SOPHIA GENOVESE: Advocates Must Keep Pushing Back Against DOJ’s Bias & Unduly Restrictive Interpretations Of Asylum Law!

https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/outsidenews/posts/acting-ag-whitaker-takes-aim-at-asylum-seekers-fleeing-family-based-persecution—sophia-genovese

Sophia writes in an article that was published at LexisNexis:

Acting AG Whitaker Takes Aim at Asylum Seekers Fleeing Family-Based Persecution – Sophia Genovese

Sophia Genovese, Dec. 10, 2018 – “Acting Attorney General Matthew Whitaker has followed in his predecessor’s footsteps by referring yet another immigration case to himself, Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 494 (A.G. 2018). The Acting AG asks parties to brief “whether, and under what circumstances, an alien may establish persecution on account of membership in a particular social group under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A) based on the alien’s membership in a family unit.”

As background, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 2017) recognized that membership in a family unit constitutes a particular social group. However, it held that to establish eligibility for asylum on such a basis, “an applicant must not only demonstrate that he or she is a member of the family but also that the family relationship is at least one central reason for the claimed harm.” The BIA denied asylum to the respondent, L-E-A-, for failing to meet this nexus requirement. The respondent was a native and citizen of Mexico whose father owned a general store in Mexico City. Members of a drug cartel approached the respondent’s father to ask if they could sell drugs in the store as they viewed it as a favorable distribution location. The respondent’s father refused. The members of the drug cartel approached respondent to see whether he would sell drugs for them at his father’s store. Upon respondent also refusing, the members of the cartel tried to abduct him, but he was able to get away. The respondent fled to the United States and sought asylum. The IJ and BIA reasoned that the respondent was not entitled to relief because even if the persecutor had harmed the respondent, it was done so as a means to an end, i.e. to sell drugs. In other words, they argued, the persecution was not due to the respondent’s membership in a particular social group and animus towards the family, but rather because he was interfering in their drug trade.

The BIA in Matter of L-E-A- recognized the long history of family units constituting particular social groups. See, e.g., Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 128 (4th Cir. 2011); Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980 (6th Cir. 2009); Torres v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 616, 629 (7th Cir. 2008). The BIA has previously “explained that ‘persecution on account of membership in a particular social group’ refers to ‘persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic…such as…kinship ties.” Matter of C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 951, 955 (BIA 2006) (quoting Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 233-34 (BIA 1985)). “It has been said that a group of family members constitutes the ‘prototypical example’ of a particular social group.” INS, Asylum Officer Basic Training Course: Eligibility Part III: Nexus 21 (Nov. 30, 2001) (quoting Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986)). “There can, in fact, be no plainer example of a social group based on common, identifiable and immutable characteristics than that of the nuclear family.” Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993). Indeed, the BIA found that L-E-A-’s membership in his family constituted a particular social group. Instead, the key issue was whether the harm he experienced or feared was on account of his membership in that particular social group. The BIA in L-E-A- upheld the IJ’s decision below, opining that “any motive to harm the respondent because he was a member of his family was, at most, incidental…[Rather,] the cartel’s motive to increase its profits by selling contraband in the store was one central reason for its actions against the respondent and his family.” 27 I&N Dec. at 46.

As we and others have previously discussed, the BIA missed the mark in L-E-A-. The BIA in L-E-A- critically notes that “[i]f the persecutor would have treated the applicant the same if the protected characteristic of the family did not exist, then the applicant has not established a claim on this ground.” 27 I&N Dec. at 44. Under this reasoning, L-E-A- should have been granted asylum. But for L-E-A-’s familial relationship with his father, he would not have been targeted by the cartel. In other words, despite their motivation of wanting to sell drugs at his father’s store, the cartel’s motivation in targeting L-E-A- was to get to his father, thus satisfying the nexus criteria. There is a reason why the cartel did not target the father’s neighbor – because the neighbor does not have a close, i.e. family, relationship to him. That the cartel ultimately had monetary motivations is irrelevant in the analysis of why they persecuted L-E-A-.

It is unclear how the Acting AG, or the incoming AG (anticipated to be William Barr), will rule in a case that has already made the obstacles more onerous for asylum-seekers. Given the administration’s animus towards asylum-seekers, it is unlikely that they seek to redress the problems with the BIA’s holding. Rather, it is likely that the Acting AG seeks to build upon the BIA’s flawed reasoning and make it even more difficult for those to flee persecution and obtain asylum. The BIA in Matter of L-E-A- affirmed, without question, that kinship ties are inherently a particular social group. Given the wording of the Acting AG’s question Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 494 (A.G. 2018), he will likely attack the case on this front.

As outlined by the BIA in Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 2017), and reiterated above, there is no clearer definition of particular social group than kinship ties. To be granted asylum based on one’s membership in a particular social group, the applicant must show that the group is “(1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.” Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. at 392. As set forth in Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 212 (BIA 1985), a “common immutable characteristic” is defined as “a characteristic that either is beyond the power of the individual members of the group to change or is so fundamental to their identities or consciences that it ought not be required to be changed.” Under Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208 (BIA 2014) and clarified in Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227 (BIA 2014), the social group must be defined with “particularity,” or be defined by boundaries of who is actually a member of the group. Finally, as explained in Matter of W-G-R-, “social distinction” is defined as the ‘recognition’ or ‘perception’ of the particular social group in society. 26 I&N Dec. at 216. Family units very clearly satisfy each of these requirements, where you cannot change who your family is, where who members of your family are can be defined with particularity, and where others in society can recognize you as a member of your family. A challenge to the family unit particular social group would undermine the construction of nearly all particular social groups thereafter.

Once formulating one’s social group, the applicant must also show that their persecution was on account of their membership in the social group (the “nexus requirement”), and that the government in the country of origin is unable or unwilling to afford them protection from such persecution. As we’ve previously argued, the Courts need to clarify the nexus requirement. In Matter of L-E-A-, for example, the nexus analysis needed to have focused specifically on why L-E-A- was targeted and persecuted – not what the cartel’s ultimate aim was after targeting him. Clarification on this issue is imperative for uniform adjudication of particular social group asylum cases. Additionally, given AG Sessions’ holding in Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), future courts and advocates will need to clarify the state protection analysis, especially when the persecution is carried out by private actors. In particular, advocates will need to demonstrate through country conditions reports and expert testimony that the country of origin is unable or unwilling to provide protection from these private actors. In Matter of L-E-A- in particular, one can demonstrate that the cartel acts as a quasi-government in the respondent’s town, and that the police do not have control (or choose not to have control) over them.

Although the legitimacy of Acting AG Whitaker’s appointment, and thus his self-referral of cases, has been called into question, advocates must instead focus their efforts on litigating the asylum requirements. The constant self-referral of cases and unilateral, sweeping changes to the law have been tiresome for immigration advocates; however, we should use these opportunities to litigate existing, flawed case law to create a more robust asylum framework so that we can actually protect those fleeing violent persecution.”

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Sophia is absolutely correct!

Like Sessions, Whitaker combines a White Nationalist agenda with some poor intellectual and lawyering skills. Not surprising, because lawyers advancing a racially biased restrictionist agenda are obviously driven by something outside, and usually not even very closely related to, the law and conventional human values.

Their arrogant and outrageous disregard of the law and facts provides a good opportunity for asking Article III Courts and Congress to finally adopt and enforce a legally appropriate, generous, humanitarian approach to asylum law as was directed by the Supremes back in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca. Notwithstanding some meaningful advances over the three decades since that decision, the “promise of Cardoza” for U.S. asylum law has never been fully recognized.

And this Administration is hell-bent on rolling back even the modest advances that had been painstakingly made. Now is the time to make asylum law work as it was supposed to! Human lives and our integrity as a nation of laws and values depend upon it!

Join the New Due Process Army and fight to hold the “Department of Injustice” and its biased and deviant officials accountable to the law and to history for their naked racism, extreme intellectual dishonesty, failure to uphold the rule of law, and cowardly contempt for human life! Yes, it’s annoying. Yes, it’s hard work! But, in the end it will be worth it to know that you did something worthwhile in your life. And there are few things more worthwhile than protecting the rights and saving the lives of the most helpless, exploited, and vulnerable among us.

For those of you new to “Courtside,” both Judge Jeffrey Chase and I have previously written about how the BIA stood the law of causation on its head to deny a very grantable asylum claim in Matter of L-E-A-. https://wp.me/p8eeJm-UI

https://wp.me/p8eeJm-UI;

Indeed, the Fourth Circuit later absolutely trashed the BIA’s L-E-A- rationale on nexus in Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, without mentioning L-E-A- by name. https://wp.me/p8eeJm-2aS.

The Fourth and other Circuits have also been very strong in recognizing “family” as a PSG. Indeed, one of the seminal “family-based” cases was Crespin-Valadares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 128 (4th Cir. 2011). That was a case where the Fourth Circuit reversed and slammed the BIA while affirming my finding as an Immigration Judge that a family-based PSG was cognizable. In other words, I was right and the BIA was wrong. But, hey, who’s keeping track?

Now, Whitaker seeks to make things even worse. We should all be totally outraged that the Immigration Courts are under the control of the DOJ and political officials who are completely unqualified to sit in a quasi-judicial capacity. It’s “Clown Court;” but, in this case, the “clowns” are threatening innocent people’s lives!🤡

PWS

12-13-18

DEATH THREATS ARE A WELL-ESTABLISHED FORM OF PERSECUTION, EXCEPT @ THE BIA — 4th Cir. Tells BIA To Follow Precedent — Tairou v. Whitaker

TAIROU-4TH-DEATH THREATS

Tairou v. Whitaker, 4th Cir., 11-30-18

PANEL: GREGORY, Chief Judge, MOTZ, Circuit Judge, and William L. OSTEEN, Jr., United States District Judge for the Middle District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.

OPINION BY: CHIEF JUDGE GREGORY

KEY QUOTE:

Mocktar Tairou (“Tairou”) petitions this Court to review a final removal order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his asylum and withholding of removal application and ordering his removal to Benin. Tairou contends that the BIA erred in finding that he was not subjected to past persecution and that he lacked a well- founded fear of persecution were he to return to Benin. Our binding precedent explicitly holds that a threat of death constitutes persecution. Because Tairou experienced multiple death threats in Benin, we hold Tairou established that he was subjected to past persecution. We therefore grant the petition for review and remand to allow the BIA to consider whether, in light of Tairou’s demonstrated past persecution, he has a well- founded fear of future persecution.

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As I’ve pointed out before, beneath the hoopla and commotion caused by the direct assault on Due Process in Immigration Court conducted by the Trump Administration and Jeff Sessions, there is a deeper much more fundamental lingering problem. The BIA, a supposedly “expert tribunal,” consistently errors in the application of some of the most basic precepts of immigration law, particularly when it comes to recognizing and protecting the rights of asylum seekers.

Also, even without a finding of past persecution, the threats shown in this case clearly should have been more than enough to show a “reasonable likelihood” (10% chance) of future persecution that fulfills the (supposedly) generous “well founded fear” standard for asylum enunciated by the Supremes in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca and endorsed by the BIA in Matter of Mogharrabi.

In other words, the BIA’s analysis in this case contravenes what we used to teach in basic training of Immigration Judges and Judicial Law Clerks and would have earned a student “minimal credit” on my “Refugee Law and Policy” final exam at Georgetown Law. This clearly is a system where quality and fairness are not only “Not Job 1” but aren’t even on the charts! Astoundingly, we have Appellate Judges serving on the “highest immigration tribunal” who are less competent and knowledgeable than most second year law students!

Even before Sessions, many asylum seekers were wrongfully denied by intentionally skewed interpretations and careless work by a tribunal that had long ago lost sight of its supposed vision of “being the world’s best administrative tribunal, guaranteeing fairness and due process for all.” Folks with good lawyers, the wherewithal to appeal, and the luck of the “right panel in the right circuit” might eventually obtain justice. Others had their lives ruined or even ended by a system operating in contravention of normal judicial precepts and Constitutional Due Process. Sessions “doubled down” on bias and “worst practices.”

How many must suffer and die before this system is brought into even minimal compliance with our laws, international conventions, and Constitution (let alone fulfilling its now mocked promise of becoming the “world’s best administrative tribunal guaranteeing fairness and Due Process for all”)?

Shame on those in Congress, the Executive Branch, and the Article III Judiciary who have either promoted or enabled this travesty of justice. And, shame on America for not holding all of these public officials accountable.

Join the New Due Process Army and fight to force all public officials to live up to their oaths of office!

PWS

12=07-18

THE EVER-AMAZING TAL @ CNN GIVES US THE “LOWDOWN” ON SESSIONS’S ALL-OUT PLAN TO DISABLE US PROTECTION LAWS – Pulling Out All The Stops In Attempting To Turn US Legal Protection System Into A “Killing Floor” For Most Vulnerable Refugees! – No Wonder Many U.S. Immigration Judges See Looming Conflict With Oath To Uphold U.S. Constitution & Exercise Independent Judgment Coming At Them with Breakneck Speed!

The massive asylum changes Jeff Sessions tucked into the footnotes

By Tal Kopan, CNN

When Attorney General Jeff Sessions ruled that domestic violence and gang victims are not likely to qualify for asylum in the US, he undercut potentially tens of thousands of claims each year for people seeking protection.

But in a footnote of his ruling, Sessions also telegraphed a desire for more sweeping, immediate reinterpretations of US asylum law that could result in turning people away at the border before they ever see a judge.

Sessions wrote that since “generally” asylum claims on the basis of domestic or gang violence “will not qualify for asylum,” few claims will meet the “credible fear” standard in an initial screening as to whether an immigrant can pursue their claim before a judge. That means asylum seekers may end up being turned back at the border, a major change from current practice.

“When you put it all together, this is his grand scheme to just close any possibility for people seeking protection — legally — to claim that protection that they can under the law,” said Ur Jaddou, a former chief counsel at US Citizenship and Immigration Services now at immigration advocacy group America’s Voice. “He’s looking at every possible way to end it. And he’s done it one after the other.”

The Trump administration has focused on asylum claims — a legal way to stay in the US under domestic and international law — characterizing them as a “loophole” in the system. The problem, they say, is many claims are unsuccessful, but in the meantime as immigrants wait out a lengthy court process, they are allowed to live and work in the US and build lives there, leading some to go into hiding.

More: http://www.cnn.com/2018/06/13/politics/jeff-sessions-asylum-footnotes/index.html

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I strongly recommend that you go on over to CNN at the link to read Tal’s amazing and incisive analysis of Jeff Sessions’s insidious plan to destroy US protection laws and undermine our entire Constitutional system of justice to further his obscene White Nationalist agenda.

For those of you who read “Courtside” on a regular basis, it’s no secret that I’m a “Charter Member” of the “Tal Kopan Fan Club.” I have total admiration for her amazing work ethic, ability to understand and simplify one of the most complex subjects in US law and politics, and to turn out such tightly written, gobbledygook free copy on a regular basis.

In my view, even for a superstar like Tal, this is one of her “best ever” articles, and one that every American interested in saving lives, preserving our refugee and asylum laws, retaining our Constitutional system of Due Process, and remaining a nation of “values rather than men” in light of a totally unprincipled attack by an Attorney General unqualified for office should read and digest Tal’s analysis!

How disingenuous a scofflaw is Jeff Sessions? As Tal mentions, in FN 8 of Matter of A-B-, Sessions takes aim at the well-established principle of asylum law that “family” is a qualifying “particular social group.”

Now, lets hear what a “real” Article III Court, one not bound to a restrictionist White Nationalist anti-asylum agenda, and where they judges don’t work for Jeff Sessions, has to say about “family” as a particular social group:”

The INA does not expressly define the term “particular social group,” but we have recently considered its meaning. See Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 2011).⁴ We there concluded that Chevron deference should be accorded to the BIA’s long-standing interpretation of “particular social group” as “a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic,” Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985), overruled on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987). See Lizama, 629 F.3d at 447. This “immutability” test, first articulated in the BIA’s seminal Acosta case, requires that group members share a characteristic that “the members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.” 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.

The Crespins’ proposed group satisfies this test. Acosta itself identifies “kinship ties” as paradigmatically immutable, see id., and the BIA has since affirmed that family bonds are innate and unchangeable. See In re C-A, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959 (BIA 2006); In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 342 (BIA 1996) (accepting “clan membership” as a particular social

[632 F.3d 125]

group because it was “inextricably linked to family ties”). Accordingly, every circuit to have considered the question has held that family ties can provide a basis for asylum. See Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 995 (6th Cir.2009); Ayele v. Holder, 564 F.3d 862, 869 (7th Cir.2009); Jie Lin v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 1014, 1028 (9th Cir.2004); Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir.1993). We agree; the family provides “a prototypical example of a `particular social group.'” Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).

The BIA committed legal error by concluding to the contrary. That error flowed from the fact that, as the Government concedes, the BIA’s removal order rejected a group different from that which the Crespins proposed. The BIA concluded that “those who actively oppose gangs in El Salvador by agreeing to be prosecutorial witnesses” does not constitute a cognizable social group. But the Crespins did not so contend. Rather, they maintained, and continue to maintain, that family members of those witnesses constitute such a group. The BIA later essentially admitted this error, acknowledging in its denial of Crespin’s motion to reconsider that it does “not dispute that family membership can give rise to membership in a particular social group under certain circumstances.” The BIA nonetheless affirmed its original order, asserting that the Crespins’ proposed social group was insufficiently “particular[ ]” because “anyone who testified against MS-13, as well as all of their family members, would potentially be included.” Again the BIA inaccurately characterized the Crespins’ proposed social group. Indeed, the Crespins’ proposed group excludes persons who merely testify against MS-13; the Crespins’ group instead encompasses only the relatives of such witnesses, testifying against MS-13, who suffer persecution on account of their family ties. The BIA never explained why this group stretches beyond the bounds of particularity.

Moreover, the precedent on which the BIA relied requires only that “the group have particular and well-defined boundaries” such that it constitutes a “discrete class of persons.” Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582, 584 (BIA 2008). The family unit—centered here around the relationship between an uncle and his nephew—possesses boundaries that are at least as “particular and well-defined” as other groups whose members have qualified for asylum. See, e.g., Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 365-66 (6th Cir.2010) (former gang members); Tapiero de Orejuela v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir.2005) (“the educated, landowning class of cattle farmers”); Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir.1994) (“Iranian women who advocate women’s rights or who oppose Iranian customs relating to dress and behavior”), superseded by statute on other grounds, Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, as recognized in Rife v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606, 614 (8th Cir.2004).

Finally, the BIA opined that the proposed group lacked the requisite “social visibility” of a particular social group. This was also error.⁵ Indeed, the BIA itself has previously stated that “[s]ocial

[632 F.3d 126]

groups based on innate characteristics such as … family relationship are generally easily recognizable and understood by others to constitute social groups.” In re C-A, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 959. In fact, we can conceive of few groups more readily identifiable than the family. See Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576. This holds particularly true for Crespin’s family, given that Crespin and his uncle publicly cooperated with the prosecution of their relative’s murder.

In sum, the BIA’s conclusion that Crespin failed to demonstrate his membership in a “particular social group” was manifestly contrary to law.

Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 124-26 (4th Cir. 2011).

Outrageously, Sessions is suggesting taking a position that has been held by the Article III Courts to be “manifestly contrary to law.” Could there be a clearer example of a “scofflaw?”

And, lets not forget the cause for which Sessions is prostituting himself and the law. Contrary to Sessions’s suggestion that these are just ordinary folks seeking a better life, he is actually proposing to summarily remove mostly women and children who face a specific, very real chance of rape, torture, beatings, and death because of their position, gender, and resistance to the forces perpetrating persecution in El Salvador who are closely aligned with or operate largely with impunity from the Government, in fact if not in the mythical version that Sessions portrays.

In plain terms, Jeff Sessions is advocating that we pass a potential “death sentence” on the most vulnerable among us without giving them a fair hearing or actually considering the many ways in which protections laws could be used to save their lives. Even if Sessions were legally correct (which he certainly isn’t) removing basically defenseless individuals to places where they face such a deadly future would be both cowardly and highly immoral.

Finally, as I have pointed out before, the real plan here, which will go into effect almost immediately, is to have USCIS Asylum, Officers and Immigration Judges who now are all considered “partners” in the enforcement mechanism by Sessions, deny almost all “credible fear” claims based on Sessions’s yet untested decision in Matter of A-B-. Therefore, unless the Article III Courts decide to enforce the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, a duty which to date they have fairly consistently shirked in connection with the “credible fear process,” most current and future arrivals will be shipped out without any access to the hearing process at all — in other words, without even a veneer of fairness, impartiality, and Due Process.

Advocates had better get busy with a better plan to get the illegal aspects of the “deportation express” before the Article IIIs. Otherwise, vulnerable women and children are going to be condemned to death and /or torture with no process at all! Think we’re not witnessing the “decline and fall” of our republic. Guess again!

What have we come to as a nation when a corrupt and biased individual like Sessions purports to “speak for America?”

Stand up for Due Process and human values! Oppose Jeff Sessions and his restrictionist agenda!

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Meanwhile, back at the ranch, “Midnight Writer” Tal reports on the GOP’s “DACA negotiations.”

House DACA deal in final stages: ‘Crossing the Ts’

By: Tal Kopan, CNN

Republican negotiations on a House immigration bill that would fix the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program are in the final stages, key lawmakers said as they left a secretive meeting in the House basement on Wednesday.

Both moderates and conservatives are coming together on an outline of a bill brought on by weeks of negotiations behind closed doors, as leadership brought the two wings of the party together to avert rebellions on both sides.

After a breakthrough agreement on how to proceed Tuesday — and arm twisting by leadership — that cut off moderates’ efforts to buck leadership control of the floor, talks Wednesday centered around hammering out the details of the policy itself.

The progress in negotiations sets the stage for votes on immigration on the House floor next week, which will include a vote on a conservative proposal that is not believed to have the support to pass and a separate compromise being written that will stem from the negotiations currently in progress.

Though the bills’ fates are still unclear and it’s possible neither passes the House — let alone moves in the Senate — the prospect of Republicans having a debate and vote on the political third rail of immigration on the House floor the summer before midterm elections was unthinkable just months ago.

“We’re just doing the cleanup stuff from the negotiations that (Reps) Raul (Labrador) and Carlos (Curbelo) did yesterday,” said conservative Freedom Caucus Chairman Mark Meadows as he left member negotiations Wednesday. “So we’re just trying to dot our I’s and cross our T’s.”

“We’re just about there,” Curbelo said. “I think we’ll definitely see text this week.”

What’s in it

CNN has obtained a draft from a source close to the negotiations of the outline lawmakers are working from to write the bill, which, when described to Curbelo, was confirmed as largely still what they’re working on minus a few “details filled in.” The broader GOP conference was briefed on the toplines of the bill in a Wednesday morning meeting.

More: http://www.cnn.com/2018/06/13/politics/daca-deal-house-immigration/index.html

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Sounds to me like another wasteful “legislative charade” on the way from the GOP. The only “Dreamer bill” that actually could pass both houses would be one pushed by a bipartisan group of legislators. But, GOP leadership has no interest in such a solution, nor does Trump.

Therefore, I predict that Dreamers will continue to “twist in the wind” while the Federal Courts ruminate about their fate.

PWS

06-13-18

NO, IT’S NOT “NORMAL DEVIATION:” U.S. IMMIGRATION JUDGE V. STUART COUCH’S RECORD ON CENTRAL AMERICAN WOMEN CLAIMING ASYLUM BASED ON A-R-C-G- SHOWS DEVIANT JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR, BIAS, & INSUFFICIENT CONTROL BY THE BIA – These Are The Glaring Problems Demeaning Due Process In Today’s U.S. Immigration Courts!– Yet, Jeff Sessions Appears Determined To Reinforce Bias and Denial Of Due Process Rather Than Solving The REAL Problems!

FOIA results: evidence of Immigration Judge V. Stuart Couch’s shocking prejudgment of all domestic violence asylum claims

by Bryan Johnson on April 20, 2018

At the bottom, readers will find the all of the decisions of Immigration Judge V. Stuart Couch that resulted in BIA remands for the Fiscal Year of 2017.

Time and time again, IJ Couch’s decisions denying victims of domestic violence asylum contain carbon copy language.

Thus, it is clear that IJ Couch’s has been prejudging all claims that have a history of domestic violence, and quite literally copying and pasting language he used to deny other domestic violence victims asylum. The following is one of his favorite passages to copy and paste.

The respondent’s evidence reflects that [the] physical and verbal abuse of her was related to his violent and jealous nature…The evidence in this case is more consistent with acts of general violence and therefore does not constitute evidence of persecution based on a statutorily protected ground.

Immediately below, I have excerpted key parts of the BIA & IJ Couch decisions. A clear pattern has emerged: IJ Couch does not grant asylum to women who are victims of domestic violence, despite clear instructions to the contrary from the BIA.

Pages 31-48:

Immigration Judge’s decision:

“As noted in the particularity analysis supra, Guatemala has significant and troubling

issues related to domestic violence and crimes against women. However, unlike the married

alien in Matter of A-R-C-G-, the respondent lacks an identifiable trait like marriage or

inability to seek assistance from authority that distinguishes her from other women in

Guatemalan society. Similar to the particularity analysis supra, the Court finds the

respondent is an unfortunate victim of violence against women like far too many women in

Guatemala, and thereby renders her past harm indistinct by comparison.”

BIA’s holding:

The respondent’s testimony reflects that people in the community knew them as a couple and

made comments reflecting their notions that the respondent could not escape the relationship (Tr. 232 at 66).

The respondent also testified that her parents did not help her leave the

relationship because of ingrained views that women are the property of men (Tr. at 33-35).

Under these circumstances, we conclude under the same reasoning as Matter of A-R-C-G-,

supra, that the proffered social group here is “immutable,” “particular” and “socially distinct.”

To the extent that the Immigration Judge determined that the respondent is not a member of this

particular social group, that determination is clearly erroneous. See Matter of A-R-C-G-, supra,

at 3 91 (the question whether a person is a member of a particular social group is a finding of fact

that we review for clear error).”

Pages 65-80:

Immigration Judge’s decision:

“As noted in the particularity analysis supra, El Salvador has significant and troubling

issues related to domestic violence and crimes against women. However, unlike the married

alien in Matter of A-R-C-G-, the respondent lacks an identifiable trait like marriage or

inability to seek assistance from authority that distinguishes her from other women in

Salvadoran society. Similar to the particularity analysis supra, the Court finds the

respondent is an unfortunate victim of violence against women like far too many women in

El Salvador, and thereby renders her past harm indistinct by comparison.”

BIA decision:

Finally, the record does not support the Immigration Judge’s determination that the past harm

the respondent suffered is “consistent with acts of general violence” which undermines her claim

for asylum (l.J. at 10). Further, even assuming her former partner’s “criminal tendencies and

substance abuse” played a role in his conduct (/d.), the appropriate inquiry is whether the

asserted protected ground was or would be “at least one central reason” for the claimed or feared

harm. See section 208(b)(l)(B)(i) of the Act; Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I&N Dec. 341, 349 (BIA

2010)

Pages 81-96:

Immigration Judge Decision:

The respondent testified that when was drunk, he would physically and

verbally abuse her. She further testified “he was fine” when he was not under the influence

of alcohol. Thus, ‘s abuse appears related to his own criminal tendencies and

substance abuse, rather than conclusive evidence he targeted the respondent on account of

her proposed particular social group. The evidence in this case is more consistent with acts of

general violence and therefore does not constitute evidence of persecution based on a

statutorily protected ground.

BIA decision:

Upon review of the record, we conclude that a remand is necessary for the Immigration

Judge to further assess whether the respondent established that she is a member of a cognizable

particular social group. The Immigration Judge found that the respondent’s case is factually

distinguishable from Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014), because she was not in

a marital relationship with her former partner and did not seek assistance from authorities

(I.J. at 7-9). While relevant, the distinguishing factors identified do not preclude the respondent

from establishing that her proposed particular social group is cognizable under the Act, and we

find that further fact-finding regarding the respondent’s experiences in El Salvador is necessary

to determine whether she satisfied the elements required to establish a valid particular social

group. See Matter of A-R-C-G-, supra, at 393 (stating that “adjudicators must consider a

respondent’s own experiences, as well as more objective evidence, such as background country

information”).

Pages 102-120:

BIA decision:

We find clear error in the Immigration Judge’s determination that the respondent was not

abused by her former partner on account of her particular social group. See l.J. at 12; 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.l (d)(3)(i); Matter of N-M-, 25 l&N Dec. 526, 532 (BIA 2011) (a persecutor’s actual

motive is a matter of fact to be determined by the Immigration Judge and reviewed by this Board

for clear error). The respondent testified that her former partner told her that a woman is not

more intelligent than he is and that the respondent has no value, comments which indicate that he

harmed her because of her perceived lesser status in the relationship (Tr. at 46).

Immigration Judge Decision:

The respondent’s evidence reflects that [the] physical and verbal abuse of her

was related to his violent and jealous nature, sometimes accompanied by his use of alcohol.

Thus, ‘s abuse appears related to his own criminal tendencies or substance abuse,

rather than conclusive evidence he targeted the respondent on account of her proposed

particular social group. The evidence in this case is more consistent with acts of general

violence and therefore does not co nstitute evidence of persecution based on a statutorily

protected ground. Huaman-Cornelio v. BIA, 979 F.2d 9 at l 000; Ruiz v. US. Att’y Gen., 440

F.3d 1247, 1258 (11th Cir. 2006).

Pages 137-155

BIA decision:

We disagree with the Immigration Judge that the respondent’s proposed social group, consisting of Honduran women

who are viewed as property and whose domestic partners refuse to allow them to leave their

relationship lacks the requisite immutability, particularity, and social distinction (l.J. at 7-10).

See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 l&N Dec. 227, 236-43 (BIA 2014) (outlining factors to be

considered when discerning whether a social group is cognizable under the Act); Matter of

W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208, 213-18 (BIA 2014) (same).

Immigration Judge Decision:

The respondent’s evidence reflects that ‘s physical and verbal abuse of her

was related to his violent and jealous nature, heavy use of drugs and alcohol, and association

with drug traffickers. Exhibit 3, tab C at 17-19. Thus, ‘s abuse appears related to his

own criminal tendencies or substance abuse, rather than conclusive evidence he targeted the

respondent on account of her proposed particular social group. The evidence in this case is

more consistent with acts of general violence and therefore does not constitute evidence of

persecution based on a statutorily protected ground. Huaman-Cornelio v. BIA, 979 F.2d at

1000; Quinteros-Mendoza v. Holder, 556 F.3d 159, 164-65 (4th Cir. 2009). The Court finds

that the respondent has not established targeted her due to her particular social group,

which is required to prove the requisite nexus for asylum relief. INA§ 208(b)(l)(B)(i).

Pages 157-173

Immigration Judge decision:

The respondent’s evidence reflects that Mr. ‘ physical, verbal, and sexual abuse

of her was related to his violent and jealous nature. The respondent testified Mr. ‘

motivation to harm her was anger when she would ask him for money so she could buy food

for her family. She recalled the final argument that led to their separation occurred when the

respondent confronted Mr. regarding his affair with her sister-in-law. Thus, Mr. ‘

abuse of the respondent appears related to his own violent and criminal tendencies, rather than

conclusive evidence he targeted her on account of her membership in a particular social group.

The evidence in this case is more consistent with acts of general violence and therefore does

not constitute evidence of persecution based on a statutorily protected ground.

Consistent with its immutability and particularity analysis supra, the Court finds the

respondent is an unfortunate victim of violence against women like far too many women in

Guatemala, and thereby renders her past harm indistinct by comparison. For these reasons, the

Court finds the respondent has not met her burden to show the requisite social distinction

necessary for membership in a particular social group.

BIA decision:

The Immigration Judge further concluded that the respondent did not meet the immutability,

particularity and social distinction requirements for a cognizable particular social group (I.J. at 9-

12). We have held that depending on the facts and evidence in an individual case, victims of

domestic violence can establish membership in a cognizable particular social group that forms the

basis of a claim for asylum or withholding of removal. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N

Dec. 388 (BIA 2014).

Pages 228-243

Immigration Judge decision:

The respondent’s evidence reflects that Mr. ‘s physical, verbal, and sexual

abuse of her was related to his violent and jealous nature. The respondent testified Mr.

‘s motivation to harm her was anger after she reported his abuse to government

authorities. Thus, Mr. ‘s abuse of the respondent appears related to his own

violent and criminal tendencies, rather than conclusive evidence he targeted her on account of

her membership in a particular social group. The evidence in this case is more consistent with

acts of general violence and therefore does not constitute evidence of persecution based on a

statutorily protected ground. Huaman-Cornelio v. BIA, 979 F.2d at 1000; Quinteros-Mendoza

v. Holder, 556 F.3d 159, 164-65 (4th Cir. 2009). The Court finds that the respondent has not

established Mr. targeted her due to her membership in a particular social group,

which is required to prove the requisite nexus for asylum relief. INA§ 208(b)(l)(B)(i).

BIA decision:

There appears to be no dispute that the verbal, physical and sexual abuse suffered by the

respondent at the hands of her stepfather, which occurred several times per week over a period of

years, rises to the level of past persecution. See, e.g., Barahon v. Holder, 588 F.3d 228, 232,

(4th Cir. 2009) (observing that “[a] key difference between persecution and less-severe

mistreatment is that the former is ‘systematic’ while the latter consists of isolated incidents”).

However, the Immigration Judge rejected as invalid the respondent’s proposed particular social

group of”Mexican children who are perceived as property and lack effective familial protection,”

finding that it lacked the requisite immutability, particularity, and social distinction (I.J. at 7-9).

The question whether a group is a “particular social group” within the meaning of the Act is a

question of law that we review de novo. Matter of A-R-C-G-, supra, at 390. On review, we find

that the particular social group posited by the respondent, under the circumstances of this case, is

valid under the reasoning of our recent decisions clarifying the approach to particular social

groups. See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227 (BIA 2014); Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I&N

Dec. 208 (BIA 2014).

Pages 264-283

Immigration Judge decision:

The respondent’s evidence reflects that her former spouse’s physical, sexual, verbal,

and psychological abuse of her was related to his violent and jealous nature, and frequent

intoxication from alcohol. The respondent testified that is an alcoholic whose

motivation to harm her stemmed from his anger, dislike for her, jealous nature, and infidelity

with other women. Exhibit 2, tab C at 12-13. Based upon the respondent’s testimony, it

appears the threats, assault and rape she suffered at the hands of was intended to

intimidate and threaten her to comply his own selfish and criminal demands for sex.

Thus, the abuse suffered by the respondent appears related to the violent and criminal

tendencies of her abusive former spouse, rather than conclusive evidence she was targeted on

account of her membership in a particular social group. The evidence in this case is more

consistent with acts of general violence and therefore does not constitute evidence of

persecution based on a statutorily protected ground. Huaman-Cornelio v. BIA, 979 F.2d at

1000; Quinteros-Mendoza v. Holder, 556 F.3d 159, 164-65 (4th Cir. 2009). The Court fmds

that the respondent has not established her former spouse targeted her due to her membership

in a particular social group, which is required to prove the requisite nexus for asylum relief.

INA§ 208(b)( l)(B)(i).

BIA decision:

We additionally conclude that the Immigration Judge’s finding that the respondent was able

to leave her ex-husband is clearly erroneous (l.J. at 10-11).

However, the record reflects that the respondent’s ex-husband continued to threaten and physically abuse the respondent after -their separation,

despite her move to a town over 2 hours away from him, and that he raped her in…2014, after their divorce.

Pages 315-334

Immigration Judge decision:

The respondent’s evidence reflects that Mr. ‘ physical, verbal, and sexual abuse

of her was related to his violent and jealous nature, often fueled by his use of alcohol and

drugs. Exhibit 2, tab H at 1-2. Mr. ‘ motivation to harm her appears to be based upon his

own criminal tendencies and substance abuse, rather than conclusive evidence he targeted

her on account of her membership in a particular social group.

BIA decision:

We also note that even if the evidence and testimony support a finding that the

respondent’s husband has a “violent and jealous nature” (I.J. at 12), this is not clearly separate

from a motive to persecute his wife based on feelings of domination and control, the hallmarks

of domestic violence.

Pages 373-393

Immigration Judge decision:

The respondent’s evidence reflects that her husband’s physical, verbal, and

psychological abuse of her was related to his violent and jealous nature, at times affected by his

use of alcohol. The respondent testimony suggests her husband’s motivation to harm her was

his dislike for her and suspicion she was being unfaithful to him. His motivation also appears

related to the respondent’s desire to leave him because of his infidelity, and his demands for

custody of their son. Based upon the respondent’s testimony, it appears the threats, assaults

and psychological abuse she suffered at the hands of her husband was intended to intimidate

her to obtain some unclear result.

BIA decision:

We conclude, based on the particular facts presented on this record that the respondent

established that she was a member of the particular social group she articulated. We further

conclude that the Immigration Judge erred in concluding that this case is distinguishable from

Matter of A-R-C-G-, supra, based principally on the fact that the respondent was able to separate

and live apart from her husband after he moved out of their home in 2013 (l.J. at I 0-l l ).

The respondent’s ability to live apart from her husband in Honduras is not a distinguishing factor

from the social group rationale articulated in Matter of A-R-C-G-, supra, where the respondent

credibly testified that her husband refused to consent to a divorce and showed up unannounced

and uninvited at her home on several occasions, once touching her in a sexual manner and telling

her that he has a “right” to her as his wife. Additionally, the respondent testified that she was

unable to leave the relationship in Honduras for numerous cultural reasons, including her fear that

would take their son away from her and her belief that she was unable to obtain a divorce

because of ‘s ties to local government officials (l.J. at 3-4; Tr. at 51, 56, 64-73, 99, 105).

See Matter of A-R-C-G-, supra, at 393 (recognizing that “a married woman’s inability to leave the

relationship may be informed by societal expectations about gender and subordination, as well as

legal constraints regarding divorce and separation.”). Further, that domestic violence is prevalent

in Honduras does not mean that the respondent’s proposed particular social group lacks discrete

boundaries, as the Immigration Judge determined (l.J. at 11).

*************************************

EOIR has been known to pass off this type of judicial misconduct as “normal deviations” in judging. But, there is a difference between honest variances in judicial philosophies and approach, which are present to some extent in all diverse judicial systems and might produce differing results, and clearly biased and unfair judging. Judge Couch’s performance clearly fits within the latter.

To state the obvious:

All of these incidents were “specifically targeted.” Therefore, Judge Couch’s determination that they were part of “generalized violence” is clearly fiction.
Asylum applicants are not required to demonstrate “conclusive evidence” of anything. “Conclusive evidence” is not a legal standard in any part of asylum adjudication.

What should have happened:

Judge Couch should have been removed from each of these cases for bias;
Like U.S. Courts of Appeals, the BIA should have “outed” Judge Couch, by name, in published opinions to give both applicants and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals notice of his problematic adjudication of asylum cases.
If Judge Couch continued his biased and unfair judging he should have been 1) ordered by the BIA not to hear any asylum cases involving women from the Northern Triangle, and 2) told that if his performance in asylum cases did not improve, he would be referred to the EOIR disciplinary system for Immigration Judges based on actual bias against asylum applicants.

There is simply no room in a true Due Process system, particularly one where many respondents are unrepresented, for a biased, anti-asylum judge like Judge Couch. Is this “being the world’s best administrative tribunals guaranteeing fairness and Due Process for all?” No Way! Jeff Sessions, who often enunciates biased, anti-asylum positions, is part of the problem, not the solution! Due Process can’t be restored to the U.S. Immigration court system until Jeff Sessions and the USDOJ are removed from the process.

We need an independent judiciary capable of telling judges who perform like Judge Couch to correct their behavior immediately — in other words, “shape up or ship out.”

PWS

05-09-18

HERE’S THE FUTURE AS SESSIONS DUMBS DOWN, SPEEDS UP, SKEWS THE LAW, AND DE-PROFESSIONALIZES IMMIGRATION COURTS – 4th Circuit Slams BIA’s Sloppy Analytical Work, Refuses Deference, Reverses, & Remands — Ramirez v. Sessions

RAMIREZVSESSIONS,4THSLOPPY

Ramirez v. Sessions, 4th Cir., 04-17-18, Published

PANEL: GREGORY, Chief Judge, MOTZ and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges

OPINION BY: CHIEF JUDGE GREGORY

SUMMARY (From Chief Judge Gregory’s opinion):

Jose Ramirez seeks review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) finding him ineligible for special rule cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA). Specifically, the question is whether Ramirez’s convictions for obstruction of justice pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 18.2- 460(A) qualify as crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs). We hold that obstruction of justice under § 18.2-460(A) is not a CIMT because it may be committed without fraud, deception, or any other aggravating element that shocks the public conscience. We therefore grant Ramirez’s petition for review, vacate the BIA’s order of removal, and remand with directions for the Government to facilitate Ramirez’s return to the United States to participate in further proceedings.

KEY QUOTE:

In relation to those cases, the BIA’s one-member decision in this case attempts to significantly expand the definition of a CIMT by removing deceit, a critical indicator of moral turpitude, from the equation. Since this non-precedential decision departs from, rather than relies on, precedential BIA decisions, it is not eligible for Chevron review.

In the absence of Chevron deference, the weight given to a BIA decision “hinges on ‘the thoroughness evident in [the BIA’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.’” Zavaleta-Policiano v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 241, 246 n.2 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Martinez, 740 F.3d at 909–10); see Mead, 533 U.S. at 221. Here, the BIA provides only three sentences of analysis that are conclusory in nature and disregards the agency’s prior emphasis on fraud or deceit as a critical determinant without identifying an alternative aggravator. Consequently, the BIA decision is also undeserving of so-calledSkidmore respect because it lacks the power to persuade. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 221.

In sum, under Chevron, BIA decisions defining morally turpitudinous conduct are controlling if they are precedential and reasonable. However, the BIA’s interpretations of laws that it does not administer, such as the Virginia obstruction of justice statute, and its non-precedential decisions are only given weight to the extent that this Court finds the reasoning persuasive. Here, because we do not find persuasive the BIA’s abbreviated and non-precedential opinion, we do not accord it any deference.

********************************************

As we saw during the Bush Administration, “haste makes waste” procedures imposed by the DOJ at the Immigration Courts and the BIA are likely to cause a rebellion in the Article III Courts as they are presented with sloppy work including inadequate factual analyses, incorrect fact-findings, and abbreviated, deficient legal analyses. Factors such as pressure to render more “contemporaneous oral decisions” at the end of the hearing without reviewing the full record and testimony as well as single-judge BIA decisions or “summary affirmances” without opinion aggravate the problem.

As the quantity increases and quality decreases, the Article III Courts will lose confidence in the ImmigratIon Courts and begin returning large numbers of cases for “quality control redos” — something that adds to delay and increases backlogs as well as demoralizing Immigration Judges and frustrating respondents and counsel on both sides.

At some point, I foresee that attorneys for respondents should succeed in convincing the Article III Courts that the BIA no longer qualifies as an “expert tribunal” and that its decisions therefore should not receive so-called “Chevron deference.” Session’s use of his certification power to interfere in judicial decisions is also highly problematic.

Jeff Sessions is neither a judge nor by any stretch of the imagination an unbiased quasi-judicial decision maker. Indeed any Article III or Administrative Judge who made some of the untrue and pejorative statements about migrants, asylum seekers, private attorneys, and the law that Sessions has publicly made since becoming the Attorney General would certainly be required to disqualify himself or herself from a quasi-judicial role in any immigration adjudication.

There is no possibility of a fair, unbiased, due process oriented Immigration Court system under Jeff Sessions and the DOJ.

We have “seen this show before” under Ashcroft and the Bush Administration. Congress seriously disregards its responsibilities by standing by and watching disaster unfold again with hundreds of thousands of lives, and perhaps the stability of our entire Federal Judicial System, at stake.

PWS

04-19-18

BIA BUSTED AGAIN — 4TH CIR REAMS MATTER OF JIMINEZ-CEDILLO, 27 I&N DEC. 1 (BIA 2017) — Jiminez-Cedillo v. Sessions, March 20, 2018, Published — Unexplained Departure From Prior Rulings!

Jiminez-Cedillo v. Sessions, 4th Cir., March 20, 2018, Published

PANEL: Circuit Judges Thacker and Harris; Senior Circuit Judge Shedd

OPINION: Judge Pamela Harris

SUMMARY (FROM LEXISNEXIS IMMIGRATION COMMUNITY):

03-20-2018 | 12:47 PM
Author: Daniel M. Kowalski

CA4 Vacates , 27 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 2017)

Jimenez-Cedillo v. Sessions – “Pedro Josue Jimenez-Cedillo, a native and citizen of Mexico, was ordered removed from the United States after the Board of Immigration Appeals determined that sexual solicitation of a minor in Maryland, to which Jimenez-Cedillo pled guilty, is a crime involving moral turpitude. Under Maryland law, sexual solicitation of a minor does not require that the perpetrator know the victim’s age. And before this case, under Board of Immigration Appeals precedent, a sexual offense against a child categorically involved moral turpitude only if the perpetrator knew or should have known that the victim was a minor. Because the Board failed to explain its change in position, we grant Jimenez-Cedillo’s petition for review and remand for further proceedings. … Here, we are without a reasoned explanation from the Board for its change in position. … Because the Board’s “path” from the Silva-Trevino cases to Jimenez-Cedillo’s cannot “reasonably be discerned,” its decision is arbitrary and capricious and must be set aside. … If on remand the Board takes the position that a change in Silva-Trevino I’s approach to mental culpability is appropriate, then it also should consider whether, under the traditional factors that bear on retroactivity analysis, see ARA Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 71 F.3d 129, 135–36 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 389–90 (D.C. Cir. 1972)), that new position may be applied to Jimenez-Cedillo and other aliens similarly situated.”

Here’s a link to the oral argument.

Hats way off to Ben Winograd (argued) and Helen L. Parsonage (on brief)!

********************************************

Go on over to Dan Kowalski at LexisNexis Immigration Communities for all the links to the full decision and more! https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/immigration-law-blog/archive/2018/03/20/ca4-vacates-matter-of-jimenez-cedillo-27-i-amp-n-dec-1-bia-2017.aspx?Redirected=true

Congrats to my friends Ben Winograd and Helen Parsonage for holding the BIA accountable once again!

The BIA is caught improperly creating a harder, anti-immigrant line of legal precedent without complying with the basic legal requirements — like legal analysis!

A “real” Attorney General would certainly: 1) slow down the “Falls Church assembly line;” and 2) insist that the BIA take the time and care necessary to insure that its decisions, particularly published precedents, comply with basic legal and analytical requirements. That’s essentially “Due Process 101.”

Instead, White Nationalist xenophobe Jeff Sessions actually is taking steps to make the a system with the “wheels coming off” go even faster and to truncate full hearings and proper legal analysis, while attempting — without providing basic due process — to change long-standing substantive rules of law to further screw migrants. How sick is this Dude!? How disgusting is it that he carries out his destructive agenda without any meaningful oversight by Congress?

The best way to solve this unacceptable situation, before our entire legal system is in shambles, is to see that both the individuals responsible for placing Jeff Sessions in office and those who have abdicated their duties to oversee his activities are removed from office through the ballot box. We know who is responsible for these miscarriages of justice. Now is the time to insure that they are no longer able to carry out their program of destroying America!

Join the New Due Process Army! Due Process Forever!

PWS

03-21-19

BACK ON THE KILLING FLOOR: BATTERED WOMEN STRUGGLED FOR 15 YEARS TO GET LIFE-SAVING LEGAL PROTECTION UNDER ASYLUM LAWS – – Now, Jeff Sessions Appears Poised To Sentence Them To Death Or A Lifetime Of Unremitting Abuse With A Mere Stroke Of His Poison Pen!

FINALLY, AFTER FUTILE REQUESTS TO THE BIA AND THE DOJ, THE PUBLIC HAS BEEN ABLE TO GET A COPY OF THE RECENTLY CERTIFIED MATTER OF A-B-, FROM THE ATTORNEY (WHO WASN’T TOLD OF THE ACTION UNTIL HE RECEIVED A COPY OF THE DECISION IN THE MAIL ON FRIDAY)

Here it is:

A-B- BIA Decision (12-08-2016) (redacted) (1)

It’s bad news for Due Process, justice in American, and particularly vulnerable asylum seekers who are battered women. Sessions appears to be taking direct aim at the landmark BIA precedent Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014) which, following a 15 year legal battle, recognized that battered women could be a “particular social group” and thereby qualify for asylum and withholding of opinion.

Make no mistake, the BIA decision in Matter of A-B- is correct in every respect — a virtual textbook on how U.S. Immigration Judges should be handling and granting these well-documented claims. It’s also a classic example of poor quality work and feeble, biased anti-asylum, anti-female reasoning by an Immigration Judge that plagues too much of our asylum system.

The Immigration Judge’s decision denying asylum which was reversed by the BIA in Matter of A-B- contained numerous egregious errors, including:

An incorrect adverse credibility ruling which failed to consider and properly weigh “the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors,” as required by the REAL ID Act;
Failure to recognize a “particular social group” (“PSG”) substantially similar to that approved by the BIA in Matter of A-R-C-G-;
A “clearly erroneous” finding that the abused respondent was free to leave her ex-husband;
A “clearly erroneous” finding that the valid PSG was not “at least once central reason” for the persecution;
An erroneous finding, bordering on the absurd, that the Government of El Salvador was not “unable or unwilling” to protect the respondent.

Overall, the Immigration Judge’s handling of this case has all the earmarks of a jurist who is biased against asylum applicants and has predetermined to deny most claims giving a litany of specious, basically “pre-judged” reasons.

The Attorney General compounds the problem by apparently questioning the long-established principle that persecution takes place when “non-state actors” are not reasonably controlled by their national government. See, e.g., Matter of O-Z-&I-Z-, 22 I&N Dec. 23, 26 (BIA 1998).

Rather than reinforcing the BIA’s long-overdue “reining in” of a wayward Immigration Judge, the Attorney General appears to be aiming to upend well-settled asylum law and empower those Immigration Judges who already treat asylum applicants unfairly. That’s likely to result in a monumental battle in the Article III Courts — specifically the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Hopefully, those courts eventually will recognize that the U.S. Immigration Courts are being manipulated to reflect the anti-asylum, xenophobic biases and prejudices of Jeff Sessions.

That will require them to stand up to Sessions’s bullying and insist that asylum seekers rights to fair hearings before impartial decision makers and to receive legal protection under U.S. and international standards be recognized.

Advocates also question the procedures by which this case was handled by the Immigraton Judge following the BIA remand. The BIA order instructed the Judge to schedule the case for a routine update of the fingerprints and background checks and to issue a final order; in my experience, that’s usually a “30 second process” that can be completed on a Master Calendar or by joint written motion “in chambers.”

However, according to sources, this Immigration Judge allegedly “held up” AB’s case for eight months for no particular reason, and then “recertified” it to the BIA raising a facially bogus legal issue concerning a later-issued, unrelated Fourth Circuit case. Mysteriously, the case then was “certified” by Sessions taking it out of the BIA’s jurisdiction.

This scenario raises speculation that this Immigration Judge — perhaps recognizing from the Attorney General’s public statements that Sessions was also biased against asylum seekers — may have manipulated the process to do an “end run” around the BIA to the Attorney General. All pretty unseemly stuff when “lives are on the line.” Yet more “anecdotal evidence” of a system out of control and biased against Due Process and fairness for asylum seekers and other migrants.

Stay tuned. The battle is just “revving up,” and the New Due Process Army is ready to defend our justice system against each and every debilitating attack on the rule of law by our biased and lawless Attorney General.

PWS

03-13-18

LEGAL AID JUSTICE CENTER OF VIRGINIA HUGE WIN – USD Judge Brinkema Certifies Class & Orders Bond Hearings For Individuals In “Withholding Only Proceedings” — Rogelio Amilcar Cabrera Diaz v. Hott — Get Links To All The Essential Court Docs Here!

https://www.justice4all.org/2018/02/26/case-establishes-right-to-bond-hearings/

Case Establishes Right to Bond Hearings

Posted February 26, 2018 by Tim Wallace

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Legal Aid Justice Center has won an important first-in-the-nation class action case in federal court in Alexandria, establishing the right to bond hearings for a class of detained immigrants whom the government is holding in long-term no-bond detention.

When immigrants are deported to countries where human rights violations are rampant, they often find themselves subject to persecution, torture, or even death threats. And since the U.S. government almost never gives a visa to someone who has already been deported, these individuals may find themselves with no option other than to try to return to the United States and cross the border illegally to seek a form of legal protection from persecution known as “withholding of removal.”

Previously, ICE and the immigration courts refused to grant bond to these individuals, holding them in prison-like conditions in immigration detention centers for months if not years while they fought out their cases. Legal Aid Justice Center filed a lawsuit last year on behalf of five immigrants held in this prolonged no-bond detention, and won release for two of them, but the government refused to apply the decision more broadly to other similarly situated immigrants held in detention.

We then filed a first-in-the-nation class action, seeking access to bond hearings for all immigrants detained in Virginia who fall into this category. On February 26, 2018, federal district judge Leonie M. Brinkema granted our motions in full, giving our clients and the class members all of the relief we asked for. We understand that there are about 50 immigrants currently detained at the Farmville detention center who meet this description, with more being arrested every week. Now, they will have the chance to pay a bond and leave detention, reunite with their families, and resume normal lives while they fight their cases for protection.

Special thanks to our pro bono co-counsel at Mayer Brown LLP, Murray Osorio LLP, Law Office of James Reyes, and Blessinger Legal PLLC – we couldn’t possibly do it without you!

The judge’s opinion can be found here: Memorandum Opinion (PDF)

The judge’s order can be found here: Order (PDF)

The opinion applies to all immigrants who are in pending withholding-only proceedings, and “as of December 7, 2017 or at any time thereafter are detained within the Commonwealth of Virginia under the authority of [ICE].” The government has been ordered to notify all class members by March 13, 2018, and to provide them with a bond hearing (or a Joseph hearing, if appropriate) by March 28, 2018.

We will be monitoring compliance with this opinion, and want to hear from Virginia attorneys who represent a class member. If you represent a class member, or if you have questions as to whether your client might be a class member, please e-mail LAJC attorney Rachel McFarland at rmcfarland@justice4all.org to let us know.

************************************

“Super Congrats” to Simon Y. Sandoval-Moshenberg—Director, Immigrant Advocacy Program & his team of Firms and pro bono attorneys for making this happy.

I am particularly delighted that one of my “star” former Georgetown Law RLP students, Rachel McFarland, has been involved in this case. Rachel is a “charter member” of the “New Due Process Army!”

PWS

02-28-18

BIGGIE ON GANG ASYLUM: PUBLISHED 4TH CIR. BLASTS BIA’S BOGUS APPROACH TO NEXUS IN GANG CASES — Court Eviscerates BIA’s Disingenuous Approach To Nexus In Matter of L-E-A- (Without Citing It!) – SALGADO-SOSA V. SESSIONS

4thGangsNexusSalgado-Sosa

Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, 4th Cir., 04-13-18, Published

PANEL: GREGORY, Chief Judge, and FLOYD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: JUDGE PAMELA HARRIS

SUMMARY OF HOLDING (From Court’s Opinion):

“Reynaldo Salgado-Sosa, a native and citizen of Honduras, seeks asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. If he is returned to Honduras, he fears, he will face persecution at the hands of the gang MS-13, which has repeatedly attacked his family for resisting extortion demands.

The agency proceedings focused on whether Salgado-Sosa could show, for purposes of both his asylum and withholding of removal claims, a nexus between MS-13’s threats and membership in a cognizable “particular social group” – here, Salgado-Sosa’s family. The Board of Immigration Appeals found that Salgado-Sosa could not establish the requisite nexus, and denied withholding of removal on that ground. The Board separately found that Salgado-Sosa’s asylum application was untimely, and that there was insufficient evidence to justify protection under the Convention Against Torture.

We conclude that the Board erred in holding that Salgado-Sosa did not meet the nexus requirement. The record compels the conclusion that at least one central reason for Salgado-Sosa’s persecution is membership in his family, a protected social group under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Accordingly, we vacate the denial of withholding of removal, and remand for further proceedings on that claim. On the asylum claim, we separately remand for consideration of whether our recent decision in Zambrano v. Sessions, 878 F.3d 84 (4th Cir. 2017), affects Salgado-Sosa’s argument that a statutory “changed circumstances” exception allows consideration of his untimely application.”

KEY QUOTE FROM OPINION:

“For three reasons, we are “compelled to conclude,” see Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 948, that the IJ and the Board erred in finding that Salgado-Sosa has not shown that his kinship ties are “at least one central reason” for the harm he fears. First, the record manifestly establishes that MS-13 threatened Salgado-Sosa “on account of” his connection to his stepfather and to his family. Salgado-Sosa testified, for instance, that MS-13 attacked him because of his stepfather Merez-Merlo’s conflict with the gang, not his own. Merez-Merlo similarly testified that his refusal to give MS-13 “what they wanted, which was the war tax,” led the gang to repeatedly threaten to kill his wife and son. J.A. 236; see J.A. 234, 315–16. Other evidence also corroborates the centrality of family ties. For example, the family’s long-time neighbor submitted an affidavit averring

2 As before the IJ and Board, Salgado-Sosa’s argument in this court emphasizes evidence that he and his family were targeted because of his stepfather’s testimony against MS-13. But both on appeal and before the agency, Salgado-Sosa also has argued more generally that he fears persecution based on his membership in a “particular social[] group, as defined by Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117 (4th Cir. 2011).” Appellant’s Br. at 5; see also A.R. 101, 478–79. And our holding in Crespin-Valladares was not limited to family members of witnesses, but instead established that family membership itself is a “prototypical example of a [cognizable] particular social group.” 632 F.3d at 125 (internal quotation marks omitted). The IJ and BIA accordingly considered not only whether Salgado-Sosa was persecuted for being a family member of a witness, but also whether he was persecuted because of his kinship ties generally. See A.R. 126 (finding that Salgado-Sosa “has not demonstrated” that any persecution “would be on account of a statutorily protected ground, be that family group membership, as witnesses, or any other potential protected ground”) (emphasis added). Following that lead, we also consider whether the evidence shows that Salgado-Sosa was threatened on account of his familial ties, regardless of the role played by his stepfather’s testimony.

10

that “the reason why the gang members wants [sic] to hurt [Salgado-Sosa]” is that he “defended his stepfather from the gang member[s]” when they assaulted the family. J.A. 537 (emphasis added). And the IJ, as noted above, did not doubt the credibility of any of this evidence.

Second, that Salgado-Sosa’s anticipated harm is on account of membership in his family follows from the IJ’s own factual findings, adopted by the BIA. The IJ herself determined that the central reasons for Salgado-Sosa’s feared persecution are his stepfather’s refusal to pay the gang and revenge on the family for resisting MS-13’s extortion. See J.A. 5–6, 126–27. On a proper reading of the nexus requirement and our cases applying it, that finding compels the conclusion that Salgado-Sosa’s kinship ties are a central reason for the harm he fears.

Our decision in Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch is instructive. There, the petitioner applied for asylum after gang members in El Salvador threatened her for refusing to allow her son to join the gang. 784 F.3d at 947. The BIA rejected her assertion that the persecution was “on account of” familial ties, concluding that the petitioner “was not threatened because of her relationship to her son (i.e. family), but rather because she would not consent to her son engaging in a criminal activity.” Id. at 949. We found this distinction “meaningless” and “unreasonable” given that “[petitioner’s] relationship to her son is why she, and not another person, was threatened” by the gang. Id. at 950 (emphasis added). Thus, because the petitioner’s “family connection to her son” was at least one of “multiple central reasons” for the gang’s threats, we found the nexus

requirement satisfied, and rejected the BIA’s contrary determination as resting on “an 11

excessively narrow reading of the requirement that persecution be undertaken ‘on account of membership in a nuclear family.’” Id. at 949–50.

The same logic applies here. There is no meaningful distinction between whether Salgado-Sosa was threatened because of his connection to his stepfather, and whether Salgado-Sosa was threatened because MS-13 sought revenge on him for an act committed by his stepfather. See Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 950. However characterized, Salgado-Sosa’s relationship to his stepfather (and to his family) is indisputably “why [he], and not another person, was threatened” by MS-13. See id. Thus, the IJ and BIA erred by focusing narrowly on the “immediate trigger” for MS-13’s assaults – greed or revenge – at the expense of Salgado-Sosa’s relationship to his stepfather and family, which were the very relationships that prompted the asserted persecution. See Oliva v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 53, 60 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding that the BIA drew “too fine a distinction” between the “immediate trigger” for persecution – breaking the rules imposed on former gang members – and what ultimately led to persecution – protected status as a former gang member). On the IJ’s own unchallenged account of the facts – that Salgado-Sosa’s fear of persecution arises from the actions of his stepfather and his family – the only reasonable conclusion is that family membership is “at least one central reason for [his] persecution.” See Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 950.

Third and finally, the BIA’s decision improperly focused on whether Salgado- Sosa’s family was persecuted on account of a protected ground, rather than on whether Salgado-Sosa was persecuted because of a protected ground – here, his relationship to his

family. The critical fact, for the BIA, was that the motive for the attacks on Salgado- 12

Sosa’s family was “financial gain or personal vendettas,” neither of which is itself a protected ground under the INA. J.A. 6. But as we have explained before, it does not follow that if Salgado-Sosa’s family members were not targeted based on some protected ground, then Salgado-Sosa could not have been targeted based on his ties to his family. Cordova v. Holder, 759 F.3d 332, 339 (4th Cir. 2014) (rejecting argument that feared persecution is not on account of membership in family if attacks on family are not related to protected ground). Instead, “[t]he correct analysis focuses on [Salgado-Sosa himself] as the applicant, and asks whether [he] was targeted because of [his] membership in the social group consisting of [his] immediate family.” Villatoro v. Sessions, 680 F. App’x 212, 221 (4th Cir. 2017). And once the right question is asked, the record admits of only one answer: whatever MS-13’s motives for targeting Salgado-Sosa’s family, Salgado-Sosa himself was targeted because of his membership in that family.

For all these reasons, it is clear that Salgado-Sosa has shown the required nexus between anticipated persecution and membership in a particular social group consisting of his family. Specifically, Salgado-Sosa has demonstrated that “at least one central reason” for the harm he faces is his connection to his stepfather and family. See 8 U.S.C. §1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Because the IJ and BIA relied exclusively on an erroneous determination as to nexus in denying withholding of removal, we vacate that denial and remand for further proceedings regarding Salgado-Sosa’s application.”

**********************************************

First, congrats to Alfred Lincoln (“Rob”) Robertson, Jr., ROBERTSON LAW OFFICE, PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia, who successfully represented Mr. Salgado-Sosa before the Fourth Circuit. Rob was a “regular” in the Arlington Immigration Court, particularly on my always challenging detained docket. One of the things I liked about him is that he was willing to take “tough cases” — ones where the respondent had a decent argument but by no means a “slam dunk winner.” He also practiced before the local Virginia criminal courts, so was familiar with what “really happens” in criminal court as opposed to the “Alice in Wonderland Version” often presented in Immigration Court.

Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117 (4th Cir. 2011) lives! One of my all-time favorite cases, because I was the Immigration Judge incorrectly reversed by the BIA on an asylum grant. I was right on all sorts of things, and the BIA was wrong! But, hey, who remembers things like that?

This decision is good news for justice and due process for asylum seekers. It spells some bad news for the BIA’s highly contrived decision in Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&n 40 (BIA 2017). There, the BIA looked beyond primary causation (the “but for” rule) of a family-based PSG to find a secondary cause, “criminal extortion” that did not relate to the protected ground. In other words, the BIA encouraged IJs to look for any way possible to twist facts to deny family-based PSG asylum claims. Indeed, the only lame example that the BIA could cite that might qualify under their bizarre analysis was the long-dead Romanov Family of Russia.

Both Judge Jeffrey Chase and I ripped the BIA’s anti-asylum, anti-Due Process machinations in previous blogs:

http://immigrationcourtside.com/2017/05/25/new-precedent-family-is-a-psg-but-beware-of-nexus-matter-of-l-e-a-27-in-dec-40-bia-2017-read-my-alternative-analysis/

http://immigrationcourtside.com/2017/06/03/introducing-new-commentator-hon-jeffrey-chase-matter-of-l-e-a-the-bias-missed-chance-original-for-immigrationcourtside/

What if EOIR concentrated on quality, Due Process, and fairness for asylum seekers, rather than merely looking for ways to deport more migrants (whether legally correct or not) in accordance with Sessions’s anti-migrant agenda? We need an independent Article I U.S. Immigration Court with an Appellate Division that acts like a U.S. Court of Appeals, not an extension of the Administration political agendas and DHS enforcement!

PWS

02-21-18

SLAMMED AGAIN! — 4TH CIR. FINDS CLEAR ANTI-MUSLIM BIAS IN AGAIN REJECTING TRUMP’S BOGUS TRAVEL BAN! — SUPREMES WILL HAVE LAST WORD!

https://www.buzzfeed.com/zoetillman/a-federal-appeals-court-ruled-that-trumps-third-travel-ban

Zoe Tillman reports for BuzzFeed News:

“A federal appeals court on Thursday ruled that President Donald Trump’s third attempt at a travel ban is likely unconstitutional, writing that it “continues to exhibit a primarily religious anti-Muslim objective.”

The US Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit upheld a lower court injunction that blocked the Trump administration from enforcing key parts of the travel ban, but put its order on hold while the US Supreme Court takes up the issue of the ban.

The president’s third travel ban is already before the Supreme Court, after the 9th Circuit ruled in December that it violated federal law. The 9th Circuit did not rule on the issue addressed by the 4th Circuit — whether the ban amounts to religious discrimination in violation of the US Constitution’s Establishment Clause — but the justices asked for briefing on the constitutional question as well.

The 4th Circuit sided in favor of the groups challenging the ban in a 9–4 decision. Chief Judge Roger Gregory wrote in the majority opinion that the government’s “proffered rationale for the Proclamation lies at odds with the statements of the President himself.”

“Plaintiffs here do not just plausibly allege with particularity that the Proclamation’s purpose is driven by anti-Muslim bias, they offer undisputed evidence of such bias: the words of the President,” Gregory wrote.

Gregory cited Trump’s “disparaging comments and tweets regarding Muslims,” the president’s repeated references to a Muslim ban, the fact that Trump’s previous travel bans were focused on majority-Muslim countries, and statements by Trump and his advisers that the latest order has the same goals as the previous ones.

A Justice Department spokesman did not immediately return a request for comment.

Cecillia Wang, deputy legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union, who argued the case for the travel ban challengers in the 4th Circuit, said in a statement, that, “President Trump’s third illegal attempt to denigrate and discriminate against Muslims through an immigration ban has failed in court yet again. It’s no surprise. The Constitution prohibits government actions hostile to a religion.”

After federal courts struck down the president’s first two attempts at a travel ban, Trump on Sept. 24 signed the latest set of travel restrictions. It in large part suspended travel to the US by nationals of five majority-Muslim countries covered under the previous travel bans — Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen — as well as two new countries, Chad and North Korea. The presidential proclamation also placed travel restrictions on certain government officials in Venezuela and their family members.

In October, federal judges in Hawaii and Maryland issued injunctions blocking enforcement of the ban, which the Trump administration appealed. The Supreme Court issued an order on Dec. 4 allowing the ban to go fully into effect while the appeals in the 9th Circuit and the 4th Circuit went forward. The justices wrote at the time that it expected that the appeals courts would rule “with appropriate dispatch.”

The 9th Circuit, which heard arguments on Dec. 6, issued its opinion on Dec. 20. But the 4th Circuit, which heard arguments two days later, did not rule until Thursday.

Gregory wrote in the main opinion that even if the proclamation was “facially legitimate” — that the text on its face didn’t run afoul of the constitution — it failed the test of whether the government had a “bona fide” reason for adopting it. The administration argued that the proclamation was rooted in national security concerns, but Gregory wrote that Trump’s statements undermined that.

Gregory said that even setting aside Trump’s statements during the campaign calling for a Muslim ban, the president had continued to make statements that “convey the primary purpose of the Proclamation—to exclude Muslims from the United States.” He quoted Trump’s tweets supporting his original travel ban executive order, which multiple courts determined was likely unconstitutional, as well as a tweet expressing support for an unverified story about a general who killed Muslims using bullets dipped in pig’s blood and his retweets of anti-Muslim videos.

“Plaintiffs offer undisputed evidence that the President of the United States has openly and often expressed his desire to ban those of Islamic faith from entering the United States. The Proclamation is thus not only a likely Establishment Clause violation, but also strikes at the basic notion that the government may not act based on ‘religious animosity,'” Gregory wrote.

The court upheld US District Judge Theodore Chuang’s preliminary injunction, which blocked enforcement of the proclamation’s travel restrictions with respect to nationals of Chad, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen who have a “credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.”

**********************************

The Administration continues to trip over the out of court statements by Trump and his sleazy subordinates which reveal the real agenda of bias and hate beneath his actions.

No matter how the Supremes come out (and Trump could win the cherished right to discriminate and carry out his bogus hate agenda) the stain on America being caused by Trump, Sessions, Miller, the other White Nationalists, and their supporters and enablers will take a long time to wash away!

PWS

02-15-15

FOURTH CIRCUIT JOINS 9TH, 2d, & 6TH IN REVERSING BIA’S OVERLY RESTRICTIVE READING OF ASYLUM ELIGIBILITY – ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE OF A PRE-EXISTING CLAIM CAN BE A “CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCE” JUSTIFYING “LATE” ASYLUM FILING! — ZAMBRANO V. SESSIONS (PUBLISHED)!

4th Cir on changed circumstances-1yr

Zambrano v. Sessions, 4th Cir., 12-05-17 (published)

PANEL: KEENAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and John A. GIBNEY, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

OPINION BY: Judge Gibney

KEY QUOTE:

“This Court agrees with the logic of the Ninth, Second, and Sixth circuits. New facts that provide additional support for a pre-existing asylum claim can constitute a changed circumstance. These facts may include circumstances that show an intensification of a preexisting threat of persecution or new instances of persecution of the same kind suffered in the past. The Court remands to the BIA and leaves the determination of whether the facts on record constitute changed circumstances which materially affect the petitioner’s eligibility for asylum to the BIA’s sound discretion.

III.
The BIA erred when it categorically held that additional proof of an existing claim

does not establish changed circumstances. Accordingly, we grant the petition for review, vacate the BIA’s order, and remand the case to the BIA for further consideration in light of this opinion.”

*************************************

This is a very important decision for asylum applicants in the Fourth Circuit, as this situation arises frequently in Immigration Court.

With three well-reasoned Circuit decisions already in the books, why is the BIA holding out for a discredited rationale? How many individuals who weren’t fortunate enough to have Ben Winograd or an equally talented lawyer argue for them in the Court of Appeals have already been wrongfully removed under the BIA’s discredited rationale? Where’s the BIA precedent adopting this rationale and making it binding on IJ’s nationwide before more individuals are wrongfully removed? How is this “through teamwork and innovation being the world’s best administrative tribunal guaranteeing fairness and due process for all?”

The answer to the latter question is sadly obvious. While the BIA’s problems predated his tenure, the attitude of Attorney General Jeff Sessions, as demonstrated in his recent pronouncement on so-called “Immigration Court efficiency” elevates “false efficiency,” speed, and cranking out removals above fundamental fairness and Due Process. Why have an elaborate administrative court system that doesn’t put Due Process first and foremost as “real” (non-captive) courts generally do? Why not just send all removal cases to U.S. District Judges and Magistrate Judges who make Due Process and fairness “job one” and aren’t preoccupied with “jacking up” removal statistics to please political bosses?

And, I’d like to see how far the DHS/Sessions’s (they are pretty much the same these days) boneheaded, arrogant, unrealistic, and wasteful “no PD” policy would get in a “real” court system where widespread, reasonable, and prudent use of PD by prosecutors is understood and accepted as an essential part of fairness, efficiency, and responsible use of publicly-funded judicial resources. Indeed, in some of my past “off the record” conversations with Article III Judges, they were absolutely flabbergasted to discover the unwillingness of DHS to meaningfully exercise “PD” in the pre-Obama era and to learn that at DHS the “cops,” rather than the prosecutors were responsible for setting PD policies!

PWS

12-08-17

BATTLE OF THE PUNDITS: RAPPAPORT V. LITHWICK – NOLAN SAYS “If the Supreme Court allows the courts to continue to do this to Trump, they will interfere with any national security decision he makes that impacts a country with a large Muslim population, regardless of the circumstances.” – DAHLIA SAYS “Thousands of people will be harmed for no reason other than Donald Trump dislikes Muslim countries and crafted a nearly legal theory to achieve his ban after two abject failures.” – YOU DECIDE!

http://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/363473-with-travel-ban-scotus-can-correct-lower-courts-anti-trump-bias

Nolan writes in The Hill:

“According to Eric Posner, a professor at the University of Chicago Law School, the lower U.S. courts have created a “Trump exception” to settled law on presidential powers with their travel ban decisions. They have ignored the Supreme Court’s admonition that courts may not “look behind” a “facially legitimate” reason for an executive order, which in these cases was a national security interest in stricter vetting.

Trump appealed to the Supreme Court, but his case became moot when he replaced the temporary travel ban with a permanent program with the Presidential Proclamation he issued on September 24, 2017, “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats.”

When fourth and ninth circuit courts enjoined implementation of his proclamation, he went back to the Supreme Court. On December 4, 2017, the Court ordered stays of the fourth circuit and the ninth circuit injunctions.

The Court did not state its basis for granting Trump’s stay request in either decision, but stays are not granted for meritless cases. I expect Trump to prevail on the merits of his case.

. . . .

He [Judge Derick Watson of the USDC in Hawaii] goes on to say that nevertheless “any reasonable, objective observer would conclude … that the stated secular purpose of the Executive Order is, at the very least, ‘secondary to a religious objective’ of temporarily suspending the entry of Muslims.” This “assessment rests on the specific historical record,” which “focuses on the president’s statements about a ‘Muslim ban,’” including on the campaign trail.

If the Supreme Court allows the courts to continue to do this to Trump, they will interfere with any national security decision he makes that impacts a country with a large Muslim population, regardless of the circumstances.”

Go on over to The Hill at the link to read Nolan’s complete article! I note that Nolan’s article is also posted on SCOTUSDaily. Here’s the link:

SCOTUSDaily pdf

********************************************

https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/12/the-new-travel-is-an-abomination-why-have-we-stopped-caring.html

Meanwhile, Dahlia Lithwick writes in Slate:

“Way, way back in February, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the 9^th Circuit heard oral arguments in State of Washington v. Trump, the first iteration of the first appeal of the first attempt at Donald Trump’s travel ban. This version was a hastily executed implementation of the president’s promise to create a Muslim ban, signed on Jan. 27, just a week after Trump took office.

America was riveted, listening eagerly to arguments broadcast without images and parsing—or trying to parse—complicated appellate questions about standing, and justiciability, and religious animus. As the court ultimately found—before this first version was pulled from commission and replaced with a new one—Trump’s ban trampled over all sorts of due process rights.

Almost a year later, a different panel of the 9^th Circuit heard on Wednesday a different oral argument, about a third iteration of a Trump executive order limiting immigration from some majority-Muslim countries. This one, though, was offered without the glare of national media and by seemingly worn-out advocates. More than anything, the argument was reminiscent of one of those old-timey dance marathons, in which weary partners pushed one another around a high school gymnasium in the futile hope that anything might still matter.

Wednesday’s effort made the second argument about the very same issuesfrom May seem positively zippy (May? Remember May??). But here we are in December, and the travel ban has been sanitized and then sanitized again. The current version, announced in September, targets 150 million travelers from Muslim-majority countries Chad, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen, as well as the non–Muslim majority outlier North Korea along with some Venezuelan government officials. It was promptly blocked by judges before it went into effect, and on Monday the Supreme Court allowed it to go forward for the time being, warning the appeals courts that they had better rule quickly.So here in December, it is now being defended by seemingly competent counsel, despite the fact that—if one noticed such things anymore—the president was tweeting Muslim revenge porn only a week ago.

. . . .

We should all possibly care about travel ban 3.0 and its cretinous defenders a whole lot more than we apparently do, simply because it’s permanent, it’s nearly as bad as the original, and the Supreme Court appears inclined to tolerate it. Thousands of people will be harmed for no reason other than Donald Trump dislikes Muslim countries and crafted a nearly legal theory to achieve his ban after two abject failures.

A fortiori, for the record, means an argument made with greater reason or more convincing force. Who knew that something so grotesquely cynical and cruel as this travel ban could become a fortiori, just from sheer wariness, repetition, and fatigue?”

Read the rest of Dahlia’s article over at Slate at the above link.

***************************************

Clearly, “different strokes for different folks!” But, we all have a stake in this one way or the other!

Interestingly, Nolan and Dahlia appear to agree on one thing: the Supremes (or at least a majority of them, excluding Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg who dissented from the dissolution of the stay) have signaled that they are ready to “greenlight” Trump’s “Travel Ban 3.0.” In other words, if Trump is exceeding “political and societal norms” (which many of us think he is) ultimately it will be up to the political branches of Government and the voters, not the courts, to rein him in.

PWS

12-07-17

BIG TRUMP WIN: SUPREMES GEEENLIGHT TRUMP’S HIT ON MUSLIMS!

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-allows-full-enforcement-of-trump-travel-ban-while-legal-challenges-continue/2017/12/04/486549c0-d5fc-11e7-a986-d0a9770d9a3e_story.html

Robert Barnes reports in the WashPost:

“The Supreme Court on Monday granted President Trump’s request that his revised travel ban be enforced fully while legal challenges to it proceed in lower courts.

The justices approved a request from the president’s lawyers to lift restrictions on the order — which bans most travelers from eight nations, most with Muslim majorities — that had been imposed by lower courts.

The court gave no reason for its decision, but said it expected lower court review of the executive orders to proceed quickly. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor would have kept in place partial stays on the order.

Judges in two judicial circuits — the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit in Richmond and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in San Francisco — had cast doubt on Trump’s third executive order banning almost all travel from certain countries.

Oral arguments are scheduled for soon in both federal appeals court cases on whether the ban exceeds the president’s broad powers on immigration.

The latest iteration — the third ban that Trump has ordered — blocks various people from eight countries — Syria, Libya, Iran, Yemen, Chad, Somalia, North Korea and Venezuela. Six of the countries have Muslim majorities.”

***********************

Read the complete article at the link.

Yeah, I know that this technically isn’t a “decision on the merits.” But that’s what we call “legal BS.”

The majority of Supremes are clearly signaling that they expect the lower courts to rule in Trump’s favor. If they don’t get the message, the Supreme majority will cream them “on the merits.” If there were a realistic chance of the plaintiffs prevailing, the Supremes wouldn’t have lifted the injunction imposed below.

Nolan and others who said that “Travel Ban 3.0” was a “slam dunk” winner for the Trumpsters were correct. It’s basically “open season” on Muslims, refugees, and others on the Administration’s “hit parade.” Any change will have to come at the ballot box!

PWS

12-04-17

“TERRIFIC TRIO” INSPIRES STUDENTS, FIGHTS FOR IMMIGRANT JUSTICE AT UVA LAW IMMIGRATION CLINIC — PLUS EXTRA BONUS: Go Back To School This Fall — Take My “One-Lecture” Class “Basic Asylum Law for Litigators” Right Here!

HERE THEY ARE!

INTRODUCING THE “TERRIFIC TRIO” – DEENA N. SHARUK, TANISHKA V. CRUZ, & RACHEL C. McFARLAND:

FACULTY

dsharuk@law.virginia.edu

Deena N. Sharuk

Lecturer
Biography
Courses

Deena N. Sharuk teaches Immigration Law at the Law School.

Sharuk is currently practicing as an immigration attorney at the Legal Aid Justice Center in Charlottesville, Virginia, where she manages the Virginia Special Immigrant Juvenile Project. She received her B.A. in international relations with a specialization in human rights from Wellesley College. Sharuk received her law degree from Northeastern University School of Law.

After graduation, she worked as a fellow at the American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts and later practiced immigration law in Massachusetts and Virginia. Sharuk was recently appointed as a task force core team member to foster a welcoming environment for immigrants and minorities in Charlottesville and Albemarle county. She often presents to the community about changes in immigration law.

EDUCATION

JD.   Northeastern University School of Law    2012     
BA.   Wellesley College    2007

FACULTY

tanishka@justice4all.org

Cell Phone

(434) 529-1811

Tanishka V. Cruz

Lecturer
Biography
Courses

Tanishka V. Cruz is an attorney in solo practice at Cruz Law, a Charlottesville-based immigration and family law firm. She is also an attorney with the Legal Aid Justice Center, where for the past two years she has focused on the management of the Virginia Special Immigrant Juvenile Project, an award-winning collaboration between LAJC and pro bono attorneys across the state. The project has saved more than 150 refugee children from likely deportation.

Cruz earned her B.A. from Temple University and her J.D. from the Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law.

She currently supervises students in the Immigration Law Clinic, which LAJC runs in conjunction with the Law School

EDUCATION

JD.   Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law    2012     
BA.   Temple University    2004

FACULTY

rmcfarland@justice4all.org

Rachel C. McFarland

Lecturer
Biography
Courses

Rachel C. McFarland is an attorney at Legal Aid Justice Center in Charlottesville. She focuses on cases in public and subsidized housing, unpaid wages for migrant workers and immigration.

McFarland earned her B.A. from the University of Richmond in 2009, where she majored in Latin American and Iberian studies, and rhetoric and communication studies. She received her J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center in 2015.

While at Georgetown, McFarland participated in the asylum clinic and received a certificate in refugees and humanitarian emergencies.

EDUCATION

JD.   Georgetown University Law Center    2015     
BA.   University of Richmond    2009

*************************************************

Wow, what a totally impressive and multi-talented team! All three of these amazing lawyers also work at the Legal Aid and Justice Center in Charlottesville, VA. They tirelessly pursue justice for our most vulnerable! They teach their clinical students “real life” client interview, case preparation, organization, time management, negotiation, and litigation skills while giving them a solid background in probably the most important and dynamic area in current American Law: U.S. Immigration Law.

They do it all with energy, enthusiasm, good humor, and inspiring teamwork that will help their students be successful in all areas of life and law while contributing to the American Justice system.

I am of course particularly proud of Rachel McFarland who was one of my wonderful Refugee Law and Policy students at Georgetown Law and has gone on to “do great things” and help others as a “charter member” of the “New Due Process Army.” Way to use that “RLP” training and experience, Rachel! I know that my good friend and colleague Professor Andy Schoenholtz who runs the Georgetown Law Certificate in Refugees and Humanitarian Emergencies program is also delighted at how Rachel has chosen to use her specialized training!

Thanks again, Rachel, for “making your professors proud” of your dedication and achievements. I hope that your students will do the same for you (and your terrific colleagues)!

********************************************

For those of you who want to replicate the class experience in Charlottesville last Wednesday, here is the complete text of my class presentation: “BASIC ASYLUM LAW FOR LITIGATORS!”

BASIC ASYLUM LAW FOR LITIGATORS-2SPACE

BASIC ASYLUM LAW FOR LITIGATORS

By Paul Wickham Schmidt

United States Immigration Judge (Retired)

UVA LAW IMMIGRATON CLINIC

Charlottesville, VA

October 25, 2017

BASIC ASYLUM LAW FOR LITIGATORS

OUTLINE

I. INTRODUCTION

II. WHO IS A REFUGEE?

Refugee Definition

Standard of Proof

What Is Persecution?

Nexus

III. PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP

The Three Requirements

Success Stories

The Usual Losers

What Can Go Wrong?

A Few Practical Tips on PSG

IV. PRACTICAL TIPS FOR PRESENTNG AN ASYLUM CASE IN IMMIGRATION COURT

V. CONCLUSION

I. INTRODUCTION

Good afternoon, and thanks for attending. As a former U.S. Immigration Judge at both the trial and appellate levels, and someone who has spent over four decades working in the field of immigration at all levels, I want to personally thank you for what you are doing.

Welcome to the “New Due Process Army” and our critical mission of forcing the U.S. Immigration Court system to live up to its unfulfilled promise of “guaranteeing fairness and due process for all.” Nothing is more important to achieving that mission than providing effective representation to individuals at the “retail level” of the system – the U.S. Immigration Courts.

There is a due process crisis going on in our U.S. Immigration Court system that threatens the integrity and the functioning of our entire U.S. justice system. And, the biggest need in the Immigration Courts is for effective legal representation of individuals seeking, expecting, and deserving justice in Immigration Court. Never has the need for pro bono attorneys been greater than it is now!

I’m truly delighted to be reunited with my friend and former student from Refugee Law & Policy at Georgetown Law, the wonderful Rachel McFarland. I am absolutely thrilled that Rachel has chosen to use her amazing talents to help those most in need and to be a teacher and an inspirational role model for others in the New Due Process Army. In addition to being brilliant and dedicated, Rachel exudes that most important quality for success in law and life: she is just one heck of a nice person! The same, of course, is true for your amazing Clinical Professor Deena Sharuk and her colleague Tanishka Cruz Thank you Deena, Tanishka, and Rachel, for all you are doing! All of you in this room truly represent “Due Process In Action.”

As all of you realize, our justice system is only as strong as its weakest link. If we fail in our responsibility to deliver fairness and due process to the most vulnerable individuals at the “retail level” of our system, then eventually our entire system will fail.

Our Government is going to remove those who lose their cases to countries where some of them undoubtedly will suffer extortion, rape, torture, forced induction into gangs, and even death. Before we return individuals to such possible fates, it is critical that they have a chance to be fully and fairly heard on their claims for protection and that they fully understand and have explained to them the reasons why our country is unwilling or unable to protect them. Neither of those things is going to happen without effective representation.

We should always keep in mind that contrary to the false impression given by some pundits and immigration “hard liners,” including, sadly and most recently our Attorney General, losing an asylum case means neither that the person is committing fraud nor that he or she does not have a legitimate fear of return. In most cases, it merely means that the dangers the person will face upon return do not fall within our somewhat convoluted asylum system. And, as a country, we have chosen not to exercise our discretion to grant temporary shelter to such individuals through Temporary Protected Status, Deferred Enforced Departure, or prosecutorial discretion (“PD”). In other words, we are returning them knowing that the effect might well be life threatening or even fatal in many cases.

I also predict that you will make a positive difference in the development of the law. The well-prepared and articulate arguments that you make in behalf of migrants are going to get attention and consideration from judges at all levels far beyond those presented by unrepresented individuals who can’t even speak English. It’s simply a fact of life. And, if you can win these cases, everything else you do in the law will be a “piece of cake.” I guarantee it.

Obviously, in representing your clients it is important to be polite, professional, and to let the excellence of your preparation, research, and arguments speak for you. In an overwhelmed system, judges are particularly grateful for all the help they can get. However, they are also under excruciating pressure to complete cases, particularly detained cases. So it is important to clearly identify your issues, focus your examination, and make sure that your “phone books” of evidence are properly organized and that there is a “road map” to direct the Immigration Judge and the Assistant Chief Counsel to the key points. You want to help the judge, and your opponent, get to a “comfort zone” where he or she can feel comfortable granting, or not opposing or appealing, relief.

I do want to offer one additional important piece of advice up front. That is to make sure to ask your client if her or his parents or grandparents, whether living or dead, are or were U.S. citizens. Citizenship is jurisdictional in Immigration Court, and occasionally we do come across individuals with valid but previously undeveloped claims for U.S. citizenship. You definitely want to find out about that sooner, rather than later, in the process.

My presentation today will be divided into three sections. First, we will go over the basic refugee definition and some of its ramifications. Second, I will provide some basic information about particular social group or “PSG” claims. Third, I will give you fourteen practical pointers for effectively presenting asylum cases in Immigration Court.

Please feel free to ask questions as we go along, or save them until the end.

II. WHO IS A REFUGEE?

In this section, I will first discuss the INA’s definition of “refugee.” Second, I will talk about the standard of proof. Third, we will discuss the meaning of the undefined term “persecution.” I will conclude this section with a discussion of the key concept of “nexus.”

A. Refugee Definition

An “asylee” under U.S. law is basically an individual who satisfies the “refugee” definition, but who is in the U.S. or at our border in a different status, or with no status at all. Most of your clients will fall in the latter category.

The definition of “refugee” is set forth in section 101(a)(42) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). There are four basic elements:

Generally, outside the country of nationality (not usually an issue in border cases);
Unwilling or unable to return (failure of state protection);
Because of persecution (undefined) or a well founded fear of persecution;
On account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion (“nexus”).

There are some important exclusions to the refugee definition, the most frequent ones being the one-year filing deadline for asylum, those who have committed serious nonpolitical crimes outside the U.S. or particularly serious crimes in the U.S., persecutors of others, those who have rendered material support to a terrorist organizations, and those who are firmly resettled in another country. I won’t be going into these in detail today, but you should know that they are there, and I’d be happy to take questions on them. The ground most likely to come up in your cases is the one relating to individuals who have committed crimes.

Some individuals who are ineligible for asylum might still be eligible to receive withholding of removal under section 243(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C., § 1253(b) or withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). And, everyone can potentially seek so-called “deferral of removal” under the CAT.

Also, please note that because of the requirement of a “nexus” to a “protected ground” not all types of harm trigger protection. In particular, crimes, wars, random violence, natural disasters, and personal vengeance or retribution do not automatically qualify individuals for refugee status, although “persecution“ within the meaning of the INA and the Convention certainly can sometimes occur in these contexts. However, some of these circumstances that fail to result in refugee protection because of the “nexus” requirement might be covered by the CAT, which has no nexus requirement.

The source of the “refugee” definition is he Refugee Act of 1980 which codified and implemented the U.N Convention and Protocol on the Status of Refugees to which the U.S. adhered in 1968. There are, however, some differences between the U.S. definition and the Convention definition, which I won’t go into today. But, again, you should be aware they exist, since some international or U.N. interpretations of the definition might be inapplicable under U.S. law.

B. Standard of Proof

The standard of proof in asylum cases was established by the Supreme Court in 1987 in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). In asylum cases, a “well-founded” fear is something far less than a probability. It is an “objectively reasonable fear” or the type of fear that a “reasonable person” would have under the circumstances. Most courts and authorities have adopted the “10% chance” example set forth in Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion in Cardoza.

The BIA’s implementation of Cardoza, the 1987 precedent Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987), makes the point that the persecution can be “significantly less than probable.” Your challenge as lawyers will be to get judges at all levels of our system to actually apply the generous Cardoza-Mogharrabi standard rather than just mouthing it. Sadly, the latter still happens too often, in my opinion.

A different and higher “more likely than not” standard applies to withholding of removal under the INA and to withholding and deferral of removal under the CAT. One great tool for satisfying the standard of proof for asylum or withholding under the Act is the rebuttable regulatory presumption of future persecution arising out of past persecution set forth in 8 C.F.R. 1208.13. This is a really important regulation that you should basically learn “by heart.” I will reference it again in the “practical tips” section of this presentation.

Withholding and CAT are more limited forms of relief than asylum. While they usually provide work authorization, they do not lead to green card status, allow the applicants to bring relatives, or travel abroad. They are also easier to revoke if conditions change. Nevertheless, there is one major advantage to withholding and CAT: they save your client’s life. Sometimes, that’s the best you can do. And, fundamentally, saving lives is really what this business is all about.

C. What Is Persecution?

Remarkably, neither the Convention nor the INA defines the term “persecution.” Consequently, U.S. Immigration Judges, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), and the U.S. Courts of Appeals are constantly referring to certain types of harm as “mere discrimination or harassment” not “rising to the level” of “persecution.” Often these highly subjective conclusions seem to be more in the mind of the judicial beholder than in the record or the law.

In the absence of a firm definition, I have found the most useful practical guidance to be in an opinion by the famous, or infamous, Judge Richard Posner, who recently retired from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2011 case Stanojkova v. Holder, 645 F.3d 943, 947-48 (7^th Cir. 2011). Judge Posner gave three examples.

“The three forms are discrimination, harassment, and persecution. The first [discrimination] refers to unequal treatment, and is illustrated historically by India’s caste system and the Jim Crow laws in the southern U.S. states. Discrimination normally does not involve the application of physical force, except as punishment for violation of the discriminatory laws.”

Second: “Harassment involves targeting members of a specified group for adverse treatment, but without the application of significant physical force. Had [police] furious at [the respondent’s] being soft on Albanians followed his taxi (he was a taxicab driver in Macedonia) and ticketed him whenever he exceeded the speed limit by one mile per hour, that would be an example of harassment. A common form of sexual harassment is pestering a subordinate for a date or making lewd comments on her appearance, or perhaps hugging her, which is physical but generally not violent.”

Third: “Persecution involves, we suggest, the use of significant physical force against a person’s body, or the infliction of comparable physical harm without direct application of force (locking a person in a cell and starving him would be an example), or nonphysical harm of equal gravity—that last qualification is important because refusing to allow a person to practice his religion is a common form of persecution even though the only harm it causes is psychological. Another example of persecution that does not involve actual physical contact is a credible threat to inflict grave physical harm, as in pointing a gun at a person’s head and pulling the trigger but unbeknownst to the victim the gun is not loaded.”

These definitions are, of course, not binding outside the Seventh Circuit. But, I find them to be practical, usable definitions that I certainly found helpful in making asylum decisions in the Fourth and other circuits.

D. Nexus

The concept of “nexus” or “on account of” has become critical in asylum adjudication. Indeed, that is where many of your upcoming battles will be focused. In many cases these days the DHS will concede the “particular social group” (“PSG”) and just argue that the harm has no “nexus” to that PSG or any other protected ground.

The REAL ID Act amended the INA to require that for an asylum applicant to prove ”nexus” or “on account” of any protected ground, he or she must show that the protected ground is “at least one central reason” for the feared persecution. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1208(b)(1)(B)(i) While this did not eliminate the frequently encountered “mixed motive” situation, it was intended to “tighten up” prior case law that had referred to the persecution as stemming “in whole or in part” from a protected ground.

The BIA ruled in Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I & N Dec. 341 (BIA 2010) that the “one central reason” test also applies to nexus in the withholding of removal context. However, the Ninth Circuit rejected the BIA’s interpretation in Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351 (BIA 2014), maintaining that the more generous “in whole or in part” test should continue to apply to withholding cases under the INA. To my knowledge, the Fourth Circuit has not directly addressed the issue. So, I believe that C-T-L- would apply in the Immigration Courts in the Fourth Circuit at present.

Unfortunately, the BIA has given a very narrow reading to the “one central reason” test. In a recent precedent, Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I &N Dec. 40 (BIA 2017), the respondent was a member of a family social group. He clearly was targeted by a cartel in Mexico because he was a member of a family that owned a grocery store. In other words, “but for” the respondent’s family membership, he would not have been targeted by the gang.

Nevertheless, instead of granting the case, the BIA looked beyond the initial causation. The BIA found that “the respondent was targeted only as a means to achieve the cartel’s objective to increase its profits by selling drugs in the store owned by his father. Therefore the cartel’s motive to increase its profits by selling contraband in the store was one central reason for its actions against the respondent. Any motive to harm the respondent because he was a member of his family was, at most, incidental.” 27 I&N Dec. at 46 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the BIA denied the case.

Unfortunately, the BIA cited and relied upon an analysis of nexus in a similar case by the Fifth Circuit in Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485n (5^th Cir. 2015). The BIA, and to some extent the Fifth Circuit, have essentially used the “nexus” requirement to “squeeze the life” out of the family PSG. We can see that the normal rules of legal causation have been suspended. The respondent would not have been targeted by the cartel had he not belonged to this particular family. Yet, the BIA searched for and found an “overriding motive” that did not relate to a protected ground and determined that to be the “central reason” and the family PSG to be “tangential.”

What kind of case could succeed under L-E-A-? Well, perhaps not wanting to give anyone any practical ideas on how to qualify, the BIA searched history and came up with the execution of the Romanov family by the Bolsheviks as an example of a where family was a “central reason” for the persecution. So, maybe if the respondent’s father were a major donor to a political party that opposed cartels, a member of a religion that opposed drugs, or a member of a hated minority group, the respondent’s family membership could have been “at least one central reason.”

But the Romanov family case would have been grantable on actual or imputed political opinion grounds. The other examples I gave would have been more easily grantable on actual or implied political opinion, religion, or nationality grounds. So the BIA appears designed to make the family PSG ground largely superfluous.

This leaves you as litigators in a tricky situation. The IJ will be bound by L-E-A,

and the BIA is unlikely to retreat from L-E-A-. On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit might not go along with the L-E-A- view, although Judge Wilkins appeared anxious to endorse L-E-A- in his separate concurring opinion in Valasquez v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 188 (4^th Cir. 2017).

To my knowledge, L-E-A- has not actually been considered and endorsed by any circuit to date. To me, it appears to be inconsistent with some of the existing family-based nexus case law in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits. See, e.g., Zavaleta-Policiano v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 241 (4^th Cir. 2017) (slamming BIA for misapplying concept of “mixed motive”). So, I wouldn’t be shocked if a “circuit split” eventually develops and the issue finally wends its way to the Supreme Court. Who knows, maybe one of you will be arguing it.

In any event, in my view, it is too early for you to “waive” strong nexus arguments even if they will be rejected under L-E-A-. On the other hand, that’s not likely to solve your client’s currentproblems.

So, what can you do? First, look for legitimate ways to distinguish L-E-A-. Assume that the DHS will “pull out the stops” in arguing that everything but family was the central reason –greed, lust, crime, random violence, personal vengeance, envy, resentment, etc. Look for evidence in the record that the dispute really was, to a major extent, about family, rather than one of the non-qualifying grounds.

Second, look for some qualifying non-family PSG or a “more conventional” religious, nationality, racial, or political motive.

Third, consider the possibility of CAT protection. The advocacy community probably underutilizes CAT. CAT doesn’t have a specific nexus requirement and often can be proved by extensive documentary or expert evidence, both UVA Clinic specialties. Sure, the standard of proof is high and CAT is a lesser form of relief than asylum. But, it saves your client’s life! And, if the nexus law changes in your favor, you can always file a motion to reopen to re-apply for asylum under the changed law.

This is an area of the law where creativity, preparation, and persistence often pay off in the long run. So, don’t give up. Keep on fighting for a reasonable and proper application of the “refugee” definition and for the rights of your clients.

III. PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP

In this section I will talk about the three basic requirements for a PSG, the success stories, the usual failures, things that can go wrong, and offer you a few practice pointers directly related to PSG claims.

A. The Three Requirements

The BIA has established three requirements for a PSG.

Immutability or fundamental to identity;
Particularity; and
Social distinction.

These three requirements are usually used to deny rather than grant protection. Indeed, most of the BIA’s recent precedents on PSG are rendered in a decidedly negative context.

There was a time about two decades ago when many of us, including a number of BIA Members, thought that immutability or fundamental to identity was the sole factor. But, following our departure, the BIA attached the additional requirements of “particularity” and “social visibility” now renamed “social distinction” to narrow the definition and facilitate denials, particularly of gang-based PSG claims.

The particularity and social distinction requirements basically work like a “scissors” to cut off claims. As you make your definition more specific to meet the “particularity” requirement it often will become so narrow and restrictive that it fails to satisfy “social distinction.” On the other hand, as your proposed PSG becomes more socially distinct, it’s likely that it will become more expansive and generic so that the BIA will find a lack of “particularity.”

While the UNHCR and many advocacy groups have argued for a return of immutability as the basic requirement with “social distinction” as an alternative, not an additional requirement, the BIA recently reaffirmed its “three criteria” approach. These cases, Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I &N Dec. 227 (BIA 2014) and its companion case Matter of W-E-G-, 26 I &N Dec. 208 (BIA 2014), are “must reads” for anyone doing PSG work.

About the only bright spot for advocates was that the BIA in M-E-V-G– rejected the commonly held view that no gang-based case could ever succeed. The BIA said that its decisions “should not be read as a blanket rejection of all factual scenarios involving gangs. Social group determinations are made on a case-by-case basis. For example, a factual scenario in which gangs are targeting homosexuals may support a particular social group claim. While persecution on account of a protected ground cannot be inferred merely from acts of random violence and the existence of civil strife, it is clear that persecution on account of a protected ground may occur during periods of civil strife if the victim is targeted on account of a protected ground.” 26 I&N Dec. at 251 (citations omitted).

In other words, the Board is asking for evidence intensive case-by-case adjudications of various proposed PSGs. Leaving aside the fairness of doing this in a context where we know that most applicants will be detained and unrepresented, I cannot think of an organization better suited to give the BIA what it asked for than the UVA Clinic – you guys!

B. Success Stories

There are four basic groups that have been relatively successful in establishing PSG claims.

LGBT individuals under Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I&N Dec. 819 (BIA 1990);
Women who fear or suffered female genital mutilation (“FGM”) under my decision in Matter of Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357 (BIA 1996);
Victims of domestic violence under Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014); and
Family under the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117 (4^th 2011), a case in which I was the Immigration Judge and Jones Day was pro bono counsel.

You should note that the first three of these success stories had something in common: strong support across a wide spectrum of the political universe. In fact, in LGBT, FGM, and domestic violence cases the DHS eventually changed its position so as to not oppose the recognition of the PSG. This, in turn, either facilitated or perhaps effectively forced the BIA to recognize the PSG in a precedent.

Family, on the other hand, has generally not developed the same type of political consensus as a PSG for asylum purposes. I have already discussed in detail how notwithstanding the clear logic of family as a PSG, the BIA uses a highly restrictive reading of the “nexus” requirement that prevents many family groups from qualifying for protection.

There are two additional important points established by Kasinga. First, the respondent does not have to establish that the persecutor acted or will act with “malevolent intent.” Persecution may be established even where the persecutor was inflicting the harm with the intent to “help” or “treat” the respondent. This comes up frequently in connection with LGBT claims.

Second, Kasinga holds that to justify a discretionary denial of asylum for a respondent who otherwise meets all of the statutory requirements, the adverse factors must be “egregious” so as to outweigh the likely danger of persecution.

You are likely to find a number of cases involving LGBT individuals, domestic violence, and family. In the Arlington Immigration Court during my tenure these cases succeeded at an extremely high rate, so much so that many of them went on my “short docket.” However, that was then and this is now. As they say, “There’s a new sheriff in town and, unfortunately in my view, he looks a lot like the infamous “Sheriff Joe.”

Finally, there are some “up and comer” PSG’s that have had success in some of the circuits and might eventually gain widespread acceptance. Among these are witnesses, landowners, and women subjected to forced marriages. The latter often can more successfully be presented under the domestic violence category. The Fourth Circuit actually has recognized “former gang members” as a potential PSG, although many such individuals will have difficulties under the criminal exclusions from the refugee definition. Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902 (4^th Cir. 2014).

C. The Usual Losers

PSGs that don’t fit any of the categories I just mentioned are usually “losers.” Chief among the “usual losers” are victims of crime other than domestic violence, informants, extortion victims, and those resisting gang recruitment. You’ll probably see a fair number of such cases. Your challenge will be how to present them in a way that overcomes the negative connotations normally associated with such claims.

D. What Can Go Wrong?

Lots of things can go wrong with a PSG case. First, there is the issue of “circularity.” Generally, a PSG cannot be defined in terms of itself. For example “victims of crime” would generally be a “circular” social group.

An easy test is to use your proposed PSG in a simple sentence: “This respondent was harmed to overcome the characteristic of being _________. If you can’t say with a straight face in open court, don’t use it. For example, “this respondent was raped to overcome her characteristic of being a victim of rape” isn’t going to make it as a PSG.

We’ve already talked about how PSG claims can be attacked by denying the nexus. There are also the old favorites of lack of credibility or corroboration. Then, there is failure to meet the one-year filing deadline, no failure of state protection, reasonably available internal relocation, and fundamentally changed country conditions.

That’s why if you’re considering a PSG claim, it’s always wise to have “Plan B.” The problem today, however, is that the Administration has restricted or limited many of the “Plans B.” For example, until recently, the number one “Plan B” was to request prosecutorial discretion (“PD”) from the Assistant Chief Counsel if the respondent had sympathetic humanitarian factors, a clean criminal record, and strong ties to the U.S. However, for all practical purposes, this Administration has eliminated PD.

Nevertheless, its always worthwhile to think about whether things like Wilberforce Act treatment for certain unaccompanied juveniles, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, “T” visas for trafficking victims, “U” visas for victims of crime, or benefits under the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”) might be realistic possibilities for your client.

E. A Few Practical Tips on PSG

I’m going to close this section by offering you a few practical tips on presenting PSG cases that will also tie into my next major section.

First, think “25 words or fewer.” Just like the old boxtop contests from my youth. There are few, if any, known examples of success using lengthy, convoluted social group definitions.

Second, remember folks, it isn’t “making sausages.” The definition that goes in must be the same one that comes out the other end. Social groups that “morph” during the hearing just have no chance.

Third, be prepared to explain how your proposed particular social group meets the current BIA criteria of immutability, particularity, and social distinction, formerly known as “social visibility.”

Fourth, make sure that your respondent is actually a member of the particular social group you propose. You would be surprised at the number of counsel who propose a particular social group definition and then fail to offer proof that their client actually fits within that group.

Fifth, as I just mentioned, check your particular social group for “circularity.”

Sixth, and finally, be prepared for an onslaught of other arguments against your case, the chief of which probably will be “no nexus.” Normally, the DHS will “pull out all the stops” to prevent the recognition of a new PSG.

IV. PRACTICAL TIPS FOR PRESENTING AN ASYLUM CASE IN IMMIGRATION COURT

You should all have received a copy of my comprehensive three-page treatise on asylum law entitled “Practical Tips For Presenting an Asylum Case In Immigration Court,” Feb. 2017 Revised Edition. I’m going to quickly take you through the fourteen practical tips outlined there.

My first tip is, “Read a Good Book.” My strong recommendation is the one that has always been at the top of the Immigration Court Best Seller List: Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 2017 edition.

Specifically, I invite your attention to Chapter 1208, which contains the seeds of all winning theories of asylum law, past, present, and future. It will also give you gems like how to shift the burden of proof to the DHS and how to win your case even if your client does not presently have a well-founded fear of persecution.

Second, “Get Real.” The REAL ID Act, P.L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005), deals with credibility and burden of proof issues in asylum and other cases and applies to applications “made” on or after May 11, 2005, which will be all of your cases. Read it and decide how it can help you and how you can respond to DHS arguments.

Third, “Know One When You See One.” The one-year filing requirement of section 208(a)(2)(B) of the INA bars asylum in some cases. Your burden of proof on the one-year filing issue is very high: “clear and convincing evidence.” Judicial review might be limited. But, there are exceptions. Read the statute and the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4 to find out how the filing requirement works and what arguments might be made to preserve a late asylum application. Remember that the one-year requirement does not apply to withholding of removal under the INA or to CAT applications.

At the beginning of each asylum case, I asked the parties to identify the issues. Respondents’ attorneys invariably told me about past persecution, future persecution, nexus, gender-based persecution, exceptions to the one year filing deadline, weird social groups, and so forth. The issue they sometimes fail to identify is the one that’s always first on my list. What is it?

That’s right, credibility, is the key issue in almost all asylum litigation. So, my fourth rule is “Play To Tell the Truth.” You must understand what goes into making credibility determinations and why the role of the Immigration Judge is so critical. Often, adverse credibility determinations are difficult to overturn on appeal. It’s all about deference.

But, credible testimony might not be enough to win your case. That’s why my fifth rule is “Don’t Believe Everything You Read.” Both appellate and trial court decisions often recite rote quotations about asylum being granted solely on the basis of credible testimony.

However, to give your client the best chance of winning his or her asylum case in immigration Court, under the law applicable in most circuits, you’re likely to need a combination of credible testimony and reasonably available corroborating evidence. Read Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 722 (BIA 1997), largely codified by REAL ID, and find out what it really takes to win an asylum case in most Immigration Court.

In this respect, you should remember my corollary sixth rule “Paper Your Case.” According to Fourth Circuit precedent, even a proper adverse credibility ruling against your client might not be enough for an Immigration Judge to deny the asylum claim. The Judge must still examine the record as a whole, including all of the documentation supporting the claim, to determine whether independent documentary evidence establishes eligibility for asylum. Read Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361 (4th Cir. 2004) and discover how the power of independent documentary evidence can overcome even a sustainable adverse credibility finding. Also, remember that the REAL ID Act directs Immigration Judges to consider “the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors.”

“Read Your Paper” is my seventh important rule. You and your client are responsible for all the documentation you present in your case. Nothing will give you nightmares faster than having a client present false or fraudulent documentation to the Immigration Court. In my experience, I’ve had very few attorneys able to dig out of that hole. So, don’t let this happen to you.

My eighth rule is “Pile it On.” Sometimes, as demonstrated in one of my very favorite cases Matter of O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 I&N Dec. 23 (BIA 1998), reaffirmed in Matter of L-K-, 23 I&N Dec. 677, 683 (BIA 2004), you will be able to take a series of events happening to your respondent, his or her family, or close associates, none of which individually perhaps rises to the level of persecution, and combine them to win for your client.

My ninth rule is “Don’t Get Caught by the Devil.” The devil is in the details. If you don’t find that devil, the DHS Assistant Chief Counsel almost certainly will, and you will burn. Also, make sure to put your client at ease by carefully explaining the process and by going over the direct and cross-examinations in advance. Remember the cultural and language barriers that can sometimes interfere with effective presentation of your case.

I found the DHS Assistant Chief Counsel in Arlington were all very nice folks. They were also smart, knowledgeable, well prepared, and ready to vigorously litigate their client’s positions. They handled more trials in a year than most litigators do in a lifetime. So, beware and be prepared. You would also be wise to contact the Assistant Chief Counsel in advance of any merits hearing to discuss ways of narrowing the issues and possible “Plans B.”

My tenth rule is “Know Your Geography.” Not all Immigration Courts and Circuit Courts of Appeals are located on the West Coast. The BIA certainly is not. You must know and deal with the law in the jurisdiction where your case actually is located, not in the one you might wish it were located.

For example, the Arlington Immigration Court is in Crystal City. That is in Virginia, which is not presently part of the Ninth Circuit.

This is something that I once had trouble with, coming to the Arlington Court from a job where the majority of asylum cases arose in the Ninth Circuit. But, I got over it, and so can you.

My eleventh rule is to “Get Physical.” In defining persecution, some Circuits have emphasized “the infliction or threat of death, torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom.” See, e.g., Niang v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2007). While the Circuits and the BIA have also recognized non-physical threats and harm, your strongest case probably will be to emphasize the physical aspects of the harm where they exist. Mirisawo v. Holder, 599 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2010); Matter of T-Z-, 24 I & N Dec. 163 (BIA 2007).

I particularly recommend the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117 (4th Cir. 2011), which found that the BIA erred in rejecting my conclusion that “unrebutted evidence of death threats against [the respondent] and his family members, combined with the MS-13’s penchant for extracting vengeance against cooperating witnesses, gave rise to a reasonable fear of future persecution.” In other words, I was right, and the BIA was wrong. But, who’s keeping track?

My twelfth rule is “Practice, Practice, Practice.” The Immigration Court Practice Manual, available online at the EOIR web site http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/ocij_page1.htmwas effective July 1, 2008, and replaced all prior local rules. All filings with the Immigration Court must comply with the deadlines and formats established in this Practice Manual. The Practice Manual has a very helpful index, and it covers just about everything you will ever want to know about practice before the Immigration Courts. It contains useful appendices that give you contact information and tell you how to format and cite documents for filing in Immigration Court. Best of all, it’s applicable nationwide, so you can use what you learn in all Immigration Courts.

My thirteenth, rule is “It’s Always Wise to Have ‘Plan B.’” As I have pointed out, asylum litigation has many variables and opportunities for a claim to “go south.” Therefore, it is prudent to have a “Plan B” (alternative) in mind.

Among the “Plans B” that regularly came up in Arlington were: prosecutorial discretion (“PD”), Special Rule Cancellation of Removal (“NACARA”), Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”), non-Lawful Permanent Resident Cancellation of Removal (“EOIR 42-B”), Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”), Special Immigrant Juvenile (“SIJ”) status, I-130 petition with a “stateside waiver” (“I-601A”), “Wilberforce Act” special processing for unaccompanied children (“UACs”), T nonimmigrant status (for certain human trafficking victims), and U nonimmigrant status (for certain victims of crime). In my experience, many, perhaps the majority, of the “happy outcome” asylum cases coming before me were resolved on a basis “OTA,” that is “other than asylum.”

But, unfortunately in my view, the “Plan B” world is rapidly changing. So, please listen very carefully to the caveat that comes next.

Fourteenth, hope for the best, but prepare for the worst. As some have said “there’s a new Sheriff in town,” and he’s announced a “maximum immigration enforcement” program targeting anyonewho has had any run-in with the law, whether convicted or not. He also intends to detain all undocumented border crossers or applicants for admission at the border. So, you can expect morearrests, more detention (particularly in far-away, inconvenient locations like, for instance, Farmville, VA), more bond hearings, more credible and reasonable fear reviews, more pressure to move cases even faster, and an even higher stress level in Immigration Court.

The “Plans B” involving discretion on the part of the Assistant Chief Counsel, like PD, DACA, and stateside processing, and even waiving appeal from grants of relief, are likely to disappear in the near future, if they have not already. In many cases, litigating up through the BIA and into the Article III Federal Courts (where the judges are, of course, bound to follow the law but not necessarily to accept the President’s or the Attorney General’s interpretation of it) might become your best, and perhaps only, “Plan B.”

V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I have told you about the basic elements of the refugee definition and how it is used in adjudicating asylum cases. I have also discussed the requirements and the pros and cons of the PSG protected ground. And, I have shared with you some of my practical tips for presenting an asylum case in U.S. Immigration Court.

Obviously, I can’t make you an immigration litigation expert in in afternoon. But, I trust that I have given you the basic tools to effectively represent your clients in Immigration Court. I have also given you some sources that you can consult for relevant information in developing your litigation strategy and your case.

I encourage you to read my blog, immigrationcourtside.com, which covers many recent developments in the U.S. Immigration Courts. As you come up with victories, defeats, good ideas, appalling situations, or anything else you think should be made more widely available, please feel free to submit them to me for publication. I also welcome first-hand accounts of how the system is, or isn’t, working at the “retail level.”

Thanks again for joining the New Due Process Army and undertaking this critical mission on behalf of the U.S. Constitution and all it stands for! Thanks for what you are doing for America, our system of justice, and the most vulnerable individuals who depend on that system for due process and justice.

Thanks for listening, good luck, do great things, and Due Process Forever! I’d be pleased to answer any additional questions.

(10-30-17)

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PWS

10-30-17

THE BIGGEST LOSER: US Judge In MD Also Slams Travel Ban 3.0 (Again)! No Matter What Ultimately Happens, Trump & Our Country Are The Big Losers From His Determination To Be Petty & Discriminatory!

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/second-judge-rules-against-latest-travel-ban-saying-trumps-own-words-show-it-was-aimed-at-muslims/2017/10/18/5ecdaa44-b3ed-11e7-9e58-e6288544af98_story.html

Matt Zapotosky reports for the Washington Post:

“A federal judge in Maryland early Wednesday issued a second halt on the latest version of President Trump’s travel ban, asserting that the president’s own comments on the campaign trail and on Twitter convinced him that the directive was akin to an unconstitutional Muslim ban.

U.S. District Judge Theodore D. Chuang issued a somewhat less complete halt on the ban than his counterpart in Hawaii did a day earlier, blocking the administration from enforcing the directive only on those who lacked a “bona fide” relationship with a person or entity in the United States, such as family members or some type of professional or other engagement in the United States.

[Federal judge blocks Trump’s third travel ban]

But in some ways, Chuang’s ruling was more personally cutting to Trump, as he said the president’s own words cast his latest attempt to impose a travel blockade as the “inextricable re-animation of the twice-enjoined Muslim ban.”

Omar Jadwat, who directs of the ACLU’s Immigrants’ Rights Project and represented those suing in Maryland over the ban, said: “Like the two versions before it, President Trump’s latest travel ban is still a Muslim ban at its core. And like the two before it, this one is going down to defeat in the courts.”

The third iteration of Trump’s travel ban had been set to go fully into effect early Wednesday, barring various types of travelers from Syria, Libya, Iran, Yemen, Chad, Somalia, North Korea and Venezuela. Even before Chuang’s ruling, though, a federal judge in Hawaii stopped it — at least temporarily — for all of the countries except North Korea and Venezuela.

That judge, Derrick K. Watson, blocked the administration from enforcing the measure on anyone from the six countries, not just those with a “bona fide” U.S. tie. But his ruling did not address whether Trump’s intent in imposing the directive was to discriminate against Muslims. He said the president had merely exceeded the authority Congress had given him in immigration law.

The Justice Department already had vowed to appeal Watson’s ruling, which the White House said “undercuts the President’s efforts to keep the American people safe and enforce minimum security standards for entry into the United States.” Both Watson’s temporary restraining order and Chuang’s preliminary injunction are also interim measures, meant to maintain the status quo as the parties continue to argue the case.

The administration had cast the new measure as one that was necessary for national security, implemented only after officials conducted an extensive review of the information they needed to vet those coming to the United States. Those countries that were either unwilling or unable to produce such information even after negotiation, officials have said, were included on the banned list.

“These restrictions are vital to ensuring that foreign nations comply with the minimum security standards required for the integrity of our immigration system and the security of our Nation,” the White House said after Watson’s ruling. “We are therefore confident that the Judiciary will ultimately uphold the President’s lawful and necessary action and swiftly restore its vital protections for the safety of the American people.”

Like Watson’s order, Chuang’s 91-page ruling also found Trump had exceeded his authority under immigration law, but only partially.

The order — which has “no specified end date and no requirement of renewal” — violated a nondiscrimination provision in the law in that it blocked immigrants to the United States based on their nationality, Chuang wrote.

But Chuang said he could not determine, as Watson did, that Trump had violated a different part of federal immigration law requiring him to find entry of certain nonimmigrant travelers would be “detrimental” to U.S. interests before blocking them.

Chuang instead based much of his ruling on his assessment that Trump intended to ban Muslims, and thus his order had run afoul of the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. When Trump was a presidential candidate in December 2015, Chuang wrote, he had promised a “complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States,” and all of his comments since then seemed to indicate his various travel bans were meant to fulfill that promise.

After his second ban was blocked, Chuang wrote, Trump described the measure as a “watered down version” of his initial measure, adding, “we ought go back to the first one and go all the way, which is what I wanted to do in the first place.” The president had then revoked and replaced his first travel ban, which had also been held up in court.

In August, with courts still weighing the second version, Chuang noted that Trump “endorsed what appears to be an apocryphal story involving General John J. Pershing and a purported massacre of Muslims with bullets dipped in a pig’s blood, advising people to ‘study what General Pershing . . . did to terrorists when caught.’ ”

[Trump said to study General Pershing. Here’s what the president got wrong.]

In September, as authorities worked on a new directive, Trump wrote on Twitter “the travel ban into the United States should be far larger, tougher and more specific — but stupidly, that would not be politically correct!”

Chuang had pressed challengers at a hearing this week on what the government would have to do to make the new ban legal, and he noted in his ruling that the new directive had changed from the previous iterations. The government, for example, had undertaken a review process before inking the new measure, and had added two non-Muslim majority countries to the banned list.

But Chuang wrote that he was unmoved that government had simply relied on the results of their review, and instead believed they made “certain subjective determinations that resulted in a disproportionate impact on majority-Muslim nations.” He wrote that the government offered “no evidence, even in the form of classified information submitted to the Court, showing an intelligence-based terrorism threat justifying a ban on entire nationalities,” and asserted that even the new measure “generally resembles President Trump’s earlier description of the Muslim ban.”

“The ‘initial’ announcement of the Muslim ban, offered repeatedly and explicitly through President Trump’s own statements, forcefully and persuasively expressed his purpose in unequivocal terms,” Chuang wrote.

The suits in federal court in Maryland had been brought by 23 advocacy groups and seven people who said they would be negatively impacted by the new ban.”

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Yes, the Trump Administration might ultimately prevail on appeal on this one. But, that won’t change the fact that they are “losers.” And, a country that chooses biased, incompetent, and petty leadership like this is also a “Big Loser.”

PWS

10-18-17

Acting AG Whitaker Takes Aim at Asylum Seekers Fleeing Family-Based Persecution – Sophia Genovese

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FOIA results: evidence of Immigration Judge V. Stuart Couch’s shocking prejudgment of all domestic violence asylum claims

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CA4 Vacates , 27 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 2017)

Join the New Due Process Army! Due Process Forever!

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FINALLY, AFTER FUTILE REQUESTS TO THE BIA AND THE DOJ, THE PUBLIC HAS BEEN ABLE TO GET A COPY OF THE RECENTLY CERTIFIED MATTER OF A-B-, FROM THE ATTORNEY (WHO WASN’T TOLD OF THE ACTION UNTIL HE RECEIVED A COPY OF THE DECISION IN THE MAIL ON FRIDAY)

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HERE THEY ARE!

INTRODUCING THE “TERRIFIC TRIO” – DEENA N. SHARUK, TANISHKA V. CRUZ, & RACHEL C. McFARLAND:

Deena N. Sharuk

Tanishka V. Cruz

Rachel C. McFarland

II. WHO IS A REFUGEE?

A. Refugee Definition

B. Standard of Proof

C. What Is Persecution?

D. Nexus

III. PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP

A. The Three Requirements

B. Success Stories

C. The Usual Losers

D. What Can Go Wrong?

E. A Few Practical Tips on PSG

IV. PRACTICAL TIPS FOR PRESENTING AN ASYLUM CASE IN IMMIGRATION COURT

V. CONCLUSION

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