Introduction and Summary of Argument
This brief presents amici’s practical perspective on why the Immigration and Nationality Act’s provision for removal based on a conviction for a “crime involving moral turpitude” is void for vagueness. Section 1227(a)(2)(A) combines the imprecision of the phrase “moral turpitude” with the indeterminacy of applying that phrase to a hypothetical set of facts
1 Counsel of record for all parties received notice of amici’s intent to file this brief at least ten days before its due date. The parties have consented to this filing. No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person other than amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
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under the categorical approach. The result is a provision so vague that adjudicators cannot agree on how to conduct the inquiry and frequently reach inconsistent results.
The Act charges immigration judges with determining which crimes involve “moral turpitude.” Though the statute provides no definition, in 1951, this Court held that the “language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct.” Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1951). But time has disproved that understanding. The usual “consistency [that] can be expected to emerge with the accretion of case law,” S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 550 (3d Cir. 2018), has not materialized. Indeed, the typical sources of clarity—the Board of Immigration Appeals and the courts of appeals—have produced more questions than answers. Whose morals matter? How should judges discern what those morals are? What course should judges follow when moral views conflict? How do they account for changes in views over time? Immigration judges have no way to know. And the uncertainty that the statute’s vague words create left amici with no guide except their own moral intuitions.
To this ambiguity, add that, under the categorical approach, immigration judges do not evaluate the actual conduct engaged in by the noncitizen before them. Instead, they must assess the moral implications of a theoretical set of facts—the “least culpable” means of committing the crime in question. The hypothetical nature of this mode of analysis exacerbates the underlying vagueness of the statutory phrase “crime involving moral turpitude.”
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Recently, this Court has struck down statutory provisions that suffered from analogous uncertainty, holding each unconstitutionally vague. See Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015); Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018); United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). Section 1227(a)(2)(A) should suffer the same fate.
The real-world effects of Section 1227(a)(2)(A)’s vagueness confirm this conclusion. Attempts to curtail the provision’s arbitrariness by articulating standards have failed. The Board and the courts of appeals have repeatedly but unsuccessfully tried to craft a workable set of rules for identifying which crimes involve moral turpitude. Their efforts have instead produced a series of non-dispositive, ad hoc tests that generate inconsistent and arbitrary results. Confusion abounds in immigration courts and in Article III courts alike, with widespread disagreement over whether a given crime involves moral turpitude. Among other unexplainable outcomes, the courts of appeals part ways on whether crimes such as making a terroristic threat or deceptively using a social security number involve moral turpitude. Amici were required to sort through this morass, unsure of which of the growing list of ad hoc tests applied or how to deal with the conflicting results. Their experiences confirm that the phrase “moral turpitude” is too vague to govern the “particularly severe ‘penalty’” of removal. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893)).
For these reasons, this Court should grant review and reverse.
Read the complete brief here:
Daye Amicus Brief To File 11.14.22
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For over 70 years, Federal Judges from the Supremes on down have turned a “blind eye” to our Constitution and substituted their subjective views on morality and immigrants for the rule of law. Our Round Table says it’s high time to stop! ⚔️🛡
Deputy Director and Staff Attorney – Georgetown Law Appellate Courts Immersion Clinic
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Thanks again to the superstars Esthena L. Barlow, Brian Wolfman, Counsel of Record Madeline Meth, and the rest of the “Youth Brigade of the NDPA” over @ Georgetown Law!
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PWS
11-16-22