“Conviction”under INA – Page 2 – immigrationcourtside.com

REGIME’S NEWEST SCHEME TO SCREW ASYLUM SEEKERS: BOGUS REGS THAT WOULD ILLEGALLY & UNNECESSARILY EXTEND THE GROUNDS OF “MANDATORY DENIAL,” DECREASE ADJUDICATOR DISCRETION, & SHAFT REFUGEE FAMILIES — Regime’s Outlandish “Efficiency Rationale” Fails to Mask Their Cruelty, Racism, Fraud, Waste, & Abuse – Julia Edwards Ainsley (NBC News) & Dean Kevin R. Johnson (ImmigrationProf Blog) Report

Julia Edwards Ainsley
NBC News Correspondent

https://apple.news/AXSXjJIOxRUSM4ZOgQm9plQ

Trump admin announces rule further limiting immigrants’ eligibility for asylum

DUIs, drug paraphernalia possession and unlawful receipt of public benefits would be among seven triggers barring migrants from even applying for asylum.

by Julia Ainsley | NBC NEWS

WASHINGTON — The Trump administration announced a new rule Wednesday that would further limit immigrants’ eligibility for asylum if they have been convicted of certain crimes, including driving under the influence and possession of drug paraphernalia.

The rule, if finalized, would give asylum officers seven requirements with which to deem an immigrant ineligible to apply for asylum.

Other acts that would make an immigrant ineligible for asylum under the new rule include the unlawful receipt of public benefits, illegal re-entry after being issued a deportation order and being found “by an adjudicator” to have engaged in domestic violence, even if there was no conviction for such violence.

The rules could eliminate large numbers of asylum-seekers from ever having their cases heard in court. Currently, immigration courts have a backlog of over 1 million cases, according to data kept by Syracuse University.

In a statement, the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security said the new rule would “increase immigration court efficiencies.”

Andrew Free, an immigration attorney based in Nashville, said the new regulation is “calculated to enable the denial of as many claims as possible.”

Free said the most common charges he sees for his immigrant clients are driving under the influence, domestic violence and driving without a license. Driving without a license is particularly common for immigrants who have had to use fake travel documents to enter the U.S. and live in states that do not give licenses to undocumented migrants.

“People who are fleeing persecutions and violence are not going to be able to get travel documents from the governments inflicting violence upon them. If you have to resort to other means of proving your identity, you won’t be eligible [for asylum,]” Free said.

The Trump administration has unveiled a number of new requirements meant to curb asylum applications this year. The most successful of those policies has been “Remain in Mexico” or MPP, that requires lawful asylum-seekers from Central America to wait in Mexico, often in dangerous conditions, until their court date in the United States. Over 60,000 asylum-seekers are currently waiting in Mexico for a decision to be made in their case, a process that can take over a year.

****************************************

The Beat Goes On! Joint Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Restrict Certain “Criminal Aliens'” Eligibility for Asylum

By Immigration Prof

Share

Consistent with the efforts to facilitate removal of “criminal aliens,” the Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security released the announcement below today:

“The Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security (collectively, “the Departments”) today issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) that would amend their respective regulations in order to prevent certain categories of criminal aliens from obtaining asylum in the United States. Upon finalization of the rulemaking process, the Departments will be able to devote more resources to the adjudication of asylum cases filed by non-criminal aliens.

Asylum is a discretionary immigration benefit that generally can be sought by eligible aliens who are physically present or arriving in the United States, irrespective of their status, as provided in section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1158. However, in the INA, Congress barred certain categories of aliens from receiving asylum. In addition to the statutory bars, Congress delegated to the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority to establish by regulation additional bars on asylum eligibility to the extent they are consistent with the asylum statute, as well as to establish “any other conditions or limitations on the consideration of an application for asylum” that are consistent with the INA. Today, the Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security are proposing to exercise their regulatory authority to limit eligibility for asylum for aliens who have engaged in specified categories of criminal behavior. The proposed rule will also eliminate a regulation concerning the automatic reconsideration of discretionary denials of asylum applications in limited cases.

The proposed regulation would provide seven additional mandatory bars to eligibility for asylum. The proposed rule would add bars to eligibility for aliens who commit certain offenses in the United States.Those bars would apply to aliens who are convicted of:

(1) A felony under federal or state law;

(2) An offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) or § 1324(a)(1)(2) (Alien Smuggling or Harboring);

(3) An offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (Illegal Reentry);

(4) A federal, state, tribal, or local crime involving criminal street gang activity;

(5) Certain federal, state, tribal, or local offenses concerning the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant;

(6) A federal, state, tribal, or local domestic violence offense, or who are found by an adjudicator to have engaged in acts of battery or extreme cruelty in a domestic context, even if no conviction resulted; and

(7) Certain misdemeanors under federal or state law for offenses related to false identification; the unlawful receipt of public benefits from a federal, state, tribal, or local entity; or the possession or trafficking of a controlled substance or controlled-substance paraphernalia.

The seven proposed bars would be in addition to the existing mandatory bars in the INA and its implementing regulations, such as those relating to the persecution of others, convictions for particularly serious crimes, commission of serious nonpolitical crimes, security threats, terrorist activity, and firm resettlement in another country.

Under the current statutory and regulatory framework, asylum officers and immigration judges consider the applicability of mandatory bars to asylum in every proceeding involving an alien who has submitted an application for asylum. Although the proposed regulation would expand the mandatory bars to asylum, the proposed regulation does not change the nature or scope of the role of an immigration judge or an asylum officer during proceedings for consideration of asylum applications.

The proposed rule would also remove the provisions at 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(e) and §1208.16(e) regarding reconsideration of discretionary denials of asylum. The removal of the requirement to reconsider a discretionary denial would increase immigration court efficiencies and reduce any cost from the increased adjudication time by no longer requiring a second review of the same application by the same immigration judge.” (bold added).

KJ

December 18, 2019 in Current Affairs | Permalink | Comments (0)

********************************

What total, unadulterated BS and gratuitous cruelty!

For example, 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(e) and §1208.16(e) are humanitarian provisions that seldom come up except in highly unusual and sympathetic cases. The idea that they represent a “drain” on IJ time is preposterous! And, if they did, it would be well worth it to help to keep deserving and vulnerable refugee families together!

I had about three such cases involving those regulations in 13 years on the bench, although I cited the existing regulation for the proposition that discretionary denials are disfavored, as they should be under international humanitarian laws. Federal Courts and the BIA have held that asylum should not be denied for “discretionary reasons” except in the case of “egregious adverse factors.” Therefore, an Immigration Judge properly doing his or her job would very seldom have occasion to enter a “discretionary denial” to someone eligible for asylum. Obviously, the regime intends to ignore these legal rulings.

One of my colleagues wrote “they are going to capture a lot of people and force IJs to hear separate asylum applications for each family member. So counterproductive.”

Cruelty, and more “aimless docket reshuffling” is what these “maliciously incompetent gimmicks” are all about.

I note that this is a “joint proposal” from EOIR and DHS Enforcement, the latter supposedly a “party” to every Immigration Court proceeding, but actually de facto in charge of the EOIR “judges.” That alone makes it unethical, a sign of bias, and a clear denial of Due Process for the so-called “court” and the “Government party” to collude against the “private party.”

When will the Article IIIs do their job and put an end to this nonsense? It’s not “rocket science.” Most first year law students could tell you that this absurd charade of a “court” is a clear violation of Due Process! So, what’s the problem with the Article IIIs? Have they forgotten both their humanity and what they learned in Con Law as well as their oaths of office they took upon investiture?

Right now, as intended by the regime with the connivance and complicity of the Article IIIs, those advocating for the legal, constitutional, and human rights of asylum seekers are being forced to divert scarce resources to respond to the “regime shenanigan of the day.” It’s also abusing and disrespecting the Article III Courts. Why are they so blind to what’s REALLY going on when the rest of us see it so clearly? These aren’t “legal disputes” or “legitimate policy initiatives.” No, they are lawless outright attacks on our Constitution, our nation, our human values, and our system of justice which Article III Judges are sworn to uphold!

Join the New Due Process Army and fight to protect our democracy from the White Nationalist Regime and the complicit life-tenured judges who enable and encourage it!

Due Process Forever; “Malicious Incompetence” & Complicit Courts Never!

PWS

12-21-19

BARR’S TWO LATEST PRECEDENTS CONTINUE TO ERODE IMMIGRATION JUDGES’ DISCRETION & INDIVIDUALS’ ABILITY TO AVOID DEPORTATION — Matter of Castillo-Perez & Matter of Thomas & Thompson!

Matter of Castillo-Perez: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1213196/download

Key section:

For the reasons set forth below, I affirm the Board’s order. I conclude that, when assessing an alien’s good moral character under INA § 101(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f), evidence of two or more DUI convictions during the relevant period establishes a rebuttable presumption that the alien lacked good moral character during that time. Because the Attorney General may only cancel removal of an alien who has been a person of good moral character during a 10-year period, see INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), such evidence also presumptively establishes that the alien is not eligible for that relief. Here, because the evidence of the respondent’s efforts to rehabilitate himself is insufficient to overcome this presumption, the Board correctly vacated the immigration judge’s decision to grant cancellation of removal.

Matter of Michael Vernon Thomas & Matter of Joseph Lloyd Thompson: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1213201/download

Key section:

The INA assigns clear immigration consequences to an alien who has been convicted and sentenced for a state crime, yet the Board has adopted multiple tests that permit state courts to change those results well after the fact. Although a state court may alter a state conviction for appropriate reasons under state law, the state court does not have the authority to make immigration-law determinations. In view of these considerations, I conclude that the Pickering test should apply to state-court orders that modify, clarify, or otherwise alter the term of imprisonment or sentence associated with a state-court conviction. As a result, such alterations will have legal effect for immigration purposes if they are based on a procedural or substantive defect in the underlying criminal proceeding, but not if they are based on reasons unrelated to the merits, such as rehabilitation or immigration hardship. Matter of Cota-Vargas, Matter of Song, and Matter of Estrada must therefore be overruled.

Alexei Woltornist

Public Affairs Officer

Department of Justice

Cell: (202)598-5281

Office: (202)514-2016

***********************************

Matter of Castillo-Perez effectively precludes most individuals with two (or more) DUIs from getting cancellation of removal. Obviously, the AG perceived this to be a significant problem. I don’t know how many cases like this are actually granted. Perhaps it would allow the BIA and the IJs to decline to reopen more cases if the Respondent could not show prima facie evidence that he or she could overcome the “presumption.”

Matter of Thomas & Thompson restricts a fairly common device used to avoid the harsh immigration consequences of a criminal conviction. Criminal court judges and even prosecutors are often willing to make slight “after the fact” sentence modifications to avoid deportation in sympathetic cases. Under this ruling, that will only work if there is a “non-immigration” reason for the modification — much more difficult to establish.

Taken together these cases are part of a continuing effort by the AGs under Trump to 1) limit the ability of Immigration Judges to grant discretionary relief based on hardship or equities, and 2) make it more difficult for individuals to avoid deportation. It might also allow Immigration Judges to deny more requests for relief summarily, without full hearings to consider all the equities.

To me, neither change seems “astounding” in and of itself. Rather, they are part of a continuum of efforts to restrict discretion and make it more difficult for individuals to avoid deportation based on equities in the U.S.

Notably, the Trump AGs have never intervened to rule in favor of an individual. All of their certification rulings favor DHS enforcement.

This is notable in a system where the prosecutor selects, directs, and can fire or reassign the judges. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of published precedents already favor DHS enforcement. Now, the prosecutor apparently intends to systematically overrule or limit those few precedents that have given individuals hope of a favorable resolution of their cases.

PWS

P10-26-19

BARR CONTINUES RESTRICTIONIST ASSAULT ON IMMIGRATION COURTS: Intends To Reverse BIA Precedents Giving “Full Faith & Credit” To State Court Sentence Modifications — Another Disingenuous Request For “Amicus Briefing!”

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1166251/download

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 556 (A.G. 2019) Interim Decision #3954

556
Matter of Michael Vernon THOMAS, Respondent
Matter of Joseph Lloyd THOMPSON, Respondent
Decided by Attorney General May 28, 2019
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of the Attorney General
BEFORE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i), I direct the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“Board”) to refer these cases to me for review of its decisions. The
Board’s decisions in these matters are automatically stayed pending my
review. See Matter of Haddam, A.G. Order No. 2380-2001 (Jan. 19, 2001).
To assist me, I invite the parties to these proceedings and interested amici to
submit briefs that address whether, and under what circumstances, judicial
alteration of a criminal conviction or sentence—whether labeled “vacatur,”
“modification,” “clarification,” or some other term—should be taken into
consideration in determining the immigration consequences of the
conviction.
The parties’ briefs shall not exceed 15,000 words and shall be filed on or
before June 28, 2019. Interested amici may submit briefs not exceeding
9,000 words on or before July 12, 2019. The parties may submit reply briefs
not exceeding 6,000 words on or before July 12, 2019. All filings shall be
accompanied by proof of service and shall be submitted electronically to
AGCertification@usdoj.gov, and in triplicate to:
United States Department of Justice
Office of the Attorney General, Room 5114
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530
All briefs must be both submitted electronically and postmarked on or
before the pertinent deadlines. Requests for extensions are disfavored.

********************************

Like Barr’s entire tenure and continued interference with Due Process and judicial independence in the Immigration Courts, it’s highly unethical.

Nobody outside the White Nationalist restrictionist enclave would have any interest in revisiting the BIA’s reasonable rulings, going back more than a decade and one-half, recognizing sentence modifications entered by judges in criminal cases, mostly in state courts. Matter of Song, 23 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 2001) and Matter of Cota Vargas, 23 I&N Dec. 843 (BIA 2005).

Indeed, this action does not appear to have have been generated by any actual party participating in Immigration Court litigation or by any pending Circuit Court litigation. It has nothing to do with the current “border crisis” that has paralyzed this Administration’s immigration bureaucracy.

Rather, it appears to be part of a concerted politically-based attack on migrants and the independence of the Immigration Court system orchestrated by restrictionist groups outside of government who use unscrupulous and willing senior officials like Barr, and Sessions before him, as operatives.

After ignoring all of the compelling arguments favoring the current precedents, Barr will basically “adopt” or “adapt” Judge Roger Pauley’s dissenting opinion in Matter of Cota. The decision likely has already been drafted along the lines of the restrictionist groups’ agenda for stripping migrants of the few rights they still retain in what was already a bogus “court” system where the law had intentionally been skewed against them and in favor of DHS for political reasons.

The only question is whether the Article III Courts will continue to put up with Barr’s “charade of justice at Justice.” We’ll see. But, at some point, the damage to our system being inflicted by dishonest and unethical officials like Barr might become irreparable.

PWS

05-30-19

SUPREME BOMBSHELL: JUSTICE GORSUCH PROVIDES CRITICAL FIFTH VOTE FOR OVERTURNING DEPORTATION STATUTE FOR UNCONSTITUTIONAL VAGUENESS! — Administration Suffers Yet Another Legal Setback, This Time At the High Court! – Sessions v. Dimaya — Get The Full Opinion, Court Syllabus, Key Quotes, & My “Instant Analysis” HERE!

Dimaya–15-1498_1b8e

Sessions v. Dimaya, No. 15–1498, 04-17-18 (5-4 Decision)

Syllabus By Court Staff:

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) virtually guarantees that any alien convicted of an “aggravated felony” after entering the Unit- ed States will be deported. See 8 U. S. C. §§1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1229b(a)(3), (b)(1)(C). An aggravated felony includes “a crime of violence (as defined in [18 U.S.C. §16] . . . ) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.” §1101(a)(43)(f). Section 16’s definition of a crime of violence is divided into two clauses—often referred to as the elements clause, §16(a), and the residual clause, §16(b). The residual clause, the provision at issue here, defines a “crime of violence” as “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” To decide whether a person’s conviction falls within the scope of that clause, courts apply the categorical approach. This approach has courts ask not whether “the particular facts” underlying a conviction created a substantial risk, Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1, 7, nor whether the statutory elements of a crime require the creation of such a risk in each and every case, but whether “the ordinary case” of an offense poses the requisite risk, James v. United States, 550 U. S. 192, 208.

Respondent James Dimaya is a lawful permanent resident of the United States with two convictions for first-degree burglary under California law. After his second offense, the Government sought to deport him as an aggravated felon. An Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals held that California first-degree bur- glary is a “crime of violence” under §16(b). While Dimaya’s appeal was pending in the Ninth Circuit, this Court held that a similar re-

2

SESSIONS v. DIMAYA Syllabus

sidual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)—defining “violent felony” as any felony that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)—was unconstitutionally “void for vagueness” under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. ___, ___. Relying on Johnson, the Ninth Circuit held that §16(b), as incorporated into the INA, was also unconstitu- tionally vague.

Held: The judgment is affirmed.

803 F. 3d 1110, affirmed.
JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to

Parts I, III, IV–B, and V, concluding that §16’s residual clause is un- constitutionally vague. Pp. 6–11, 16–25.

(a) A straightforward application of Johnson effectively resolves this case. Section 16(b) has the same two features as ACCA’s residu- al clause—an ordinary-case requirement and an ill-defined risk threshold—combined in the same constitutionally problematic way. To begin, ACCA’s residual clause created “grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime” because it “tie[d] the judi- cial assessment of risk” to a speculative hypothesis about the crime’s “ordinary case,” but provided no guidance on how to figure out what that ordinary case was. 576 U. S., at ___. Compounding that uncer- tainty, ACCA’s residual clause layered an imprecise “serious poten- tial risk” standard on top of the requisite “ordinary case” inquiry. The combination of “indeterminacy about how to measure the risk posed by a crime [and] indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for the crime to qualify as a violent felony,” id., at ___, resulted in “more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates,” id., at ___. Section 16(b) suffers from those same two flaws. Like ACCA’s residual clause, §16(b) calls for a court to identify a crime’s “ordinary case” in order to measure the crime’s risk but “offers no reliable way” to discern what the ordinary version of any offense looks like. Id., at ___. And its “substantial risk” thresh- old is no more determinate than ACCA’s “serious potential risk” standard. Thus, the same “[t]wo features” that “conspire[d] to make” ACCA’s residual clause unconstitutionally vague also exist in §16(b), with the same result. Id., at ___. Pp. 6–11.

(b) The Government identifies three textual discrepancies between ACCA’s residual clause and §16(b) that it claims make §16(b) easier to apply and thus cure the constitutional infirmity. None, however, relates to the pair of features that Johnson found to produce imper- missible vagueness or otherwise makes the statutory inquiry more determinate. Pp. 16–24.

(1) First, the Government argues that §16(b)’s express require-

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 3

Syllabus

ment (absent from ACCA) that the risk arise from acts taken “in the course of committing the offense,” serves as a “temporal restriction”— in other words, a court applying §16(b) may not “consider risks aris- ing after” the offense’s commission is over. Brief for Petitioner 31. But this is not a meaningful limitation: In the ordinary case of any of- fense, the riskiness of a crime arises from events occurring during its commission, not events occurring later. So with or without the tem- poral language, a court applying the ordinary case approach, whether in §16’s or ACCA’s residual clause, would do the same thing—ask what usually happens when a crime is committed. The phrase “in the course of” makes no difference as to either outcome or clarity and cannot cure the statutory indeterminacy Johnson described.

Second, the Government says that the §16(b) inquiry, which focus- es on the risk of “physical force,” “trains solely” on the conduct typi- cally involved in a crime. Brief for Petitioner 36. In contrast, ACCA’s residual clause asked about the risk of “physical injury,” requiring a second inquiry into a speculative “chain of causation that could possibly result in a victim’s injury.” Ibid. However, this Court has made clear that “physical force” means “force capable of causing physical pain or injury.” Johnson v. United States, 559 U. S. 133, 140. So under §16(b) too, a court must not only identify the conduct typically involved in a crime, but also gauge its potential consequenc- es. Thus, the force/injury distinction does not clarify a court’s analy- sis of whether a crime qualifies as violent.

Third, the Government notes that §16(b) avoids the vagueness of ACCA’s residual clause because it is not preceded by a “confusing list of exemplar crimes.” Brief for Petitioner 38. Those enumerated crimes were in fact too varied to assist this Court in giving ACCA’s residual clause meaning. But to say that they failed to resolve the clause’s vagueness is hardly to say they caused the problem. Pp. 16– 21.

(2) The Government also relies on judicial experience with §16(b), arguing that because it has divided lower courts less often and resulted in only one certiorari grant, it must be clearer than its ACCA counterpart. But in fact, a host of issues respecting §16(b)’s application to specific crimes divide the federal appellate courts. And while this Court has only heard oral arguments in two §16(b) cases, this Court vacated the judgments in a number of other §16(b) cases, remanding them for further consideration in light of ACCA decisions. Pp. 21–24.

JUSTICE KAGAN, joined by JUSTICE GINSBURG, JUSTICE BREYER, and JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concluded in Parts II and IV–A:

(a) The Government argues that a more permissive form of the void-for-vagueness doctrine applies than the one Johnson employed

4

SESSIONS v. DIMAYA Syllabus

because the removal of an alien is a civil matter rather than a crimi- nal case. This Court’s precedent forecloses that argument. In Jor- dan v. De George, 341 U. S. 223, the Court considered what vague- ness standard applied in removal cases and concluded that, “in view of the grave nature of deportation,” the most exacting vagueness standard must apply. Id., at 231. Nothing in the ensuing years calls that reasoning into question. This Court has reiterated that deporta- tion is “a particularly severe penalty,” which may be of greater con- cern to a convicted alien than “any potential jail sentence.” Jae Lee v.United States, 582 U. S. ___, ___. Pp. 4–6.

(b) Section 16(b) demands a categorical, ordinary-case approach. For reasons expressed in Johnson, that approach cannot be aban- doned in favor of a conduct-based approach, which asks about the specific way in which a defendant committed a crime. To begin, the Government once again “has not asked [the Court] to abandon the categorical approach in residual-clause cases,” suggesting the fact- based approach is an untenable interpretation of §16(b). 576 U. S., at ___. Moreover, a fact-based approach would generate constitutional questions. In any event, §16(b)’s text demands a categorical ap- proach. This Court’s decisions have consistently understood lan- guage in the residual clauses of both ACCA and §16 to refer to “the statute of conviction, not to the facts of each defendant’s conduct.”Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575, 601. And the words “by its na- ture” in §16(b) even more clearly compel an inquiry into an offense’s normal and characteristic quality—that is, what the offense ordinari- ly entails. Finally, given the daunting difficulties of accurately “re- construct[ing],” often many years later, “the conduct underlying [a] conviction,” the conduct-based approach’s “utter impracticability”— and associated inequities—is as great in §16(b) as in ACCA. John- son, 576 U. S., at ___. Pp. 12–15.

JUSTICE GORSUCH, agreeing that the Immigration and Nationality Act provision at hand is unconstitutionally vague for the reasons identified in Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. ___, concluded that the void for vagueness doctrine, at least properly conceived, serves as a faithful expression of ancient due process and separation of powers principles the Framers recognized as vital to ordered liberty under the Constitution. The Government’s argument that a less-than-fair- notice standard should apply where (as here) a person faces only civ- il, not criminal, consequences from a statute’s operation is unavail- ing. In the criminal context, the law generally must afford “ordinary people . . . fair notice of the conduct it punishes,” id., at ___, and it is hard to see how the Due Process Clause might often require any less than that in the civil context. Nor is there any good reason to single out civil deportation for assessment under the fair notice standard

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 5

Syllabus

because of the special gravity of its penalty when so many civil laws impose so many similarly severe sanctions. Alternative approaches that do not concede the propriety of the categorical ordinary case analysis are more properly addressed in another case, involving ei- ther the Immigration and Nationality Act or another statute, where the parties have a chance to be heard. Pp. 1–19.

KAGAN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III, IV–B, and V, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined, and an opin- ion with respect to Parts II and IV–A, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KENNEDY and ALITO, JJ., joined as to Parts I–C–2, II–A–1, and II–B.

Key Quote From Justice Kagan’s Majority (Pt. V):

Johnson tells us how to resolve this case. That decision held that “[t]wo features of [ACCA’s] residual clause con- spire[d] to make it unconstitutionally vague.” 576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5). Because the clause had both an ordinary-case requirement and an ill-defined risk thresh- old, it necessarily “devolv[ed] into guesswork and intui- tion,” invited arbitrary enforcement, and failed to provide fair notice. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8). Section 16(b) possesses the exact same two features. And none of the minor linguistic disparities in the statutes makes any real difference. So just like ACCA’s residual clause, §16(b) “produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 6). We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Key Quote From Justice Gorsuch”s Concurring Opinion:

Vague laws invite arbitrary power. Before the Revolu tion, the crime of treason in English law was so capa ciously construed that the mere expression of disfavored opinions could invite transportation or death. The founders cited the crown’s abuse of “pretended” crimes like this as one of their reasons for revolution. See Declaration of Independence ¶21. Today’s vague laws may not be as invidious, but they can invite the exercise of arbitrary power all the same—by leaving the people in the dark about what the law demands and allowing prosecutors and courts to make it up.

The law before us today is such a law. Before holding a lawful permanent resident alien like James Dimaya sub ject to removal for having committed a crime, the Immi gration and Nationality Act requires a judge to determine that the ordinary case of the alien’s crime of conviction involves a substantial risk that physical force may be used. But what does that mean? Just take the crime at issue in this case, California burglary, which applies to everyone from armed home intruders to door-to-door salesmen peddling shady products. How, on that vast spectrum, is anyone supposed to locate the ordinary case and say whether it includes a substantial risk of physical force? The truth is, no one knows. The law’s silence leaves judges to their intuitions and the people to their fate. In my judgment, the Constitution demands more.

Key Quote From Chief Justice Roberts’s Dissenting Opinion:

The more constrained inquiry required under §16(b)— which asks only whether the offense elements naturally carry with them a risk that the offender will use force in committing the offense—does not itself engender “grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime.” And the provision’s use of a commonplace sub- stantial risk standard—one not tied to a list of crimes that lack a unifying feature—does not give rise to intolerable “uncertainty about how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify.” That should be enough to reject Dimaya’s facial vagueness challenge.4

Because I would rely on those distinctions to uphold

——————

4 The Court also finds it probative that “a host of issues” respecting §16(b) “divide” the lower courts. Ante, at 22. Yet the Court does little to explain how those alleged conflicts vindicate its particular concern about the provision (namely, the ordinary case inquiry). And as the Government illustrates, many of those divergent results likely can be chalked up to material differences in the state offense statutes at issue. Compare Escudero-Arciniega v. Holder, 702 F. 3d 781, 783–785 (CA5 2012) (per curiam) (reasoning that New Mexico car burglary “requires that the criminal lack authorization to enter the vehicle—a require- ment alone which will most often ensure some force [against property] is used”), with Sareang Ye v. INS, 214 F. 3d 1128, 1134 (CA9 2000) (finding it relevant that California car burglary does not require unlaw- ful or unprivileged entry); see Reply Brief 17–20, and nn. 5–6.

14 SESSIONS v. DIMAYA ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

§16(b), the Court reproaches me for not giving sufficient weight to a “core insight” of Johnson. Ante, at 10, n. 4; seeante, at 15 (opinion of GORSUCH, J.) (arguing that §16(b) runs afoul of Johnson “to the extent [§16(b)] requires an ‘ordinary case’ analysis”). But the fact that the ACCA residual clause required the ordinary case approach was not itself sufficient to doom the law. We instead took pains to clarify that our opinion should not be read to impart such an absolute rule. See Johnson, 576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10). I would adhere to that careful holding and not reflexively extend the decision to a different stat- ute whose reach is, on the whole, far more clear.

The Court does the opposite, and the ramifications of that decision are significant. First, of course, today’s holding invalidates a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act—part of the definition of “aggravated felony”—on which the Government relies to “ensure that dangerous criminal aliens are removed from the United States.” Brief for United States 54. Contrary to the Court’s back-of-the-envelope assessment, see ante, at 23, n.12, the Government explains that the definition is “critical” for “numerous” immigration provisions. Brief for United States 12.

In addition, §16 serves as the universal definition of “crime of violence” for all of Title 18 of the United States Code. Its language is incorporated into many procedural and substantive provisions of criminal law, including provisions concerning racketeering, money laundering, domestic violence, using a child to commit a violent crime, and distributing information about the making or use of explosives. See 18 U. S. C. §§25(a)(1), 842(p)(2), 1952(a), 1956(c)(7)(B)(ii), 1959(a)(4), 2261(a), 3561(b). Of special concern, §16 is replicated in the definition of “crime of violence” applicable to §924(c), which prohibits using or carrying a firearm “during and in relation to any crime of violence,” or possessing a firearm “in furtherance of any such crime.” §§924(c)(1)(A), (c)(3). Though I express no view on whether §924(c) can be distinguished from the provision we consider here, the Court’s holding calls into question convictions under what the Government warns us is an “oft-prosecuted offense.” Brief for United States 12.

Because Johnson does not compel today’s result, I respectfully dissent.

Key Quote From Justice Thomas’s Dissent:

I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE that 18 U. S. C. §16(b), as incorporated by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), is not unconstitutionally vague. Section 16(b) lacks many of the features that caused this Court to invalidate the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) in Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. ___ (2015). ACCA’s residual clause—a provision that this Court had applied four times before Johnson—was not unconstitu tionally vague either. See id., at ___ (THOMAS, J., concur ring in judgment) (slip op., at 1); id., at ___–___ (ALITO, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 13–17). But if the Court insists on adhering to Johnson, it should at least take Johnson at its word that the residual clause was vague due to the “‘sum’” of its specific features. Id., at ___ (majority opinion) (slip op., at 10). By ignoring this limitation, the Court jettisonsJohnson’s assurance that its holding would not jeopardize “dozens of federal and state criminal laws.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12).

While THE CHIEF JUSTICE persuasively explains why respondent cannot prevail under our precedents, I write separately to make two additional points. First, I continue to doubt that our practice of striking down statutes as unconstitutionally vague is consistent with the original meaning of the Due Process Clause. See id., at ___–___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 7–18). Second, if the Court thinks that §16(b) is unconstitutionally vague be cause of the “categorical approach,” see ante, at 6–11, then the Court should abandon that approach—not insist on reading it into statutes and then strike them down. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

****************************************

Gee whiz, those Trumpsters and GOP Senators who were overflowing with their praise of Justice Gorsuch’s brilliance during his confirmation hearings must be beside themselves now that he joined the “Gang of Four” in striking down a statute in an immigration enforcement case!

I predicted early on that Gorsuch might surprise those on both sides who expected him to be a “complete Trump toady.” Indeed, the case that drove today’s decision in Dimaya, Johnson v. United States, was written by none other than Justice Scalia, one of Justice Gorsuch’s “juridical role models.” At bottom, Dimaya is all about strict adherence to the Constitution and separation of powers, two things that Gorsuch as extolled in past decisions.

No, I don’t think that Justice Gorsuch is likely to team up with Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor on most future immigration cases. But, I am encouraged that he seems to be going where his legal principles, whether one agrees with them or not, take him, rather than just voting to support the Administration’s hard-line immigration agenda as many had predicted and some had hoped or assumed would happen.

There are other important immigration cases before the Supremes where adherence to the literal language of a statute and skepticism about giving the Executive unbridled power under separation of powers could aid the respondent’s position. So, while this might not be a “normal” majority configuration, it could well be repeated in some future immigration case. Let’s hope so!

Interestingly, I had this issue come up in one of the last cases I wrote before retiring from the Arlington Immigraton Court. I noted that the respondent made a strong argument for unconstitutionality under Johnson v, United States. However, as an Immigration Judge, I had no authority to hold a statute unconstitutional (although, ironically, under today’s convoluted system, the respondent was required to make his constitutional argument before me to “preserve” it for review by the Court of Appeals). So, I merely “noted” the constitutional issue for those higher up the “judicial food chain” and decided the issue on the basis that burglary as defined under the state law in question was not categorically a “crime of violence” under the so-called “categorical approach.”

Two other points worth mentioning:

In this particular case, the Supremes upheld the ruling of the much maligned (particularly by Trump & Sessions) 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, having jurisdiction over California ;
This type of issue is frequently recurring in Immigration Court where many, perhaps the majority, of respondents are unrepresented. How would an unrepresented individual who does not even speak English make the type of sophisticated legal arguments that a) got this case to the Supremes in the first place, and b) persuaded the majority of the Court? Of course, they couldn’t. That’s why much of what is going on in today’s U.S. Immigration Courts is a farce — a clear violation of constitutional Due Process that the Federal Courts have been doing their best to ignore or gloss over for many decades.
As more light is shed on the much misunderstood U.S. Immigration Court system, both Congress and the Article III Courts must come to grips with the procedural, ethical, and fairness inadequacies built into today’s “captive” Immigration Courts and the utter lack of any concern about protecting the legal rights of migrants shown by Jeff Sessions and the rest of the Trump Administration. Shockingly, they have actually pledged to stomp on migrants already unfulfilled rights to fair hearings in the name of a “false efficiency.”
Join the “New Due Process Army” and help stop the continuing abuses of human rights, statutory rights, and constitutional rights of migrants by Sessions and the rest of the “Trump Scofflaws!”

PWS

04-17-18

BIA STANDS UP TO 5TH CIRCUIT‘S IDOCY ON “CONVICTIONS” — MATTER OF MARQUEZ CONDE, 27 I&N Dec. 251 (BIA 2018) — This Is How The System Could & Should Work

Marquez3923

Matter of MARQUEZ-CONDE, 27 I&N Dec. 251 (BIA 2018)

BIA HEADNOTE:

The Board of Immigration Appeals’ holding in Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621 (BIA 2003), rev’d on other grounds, Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2006), regarding the validity of vacated convictions for immigration purposes, is reaffirmed, and the decision is modified to give it nationwide application. Renteria-Gonzalez v. INS, 322 F.3d 804 (5th Cir. 2002), not followed.

PANEL; BIA VICE CHAIR JUDGE CHARLES ADKINS-BLANCH; BIA APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGES ANA MANN, EDWARD KELLY

OPINION BY: JUDGE ADKINS-BLANCH, VICE CHAIR

KEY QUOTE:

In Renteria-Gonzalez, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reasoned that because Congress was silent regarding vacated convictions when it defined the term “conviction” in section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2000), it did not intend to include an exception for vacated convictions. Id. at 813. However, as the parties have noted on appeal, Judge Benavides issued a concurring opinion in Renteria-Gonzalez v. INS that he disagreed with the majority’s analysis because it “paint[ed] with too broad a brush with respect to whether a vacated conviction falls within the purview of the definition” of a conviction. Id. at 820 (Benavides, J., specially concurring). Although he agreed with the result, Judge Benavides asserted that “any indication in the majority opinion that a conviction vacated based on the merits constitutes a conviction under [section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act] is entirely dicta in that the case at bar did not involve such a vacatur.” Id. at 823 n.4. He therefore concluded that he would distinguish the vacatur in that case “from cases involving convictions vacated because of a defect in the criminal proceedings.” Id. at 822.

*******************************************

Kudos to the BIA for providing this important guidance. Remarkably, the Immigration Judge “ran over” a joint motion by the DHS and respondent’s counsel to reach the absurd result below!

As for the two Fifth Circuit judges who ruled that a conviction vacated on the merits remains a “conviction,” as one of my bosses used to say “What did they teach you at that law school?”

As those who read this blog know, normally I’m not a fan of Chevron or Brand X. But, here they seem to have saved the day from some pretty incompetent/biased judging from some “Article IIIs.’

PWS

04-08-18

BIA SHOWS AGAIN HOW YOU DON’T HAVE TO BE CONVICTED TO BE “CONVICTED” UNDER THE INA: Matter of Mohamed, 27 I&N Dec. 92 (BIA 2017)

3900

BIA HEADNOTE:

“Entry into a pretrial intervention agreement under Texas law qualifies as a “conviction” for immigration purposes under section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2012), where (1) a respondent admits sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt at the time of his entry into the agreement, and (2) a judge authorizes an agreement ordering the respondent to participate in a pretrial intervention program, under which he is required to complete community supervision and community service, pay fees and restitution, and comply with a no-contact order.”

PANEL: BIA APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGES GRANT, PAULEY, MANN

OPINION BY: JUDGE GRANT

*********************************

Under the INA state criminal proceedings cannot be “relitigated” in U.S. Immigration Court. States go to great lengths to relieve certain first or minor offenders of the legal consequences of a conviction. But, at that point, the INA ditches out state determinations and imposes its own broad definition of “conviction.” Rule: Whatever is necessary to screw the migrant!

PWS

09-07-17

The Beat Goes On! Joint Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Restrict Certain “Criminal Aliens'” Eligibility for Asylum

What total, unadulterated BS and gratuitous cruelty!

Join the New Due Process Army and fight to protect our democracy from the White Nationalist Regime and the complicit life-tenured judges who enable and encourage it!

Due Process Forever; “Malicious Incompetence” & Complicit Courts Never!

PWS

12-21-19

Related posts:

Related posts:

Related posts:

Related posts:

Related posts:

Related posts: