BIA HEADNOTE:
(1) Torturous conduct committed by a public official who is “acting in an official capacity,” meaning acting under color of law, is covered by the regulations implementing the Convention Against Torture, but such conduct by an official who is not acting in an official capacity is not covered. Matter of O-F-A-S-, 28 I&N Dec. 35 (A.G. 2020), followed.
(2) The key consideration in determining if an official’s torturous conduct was undertaken “in an official capacity” for purposes of CAT eligibility is whether the official was able to engage in the conduct because of his or her government position, or whether the official could have done so without connection to the government.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Ethan R. Horowitz, Esquire, Lawrence, Massachusetts
BEFORE: Board Panel: MALPHRUS, Deputy Chief Appellate Immigration Judge; CREPPY and HUNSUCKER; Appellate Immigration Judges.
MALPHRUS, Deputy Chief Appellate Immigration Judge:
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SCHMIDT, RETIRED JUDGE OF THE ROUND TABLE, DISSENTING:
I dissent.
A far fairer, more logical, efficient, and uniformity-promoting solution is staring us in the face: An applicant who credibly establishes torture by a public official or officials should be entitled to a rebuttable presumption that the torture was inflicted “under color of law.” The DHS should then be required to establish by a preponderance of evidence that the official was acting in another capacity if it wishes to contest that presumption.
The information and evidence that might overcome a logical presumption that government officials act “under color of law” is much more likely to be available to the DHS than to the applicant. This is particularly true in the many cases where CAT applicants are detained, unrepresented, or both.
This rebuttable presumption would also, as a practical matter, close the gap between our interpretation and the rule in the Ninth Circuit which wisely recognizes no exceptions when torture is inflicted by government officials. See, e.g., Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 362 (9th Cir. 2017).
In adjudicating claims from individuals who have already suffered torture at the hands of government officials we must err on the side of protection, not rejection. The panel’s mushy guidance amounts to no practical guidance at all. It will certainly result in conflicting results, increased trial times and backlogs, arbitrary denials, and violations of due process. More backlog-promoting, avoidable Circuit Court remands are sure to follow.
Consequently, I dissent.
🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!
PWS
08-14-23
