Michael Mukasey – immigrationcourtside.com

☠️🤮🤯 HOW CAN JUDGES WHO DON’T KNOW WHAT TORTURE IS FAIRLY PREDICT ITS FUTURE PROBABILITY? — THEY CAN’T! — 1st Cir. “Outs” EOIR’s CAT Denial Conveyor Belt!

Hernandez-Martinez v. Garland, 1st Cir.

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/21-1448P-01A.pdf

. . . .

In March 2014, Hernandez-Martinez was on his way to work when two men approached him, demanding money and threatening to kill him if he did not pay. Hernandez-Martinez did not know who the men were. The men told him that they knew where he lived and would harm him or his wife if he did not comply. They also instructed him not to go to the police.

Hernandez-Martinez went to the police later that day. Two police officers told Hernandez-Martinez not to be afraid because they would “take matters into their own hands,” and they offered to drive him home. Instead, they delivered him to the men who had threatened him earlier. The men hit Hernandez-Martinez in the face, cut his waist with a knife, burned his right foot with motorcycle exhaust, dragged him, repeated their threats, and beat him senseless. The police appeared to know his assailants and laughed while the men were assaulting him. Hernandez-Martinez recovered consciousness in a hospital, where he stayed for three or four days. When he had sufficiently recovered, he promptly fled to the United States to join his wife and then four- or five- year-old son, who had already made the journey.

. . . .

The IJ’s reasons are not at all clear. She more or less simply stated the elements of a CAT claim and asserted that Hernandez-Martinez did not establish those elements without specifying which elements were found wanting, or why.2 In addressing the asylum claim, the IJ did comment on the severity of harm inflicted on Hernandez-Martinez, stating that the abuse he suffered did not “rise above the level of unpleasantness, harassment, and even basic suffering.” We agree with the government that were this a supportable description of the harm inflicted, it would not support a CAT claim. We disagree, though, that the facts found support such a description. More to the point, as a matter of law we reject the implicit claim that the harm visited upon Hernandez-Martinez was not severe enough to qualify as torture.

. . . .

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It’s actually pretty hard to get a “rise to the level of torture” case wrong as a matter of law! But three levels of Garland’s DOJ managed to pull it off!

EOIR’s “holdover Ashcroft/Sessions/Barr era” deny every CAT claim approach seems to be running into problems in the “real” Federal Courts. Nothing that competent BIA Appellate Judges couldn’t solve. But, don’t hold your breath!

This absurdist CAT “adjudication” and its beyond absurd, unethical defense by OIL (“doesn’t even rise to the level of persecution,“ citing inapposite cases, gimmie a break) falls below minimum legal and professional standards in every conceivable way: at the IJ, the BIA (“summary affirmance”), and OIL!

That nearing the halfway point of the Biden Administration there is no Senate-confirmed Assistant AG running the all-important Civil Division, which supervises OIL, shows just how grossly deficient and indolent Dems’ approach to “justice at Justice” has been — both within the Biden Administration and in the Senate.

This stunningly defective, shallow, basically non-existent “analysis” by this IJ shows an out of control system where judges feel free to enter defective deportation orders in life or death cases without much thought and without fearing any accountability from the BIA. The latter obviously is an “any reason to deny” assembly line where clearly unacceptable performance by IJs is “rubber stamped” so long as the result is “deny and deport!”

What’s happening at Garland’s EOIR is analogous to a patient going into the hospital for knee replacement, getting a lobotomy by mistake, and dying to boot. Yet, the “hospital administrator “ shrugs it off as just “business as usual,” a “minor mistake” — “good enough for surgery” and lets the team of quacks keep operating and killing folks!

Gosh, even lesser legal luminaries like Gonzalez and Mukasey finally “got” that EOIR was totally out of control and off the wall in the aftermath of Ashcroft’s “due process purge” and mal-administration. They actually took some “corrective action,” even if largely ineffectual and mostly cosmetic.

It’s also no accident that a disproportionate amount of EOIR’s bad judging and docket mismanagement is inflicted on migrants of color, particularly those from Latin America and Haiti, and their representatives. Much as the Biden Administration tries to ignore it, there is a clear connection between institutionalized xenophobia and racial bias in our immigration system and the problematic state of racial justice elsewhere in the U.S.

Contrast the truly abysmal, unacceptable performance by the EOIR judges and OIL attorneys in this case with the outstanding performance of Judge Brea Burgie and private attorney Alexandra Katsiaficas in the asylum grant from Denver I highlighted yesterday. https://immigrationcourtside.com/2023/02/06/%e2%9a%96%ef%b8%8f%f0%9f%97%bd%f0%9f%a7%91%f0%9f%8f%bb%e2%9a%96%ef%b8%8f%f0%9f%91%a9%f0%9f%92%bc-modeling-eoirs-potential-in-denver-judge-brea-c-burgie-attorne/.

Obviously, there is expert judicial talent on the EOIR bench and in the private sector that could be recruited and elevated to fuel a “due process, great judging, and best practices renaissance” in this dysfunctional, inherently unfair, and grotesquely mal-administered system! But, equal justice and minimal professional standards at EOIR can’t wait! Lives are going down the drain, and wasteful corrections and “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” further cripple this already “rock bottom” system every day.

Garland must finally “swap out the deadwood and under-performers” at the BIA and senior management at EOIR HQ in Falls Church. He needs to bring in the available, proven talent from both Government and the private sector to lead and guide his mockery of a court system back to at least a minimal level of competence, professionalism, and accountability.

It’s well within Garland’s authority to “end this disreputable, deadly ‘clown show’ at EOIR!” Dems both inside and outside Government should be demanding reforms and accountability!

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

02-07-23

⚖️ HON. “SIR JEFFREY” CHASE ON LOZADA/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL— Reviving My “Rivera Dissent,” While Highlighting More Than A Decade Of EOIR/DOJ Failure To Provide Effective Guidance!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2022/10/11/amending-lozada

Amending Lozada?

October 11, 2022

In 1984, the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington announced the standard for determining when the Constitution’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires the overturning of a criminal conviction due to ineffective assistance of counsel.1 Strickland involved a death penalty case; on its winding path to the Supreme Court, a circuit court panel found in the defendant’s favor. That ruling was later overturned; the defendant was executed two months after the Supreme Court’s decision established a standard that the defendant could not satisfy.

A commentator writing years later could find no record of a malpractice claim or disciplinary complaint of any type having been filed against the attorney impugned in that case.2 The commentator cited this example in making the point that attorneys who are found to be Constitutionally deficient in criminal defense cases very rarely face disciplinary complaints.3 And the standard for establishing ineffective assistance laid out in Strickland does not require the filing of any such complaint.4

By contrast, the requirements for claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in immigration proceedings were set forth by the Board of Immigration Appeals in its 1988 decision Matter of Lozada.5 As immigration proceedings are civil in nature, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was found not to apply; the Board determined that a right to counsel in the removal context “is grounded in the fifth amendment guarantee of due process.”6The BIA thus created its own standard in Lozada that requires (1) filing an affidavit attesting to the relevant facts; (2) informing prior counsel of the allegations, and providing any response received; and (3) if claiming “a violation of ethical or legal responsibilities” by prior counsel, indicating “whether a complaint has been filed with appropriate disciplinary authorities regarding such representation, and if not, why not.”7

A practice advisory of the American Immigration Council points out that requirement number three “on its face…does not require filing a bar complaint in all circumstances.”8 The AIC advisory cites circuit decisions excusing the filing of disciplinary complaints, including Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 156-57 (3d Cir. 2007) (allowing no bar complaint “where counsel acknowledged the ineffectiveness and made every effort to remedy the situation”), and Correa-Rivera v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1128, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that Lozada only requires an explanation of whether a bar complaint was submitted, not proof that the complaint was filed).9

Nevertheless, a 1996 BIA precedent, Matter of Rivera,10 underscores the risk of not filing a bar complaint. In that case, the requirements of Lozada were satisfied. As to the third requirement, new counsel indicated that a disciplinary complaint was not filed against prior counsel because “if any error was made in this case it was a postal error or an error of inadvertence by [former counsel].”11 Although this explanation accorded with Lozada, as it was explained both whether a bar complaint was filed and why, the Board rejected the explanation as insufficient.

The majority opinion in Rivera went on to provide a list of reasons why it considered “[t]he requirement of a bar complaint” important in ineffective assistance claims. A dissenting opinion written by then-BIA chair Paul Schmidt addressed the issue far more sensibly:

I do not need a Lozada motion or a state bar complaint to find that ineffective assistance has occurred here. The respondent’s affidavit and that of former counsel are sufficient to establish that former counsel’s duties to the respondent were not properly discharged. There is no hint of collusion between former counsel and the respondent. Under these circumstances, I see no basis for making the filing of a state bar complaint the determinative factor…12

Thus, in Rivera (and in a subsequent precedent, Matter of Assaad,13 the Board reframed the need to file a disciplinary complaint as a categorical requirement under Lozada. But in its circumstance-specific approach, Judge Schmidt’s dissent raised the question of whether this requirement is really necessary.

Nearly six years after Rivera, the answer to that question came from an unlikely source. Matter of Lozada was briefly vacated in the final days of the Bush Administration by then Attorney General Michael Mukasey.14His decision reframed ineffective assistance claims from a due process right into a discretionary agency action, and in doing so, created a new, tougher standard for establishing ineffective assistance that far fewer respondents would be able to satisfy. But interestingly, the A.G.’s decision felt the need to rethink the Board’s disciplinary complaint requirement:

By making the actual filing of a bar complaint a prerequisite for obtaining (or even seeking) relief, it appears that Lozada may inadvertently have contributed to the filing of many unfounded or even frivolous complaints. See, e.g., Comment filed by the Committee on Immigration & Nationality Law, Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Sept. 29, 2008), in response to the Proposed Rule for Professional Conduct for Practitioners—Rules and Procedures, and Representation and Appearances, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,178 (July 30, 2008) (“Under the Lozada Rule, an ineffective assistance of counsel charge is often required in order to reopen a case or reverse or remand an unfavorable decision. The practice of filing such claims is rampant, and places well-intentioned and competent attorneys at risk of discipline.”). Such unfounded complaints impose costs on well-intentioned and competent attorneys, and make it harder for State bars to identify meritorious complaints in order to impose sanctions on lawyers whose performance is truly deficient. The new approach is intended to avoid these problems by requiring only that the [noncitizen] submit to the Board a completed and signed but unfiled complaint…15

In light of these concerns, the new Compean standard still required the preparation of a disciplinary complaint against prior counsel, but (perhaps in a bizarre nod to Moses E. Herzog) added that the respondent “need not actually file the complaint with the appropriate State bar or disciplinary authorities, as Lozada had required.”16

Less than five months after its issuance, Compean was vacated by Mukasey’s successor, Attorney General Eric Holder, thus restoring the Lozada standard, along with its mandatory bar requirement.17 Holder’s decision further directed EOIR to draft proposed regulations on the topic for public comment “as soon as practicable.”18

When the agency finally published those proposed regulations more than seven years later, they retained Rivera’s mandatory complaint requirement.19 In its comments to the proposed rule, the American Immigration Lawyers Association opined that the mandatory complaint requirement should be eliminated, stating that “rather than centering on attorney discipline, the rules governing ineffective assistance of counsel should focus on assisting and protecting the noncitizen victim…” The comment continued that “EOIR already has ample existing procedures to police the immigration bar without requiring the filing of a formal complaint.”20As no final rule was ever published, we don’t know EOIR’s reaction to the comment.

Another six years later, the question first raised in the Rivera dissent, and to which a Bush Administration Attorney General and leading bar groups seem in agreement on the answer, remains unresolved.Recently, immigration law experts have revived the issue.21As those experts again point out, the purpose of reopening a proceeding in which attorney error occurred is to remedy a harm that was beyond the respondent’s ability to control. The focus on correcting the harm (as opposed to punishing the lawyer) is why in the criminal context bar complaints rarely if ever accompany ineffective assistance claims. The lack of sucha requirement allows attorneys to admit to their occasional errors without fear of retribution.

In its unique approach to the contrary, the BIA discourages attorneys from being forthcoming about their errors, and further forces counsel to turn on their own colleagues for acts that would not warrant the extreme action of a bar complaint in any other context. It seems remarkable that even an Attorney General decision issued during the Bush Administration acknowledged that most bar complaints filed pursuant to Lozada are “unfounded” and “impose costs on well-intentioned and competent attorneys,” while also hampering state bars from identifying and disciplining genuine incidents of malpractice.

According to one proponent of amending the standard, attorney Rekha Sharma Crawford, the current Lozada requirement pits members of the private bar against one another in a very destructive way, and adds unnecessary stress on the immigration removal defense counsel who are often at the forefront of these claims-many which are meaningless and done only to comply with Lozada.22

Hopefully, this will be the year that the agency finally gets around to resolving this issue by removing the mandatory complaint requirement of Lozada, and thus bringing the standard in immigration proceedings into alignment with those required in other civil and criminal courts and tribunals.

Copyright 2022 Jeffrey S. Chase.All rights reserved.

Notes:

466 U.S. 668 (1984).

Joseph H. Ricks, Raising the Bar: Establishing an Effective Remedy against Ineffective Counsel, 2015 BYU L. Rev. 1115, 1120 (2016).

Id.

The Strickland standard requires a finding that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there was a reasonable probability that the result would have been different if not for counsel’s inadequate performance.

19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988).

Id. at 638.

Id. at 639.

American Immigration Council, Practice Advisory, “Seeking Remedies For Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Immigration Cases,” (Jan. 2016), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/seeking_remedies_for_ineffective_assistance_of_counsel_in_immigration_cases_practice_advisory.pdf, at 11.

Id.

10.21 I&N Dec. 599 (BIA 1996) (en banc).

11.Id. at 606.

12.Id. at 608. It bears noting that Judge Schmidt, and two of the three Board Members who joined in his dissent (Lory Rosenberg and Gustavo Villageliu) are presently members of the Round Table of Former Immigration Judges.

13.23 I&N Dec. 553 (BIA 2003).

14.Matter of Compean, Bangaly, & J-E-C-, 24 I&N Dec. 710 (A.G. Jan. 7, 2009).

15.Id. at 737-38.

16.Id. at 737. Moses E. Herzog, the fictional protagonist of Saul Bellow’s novel Herzog, authored numerous strongly-worded letters that he never sent.

17.Matter of Compean, Bangaly, & J-E-C-, 25 I&N Dec. 1 (A.G. June 3, 2009).

18.Id. at 2.

19.81 Fed. Reg. 49556, 49565 (July 28, 2016), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/07/28/2016-17540/motions-to-reopen-removal-deportation-or-exclusion-proceedings-based-upon-a-claim-of-ineffective.

20.Comment filed by the American Immigration Lawyers Association (Sept. 26, 2016), in response to the Proposed Rule for Motions Reopen Removal, Deportation, or Exclusion Proceedings Based Upon a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 81 Fed. Reg. 145 (July 28, 2016).

21.See, e.g., an October 3 AILA Roundtable, “Changing the Bench: A New Narrative on Lozada and Bar Complaints.”

22.Private email to the author.

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Republished by permission.

As “Sir Jeffrey points out,” in Matter of Compean, Bangaly, & J-E-C-, 25 I&N Dec. 1 (A.G. June 3, 2009), AG Eric Holder directed EOIR to promulgate new regulations providing guidance on ineffective assistance of counsel. More than seven years later, in 2016 — essentially the entire Obama Administration — DOJ/EOIR issued flawed “proposed” regulations. Not surprisingly, no final regulations were ever issued. A dozen yers after the AG directed EOIR to take action — a big “nothingburger.”

This by no means is the only example of EOIR/DOJ’s unsuitability to the task facing it. It’s reminiscent of the tortured history of the “gender based asylum” regulations ordered by former AG, the late Janet Reno, but issued only as a badly flawed proposal and never finalized.

Additionally, incoming President Joe Biden made issuing “gender based regulations” one of his Administration’s highest priorities, ordering action by October 2021. A year later — nothing!

Meanwhile, EOIR Judges’ applications and interpretations of the governing precedent on gender-based asylum — Matter of A-R-G-G- — are wildly inconsistent. Beyond that, the 5th Circuit has taken the right-wing misogynistic “liberty” of simply ignoring the law on gender-based asylum.

“Lozada reform” is long overdue. But, so is meaningful EOIR reform!

Ultimately, America needs and deserves an independent U.S. Immigration Court with exceptionally well-qualified judges, at all levels, who are recognized experts in asylum law and unswervingly committed to due process and best judicial practices.

Until then, those appearing in Immigration Court — disproportionately individuals of color and women — and their hard-working attorneys — will continue to receive grossly substandard “justice” from “Justice!”

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

10-12-22

HON. JEFFREY S. CHASE: DHS’S ARROGANT “IN YOUR FACE” APPROACH TO “PEREIRA NOTICE” CASES APPEARS TO BE BACKFIRING WITH ARTICLE IIIs — US District Judge in Nevada Latest To Find That “Pereira Defective NTAs” Gave Immigration Judge No Jurisdiction Over Removal Case!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/12/8/interpreting-pereira-a-hint-of-things-to-come

I haven’t posted for a while. I’ve been extremely busy, but there was something else: my response to so many recent events has been just pure anger. Although I’ve written the occasional “cry from the heart,” I don’t want this blog to turn into the rantings of an angry old man.

So I resume posting with a case that provides a glimmer of hope (and, hopefully, a hint of things to come?). Last week, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, a court generally known for its conservatism, issued an order granting an emergency stay of removal in the case of Manuel Leonidas Duran-Ortega v. U.S. Attorney General. As is common in such types of grants, the three-judge panel issued a decision consisting of two sentences, granting the stay, and further granting the request of interested organizations to allow them to file an amicus (“friend of the court”) brief.

What made this decision noteworthy is that one of the judges on the panel felt the need to write a rather detailed concurring opinion. Among the issues discussed in that opinion is the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions (which I wrote about here: https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/9/1/the-bia-vs-the-supreme-court) on Mr. Duran-Ortega’s case. As in Pereira, the document filed by DHS with the immigration court in order to commence removal proceedings lacked a time and date of hearing. In her concurring opinion, Judge Beverly B. Martin observed that under federal regulations, jurisdiction vests, and immigration proceedings commence, only when a proper charging document is filed. The document filed in Mr. Duran-Ortega’s case purported to be a legal document called a Notice to Appear. But as Judge Martin noted, “The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Pereira appears to suggest, as Duran-Ortega argues, that self-described “notice to appears” issued without a time or place are not, in fact, notice to appears” within the meaning of the statute.

Judge Martin (a former U.S. Attorney and Georgia state Assistant Attorney General) continued that the Pereira decision “emphasized” that the statute does not say that a Notice to Appear is “complete” when it contains a time and date of the hearing; rather, he quotes the Pereira decision as holding that the law defines that a document called a “Notice to Appear” must specify “at a minimum the time and date of the removal proceeding.” The judge follows that quote with the highlight of her decision: “In other words, just as a block of wood is not a pencil if it lacks some kind of pigmented core to write with, a piece of paper is not a notice to appear absent notification of the time and place of a petitioner’s removal proceeding.”

As this Reuters article reported (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-terminations/u-s-courts-abruptly-tossed-9000-deportation-cases-heres-why-idUSKCN1MR1HK) enough immigration judges had a similar reading of Pereira to terminate 9,000 removal cases in the two months between the Supreme Court’s decision and the issuance of a contrary ruling by the Board of Immigration Appeals, in which the BIA’s judges, out of fear of then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions, chose appeasement of their boss over their duty to reach fair and independent decisions.

Judge Martin referenced that BIA decision, Matter of Bermudez-Cota, but stated: “This court need not defer to Bermudez-Cota if the agency’s holding is based on an unreasonable interpretation of the statutes and regulations involved, or if its holding is unambiguously foreclosed by the law…In light of Pereira and the various regulations and statutes at issue here, it may well be the case that deference is unwarranted.”

For those readers who are not immigration practitioners, attorneys with ICE (which is part of the Department of Homeland Security) and the Office of Immigration Litigation (“OIL”) (which is part of the Department of Justice, along with the BIA) have been filing briefs opposing motions to terminate under Pereira using language best described as snarky. A recent brief fled by OIL called the argument that proceedings commenced with a document lacking a time and date must be terminated under Pereira “an unnatural, distorted interpretation of the Supreme Court’s opinion,” and a “labored interpretation of Pereira.” A brief recently filed by ICE called the same argument an “overbroad and unsupported expansion of Pereira [which] is unwarranted and ignores the Court’s clear and unmistakable language.”

There is an old adage among lawyers that when the facts don’t favor your client, pound the law; when the law doesn’t favor your client, pound the facts; and when neither the law nor the facts favor your client, pound the table. I find the tone of the government’s briefs as sampled above to be the equivalent of pounding the table. The government is claiming that to interpret the Supreme Court’s language that “a notice that lacks a time and date is not a Notice to Appear” as meaning exactly what it says is an unnatural, distorted interpretation that is labored and ignores the clear language of the Court. The government then counters by claiming that the natural, obvious, clear interpretation is the exact opposite of what Pereira actually says.

So although it is just the view of one judge in one circuit in the context of a concurring opinion, it nevertheless feels very good to see a circuit court judge calling out the BIA, OIL, and DHS on their coordinated nonsense. Three U.S. district courts have already agreed with the private bar’s reading of Pereira, in U.S. v. Virgen Ponce (Eastern District of Washington); in U.S. v. Pedroza-Rocha (Western District of Texas); and just yesterday, in U.S. v. Soto-Mejia (D. Nev.). At this point, this is only cause for cautious optimism. But as an immigration lawyer named Aaron Chenault was articulately quoted as saying in the above Reuters article, for now, Pereira (and its proper interpretation by some judges) has provided “a brief glimmer of hope, like when you are almost drowning and you get one gasp.” Well said.

Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

REPRINTED WITH PERMISSION

JEFF CHASE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v.
RAUL SOTO-MEJIA, Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-cr-00150-RFB-NJK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA

December 6, 2018

ORDER

        Before the Court is Mr. Soto-Mejia’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 21] the Indictment in this case, for the reasons stated below the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss.

        I. Factual Findings

        Based upon the record, including the joint stipulation of fact submitted by the parties [ECF No. 41], the Court makes the following factual findings. Mr. Soto-Mejia was encountered by immigration officials on February 7, 2018 in California. On that same day, February 7, the Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear for Removal Proceedings (NTA) against Soto-Mejia. The Notice to Appear stated that Soto-Mejia was to appear before an immigration judge on a date and time “[t]o be set” and at a place “[t]o be determined.” Soto-Mejia was personally served with the Notice to Appear at 10400 Rancho Road in Adelanto, California, 92401. The Notice to Appear contained allegations and provided a potential legal basis for Soto-Mejia’s removal from the United States. The Notice to Appear was filed with the Immigration Court in Adelanto, California on February 12, 2018.

        On February 27, 2018 an order advancing the removal hearing was served on a custodial officer for Soto-Mejia. On February 27, 2018, a letter entitled “Notice of Hearing in Removal Proceedings” addressed to Soto-Mejia at the Adelanto Detention Facility on 10250 Rancho Road

Page 2

in Adelanto, California, 92301 was served on a custodial officer for Soto-Mejia. The letter indicated that a hearing before Immigration Court was scheduled for March 7, 2018 at 1:00 p.m. The Notice of Hearing did not reference the nature or basis of the legal issues or charges for the removal proceedings. The Notice of Hearing also did not reference any particular Notice to Appear.

        On March 7, 2018, the “Order of the Immigration Judge” indicates that Soto-Mejia appeared at the Immigration Court hearing and that he was ordered removed from the United States to Mexico. Soto-Mejia was deported on March 8, 2018. Subsequently, Soto-Mejia was encountered in the United States again and was ordered removed on March 19, 2018. The March 19 Order, as a reinstate of the prior order, derived its authority to order removal from the March 7 Order. The Indictment in this case explicitly references and relies upon the March 7 and March 19 removal orders as a basis for establishing a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 by Soto-Mejia.

        II. Legal Standard

        Since a prior order of removal is a predicate element of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, a defendant may collaterally attack the underlying removal order.United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2004). To prevail on such a collateral challenge to a deportation order, the individual must demonstrate that (1) he exhausted any administrative remedies he could have used to challenge the order (or is excused from such exhaustion); (2) the deportation proceedings deprived the individual of judicial review (or is excused from seeking judicial review); (3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair. 8 U.S.C. 1326(d); Ramos, 623 F.3d at 680.

        A removal order is “fundamentally unfair” if (1) an individual’s due process rights were violated by defects in the underlying proceeding, and (2) the individual suffered prejudice as a result. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d at 1048.

        III. Discussion

        The Defendant argues that this case must be dismissed because his criminal prosecution derives from a defective immigration proceeding in which the immigration court did not have

Page 3

jurisdiction to commence removal proceedings against him because the Notice to Appear initiating the proceeding was defective. He argues that the March 7 Order is thus void as the immigration court did not have jurisdiction to issue an order. He further argues that, as the initial March 7, 2018 deportation order is void, the subsequent reinstatement removal order of March 19, 2018 is also void as it derived its authority from the March 7 Order. Specifically, Soto-Mejia argues that the initial Notice to Appear that issued in his case did not include a time and location for the proceeding. Relying upon the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S.Ct. 2105 (2018), Soto-Mejia argues that a notice to appear must contain a location and time for a removal hearing in order to create jurisdiction for the immigration court. Id. at 2110. As the Notice to Appear in this case did not contain such information, the immigration court, according to Soto-Mejia, did not have jurisdiction to issue a removal or deportation order.

        The government responds with several arguments. First, the government argues that Soto-Mejia waived his argument regarding jurisdiction—claiming that it is personal rather subject matter jurisdiction which is at issue—by not raising a jurisdictional objection in the immigration proceeding and conceding to the immigration court’s jurisdiction by appearing. Second, the government avers that the immigration court’s jurisdiction is determined by the federal regulations and that the Notice to Appear in this case contained the information it must pursuant to those regulations to vest the immigration court with jurisdiction. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.14(a), 1003.15(b) and (c). Third, the government argues that the holding in Pereia is limited to the cases in which a court must determine the validity of a particular notice to appear as it relates to the triggering of the “stop-time rule.” Id. at 2116. Fourth, the government argues that there is no prejudice to Soto-Mejia as any defect was cured by the Notice of Hearing and Soto-Mejia’s participation in the removal proceedings. The Court rejects all of the government’s arguments.

        A. The Removal Orders of March 7 and March 19 Violated Due Process As the Immigration Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction

        The Court finds that Supreme Court’s holding in Pereira to be applicable and controlling in this case. First, the Court finds pursuant to the plain language of the regulations that the jurisdiction of the immigration court “vests” only “when a charging document is filed with the

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Immigration Court.” 8 C.F.R. §1003.14. A “Notice to Appear” is such a “charging document.” Id. at § 1003.13. Relying upon the reasoning of Pereira, this Court finds that the definition of a “Notice to Appear” is controlled by statute and not regulation, as the Supreme Court expressly rejected in Pereira the regulation-based interpretation by the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644 (2011). Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2111-14. And, pursuant to Pereira, a Notice to Appear must include the time and location for the hearing. Id. at 2114-17. As the Notice to Appear in this case failed to include the time and location for the hearing, the immigration court did not have jurisdiction to issue its March 7 deportation order.

        The Court rejects the government’s argument that Soto-Mejia waived his jurisdictional argument by not raising it earlier and by participating in the underlying immigration proceeding. The government’s argument conflates personal jurisdiction with subject matter jurisdiction. Soto-Mejia’s argument is founded upon his assertion that the immigration court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and not personal jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction is a limitation on “federal power” that “cannot be waived” so “a party does not waive the requirement [of subject matter jurisdiction] by failing to challenge jurisdiction early in the proceedings.” Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 (1982). Moreover, the plain language of the regulation establishing the immigration court’s jurisdiction explicitly notes that an immigration court’s authority only “vests” with the filing of a “charging document” and the regulation makes no reference to a waiver exception to this requirement for subject matter jurisdiction. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a).

        The Court also rejects the government’s argument that the holding in Pereira is limited to cases determining the applicability of the stop-time rule. As noted, the Supreme Court’s holding in Pereira was based upon the plain language of the text of 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.13 and 1003.14 and 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2111-13. Section 1003.13 specifies which documents can constitute a “charging document” for immigration proceedings after April 1, 1997. The parties all concede in this case that the only document in this record that is a “charging document” is the Notice to Appear. Id. The Court in Pereira explained that the text of Section 1229(a) lays out the statutory definition of and requirements for a “Notice to Appear” which includes the time and

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location for the hearing. 138 S. Ct. at 2114. The Supreme Court unambiguously proclaimed: “A putative notice to appear that fails to designate the specific time or place of the noncitizen’s removal proceedings is not a ‘notice to appear under section 1229(a).“‘” Id. at 2113-14 (emphasis added). While the Supreme Court applied this definition to the determination of the applicability of the stop-time rule, the express language of this holding does not suggest any limitation on the Court’s definition of what is and is not a “Notice to Appear” under Section 1229(a) with respect to the requirement for the notice to contain a time and location.

        There is no basis to assume or conclude that the definition of a “Notice to Appear” under Section 1229(a) would be different without reference to the stop-time rule. That is because the fundamental question that the Supreme Court was answering in Pereira is whether a notice must contain the time and location of the hearing to be a “notice to appear” under Section 1229(a). 138 S. Ct. at 2113-17. In answering this foundational question, the Court did not rely upon the stop-time rule to determine the definition of a notice to appear under Section 1229(a). To the contrary, the Court spent considerable time explaining why consideration of the stop-time rule’s “broad reference” to all of the paragraphs of Section 1229(a) did not alter the fact that the essential definition of and requirements for the notice arise in the first paragraph. 138 S. Ct. at 2114 (noting that the “broad reference to §1229(a) is of no consequence, because as even the Government concedes, only paragraph (1) bears on the meaning of a ‘notice to appear'”). This first paragraph requires that the notice contain the time and location for the removal proceeding.

        The Court is also unpersuaded that a defect in a “Notice to Appear” can be ‘cured’ as the government suggests by the filing and/or serving of the Notice of Hearing on Soto-Mejia. That is because such an argument is contrary to the plain text of the regulation, Section 1003.14(a), which unequivocally states that an immigration court’s jurisdiction only “vests” or arises with the filing of a “charging document.” A Notice of Hearing is not one of the “charging documents” referenced in Section 1003.13. A Notice of Hearing cannot therefore commence an immigration proceeding by subsequently providing a time and location for a removal hearing. Consequently, if the immigration court’s jurisdiction never arose because the Notice to Appear was invalid, then there is no proceeding in which a Notice of Hearing could properly be filed. There is nothing to cure.

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        Moreover, the Court also finds that the Notice of Hearing in this case did not reference a specific Notice to Appear. Indeed, the government conceded and the Court finds that the Notice of Hearing form does not generally, or in this case, reference a prior specific Notice to Appear and it does not contain information about the legal issues or charges which serve as a basis for the removal proceedings. The two documents only common identifying information is the A-file number of the particular person—Soto-Mejia in this case. This means that if an individual had multiple potential charges or legal issues related to his immigration status, the Notice of Hearing could not inform him about which charges were at issue in the upcoming hearing and the Notice of Hearing could be filed months or years after the Notice to Appear. Indeed, this is the very reason that the Supreme Court in Pereira rejected the argument that the “Notice to Appear” did not have to include the time and location of the removal proceeding, because that would defeat the ultimate objective of requiring notice—allowing the person to prepare for the hearing and potentially consult with counsel. 138 S. Ct. at 2114-15. As the Court noted, if there was no requirement for this information “the [g]overnment could serve a document labeled ‘notice to appear’ without listing the time and location of the hearing and then, years down the line, provide that information a day before the removal hearing when it becomes available.” Id. at 2115. Under such an interpretation “a noncitizen theoretically would have had the ‘opportunity to secure counsel,’ but that opportunity will not be meaningful” as the person would not truly have the opportunity to consult with counsel and prepare for the proceeding.” Id. As a Notice of Hearing, like the one here, is not explicitly connected to a particular Notice to Appear and the associated charges, the Court finds that it cannot serve to ‘cure’ a defective Notice to Appear such as in this case.

        B. The Defendant Suffered Prejudice¹

        The Court further finds that the Soto-Mejia suffered prejudice as a result of the defect in the underlying proceeding. Specifically, he was subjected to removal twice based upon the initial

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March 7 Order which the immigration court did not have jurisdiction to issue. The government’s argument that Soto-Mejia was not prejudiced because he “participated” in the removal proceedings misses the point. It is immaterial if he participated in the proceedings. He suffered prejudice by the issuance of the deportation orders because the immigration court lacked jurisdiction to order his removal on March 7, 2018.

        IV. Conclusion

        For the reasons stated, the Court finds that the March 7 and March 19 deportation orders are void due to the immigration court’s lack of jurisdiction. As these orders are void, the Court finds that the government cannot establish a predicate element—the prior removal or deportation of Soto-Mejia—of the sole offense in the Indictment. The Indictment in this case must therefore be dismissed.

        Accordingly,

        IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. The Indictment in this case is DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court shall close this case.

        IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as this Court has no authority to detain Defendant Soto-Mejia pursuant to this case, he is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED.

        DATED this 6th day of December, 2018.

        /s/_________

        UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

——–

Footnotes:

        ^1. The Court finds that Soto-Mejia is not required to have exhausted any possible administrative remedies, because (a) the Supreme Court decision in Pereira issued after his March 7, 2018 proceeding and (b) defects as to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 702-03.

************************************

Unlike the BIA’s convoluted reasoning in Matter of Bemudez-Cota, 27 I&N Dec. 441 (BIA 2018), Judge Boulware’s analysis is very straightforward and complies with both the statutory language and the Supreme Court decision. What’s not to like about that?

As I’ve pointed out before, Sessions was so busy artificially “jacking up” the backlog and intimidating the Immigration Judges working for him that he never bothered to address the many solvable legal and administrative problems facing the Immigration Courts. That could mean not only more failed criminal prosecutions, but perhaps more significantly, could invalidate the vast majority of the 1.1 million case backlog that Sessions artificially increased with his short-sighted, racially motivated “gonzo” polices and interpretations.

And Whitaker is following in his footsteps by taking issues off the “restrictionist checklist” for screwing asylum seekers and migrants, rather than addressing the real legal and administrative deficiencies that make the Immigration Court a parody of justice in America.

Sadly, I wouldn’t expect any improvement under Barr, whose recent totally revolting “paean to Jeff Sessions” (co-authored with former GOP AGs Meese & Mukasey) projects that until we get “regime change,” justice in America will continue to be reserved for well-to-do straight evangelical White men. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/jeff-sessions-can-look-back-on-a-job-well-done/2018/11/07/527e5830-e2cf-11e8-8f5f-a55347f48762_story.html?utm_term=.aaad2f8e6250

People of color and other vulnerable minorities should continue to beware of the “Department of Injustice.”

Here’s a very compelling article by ACLU Legal Director David Cole on why Bill Barr is likely to be a “Button Down Corporate Version of Jeff Sessions.” https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/no-relief-william-barr-bad-jeff-sessions-if-not-worse

Darn, perhaps carried away with all the tributes to Bush I, I had hoped for a conservative, law enforcement oriented, but non-racist, non-White-Nationalist approach to immigration. Something like firm, but fair, unbiased, professional, and rationally managed. Guess that just isn’t going to happen under a GOP that has made racist appeals, xenophobia, false narratives, and anti-democracy part of its official agenda. I have a tendency to give everyone the “benefit of the doubt” at least until proven otherwise. I guess I have to alter that when dealing with anyone associated with today’s GOP.

That’s why the New Due Process Army must continue to be America’s bastion against the forces of darkness that threaten us all.

PWS

12-10-18

HEIDI BOAS @ WILKES LEGAL: Following A Colossal 14-Year Battle, The U.S. Asylum System Saved Rodi Alvarado’s Life – Can Jeff Sessions Undo This Critically Needed, Life-Saving Protection For Thousands Of Women & Children Like Rodi With A Single Stroke Of His Pen?

Issue Spotlight:

Will America Shut Its Doors to Immigrant Survivors of Domestic Violence?

by Heidi Boas, Immigration Attorney

Wilkes Legal, LLC

April 5, 2018

Will the U.S. continue to offer asylum to

immigrant survivors of domestic violence

like Rodi Alvarado Peña?

In January 2018, Wilkes Legal won asylum for an immigrant mother and her children who escaped over a decade of extreme physical, psychological, and sexual abuse that sent our client to the hospital and left one of her children with a permanent physical impairment. Because our client’s domestic partner was a high-ranking military officer in their home country, her pleas for help from government authorities fell on deaf ears, causing her to flee the country for her safety. In recent years, the United States has offered asylum protection to domestic violence survivors like this client. A recent move by Attorney General Jeff Sessions, however, could soon limit or end the ability of domestic violence survivors to receive asylum protection in the United States.

Domestic violence has long been a contentious issue in asylum law. More than two decades ago, advocates began a 14-year legal battle to win asylum for Rodi Alvarado Peña, a Guatemalan woman who suffered a decade of brutal violence at the hands of her husband. Even though Ms. Alvarado repeatedly sought help from the Guatemalan police and courts, the Guatemalan authorities refused to intervene and protect her. When Ms. Alvarado tried to escape from her husband, he tracked her down and beat her unconscious. Ms. Alvarado ultimately fled to the United States and became the subject of a controversial, high profile immigration court case, as multiple administrations considered whether to grant asylum to women whose countries fail to protect them from domestic violence. Ms. Alvarado ultimately received asylum in 2009, but her case did not establish legal precedent that could help other asylum-seekers fleeing domestic violence.

In 2014, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) finally issued a precedential decision recognizing domestic violence as a basis for asylum. In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the BIA granted asylum to a Guatemalan woman whose husband broke her nose, repeatedly raped her, and burned her with paint thinner. The BIA recognized “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” as a group that can qualify for asylum. This landmark case opened the doors to protection for other immigrant survivors of domestic violence whose countries fail to protect them from abuse.

While the United States has made great strides in offering protection to immigrant survivors of domestic violence, Attorney General Jeff Sessions recently took a step that could potentially undo decades of forward progress. As attorney general, Sessions has the authority to refer immigration court cases to himself, overturn decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals, and set precedent. Last month, Sessions referred an immigration case to himself involving a survivor of domestic violence from El Salvador. If Sessions rules against this woman, he would begin reshaping asylum law for abuse survivors and could potentially shut the doors to countless victims seeking protection in the United States.

In the case under Sessions’ review, a Salvadoran women referred to as A.B. suffered years of domestic violence at the hands of her ex-husband in El Salvador. Even though A.B. separated from her husband and eventually divorced him, her ex-husband returned three years after their separation and raped her. A.B. also testified to receiving threats from her ex-husband’s brother, who is a police officer, and his friend, who told the woman that her ex-husband would kill her and he would help dispose of her body. Although an Immigration Judge denied A.B.’s asylum case, the Board of Immigrant Appeals disagreed with the judge’s ruling and sent the case back to the judge to reconsider his decision. The Immigration Judge again refused to grant asylum to A.B., however, despite the BIA’s precedent decision in Matter of A-R-C-G-, due to other more recent decisions in his jurisdiction.

Now that Sessions has stepped in to review A.B.’s case, he has the authority to determine whether she should be granted asylum. If Sessions denies her asylum case, his decision could have a far-reaching impact, setting precedent that would make it more difficult for other immigrant survivors of domestic violence to qualify for asylum in the future. If Session limits asylum eligibility for these survivors, he will roll back decades of progress in asylum law and close the doors to immigrant victims of abuse who have nowhere else to turn.

Wilkes Legal stands with immigrant survivors of domestic violence and urges Sessions to uphold the BIA’s current precedent, keeping America’s doors open to victims of domestic abuse whose governments fail to protect them.

Visit our website, follow us on Facebook or Twitter, or call our office at (301) 576-0491 to learn more about Wilkes Legal, LLC.

**************************************

From his actions to date, Sessions appears to be up to no good. But, by now the “A-R-C-G-/R-A- principles” are deeply ingrained in U.S. protection law as interpreted by the Article III Federal Courts.

I predict that an attempt by Sessions to undo A-R-C-G- protections will be heavy-handed, blatantly biased, and thinly reasoned as have been all of his transparently biased reversals of established legal positions to date.

It’s therefore likely to suffer a fate of emphatic rejection by the Article IIIs much like what happened when Attorney General Michael Mukasey tried to undo years of established legal precedent about proof of crimes involving moral turpitude in Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008), rev’d & remanded, Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I&N Dec. 550 (A.G. 2015).

I’m hardly a “Charter Member of the Mike Mukasey Fan Club.” His poor stewardship over the U.S. Immigration Court system is at least partially responsible for today’s inexcusable mess in our Immigration Courts.

Nevertheless, before becoming Attorney General, Mukasey was a well-respected U.S. District Judge. He’s 10X the lawyer as Sessions! Sessions’s lack of any discernible legal skills, integrity, humanity, and judgement probably bodes well for the “Good Guys” in the long run.

But, that doesn’t mean that there won’t be unnecessary and unconscionable suffering. Sessions is a bully at heart who relies on the fact that the majority of individuals in the U.S. Immigration Court system are unrepresented and therefore unable to defend themselves against his racist/xenophobic policies.

I’m proud to be one of the “Gang of Five” Appellate Immigration Judges (“Board Members” ) who dissented from the BIA’s original outrageously incorrect decision in Matter of R-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 908 (BIA 1999), vacated, Matter of R-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 908 (A.G. 2001) that reversed a clearly correct grant of asylum to Rodi Alvarado. The other dissenters were Judges John Guendelsberger (who wrote the dissent), Lory Diana Rosenberg, Gustavo D. Villageliu, and Anthony C. Moscato.

Not coincidentally, all of us except for Judge Moscato were removed and “exiled” from the BIA during the “Ashcroft Purge of 2003” for the transgression of doing our jobs conscientiously and standing up for a correct interpretation of the asylum law. So much for the “facade of quasi-judicial independence at the BIA.” (Credit to Peter Levinson). And, that’s before the current “descent into the abyss” brought about by Sessions!

We need an independent Article I U.S. Immigration Court now!

PWS

04-05-18

HON. JEFFREY CHASE: Sessions’s Abuses Of “Certification Power” Show Why It’s Past Time To End This Unfair, Unethical, & (Probably) Unconstitutional Mockery of Justice!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/3/29/the-ags-certifying-of-bia-decisions

Mar 29 The AG’s Certifying of BIA Decisions

The recent flurry of case certifications by Attorney General Jeff Sessions (he has certified four BIA decisions to himself since January) raises the question of the continued appropriateness of the practice. Certification allows a political appointee who heads an enforcement agency, and is subject to the policy agenda of the administration he or she serves, absolute authority to overrule or completely rewrite the decisions of an ostensibly neutral and independent tribunal comprised of judges possessing greater subject matter expertise.

The issue has only become a matter of legitimate concern under the two most recent Republican administrations. In her eight years as Attorney General during the Clinton Administration, Janet Reno decided a total of three cases pursuant to certification. Under the Obama administration, AGs Loretta Lynch and Eric Holder decided a comparable number of cases (four). The number is artificially inflated by the fact that two of those consisted of Holder vacating late-term decisions by his predecessor, Michael Mukasey. In one of the vacated decisions, Mukasey’s reasoning had been rejected by five separate U.S. circuit courts of appeal.

In contrast, during the eight year administration of George W. Bush, his three Attorneys General issued 16 precedent decisions through the certification process. Sessions so far seems to be on a similar pace.

One of Bush’s AGs, Alberto Gonzales, co-authored an article in 2016 defending the use of certification.1 As part of his argument, Gonzales traced the history of the practice to the BIA’s origins as an advisory-only panel in the Department of Labor in the 1920s and 30s. When the Board was transferred to the Department of Justice in 1940, it was provided only limited decision-making authority, but was required to refer to the AG certain categories of cases, including those “in which a dissent has been recorded” or where “a question of difficulty is involved.”

I will add that the early appointees to the BIA were career bureaucrats with no prior expertise or experience in the field of immigration law. To me, such history seems to provide no real justification for the continued practice. The BIA has for decades enjoyed the authority to independently decide a broad class of cases. It’s members all come to the Board with far more expertise and experience in the field of immigration law than the AG possesses (although since the 2003 purge by then-AG John Ashcroft, its make-up is far more conservative). Furthermore, whereas in the past, it was the BIA itself, and later, the Commissioner of INS, requesting certification, at present, the AG is handpicking the cases and certifying them to himself, sometimes in order to decide an issue that wasn’t part of the decision below.

Law Professor Margaret H. Taylor has noted that the practice of AG certification “might be seen as objectionable because it conflicts with a core value of our legal system: that disputes are resolved by an impartial adjudicator who has no interest in the outcome.”2 Taylor further points out that many such decisions were issued in the final days of an AG’s term, meaning that the AG “refers a controversial issue to himself and renders a decision upending agency precedent on his way out the door.”3

In an article calling for the implementation of procedural safeguards on the AG’s certification power, the author accurately notes that the practice of “agency head review” is common and non-controversial.4 However, Professor Stephen Legomsky has pointed out that the strongest arguments for agency head review – inter-decisional consistency, and agency control (by politically-accountable officials) over policy – don’t translate well to the process of deciding asylum applications, for example.5 This harks back to a point I made in an earlier article – that immigration judges (including BIA Board member) are the only judges in the otherwise enforcement-minded Department of Justice, and that the Department has never really grasped the concept of independent decision-makers existing under its jurisdiction.

Legomsky pointed out in the same article that the BIA, as an appellate authority, “can yield the same consistency as agency head review” through the issuance of en banc decisions; adding that the AG could require the Board to decide certain cases en banc.6 Interestingly, the BIA has given up the use of en banc decisions in recent years. It has not decided a precedent decision en banc even in cases of major import, or following remands from the AG or circuit courts.

Sessions’ use of certification thus far is unique in his redetermination of what the case he chooses is even about. In Matter of Castro-Tum, the DHS appealed an immigration judge’s decision to administratively close proceedings in which an unaccompanied minor did not appear on the grounds that it had met its burden of establishing proper notice of the hearing on the minor respondent. The BIA actually agreed with DHS and remanded the matter. However, Sessions has now turned the case into a referendum on whether any IJ or the BIA has the legal authority to administratively close any case, an argument that was never raised below. In Matter of A-B-, an immigration judge, in defiance of the BIA’s order to grant asylum on remand, refused to calendar the case for a hearing for an excessive length of time, and then disobeyed the Board’s order by denying asylum again for spurious reasons. Somehow, Sessions decided to certify this case to decide whether anyone seeking asylum based on membership in a particular social group relating to being a victim of private criminal activity merits such relief. His ultimate decision could curtail asylum eligibility for victims of domestic violence, members of the LGBTQ community, targets of gang violence, and victims of human trafficking.

Furthermore, two of the cases certified by Sessions involve tools of docket management, i.e. administrative closure and continuances. As immigration judges are the only judges within the Department, and as the BIA has set out uniform procedures for the proper use of these tools, how can the AG justify his need to weigh in on these issues, which clearly do not involve the need for intra-department consistency (as no other component of the department employs such tools), or for control by a politically-accountable official to ensure the coherent expression of agency policy?

Once again, the solution is to create an independent, Article I immigration court, allowing IJs to continue to decide cases with fairness and neutrality free from such policy-driven interference.

Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

Notes:

Alberto Gonzales and Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch Immigration Policy Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority, 101 Iowa L.Rev. 841 (2016).

Margaret H. Taylor, Midnight Agency Adjudication: Attorney General Review of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 18 (2016).

Id.

Laura S. Trice, Adjudication by Fiat: The Need for Procedural Safeguards in Attorney General Review of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1766 (2010).

Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to Consistency, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 413, 458 (2007).

6. Id.

JEFF CHASE

GONZO’S WORLD: JUDICIAL REBELLION – Less Than One Year Into Gonzo’s Reign at The DOJ, One of America’s Most Conservative Judiciaries Seeks Protection From His Plans to Politicize The U.S Immigration Courts!

http://www.asylumist.com/2017/12/19/immigration-judges-revolt-against-trump-administration/

Jason “The Asylumist” Dzubow writes:

“In a little noted, but quite extraordinary move, the National Association of Immigration Judges (“NAIJ”) has asked Congress to protect its members (Immigration Judges) from the Trump Administration (their employer). The reason? The Trump Administration is seeking to “evaluate judges’ performance based on numerical measures or production quotas.” According to NAIJ, “If EOIR is successful in tying case completion quotas to judge performance evaluations, it could be the death knell for judicial independence in the Immigration Courts.” “Judges can face potential termination for good faith legal decisions of which their supervisors do not approve.”

EOIR is developing a more efficient way to adjudicate cases (and it comes with a free drink!).

Let’s start with a bit of background. NAIJ is a voluntary organization of United States Immigration Judges. It also is the recognized representative of Immigration Judges for collective bargaining purposes(in other words, the IJs’ union): “Our mission is to promote the independence of Immigration Judges and enhance the professionalism, dignity, and efficiency of the Immigration Courts, which are the trial-level tribunals where removal proceedings initiated by the Department of Homeland Security are conducted.”

According to NAIJ, the most important regulation governing IJ decision-making is 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b). This regulation requires that immigration judges exercise judicial independence. Specifically, “in deciding the individual cases before them, and subject to the applicable governing standards, immigration judges shall exercise their independent judgment and discretion and may take any action consistent with their authorities under the Act and regulations that is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of such cases.” 8 C.F.R. §1 003.10(b).

Up until now, IJs were exempted from quantitative performance evaluations. According to NAIJ, “The basis for this exemption was rooted in the notion that ratings created an inherent risk of actual or perceived influence by supervisors on the work of judges, with the potential of improperly affecting the outcome of cases.”

The Trump Administration is now moving to change the way it evaluates IJs. The main reason for the change is the Administration’s goal of reducing the very-large backlog of cases in Immigration Court (currently, there are about 640,000 pending cases). The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR – the office that administers the nation’s Immigration Courts) recently announced a plan to “transform[] its institutional culture to emphasize the importance of completing cases.” In other words, EOIR will judge its judges based–at least in part–on the number of cases completed.

NAIJ has called this development “alarming” and a threat to judicial independence. Why? Because when judges are forced to complete a certain number of cases, they may be unable to devote the necessary time to each case. As a result, the ability to make proper, well-thought-out decisions will suffer.

This is already a problem in Immigration Court. One IJ famously quipped that his job involved adjudicating death penalty cases in a traffic court setting. And so pushing judges to do more cases in less time will potentially impact the alien’s due process rights, and the integrity of our Immigration Courts.

NAIJ has long believed that the system needs a “structural overhaul” and has advocated for converting the Immigration Courts into Article I courts. Article I refers to the first article in the U.S. Constitution, the section on legislative (i.e., Congressional) powers. The idea is that Congress would establish an independent immigration court, much like it created a tax court and a court of veterans appeal. Such a court would be independent of the Executive Branch–the branch of government tasked with enforcing immigration law (currently, IJs are employees of the Department of Justice, a part of the Executive Branch).

NAIJ recognizes that creating Article I immigration courts “may not be feasible right now,” but it nevertheless urges Congress to protect the nation’s IJs from the new Trump Administration policy:

Congress can… easily and swiftly resolve this problem through a simple amendment to the civil service statute on performance reviews. Recognizing that performance evaluations are antithetical to judicial independence, Congress exempted Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) from performance appraisals and ratings by including them in the list of occupations exempt from performance reviews in 5 U.S.C. § 4301(2)(D). This provision lists ALJs as one of eight categories (A through H) of employees who are excluded from the requirement of performance appraisals and ratings. To provide that same exemption to Immigration Judges, all that would be needed is an amendment to 5 U.S.C. § 4301(2), which would add a new paragraph (I) listing Immigration Judges in that list of exempt employees.

The fact that IJs themselves are concerned about the Administration’s move is worrying. The Immigration Judges I know are conscientious and take their jobs very seriously (in contrast to the Trump Administration, which seems utterly lacking in seriousness). If EOIR is making it more difficult for IJs to do their duty, as they understand it, then something is clearly wrong.

Perhaps the IJs’ concerns are overblown. Maybe EOIR will implement the new case completion standards in a way that does not damage judicial independence or due process. But given the Administration’s track record in general, and the inexperienced acting director appointed to head EOIR, it’s difficult to have much confidence in the new policy. Since Congress is unlikely to act on NAIJ’s request for protection, I suppose we will see soon enough how these changes affect the Immigration Courts.

Finally, in my opinion, EOIR has largely misdiagnosed the problem. While some delay may be caused by IJs kicking the can down the road, or by aliens “playing” the system, most delay is systematic–it is caused by reshuffling Administration priorities, which affect how DHS and DOJ schedule cases. I doubt that imposing numerical quotas on IJs will do much to improve the situation. Other solutions–facilitating pre-trial conferences, reforming the Master Calendar system, better use of technology, imposition of costs, premium processing for certain applicants–might be more effective. Everyone agrees that reducing the backlog is a worthy goal, but case completion requirements are probably not the best way to achieve that end.”

************************************

“Extraordinary” to be sure! Folks, this isn’t the Ninth Circuit or even the Seventh, Second, or Fourth Circuit, all of which from time to time have “stood tall” for the Due Process rights of migrants.

For those unfamiliar with the process, the U.S. immigration Court is a “captive Administrative Court” functioning as part of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) rather as an independent judiciary established under Article III or Article I of the U.S. Constitution.

For the past 17 years, the DOJ (with the exception of an ill-fated move by the Bush II Administration to hand out Immigration Judgeships as political rewards to their faithful) has gone out of its way to insure that those selected as Immigration Judges have a record demonstrating a “commitment to achieving agency priorities.” Translated from bureaucratese, that means that they understand the DHS immigration enforcement objectives and will not “rock the boat” by expanding or recognizing any new rights for migrants unless given permission to do so by the DOJ or DHS.

Not surprisingly, this has resulted in a judiciary where the overwhelming number of new U.S, immigration Judges appointed since 2000 — nearly 90% — come from “safe” government backgrounds, primarily from the DHS. Moreover, no “Appellate Immigration Judge” (or, “Board Member”) at the BIA has been appointed directly from outside the U.S. Government since the pre-21st Century “Schmidt Era” at the BIA. (For “EOIR trivia buffs,” the last two outside appointments to the BIA in 2000 were the late Hon. Juan P. Osuna and the Hon. Cecelia M. Expenoza who was exiled along with me and others during the “Ashcroft Purge” of 2003.)

So, we’re dealing with a basically conservative, government-oriented judiciary of “non-boat rockers” who mostly achieved and retained their present judicial positions by “knowing and doing what the boss wanted” and making sure that any “deviations” were within limits that would be tolerated.

Yes, it’s OK to grant some asylum cases, particularly from Africa or the Middle East, over DHS objections; but “watch out” if you start granting lots of asylum to folks from the Northern Triangle or Mexico for whom the big “NOT WELCOME SIGN” has been hung out by the last three Administrations, or if you accept any new “particular social groups” which Administrations tend to view with fearful eyes as potentially “opening the floodgates” of protection to those who sorely need and can easily access it (in other words, to those whom the Geneva Refugee Convention actually was intended to protect.)

So, this isn’t a judiciary that normally would be expected to “buck the system.” Indeed, although the world has probably never been worse for refugees since World War II, the Immigration Courts seem to have inexplicably but dutifully reduced asylum grants since the clearly xenophobic, anti-refugee, and anti-asylum Trump Administration assumed office and Gonzo began delivering his anti-asylum, anti-lawyer, anti-immigrant rants.

Therefore, the threat to the limited judicial independence that U.S. Immigration Judges possess under the regulations (which haven’t prevented occasional “reassignments” for ideological or political reasons in the past) has to be presumed both real and immediate to prompt this group to take the risky action of publicly seeking protection. After all, Gonzo could potentially “retaliate” by further limiting the judges’ authority, further jacking up the already astronomically high stress levels under which the judges operate, or “reassigning” “unreliable” judges to more mundane or unattractive positions within the DOJ (sometimes known as “hallwalker” positions).

It’s definitely a further sign of an unhealthy judicial system on the verge of collapse. Before that happens, and 650,000+ additional cases spew forth into other parts of our justice system, it would be wise of Congress to make at least some immediate reforms to preserve independence and due process within the U.S. immigration Courts.

I also agree with Jason that attorneys and respondents are not the major problem driving uncontrolled backlogs in the U.S. immigration Courts. No, it’s all about “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” (“ADR”) generated by EOIR itself at the behest of its political handlers at the DOJ.

But, I don’t agree with Jason’s statement that EOIR has merely “misdiagnosed” the problem. No, EOIR and DOJ know exactly what the problem is, because they created it (egged on, no doubt by DHS and sometimes the White House).

Gonzo and EOIR are intentionally misrepresenting and misusing data to hide the truth about how screwed up the system has become because of the DOJ’s toxic combination of administrative incompetence with improper political and enforcement motives. In other words, DOJ is attempting to cover up its own “fraud, waste, and abuse” of public funds.

Even worse, and more reprehensible, Gonzo is attempting disingenuously to shift the blame to respondents and their overworked attorneys who are more often than not the actual victims of the scam being pulled off by the DOJ as part of the Trump Administration’s xenophobic, White Nationalist campaign to reduce the precious rights of asylum seekers and others. We can’t let him get away with it!

JUST SAY NO TO GONZO!

PWS

12-21-17

Senator Cory Booker Is Skeptical That Jeff Sessions Will “Seek Justice For All” As AG!

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/jeff-sessions-has-made-his-case-to-be-the-attorney-general-now-the-senate-will-hear-from-supporters-and-detractors/2017/01/10/5683ce24-d796-11e6-9a36-1d296534b31e_story.html?hpid=hp_rhp-top-table-main_sessions-1225p%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.60a27c7babe2

In an unprecedented move, Senator Cory Booker (D-NJ) became the first U.S. Senator ever to testify against a colleague during a confirmation hearing. In the above account from the Washington Post, Senator Booker charged that:

“If confirmed, Sen. Sessions will be required to pursue justice for women, but his record indicates that he won’t,” Booker said. “He will be expected to defend the equal rights of gay and lesbian and transgender Americans, but his record indicates that he won’t. He will be expected to defend voting rights, but his record indicates that he won’t. He will be expected to defend the rights of immigrants and affirm their human dignity, but the record indicates that he won’t.”

The Senate Judiciary Committee also heard testimony from a number of Sessions’s supporters, including former Attorney General Michael Mukasey, who said, according to the Post:

“Sessions is “thoroughly dedicated to the rule of law and the mission of the [Justice] department.”

The Post also reported that the Committee heard testimony from Oscar Vasquez, a former undocumented individual, who expressed the fear of many so-called “Dreamers” that as Attorney General Sessions will support the revocation of their protected status and use the information that they voluntarily furnished to the USCIS to institute removal proceedings.

During yesterday’s hearing, Senator Sessions took a somewhat ambiguous position on Dreamers. He indicated he would have no problem if President Trump decided to revoke the Executive Order establishing the DACA program, while at the same time acknowledging that there was no plan in the offing to actually place Dreamers into removal proceedings.

**********************************

Notwithstanding Senator Booker’s reservations, and those of many others in the civil rights, human rights, women’s rights, and immigrants’ rights communities, Senator Sessions will be the next Attorney General. At best, therefore, Senator Booker’s testimony was a “marker” in the event that once confirmed, Senator Sessions abandons his promise to seek justice for all Americans (which includes lawfully resident immigrants and undocumented individuals residing in the United States) and returns to the much narrower view of civil rights, human rights, women’s rights, and immigrants’ rights that he has often expressed and defended during his long Senate career.

It’s a tall order for Senator Sessions to rise above the limitations of his past and take a broader, more inclusive, more humane view of the U.S. legal system. But, for the sake of all Americans, I sincerely hope he can pull it off.

PWS

01/11/17

Hernandez-Martinez v. Garland, 1st Cir.

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

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