"The Voice of the New Due Process Army" ————– Musings on Events in U.S. Immigration Court, Immigration Law, Sports, and Other Random Topics by Retired United States Immigration Judge (Arlington, Virginia) and former Chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals Paul Wickham Schmidt. To see my complete professional bio, just click on the link below.
“Petitioner Christian Alberto Santos Garcia, a native and citizen of El Salvador, has twice travelled unlawfully into the United States — first in 2012, and again in 2016. In both instances, Garcia fled threats to his life and attacks carried out against him by the 18th Street Gang and the Salvadoran police. After seeking protection from removal before an immigration judge (the “IJ”) in 2016, Garcia was afforded relief — in the form of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (the “CAT”) — by three separate IJ rulings. On each occasion, the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”) reversed the IJ rulings. Garcia, for his part, was removed to El Salvador in May 2022, and has awaited further developments in these proceedings from his home country. In this appeal, Garcia challenges and seeks reversal of three rulings made by the BIA — those being: (1) that the “particular social group” relied upon in connection with Garcia’s application for withholding of removal is not legally cognizable; (2) that Garcia was not persecuted in El Salvador on account of his political opinions; and (3) that Garcia failed to establish eligibility for CAT protection. As explained herein, we grant Garcia’s petition for review and reverse the BIA rulings in part, affirm them in part, and vacate them in part. We otherwise remand to the BIA for such further proceedings as may be appropriate.”
“Petitioner Juan Pablo Paucar petitions for review of a January 22, 2021 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision (1) affirming an Immigration Judge’s denial of his application for cancellation of removal and (2) denying his motion to remand. The BIA rejected Paucar’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, declined to remand for consideration of additional hardship relating to his cancellation application, and declined to remand to await adjudication of his U visa application. Paucar argues that the BIA (1) applied an incorrect standard when reviewing his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, (2) overlooked and mischaracterized his new hardship evidence, and (3) failed to follow precedent when denying his request for remand while awaiting the adjudication of his U visa application. We are persuaded by Paucar’s arguments. Accordingly, we GRANT Paucar’s petition for review, VACATE the BIA’s decision, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
In Santos-Garcia v. Garland, the BIA’s 6-year quest to wrongfully deny protection to Santos has been thwarted, for now. But, the matter remains far from finally resolved, even though an IJ has now properly granted Santos relief three separate times, only to be wrongly reversed by the BIA on each occasion!
Rather than insuring that individual justice is done, the BIA has acted to promote injustice, create needless delay, and demoralize IJ’s who are getting it right! In the meantime, the respondent has been removed to the country where he has a well-founded fear of persecution to await his fate. This is because the 4th Circuit denied a stay they should routinely have granted in an exercise of truly horrendous judicial misjudgment.
Now, the court majority fecklessly pontificates about the need for timely resolution (you’ve got to be kidding) while hinting, but not requiring, that the “Gang That Can’t Shoot Straight” should return the respondent now. Don’t hold your breath!
Here are three of my favorite quotes from Judge King’s majority opinion in Santos Garcia v. Garland.
Put simply, the BIA declined to “interact seriously” with the record before it in reviewing Garcia’s claim for CAT protection, and its failure in that regard requires a remand.
Should we not expect a supposed “expert tribunal” like the BIA should be to “seriously interact” with the record in life-or-death cases?Why aren’t Dems in Congress and everywhere else “all over Garland like a cheap suit” to stop this kind of judicial misbehavior in his “wholly owned courts?”
In closing, we recognize that Garcia’s removal proceedings have languished before the IJ and the BIA — and now this Court — for more than six years, leaving him in limbo and presently in harm’s way in El Salvador. We are also mindful that Garcia was only 15 years old when he sought to protect his cousin from the 18th Street Gang’s advances, setting off more than a decade of hardship and uncertainty. With that, we emphasize the “strong public interest in bringing [this] litigation to a close . . . promptly.” See Hussain v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 153, 158 (4th Cir. 2007). And although we do not direct the affirmative award of any relief, we acknowledge the compelling case for protection that Garcia has made. If, on remand, the BIA affirms either the IJ’s award of withholding of removal or the award of CAT relief, the DHS and the Attorney General should swiftly “facilitate [Garcia’s] return to the United States” from El Salvador. See Ramirez v. Sessions, 887 F.3d 693, 706 (4th Cir. 2018) (directing the government to facilitate previously removed petitioner’s return to the United States pursuant to an Immigration and Customs Enforcement Policy Directive). Moreover, if the BIA determines that Garcia’s “presence 24 is necessary for continued administrative removal proceedings” on remand, the authorities should see to his prompt return. Id.
So, after six years bouncing around the system and three separate grants of asylum by an Immigration Judge, the 4th Circuit essentially “begs” the BIA to get it right this time! This is after the court itself curiously denied the respondent’s application for stay notwithstanding the rather obvious risk of irreparable harm (e.g., death, torture) and the equally obvious substance of his timely filed appeal.
What a way to run a “justice system” (or, in this case, not)! Both the Executive and the Judiciary should be totally embarrassed by their gross mishandling of this case! But, I see resolve from neither Branch (nor the ever-absent Legislature) to put an end to this systemic mockery of due process, fundamental fairness, and simple common sense!
Here, discovering the BIA’s error in rejecting Garcia’s proposed social group of “young male family members of his cousin Emily” is no herculean task. Social groups based on family ties have been consistently approved by this Court as providing a sound basis for asylum or withholding of removal applications. See, e.g., Salgado-Sosa, 882 F.3d at 457; Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944, 949 (4th Cir. 2015); Cedillos-Cedillos v. Barr, 962 F.3d 817, 824 (4th Cir. 2020). Indeed, our pivotal 2011 decision on the matter — Crespin-Valladares v. Holder — recognized in no uncertain terms that “the family provides a prototypical example of a particular social group.” See 632 F.3d at 125. In tossing out Garcia’s proposed social group in March 2021, however, the BIA largely disregarded our precedent, providing no citation to or discussion of Crespin-Valladares. The BIA instead relied chiefly on its own then-existing precedent, set forth in the Attorney General’s 2019 L-E-A- II decision. As described above, L-E-A- II — which was vacated by the Attorney General in June 2021 and thus “lacks legal force” — “conflicted with [this Court’s] well-established precedent” recognizing families as cognizable social groups. See Perez Vasquez v. Garland, 4 F.4th 213, 227 n.11 (4th Cir. 2021). Surprisingly, the BIA paid little mind to L-E-A- II’s vacatur in its Reconsideration Order of 2022, doubling down on its earlier “particular social group” ruling and again inexplicably declining to apply Crespin-Valladares and its progeny.7
Notably, the “rule of Crespin-Valledares” — my case where the BIA erroneously reversed me — continues to have an impact! A dozen years post-Crespin and the BIA is still getting it wrong! Why are these guys still on the appellate bench, setting negative precedents and ignoring favorable precedents? In a Dem Administration? Seriously!
Michelle N. Mendez, ESQ Director of Legal Resources and Training National Immigration Project, National Lawyers Guild PHOTO: NIPNLG
My friend Michelle Mendez, Director of Legal Resources and Training over at National Immigration Project offered some commentary on the Second Circuit’s decision in Paucar v. Garland.
Congratulations and thank you for your superb work, Lindsay! This case offers so much and seems like the CA2 delivered.
Here are a couple of excerpts from the decision that stood out to me:
“In a January 14, 2020 written decision, the BIA dismissed Paucar’s appeal and denied his motion to reopen and remand. Three months later—after Paucar filed a petition to review the BIA’s decision in this Court—the BIA sua sponte reinstated Paucar’s appeal and motion, noting that it had not “consider[ed] all of the evidence submitted by [Paucar].” Id. at 124.” [Do we know why the BIA sua sponte reinstated the appeal and motion?] LINDSAY NASH RESPONDS: “The BIA only sua sponte reopened the appeal and motion because Paige Austin (co-counsel extraordinaire, copied here) filed a PFR and identified the missing evidence early on, prompting OIL to agree to a remand.”
“Finally, the BIA concluded that remand to await the adjudication of Paucar’s U visa petition was unnecessary because Paucar could request a stay of removal from USCIS.” [Does anyone know what the BIA was referencing here? Later on the decision says DHS and not USCIS so perhaps it is a typo.] LINDSAY NASH RESPONDS: “I think that the reference to USCIS that you flag was a typo and that it should have said DHS.”
“We conclude that the BIA should have applied the Sanchez Sosa factors in considering Paucar’s motion to remand as it pertains to his U visa or explained its reasoning for not doing so. [This is the first time that the CA2 answers the question of whether Sanchez Sosa applies to motions to remand or reopen filed during the pendency of an appeal where the noncitizen did not previously request such a continuance before the IJ].”
There is a great discussion on the BIA improperly applying Coelho (which they love to throw around in correctly) to the prejudice assessment and a paragraph discussing how the CA2 and other courts of appeals view unpublished BIA decisions.
Again, really great work and outcome! Thanks for sharing with all of us, Dan!
For a case distinguishing Coelho and applying a “reasonable likelihood of success” standard to a MTR, see Matter of L-O-G-, 21 I&N Dec. 436 (BIA 1996), written by me! The BIA ignores it or misapplies it in many cases. But, it’s still “good law!” Just another instance in which the BIA evades “older” precedents that could produce favorable outcomes for respondents!
In this case the IJ denied the respondent’s applications and ordered removal in May 2018, five years ago. Nobody contests that the respondent was ineffectively represented at that time.
Through new pro bono counsel, respondent Paucar filed a timely appeal with the BIA. Less than two months following the IJ’s decision, new counsel filed a copiously documented motion to the BIA to remand for a new hearing because of the ineffective representation.
Rather than promptly granting that motion for a new hearing, the BIA set in motion five years of dilatory effort on their part to avoid providing a hearing. Obviously, several new merits hearings could have been completed during the time occupied by the BIA’s anti-immigrant antics!
Along the way, according to the Second Circuit, the BIA “improperly imposed a heightened standard,” “erred by discounting the impact of counsel’s ineffectiveness,” “improperly relied] on the IJ’s tainted findings,” “overlooked and mischaracterized the record evidence,” “erred by overlooking or mischaracterizing evidence,” “overlooked and mischaracterized material evidence,” and failed, without explanation, “to follow its own precedent.” What else could they have screwed up? The file number?
This would be highly unacceptable performance by ANY tribunal, let alone one entrusted with making life or death decisions about human lives and whose decisions in some instances have been unwisely insulated from effective judicial review by Congress. Individuals appearing before EOIR deserve better! American justice deserves better! How long will AG Garland continue to get away with failing to “clean house” at America’s most dysfunctional court system and bring order, due process, fundamental fairness, legal expertise, and judicial professionalism to this long-overlooked, yet absolutely essential, foundation of our entire U.S. justice system!
Wasting time and resources looking for bogus ways to deny that which better, more expert, fairer judges could easily grant his had a huge negative impact on the EOIR backlog and is a driver of legal dysfunction throughout the immigration bureaucracy, and indeed throughout our entire legal system, all the way up to and including the Supremes!
Start by fixing “that within your control!” That’s a simple message that Dems, unfortunately, don’t seem to get when it comes to immigration, human rights, and racial justice in America!
On June 30, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued a decision that might not have received the attention it deserved. The end result of the court’s published decision in Herrera-Alcala v. Garland was to affirm an Immigration Judge’s denial of asylum based on a lack of credibility.1
But before reaching the merits, the court addressed a jurisdictional issue, and that is where our interest lies. At his removal proceeding, the petitioner was detained at a Louisiana correctional facility, which placed him physically within the territory of the Fifth Circuit. For some reason, the Administrative Control Court (which is where the administrative record for the case was created and maintained, and where documents were filed by the parties) having jurisdiction over that Louisiana correctional facility was in Fort Snelling, Minnesota, which is physically located within the Eighth Circuit’s jurisdiction.
However, the immigration judge who conducted the hearing remotely by video and rendered the decision was sitting at the Immigration Adjudication Center in Falls Church, Virginia, which is within the geographic jurisdiction of the Fourth Circuit. So after the BIA dismissed the petitioner’s appeal, his counsel sought review with the Fourth Circuit. The Department of Justice moved to change venue to the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the petitioner’s location was determinative. And an amicus brief filed by an immigrants’ rights group took the position that venue properly belonged in the Eighth Circuit, where the control court was located.
The Fourth Circuit resolved the question of jurisdiction using the language of the relevant statute. Since 8 U.S.C. section 1252(b)(2) states that the “petition for review shall be filed with the court of appeals for the judicial circuit in which the immigration judge completed the proceedings,” the court interpreted that to mean it is the location of the judge that determines jurisdiction. And as the judge in this case was in Virginia, it found proper jurisdiction to be with the Fourth Circuit.
The decision yields an immediate benefit, as there are presently nineteen Immigration Judges sitting in the two Immigration Adjudication Centers that are located within the Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction (in Falls Church and Richmond, VA). Based on the Fourth Circuit’s ruling, any of the thousands of noncitizens whose cases were heard by one of these Virginia-based judges now have the option of seeking judicial review in the Fourth Circuit.
The impact of this becomes apparent when we look at the BIA’s precedent decision in Matter of L-E-A-.2 In that case, the Board held that the respondent’s family constituted a valid particular social group for asylum purposes, but then denied asylum by finding that a nexus had not been established between that family membership and the feared persecution. In fact, the decision created an unreasonably high standard for nexus in a commonly occurring type of asylum claim. But the decision contains a footnote recognizing that the Fourth Circuit holds a significantly different view of nexus in such cases, adding that L-E-A- did “not arise in the Fourth Circuit.”3
Although the Board doesn’t go as far as saying so, applying Fourth Circuit case law to the facts of L-E-A- would have resulted in a grant of asylum. As I discussed in far greater depth in this blog post in December, the Fourth Circuit has repeatedly reversed the Board on nexus, citing the latter’s error of focusing on why the persecutor targeted the group in question, instead of asking why they targeted the asylum applicant themself. For example, if the group in question is a family, it doesn’t matter if the persecutor is targeting that family for an unprotected reason such as money, revenge, or self-preservation. Per the Fourth Circuit, if the asylum seeker themself wouldn’t be targeted if not for their membership in that family, then nexus has been established, regardless of the reason the family is at risk in the first place.4
In addition to its more favorable take on nexus, the Fourth Circuit is also among the handful of circuits to consider verbal death threats to constitute persecution.5 This is important, because one who has been threatened in those circuits has thus established past persecution, causing burdens of proof regarding future fear and internal relocation to then shift to the government to rebut, and further opening the possibility for humanitarian grants of asylum even where the government meets its burden of rebuttal.6
The Fourth Circuit has also imposed on Immigration Judges a strong obligation under international law to fully develop the record in hearings involving asylum claims, particularly (but not exclusively) where the respondent is pro se, and considers an IJ’s failure to meet this obligation to be “presumptively prejudicial.”7 Any attorney who is representing on appeal an asylum applicant who appeared pro se below where the IJ had been sitting in Virginia might want to review the record to see if the duties imposed by the Fourth Circuit to develop the record, which includes a “broad and robust duty to help pro se asylum seekers articulate their particular social groups,” was satisfied.8
In spite of the above-listed benefits, advocates have identified a potential downside to the ruling in Herrera-Alcala should the Fourth Circuit’s view on jurisdiction be adopted nationwide. To illustrate this concern, I’ll use a hypothetical example arising in a circuit such as the Fourth with a body of case law favorable to asylum applicants. Let’s imagine that after briefing and documenting the claim in line with that circuit’s law, the presiding judge in Baltimore is out sick on the day of the merits hearing. A deserving asylum seeker could have a likely grant of asylum upended if a judge stationed in a jurisdiction with far less favorable case law is enlisted to hear the case by video under EOIR’s “No Dark Courtrooms” policy.9 While the intent behind substituting in a remote judge might be an innocent one, the impact on the asylum seeker of unexpectedly having to overcome a much tougher standard for nexus or a narrower definition of persecution could be devastating, as the Matter of L-E-A- example illustrated.
The Fourth Circuit’s view is presently limited to the Fourth Circuit. But should it come to be the universal rule, while whether a particular circuit will accept jurisdiction over a petition for review is beyond EOIR’s control, the agency may itself still choose which circuit’s case law its own Immigration Judges should apply in individual cases before the Immigration Courts. EOIR would do well to look to the example of USCIS, which advises its asylum officers conducting credible fear interviews that where there is disagreement among the circuits as to the proper interpretation of a legal issue, “generally the interpretation most favorable to the applicant is used when determining whether the applicant meets the credible fear standard.”10
I mentioned above the Fourth Circuit’s recognition of the duty of Immigration Judges to ensure that the record is fully developed in asylum claims. Scholars credit that obligation to the legal requirement on nations to implement treaties in good faith. For example, in discussing the adjudicator’s duty to develop the record in asylum cases, two leading international refugee law scholars explain the duty to implement treaties in good faith as holding states “not simply to ensuring the benefits of the Convention are withhold from persons who are not refugees, but equally to doing whatever is within their ability to ensure recognition of genuine refugees.”11
But shouldn’t that same obligation apply to not only developing the evidence of record, but also to deciding which law to apply when, as in Herrera-Alcala, there is more than one option? If there is an obligation on our government to do everything in its ability to ensure recognition of genuine refugees, then isn’t that obligation breached where an individual sitting in a geographic area in which the law deems her deserving of asylum is then denied protection because the judge being beamed into that courtroom is sitting in a place with less enlightened precedent?
Copyright Jeffrey S. Chase 2022. All rights reserved.
Notes:
Herrera-Alcala v. Garland, Nos. 20-1770, 20-2338, ___ F.4th ___ (4th Cir. June 30, 2022).
See Sorto-Guzman v. Garland, No. 20-1762, ___ F.4th ___ (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2022) (restating the court’s repeated holding that “the ‘threat of death’ qualifies as persecution.”); Bedoya v. Barr, 981 F.3d 240, 246 (4th Cir. 2020) (emphasizing that “under our precedent, as we have repeatedly explained, a threat of death qualifies as past persecution”).
8 C.F.R. §§1208.13(b)(1), 1208.13(b)(3)(ii), and 1208.13(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Matter of D-I-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 448 (BIA 2008); Matter of L-S-, 25 I&N Dec. 705 (BIA 2012).
Arevalo Quintero v. Garland, 998 F.3d 612, 642 (4th Cir. 2021) (italics in original).
Id. at 633.
March 29, 2019 Memo of EOIR Director, “No Dark Courtrooms,” OOD PM 19-11.
USCIS Asylum Division Officer Training Course, Credible Fear of Persecution and Torture Determinations (Feb. 13, 2017), at 17.
James C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status (2d Ed.), Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014, at 119.
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Jeffrey S. Chase is an immigration lawyer in New York City. Jeffrey is a formerImmigration Judge and Senior Legal Advisor at the Board of Immigration Appeals.He is the founder of the Round Table of Former Immigration Judges, which was awarded AILA’s 2019 Advocacy Award.Jeffrey is also a past recipient of AILA’s Pro Bono Award.He sits on the Board of Directors of the Association of Deportation Defense Attorneys, and Central American Legal Assistance.
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At the “Legacy INS,” the acronym for what were then called “Remote Adjudication Centers” was “The RACK” — with good reason! Once upon a time, EOIR went out of the way to emphasize the differences with, and independence from, INS — it ran “courts” not “adjudication centers,” and it was comprised of “judges” NOT “adjudicators.”
Indeed, I can remember a past (in person) IJ National Conference where a senior DOJ official received a rather chilly reception for referring to the IJs in the room as “highly paid immigration examiners who worked for the AG.”
But, times change, and passage of time does not always bring progress. In many important ways EOIR is going backwards. Over the years, particularly 2017-2021, it probably has become more “politicized, compromised, weaponized, and subservient to immigration enforcement” than it was when it operated within the “Legacy INS.” Now, its bloated hierarchical bureaucracy, unmanageable backlogs, lousy public service, and emphasis on “productivity” and carrying out DOJ policies, looks more and more like DHS — the successor to the agency from which it declared “independence” back in 1983. What an unforgivable mess!
As a “vet” of thousands of Televideo Hearings during my 13+ years on the bench at Arlington, I can definitively say that they are inferior to in person hearings, for many reasons. But, sometimes bureaucratic attempts to “depersonalize” justice, cut corners, and achieve bureaucratic goals produce unanticipated outcomes!
Train Dennis Adams, Federal Highway Administration; levels adjustment applied by Hohum Public domain. — Garland’s Deportation Railway retains most of his predecessors’ engineers, conductors, and crew. It’s often slow, unreliable, erratic, and subject to arbitrary unannounced schedule changes. It continues to bypass “Due Processville” and “Fundamental Fairness City.”
Mejia-Velasquez v. Garland, 4th Cir., 02-16-22, published
PANEL: NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
OPINION BY: Judge Niemeyer
DISSENT: Judge Motz
KEY QUOTE FROM DISSENT:
Under the current immigration statutes, DHS has good reason to require applicants for relief from removal to submit fingerprints and other biometrics. But before DHS does so, it must first comply with specified notice obligations. Where, as here, DHS fails to do so, I would not fault the applicant. As the Supreme Court explained in Niz-Chavez, “[i]f men must turn square corners when they deal with the government, it cannot be too much to expect the government to turn square corners when it deals with them.” 141 S. Ct. at 1486.
I respectfully dissent.
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The IJ and the BIA relied on a wrong BIA precedent. The 4th Circuit majority judges recognized its incorrectness, but took OIL’s invitation to fashion another rationale for denying this asylum applicant a hearing on the merits of her life or death claim. While the respondent was represented by counsel, the disputed “warnings” and dialogue relating to the missing biometrics were not translated into Spanish, the only language she understood.
While this case was pending, USCIS finally delivered the long and inexplicably delayed biometrics appointment letter to the respondent. But, that made no difference to a group of judges anxious to railroad her back to Honduras (one of the most dangerous and thoroughly corrupt countries in the hemisphere) without a meaningful chance to be heard.
Of all the Federal Judges who looked at this case over the years, only Judge Motz was interested in providing the respondent a due process hearing on her life-determining claim. The rest evidently were more fixated on creating reasons for NOT hearing her case. With the same amount of judicial and litigation effort, likely less, the respondent probably could have received a due process hearing on the merits of her claim. Additionally, there would have been consequences for the BIA’s defective “good enough for government work” precedent.
Of course, like Garland, none of the exalted judges involved in this disgraceful dereliction of duty have actually represented an asylum applicant in Immigration Court and had to deal with the confusing, convoluted, backlogged, and often notoriously screwed up DHS/EOIR biometrics process. See, e.g., “USCIS Biometrics Appointment Backlog,” https://www.stilt.com/blog/2021/02/biometrics-appointment-backlog/.
I suspect that folks contesting a parking ticket get more consideration in our system than this asylum applicant got from Garland’s unfair and dysfunctional Immigration Courts and the OIL lawyers who defend these mis-handled cases. And, in the world of “refugee roulette,” where human lives are treated like lottery tickets, a different Circuit panel of judges might have joined Judge Motz in getting it right.
The problem starts with EOIR — tribunals that receive deference without earning it through expertise, quality scholarship, and prioritizing due process, fundamental fairness, and best practices. It’s aggravated and multiplied by Garland — an Attorney General indifferent to injustice and the trail of broken lives and dashed hopes left in its wake. And, it’s aided, abetted, and enabled by judges like the panel majority here, who can’t be troubled with the hard work of understanding the consequences of their dilatory approach and demanding fair, competent, and reasonable expert judging from EOIR.
As several of my colleagues have said about the broken, dysfunctional, unfair Immigration Court system, the haphazard review by some Circuit Courts, and the disturbing systemic lack of judicial courage when it comes to fairly applying the Due Process Clause of our Constitution to migrants of color: “The cruelty is the point.”
It’s also worthy of note that the failure of all the Federal Judges, save Judge Motz, to make any meaningful inquiry into the respondent’s clearly expressed fear of return to Honduras appears to violate mandatory requirements for withholding of removal under the INA and international conventions. Perhaps that’s not surprising as Federal Judges have allowed Garland, Mayorkas, and their predecessors to use the transparent pretext of “Title 42” to systemically violate the legal and human rights of refugees at our borders — every day!
It’s also worth putting into context the Biden Administration’s continuing pontification about the human rights of Ughyurs, Afghans, women, and other persecuted minorities, as well as their professed commitment to racial justice in the U.S., which has not been matched by actions. Indeed, the Biden Administration’s actual approach to human rights looks much more like “Miller Lite Time” than it does a courageous, competent, and fair reinstitution of the rule of law!
According to recent reports, many of the Ughyurs and Afghans who were fortunate enough to reach the U.S. and avoid arbitrary “turn backs” at our borders, are now mired in the endless, mindless Mayorkas/Garland bureaucracy that masquerades as an “asylum system” — subject to long waits, missing work authorizations, and sometimes arbitrary and secretive “denials” blasted by human rights advocates. In a functional system these would be the “low hanging fruit” that could rapidly be removed from limbo and given the ability to fully function in our society. But, not in the “Amateur Night at the Bijou” atmosphere fostered by Mayorkas and Garland.
Melody Busey ESQUIRE Associate Attorney Devine & Beard Law Office Charleston, SC PHOTO: Devineandbeard.comIt should have been a 2-minute “no brainer” administrative closing @ EOIR. Instead, it took two years of tough, smart, dedicated litigation by their firm to get justice in Garland’s broken and dysfunctional “Clown Court” system. But, in the end, Melody Busey, Mark Devine, & Ashley Beard got long-overdue justice for their client by pummeling “Garland’s DOJ Clown-ocracy” in the Fourth Circuit! Should justice in America really be this difficult and uncertain? Garland seems to think so! — Mark J. Devine & Ashley R. Beard Principal Partners Devine & Beard Law Office Charleston, SC PHOTO: Devineandbeard.com
Garcia Cabrera v. Garland, 4th Cir., 01-06-21, published
PANEL: MOTZ, QUATTLEBAUM, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
OPINION: Judge Motz
CONCURRING OPINION; Judge Rushing
KEY QUOTE:
In sum, we hold that the BIA and IJ abused their discretion in denying Garcia
Cabrera’s motion for a continuance. Both the BIA and IJ departed from the established policies set forth in precedential opinions in holding that Garcia Cabrera failed to show good cause. Under Matter of L-A-B-R-, the BIA and IJs must consider two factors above all others: (1) the likelihood that USCIS will grant the movant’s U visa application, and (2) whether a U visa would materially affect the outcome of the movant’s deportation proceedings. 27 I. & N. Dec. at 406. Both of these factors weigh in Garcia Cabrera’s favor. The BIA recognized the existence of these factors but failed to consider whether or how they applied, focusing solely on less significant secondary factors. And although the IJ did address the primary factors, he nonetheless abused his discretion by failing to recognize that a U visa would materially affect the outcome of the deportation proceedings.
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Many, many congrats to NDPA stars Melody Busey, Mark J. Devine, and Devine & Beard Law Office in Charleston, SC, for their perseverance and outstanding advocacy in this case! As I’ve said before, it’s painfully obvious (to anyone but Garland and his team) that the wrong folks are on the bench and in key policy positions at EOIR!
Notably, this decision comes from an ideologically diverse 4th Circuit panel with two Trump appointees. Clearly, this panel took more time to understand the record and carefully and correctly analyze the applicable law and policy considerations than did the “faux experts” at EOIR, at either the trial or appellate levels!
Although I don’t always agree with Judge Rushing, her concurring opinion here shows that she took the time to carefully read the record, understand the applicable law, and clearly explain her position in straightforward, understandable terms. In other words, she treated this case like the important life or death matter it is, rather than “just another immigration case on the assembly line.” And, that led her to get the “bottom line” right. That’s a degree of judicial professionalism that we seldom, if ever, see from Garland’s EOIR these days.
That we get better performance on immigration cases from some Trump appointees on the Article IIIs than from Garland’s “wholly-owned EOIR” shows the total disconnect in theBiden Administration’s approach to the ongoing, unmitigated disaster unfolding every day in our broken and dysfunctional Immigration Courts. Unlike the Article IIIs, the Immigration Courts, now sporting an astounding, largely self-created 1.5+ million and growing case backlog, are a “wholly owned subsidiary” of the Administration and Garland’s DOJ!
When you’re in an EOIR “programmed to deny” by White Nationalist nativist overlords like Sessions, Barr, and Miller, you do dumb things and churn out sloppy work.
Indeed, “virtual discussion” of this case spurred some “PTSD” recollections by NDPAattorneys of other horrible, lawless decisions by this particular Immigration Judge, who never should have been on the bench in the first place. Incredibly, this judge, a member of the disgraceful “90% Denial Club” that has helped create disgusting “Asylum Free Zones” at EOIR throughout America, was appointed by the tone-deaf Obama Administration!
The idea that there weren’t better-qualified candidates out there at the time in private practice, the NGOs, clinical education, or even the government is simply preposterous! Failure of Dems to realize the progressive potential of the Immigration Courts has a long and disreputable history! Indeed, EOIR under Garland looks and performs disturbingly similar to EOIR under Miller, Sessions, and Barr!
While this particular IJ has retired, too many other unqualified judges appointed in the past under selection systems stacked against outside advocates and experts remain on the bench, at both the trial and appellate levels, under Garland.
Here’s part of the “Garland Tragedy/Missed Opportunity.” He actually has at least a few folks among his judiciary ranks who have experience and actually understand U visas and how to deal properly, justly, and efficiently with them. I guarantee that none of them would have come up with this inane and wasteful performance of judicial ineptitude and, frankly, anti-immigrant bias!
Why aren’t those folks “running the show” on the BIA, rather than the “deny anything for any reason” holdover gang that (save for Judge Saenz) Garland has “adopted as his.” Excluding Judge Saenz, I doubt that collectively the appellate judges on the BIA have ever handled a U visa case for an applicant. They are blissfully clueless as to both the practical stupidity and traumatic human consequences of the horrible decision-making exhibited at both the trial and appellate levels in this debacle! What’s a wrong with this bizarre picture of Dem incompetence and malfeasance?
Interesting that White Nationalist xenophobes like Sessions, Barr, and Miller had no problem whatsoever using their positions to further lies and myths about asylum seekers and other migrants and acting to weaponize the Immigration Courts (including “packing”them with unqualified and questionably qualified judges, unfairly selected) against individuals and their lawyers seeking justice (following eight years of indolent mismanagement of EOIR by politicos in the Obama DOJ which “teed EOIR up” for Trump and Miller).
By contrast, Dems appear afraid to speak out and act with resolve and purpose on due process, fundamental fairness, human rights, impartial professional expert judging, and human dignity — at our borders and in our Immigration Courts. Why?
Is is because deep down they don’t really believe in racial justice and equal justice for all? Because they can’t accept the humanity of migrants? Why is Garland still carrying out many of Stephen Miller’s White Nationalist policies and using a “court system” unfairly “packed” with those selected because they were perceived to be willing to carry out the Trump/Miller White Nationalist, anti-immigrant agenda?
More than nine months after taking over at “Justice,” why is Garland still defending clearly wrong, counterproductive, and frivolous EOIR decisions like this? Why should simple justice for migrants require a two-year battle by members of the NDPA to be realized?
And, I daresay that there are other panels, in other Circuits, that would have “rubber-stamped” EOIR’s errors. Lack of professionalism and judicial expertise at EOIR, promoted and defended by Garland, breeds wildly inconsistent results and turns justice in life or death cases into a “crap shoot.” That undermines and builds contempt for the entire Federal Justice System and exposes deep flaws at the DOJ that Garland has ignored!
In a functioning system, this case involving someone who is prima facie qualified to remain in the US: 1) should never have been brought by DHS, and 2) if brought, should have been promptly administratively closed or terminated without prejudice by EOIR. A competent judge might also have considered sanctioning DHS counsel for pushing ahead with this case with no justification whatsoever. In other words, conducting frivolous litigation!
That’s how you: 1) cut cases that don’t involve legitimate enforcement issues from the intentionally bloated EOIR docket; 2) reduce incredible, largely self-created backlogs; 3) hold DHS accountable for wasting court time; 4) deliver a long overdue “shape up or ship out” message to poorly performing Immigration Judges (like those in this case) at both the trial and appellate levels; 5) promote consistency and equal justice for all; 6) end the reprehensible practice of “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” at EOIR; and 7) stop wasting the time of the Article IIIs by defending garbage like that churned out at both the IJ and BIA level here!
Garland has demonstrated cluelessness, timidity, and intransigence in all of the foregoing essential areas of long overdue radical, yet common-sense and basically “no brainer,” progressive reforms at EOIR! You can’t get there with the current, holdover BIA! That’s as clear today as it was the day Garland was sworn in as AG.
The Biden Administration’s gross failure to bring progressive leadership, scholarship, competency, quality, and professionalism to a poorly performing, dysfunctional EOIR is corroding our justice system! Seems like an incredibly bad stance for an Administration claiming to be the “last best hope” for preserving American democracy, heading into midterms with a significant portion of its reliable progressive base angry and turned off by its contemptuous mal-performance on immigration, human rights, racial justice, and EOIR reforms!
Sometimes, just asking for financial support and votes isn’t enough! You have to earn it with bold actions!
PANEL: THACKER, RICHARDSON, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.
OPINION BY: JUDGE QUATTLEBAUM
DISSENT: JUDGE RICHARDSON
KEY QUOTE FROM MAJORITY:
Juan Carlos Amaya, a citizen of El Salvador, seeks to avoid deportation to that country, fearing persecution on account of membership in the PSG “former Salvadoran MS-13 members.”1 Appellant’s Br. at 13–16. For that reason, he argued to an immigration judge (“IJ”) that his removal from the United States should be withheld.2 After the IJ denied Amaya’s claims, he appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA dismissed Amaya’s appeal, determining that the “former Salvadoran MS-13 members” PSG was “too diffuse” to satisfy the particularity requirement. J.A. 4. Assuming we must afford Chevron deference to the BIA’s decision, our question is whether we think the BIA’s decision is reasonable. Because we do not, we grant the petition in part and remand on this ground.
***************
Great opinion by Judge A. Marvin QUATTLEBAUM! He’s a Trump appointee whom I’ve criticized in the past. But, his analysis is “spot on” in this case!
Perhaps the Federal Courts are finally catching on to the BIA’s disingenuous “scissors approach” to PSG. That’s used to “cut off” all PSG asylum claims no matter how meritorious.
Here’s how it works. They incorrectly find that almost all “particularized” social groups fail the “social distinction” test. But, when you prove “social distinction,” they wrongly characterize the social group as too “amorphous” or “vague” to be particularized. In that manner, the BIA and many IJs can manipulate the law to reject proper “particular social groups” and keep their White Nationalist anti-asylum “handlers” at the DOJ happy, which also helps them retain their positions.
It will be interesting to see how that works out for them if, as many of us have recommended, Judge Garland actually puts some Appellate Judges on the BIA who understand asylum law and start applying it fairly, correctly, and in accordance with due process?
In making EOIR appointments, the Obama Administration generally eschewed the “best and brightest” with expertise representing asylum seekers and applying the UN Convention and the Refugee Act of 1980 in accordance with their humanitarian intent, rather as ways to advance a restrictionist agenda of deterring asylum seekers by wrongfully denying their claims. After all, how many asylum seekers are fortunate enough to have a good lawyer like Abdoul Aziz Konare represent them in their asylum cases? Not very many!
No, the average asylum seeker, many in detention and without adequate access to counsel or research materials, gets railroaded out with gobbledegook like “Chevron deference,” too “amorphous,” not “socially visible” and citations to cases even experienced Federal Judges often don’t correctly understand. So, getting asylum tends to depend not so much on the strength of your claim (many of which should be pretty easily grantable unless the IJ is “programmed to deny” — the norm these days), but on your lawyer, your IJ, and whether you are fortunate enough to have access to a thoughtful Article III judge like Judge Quattlebaum in this case. He took the time to figure out the bogus nature of the DOJ’s standard “BS arguments.”
Unfortunately, many Federal Judges would have just “punted” by accepting the “Chevron deference” argument for a “quick kill” without the need for much thought or analysis. After all, Court of Appeals Judges also like to “keep their dockets moving” and what easier victim to “throw under the bus” than an asylum applicant who is going to be deported to a place where he or she will be too busy fighting to stay alive to reflect on the deteriorating quality and lack of concern for fairness in the U.S. Judicial system.
The Trump kakistocracy actually went a long way toward convincing the world that the once widely admired U.S. Justice system is now little more than a “third world sham” — controlled by nationalist politicos, programmed to reject, deny, dehumanize, and operated largely for the exclusive benefit of the rich white ruling class.
I hope that “Team Garland” will “End the EOIR Clown Show” 🤡 and restore integrity to our system. But, so far, it bumbles along chewing up and spitting out hope, humanity, and lives, while mocking any normal understanding of “justice” on a daily basis. Not something I’d want on my watch!
The BIA fatally erred in deciding that Officer Bedoya had not established past persecution because the various threats were merely “written” and because Bedoya was never physically approached by FARC members. See Zavaleta-Policiano, 873 F.3d at 247; Crespin-Valladares, 632 F.3d at 126-27. We have recognized that “the threat of death alone constitutes persecution,” see Tairou v. Whitaker, 909 F.3d 702, 708 (4th Cir. 2018), and we have never required that a petitioner be physically harmed or personally approached
10
in order for the threats to qualify as persecution.4 Moreover, our precedents in Zavaleta- Policiano and Crespin-Valladares demonstrate that death threats may be written. Indeed, written home-delivered death threats and text messages can easily be more menacing than verbal threats, in that they show that the writer and sender knows where his target lives and the relevant personal cellphone number.
The BIA also emphasized the period of time between the threats that Officer Bedoya received in 1996 and those he received in 2013. That period, however, is not dispositive of Bedoya’s asylum claim, in that he has clearly shown past persecution on the basis of the threats he received in 2013. The earlier incident in 1996 — where Bedoya’s friend Correa was killed for trying to protect Bedoya from FARC — simply bolsters Bedoya’s asylum claim and highlights FARC’s “penchant for extracting vengeance.” See Crespin-Valladares, 632 F.3d at 126-27. Moreover, if FARC is targeting former Colombian police officers for their past actions, there is inevitably going to be a time gap between the actions of such officers and when an officer retires.
In sum, Officer Bedoya received multiple threats of death and harm to himself and his family, and the BIA’s determination that Bedoya had not suffered past persecution was manifestly contrary to the law and constituted an abuse of discretion. See Tairou, 909 F.3d
4 Notably, in a recent unpublished opinion, we emphasized that “[w] Lopez-Orellana v. Whitaker, 757 F. App’x 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2018).
11
e have never
adopted a requirement that an [asylum] applicant suffer physical harm [in order] to show
past persecution.” See
at 708; Crespin Valladares, 632 F.3d at 126. We therefore reverse the BIA’s ruling that Bedoya failed to establish that he was subject to past persecution.
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Notably, the key 4th Circuit precedent that the BIA ignored here, Crespin-Valadares v. Holder, was my case at the Arlington Immigration Court. I had granted asylum, the BIA reversed me, and the 4th Circuit reversed the BIA. In other words, I was right and the BIA was wrong! But hey, who’s keeping score?
The continuing abuses by the BIA of asylum law and controlling Circuit precedents favoring asylum grants is in the “when will they ever learn” category. Instead of carefully and forcefully building a body of case law amplifying Crespin-Valladares and applying it broadly to insure more expeditious asylum grants at the “retail level” of our system — the Asylum Office and the Immigration Courts — the BIA insists on the illegal (not to mention immoral) “any reason to deny” approach improperly promoted by White Nationalist racist restrictionist AGs Sessions & Barr.
EOIR could function, as it was intended, as a model of scholarship, due process, fundamental fairness, and equal justice insuring the granting of the generous protection described by the Supreme Court in Cardoza in many more cases. EOIR could become a model of humane, practical, efficient, best practices jurisprudence that would reduce dockets by promoting correct results at the Asylum Office and trial levels and taking pressure off of the Circuit Courts by minimizing improper denials of relief that engender unnecessary litigation.
But, that’s not going to happen until the current group of deficient, biased EOIR Executives and BIA Judges is replaced by qualified “practical scholars” from the NDPA who are experts in asylum law and will ensure that necessary, life-saving protection is granted wherever possible.
The Fourth Circuit also has stomped Gonzo’s illegal and unethical interference with Immigration Judges’ authority to manage their dockets isn a previous very forceful rejection Castro-Tum:
“GONZO APOCALYPTO” SLAMMED: UNANIMOUS PANEL OF 4TH CIR. REJECTS MATTER OF CASTO-TUM — Exposes Irrationality Of Biased, Unqualified Restrictionist Former AG — “ADR” Outed— “Although one of its purported concerns is efficient and timely administration of immigration proceedings, it would in fact serve to lengthen and delay many of these proceedings by: (1) depriving IJs and the BIA of flexible docketing measures sometimes required for adjudication of an immigration proceeding, as illustrated by Avetisyan, and (2) leading to the reopening of over 330,000 cases upon the motion of either party, straining the burden on immigration courts that Castro-Tum purports to alleviate.”
ZUNIGA ROMERO V. BARR, NO. 18-1850, 4th Cir., 08-29-19, published
PANEL: AGEE, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
OPINION BY: Judge Agee
KEY QUOTE:
In the absence of Auer deference, the weight given to a BIA decision “hinges on the thoroughness evident in [the BIA’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade”—that is, whether the interpretation should be afforded Skidmore deference. Zavaleta–Policiano v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 241, 246 n.2 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). And here, a court reviewing Castro-Tum for Skidmore deference would not be persuaded to adopt the agency’s own interpretation of its regulation for substantially the same reasons it is not entitled to Auer deference: because it represents a stark departure, without notice, from long-used practice and thereby cannot be deemed consistent with earlier and later pronouncements. As a result, it lacks the “power to persuade.” Id.; see also Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2427 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (contending that an agency interpretation of a regulation should as an initial matter be “entitled only to a weight proportional to ‘the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade’” (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140)). Put another way, even under the view set forth by Justice Gorsuch in Kisor, the Attorney General’s interpretation would amount to a failure of proof because the evidence—that is, Castro- Tum—comes too late in the game.
*** *
In sum, the result is that 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) unambiguously confer upon IJs and the BIA the general authority to administratively close cases such that the BIA’s decision should be vacated and remanded.
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A huge victory for the “New Due Process Army.” The “Roundtable of Former Immigration Judges” actually filed an amicus brief before Sessions in Castro-Tum raising many of the points found determinative by the Fourth Circuit. Our brief was, of course, ignored by “Gonzo,” who undoubtedly had already drafted his decision along the lines dictated to him by some restrictionist interest group.
Finally, an Article III Court “gets” how the DOJ under the Trump Administration is promoting “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” (“ADR”) in an attempt to build the backlog, destroy the system, blame the victims (respondents and their, largely pro bono, attorneys), and dishonestly call upon GOP Legislators to mount a pernicious attack on constitutional Due Process by statute!
The idea that adding 330,000 cases to the already backlogged Immigration Courts was legally required or a good policy idea clearly is a piece of White Nationalist restrictionist propaganda promoted by corrupt public officials like Miller, Sessions, and Barr.
With the Democrats in control of the House, there is no way that Congress will eliminate “Administrative Closing” by statute. And, while the DOJ under the sycophantic Barr might try to change the regulation, this decision makes it very clear that there is no rational basis for doing so. Therefore, any future regulation change is likely to be tied up in litigation in the Article III Courts for years, adding to the confusion and ADR, as well as threatening to immobilize the Article III Courts.
Unless the Article III Courts want their dockets to be totally swamped with immigration appeals, the answer is to end this unconstitutional system administered by an Attorney General clearly unfit to act in a quasi-judicial capacity and place the Immigration Courts under a court-appointed independent “Special Master” to insure fairness, impartiality, and other aspects of Due Process until Congress fixes the glaring Constitutional defect by creating an independent U.S. Immigration Court outside of the DOJ.
PWS
08-29-19
When, oh when, will the Circuit Courts finally put an end to this clearly unconstitutional nonsense and never-ending exhibition of malicious incompetence called EOIR. Taking it apart piece by rotten piece is both wasteful of judicial resources and highly unfair to the many individuals prevented by EOIR’s systematic misconduct and a biased system from even reaching the Courts of Appeals.
OPINION BY:Judge King, joined by Chief Judge Gregory and Judges Motz, Keenan, Wynn, Diaz, Floyd, Thacker, and Harris
DISSENTING OPINION: Judge Quattlebaum, in which Judges Wilkinson, Niemeyer, Agee, Richardson, and Rushing joined.
KEY QUOTES:
Felipe sought judicial review of the Agency’s rejection of his SIJ application, initiating these proceedings in October 2016 in the Western District of North Carolina against the Director of USCIS.1 In March 2018, the federal district court denied Felipe’s motion to set aside the Agency’s final action and granted the summary judgment motion of USCIS. Felipe then timely noted this appeal from the judgment of the district court. Unlike that court, we conclude that the Agency’s interpretation of the SIJ provision — that clause (i) requires a permanent custody order — is entitled to no deference, defies the plain statutory language, and impermissibly intrudes into issues of state domestic relations law. Consequently, we reverse the judgment and remand with instructions to grant Felipe’s motion to set aside the Agency’s final action denying him SIJ status.
. . . .
Perhaps the most egregious aspect of the dissent is that it accuses us of “plac[ing] this Court’s stamp of approval on a brazen scheme to game our federal immigration system.” See post 32. That is, despite the lack of any determination from the North
Carolina district court or even from USCIS that Felipe has acted dishonestly or corruptly, 27
the dissent boldly declares that Felipe engaged in an “obvious manipulation of the state juvenile court to circumvent federal immigration laws.” See id. The dissent specifically finds that Felipe “used, at best, dubious claims of an emergency to obtain an ex parte order at a time close enough to his eighteenth birthday that the order would never receive a proper review.” See id. And, as if it demonstrates bad intent, the dissent points to the request in Mateo Perez Perez’s complaint for custody of his brother Felipe “that the North Carolina court make the precise findings that would permit [Felipe] to apply for SIJ status and then apply for a permanent visa to remain in the United States.” See id. at 34 (commenting that the “benefits [of obtaining SIJ status] were far from lost on [Felipe]”).
The dissent’s endeavor to demonize Felipe is wholly inappropriate, unfair, and dispiriting. First of all, the principle “that appellate courts do not make factual findings” is an “axiomatic” one. See Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp., 599 F.3d 403, 419 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Columbus-Am. Discovery Grp. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 56 F.3d 556, 575-76 (4th Cir. 1995) (“It is a basic tenet of our legal system that, although appellate courts often review facts found by a judge or jury . . . , they do not make such findings in the first instance.”)). The dissent’s fact finding is particularly objectionable here because it tramples upon the exclusive authority of the North Carolina district court to adjudicate Felipe’s custody. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 656 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasizing that “domestic relations is an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Ojo v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 533, 539 (4th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “it is well understood that, in
28
the United States, our various state courts exercise full authority over the judicial act of adoption”).
Furthermore, the dissent’s theory that Felipe acted dishonestly and corruptly is in no way compelled by the record. Indeed, many of the adverse inferences that the dissent draws against Felipe are patently unreasonable. For example, without acknowledging that Mateo filed his complaint for custody of Felipe nearly six months before Felipe turned eighteen, the dissent finds that Felipe plotted to obtain an unreviewable emergency custody order from the North Carolina district court within days of his eighteenth birthday. And although Felipe was required by federal regulation to submit to USCIS a state juvenile court order containing findings necessary to his SIJ application, see 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(d)(2), the dissent negatively cites the request for those findings made in Mateo’s complaint for custody of Felipe. The dissent even maligns Felipe for appreciating the benefits of SIJ status, as if a mere desire to live in the United States is evidence of immigration fraud.
There is no justification for the dissent’s dismal portrait of Felipe. The North Carolina district court certainly did not indicate that it thought itself manipulated in the custody proceedings, and USCIS did not attribute its rejection of Felipe’s SIJ application to any chicanery. Rather, the state court gave every indication it believed that Felipe was the victim of abuse, neglect, and abandonment by his biological parents in Guatemala and that placing him in the custody of Mateo was in Felipe’s best interests. Thereafter, USCIS denied Felipe SIJ status solely because he lacked the type of custody order — a permanent one — that the Agency has interpreted clause (i) of the SIJ provision to require. All we 29 say today is that, because USCIS’s clause (i) interpretation is not in accordance with law, the Agency must take another look at Felipe’s SIJ application.8
KEY QUOTE FROM THE DISSENT:
Finally, in addition to suffering from the legal deficiencies described above, I fear
our decision will have serious and far reaching ramifications. First, in adopting Perez’s arguments, we sanction a scheme to game United States immigration laws. As noted above, Perez’s brother alleged to a court of law and either Perez or his brother swore in an affidavit that temporary emergency custody of Perez was needed to protect Perez from imminent, serious physical harm from Perez’s parents. But at the time the motion containing this allegation and the supporting affidavit were filed, his parents were still in Guatemala. In
other words, Perez had been in the United States, over 2,700 miles from his parents, for 47
over a year. When asked by the panel at oral argument the basis of the purported emergency, counsel for Perez was unable to provide any explanation. He likewise provided none before the entire court sitting en banc. No one, at any time, has articulated any sort of emergency.3
If there was an actual emergency, one would expect Perez’s brother to have filed the motion for an emergency order at the time the complaint was filed, or even sooner. But he did not do so. Instead, he waited until June 2015, just weeks before Perez turned eighteen, to file the motion.4 By doing so, Perez was able to obtain the ex parte, emergency order without any meaningful examination of the allegations since the parents had no way to know the motion was even filed. And since Perez was about to turn eighteen on July 6, Perez and his brother knew the July 22, 2015 hearing the state court ordered would never happen. Perez’s scheme makes a mockery of the immigration laws passed by Congress. What’s more, by sanctioning this scheme, we are sending the clear message: Gaming the federal laws is fine with us. Keep doing it.
In insisting the record does not support my characterization of Perez’s conduct, the majority invokes John Adams’ famous reminder that “facts are stubborn things.” Indeed
3 The language cited by the majority at pages 6-7 of its opinion refer to circumstances that allegedly existed when Perez lived in Guatemala. Even if true, they offer no basis for an emergency, ex parte order hearing a year and a half after Perez left Guatemala and came to the United States.
4 Perez flip-flopped on this issue at the en banc oral argument. He first suggested that he promptly filed the motion and the delay was due to the slow pace of the North Carolina court. When pressed, however, he conceded that he had not filed the motion until six months later, in June.
48
they are. The fact here is that the purported emergency on which Perez’s motion was based involves events that occurred years ago and thousands of miles away. J.A. 116-117. The fact here is that Perez’s brother waited until just before Perez turned eighteen to seek emergency relief. J.A. 88, 127. The fact here is that Perez’s brother sought emergency custody of Perez without providing any notice to their parents in Guatemala. J.A. 88-89, 129-130. The fact here is that the order on which Perez’s SIJ petition was based only preserved the status quo until a hearing with due process rights could be held. J.A. 130. All these facts are plainly in the record, and my good colleagues in the majority do not suggest otherwise. They simply come to a different, and in my view implausible, conclusion about them.5
5 In considering whether Perez’s conduct is part of a scheme to game our immigration laws, I note the remarkable similarities between the facts here and those of Reyes v. Cissna, 737 F. App’x 140 (4th Cir. 2018). There, Reyes lived with her grandparents from the time she was eleven until she was sixteen. Id. at 142. At age sixteen, she entered the United States unlawfully, was apprehended and, pending a removal hearing, was moved to North Carolina where her father lived. Id. Almost two years later, and four days before Reyes’ eighteenth birthday, Reyes’ father, represented by the same lawyers as Perez, filed an action in North Carolina state court to terminate the parental rights of Reyes’ mother. Id. Reyes’ father also filed a motion seeking emergency custody of Reyes because Reyes had been abandoned by her mother. Reyes’ father claimed he should be awarded custody of Reyes on an emergency basis even though the alleged abandonment took place seven years earlier when Reyes was eleven and even though Reyes lived with her grandparents from that time until she came to the United States illegally. The North Carolina state court granted the emergency relief and set a hearing just five days later to determine custody. Id. at 143. Like our case, however, Reyes turned eighteen just before the hearing, depriving the North Carolina state court of jurisdiction to make a custody determination. Despite that, Reyes used the emergency order, obtained without any due process provided to her mother, to petition for federal SIJ benefits. Id. at 143. Sound familiar?
49
Second, our decision effectively transfers much of the responsibility of determining eligibility for SIJ benefits from the Agency—which is where Congress placed it—to state juvenile courts. In doing this, we pave the way for immigrants to seek orders from state juvenile courts in order to gain an immigration advantage. I agree that, as a general rule, neither federal agencies nor federal courts should wade into the waters of state domestic relations law. But the Agency did not make any state domestic relations law determinations. And giving appropriate respect to state courts in the area of domestic relations does not mean that the Agency must abdicate its role, rubber stamp a barebones set of “findings” or ignore the circumstances of an SIJ submission. Certainly nothing in the INA suggests that result.
Third, beyond the damage to our immigration laws, this scheme and our approval of it marginalizes the importance of parents having custody over their children. Our decision approves a scheme that terminated the custodial rights of Perez’s parents without a scintilla of due process. Here, although North Carolina law requires notice and a hearing for a custody determination, Perez made an end run around that requirement with his dubious claim of emergency. And although an emergency order normally only holds the status quo in place until a hearing of which all parties receive notice and are given an opportunity to be heard, Perez’s strategic timing of the emergency motion in relation to his eighteenth birthday assured that hearing would not take place. Then, the INA and its accompanying regulations, which assume that the state court order would have been carried out with due process protections, do not require the parents to be notified of the SIJ petition.
50
Perez’s scheme, like a thief in the night, terminates his parents’ custodial rights without the parents even knowing.
Last, these results would be bad enough if they affected American citizens. But here, courts in the United States are being used to eviscerate the rights of citizens of Guatemala whose parental rights should be governed by the laws of that country. Imagine the outrage we would rightly feel if another country’s courts terminated the custodial rights of American citizen parents over an American child. International comity means nothing if these schemes are endorsed.
******************************
I had significant experience with SIJS during my 13 years on the bench in Arlington. I also worked some on enactment of the original SIJS law that was part of IMMACT 90 during my days in private practice.
Leaving aside the facts of this particular case, whatever they might be, I found SIJS to be a “life saver” for many deserving young people who might well have been severely harmed or abused, perhaps killed or forced to “join gangs or die,” if returned to their home countries.
Some of them were individuals who should have been granted asylum, but were improperly excluded from that relief by intentional misinterpretations of asylum law directed against refugees from Central America which predated this Administration; such injustices obviously have been aggravated by the the Trump/Miller shameless White Nationalist agenda now being directed at asylum seekers of color, all too often with the wooden approval of life-tenured appellate judges who should know better.
PANEL: GREGORY, Chief Judge, and DIAZ and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
OPINION BY: PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge
KEY QUOTE:
Sindy Marilu Alvarez Lagos testified credibly that she and her then-seven-year-old daughter, natives and citizens of Honduras, were threatened with gang rape, genital mutilation, and death if they did not comply with the extortionate demands of a Barrio 18 gang member. Unable to meet those demands and fearing for their lives, Alvarez Lagos and her daughter fled to the United States, where they sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.
Now, almost five years later, an immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals have issued a total of three separate decisions denying Alvarez Lagos’s claims. The government defends none of those decisions, including the most recent, which came after we agreed, at the government’s request, to remand the case for reconsideration. Instead, the government admits that errors remain, but argues that we should leave them unaddressed and simply remand once again so that the agency may have a fourth opportunity to analyze Alvarez Lagos’s claims correctly.
We decline that request. A remand is required here on certain questions that have yet to be answered, or answered fully, by the agency. But we take this opportunity to review the agency’s disposition of other elements of Alvarez Lagos’s claims. For the reasons given below, we reverse the agency’s determination with respect to the “nexus” requirement for asylum and withholding of removal. And so that they will not recur on remand, we identify additional errors in the agency’s analysis of the “protected ground” requirement for the same forms of relief, and in the agency’s treatment of Alvarez Lagos’s claim under the Convention Against Torture.
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It’s partially on the Article IIIs. Great decision in many ways. But, this type of injustice occurs daily in our unconstitutional U.S. Immigration Courts. How many Central American asylum applicants get this type of representation—Steve Shulman of Akin Gump for a pro bono lawyer, Tom Boerman as an expert? Not very many.
How many can be this persistent, particularly if detained or sent to Mexico to wait? Almost none! I think that if these respondents were in “Return to Mexico” they would have long ago been forced to give up and accept “Death Upon Return.”
This case should have been a “no brainer grant” five years ago. Could have been done at an Asylum Office (under a more rational system) or by DHS stipulation. THIS abuse of the legal system and gross waste of public resources by DHS and DOJ is the reason why we have unmanageable Immigration Court backlogs, not because asylum applicants and their representatives assert their legal rights.
The Office of Immigration Litigation (“OIL”) didn’t even bother to defend any of the EOIR actions here! So, after five years why is it “Due Process” for the Fourth Circuit to give the BIA yet another opportunity to come up with bogus reasons to deny asylum.
An Article III Court fulfilling its oath to uphold the laws and Constitution could have ordered this case to be granted and either exercised contempt authority against those at DOJ responsible for this mess or ordered an independent investigation into the judicial incompetence and bias evident here. At the least, the court should have removed any judge having had a role in this abomination from any future proceedings involving these respondents.
Cases such good as this also illustrate the continuing dereliction of duty by Article III Courts who continue to “go along top get along” with the absurdly unconstitutional position that unrepresented asylum applicants can receive “Due Process” in today’s overtly unfair and biased Immigration Courts. The Due Process clause applies to all persons in the U.S., and the right to a fair asylum hearing exceeds the rights at stake in 98% of the civil litigation and most of the criminal litigation in the Federal Courts. If the Article III Courts actually viewed asylum applicants as “persons,” that is “fellow human beings,” rather than dehumanized “aliens,” this farce would have ended decades ago! Folks represented by Steve Schulman and Akin Gump can’t get a “fair shake” from EOIR; what chance does any unrepresented applicant have?
You reap what you sow, and what goes around comes around! If Article III Courts want to be taken seriously and respected, they must step up to the plate and stop the systematic bias against asylum applicants (particularly women and children from Central America) and the abuses like this occurring every day in our unconstitutional U.S. Immigration Courts!
History is watching and making a record, even if those wronged by the Article IIIs all too often don’t survive or aren’t in a position to confront them with their dereliction of legal duties and the obligations human beings owe to each other.
In reviewing such decisions, we treat factual findings “as conclusive unless the evidence was such that any reasonable adjudicator would have been compelled to a contrary view,” and we uphold the agency’s determinations “unless they are manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion.” Tassi v. Holder, 660 F.3d 710, 719 (4th Cir. 2011). These standards demand deference, but they do not render our review toothless. The agency “abuse[s] its discretion if it fail[s] to offer a reasoned explanation for its decision, or if it distort[s] or disregard[s] important aspects of the applicant’s claim.” Id.; accord Zavaleta-Policiano, 873 F.3d at 247.
Orellana contends that the IJ and the BIA did precisely this in their reasoning as to whether the Salvadoran government was willing and able to protect her.3 We must agree. Examination of the record demonstrates that the agency adjudicators erred in their treatment of the evidence presented. Here, as in Tassi and Zavaleta-Policiano, the agency adjudicators both disregarded and distorted important aspects of the applicant’s claim.
First, agency adjudicators repeatedly failed to offer “specific, cogent reason[s]” for disregarding the concededly credible, significant, and unrebutted evidence that Orellana provided. Tassi, 660 F.3d at 722; accord Ai Hua Chen, 742 F.3d at 179. For example,
3 Orellana also contends that the BIA failed to conduct separate inquiries into the Salvadoran government’s “willingness” to protect her and its “ability” to do so. See Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 506 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding legal error where the BIA considered a government’s efforts at offering protection without “examin[ing] the efficacy of those efforts”). After careful review of the record, we must reject this contention. The BIA applied the proper legal framework. It treated “willingness” and “ability” as distinct legal concepts, and it sufficiently addressed each in its order.
9
Orellana testified that during her third attempt to obtain a protective order in 2009, the Salvadoran family court refused to offer aid and instead directed her to the police station, which also turned her away. Yet the IJ gave this evidence no weight.
The IJ declined to do so on the theory that it was “unclear and confusing as to why exactly she was not able to get assistance from either the police or the court during these times.” But the record offers no evidence to support the view that the Salvadoran government officials had good reason for denying Orellana all assistance. Cf. Tassi, 660 F.3d at 720 (requiring agency to “offer a specific, cogent reason for rejecting evidence” as not credible). Rather, Orellana offered the only evidence of their possible motive aside from the family court officials’ claim that they were “too busy” — namely, uncontroverted expert evidence that “[d]iscriminatory gender biases are prevalent among [Salvadoran] government authorities responsible for providing legal protection to women.”
Nor did the IJ or the BIA address Orellana’s testimony, which the IJ expressly found credible, that she called the police “many times” during a twelve-year period, calls to which the police often did not respond at all. This testimony, too, was uncontroverted. To “arbitrarily ignore[]” this “unrebutted, legally significant evidence” and focus only on the isolated instances where police did respond constitutes an abuse of discretion.Zavaleta-Policiano, 873 F.3d at 248 (quoting Baharon v. Holder, 588 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 2009)); accord Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 951 (“[A]n IJ is not entitled to ignore an asylum applicant’s testimony in making . . . factual findings.”).
10
The agency’s analysis also “distorted” the record evidence concerning the instances of government involvement. Tassi, 660 F.3d at 719. For example, although the IJ accepted as credible Orellana’s testimony that Salvadoran family court employees rebuffed her third request for a protective order because “they were too busy” and suggested that she try again another day, the IJ inexplicably concluded from this testimony that Salvadoran family court employees “offered continued assistance” to Orellana. The IJ similarly distorted the record in finding that, in 2006, “the [family] court in El Salvador acted on [Orellana’s] behalf” when it took no action against Garcia, and in finding that, in 2009, a different Salvadoran court “attempted to assist” Orellana bydenying her the protective order that she requested.
Despite these errors, the Government asserts three reasons why the BIA’s order assertedly finds substantial evidentiary support in the record. None are persuasive.
First, the Government argues that Orellana’s own testimony established that she had “access to legal remedies” in El Salvador. But access to a nominal or ineffectual remedy does not constitute “meaningful recourse,” for the foreign government must be both willing and able to offer an applicant protection. Rahimzadeh v. Holder, 613 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2010). As the Second Circuit has explained, when an applicant offers unrebutted evidence that “despite repeated reports of violence to the police, no significant action was taken on [her] behalf,” she has provided “ample ground” to conclude “that the BIA was not supported by substantial evidence in its finding that [she] did not show that the government was unwilling to protect [her] from private persecution.” Aliyev v.
Mukasey, 549 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2008). Evidence of empty or token “assistance” 11
cannot serve as the basis of a finding that a foreign government is willing and able to protect an asylum seeker.
Second, the Government contends that Orellana cannot show that the Salvadoran government is unable or unwilling to protect her because she did not report her abuse until 1999 and later abandoned the legal process. But Orellana’s initial endurance of Garcia’s abuse surely does not prove the availability of government protection during the decade-long period that followed, during which time she did seek the assistance of the Salvadoran government without success. As to Orellana’s asserted abandonment of the Salvadoran legal process, we agree with the Government that an applicant who relinquishes a protective process without good reason will generally be unable to prove her government’s unwillingness or inability to protect her. But there is no requirement that an applicant persist in seeking government assistance when doing so (1) “would have been futile” or (2) “have subjected [her] to further abuse.” Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, Orellana offered undisputed evidence of both.
Finally, the Government suggests that even if the Salvadoran government had previously been unwilling or unable to help Orellana, country conditions had changed by 2009 such that she could receive meaningful protection. Because the agency never asserted this as a justification for its order, principles of administrative law bar us from
12
dismissing the petition on this basis. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94–95 (1943).4
We have often explained that an applicant for asylum is “entitled to know” that agency adjudicators “reviewed all [her] evidence, understood it, and had a cogent, articulable basis for its determination that [her] evidence was insufficient.” Rodriguez- Arias v. Whitaker, 915 F.3d 968, 975 (4th Cir. 2019); accord, e.g., Baharon, 588 F.3d at 233 (“Those who flee persecution and seek refuge under our laws have the right to know that the evidence they present . . . will be fairly considered and weighed by those who decide their fate.”). That did not happen here.
We therefore vacate the order denying Orellana asylum.5 On remand, the agency must consider the relevant, credible record evidence and articulate the basis for its decision to grant or deny relief.
This is how “malicious incompetence” builds backlog. This case has been pending since March 2011, more than eight years.It has been before an Immigration Judge twice, the BIA three times, and the Fourth Circuit twice. Yet, after eight years, three courts, seven judicial decisions, and perhaps as many as 17 individual judges involved, nobody has yet gotten it right! This is a straightforward “no brainer” asylum grant!
However, the Fourth Circuit, rather than putting an end to this continuing judicial farce, remands to the BIA who undoubtedly will remand to the Immigration Judge. Who knows how many more years, hearings, and incorrect decisions will go by before this respondent actually gets the justice to which she is entitled?
Or maybe she won’t get justice at all. Who knows what the next batch of judges will do? And, even ifthe respondent “wins,” is getting asylum approximately a decade after it should have been granted really “justice?” This respondent actually could and should be a U.S. citizen by now!
To make things worse, although the DHS originally agreed that most of the facts, the “particular social group,” as well as “nexus” were “uncontested,” now, after eight years of litigating on that basis, likely spurred by Session’s White Nationalist unethical attack on the system in Matter of A-B-, the DHS apparently intends to “contest” the previously stipulated particular social group.
Rather than putting an end to this nonsense and sanctioning the Government lawyers involved for unethical conduct and delay, the Fourth Circuit merely “notes in passing,” thereby inviting further delay and abuse of the asylum system by the DHS and EOIR.
This well-documented, clearly meritorious case should have been granted by the Immigration Judge, in a short hearing, back in March 2013, and the DHS should have (and probably would have, had the Immigration Judge acted properly) waived appeal.
Indeed, in a functional system, there would be a mechanism for trained Asylum Officers to grant these cases expeditiously without even sending them to Immigration Court.
The bias, incompetence, and mismanagement of the Immigration Court system, and the unwarranted tolerance by the Article III Courts, even those who see what is really happening, is what has sent the system out of control
Don’t let the Administration, Congress, the courts, or anyone else blame the victims of this governmental and judicial misbehavior — the asylum seekers and their lawyers, who are intentionally being dehumanized, demeaned, and denied justice in a system clearly designed to screw asylum seekers, particularly women fleeing persecution from the Northern Triangle!
We don’t need a change in asylum law.We need better judges and better administration of the Asylum Office, as well as some professionalism, sanity, and discipline from ICE and CBP about what cases they choose to place in an already overtaxed system.
That’s why it’s critical for advocates not to let the Article IIIs “off the hook” when they improperly “defer” to a bogus system that currently does not merit any deference, rather than exposing the misfeasance in this system and forcing it to finally comply with Constitutional Due Process of law.
While the statute says Article III Courts should “defer” to fact findings below, such deference should be “one and done.” In cases such as this, where EOIR has already gotten it wrong (here five times at two levels), Due Process should require “enhanced scrutiny” by the Article IIIs.
It’s welcome to get a correct published analysis from an Article III.
But, as noted by the Fourth Circuit, this is at least the third time the BIA has ignored the Fourth Circuit’s published precedents by “disregarding and distorting” material elements of a respondent’s claim. There is a name for such conduct: fraud.
Yet, the Fourth Circuit seems unwilling to confront either the BIA or their apologists at the Office of Immigration Litigation (“OIL”) for their unethical, incompetent, frivolous, and frankly, contemptuous behavior.
That’s why it’s absolutely critical for the advocacy community (the “New Due Process Army”) to keep pushing cases like this into the Article III Courts and forcing them to confront their own unduly permissive attitude toward the BIA which is helping to destroy our system of justice.
And, if the Article IIIs don’t get some backbone and creativity and start pushing back against the corrupt mess at EOIR, they will soon find the gross backlogs caused by “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” and “malicious incompetence” will be transferring to their dockets from EOIR.
Due Process Forever; complicity in the face of “malicious incompetence,” never!
Jimenez-Cedillo v. Sessions – “Pedro Josue Jimenez-Cedillo, a native and citizen of Mexico, was ordered removed from the United States after the Board of Immigration Appeals determined that sexual solicitation of a minor in Maryland, to which Jimenez-Cedillo pled guilty, is a crime involving moral turpitude. Under Maryland law, sexual solicitation of a minor does not require that the perpetrator know the victim’s age. And before this case, under Board of Immigration Appeals precedent, a sexual offense against a child categorically involved moral turpitude only if the perpetrator knew or should have known that the victim was a minor. Because the Board failed to explain its change in position, we grant Jimenez-Cedillo’s petition for review and remand for further proceedings. … Here, we are without a reasoned explanation from the Board for its change in position. … Because the Board’s “path” from the Silva-Trevino cases to Jimenez-Cedillo’s cannot “reasonably be discerned,” its decision is arbitrary and capricious and must be set aside. … If on remand the Board takes the position that a change in Silva-Trevino I’s approach to mental culpability is appropriate, then it also should consider whether, under the traditional factors that bear on retroactivity analysis, see ARA Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 71 F.3d 129, 135–36 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 389–90 (D.C. Cir. 1972)), that new position may be applied to Jimenez-Cedillo and other aliens similarly situated.”
Congrats to my friends Ben Winograd and Helen Parsonage for holding the BIA accountable once again!
The BIA is caught improperly creating a harder, anti-immigrant line of legal precedent without complying with the basic legal requirements — like legal analysis!
A “real” Attorney General would certainly: 1) slow down the “Falls Church assembly line;” and 2) insist that the BIA take the time and care necessary to insure that its decisions, particularly published precedents, comply with basic legal and analytical requirements. That’s essentially “Due Process 101.”
Instead, White Nationalist xenophobe Jeff Sessions actually is taking steps to make the a system with the “wheels coming off” go even faster and to truncate full hearings and proper legal analysis, while attempting — without providing basic due process — to change long-standing substantive rules of law to further screw migrants. How sick is this Dude!? How disgusting is it that he carries out his destructive agenda without any meaningful oversight by Congress?
The best way to solve this unacceptable situation, before our entire legal system is in shambles, is to see that both the individuals responsible for placing Jeff Sessions in office and those who have abdicated their duties to oversee his activities are removed from office through the ballot box. We know who is responsible for these miscarriages of justice. Now is the time to insure that they are no longer able to carry out their program of destroying America!
Join the New Due Process Army! Due Process Forever!
