, reasonableness, and non-racist judging aren’t “rocket science.” That’s why Wilkinson had to cloak his anti-immigrant bias with 71 pages of irrational nonsense and legal gobbledygook.

Just another example of the U.S. District Judge “getting it right” only to be undermined by bad judging from higher Federal Courts. Unwillingness of the Federal Judiciary to take a unified strand for equal justice and against institutionalized racism and the White Nationalist agenda of the Trump regime is literally ripping our nation apart as well as showing the fatal weakness of the Federal Judiciary as a protector of our democracy and our individual rights.

Folks like Wilkinson and Niemeyer are what they are. But, we have the power to elect a President and a Senate who will appoint judges who actually believe in Constitutional due process and equal justice for all, regardless of color or status. Judges who will “tell it like it is,” “just say no” to “Dred Scottification” of “the other,” and courageously stand up for an unbiased interpretation the law and for simple human decency, rather than pretzeling themselves to defend an indefensible Executive agenda of unbridled White Nationalism and racism.

This November vote like your life and the future of our nation depend on it. Because they do.

PWS

08-06-20

AS SESSIONS DISEMBOWELS DUE PROCESS, THE REAL LEGAL PROBLEMS LEADING TO UNFAIR HEARINGS FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS AND OTHERS CONTINUE UNABATED & UNADDRESSED IN U.S. IMMIGRATION COURT – 2d Cir. Delivers A “Double Shot” Rebuke To Misapplication Of Credibility Rules By Immigration Judges & BIA Judges Who Should Know Better — HONG FEI GAO V. SESSIONS

GAO-2D CIR 16-2262_16-2493_opn

Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 2d Cir., May 25, 2018, published

PANEL: WINTER and CHIN, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN, Judge.*

Edward R. Korman, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

OPINION BY: JUDGE CHIN

SUMMARY OF HOLDING (From Decision):

These petitions for review heard in tandem challenge two decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (the ʺBIAʺ), affirming decisions by two Immigration Judges (ʺIJsʺ), denying asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (ʺCATʺ) to two petitioners seeking relief from religious persecution in China on adverse credibility grounds. During removal proceedings, petitioners testified regarding the medical attention they received for injuries they sustained from police beatings. The IJs and the BIA relied substantially on the omission of that information from petitionersʹ initial applications and supporting documents to determine that petitioners lacked credibility.

On appeal, petitioners principally challenge the agencyʹs adverse credibility determinations. In light of the totality of the circumstances and in the context of the record as a whole, in each case we conclude that the IJ and BIA erred in substantially relying on certain omissions in the record. Accordingly, we grant the petitions, vacate the decisions of the BIA, and remand the cases to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

KEY QUOTE:

For cases filed after May 11, 2005, the effective date of the REAL ID Act, Pub L. No. 109‐13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005), ʺan IJ may rely on any inconsistency or omission in making an adverse credibility determination as long as theʹtotality of the circumstancesʹ establishes that an asylum applicant is not credible,ʺ Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). The agency may base a credibility finding on an asylum applicantʹs ʺdemeanor, candor, or responsivenessʺ; the ʺinherent plausibilityʺ of his account; the consistency among his written statements, oral statements, and other record evidence; and ʺany inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicantʹs claim, or any other relevant factor.ʺ 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Even where the agency ʺrelies on discrepancies or lacunae that, if taken separately, concern matters collateral or ancillary to the claim, the cumulative effect may nevertheless be deemed consequential.ʺ Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (quoting Tu Lin v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 395, 402 (2d Cir. 2006)). To resolve the instant appeals, we first clarify the following principles that govern credibility determinations based on omissions following the REAL ID Act.

First, although the REAL ID Act authorizes an IJ to rely on ʺanyinconsistency or omission in making an adverse credibility determination,ʺ even one ʺcollateral or ancillaryʺ to an applicantʹs claims, id. at 167, the Act does not give an IJ free rein. The REAL ID Act does not erase our obligation to assess whether the agency has provided ʺspecific, cogent reasons for the adverse credibility finding and whether those reasons bear a legitimate nexus to the finding.ʺ Id. at 166 (quoting Zhou Yun Zhang, 386 F.3d at 74); accord Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010) (ʺThe REAL ID Act did not strip us of our ability to rely on the institutional tools that we have developed, such as the requirement that an agency provide specific and cogent reasons supporting an adverse credibility determination, to aid our review.ʺ). Thus, although IJs may rely on non‐material omissions and inconsistencies, not all omissions and inconsistencies will deserve the same weight. A trivial inconsistency or omission that has no tendency to suggest a petitioner fabricated his or her claim will not support an adverse credibility determination. See Latifi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 103, 105 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (remanding where we found ʺany potential discrepancies that might exist to be far from ʹsignificant and numerous,ʹ but rather insignificant and trivialʺ); accord Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1044 (noting thatʺtrivial inconsistencies that under the total circumstances have no bearing on a petitionerʹs veracity should not form the basis of an adverse credibility determinationʺ); Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 821 (7th Cir. 2007) (faulting IJ forʺfail[ing] to distinguish between material lies, on the one hand, and innocent mistakes, trivial inconsistencies, and harmless exaggerations, on the other handʺ).3

Second, although ʺ[a] lacuna in an applicantʹs testimony or omission in a document submitted to corroborate the applicantʹs testimony . . . can serve as a proper basis for an adverse credibility determination,ʺ Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166 n.3, we also recognize that ʺasylum applicants are not required to list every incident of persecution on their I–589 statement,ʺ Lianping Li v. Lynch, 839 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (quoting Pavlova, 441 F.3d at 90); see also Secaida‐Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 308 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that an applicantʹsʺfailure to list in his or her initial application facts that emerge later in testimony will not automatically provide a sufficient basis for an adverse credibility findingʺ), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; accord Pop v. INS, 270 F.3d 527, 531‐32 (7th Cir. 2001) (ʺWe hesitate to find that one seeking asylum must state in his or her application every incident of persecution lest the applicant have his or her credibility questioned if the incident is later elicited in direct testimony.ʺ); Abulashvili v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 2011). Because of this tension, although we have noted in dictum that an inconsistency and an omission are ʺfunctionally equivalentʺ for adverse credibility purposes, Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166 n.3, in generalʺomissions are less probative of credibility than inconsistencies created by direct contradictions in evidence and testimony,ʺ Lai v. Holder, 773 F.3d 966, 971 (9th Cir. 2014). Cf. Lianping Li, 839 F.3d at 150 (upholding adverse credibility determination where petitionerʹs ʺasylum application did not simply omit incidents of persecution. . . . [but rather] described the same incidents of persecution differentlyʺ).

An example of a trivial inconsistency that is entitled to little if any weight is the difference between Gaoʹs hearing testimony that he was interrogated by the police ʺfour timesʺ and his application statement that he was interrogated ʺseveral times.ʺ The BIA correctly held that this ʺdiscrepancyʺ did not support an adverse credibility determination. Likewise, the difference between September 1, 2010 and September 4, 2010 as the date when Shao contacted his cousin is a trivial discrepancy.

Although the federal evidentiary rules do not apply in immigration proceedings, Aslam v. Mukasey, 537 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), it is nonetheless instructive to analogize the use of omissions in adverse credibility determinations to the use of a witnessʹs prior silence for impeachment. In the latter context, we have indicated that ʺ[w]here the belatedly recollected facts merely augment that which was originally described, the prior silence is often simply too ambiguous to have any probative force, and accordingly is not sufficiently inconsistent to be admitted for purposes of impeachment.ʺ United States v. Leonardi, 623 F.2d 746, 756 (2d Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). In addition, the probative value of a witnessʹs prior silence on particular facts depends on whether those facts are ones the witness would reasonably have been expected to disclose. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239 (1980) (ʺCommon law traditionally has allowed witnesses to be impeached by their previous failure to state a fact in circumstances in which that fact naturally would have been asserted.ʺ(emphasis added)). In the immigration context, in assessing the probative value of the omission of certain facts, an IJ should consider whether those facts are ones that a credible petitioner would reasonably have been expected to disclose under the relevant circumstances.

Finally, the REAL ID Act requires IJs to evaluate each inconsistency or omission in light of the ʺtotality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors,ʺ8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). That requirement is consistent with our well‐established rule that review of an agencyʹs adverse credibility determination ʺis conducted on the record as a whole.ʺ Tu Lin, 446 F.3d at 402; see also Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (an applicantʹs testimony must be considered ʺin light of . . . the manner in which it hangs together with other evidenceʺ (citation omitted)); accord Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1040 (ʺ[T]he totality of the circumstances approach also imposes the requirement that an IJ not cherry pick solely facts favoring an adverse credibility determination while ignoring facts that undermine that result.ʺ). Thus, ʺan applicantʹs testimonial discrepancies ‐‐ and, at times, even outright lies ‐‐ must be weighed in light of their significance to the total context of his or her claim of persecution.ʺ Zhong v. U.S. Depʹt of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 127 (2d Cir. 2007). An IJ must also ʺʹengage or evaluateʹ an asylum applicantʹs explanations for apparent inconsistencies in the record.ʺ Diallo v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 624, 629 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Latifi, 430 F.3d at 105); see also Cao He Lin v. U.S. Depʹt of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 403 (2d Cir. 2005) (ʺAbsent a reasoned evaluation of [petitionerʹs] explanations, the IJʹs conclusion that his story is implausible was based on flawed reasoning and, therefore, cannot constitute substantial evidence supporting her conclusion.ʺ).

II. Application
In light of the foregoing principles, we conclude that in both cases, the IJs and the BIA erred by substantially relying on certain inconsistencies and omissions that had no tendency to show that petitioners fabricated their claims when considered in light of the totality of the circumstances and in the context of the record as a whole. Because we cannot confidently predict that the IJs would have adhered to their adverse credibility determinations absent these erroneous bases, we remand for further evaluation.

*******************************

So, while Jeff Sessions is busy with a “nuclear attack” on asylum law and Constitutional Due Process, some U.S. Immigration Judges and BIA Appellate Immigration Judges are equally busy just mis-applying well-established legal standards to screw asylum seekers.

Rather than looking at the record as a whole, as required by law, and giving asylum seekers the “benefit of the doubt,” too many Immigration Judges and BIA Judges are playing “gotcha” with the law — using minor or irrelevant variances in testimony or minor gaps in proof to justify bogus adverse credibility findings and asylum denials. Obviously, as backlogs stretch out, the problems inherent in “fly-specking” an applicant’s testimony about events many years in the past increases. That’s one of the reasons why Sessions’s insane bid to shove more properly administratively closed removal cases back onto “active dockets,” and to discourage the further removal of “low priority” cases from active dockets, is totally and intentionally destructive to an already failing court system.

The REAL ID ACT was effective in 2005, well over a decade ago. So, its proper application is not “rocket science.” It’s “Immigration Judging 101.”

Yet unfair applications of the law to wrongfully discredit and deny asylum seekers persists in the Immigration Courts and seems to breeze through at least some BIA “Panels” without critical review or analysis. I put “Panels” in quotes because all too often these days the appellate review is conducted by a “Panel of One” judge.

And since the BIA Appellate Immigration Judges now come almost exclusively from Government backgrounds, they are very likely to share some of the same “blind spots” as to the reality of presenting an affirmative asylum application in Immigration Court. If any of them have done it (and most haven’t), it was decades ago when conditions and the law were very different. They all too often draw inferences and reach conclusions that any competent immigration practitioner would know are way out of line with reality.

How are these endemic problems affecting fairness and Constitutional Due Process in the Immigration Courts, and potentially destroying and endangering lives of asylum applicants, solved by cranking up judicial productivity, trying to reverse long-standing precedents that aid asylum seekers pursuing legal protections, and making biased public anti-asylum statements? How is justice and Due Process served by gratuitously attacking immigration lawyers and disingenuously seeking to eliminate laws that provide the already meager and inadequate protections that asylum seekers now have? Yet this is precisely what Sessions’s program is!

The Immigration Court system needs reform to guarantee unbiased, high quality, fair treatment of asylum seekers and other individuals fighting for their very lives. Jeff Sessions is dedicated to the eradication of Due Process and turning the Immigration Courts into a “Death Railroad” for asylum seekers and other migrants. He must be stopped before he destroys our entire U.S. justice system — apparently his ultimate aim.

Join the New Due Process Army and stand up to Jeff Sessions and the other bullying, scofflaw, White Nationalists in the Trump Regime.

PWS

06-01-18

GONZO’S WORLD: 2D CIR AMUSED, BUT NOT RECEPTIVE TO DOJ’S “WHACKADOODLE” ADVOCACY FOR HOMOPHOBIA! — DOJ Attorneys Sacrifice Credibility & Self Respect Every Time They Stand Up To Defend Gonzo’s Hate Agenda! — They Are Becoming The “Neo Clowns”Of The Legal World🤡

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/09/the_doj_s_new_anti_gay_legal_posture_just_got_shut_down_in_federal_court.html

Mark Joseph Stern reports for Slate:

“NEW YORK—The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit had a burning question for Donald Trump’s Department of Justice on Tuesday: What are you doing in our courthouse? By the end of the day, the answer still wasn’t clear. Something else was, though: The DOJ’s new anti-gay legal posture is not going to be received with open arms by the federal judiciary.

The Justice Department’s latest wound was fully self-inflicted, as Tuesday’s arguments in Zarda v. Altitude Express should not have involved the DOJ in the first place. The case revolves around a question of statutory interpretation: whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlaws anti-gay workplace discrimination. Title VII bars employment discrimination “because of sex,” which many federal courts have interpreted to encompass sexual orientation discrimination. The 2nd Circuit is not yet one of them, and Chief Judge Robert Katzmann signaled recently that he would like to change that. So on Tuesday, all of the judges convened to consider joining the chorus of courts that believe Title VII already prohibits anti-gay discrimination in the workplace.

It’s important to understand some background before getting further into how those arguments went. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission decided in 2015 that Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination does protect gay employees. Under President Barack Obama, the Justice Department took no position on this question. But in late July, Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ DOJ unexpectedly filed an amicus brief in Zarda arguing that Title VII does not protect gay people. The 2nd Circuit had not solicited its input, making the brief both puzzling and gratuitous. Its purpose only became apparent in September, when the DOJ filed a similarly uninvited brief asserting that bakers have a free speech right not to serve same-sex couples. Both anti-gay briefs were startlingly incoherent, seemingly the product of political pandering rather than legal reasoning.

Regardless, the DOJ’s decision to weigh in on Zarda ensured that oral arguments would include the weird spectacle of one federal agency opposing another in court. That doesn’t happen often—and really shouldn’t happen—because the executive branch is expected to speak with one voice on legal affairs. But the EEOC’s commissioners serve fixed terms and haven’t gotten the memo placing politics above the law yet. And so they were not exactly delighted to see political appointees at the Justice Department trash their theories in court on Tuesday when the two agencies faced off over what it means to discriminate “because of sex.”

. . . .

That set the stage for Mooppan’s appearance, which, to put it mildly, did not go well at all. Chief Judge Katzmann immediately wanted to know: Why didn’t the DOJ defer to the EEOC on Title VII, as it normally does? Mooppan’s basic reply was that the Justice Department is the nation’s “largest employer”—meaning, in short, that it has an interest in retaining its capacity to fire gay people for being gay.

“What is the process with regard to the EEOC and the DOJ in terms of filing a brief?” Katzmann followed up.

“That’s a complicated question,” Mooppan responded.

“Try to help us,” Katzmann implored. He also wanted to know what career attorneys at the DOJ’s civil rights division think about the agency’s position. But Mooppan wouldn’t answer: “That’s not appropriate for me to disclose,” he told the judge. Katzmann looked alarmed. Judge Pooler jumped in: “Does the Justice Department sign off on a brief that EEOC intends to file?” she wondered.

“That’s not appropriate for me to disclose,” Mooppan repeated.

“It’s procedure, not internal deliberations,” Pooler responded.

“I don’t think it’s appropriate,” Mooppan said again, stonewalling. Now a majority of the judges looked irritated. As a general rule, attorneys are supposed to answer questions posed by the court, not dodge them as though they’re taking the Fifth. It was a terrible start for Mooppan, and both Pooler and Katzmann looked genuinely perplexed that a DOJ attorney would show such blatant disrespect. Finally, Judge Dennis Jacobs broke the impasse: “I, for one, am prepared to proceed on the assumption that you’re here,” he said.”

******************************

Read the entire rather amazing, if disturbing, article at the link. Accounts of the daily doings of “Gonzo’s Justice” could be ripped right from the headlines of The Onion. But, sadly they aren’t. Every day that Gonzo serves in the office for which he is jaw-droppingly unaqualified diminishes the American legal system and our country as a whole.

Liz was right. She might even have understated the case against Gonzo. Happy to be retired. Pity those still at the DOJ. Move over, John Mitchell, you’ve got some real competition for “Worst Attorney General In Modern American History.” I feel like asking for a recount when Betsy De Vos allegedly edged out Gonzo for “Worst Cabinet Member!” Could it be Russian interference?

GPWS

09-27-17

RECENT UNPUBLISHED REMANDS FROM 3RD & 2D CIRCUITS SHOW HOW BIA TILTS FACTS & LAW TO DENY PROTECTION TO CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES

HOW THE BIA UNFAIRLY DENIES PROTECTION TO CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES WHILE ENCOURAGING U.S. IMMIGRATION JUDGES TO DO THE SAME

By Paul Wickham Schmidt

U.S. Immigration Judge (Retired)

Two recent (alas unpublished) decisions from the Third and Second Circuits illustrate a key point that the Hon. Jeffrey Chase and I have made in our prior blogs: too often the BIA goes out of its way to bend the law and facts of cases to deny asylum seekers, particularly those from Central America, the protection to which they should be entitled. The BIA’s erroneous interpretations and applications of the asylum law have a corrupting effect on the entire fair hearing system in the U.S. Immigration Courts and the DHS Asylum Offices.

See:

http://immigrationcourtside.com/2017/08/13/analysis-by-hon-jeffrey-chase-bia-once-again-fails-refugees-matter-of-n-a-i-27-in-dec-72-bia-2017-is-badly-flawed/

http://immigrationcourtside.com/2017/06/03/introducing-new-commentator-hon-jeffrey-chase-matter-of-l-e-a-the-bias-missed-chance-original-for-immigrationcourtside/

http://immigrationcourtside.com/2017/08/14/politico-highlights-lack-of-due-process-cultural-awareness-proper-judicial-training-in-u-s-immigration-courts-handling-of-vietnamese-deportation-case/

http://immigrationcourtside.com/2017/08/11/4th-circuit-shrugs-off-violation-of-refugees-due-process-rights-mejia-v-sessions/

http://immigrationcourtside.com/2017/08/10/normalizing-the-absurd-while-eoir-touts-its-performance-as-part-of-trumps-removal-machine-disingenuously-equating-removals-with-rule-of-law-the-ongoing-assault-on-due-process-in-us-immig/

http://immigrationcourtside.com/2017/07/31/u-s-immigration-courts-apear-stacked-against-central-american-asylum-applicants-charlotte-nc-approval-rates-far-below-those-elsewhere-in-4th-circuit-is-precedent-being-misapplied/

Aguilar v. Attorney General, 3d Cir., 08-16-17

163921np

What happened:

Aguilar credibly testified that he was extorted by MS-13 because he was a successful businessman. Aguilar publicly complained to neighbors about the gang and said he would like them exterminated. Thereafter, the gang told him that because he had complained, they were doubling the amount of their extortion to $100 and would kill his family if he didn’t comply. Eventually, the gang increased the demand to $500 and threatened Aguilar at gunpoimt. Aguilar left the country and sought asylum in the U.S.

What should have happened:

Aguilar presented a classic “mixed motive” case. In a gang-ridden society like El Salvador, public criticism of gangs is a political opinion. This is particularly true because gangs have infiltrated many levels of government. Indeed in so-called “peace negotiations,” the Salvadoran government treated gangs like a separate political entity.

Undoubtedly, the gang’s increased extortion combined with death threats against Aguilar and his family resulted from his public political criticism of the gangs. Indeed, they told him that was the reason for increasing the amount to $100. There also is no doubt that gangs are capable of carrying out threats of harm up to the level of death and that the Salvadoran government is often unwilling or unable to protect its citizens from gangs.

Consequently, the respondent has established a well-founded fear (10% chance) of future persecution. He has also shown that political opinion is at least one central reason for such persecution. Consequently, Aguilar and his family should be granted asylum.

What actually happened:

The Immigration Judge denied Aguilar’s claim, finding that Aguilar’s statements were not made “in a political context” and also that the increased extortion and threats of harm were motivated by “pecuniary interest or personal animus” not a political opinion. The BIA affirmed on appeal.

What the Third Circuit said:

“Nothing in this exchange indicates that Aguilar believed that MS continued asking him for money “over the years” solely because he was a business owner or that their motive did not evolve over time. Rather, Aguilar’s earlier testimony stated that after he had made his negative statements about MS, “a few days pass, less than a week, when I have them back, and three of them came, and they said, we heard that you talked badly about us, and because you did that we are going to charge you $100 a week from now on, and if you don’t pay that we are going to kill your family.” (A.R. 171 (emphasis added).) In other words, Aguilar testified that the gang specifically cited his statements as the reason why it was increasing his payments. This runs contrary to the BIA’s conclusion

that his testimony “did not indicate a belief that he was targeted on account of any beliefs, opinions, or actions,” (App. 10), and directly supports his mixed motive argument. Despite affirming the IJ’s determination that Aguilar was credible, (App. 10), the BIA failed to acknowledge this important portion of Aguilar’s testimony. Instead, both the BIA and IJ determined that Aguilar had failed to show that his increased extortion payments and threats were the result of a protected ground rather than the pecuniary interest or personal animus of MS. However, the BIA has recognized that [p]ersecutors may have differing motives for engaging in acts of persecution, some tied to reasons protected under the Act and others not. Proving the actual, exact reason for persecution or feared persecution may be impossible in many cases. An asylum applicant is not obliged to show conclusively why persecution has occurred or may occur. In Re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 489 (B.I.A. 1996). As such, “an applicant does not bear the unreasonable burden of establishing the exact motivation of a ‘persecutor’ where different reasons for actions are possible.” Id. While we must affirm factual determinations unless the record evidence would compel any reasonable factfinder to conclude to the contrary, Aguilar’s credible testimony supports his assertion that the increased payments were, at least in part, the result of his negative statements. Requiring him to show that the MS members were motivated by his membership in the particular social group of persons who have spoken out publicly against the MS and who have expressed favor for vigilante organizations, rather than personal animus because of those statements, would place an unreasonable burden on Aguilar. There is no clear delineation between these two motives, and there is

no additional evidence that we can conceive of that would allow Aguilar to hammer down the gang members’ precise motivations, short of their testimony. Rather, the immediacy with which the gang increased its demands coupled with its stated reason for the increase leads us to conclude that any reasonable fact finder would hold that Aguilar had demonstrated that the increased demands were at least in part motivated by his statements.

The question now becomes whether Aguilar’s statements were a political opinion or if they indicated his membership in a particular social group. The IJ determined that Aguilar’s criticism of MS was not made in a political context, and the BIA affirmed. (App. 2, 24 n.3.) However, neither the IJ nor the BIA provided reasoning to support this finding. Similarly, the IJ determined that Aguilar’s proposed particular social groups were not sufficiently particular or socially distinct. (App. 24 n.3.) Again, no reasoning was given. The BIA declined to weigh in on the issue because it found that Aguilar had not met his burden of showing a nexus between the persecution and a protected ground. Thus, we will vacate and remand the issue to the BIA to review whether Aguilar’s proposed groups are sufficiently particular or distinct, and to provide a more detailed review of whether his statements were a political opinion. Aguilar’s application for withholding of removal should similarly be reevaluated in light of our guidance.”

Martinez-Segova v. Sessions, 2d Cir., 08-18-17

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/c0292714-4831-4fb8-b31e-c1269886a55b/1/doc/16-955_so.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/c0292714-4831-4fb8-b31e-c1269886a55b/1/hilite/

What happened:

Martinez-Segova suffered domestic abuse at the hands of her husband. She suffered harm rising to the level of past persecution on account of a particular social group. However, the DHS claims that the Salvadoran government is not unwilling or unable to protect Martinez-Segova because she obtained a protective order from a court. After the protective order was granted the respondent’s husband “violated the order with impunity by showing up to her place of work kissing and grabbing her and begging her to return.”

According to the U.S. State Department,

“Violence against women, including domestic violence, was a widespread and serious problem. A large portion of the population considered domestic violence socially acceptable; as with rape, its incidence was underreported. The law prohibits domestic violence and generally provides for sentences ranging from one to three years in prison, although some forms of domestic violence carry higher penalties. The law also permits restraining orders against offenders. Laws against domestic violence were not well enforced, and cases were not effectively prosecuted.”

Martinez-Segova also submitted lots of documentary evidence showing “the Salvadoran government’s 13 inability to combat domestic violence.”

What should have happened:

Martinez-Sevova has a “slam dunk” case for asylum. The Government’s argument that Salvador can protect her is basically frivolous. The Salvadoran government in fact was unable to protect the respondent either before or after the protective order. The State Department Country Report combined with the expert evidence show that the Salvadoran government t has a well-established record of failure to protect women from domestic violence.

The idea that the DHS could rebut a presumption of future persecution based on past persecution by showing fundamentally changed circumstances or the existence of a reasonably available internal relocation alternative is facially absurd in the context of El Salvador.

What really happened:

Incredibly, the Immigration Judge denied Martinez-Segova’s claim, and the BIA affirmed. The BIA made a bogus finding that Martinez-Segova failed to show that the Salvadoran government was unwilling or unable to protect her.

What the Secomd Circuit said:

“We conclude that the agency failed to sufficiently consider the country conditions evidence in analyzing whether Martinez-Segova demonstrated that the Salvadoran government was unable or unwilling to protect her from her husband. The BIA relied heavily on the fact that Martinez-Segova failed to report her husband’s violation of the protective order to the police. The agency’s decision in this regard was flawed. Where, as here,“the IJ and BIA ignored ample record evidence tending to show that”authorities are unwilling and unable to protect against persecution, we need not decide “whether [a petitioner’s] unwillingness to confront the police is fatal to [her] asylum claim.” Pan v. Holder, 777 F.3d 540, 544-45 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Aliyev v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2008) (declining to determine “precisely what a person must show in order for the government to be deemed responsible for the conduct of private actors” where petitioner “introduced enough evidence to forge the link between private conduct and public responsibility” (emphasis added)).

Although the agency does not have to parse each individual piece of evidence, Zhi Yun Gao v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 86, 87 (2d Cir. 2007), there is no indication that the agency considered the ample record evidence of the Salvadoran government’s inability to combat domestic violence—a phenomenon that the U.S. State Department deems one of El Salvador’s “principal human rights problems” for which its efforts to ameliorate the problem are “minimally effective.” A declaration from an human rights attorney and expert on gender issues in El Salvador reveals that orders of protection, while difficult to procure, “do little to protect victims from further violence because judges often draft them inadequately and law enforcement officials neglect or refuse to enforce them” and “are little more than pieces of paper affording no more protection than the victims had prior to the legal process.” Where orders of protection are issued, the onus is on the government to ensure compliance; for example, judges are required to appoint an independent team to monitor compliance with orders of protection and that inadequate follow up “frequently renders victims of domestic violence virtually helpless to enforce their rights.” There is no indication that that judge did this in Martinez-Segova’s case. Moreover, the order of protection prohibited Martinez-Segova’s husband from “harassing, stalking, [and] intimidating” her, but her husband nonetheless violated the order with impunity by showing up to her place of work, kissing and grabbing her and begging her to return. Because the agency’s conclusion—that Martinez- Segova failed to establish that the Salvadoran government was unable or unwilling to protect her from her husband because she had been able to obtain a protective order —is in tension with the record evidence demonstrating that such orders are largely ineffective, we grant the petition and remand for consideration of this evidence. See Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Despite our generally deferential review of IJ and BIA opinions, we require a certain minimum level of analysis from the IJ and BIA opinions denying asylum, and indeed must require such if judicial review is to be meaningful.”). Because remand is warranted for the agency to consider whether Martinez-Segova established past persecution, we decline to reach its humanitarian asylum ruling at this time. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”). Moreover, the BIA did not address the IJ’s conclusion that the Government rebutted Martinez-Segova’s well-founded fear of persecution, and that determination generally precedes an analysis on whether humanitarian asylum is warranted. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(B)(iii) (humanitarian asylum is generally considered “in the absence of a well-founded fear of persecution”).”

CONCLUSION

The BIA and the Immigration Judges made an incredible number of serious errors in these two cases, from misreading the record, to ignoring the evidence, to botching the law.

So, while DOJ and EOIR are patting each other on the back for becoming such great cogs in the Trump deportation machine, and racing removals through the system, the real results are starkly illustrated here. Every day, vulnerable asylum applicants with sound, well-documented claims that should be quickly granted either at the Asylum Office or on an Immigration Court’s “short docket” are being screwed by the BIA’s failure to protect the rights of asylum seekers and to educate and in some cases force Immigration Judges to do likewise.

The Federal Courts are being bogged down with cases that a third-year law student who has had a course in asylum law could tell have been badly mis-analyzed. The idea that EOIR contains the world’s best administrative tribunals dedicated to guaranteeing fairness and due process for all has become a cruel joke.

Our Constitution and laws protecting our rights are meaningless if nobody is willing and able to stand up for the rights of individuals who are being railroaded through our system. We saw this in the era of Jim Crow laws directed at depriving Black Americans of their rights, and we are seeing it again today with respect to migrants caught up in the Trump Administration’s gonzo enforcement program.

Yeah, today it’s not you or me. But, when you or I need justice, why will we get (or deserve) any better treatment than the farce that the Trump Administration and EOIR are unloading on migrants now?

PWS

08-27-17

This November vote like your life and the future of our nation depend on it. Because they do.

Related posts:

Join the New Due Process Army and stand up to Jeff Sessions and the other bullying, scofflaw, White Nationalists in the Trump Regime.

Related posts:

Related posts:

Aguilar v. Attorney General, 3d Cir., 08-16-17

Martinez-Segova v. Sessions, 2d Cir., 08-18-17

CONCLUSION

Related posts: