"The Voice of the New Due Process Army" ————– Musings on Events in U.S. Immigration Court, Immigration Law, Sports, Music, Politics, and Other Random Topics by Retired United States Immigration Judge (Arlington, Virginia) and former Chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals Paul Wickham Schmidt and Dr. Alicia Triche, expert brief writer, practical scholar, emeritus Editor-in-Chief of The Green Card (FBA), and 2022 Federal Bar Association Immigration Section Lawyer of the Year. She is a/k/a “Delta Ondine,” a blues-based alt-rock singer-songwriter, who performs regularly in Memphis, where she hosts her own Blues Brunch series, and will soon be recording her first full, professional album. Stay tuned! 🎶 To see our complete professional bios, just click on the link below.
The rescission of DACA—based as it was solely on a misconceived view of the law—is reviewable, and plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that it must be set aside under the APA. We therefore affirm the district court’s entry of a preliminary injunction.31 The district court also properly dismissed plaintiffs’ APA notice-and-comment claim, and their claim that the DACA rescission violates their substantive due process rights. The district court also properly denied the government’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ APA arbitrary-and-capricious claim, their claim that the new information-sharing policy violates their due process rights, and their claim that the DACA rescission violates their right to equal protection.
***
The Executive wields awesome power in the enforcement of our nation’s immigration laws. Our decision today does not curb that power, but rather enables its exercise in a manner that is free from legal misconceptions and is democratically accountable to the public. Whether Dulce Garcia and the hundreds of thousands of other young dreamers like her may continue to live productively in the only country they have ever known is, ultimately, a choice for the political branches of our constitutional government. With the power to make that choice, however, must come accountability for the consequences.
Here’s a link to the full decision by the 9th Circuit:
In a case that the ACLU says could affect thousands of immigrants, the Supreme Court on Wednesday considered when the government has the right to detain a class of immigrants without a bail hearing.
Under a 1996 law, the federal government is allowed to detain immigrants whose criminal conviction or involvement in terrorism-related activities would make them inadmissible or deportable. The law says the government “shall” take any of those immigrants into custody “when the alien is released” from criminal custody. The question before the justices is: What happens if the Department of Homeland Security doesn’t do so immediately?
The arguments on Wednesday focused on the technicalities of the 1996 law, rules of grammar, and timelines — not the sort of fiery rhetoric usually favored by President Donald Trump or Attorney General Jeff Sessions when talking about immigrants.
And while the case was granted to resolve the question of whether the statute still applied if DHS does not act immediately — whether there is any time restriction — the arguments shifted to a question of what limitation would be reasonable.
After a back-and-forth with Justice Sonia Sotomayor and a question from Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Neil Gorsuch spoke up early in the Wednesday arguments, asking, “[D]oes the government have any view about if ever the obligation [to take an immigrant into custody] lapses? Could it be 30 years? … Thirty years, and the government was aware of him the entire time and chose not to act. … Is there any limit on the government’s power?”
The government lawyer, Zachary Tripp from the Solicitor General’s Office, said the law created “a continuing obligation” that “does not lapse.”
Later, when Justice Stephen Breyer raised a similar question and Tripp began answering about when certain underlying crimes would be covered under the detention provision, Gorsuch interjected, said that back-and-forth was “quibbling,” and redirected Tripp to the larger question: “Justice Breyer’s question is my question, and I really wish you’d answer it.”
Breyer then stated his question more directly: “Is the government’s position that this paragraph, which says shall be arrested upon release, applies to a person who has been released 50 years before?”
Tripp, not giving in at all, said the government’s position is “absolutely that this applies regardless of the time” that’s passed.
. . . .
********************************
Read the complete article at the link.
I had predicted the possibility that Justice Gorsuch’s past jurisprudence questioning the extent of and deference to Executive Power could make him an “honest broker” in some immigration cases.
I’d like to believe Justice Kavanaugh’s testimony that he will approach cases in a fair and impartial manner. But, neither his partisan outburst during his conformation nor his fawning performance during the unnecessary “formal swearing in” that became a Trump campaign rally were very encouraging from a fairness and impartiality standpoint.
Both his reputation and the country would be better served if he filled the “open minded conservative” role played by his predecessor and mentor Justice Kennedy rather than the “bought and paid for partisan vote” that all the Senators and Trump expect him to be.
Indeed, the one unifying theme of the Senate confirmation process was that all believed that he would perform as a totally predictable right-wing partisan vote. If he doesn’t live up to this expectation, the Dems will be (pleasantly) shocked and the GOP outraged at his “betrayal.” That’s why he would do well to at least occasionally listen carefully to the analysis of some of his more “liberal leaning” colleagues.
Lee Brand, Partner at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP in Palo Alto, CA and his amazing group of brief write gave us the good news this afternoon and sent along these orders granting the rehearing en banc and setting OA:
This is one of many important Federal Court and BIA cases in which “Our Gang” under the leadership of Judge Jeffrey Chase and Judge Lory Rosenberg have filed amicus briefs informing the courts of the realities of Immigration Court practice and the current sad state of Due Process in the courts. We’re working on some additional “assignments.” We’ll keep fighting for fairness, Due Process, and judicial independence as long as we’re “alive and kicking.”
Here’s a brief report form Jeffrey:
I am sending this to our now much larger full group. One of the early amicus briefs in which 11 members of our gang participated was filed in support of a motion for rehearing en banc before the 9th Cir. in CJLG v. Sessions. In that case, an IJ went forward with the asylum hearing of a 15 year old respondent who was unable to retain counsel, telling his mother that she would represent him. Not surprisingly, asylum was denied based on the respondent’s inability to state a cognizable social group and to establish the government was unable/unwilling to control. The ACLU filed a petition for review in the 9th Cir. arguing that minors should be assigned counsel in removal proceedings, which was dismissed by a 3 judge panel.
Today, the 9th Cir. granted the motion for rehearing en banc; oral arguments are set for Dec. 10.
So far, of the cases in which our gang submitted amicus briefs, there have been successful outcomes in Negusie (before the BIA), and in Matumona v. Sessions in the 10th Cir., in which OIL stipulated to remand for the BIA to consider the arguments raised on appeal (which concerned the impact of remote detention centers on the respondent’s ability to retain counsel).
It’s an honor to be a member of “Our Gang” and to have the opportunity to work with the many outstanding pro bono counsel and firms throughout the country who are part of the “New Due Process Army.” The efforts of these wonderful lawyers represent the real commitment to the “rule of law” in immigration and stand in sharp contrast with the jaundiced views and insults to the legal profession publicly proclaimed by Jeff Sessions.
If you are a retired Immigration Judge or BIA Appellate Immigration Judge and would like to join our collegial group effort, please contact Jeffrey, Lory, or me. It’s a rewarding experience and a great opportunity to use your expertise to “make a difference.” It’s also a great chance to keep in touch with your judicial colleagues. It’s not all work (that’s where our wonderful pro bono lawyers come in) — we also have some fun, good times, and fond recollections in the process. (Judge Gus “Hang 10” Villageliu has promised free (non-web) surfing lessons to all new members once hurricane season is past!)
Quiroz Parada v. Sessions, 9th Cir., 08-29-18, Published
COURT STAFF SUMMARY:
The panel granted Moris Alfredo Quiroz Parada’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, in a case in which Quiroz Parada, a citizen of El Salvador, sought relief after he and his family were the victims of threats, home invasions, beatings, and killings at the hands of Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional guerillas.
The panel held that the record compelled a finding of past persecution. The panel explained that the Board mischaracterized what Quiroz Parada endured as simply threats against his family and attempts to recruit him, and ignored, among other evidence, his brother’s assassination, the murder of his neighbor as a result of Quiroz Parada’s own family being targeted, his experience being captured and beaten to the point of unconsciousness, repeated forced home invasions, and specific death threats toward his family. The panel concluded that the harm Quiroz Parada and his family suffered rose to the level of past persecution.
Applying pre-REAL ID Act standards, the panel held that the harm Quiroz Parada suffered bore a nexus to a protected ground, as the FMLN guerillas were motivated, at least in part, by his family’s government and military service. The panel noted that it was immaterial that the
FMLN’s attempted conscription of Quiroz Parada would have served the dual goal of filling their ranks in order to carry on their war against the government and pursue their political objectives, because their additional goal of retaliating against the Quiroz Parada family was a protected ground.
The panel held that substantial evidence did not support the agency’s determination that the government successfully rebutted the presumption of future persecution. The panel noted that by the time the IJ considered the country conditions information submitted into the record it was five years out of date, and predated the FMLN’s rise to power in government. The panel explained that the government cannot meet its burden of rebutting the presumption by presenting evidence of the Salvadoran government’s human rights record at a time when the government was run by a different political party, particularly when at the time of the IJ hearing it was run by the very same FMLN who persecuted the Quiroz Parada family. The panel joined the Second Circuit in holding that reliance on significantly or materially outdated country reports cannot suffice to rebut the presumption of future persecution.
The panel concluded that the agency erred as a matter of law in denying Quiroz Parada’s application for CAT relief because it ignored pertinent evidence in the record and erred by construing the “government acquiescence” standard too narrowly. The panel explained that acquiescence does not require actual knowledge or willful acceptance of torture, and that awareness and willful blindness will suffice. The panel further explained that the acquiescence standard is met where the record demonstrates that public officials at any level, even if not at the federal level, would acquiesce in the torture the petitioner is likely to suffer, and that evidence showing widespread corruption of public officials, as the record revealed in this case, can be highly probative on this point. The panel noted that the country conditions reports and exhibits submitted by Quiroz Parada indicate the acquiescence of the Salvadoran government, or at least parts of the Salvadoran government, in the rampant violence and murder perpetrated by the Mara Salvatrucha gang, at whose hands Quiroz Parada fears that he will be killed.
The panel remanded for reconsideration of his CAT claim, an exercise of discretion whether to grant asylum relief, and an appropriate order withholding Quiroz Parada’s removal.
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
PANEL: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judge, and Timothy J. Savage,* District Judge.
* The Honorable Timothy J. Savage, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
OPINION BY: Judge Paez
KEY QUOTES FROM OPINION:
Quiroz Parada applied for asylum5 and withholding of removal on September 27, 1994. If he is removed to El Salvador, Quiroz Parada fears he will be persecuted on account of his family status and political opinion. The source of that feared persecution is twofold: the MS gang members seeking revenge on behalf of their FMLN guerilla parents, as well as the FMLN itself—despite the fact that the FMLN is currently a political party, rather than a violent revolutionary movement. Because the FMLN is now the ruling political party, Quiroz Parada does not believe he can safely reside in any part of the country without falling victim to retribution by the FMLN. Moreover, simply laying low is not an option: Quiroz Parada believes the FMLN will learn of his return to the country and have the ability to locate him because he no longer has any Salvadoran documentation and would thus be required to renew all of his documents upon arriving in El Salvador. Quiroz Parada also testified that he is opposed to the FMLN’s “leftist wing” form of democracy and that he would feel compelled to speak out against the FMLN-run government’s policies, which he fears would result in persecution by the government. While Quiroz Parada is aware that the civil war ended several decades ago, he does not believe that the Salvadoran government would prosecute former FMLN guerillas if “they murder people, or behave badly.”6
5 Because Quiroz Parada applied for asylum prior to the effective date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, the one-year bar for asylum applications does not apply.See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a).
6 Regrettably, as with many critical pieces of his testimony, Quiroz Parada’s explanation for why he does not believe in the Salvadoran government’s ability or willingness to prosecute former FMLN members who murder or otherwise attack their former enemies is transcribed as “[indiscernible] and [indiscernible].”
Thirteen years passed before the government took any action on Quiroz Parada’s 1994 asylum application. In May 2007, a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officer finally interviewed Quiroz Parada. On May 31, 2007, Quiroz Parada’s asylum case was referred to an immigration judge; DHS simultaneously issued a notice to appear, charging him with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(I) for being present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. At a master calendar hearing in February 2008, an IJ sustained the charge of removability. Quiroz Parada requested relief in the form of asylum, withholding of removal, CAT protection, and cancellation of removal.
The delays for Quiroz Parada didn’t end there: nearly five years passed between his February 2008 hearing and his merits hearing before an IJ in November 2012. The government submitted its hearing exhibits back in 2008, including a 2007 Department of State Country Report and a 2007 Department of State Profile on El Salvador. Yet for unknown reasons, the government did not update their exhibits during the years that passed between submission of their exhibits and the actual hearing—despite the fact that the country conditions reports were five years out of date by the time of the merits hearing.
Quiroz Parada, by contrast, submitted his exhibits approximately one week before the November 2012 hearing. In addition to a written statement describing his past persecution and fear of future persecution, Quiroz Parada submitted a number of other exhibits corroborating his claims. For example, he submitted a 2010 letter from his sister—written prior to her fleeing the country—imploring him to not return to El Salvador for any reason because of the risk that he will be kidnapped or killed by MS. The letter explained that the “police do[] not help, and they even get killed,” and warned that if he were to come back to the country, “history would repeat itself.” Another one of his sisters sent him a copy of a handwritten threat she received from MS members, which said they knew she “snitched on the barrio” and warned her that if she failed to leave the area by a particular date, her “daughters will suffer the consequences.” His exhibits also included several newspaper articles about the violence perpetrated by MS in Quiroz Parada’s home region; these articles echoed a letter from the National Civil Police of El Salvador describing MS’s crimes, the gang’s pervasiveness in Quiroz Parada’s home region, and how the rampant violence has forced many families to flee.
The long-awaited hearing in November 2012 did not begin on a promising note. Prior to hearing any testimony from Quiroz Parada or argument from his attorney, the IJ conveyed his belief that Quiroz Parada’s asylum claim “may be a lost cause.” Nonetheless, despite the IJ’s significant skepticism, he allowed Quiroz Parada’s attorney to present Quiroz Parada’s case for asylum. On February 8, 2013, the IJ issued a written decision denying Quiroz Parada’s requests for asylum, withholding of removal, CAT protection, and cancellation of removal. The IJ first found that Quiroz Parada was credible under both the pre-REAL ID Act and REAL ID Act standards.7 The IJ then determined that Quiroz Parada had not shown past persecution, but further concluded that even if he had, DHS had rebutted the presumption with evidence of changed country conditions. The IJ also found that Quiroz Parada had not shown an independent well-founded fear of future persecution. Because the IJ determined that Quiroz Parada had not established eligibility for asylum through either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, Quiroz Parada necessarily failed to meet the higher bar required to obtain withholding of removal. The IJ also rejected Quiroz Parada’s claim for CAT relief.
7 Although the REAL ID Act governs Quiroz Parada’s claim for cancellation of removal, it does not govern his claims currently on appeal, which were filed prior to May 11, 2005. See Joseph v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1235, 1240 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010).
Quiroz Parada appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA, which dismissed his appeal. In its decision, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s determinations on Quiroz Parada’s asylum, withholding, and CAT claims, including the IJ’s alternative holding that even if Quiroz Parada had established past persecution, the government had rebutted the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA denied relief to Quiroz Parada, but granted him voluntary departure. Quiroz Parada timely petitioned us for review.
. . . .
As an initial matter, we reject the government’s contention that we lack jurisdiction to consider Quiroz Parada’s CAT claim because he did not raise it before the BIA. Although Quiroz Parada did not specifically appeal his CAT claim to the BIA, the agency addressed the merits of the claim. It is well-established that we may review any issue addressed on the merits by the BIA, regardless of whether the petitioner raised it before the agency. See Rodriguez-Castellon v. Holder, 733 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 355 (2014). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to review the claim.
The agency’s first error was its failure to consider all relevant evidence. CAT’s implementing regulations require the agency to consider “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture,” and we have repeatedly reversed where the agency has failed to do so.See, e.g., Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 770–72 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[W]here there is any indication that the BIA did not consider all of the evidence before it, a catchall phrase [that the agency has considered all of the evidence] does not suffice, and the decision cannot stand.”); Aguilar-Ramos v. Holder, 594 F.3d 701, 705 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The failure of the IJ and BIA to consider [relevant evidence] constitutes reversible error.”). Relevant evidence includes the petitioner’s testimony and country conditions evidence. See Cole, 659 F.3d at 771–72. Moreover, a petitioner’s credible testimony “may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).
Here, the relevant evidence included Quiroz Parada’s credible testimony, the 2007 country conditions reports, and exhibits submitted by Quiroz Parada. Yet the IJ summarily dismissed Quiroz Parada’s CAT claim, stating:
Based on the respondent’s testimony and the evidence in the record, the Court finds that the respondent has not shown that he is “more likely than not” to be tortured if he is removed to El Salvador. In addition, to be eligible for CAT relief, the respondent must establish that the torture feared would be inflicted by or with the acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. Matter of S-V-, 22 I&N Dec. 1306, 1311 (BIA 2000), disagreed with on other grounds by Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2003). “Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture does not
extend protection to persons fearing entities that a government is unable to control.” Id.at 1312. The respondent has not alleged that he fears torture inflicted by any governmental entities in El Salvador, nor by any other entity with the acquiescence of any government official. Thus, he has not established eligibility for CAT relief.
This conclusion ignored significant evidence in the record demonstrating that 1) Quiroz Parada credibly feared death at the hands of the MS gang, and 2) the country conditions reports and other evidence in the record established not only that the government “acquiescence[d]” in the MS gang’s violence, but also that Salvadoran security forces engaged in torture on a regular basis—as the IJ himself found in a section of his decision summarizing the country conditions evidence:
[P]rotection of human rights was undermined by widespread violent crime, rampant judicial and police corruption, intimidation by the ubiquitous violent street gangs, and violence against witnesses. Criminal gangs are a serious, widespread, and pervasive socio-economic challenge to the security, stability, and welfare of El Salvador. Indeed, gangs are blamed for the bulk of crimes and murders in El Salvador. While the government’s fight against the gangs has met with some success in areas, El Salvador remains an exceptionally violent country because of the pervasive gang violence.
Although arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention, and torture are prohibited in El Salvador, Salvadoran security forces apparently continue to participate in such practices on a regular basis. Conditions in detention are degrading and extremely dangerous. Many officials throughout all levels of government engage in corruption with impunity despite a recent increased emphasis on enforcement.
Thus, while the IJ did “consider” the country conditions reports, the significant and material disconnect between the IJ’s quoted observations and his conclusions regarding Quiroz Parada’s CAT claim indicate that the IJ did not properly consider all of the relevant evidence before him.See Cole, 659 F.3d at 771–72 (explaining that indications of the agency’s failure to properly consider all of the relevant evidence “include misstating the record and failing to mention highly probative or potentially dispositive evidence”).
The agency’s second error was its overly narrow construction of the “acquiescence” standard. In a similar case, we reversed and remanded where the agency “erred by construing ‘government acquiescence’ too narrowly,” noting that “acquiescence does not require actual knowledge or willful acceptance of torture; awareness and willful blindness will suffice.” Aguilar-Ramos, 594 F.3d at 705–06 (citing Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1194–95 (9th Cir. 2003)). In Aguilar-Ramos, we found “evidence in the record that suggests that gangs and death squads operate in El Salvador, and that its government is aware of and willfully blind to their existence.” Id. at 706. So too here.
Moreover, we have held that the acquiescence standard is met where the record demonstrates that public officials at any level—even if not at the federal level—would acquiesce in torture the petitioner is likely to suffer. Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 509–10 (9th Cir. 2013). Evidence showing widespread corruption of public officials—as the record reveals here—can be highly probative on this point.See id. at 510 (noting that “[v]oluminous evidence in the record explains that corruption of public officials in Mexico remains a problem”). As in Madrigal, the country conditions reports and exhibits submitted by Quiroz Parada indicate the acquiescence of the Salvadoran government (or at least parts of the Salvadoran government) in the “rampant” violence and murder perpetrated by the MS gang—at whose hands Quiroz Parada fears that he will be killed. And as we have previously held, “torture” under CAT includes killings. See Cole, 659 F.3d at 771.
Because the agency erred by failing to consider all relevant evidence and by improperly construing the government acquiescence standard, we reverse the BIA’s determination that Quiroz Parada is not eligible for CAT relief and remand to the agency for further consideration of his claim.
******************************************
The BIA’s and IJ’s fundamental errors included:
Failing to follow their regulations requiring them to consider all the evidence;
Incorrectly finding no “past persecution;”
Incorrectly applying the regulatory presumption of future persecution;
Incorrectly denying asylum and withholding of removal;
Applying an incorrect standard for CAT protection;
Incorrectly analyzing country conditions for CAT.
Wow, what did the BIA and the IJ get right here other than the name and “A#?”
Contrary to the “Sessions myth” about “dirty attorneys” and respondents “gaming the system,” this case presents the perhaps extreme, but certainly not atypical, example where “the government took thirteen years to process the asylum application and then another five years to hold a hearing before an IJ—during which time the government had every opportunity to submit more up-to-date evidence of changed country conditions, but failed to do so.”
The respondent, “by contrast, submitted his exhibits approximately one week before the November 2012 hearing. In addition to a written statement describing his past persecution and fear of future persecution, Quiroz Parada submitted a number of other exhibits corroborating his claims.”
Moreover, once the hearing finally took place, it was fairly obvious from the IJ’s negative pre-hearing comments that he had already “prejudged’ the case against the respondent.
The court also notes how the phenomenon I call “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” (“ADR”) by the Government, which Sessions has shoved into overdrive, fuels “our previously-expressed concern that ‘constant remands to the BIA to consider the impact of changed country conditions occurring during the period of litigation of an asylum case would create a “Zeno’s Paradox” where final resolution of the case would never be reached.’”Baballah, 367 F.3d at 1078 n.11 (quoting Hoxha v. Ashcroft,319 F.3d 1179, 1185 n.7 (9th Cir. 2003)) (alteration omitted).”
The grossly under-studied phenomenon of “ADR” by the DHS and EOIR/DOJ also requires the respondent and his or her often pro bono attorney to constantly update the record and the evidence to deal with changing conditions, while the DHS often takes the lackadaisical approach they did here, apparently counting on the IJ or the BIA to “fill in the gaps” necessary to “get to a denial of the facially grantable claim.”
Here’s the court’s accurate statement of both the CAT standard for acquiescence and the current conditions in El Salvador:
“In Aguilar-Ramos, we found “evidence in the record that suggests that gangs and death squads operate in El Salvador, and that its government is aware of and willfully blind to their existence.” Id. at 706. So too here.
Moreover, we have held that the acquiescence standard is met where the record demonstrates that public officials at any level—even if not at the federal level—would acquiesce in torture the petitioner is likely to suffer. Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 509–10 (9th Cir. 2013). Evidence showing widespread corruption of public officials—as the record reveals here—can be highly probative on this point.See id. at 510 (noting that “[v]oluminous evidence in the record explains that corruption of public officials in Mexico remains a problem”). As in Madrigal, the country conditions reports and exhibits submitted by Quiroz Parada indicate the acquiescence of the Salvadoran government (or at least parts of the Salvadoran government) in the “rampant” violence and murder perpetrated by the MS gang—at whose hands Quiroz Parada fears that he will be killed. And as we have previously held, “torture” under CAT includes killings. See Cole, 659 F.3d at 771″
Compare the above with Sessions’s completely disingenuous description of both the standard for “unwilling or unable to protect” — certainly “acquiescence” would meet or exceed “unwilling or unable to protect” — and the beyond deplorable country conditions in El Salvador in Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
This case also illustrates how in the “haste makes waste” world of EOIR, transcripts are often missing or garble testimony critical to the respondent’s case.
Unfortunately, this case is but an example of the deep, ugly hidden truth about our Immigration Courts. Even before Session’s White Nationalist restrictionist moves against asylum seekers, the Immigration Courts were mistreating too many asylum seekers, particularly those from the Northern Triangle fleeing life-threatening violence. Well prepared claims were often shunted to the end of the docket by ADR at both the courts and the DHS Asylum offices. They are often replaced by “prioritized” claims in detention settings or in other unnecessarily rushed situations where individuals have not had adequate time to obtain competent counsel and to prepare the necessary documentation to win a claim.
That’s compounded by the fact that even in the past, statements of politicos within Administrations of both parties and the generally negative tenor of BIA precedents on asylum for the Northern Triangle have encouraged some willing Immigration Judges to either prejudge the cases or give them “short shrift” to discourage such claims in the future and to act as a “deterrent,” as well as to jack up the number of “case completions” by cutting corners. This was happening in some Immigration Courts and on some BIA panels even before Sessions took over.
Certainly, the message from Sessions has been overtly anti-asylum, anti-Hispanic, anti-female, anti-family, anti-Due-Process, anti-scholarship, and anti-deliberation. In essence: “Just rubber stamp ’em, deny ’em, and move ’em out as fast as you can if you want to keep your job. And, don’t forget that your job involves ‘partnership’ with the DHS prosecutors.”
Obviously, our Immigration Court systems had some deep-seated Due Process problems with anti-asylum, anti-Northern Triangle attitudes, as well as fundamentally incorrect views of the asylum law and regulations, by some Immigration Judges and BIA Appellate Immigration judges even prior to Sessions’s advent. That’s one of the key reasons why gross discrepancies in approval-denial rates in similar cases among Immigration Judges and among BIA “panels” (which often can be nothing more than a single Appellate Judge) had no reasonable explanation even during the Obama Administration.
Sessions has made all of this immeasurably worse! Rather than fostering an attitude of judicial independence, courtesy, fairness, respect for both parties, Due Process, and the generous consideration of asylum claims mandated by the Supremes in Cardoza-Fonseca and at least mouthed by the BIA in Matter of Mogharrabi, Sessions has come up with ways of forcing the already broken Immigration Court system to take on even more cases, cut even more corners, and spew forth even more incorrect and unfair decisions, particularly in the area of asylum.
He has shown a simply horrible, outright hostility to working cooperatively with the individual Immigration Judges, the NAIJ, the private bar, the pro bono community, the NGO’s, and the academic community, along with the DHS, to develop methods of improving Due Process, fairness, and timeliness in the asylum adjudication system. Perhaps even worse, by reducing the status of judges to “denial officers,” and upping the stress levels to incredible heights, he’s also made the U.S. Immigration Judge and the BIA Appellate Immigration Judge jobs far less appealing to well-qualified individuals who would fairly, efficiently, correctly, and professionally adjudicate asylum claims. Such individuals also likely would have some of the “creative, yet practical” “think outside the box” approaches necessary to deal with the backlog in a timely manner without compromising Due Process. It’s painfully obvious that the Sessions and the other politicos now futilely trying to micromanage the Immigration Court system are devoid of any such insights.
Frankly, this is the type of case that probably could have been granted back in 1994 when it was first filed. Even by the time it finally got to Immigration Court, it appears to be the type of well-documented, clearly grantable case that could have been set for a “short block hearing” with the understanding that if certain aspects of the respondent’s background and experiences were verified under oath, the DHS would not oppose a grant of asylum.
Instead, this case has been “hanging around” the system for more than 24 years, and still hasn’t been finally resolved! More seriously, after taking five years on the docket to get to the merits hearing, both the IJ and the BIA clearly got it wrong!
The mess that currently exists in the Immigration Court and asylum systems is primarily the product of years of such abuse and mismanagement by a politically-driven adjudication system, aided and abetted by Congressional inaction and failure to provide adequate funding. Cutting more corners, pushing overwhelmed judges to turn out more cases in less time, and punishing asylum applicants by taking away their children, detaining them in substandard conditions, denying them reasonable access to counsel, denying them fairness, Due Process, and the life-saving protection to which many of them are entitled clearly isn’t the answer.
We need regime change (along with an attitude and culture change among some Immigration Judges and among some BIA panels)!
An amicus brief was recently filed on behalf of a group of 20 former Immigration Judges and BIA Members (including myself) in the case of Rodriguez et. al. v. Robbins. The case, which was remanded back to the Ninth Circuit by the U.S. Supreme Court in its February 2018 decision in Jennings et. al. v. Rodriguez, is the latest chapter in an ongoing conflict over the constitutionality of indefinite civil detention of noncitizens.
The concept of indefinite detention is at odds with our legal system’s well-known practice of meting out specific time frames for incarceration as part of the sentencing of convicted criminals. Indefinite non-punitive civil detention is even stranger to American concepts of liberty. For this reason, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rendered its decision in Rodriguez in 2015, requiring three classes of indefinitely detained noncitizens – those seeking entry to the U.S., those awaiting decisions on their removal from the U.S., and those convicted of certain classes of crimes but not subject to a final order of removal – to be afforded bond hearings every six months. The court noted that its order did not require “Immigration Judges to release any single individual; rather, we are affirming a minimal procedural safeguard…to ensure that after a lengthy period of detention, the government continues to have a legitimate interest in the further deprivation of an individual’s liberty.”
At around the same time the Ninth Circuit decided Rodriguez, the Second Circuit took the same approach in Lora v. Shanahan, also requiring bond hearings every 6 months, and further holding that bail must be afforded unless ICE establishes “by clear and convincing evidence that the immigrant poses a risk of flight or a risk of danger to the community.”
The Supreme Court disagreed with Rodriguez, and remanded the matter back to the Ninth Circuit, where that court will consider the issue of whether the detainees have a constitutional right to a bond hearing.
Our amicus brief argues that not only is the right to a bond hearing every six months consistent with principles of due process, but that such policy also assists with the immigration court’s efficient administration of justice. Given the huge backlog of some 715,000 cases in the nation’s immigration courts, the brief argues that prolonged detention has the effect of bogging down immigration court dockets by decreasing the detainees’ ability to obtain representation, impeding on the ability of represented detainees to communicate with their counsel, and creating obstacles for unrepresented respondents to present their cases. Many ICE detention facilities are in remote locations, often 100 or more miles from the nearest legal services provider or from cities with sizable populations of immigration lawyers. As a result, a recent study found that only 14 percent of detained immigrants obtain representation. Such distances create obstacles to communication between the lucky few who are represented and their counsel. The great majority who are left to defend themselves are hindered by the detention centers’ inadequate legal resources, including a lack of foreign language materials. As a result, cases take longer to complete, and the lack of legal briefs and supporting documentation places a greater burden on the already overworked immigration judges.
Our brief also argues that those facing the longest periods of detention are often those with the strongest cases for relief. The brief further opines that immigration judges are well-equipped to make individualized bond determinations, and that those released on bond do not present a flight risk.
We offer our heartfelt appreciation to attorneys David Lesser, Jamie Stephens Dycus, Adriel I. Cepeda Derieux, and Jessica Tsang of the law firm of WilmerHale for their outstanding efforts in the drafting of the brief.
Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.
White House reviewing plan to end court settlement on immigrant child detention
By Tal Kopan, CNN
The White House is reviewing a plan that could nullify a settlement that immigrant children that arrive with their families be released from custody within 20 days, a rule they have blamed for their separation of thousands of families at the border.
The action to finalize regulations on the topic, revealed in a government database, comes after repeated attempts to change the Flores Settlement Agreement have been resoundingly rejected by a federal judge and amid continuing fallout over the Trump administration’s related decision to separate families at the border.
The Trump administration has made the Flores settlement a frequent target of its ire — blaming the agreement for its decision to implement a policy at the border that resulted in thousands of families being separated. It has also repeatedly said only Congress can act to overrule the settlement. But lawmakers have shown little appetite to do so and have so far failed to pass any immigration legislation under this administration.
Key provisions of the agreement dictate minimum standards of care of immigrants in detention, as well as requiring that children who arrive with their families be released from custody within 20 days unless their parent agrees to them being held longer. But three weeks is faster than their immigration court cases can be processed, leading the Trump administration to complain the agreement forces them to either release the families together or separate them.
Flores doesn’t purport to create Constitutional rights for the class members. Congress clearly could, and should, merely enact the Flores protections for children into statute. But, realistically, that’s not going to happen under Trump, and even if it did, Trump would undoubtedly veto it.
Conversely, perhaps Congress could overrule Flores by statute. But, if Flores turns out to be setting forth Constitutional minimum requirements, then the statute would be held unconstitutional. On the other hand, if no Constitutional issues are involved, Congress would be free to act. However, Congress hasn’t shown any enthusiasm for immigration legislation, particularly something as sensitive and potentially controversial as Flores.
Additionally, just because Congress could change the law doesn’t necessarily mean that the Administration could do so by regulation. Indeed, if the Administration could void a court-approved settlement simply by publishing a regulation, settlements with the Government would cease to have any meaning or enforceability.
Also, at the time of the original Flores settlement it seems to me that both parties and the court wisely wanted to avoid protracted litigation on the Constitutional question of long-term detention of children which had risks for both parties.
At a minimum, an attempt to “undo” Flores by regulation would allow the plaintiffs to raise the Constitutional issue in court. It’s seems to me that there must be some Constitutional limits on child detention. So, the Government could well end up enjoined to follow Flores while the litigation on the Constitutional question works its way up the system — a process likely to take until beyond 2020. I’d also say that the Administration’s stupidity and lawlessness on separating children from parents tends to make the “litigating context” very favorable for plaintiffs.
So, to me, it looks like another dumb, counterproductive, “in your face” move by the Trumpsters. But, that doesn’t mean they won’t try it. In fact, most of their so-called “litigating strategy” seems to fit this mold. It’s an Administration that has made immorality, lies, fraud, waste, and abuse of public resources the norm. However this issue comes out, that couldn’t bode well for the future of our country.
A federal appeals court decided Wednesday that the Trump administration may not withhold federal funds from California’s immigrant-friendly “sanctuary” cities and counties.
The U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, upheld a district judge’s ruling in favor of San Francisco and Santa Clara County, which sued over the administration’s threats to withhold money to jurisdictions that have passed laws limiting local law enforcement cooperation with federal immigration authorities.
The ruling was a blow to the Trump administration’s efforts to punish cities and states that fail to help enforce federal immigration law, a goal President Trump announced shortly after he was sworn in.
The administration did not comment on whether it intended to appeal the decision.
But the 9th Circuit handed Trump one victory. It removed a nationwide injunction against his directive, concluding there was not enough evidence presented in the case so far to support blocking it beyond California.
Devin O’Malley, a spokesman for the U.S. Department of Justice, called the ruling a “a victory for criminal aliens in California, who can continue to commit crimes knowing that the state’s leadership will protect them from federal immigration officers.”
O’Malley also declared that the removal of the nationwide injunction amounted to “another major victory for the rule of law.”
The case stemmed from an executive order issued by Trump shortly after taking office. He directed his administration to withhold federal funds from sanctuary jurisdictions.
The 9th Circuit said Trump exceeded his authority because only Congress can put conditions on federal funds.
“The United States Constitution exclusively grants the power of the purse to Congress, not the President,” wrote Chief 9th Circuit Judge Sidney R. Thomas, a Clinton appointee.
The administration argued that the order was “all bluster and no bite, representing a perfectly legitimate use of the presidential ‘bully pulpit,’ without any real meaning — ‘gesture without motion,’ as T.S. Eliot put it,” Thomas wrote.
But that explanation “strains credulity,” Thomas said.
The ruling quoted Trump expressing his opposition to sanctuary cities in a television interview after issuing his order.
“If we have to defund, we give tremendous amounts of money to California…. California in many ways is out of control,” the court quoted Trump as saying.
The Justice Department later issued a memorandum interpreting Trump’s order as affecting only three law enforcement grants historically conditioned on compliance with immigration law.
But the 9th Circuit said that interpretation was unreasonable and inconsistent with the executive order.
The court left the injunction in place for California because it found there was sufficient evidence that the counties and the state were “particular targets.”
But there was little to no evidence presented on the impact of the executive order outside California, the 9th Circuit said.
“The record as presently developed does not justify a nationwide injunction,” the court said.
Unless the Trump administration appeals, which legal analysts believe is likely, the case will return to the district court, where evidence could be presented to support a nationwide injunction.
Ninth Circuit Judge Ferdinand F. Fernandez, appointed by former President George H.W. Bush, dissented.
He argued the case was not “ripe” for a decision, in part because no action has been taken against the counties.
“While the counties may be convinced that the Executive Order loosed a fearsome chimera upon them, that does not mean that the courts should take up arms to vanquish the imagined beast by slaying the executive order itself,” Fernandez said.
Wednesday’s decision was the latest among several to block Trump from punishing sanctuary jurisdictions.
Last month, a federal judge in Sacramento largely rejected a challenge by the Trump administration of three statewide California sanctuary laws.
In April, a federal judge in Los Angeles sided with the city in a ruling that said the administration could not consider sanctuary policies in parsing out police grants.
Chicago and Philadelphia also won court challenges of the administration’s authority to yank law enforcement grants based on sanctuary policies. The U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the decision in the Chicago case.
The U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, though, has allowed a Texas law requiring police chiefs and sheriffs to cooperate with federal immigration officials to go into effect. Texas lawmakers passed the requirement in response to the sanctuary city movement.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on the sanctuary policies or on the legality of the administration’s effort to end protections from deportation for immigrants who came to the U.S. when they were young.
The high court decided 5 to 4 in June to uphold Trump’s travel ban, which was a revision of an executive order the president issued shortly after taking office.
The order bans foreign visitors and immigrants from several mostly Muslim-majority nations. Lower courts had struck down the ban.
Santa Clara County Counsel James Williams called Wednesday’s decision “great news.”
He said all the courts that have examined lawsuits involving sanctuary polices have concluded that Congress, not the executive branch, controls federal spending.
“This opinion today is a huge reaffirmation of that very core bedrock principle of separation of powers,” Williams said.
Kent Scheidegger, legal director of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, described the majority ruling as “deeply dishonest.” The foundation sided with the Trump administration in the case.
Scheidegger noted that Trump’s order asked for compliance “consistent with law,” which limited it to only a few grants, not all federal spending.
“This case is headed for rehearing by a larger 11-judge panel, at least, and probably to the Supreme Court,” he said.
San Francisco City Attorney Dennis Herrera praised the ruling for blocking an unconstitutional “power grab” by Trump.
“San Francisco’s sanctuary policies make our city safer by encouraging anyone who has been a victim or witness to a crime to tell police,” Herrera said. “We are a safer community when people aren’t afraid to call the Fire Department in an emergency.”
*************************************************
Fairly predictable. Just think of the incredible amount of attorney and court resources, and the potential for goodwill and cooperation the Trump Administration has wasted in pursuing its White Nationalist agenda to actually make America less safe!
If the same amount of energy, effort, and resources were put on working with the private bar and the Immigration Judges to 1) get all asylum applicants competently represented, and 2) remove the 75% or so of the cases of individuals who should eventually be legalized or otherwise allowed to stay from already overcrowded Immigration Court dockets, the backlog resulting from “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” by DOJ politicos could largely be eliminated. The system then would be able to adjudicate new cases, particularly those of recently arrived asylum seekers, fairly, within a reasonable period of time, and in conformity with Constitutional Due Process.
Temporary deprivations of immigrants’ physical liberty “may sometimes be justified by concerns about public safety or flight risk” but must “always be constrained [by] the requirements of due process.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2017). Petitioners in this case naturally focus on the constitutional concerns raised by prolonged detention in the absence of a bond hearing. But lengthy pretrial detention of immigrants in removal proceedings also has a profoundly negative impact on the administration of the nation’s immigration laws. Such detention renders already complicated and challenging administrative proceedings even more so by limiting immigrants’ access to counsel and impairing even counseled immigrants’ presentation of their cases. At the same time, such detention requires a large expenditure of resources that could instead be devoted to other urgent needs of the immigration system. Amici respectfully submit that providing a bond hearing where pretrial detention of an immigrant in removal proceedings exceeds six months, as Petitioners urge, is not only consistent with the requirements of due process but also a straightforward and effective means of addressing these issues.
HERE ARE THE FORMER JUDGES WHO SIGNED ON:
Hon. Steven Abrams
Hon. Sarah M. Burr
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. George T. Chew
Hon. Joan V . Churchill
Hon. Bruce J. Einhorn
Hon. Cecelia M. Espenoza
Hon. Noel Ferris
Hon. John F. Gossart, Jr.
Hon. William P. Joyce
Hon. Edward Kandler
Hon. Carol King
Hon. Margaret McManus
Hon. Charles Pazar
Hon. Lory D. Rosenberg
Hon. Susan Roy
Hon. Paul W. Schmidt
Hon. William Van Wyke
Hon. Gustavo D. Villageliu
Hon. Polly A. Webber
AND HERE’S THE “ALL-STAR TEAM” THAT REPRESENTED US AND TO WHOM WE WILL ALWAYS BE INDEBTED:
MAJORITY: ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, THOMAS, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.
CONCURRING OPINIONS: KENNEDY, J., and THOMAS, J., filed concurring opinions.
DISSENTING OPINIONS: BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN, J., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined.
COURT SYLLABUS:
In September 2017, the President issued Proclamation No. 9645, seek- ing to improve vetting procedures for foreign nationals traveling to the United States by identifying ongoing deficiencies in the infor- mation needed to assess whether nationals of particular countries present a security threat. The Proclamation placed entry restrictions on the nationals of eight foreign states whose systems for managing and sharing information about their nationals the President deemed inadequate. Foreign states were selected for inclusion based on a re- view undertaken pursuant to one of the President’s earlier Executive Orders. As part of that review, the Department of Homeland Securi- ty (DHS), in consultation with the State Department and intelligence agencies, developed an information and risk assessment “baseline.” DHS then collected and evaluated data for all foreign governments, identifying those having deficient information-sharing practices and presenting national security concerns, as well as other countries “at risk” of failing to meet the baseline. After a 50-day period during which the State Department made diplomatic efforts to encourage foreign governments to improve their practices, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security concluded that eight countries—Chad, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen—remained deficient. She recommended entry restrictions for certain nationals from all of those countries but Iraq, which had a close cooperative re- lationship with the U. S. She also recommended including Somalia, which met the information-sharing component of the baseline stand- ards but had other special risk factors, such as a significant terrorist presence. After consulting with multiple Cabinet members, the Pres- ident adopted the recommendations and issued the Proclamation.
2
TRUMP v. HAWAII Syllabus
Invoking his authority under 8 U. S. C. §§1182(f) and 1185(a), he de- termined that certain restrictions were necessary to “prevent the en- try of those foreign nationals about whom the United States Gov- ernment lacks sufficient information” and “elicit improved identity- management and information-sharing protocols and practices from foreign governments.” The Proclamation imposes a range of entry re- strictions that vary based on the “distinct circumstances” in each of the eight countries. It exempts lawful permanent residents and pro- vides case-by-case waivers under certain circumstances. It also di- rects DHS to assess on a continuing basis whether the restrictions should be modified or continued, and to report to the President every 180 days. At the completion of the first such review period, the Pres- ident determined that Chad had sufficiently improved its practices, and he accordingly lifted restrictions on its nationals.
Plaintiffs—the State of Hawaii, three individuals with foreign rela- tives affected by the entry suspension, and the Muslim Association of Hawaii—argue that the Proclamation violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Establishment Clause. The District Court granted a nationwide preliminary injunction barring enforce- ment of the restrictions. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Proclamation contravened two provisions of the INA: §1182(f), which authorizes the President to “suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens” whenever he “finds” that their entry “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States,” and §1152(a)(1)(A), which provides that “no person shall . . . be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.” The court did not reach the Establishment Clause claim.
Held:
1. This Court assumes without deciding that plaintiffs’ statutory
claims are reviewable, notwithstanding consular nonreviewability or any other statutory nonreviewability issue. See Sale v. Haitian Cen- ters Council, Inc., 509 U. S. 155. Pp. 8–9.
2. The President has lawfully exercised the broad discretion grant- ed to him under §1182(f) to suspend the entry of aliens into the Unit- ed States. Pp. 9–24.
(a) By its terms, §1182(f) exudes deference to the President in every clause. It entrusts to the President the decisions whether and when to suspend entry, whose entry to suspend, for how long, and on what conditions. It thus vests the President with “ample power” to impose entry restrictions in addition to those elsewhere enumerated in the INA. Sale, 509 U. S., at 187. The Proclamation falls well with- in this comprehensive delegation. The sole prerequisite set forth in §1182(f) is that the President “find[ ]” that the entry of the covered al-
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 3
Syllabus
iens “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.” The President has undoubtedly fulfilled that requirement here. He first ordered DHS and other agencies to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of every single country’s compliance with the information and risk assessment baseline. He then issued a Proclamation with extensive findings about the deficiencies and their impact. Based on that review, he found that restricting entry of aliens who could not be vetted with adequate information was in the national interest.
Even assuming that some form of inquiry into the persuasiveness of the President’s findings is appropriate, but see Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592, 600, plaintiffs’ attacks on the sufficiency of the findings cannot be sustained. The 12-page Proclamation is more detailed than any prior order issued under §1182(f). And such a searching in- quiry is inconsistent with the broad statutory text and the deference traditionally accorded the President in this sphere. See, e.g., Sale, 509 U. S., at 187–188.
The Proclamation comports with the remaining textual limits in §1182(f). While the word “suspend” often connotes a temporary de- ferral, the President is not required to prescribe in advance a fixed end date for the entry restriction. Like its predecessors, the Procla- mation makes clear that its “conditional restrictions” will remain in force only so long as necessary to “address” the identified “inadequa- cies and risks” within the covered nations. Finally, the Proclamation properly identifies a “class of aliens” whose entry is suspended, and the word “class” comfortably encompasses a group of people linked by nationality. Pp. 10–15.
(b) Plaintiffs have not identified any conflict between the Proc- lamation and the immigration scheme reflected in the INA that would implicitly bar the President from addressing deficiencies in the Nation’s vetting system. The existing grounds of inadmissibility and the narrow Visa Waiver Program do not address the failure of certain high-risk countries to provide a minimum baseline of reliable infor- mation. Further, neither the legislative history of §1182(f) nor his- torical practice justifies departing from the clear text of the statute. Pp. 15–20.
(c) Plaintiffs’ argument that the President’s entry suspension vio- lates §1152(a)(1)(A) ignores the basic distinction between admissibil- ity determinations and visa issuance that runs throughout the INA. Section 1182 defines the universe of aliens who are admissible into the United States (and therefore eligible to receive a visa). Once §1182 sets the boundaries of admissibility, §1152(a)(1)(A) prohibits discrimination in the allocation of immigrant visas based on national- ity and other traits. Had Congress intended in §1152(a)(1)(A) to con- strain the President’s power to determine who may enter the country,
4
TRUMP v. HAWAII Syllabus
it could have chosen language directed to that end. Common sense and historical practice confirm that §1152(a)(1)(A) does not limit the President’s delegated authority under §1182(f). Presidents have re- peatedly exercised their authority to suspend entry on the basis of nationality. And on plaintiffs’ reading, the President would not be permitted to suspend entry from particular foreign states in response to an epidemic, or even if the United States were on the brink of war. Pp. 20–24.
3. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that the Proclamation violates the Establish- ment Clause. Pp. 24–38.
(a) The individual plaintiffs have Article III standing to chal- lenge the exclusion of their relatives under the Establishment Clause. A person’s interest in being united with his relatives is suffi- ciently concrete and particularized to form the basis of an Article III injury in fact. Cf., e.g., Kerry v. Din, 576 U. S. ___, ___. Pp. 24–26.
(b) Plaintiffs allege that the primary purpose of the Proclamation was religious animus and that the President’s stated concerns about vetting protocols and national security were but pretexts for discrim- inating against Muslims. At the heart of their case is a series of statements by the President and his advisers both during the cam- paign and since the President assumed office. The issue, however, is not whether to denounce the President’s statements, but the signifi- cance of those statements in reviewing a Presidential directive, neu- tral on its face, addressing a matter within the core of executive re- sponsibility. In doing so, the Court must consider not only the statements of a particular President, but also the authority of the Presidency itself. Pp. 26–29.
(c) The admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a “funda- mental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.” Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787, 792. Although foreign nationals seeking admission have no constitutional right to entry, this Court has engaged in a cir- cumscribed judicial inquiry when the denial of a visa allegedly bur- dens the constitutional rights of a U. S. citizen. That review is lim- ited to whether the Executive gives a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for its action, Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 769, but the Court need not define the precise contours of that narrow in- quiry in this case. For today’s purposes, the Court assumes that it may look behind the face of the Proclamation to the extent of apply- ing rational basis review, i.e., whether the entry policy is plausibly related to the Government’s stated objective to protect the country and improve vetting processes. Plaintiffs’ extrinsic evidence may be considered, but the policy will be upheld so long as it can reasonably
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 5
Syllabus
be understood to result from a justification independent of unconsti- tutional grounds. Pp. 30–32.
(d) On the few occasions where the Court has struck down a policy as illegitimate under rational basis scrutiny, a common thread has been that the laws at issue were “divorced from any factual context from which [the Court] could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620, 635. The Proclama- tion does not fit that pattern. It is expressly premised on legitimate purposes and says nothing about religion. The entry restrictions on Muslim-majority nations are limited to countries that were previous- ly designated by Congress or prior administrations as posing national security risks. Moreover, the Proclamation reflects the results of a worldwide review process undertaken by multiple Cabinet officials and their agencies. Plaintiffs challenge the entry suspension based on their perception of its effectiveness and wisdom, but the Court cannot substitute its own assessment for the Executive’s predictive judgments on such matters. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Pro- ject, 561 U. S. 1, 33–34.
Three additional features of the entry policy support the Govern- ment’s claim of a legitimate national security interest. First, since the President introduced entry restrictions in January 2017, three Muslim-majority countries—Iraq, Sudan, and Chad—have been re- moved from the list. Second, for those countries still subject to entry restrictions, the Proclamation includes numerous exceptions for vari- ous categories of foreign nationals. Finally, the Proclamation creates a waiver program open to all covered foreign nationals seeking entry as immigrants or nonimmigrants. Under these circumstances, the Government has set forth a sufficient national security justification to survive rational basis review. Pp. 33–38.
878 F. 3d 662, reversed and remanded.
KEY QUOTE FROM JUSTICE BRYER’S DISSENT:
And, perhaps most importantly, if the Government is not applying the Proclamation’s exemption and waiver system, the claim that the Proclamation is a “Muslim ban,” rather than a “security-based” ban, becomes much stronger. How could the Government successfully claim that the Proclamation rests on security needs if it is ex- cluding Muslims who satisfy the Proclamation’s own terms? At the same time, denying visas to Muslims who meet the Proclamation’s own security terms would support the view that the Government excludes them for reasons based upon their religion.
Unfortunately there is evidence that supports the sec-
4 TRUMP v. HAWAII BREYER, J., dissenting
ond possibility, i.e., that the Government is not applying the Proclamation as written. The Proclamation provides that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security “shall coordinate to adopt guidance” for consular officers to follow when deciding whether to grant a waiver. §3(c)(ii). Yet, to my knowledge, no guidance has issued. The only potentially relevant document I have found consists of a set of State Department answers to certain Frequently Asked Questions, but this document simply restates the Proclamation in plain language for visa appli- cants. It does not provide guidance for consular officers as to how they are to exercise their discretion. See Dept. of State, FAQs on the Presidential Proclamation, https:// travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-information- resources/presidential-proclamation-archive/2017-12-04- Presidential-Proclamation.html (all Internet materials as last visited June 25, 2018).
An examination of publicly available statistics also provides cause for concern. The State Department reported that during the Proclamation’s first month, two waivers were approved out of 6,555 eligible applicants. Letter from M. Waters, Assistant Secretary Legislative Affairs, to Sen. Van Hollen (Feb. 22, 2018). In its reply brief, the Government claims that number increased from 2 to 430 during the first four months of implementation. Reply Brief 17. That number, 430, however, when compared with the number of pre-Proclamation visitors, accounts for a miniscule percentage of those likely eligible for visas, in such categories as persons requiring medical treatment, academic visitors, students, family members, and others belonging to groups that, when considered as a group (rather than case by case), would not seem to pose security threats.
Amici have suggested that there are numerous appli- cants who could meet the waiver criteria. For instance, the Proclamation anticipates waivers for those with “sig-
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 5
BREYER, J., dissenting
nificant business or professional obligations” in the United States, §3(c)(iv)(C), and amici identify many scholars who would seem to qualify. Brief for Colleges and Universities as Amici Curiae 25–27; Brief for American Council on Education et al. as Amici Curiae 20 (identifying more than 2,100 scholars from covered countries); see also Brief for Massachusetts Technology Leadership Council, Inc., asAmicus Curiae 14–15 (identifying technology and business leaders from covered countries). The Proclamation also anticipates waivers for those with a “close family member (e.g., a spouse, child, or parent)” in the United States, §3(c)(iv)(D), and amici identify many such individuals affected by the Proclamation. Brief for Labor Organiza- tions as Amici Curiae 15–18 (identifying children and other relatives of U. S. citizens). The Pars Equality Cen- ter identified 1,000 individuals—including parents and children of U. S. citizens—who sought and were denied entry under the Proclamation, hundreds of whom seem to meet the waiver criteria. See Brief for Pars Equality Center et al. as Amici Curiae 12–28.
Other data suggest the same. The Proclamation does not apply to asylum seekers or refugees. §§3(b)(vi), 6(e). Yet few refugees have been admitted since the Proclama- tion took effect. While more than 15,000 Syrian refugees arrived in the United States in 2016, only 13 have arrived since January 2018. Dept. of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Interactive Reporting, Refugee Processing Center, http://ireports.wrapsnet.org. Similarly few refugees have been admitted since January from Iran (3), Libya (1), Yemen (0), and Somalia (122). Ibid.
The Proclamation also exempts individuals applying for several types of nonimmigrant visas: lawful permanent residents, parolees, those with certain travel documents, dual nationals of noncovered countries, and representa- tives of governments or international organizations. §§3(b)(i)–(v). It places no restrictions on the vast majority
6 TRUMP v. HAWAII BREYER, J., dissenting
of student and exchange visitors, covering only those from Syria, which provided 8 percent of student and exchange visitors from the five countries in 2016. §§2(b)–(h); see Dept. of State, Report of the Visa Office 2016, Table XVII Nonimmigrant Visas Issued Fiscal Year 2016 (Visa Report 2016 Table XVII). Visitors from Somalia are eligible for any type of nonimmigrant visa, subject to “additional scrutiny.” §2(h)(ii). If nonimmigrant visa applications under the Proclamation resemble those in 2016, 16 per- cent of visa applicants would be eligible for exemptions. See Visa Report 2016 Table XVII.
In practice, however, only 258 student visas were issued to applicants from Iran (189), Libya (29), Yemen (40), and Somalia (0) in the first three months of 2018. See Dept. of State, Nonimmigrant Visa Issuances by Nationality, Jan., Feb., and Mar. 2018. This is less than a quarter of the volume needed to be on track for 2016 student visa levels. And only 40 nonimmigrant visas have been issued to Somali nationals, a decrease of 65 percent from 2016.Ibid.; see Visa Report 2016 Table XVII. While this is but a piece of the picture, it does not provide grounds for confidence.
Anecdotal evidence further heightens these concerns. For example, one amicus identified a child with cerebral palsy in Yemen. The war had prevented her from receiv- ing her medication, she could no longer move or speak, and her doctors said she would not survive in Yemen. Her visa application was denied. Her family received a form with a check mark in the box unambiguously confirming that “‘a waiver will not be granted in your case.’” Letter from L. Blatt to S. Harris, Clerk of Court (May 1, 2018). But after the child’s case was highlighted in an amicusbrief before this Court, the family received an update from the consular officer who had initially denied the waiver. It turns out, according to the officer, that she had all along determined that the waiver criteria were met. But, the
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 7
BREYER, J., dissenting
officer explained, she could not relay that information at the time because the waiver required review from a super- visor, who had since approved it. The officer said that the family’s case was now in administrative processing and that she was attaching a “‘revised refusal letter indicating the approval of the waiver.’” Ibid. The new form did not actually approve the waiver (in fact, the form contains no box saying “granted”). But a different box was now checked, reading: “‘The consular officer is reviewing your eligibility for a waiver under the Proclamation. . . . This can be a lengthy process, and until the consular officer can make an individualized determination of [the relevant] factors, your visa application will remain refused under Section 212(f) [of the Proclamation].’” Ibid. One is left to wonder why this second box, indicating continuing review, had not been checked at the outset if in fact the child’s case had remained under consideration all along. Though this is but one incident and the child was admitted after considerable international attention in this case, it pro- vides yet more reason to believe that waivers are not being processed in an ordinary way.
Finally, in a pending case in the Eastern District of New York, a consular official has filed a sworn affidavit assert- ing that he and other officials do not, in fact, have discre- tion to grant waivers. According to the affidavit, consular officers “were not allowed to exercise that discretion” and “the waiver [process] is merely ‘window dressing.’” See Decl. of Christopher Richardson, Alharbi v. Miller, No. 1:18-cv-2435 (June 1, 2018), pp. 3–4. Another report similarly indicates that the U. S. Embassy in Djibouti, which processes visa applications for citizens of Yemen, received instructions to grant waivers “only in rare cases of imminent danger,” with one consular officer reportedly telling an applicant that “‘[e]ven for infants, we would need to see some evidence of a congenital heart defect or another medical issue of that degree of difficulty
8 TRUMP v. HAWAII BREYER, J., dissenting
that…would likely lead to the child’s developmental harm or death.’” Center for Constitutional Rights and the Rule of Law Clinic, Yale Law School, Window Dressing the Muslim Ban: Reports of Waivers and Mass Denials from Yemeni-American Families Stuck in Limbo 18 (2018).
Declarations, anecdotal evidence, facts, and numbers taken from amicus briefs are not judicial factfindings. The Government has not had an opportunity to respond, and a court has not had an opportunity to decide. But, given the importance of the decision in this case, the need for assur- ance that the Proclamation does not rest upon a “Muslim ban,” and the assistance in deciding the issue that an- swers to the “exemption and waiver” questions may pro- vide, I would send this case back to the District Court for further proceedings. And, I would leave the injunction in effect while the matter is litigated. Regardless, the Court’s decision today leaves the District Court free to explore these issues on remand.
If this Court must decide the question without this further litigation, I would, on balance, find the evidence of antireligious bias, including statements on a website taken down only after the President issued the two execu- tive orders preceding the Proclamation, along with the other statements also set forth in JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’s opinion, a sufficient basis to set the Proclamation aside. And for these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
KEY QUOTE FROM JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’S DISSENT:
The United States of America is a Nation built upon the promise of religious liberty. Our Founders honored that core promise by embedding the principle of religious neu trality in the First Amendment. The Court’s decision today fails to safeguard that fundamental principle. It leaves undisturbed a policy first advertised openly and unequivocally as a “total and complete shutdown of Mus lims entering the United States” because the policy now masquerades behind a façade of national-security con cerns. But this repackaging does little to cleanse Presi dential Proclamation No. 9645 of the appearance of dis crimination that the President’s words have created. Based on the evidence in the record, a reasonable observer would conclude that the Proclamation was motivated by anti-Muslim animus. That alone suffices to show that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their Estab lishment Clause claim. The majority holds otherwise by ignoring the facts, misconstruing our legal precedent, and turning a blind eye to the pain and suffering the Procla mation inflicts upon countless families and individuals, many of whom are United States citizens. Because that troubling result runs contrary to the Constitution and our precedent, I dissent.
. . .
In the intervening years since Korematsu, our Nation has done much to leave its sordid legacy behind. See, e.g.,Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U. S. C. App. §4211 et seq.(setting forth remedies to individuals affected by the executive order at issue in Korematsu); Non-Detention Act of 1971, 18 U. S. C. §4001(a) (forbidding the imprisonment or detention by the United States of any citizen absent an Act of Congress). Today, the Court takes the important step of finally overruling Korematsu, denouncing it as “gravely wrong the day it was decided.” Ante, at 38 (citingKorematsu, 323 U. S., at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting)). This formal repudiation of a shameful precedent is laud able and long overdue. But it does not make the majority’s decision here acceptable or right. By blindly accepting the Government’s misguided invitation to sanction a discrimi natory policy motivated by animosity toward a disfavored group, all in the name of a superficial claim of national security, the Court redeploys the same dangerous logic underlying Korematsu and merely replaces one “gravely wrong” decision with another. Ante, at 38.
Our Constitution demands, and our country deserves, a Judiciary willing to hold the coordinate branches to ac count when they defy our most sacred legal commitments. Because the Court’s decision today has failed in that respect, with profound regret, I dissent.
************************************
Quick Takes:
Yes, I think it’s as bad as it looks and sounds at first glance!
Anybody who thought that the Supremes would stand up for the Constitution against bias-based Executive overreaching should be disabused of that wishful thinking by this decision.
The majority showed little or no interest in holding Trump within Constitutional norms in the area of immigration.
Seems like the Supremes are inviting a bogus “Asylum Ban” as Trump’s next move, and signaling that they won’t do anything no matter how bad his abuses of the law, the Constitution, or international law might be.
Things are likely to get ugly really fast. And, the Supremes are saying that the last and only hope for getting our country and our Constitution back from the restrictionist regime is at the ballot box.
To make that result unlikely, however, they also turned their backs this week on clear racial and political gerrymandering, thus seeking to guarantee White minority control of all branches of Government for the foreseeable future.
“By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Policy. It is the policy of this Administration to rigorously enforce our immigration laws. Under our laws, the only legal way for an alien to enter this country is at a designated port of entry at an appropriate time. When an alien enters or attempts to enter the country anywhere else, that alien has committed at least the crime of improper entry and is subject to a fine or imprisonment under section 1325(a) of title 8, United States Code. This Administration will initiate proceedings to enforce this and other criminal provisions of the INA until and unless Congress directs otherwise. It is also the policy of this Administration to maintain family unity, including by detaining alien families together where appropriate and consistent with law and available resources. It is unfortunate that Congress’s failure to act and court orders have put the Administration in the position of separating alien families to effectively enforce the law.
Sec. 2. Definitions. For purposes of this order, the following definitions apply: (a) “Alien family” means
(i) any person not a citizen or national of the United States who has not been admitted into, or is not authorized to enter or remain in, the United States, who entered this country with an alien child or alien children at or between designated ports of entry and who was detained; and
(ii) that person’s alien child or alien children.
(b) “Alien child” means any person not a citizen or national of the United States who
(i) has not been admitted into, or is not authorized to enter or remain in, the United States;
(ii) is under the age of 18; and
(iii) has a legal parent-child relationship to an alien who entered the United States with the alien child at or between designated ports of entry and who was detained.
Sec. 3. Temporary Detention Policy for Families Entering this Country Illegally. (a) The Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary), shall, to the extent permitted by law and subject to the availability of appropriations, maintain custody of alien families during the pendency of any criminal improper entry or immigration proceedings involving their members.
(b) The Secretary shall not, however, detain an alien family together when there is a concern that detention of an alien child with the child’s alien parent would pose a risk to the child’s welfare.
(c) The Secretary of Defense shall take all legally available measures to provide to the Secretary, upon request, any existing facilities available for the housing and care of alien families, and shall construct such facilities if necessary and consistent with law. The Secretary, to the extent permitted by law, shall be responsible for reimbursement for the use of these facilities.
(d) Heads of executive departments and agencies shall, to the extent consistent with law, make available to the Secretary, for the housing and care of alien families pending court proceedings for improper entry, any facilities that are appropriate for such purposes. The Secretary, to the extent permitted by law, shall be responsible for reimbursement for the use of these facilities.
(e) The Attorney General shall promptly file a request with the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California to modify the Settlement Agreement in Flores v. Sessions, CV 85-4544 (“Flores settlement”), in a manner that would permit the Secretary, under present resource constraints, to detain alien families together throughout the pendency of criminal proceedings for improper entry or any removal or other immigration proceedings.
Sec. 4. Prioritization of Immigration Proceedings Involving Alien Families. The Attorney General shall, to the extent practicable, prioritize the adjudication of cases involving detained families.
Sec. 5. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented in a manner consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
DONALD J. TRUMP”
***************************************
Section 1 maintains the abusive policy of prosecuting every misdemeanor illegal entry case (“zero-tolerance,” a/k/a “zero common sense,” a/k/a “zero humanity”). Most of those duressed into pleading guilty in assembly line Federal criminal courts are sentenced to “time served,” thus illustrating the absurd wastefulness of this policy and how it detracts from real law enforcement. Trump also throws in a gratuitous and totally disingenuous jab at Congress and the courts for causing the problem that he & Sessions actually created.
Section 3(a) directs the detention of families throughout criminal proceedings and until the end of Immigration Court proceedings (which often takes many months or even years), an abominable, costly, inhumane, unnecessary, and unsustainable policy originally developed during the Obama Administration. The Government lacks adequate family detention facilities, which are supposed to be non-secure facilities licensed by a child welfare agency. Additionally, asylum applicants in Removal Proceedings generally have a right to bond. In most cases, there would be no legitimate reason to deny bond. Contrary to the Administration’s bogus suggestions and intentionally misleading statistics, studies show that those who are represented by counsel and understand the asylum process show up for their hearings more than 90% of the time. I found it was close to 100%. This suggests that a “saner” policy would be to help individuals find lawyers and then release them.
Section 3(c) makes the Secretary of Defense, an official without any qualifications whatsoever, responsible for providing family jails on military bases. It shouldn’t take the courts too long to find these facilities unsuitable for family immigration detention.
Section 3(e) recognizes that this order is largely illegal in that it contravenes the order of the U.S. District Court in Flores v. Sessions which was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. Flores orders the release of juveniles from immigration detention within 20 days unless they present a significant public safety risk or are likely to abscond. Where juveniles don’t meet the release criteria, they must be held in the least restrictive setting appropriate to age and special needs. While Trump orders the Attorney General to seek a modification of Flores, there is no legal rationale for that action. In fact, the abusive “fake emergency” situation that Trump & Sessions have created, shows exactly why Flores is needed, now more than ever. It also makes a compelling case for Congress to enact Flores protections into law, thereby making them permanent and avoiding future abuses by the Executive.
Section 4 basically orders the Attorney General to engage in more “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” (“ADR”) in the U.S. Immigration Courts by prioritizing cases of recently arrived families, many of whom have not had a chance to obtain lawyers and document applications, at the expense of cases that are already on the docket and ready for final hearings. That’s why the Immigration Court backlog is 720,000 cases and continuing to grow. It also shows why the Immigration Courts are a facade of Due Process, totally mismanaged by politicos, and must be removed from the DOJ and become a truly independent court system that establishes court priorities and procedures without Executive interference.
The order is silent on whether it applies to those families who have already been separated and how those families might be reunited.
In summary, this “Temporary Executive Order” is not a credible attempt to solve the problem of family separation. Rather, it is another “designed to fail” charade intended to provoke litigation so that the predictable mess can be blamed on the courts, Congress, the asylum applicants and their families (“blaming the victims”), and their courageous lawyers. In other words, anyone except Trump and his cronies who are responsible for the problem.
It’s a prime example of what life in a Kakistocracy is and will continue to be until there is “regime change.”
What would a “real solution” to this issue look like. Well, I’ve said it before:
The real choices are 1) a dangerous 4,000 mile journey to a place where you might be able to save your life and that of your loved ones; or 2) the much more dangerous option of remaining in a place where you will likely be beaten, raped, extorted, tortured, impressed against your will, or killed by gangs, who are not just “street criminals” (as falsely portrayed by Sessions and other restrictionists) but who exercise quasi-governmental authority with the knowing acquiescence of the recognized governments.
Realistically, folks are going to opt for #1. We could recognize them as refugees; screen them abroad to weed out gang members and criminals and to take the danger out of the 4,000 mile journey; work with the UNHCR and other countries to distribute the flow; open more paths to legal immigration for those who want to leave but might not fit easily within the refugee definition; and encourage those who still arrive at our borders without documents seeking protection to go to a port of entry where they will be treated respectfully, humanely, and be given a prompt but full opportunity to present their cases for protection with access to counsel in a system that satisfies all the requirements of Constitutional Due Process, with the additional understanding that if they lose they will have to return to their home country.
Alternatively, we could double down on our current failed policies of detention, deterrence, and lawless and immoral Governmental behavior; send the message that folks shouldn’t bother using our legal system because it’s a fraud that has intentionally been fixed against them; encourage the use of smugglers who will charge ever higher fees for developing new and more dangerous means of entry; and send the message that if folks really want to survive, they should pay a smuggler to get them into the interior of our country where they have at least a fighting chance of blending in, hiding out from immigration enforcement, behaving themselves, and working hard until they are caught and removed, die, conditions improve and they leave voluntarily for their country of origin, or we finally give them some type of legal recognition.
My first alternative could likely be established and operated for a fraction of what we are now spending on failed immigration enforcement, useless and unnecessarily cruel detention, unnecessary criminal prosecutions, and a broken Immigration Court system.
Plus, at a time of low birth rate and low unemployment, it would give us a significant economic boost by bringing a highly motivated, hard-working, family oriented, and appreciative workforce into our society. It might also inspire other stable democratic nations to join us in an effort to save lives (which also happens to fit in well with religious values), resettle individuals, and, over time, address the horrible situation in the Northern Triangle that is creating this flow.
Alternative two, which is basically a variation on what we already are doing, will guarantee a continuing “black market flow”of migrants, some of whom will be apprehended and removed at significant financial and societal costs, while most will continue to live in an underground society, subject to exploitation by unscrupulous employers and law enforcement, underutilizing their skills, and not being given the opportunity to integrate fully into our society.
Don’t hold your breath! But, eventually the New Due Process Army will win the war and enough elections to finally bring sanity, humanity, and reality to the U.S. immigration system.
I raised the possibility a year ago that Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel will face criminal charges for harboring undocumented aliens if he goes much further with his sanctuary policies.
Punishment for harboring ranges from a fine and/or up to a year in prison to life in prison or a death sentence.
It hasn’t happened…yet. But Attorney General Jeff Sessions has called for more harboring prosecutions and is not limiting the reach of the harboring provisions.
The Border Patrol arrested a member of the No More Deaths humanitarian group in the Arizona desert a few months ago and charged him with harboring for giving aliens who had made an illegal crossing food, water, and a place to sleep for three days.
Harboring prosecutions are still uncommon, but I expect this to change when Sessions realizes that the immigration court backlog crisis is making it impossible for him to enforce the immigration laws effectively.
He will have to find ways to make America a less desirable place for undocumented aliens to live. In other words, he will have to encourage “self-deportation.”
Harboring prosecutions can serve this purpose by making individuals, landlords, employers, humanitarian organizations, etc., afraid to become involved with undocumented aliens. Even church congregations would be vulnerable.
. . . .
Will harboring prosecutions be more successful than employer sanctions were?
Maybe not, but Sessions has to try something and harboring prosecutions might help.
To convict someone of harboring, the government must establish that the defendant concealed, harbored, or shielded an undocumented alien from detection. A conviction can result from committing any one of the three acts.
The harboring provisions provide the following penalties for each alien in respect to whom a violation occurs:
If the offense did not involve commercial advantage or financial gain, a fine or imprisonment for up to 5 years, or both;
If it was done for commercial advantage or financial gain, a fine or imprisonment for up to 10 years, or both;
In the case of a violation during and in relation to which the offender causes serious bodily injury, or places in jeopardy the life of any person, a fine or imprisonment for up to 20 years, or both; and
In the case of a violation resulting in the death of any person, a death sentence or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, a fine, or both.
The statute does not define “conceal,” “harbor,” or “shield from detection.” The federal courts have had to define these terms.
“Conceal” generally has been taken to mean hiding or otherwise preventing the discovery of an undocumented alien.
Courts have interpreted “shielding” more expansively. Even the making of false statements or falsifying documents may constitute “shielding.”
According to the ACLU, “harboring” is defined differently in the various federal jurisdictions across the country.
The most frequent characteristic the courts have used to describe “harboring” is that it facilitates an immigrant’s remaining in the United States illegally, which encompasses an extremely wide range of activities.
This is certain to result in inconsistent verdicts. People are going to be incarcerated for conduct that wouldn’t have been considered a crime if it had been committed in a different judicial district.
While a large-scale, nationwide campaign of harboring prosecutions might make it harder for undocumented aliens to live in the United States, the cost will be too high if it fills our prisons with American citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents who were just trying to be good Samaritans.
********************************************
Get Nolan’s complete article over at The Hill at the link!
Yeah, I could see Sessions pursuing this. But, believe it or not, it’s been tried before and failed as a deterrent.
During the Reagan Administration, when I was the INS Deputy General Counsel, the Administration brought criminal cases against some of the leaders of the so-called “Sanctuary Movement” in Texas and Arizona.
Unlike undocumented migrants held in immigration detention, those charged with harboring are always vigorously represented by good defense lawyers. The trials are very time-consuming and labor intensive.
I remember once spending the better part of a week in South Texas waiting to be called as a Government witness in a sanctuary prosecution. Upon finally being reached on the witness list, all I got to state was my name and position before the U.S. District Judge sustained the defendants’ objection to my testimony and disqualified me as a witness.
Also, unlike prosecuting undocumented migrants in Immigration Court, 100% of the convictions are appealed, a process that also stretches out for many years. Even when the Government “wins” the case and a conviction is sustained, the sentence is almost always probation or something quite nominal.
In other words, this is a “strategy’ that will tie up lots of U.S. Attorney and Federal Judicial resources, create lots of ill feeling in the community, but provide no real deterrence. Indeed, my recollection is that rather than deterring the “Sanctuary Movement,” these prosecutions actually inspired and motivated groups opposed to the Government’s policies on Central American migrants!
In fact, eventually there were enough demonstrated problems with the Regan/Bush I Administrations’ approach to Central American asylum seekers that the plaintiffs succeeded in a class action in getting a “redo” of all the cases. This was known as ABC v. Thornburgh. This case, for all practical purposes, ended the U.S. Government’s efforts to expel the Central American asylum seekers who arrived during the 1980s.
Eventually, class members were allowed to obtain green cards under the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act (“NACRA”). I was pleased to have approved numerous NACARA cases during my tenure as an Immigration Judge in Arlington. (Yes, they were still around decades later.)
I was continuously inspired by what these hard-working families had achieved in their lives, notwithstanding our efforts to expel them. No, they weren’t all “rocket scientists.” But, nearly without exception, they were contributing members of our community, providing important services or creating necessary goods.
One of the many things that “gives lie” to the restrictionist claim that the current wave of asylum seekers and migrants from the Northern Triangle won’t “fit in” and be able to assimilate. About the only thing inhibiting “assimilation” is our Government’s unwillingness to allow it to take place, and actually acting to discourage it in many, many ways.
I found NACARA applicants to be remarkably “the same as the rest of us, perhaps better” in terms dedication to the “American Dream,” work ethic, respect for education, and willingness to sacrifice so that future generations could have better lives. The only real difference was the “pure luck” of those of us who had the good fortune to be born here.
A “smart” approach to immigration would be to “can” the waste of resources on border prosecutions and detention and put together another legislative effort like NACARA, only this time for all long-time undocumented residents of the US. But, of course, that wouldn’t serve to “fire up” the White Nationalist electoral base that Trump relies upon.
Common sense, learning from history, responsible use of Government resources, and basic human decency are qualities conspicuously absent from Sessions. But, I think that the “NACRA story” shows a very plausible “ultimate long-term outcome” for the latest, ultimately doomed, efforts to deal with immigration issues exclusively with restrictionist policies.
Finally, Nolan has kindly supplied us with an updated link to a list of all seventy (70) of his past articles in The Hill on immigration policy. Congratulations, Nolan, for your prodigious contributions!
The Supreme Court’s final oral argument of the term will be one of its most important and potentially far-reaching, an examination of the president’s authority to protect the country by banning some foreigners who seek entry.
But, similar to a debate that has consumed Washington for the past 15 months, a major issue for the court is separating “the president” from “this president.”
The justices on Wednesday will consider President Trump’s third iteration of a travel ban that bars most nationals from a small group of mostly Muslim nations. It is the first time the court has considered the merits of a policy that has consumed the administration since its start, and raises deep questions about the judiciary’s role in national security issues usually left to the political branches.
The first version of the ban was issued just a week after Trump took office, and lower courts have found that it and each reformulated version since exceeded the authority granted by Congress and was motivated by Trump’s prejudice — animus, as courts like to say — toward Muslims.
The state of Hawaii, which is leading the challenge of the ban, told the Supreme Court:
“For over a year, the president campaigned on the pledge, never retracted, that he would ban Muslims from entering the United States.
“And upon taking office, the president issued and reissued, and reissued again, a sweeping and unilateral order that purports to bar over 150 million aliens — the vast majority of them Muslim — from entering the United States.”
Hawaii’s brief, by Washington lawyer Neal K. Katyal, cites not only Trump’s campaign comments, but also his actions as president, including the time he retweeted “three anti-Muslim propaganda videos” from a widely condemned far-right British organization.
This led to a response by the solicitor general of the United States to the justices of the Supreme Court that could have been written only in this era, about this chief executive:
“The president’s retweets do not address the meaning of the proclamation at all.”
Solicitor General Noel J. Francisco urged the court not to get distracted by the president’s bluster — he has said nice things about Muslims, too, the brief states — and to keep its examination on the law.
*************************
Read Barnes’s full article at the link.
Trump has never shown any actual justification for the “bogus ban.” But, the standard of “facially bona fide and legitimate” is very permissive. As usual, from a legal standpoint, Trump would have done better to have kept his big mouth shut!
Matter of Sanchez-Lopez, 27 I&N Dec. 256 (BIA 2018), overrulingMatter of Sanchez-Lopez, 26 I&N Dec. 7 (BIA 2012)
BIA HEADNOTE:
The offense of stalking in violation of section 646.9 of the California Penal Code is not “a crime of stalking” under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2012). Matter of Sanchez-Lopez, 26 I&N Dec. 71 (BIA 2012), overruled.
Although the DHS appears to concede that stalking under section 646.9 is “overbroad” relative to the definition we outlined in Matter of Sanchez-Lopez, it asserts that we should broaden the definition of a “crime of stalking” under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Act to meet contemporary standards. Specifically, it argues that we should redefine the term “stalking” in the Act based on its commonly understood meaning, either in 2012 when we decided Matter of Sanchez-Lopez, or based on the common elements of State and Federal stalking statutes in 2017.
We recognize that the common elements of stalking have evolved since section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) was added to the Act in 1996, in that a number of States have broadened the term “stalking” to cover threats of nonphysical harm in an effort to afford greater protections to their citizens against stalkers. However, we are constrained to define offenses “based on the ‘generic, contemporary meaning’ of the statutory words at the time the
statute was enacted.” Matter of Cardiel, 25 I&N Dec. 12, 17 (BIA 2009) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990)); see also Matter of Alvarado, 26 I&N Dec. 895, 897 (BIA 2016). The DHS relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2281 (2016), which declined “to wind the clock back” to consider the common law in discerning whether the provision at issue reached reckless acts. But that case also looked to the legislative history and the “state-law backdrop” that existed at the time the statute was enacted. Id. at 2280–82. We are therefore unpersuaded to broaden the definition of the term “stalking” under section 237(a)(2)(E) of the Act to encompass the most contemporary understanding of that offense.
Upon reconsideration, we conclude that the offense of stalking in violation of section 646.9 of the California Penal Code is not “a crime of stalking” under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Act. We will therefore overrule our decision in Matter of Sanchez-Lopez and vacate all prior orders in this case to the extent they hold to the contrary. Accordingly, because the respondent is not removable, his appeal will be sustained and the removal proceedings will be terminated.
KEY QUOTE FROM DISSENT:
The legal landscape has changed since we published our decision inMatter of Sanchez-Lopez. This case illustrates the limitations of applying the categorical approach imposed by the Supreme Court in Descamps andMathis to provisions of the immigration laws enacted by Congress for the purpose of removing aliens convicted of serious criminal conduct. See Matter of Chairez, 27 I&N Dec. 21, 25–26 (BIA 2017) (Malphrus, concurring). Under this approach, only if section 646.9 is divisible can we look to the respondent’s conviction records to determine if his conduct involved an intent to cause the victim to fear death or bodily injury, as many such stalking cases do. Because of this strict categorical approach, many statutes that have since broadened the scope of protection for stalking victims may not qualify as a categorical match to section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Act. As a result, in California and many other States, an alien who was criminally convicted of stalking an innocent victim will not be removable under the Act, even though the record makes clear that he or she committed “a crime of stalking.” It is highly unlikely that Congress intended this result.
I liked the comment from Dan Kowalski over at LexisNexis Immigration Community: “It only took about 6 years and several trips up and down the administrative and judicial food chain.”
My point (that I make over and over) is that there is NO WAY that an unrepresented respondent (particularly in DHS detention where most respondents convicted of crimes end up) could have achieved this result. That means that unrepresented individuals are wrongfully deported by DHS every day.
The Immigration Court system already is failing in its duty to guarantee fairness and due process to all respondents. Outrageously, instead of doing what he should do — working to insure maximum representation and raising the quality of Immigration Judge and BIA decisions to insure Due Process — Jeff Sessions is doing just the opposite!
He’s putting “haste makes waste quotas” on Immigration Judges; encouraging judges to deny continuances needed to obtain counsel and adequately prepare defenses; locating Immigration Courts in detention centers which intentionally lack both public access and ready availability of pro bono counsel; using coercive, substandard detention and family separation to deter individuals from pursuing potentially successful claims and defenses; further skewing the law against asylum seekers; and suspending the essential “Legal Orientation Program” which helps unrepresented individuals in detention understand their rights and what will happen in Immigration Court before their first appearance before a judge.
Sessions v. Dimaya, No. 15–1498, 04-17-18 (5-4 Decision)
Syllabus By Court Staff:
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) virtually guarantees that any alien convicted of an “aggravated felony” after entering the Unit- ed States will be deported. See 8 U. S. C. §§1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1229b(a)(3), (b)(1)(C). An aggravated felony includes “a crime of violence (as defined in [18 U.S.C. §16] . . . ) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.” §1101(a)(43)(f). Section 16’s definition of a crime of violence is divided into two clauses—often referred to as the elements clause, §16(a), and the residual clause, §16(b). The residual clause, the provision at issue here, defines a “crime of violence” as “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” To decide whether a person’s conviction falls within the scope of that clause, courts apply the categorical approach. This approach has courts ask not whether “the particular facts” underlying a conviction created a substantial risk, Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1, 7, nor whether the statutory elements of a crime require the creation of such a risk in each and every case, but whether “the ordinary case” of an offense poses the requisite risk, James v. United States, 550 U. S. 192, 208.
Respondent James Dimaya is a lawful permanent resident of the United States with two convictions for first-degree burglary under California law. After his second offense, the Government sought to deport him as an aggravated felon. An Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals held that California first-degree bur- glary is a “crime of violence” under §16(b). While Dimaya’s appeal was pending in the Ninth Circuit, this Court held that a similar re-
2
SESSIONS v. DIMAYA Syllabus
sidual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)—defining “violent felony” as any felony that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)—was unconstitutionally “void for vagueness” under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. ___, ___. Relying on Johnson, the Ninth Circuit held that §16(b), as incorporated into the INA, was also unconstitu- tionally vague.
Held: The judgment is affirmed.
803 F. 3d 1110, affirmed.
JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to
Parts I, III, IV–B, and V, concluding that §16’s residual clause is un- constitutionally vague. Pp. 6–11, 16–25.
(a) A straightforward application of Johnson effectively resolves this case. Section 16(b) has the same two features as ACCA’s residu- al clause—an ordinary-case requirement and an ill-defined risk threshold—combined in the same constitutionally problematic way. To begin, ACCA’s residual clause created “grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime” because it “tie[d] the judi- cial assessment of risk” to a speculative hypothesis about the crime’s “ordinary case,” but provided no guidance on how to figure out what that ordinary case was. 576 U. S., at ___. Compounding that uncer- tainty, ACCA’s residual clause layered an imprecise “serious poten- tial risk” standard on top of the requisite “ordinary case” inquiry. The combination of “indeterminacy about how to measure the risk posed by a crime [and] indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for the crime to qualify as a violent felony,” id., at ___, resulted in “more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates,” id., at ___. Section 16(b) suffers from those same two flaws. Like ACCA’s residual clause, §16(b) calls for a court to identify a crime’s “ordinary case” in order to measure the crime’s risk but “offers no reliable way” to discern what the ordinary version of any offense looks like. Id., at ___. And its “substantial risk” thresh- old is no more determinate than ACCA’s “serious potential risk” standard. Thus, the same “[t]wo features” that “conspire[d] to make” ACCA’s residual clause unconstitutionally vague also exist in §16(b), with the same result. Id., at ___. Pp. 6–11.
(b) The Government identifies three textual discrepancies between ACCA’s residual clause and §16(b) that it claims make §16(b) easier to apply and thus cure the constitutional infirmity. None, however, relates to the pair of features that Johnson found to produce imper- missible vagueness or otherwise makes the statutory inquiry more determinate. Pp. 16–24.
(1) First, the Government argues that §16(b)’s express require-
Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 3
Syllabus
ment (absent from ACCA) that the risk arise from acts taken “in the course of committing the offense,” serves as a “temporal restriction”— in other words, a court applying §16(b) may not “consider risks aris- ing after” the offense’s commission is over. Brief for Petitioner 31. But this is not a meaningful limitation: In the ordinary case of any of- fense, the riskiness of a crime arises from events occurring during its commission, not events occurring later. So with or without the tem- poral language, a court applying the ordinary case approach, whether in §16’s or ACCA’s residual clause, would do the same thing—ask what usually happens when a crime is committed. The phrase “in the course of” makes no difference as to either outcome or clarity and cannot cure the statutory indeterminacy Johnson described.
Second, the Government says that the §16(b) inquiry, which focus- es on the risk of “physical force,” “trains solely” on the conduct typi- cally involved in a crime. Brief for Petitioner 36. In contrast, ACCA’s residual clause asked about the risk of “physical injury,” requiring a second inquiry into a speculative “chain of causation that could possibly result in a victim’s injury.” Ibid. However, this Court has made clear that “physical force” means “force capable of causing physical pain or injury.” Johnson v. United States, 559 U. S. 133, 140. So under §16(b) too, a court must not only identify the conduct typically involved in a crime, but also gauge its potential consequenc- es. Thus, the force/injury distinction does not clarify a court’s analy- sis of whether a crime qualifies as violent.
Third, the Government notes that §16(b) avoids the vagueness of ACCA’s residual clause because it is not preceded by a “confusing list of exemplar crimes.” Brief for Petitioner 38. Those enumerated crimes were in fact too varied to assist this Court in giving ACCA’s residual clause meaning. But to say that they failed to resolve the clause’s vagueness is hardly to say they caused the problem. Pp. 16– 21.
(2) The Government also relies on judicial experience with §16(b), arguing that because it has divided lower courts less often and resulted in only one certiorari grant, it must be clearer than its ACCA counterpart. But in fact, a host of issues respecting §16(b)’s application to specific crimes divide the federal appellate courts. And while this Court has only heard oral arguments in two §16(b) cases, this Court vacated the judgments in a number of other §16(b) cases, remanding them for further consideration in light of ACCA decisions. Pp. 21–24.
JUSTICE KAGAN, joined by JUSTICE GINSBURG, JUSTICE BREYER, and JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concluded in Parts II and IV–A:
(a) The Government argues that a more permissive form of the void-for-vagueness doctrine applies than the one Johnson employed
4
SESSIONS v. DIMAYA Syllabus
because the removal of an alien is a civil matter rather than a crimi- nal case. This Court’s precedent forecloses that argument. In Jor- dan v. De George, 341 U. S. 223, the Court considered what vague- ness standard applied in removal cases and concluded that, “in view of the grave nature of deportation,” the most exacting vagueness standard must apply. Id., at 231. Nothing in the ensuing years calls that reasoning into question. This Court has reiterated that deporta- tion is “a particularly severe penalty,” which may be of greater con- cern to a convicted alien than “any potential jail sentence.” Jae Lee v.United States, 582 U. S. ___, ___. Pp. 4–6.
(b) Section 16(b) demands a categorical, ordinary-case approach. For reasons expressed in Johnson, that approach cannot be aban- doned in favor of a conduct-based approach, which asks about the specific way in which a defendant committed a crime. To begin, the Government once again “has not asked [the Court] to abandon the categorical approach in residual-clause cases,” suggesting the fact- based approach is an untenable interpretation of §16(b). 576 U. S., at ___. Moreover, a fact-based approach would generate constitutional questions. In any event, §16(b)’s text demands a categorical ap- proach. This Court’s decisions have consistently understood lan- guage in the residual clauses of both ACCA and §16 to refer to “the statute of conviction, not to the facts of each defendant’s conduct.”Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575, 601. And the words “by its na- ture” in §16(b) even more clearly compel an inquiry into an offense’s normal and characteristic quality—that is, what the offense ordinari- ly entails. Finally, given the daunting difficulties of accurately “re- construct[ing],” often many years later, “the conduct underlying [a] conviction,” the conduct-based approach’s “utter impracticability”— and associated inequities—is as great in §16(b) as in ACCA. John- son, 576 U. S., at ___. Pp. 12–15.
JUSTICE GORSUCH, agreeing that the Immigration and Nationality Act provision at hand is unconstitutionally vague for the reasons identified in Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. ___, concluded that the void for vagueness doctrine, at least properly conceived, serves as a faithful expression of ancient due process and separation of powers principles the Framers recognized as vital to ordered liberty under the Constitution. The Government’s argument that a less-than-fair- notice standard should apply where (as here) a person faces only civ- il, not criminal, consequences from a statute’s operation is unavail- ing. In the criminal context, the law generally must afford “ordinary people . . . fair notice of the conduct it punishes,” id., at ___, and it is hard to see how the Due Process Clause might often require any less than that in the civil context. Nor is there any good reason to single out civil deportation for assessment under the fair notice standard
Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 5
Syllabus
because of the special gravity of its penalty when so many civil laws impose so many similarly severe sanctions. Alternative approaches that do not concede the propriety of the categorical ordinary case analysis are more properly addressed in another case, involving ei- ther the Immigration and Nationality Act or another statute, where the parties have a chance to be heard. Pp. 1–19.
KAGAN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III, IV–B, and V, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined, and an opin- ion with respect to Parts II and IV–A, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KENNEDY and ALITO, JJ., joined as to Parts I–C–2, II–A–1, and II–B.
Key Quote From Justice Kagan’s Majority (Pt. V):
Johnson tells us how to resolve this case. That decision held that “[t]wo features of [ACCA’s] residual clause con- spire[d] to make it unconstitutionally vague.” 576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5). Because the clause had both an ordinary-case requirement and an ill-defined risk thresh- old, it necessarily “devolv[ed] into guesswork and intui- tion,” invited arbitrary enforcement, and failed to provide fair notice. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8). Section 16(b) possesses the exact same two features. And none of the minor linguistic disparities in the statutes makes any real difference. So just like ACCA’s residual clause, §16(b) “produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 6). We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Key Quote From Justice Gorsuch”s Concurring Opinion:
Vague laws invite arbitrary power. Before the Revolu tion, the crime of treason in English law was so capa ciously construed that the mere expression of disfavored opinions could invite transportation or death. The founders cited the crown’s abuse of “pretended” crimes like this as one of their reasons for revolution. See Declaration of Independence ¶21. Today’s vague laws may not be as invidious, but they can invite the exercise of arbitrary power all the same—by leaving the people in the dark about what the law demands and allowing prosecutors and courts to make it up.
The law before us today is such a law. Before holding a lawful permanent resident alien like James Dimaya sub ject to removal for having committed a crime, the Immi gration and Nationality Act requires a judge to determine that the ordinary case of the alien’s crime of conviction involves a substantial risk that physical force may be used. But what does that mean? Just take the crime at issue in this case, California burglary, which applies to everyone from armed home intruders to door-to-door salesmen peddling shady products. How, on that vast spectrum, is anyone supposed to locate the ordinary case and say whether it includes a substantial risk of physical force? The truth is, no one knows. The law’s silence leaves judges to their intuitions and the people to their fate. In my judgment, the Constitution demands more.
Key Quote From Chief Justice Roberts’s Dissenting Opinion:
The more constrained inquiry required under §16(b)— which asks only whether the offense elements naturally carry with them a risk that the offender will use force in committing the offense—does not itself engender “grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime.” And the provision’s use of a commonplace sub- stantial risk standard—one not tied to a list of crimes that lack a unifying feature—does not give rise to intolerable “uncertainty about how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify.” That should be enough to reject Dimaya’s facial vagueness challenge.4
Because I would rely on those distinctions to uphold
——————
4 The Court also finds it probative that “a host of issues” respecting §16(b) “divide” the lower courts. Ante, at 22. Yet the Court does little to explain how those alleged conflicts vindicate its particular concern about the provision (namely, the ordinary case inquiry). And as the Government illustrates, many of those divergent results likely can be chalked up to material differences in the state offense statutes at issue. Compare Escudero-Arciniega v. Holder, 702 F. 3d 781, 783–785 (CA5 2012) (per curiam) (reasoning that New Mexico car burglary “requires that the criminal lack authorization to enter the vehicle—a require- ment alone which will most often ensure some force [against property] is used”), with Sareang Ye v. INS, 214 F. 3d 1128, 1134 (CA9 2000) (finding it relevant that California car burglary does not require unlaw- ful or unprivileged entry); see Reply Brief 17–20, and nn. 5–6.
14 SESSIONS v. DIMAYA ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting
§16(b), the Court reproaches me for not giving sufficient weight to a “core insight” of Johnson. Ante, at 10, n. 4; seeante, at 15 (opinion of GORSUCH, J.) (arguing that §16(b) runs afoul of Johnson “to the extent [§16(b)] requires an ‘ordinary case’ analysis”). But the fact that the ACCA residual clause required the ordinary case approach was not itself sufficient to doom the law. We instead took pains to clarify that our opinion should not be read to impart such an absolute rule. See Johnson, 576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10). I would adhere to that careful holding and not reflexively extend the decision to a different stat- ute whose reach is, on the whole, far more clear.
The Court does the opposite, and the ramifications of that decision are significant. First, of course, today’s holding invalidates a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act—part of the definition of “aggravated felony”—on which the Government relies to “ensure that dangerous criminal aliens are removed from the United States.” Brief for United States 54. Contrary to the Court’s back-of-the-envelope assessment, see ante, at 23, n.12, the Government explains that the definition is “critical” for “numerous” immigration provisions. Brief for United States 12.
In addition, §16 serves as the universal definition of “crime of violence” for all of Title 18 of the United States Code. Its language is incorporated into many procedural and substantive provisions of criminal law, including provisions concerning racketeering, money laundering, domestic violence, using a child to commit a violent crime, and distributing information about the making or use of explosives. See 18 U. S. C. §§25(a)(1), 842(p)(2), 1952(a), 1956(c)(7)(B)(ii), 1959(a)(4), 2261(a), 3561(b). Of special concern, §16 is replicated in the definition of “crime of violence” applicable to §924(c), which prohibits using or carrying a firearm “during and in relation to any crime of violence,” or possessing a firearm “in furtherance of any such crime.” §§924(c)(1)(A), (c)(3). Though I express no view on whether §924(c) can be distinguished from the provision we consider here, the Court’s holding calls into question convictions under what the Government warns us is an “oft-prosecuted offense.” Brief for United States 12.
Because Johnson does not compel today’s result, I respectfully dissent.
Key Quote From Justice Thomas’s Dissent:
I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE that 18 U. S. C. §16(b), as incorporated by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), is not unconstitutionally vague. Section 16(b) lacks many of the features that caused this Court to invalidate the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) in Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. ___ (2015). ACCA’s residual clause—a provision that this Court had applied four times before Johnson—was not unconstitu tionally vague either. See id., at ___ (THOMAS, J., concur ring in judgment) (slip op., at 1); id., at ___–___ (ALITO, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 13–17). But if the Court insists on adhering to Johnson, it should at least take Johnson at its word that the residual clause was vague due to the “‘sum’” of its specific features. Id., at ___ (majority opinion) (slip op., at 10). By ignoring this limitation, the Court jettisonsJohnson’s assurance that its holding would not jeopardize “dozens of federal and state criminal laws.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12).
While THE CHIEF JUSTICE persuasively explains why respondent cannot prevail under our precedents, I write separately to make two additional points. First, I continue to doubt that our practice of striking down statutes as unconstitutionally vague is consistent with the original meaning of the Due Process Clause. See id., at ___–___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 7–18). Second, if the Court thinks that §16(b) is unconstitutionally vague be cause of the “categorical approach,” see ante, at 6–11, then the Court should abandon that approach—not insist on reading it into statutes and then strike them down. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
****************************************
Gee whiz, those Trumpsters and GOP Senators who were overflowing with their praise of Justice Gorsuch’s brilliance during his confirmation hearings must be beside themselves now that he joined the “Gang of Four” in striking down a statute in an immigration enforcement case!
I predicted early on that Gorsuch might surprise those on both sides who expected him to be a “complete Trump toady.” Indeed, the case that drove today’s decision in Dimaya, Johnson v. United States, was written by none other than Justice Scalia, one of Justice Gorsuch’s “juridical role models.” At bottom, Dimaya is all about strict adherence to the Constitution and separation of powers, two things that Gorsuch as extolled in past decisions.
No, I don’t think that Justice Gorsuch is likely to team up with Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor on most future immigration cases. But, I am encouraged that he seems to be going where his legal principles, whether one agrees with them or not, take him, rather than just voting to support the Administration’s hard-line immigration agenda as many had predicted and some had hoped or assumed would happen.
There are other important immigration cases before the Supremes where adherence to the literal language of a statute and skepticism about giving the Executive unbridled power under separation of powers could aid the respondent’s position. So, while this might not be a “normal” majority configuration, it could well be repeated in some future immigration case. Let’s hope so!
Interestingly, I had this issue come up in one of the last cases I wrote before retiring from the Arlington Immigraton Court. I noted that the respondent made a strong argument for unconstitutionality under Johnson v, United States. However, as an Immigration Judge, I had no authority to hold a statute unconstitutional (although, ironically, under today’s convoluted system, the respondent was required to make his constitutional argument before me to “preserve” it for review by the Court of Appeals). So, I merely “noted” the constitutional issue for those higher up the “judicial food chain” and decided the issue on the basis that burglary as defined under the state law in question was not categorically a “crime of violence” under the so-called “categorical approach.”
Two other points worth mentioning:
In this particular case, the Supremes upheld the ruling of the much maligned (particularly by Trump & Sessions) 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, having jurisdiction over California ;
This type of issue is frequently recurring in Immigration Court where many, perhaps the majority, of respondents are unrepresented. How would an unrepresented individual who does not even speak English make the type of sophisticated legal arguments that a) got this case to the Supremes in the first place, and b) persuaded the majority of the Court? Of course, they couldn’t. That’s why much of what is going on in today’s U.S. Immigration Courts is a farce — a clear violation of constitutional Due Process that the Federal Courts have been doing their best to ignore or gloss over for many decades.
As more light is shed on the much misunderstood U.S. Immigration Court system, both Congress and the Article III Courts must come to grips with the procedural, ethical, and fairness inadequacies built into today’s “captive” Immigration Courts and the utter lack of any concern about protecting the legal rights of migrants shown by Jeff Sessions and the rest of the Trump Administration. Shockingly, they have actually pledged to stomp on migrants already unfulfilled rights to fair hearings in the name of a “false efficiency.”
Join the “New Due Process Army” and help stop the continuing abuses of human rights, statutory rights, and constitutional rights of migrants by Sessions and the rest of the “Trump Scofflaws!”
Gomez-Sanchez v. Sessions, 9th Cir., 04-06-18, Published, vacatingMatter of G-G-S-, 26 I&N Dec. 339 (BIA 2014)
COURT STAFF SUMMARY:
The panel granted Guillermo Gomez-Sanchez’s petition for review of the published decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 339 (BIA 2014), which concluded that Gomez-Sanchez was statutorily ineligible for withholding of removal because he was convicted of a “particularly serious crime” under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B), and vacated and remanded.
Gomez-Sanchez was convicted of assault with a non- deadly firearm weapon in violation of California Penal Code § 245(a)(1), which the BIA concluded constituted a particularly serious crime that prevented Gomez-Sanchez from being eligible for withholding of removal. In reaching this decision, the BIA held that a petitioner’s mental health could not be considered when addressing whether he had committed a particularly serious crime.
The panel held that Matter of G-G-S- was not entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. N.R.D.C., Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under step one of Chevron, the panel concluded that Matter of G-G-S-’s blanket rule against considering mental health is contrary to Congress’s clearly expressed intent that the particularly serious crime determination, in cases where a conviction falls outside the only statutorily enumerated per se category of particularly serious crimes, requires a case-by-case analysis. The panel also concluded that, even if Matter of G-G-S- were to survive step one of Chevron, it would fail at step two because the BIA’s interpretation is not reasonable in that the BIA’s two rationales for its broad rule – 1) that the Agency could not reassess a criminal court’s findings, and 2) that mental health is never relevant to the particularly serious crime determination – are unpersuasive and are inconsistent with the law of this Circuit and the BIA’s own decisions.
*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
PANEL:
Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw* and Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges, and Janet Bond Arterton,**District Judge.
* This case was submitted to a panel that included Judge Kozinski, who recently retired. Following Judge Kozinski’s retirement, Judge Wardlaw was drawn by lot to replace him. Ninth Circuit General Order 3.2.h. Judge Wardlaw has read the briefs, reviewed the record, and listened to oral argument.
** The Honorable Janet Bond Arterton, United States District Judge for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.
OPINION BY:
Judge Janet Bond Arterton
KEY QUOTES:
Against this backdrop, the BIA here announced and applied a blanket rule against considering an individual’s mental health as a factor when deciding whether his or her crime of conviction is particularly serious. Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 339, 347.4 This decision is contrary to Congress’s clearly expressed intent that the analysis of whether a crime is particularly serious “requires the agency to conduct a case-by-case analysis of convictions falling outside the category established by Congress,” Blandino- Medina, 712 F.3d at 1345, because such categorical rules undermine the ability of the agency to conduct a case-by- case analysis in each case, see Konou, 650 F.3d at 1128; see also Arteaga De Alvarez, 704 F.3d at 740.
. . . .
Here, the Board cited In re N-A-M- approvingly, as if applying it. See Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 343. However, in reality, its decision to constrain the evidence IJs may consider when making a particularly serious crime determination is at least inconsistent with, if not directly in contradiction with its earlier holding permitting consideration of “all reliable information.” See In Re N-A- M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 338, 342. Petitioner’s case makes this inconsistency clear—despite not disputing the reliability of the information Petitioner submitted concerning his mental illness, the Board entirely precluded consideration of that evidence. Given that the Board made no attempt to address the apparent inconsistencies between its earlier rule and the rule at issue here, we find its current interpretation to be unreasonable and thus decline to afford it deference. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016) (“[A]n ‘[u]nexplained inconsistency’ in agency policy is ‘a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice,’” and thus finding that the interpretation is not entitled to Chevron deference. (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005)));see also Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 920 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
Given the severe repercussions of being found to have committed a particularly serious crime, the risk of precluding relevant evidence that might alter that determination is unreasonable. Furthermore, this risk is readily avoided by permitting the IJ to use his or her discretion in weighing relevant, reliable evidence of mental health rather than categorically barring this evidence in all cases.
For all of these reasons the Board’s interpretation of the INA does not warrant deference under Chevron.
. . . .
We find the Board’s conclusion to be unreasonable because it is inconsistent with its own precedent recognizing the relevance of motivation and intent to the particularly serious crime determination. See Alphonsus, 705 F.3d at 1048 (“The BIA acts arbitrarily when it disregards its own precedents and policies without giving a reasoned explanation for doing so.” (quoting Israel v. I.N.S., 785 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1986))). In Matter of L-S-, the Board found significant that an individual convicted of alien smuggling did not intend to harm the victim. 22 I. & N. Dec. 645, 655–56 (BIA 1999). Indeed, the Government concedes that a particularly serious crime analysis permits consideration of an individual’s motivation. See Alphonsus, 705 F.3d at 1048 (finding no intent to harm either the arresting officer or members of the public).
********************************************
The BIA got it wrong in just about every conceivable way, including ignoring and misapplying its own precedents, in trying to reach a result unfavorable to the respondent. Against this backdrop of serious substantive problems (and, frankly, anti-respondent bias) permeating the entire U.S. Immigration Court System, from top to bottom, Sessions outrageously is trying to speed up the system without regard to quality or due process.
Suppose you inherited a factory that was producing defective cars. Would you solve the problem by speeding up the assembly line, forbidding the workers to think about their job functions, and denying them necessary training and equipment. No, that would produce even more defective cars, likely putting your company out of business. So, how is Session’s “just pedal faster” approach to assembly line justice acceptable? Obviously, it isn’t!
Sometimes, it doesn’t take a Government Accountability Office study to ferret out waste, fraud, and abuse. In this case, Jeff Sessions is right out there in public view intentionally and maliciously destroying a key part of the U.S. justice system. Why is Congress standing by and letting him get away with it? Why is the taxpayers’ money being wasted on illegal, illogical, and totally counterproductive actions? Whatever happened to effective oversight?
