Department of Justice – Page 286 – immigrationcourtside.com

Five Circuit Judges Dissent From 9th Circuit’s Decision Not To Vacate The Panel Decision In State of Washington v. Trump On Travel Ban 1.0!

Judge Bybee writing for the dissenters:

“Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105 (Motions Panel–February 9, 2017)
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FILED

MAR 15 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

BYBEE, Circuit Judge, with whom KOZINSKI, CALLAHAN, BEA, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting from the denial of reconsideration en banc.

I regret that we did not decide to reconsider this case en banc for the purpose of vacating the panel’s opinion. We have an obligation to correct our own errors, particularly when those errors so confound Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent that neither we nor our district courts will know what law to apply in the future.

The Executive Order of January 27, 2017, suspending the entry of certain aliens, was authorized by statute, and presidents have frequently exercised that authority through executive orders and presidential proclamations. Whatever we, as individuals, may feel about the President or the Executive Order,1 the President’s decision was well within the powers of the presidency, and “[t]he wisdom of the policy choices made by [the President] is not a matter for our consideration.” Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 165 (1993).

1 Our personal views are of no consequence. I note this only to emphasize that I have written this dissent to defend an important constitutional principle—that the political branches, informed by foreign affairs and national security considerations, control immigration subject to limited judicial review—and not to defend the administration’s policy.

This is not to say that presidential immigration policy concerning the entry of aliens at the border is immune from judicial review, only that our review is limited by Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)—and the panel held that limitation inapplicable. I dissent from our failure to correct the panel’s manifest error.”

Read Judge Bybee’s full dissent here:

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2017/03/15/17-35105 en banc.pdf

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I had speculated at the time a Judge of the 9th Circuit requested a vote on rehearing en banc that it was part of a strategy not intended to actually force such review, but rather to give those Judges who disagreed with the 3-Judge panel a chance to publicly express dissenting views. This dissent will be published.

Nevertheless, with only five of the 29 or so active Judges on the 9th Circuit joining Judge Bybee’s dissent, the prospect for the Administration obtaining any relief there from the TRO in State of Hawaii v. Trump enjoining Travel Ban 2.0 appears dim.

Notwithstanding President Trump’s claim that he will litigate Travel Ban 2.0 to the Supreme Court, that might not be so easy, particularly for the foreseeable future. The Supreme Court is not obligated to take any case just because the President wishes it. The Court has discretion.

In exercising that discretion (known as a “petition for certiorari”) the Court generally does not like to intervene at the TRO or Preliminary Injunction stage, before a full record is developed. Also, the current eight member configuration, presenting the possibility of a tie vote, makes it less likely that the Court would take the case now.

And, one of the reasons for the Court taking such a case — a split in Circuits — doesn’t exist here. The Administration has consistently lost on the issue except for a single District Court ruling from Massachusetts.

Consequently, the Administration might have to wait for a full trial on the merits of the plaintiffs’ case, a process that would take weeks at a minimum and quite possibly months or even years. Even then, there is no guarantee that the Supreme Court would take the case, or that even with Justice Gorsuch on the bench the Administration’s position would prevail.

Finally, I note that much of Judge Bybee’s dissent echoes the views expressed by Nolan Rappaport in several articles from The Hill posted on this blog. The most recent of those, relating to State of Hawaii v. Trump, can be found here:

http://wp.me/p8eeJm-tV

PWS

03/16/17

BREAKING: Another Defeat For Travel Ban — Maryland Federal Judge Also Slams Administration — Get Full Opinion Here!

Here’s the key “Establishment Clause” portion of Judge Theodore D. Chuang’s decision in International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump:

B. Establishment Clause

Plaintiffs assert that the travel ban on citizens from the Designated Countries is President Trump’s fulfillment of his campaign promise to ban Muslims from entering the United States. They argue that the Second Executive Order therefore violates the Establishment Clause. The First Amendment prohibits any “law respecting an establishment of religion,” U.S. Const. amend. I, and “mandates governmental neutrality between religion. and religion, and between religion and nonreligion,” Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). When a law does not differentiate among religions on its face, courts apply the test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See Hernandez v. C.IR., 490 U.S. 680, 695 (1989). Under the Lemon test, to withstand an Establishment Clause challenge (1) an act must have a secular purpose, (2) “its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,” and (3) it must not “foster’ an excessive government entanglement with religion. ‘” Id. at 612-613 (quoting

Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). All three prongs of the test must be satisfied. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987).

The mere identification of any secular purpose for the government action does not satisfy the purpose test. McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union a/Ky., 545 U.S. 844,860,865 n.13

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(2005). Such a rule “would leave the purpose test with no real bite, given the ease of finding some secular purpose for almost any government action.” Id. (“[A]n approach that credits any valid purpose . . . has not been the way the Court has approached government action that implicates establishment.” (emphasis added)). Thus, although governmental statements of purpose generally receive deference, a secular purpose must be “genuine, not a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective.” Id. at 864. If a religious purpose for the government action is the predominant or primary purpose, and the secular purpose is “secondary,” the purpose test has not been satisfied. Id. at 860, 862-65; see also Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594 (finding a violation of the Establishment Clause where the “primary purpose” of the challenged act was “to endorse a particular religious doctrine”).

An assessment ofthe purpose of an action is a “common” task for courts. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 861. In determining purpose, a court acts as an “objective observer” who considers “the traditional external signs that show up in the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, or comparable official act.” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 862 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000)). An “understanding of official objective” can emerge from “readily discoverable fact” without ”judicial psychoanalysis” of the decisionmaker. Id.

Plaintiffs argue that the Second Executive Order fails the purpose prong because there is substantial direct evidence that the travel ban was motivated by a desire to ban Muslims as a group from entering the United States. Plaintiffs’ evidence on this point consists primarily of public statements made by President Trump and his advisors, before his election, before the issuance of the First Executive Order, and since the decision to issue the Second Executive Order. Considering statements from these time periods is appropriate because courts may

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consider “the historical context” of the action and the “specific sequence of events” leading .up to it. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594-95. Such evidence is “perfectly probative” and is considered as a matter of “common sense”; indeed, courts are “forbid[ den] … ‘to tum a blind eye to the context in which [the] policy arose.”’ McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866 (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315 (2000)); cf Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1987) (including the “historical background of the decision,” the “specific sequence of events leading up [to] the challenged decision,” and “contemporary statements of the decisionmaking body” as factors indicative of discriminatory intent), cited with approval in Edwards, 482 U.S. at 595.

One consequence of taking account of the purpose underlying past actions is that the same government action may be constitutional if taken in the first instance and unconstitutional if it has a sectarian heritage. This presents no incongruity, however, because purpose matters.

McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866 n.l4.
Specifically, the evidence offered by Plaintiffs includes numerous statements by

President Trump expressing an intent to issue a Muslim ban or otherwise conveying anti-Muslim sentiments. For example, on December 7, 2015, then a Republican primary candidate, Trump posted a “Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration” on his campaign website “calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our representatives can figure out what is going on.” J.R. 85. In a March 9, 2016 interview with CNN, Trump professed his belief that “Islam hates us,” and that the United States had “allowed this propaganda to spread all through the country that [Islam] is a religion of peace.” J.R. 255-57. Then in a March 22, 2016 Fox Business interview, Trump reiterated his call for a ban on Muslim immigration, explaining that his call for the ban had gotten “tremendous support” and that “we’re having problems with the Muslims, and we’re having problems with Muslims coming into the country.”

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into the country.” J.R. 261. On December 21, 2016, when asked whether a recent attack in Germany affected his proposed Muslim ban, President-Elect Trump replied, “You know my plans. All along, I’ve proven to be right. 100% correct.” J.R.245. In a written statement about the events, Trump lamented the attack on people “prepared to celebrate the Christmas holiday” by “ISIS and other Islamic terrorists [who] continually slaughter Christians in their communities and places of worship as part of their global jihad.” J.R. 245.

Significantly, the record also includes specific statements directly establishing that Trump intended to effectuate a partial Muslim ban by banning entry by citizens of specific predominantly Muslim countries deemed to be dangerous, as a means to avoid, for political reasons, an action explicitly directed at Muslims. In a July 24, 2016 interview on Meet the Press, soon after becoming the Republican presidential nominee, Trump asserted that immigration should be immediately suspended “from any nation that has been compromised by terrorism.” J.R. 219. When questioned whether his new formulation was a “rollback” of his call for a “Muslim ban,” he described it as an “expansion” and explained that “[p]eople were so upset when I used the word Muslim,” so he was instead “talking territory instead of Muslim.” J.R. 220. When President Trump was preparing to sign the First Executive Order, he remarked, “This is the ‘Protection of the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.’ We all know what that means.” J.R. 142. The day after the First Executive Order was issued, Mayor Giuliani appeared on Fox News and asserted that President Trump told him he wanted a Muslim ban and asked Giuliani to “[s]how me the right way to do it legally.” J.R. 247. Giuliani, in consultation with others, proposed that the action be “focused on, instead of religion … the areas of the world that create danger for us,” specifically “places where there are [sic] substantial

evidence that people are sending terrorists into our country.” J.R.247-48. These types of public

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statements were relied upon by the Eastern District of Virginia in enjoining the First Executive Order based on a likelihood of success on an Establishment Clause claim, Aziz, 2017 WL 580855, at *11, and the Ninth Circuit in concluding that an Establishment Clause claim against that Order raised “serious allegations” and presented “significant constitutional questions.” Washington, 847 F.3d at 1168.

These statements, which include explicit, direct statements of President Trump’s animus towards Muslims and intention to impose a ban on Muslims entering the United States, present a convincing case that the First Executive Order was issued to accomplish, as nearly as possible,

. President Trump’s promised Muslim ban. In particular, the direct statements by President Trump and Mayor Giuliani’s account of his conversations with President Trump reveal that the plan had been to bar the entry of nationals of predominantly Muslim countries deemed to

constitute dangerous territory in order to approximate a Muslim ban without calling it one- precisely the form of the travel ban in the First Executive Order. See Aziz, 2017 WL 580855, at *4 (quoting from a July 17,2016 interview during which then-candidate Trump, upon hearing a tweet stating “Calls to ban Muslims from entering the U.S. are offensive and unconstitutional,” responded “So you call it territories. OK? We’re gonna do territories.”). Such explicit statements of a religious purpose are “readily discoverable fact[s]” that allow the Court to identify the purpose of this government action without resort to “judicial psychoanalysis.” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 862. They constitute clear statements of religious purpose comparable to those relied upon in Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (lith Cir. 2003), where the court found that a Ten Commandments display at a state courthouse was erected for a religious purpose in part based on the chief justice stating at the dedication ceremony that “in order to establish justice, we must invoke ‘the favor and guidance of Almighty God. ‘” Id. at 1286, 1296 (“[N]o

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psychoanalysis or dissection is required here, where there is abundant evidence, including his own words, of the Chief Justice’s purpose.”).

Relying primarily on this record, Plaintiffs asks this Court to issue an injunction against the Second Executive Order on Establishment Clause grounds. In considering this request, the same record of public statements by President Trump remains highly relevant. In McCreary, where the Court was reviewing a third attempt to create a courthouse display including the Ten Commandments after two prior displays had been deemed unconstitutional, it held that its review was not limited to the “latest news about the last in a series of governmental actions” because “the world is not made brand new every morning,” “reasonable observers have reasonable memories,” and to impose such a limitation would render a court “an absentedminded objective observer, not one presumed familiar with the history of the government’s action and competent to learn what history has to show.” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866.

The Second Executive Order, issued only six weeks after the First Executive Order, differs, as relevant here, in that the preference for religious minorities in the refugee process has been removed. It also removes Iraq from the list of Designated Countries, exempts certain categories of individuals from the ban, and lists other categories of individuals who may be eligible for a case-by-case waiver from the ban. Despite these changes, the history of public statements continues to provide a convincing case that the purpose of the Second Executive Order remains the realization of the long-envisioned Muslim ban. The Trump Administration acknowledged that the core substance of the First Executive Order remained intact. Prior to its

issuance, on February 16, 2017, Stephen Miller, Senior Policy Advisor to the President, described the forthcoming changes as “mostly minor technical differences,” and stated that the “basic policies are still going to be in effect.” J.R. 319. When the Second Executive Order was

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signed on March 6, 2017, White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer stated that “[t]he principles of the [second] executive order remain the same.” J.R. 118. The Second Executive Order itself explicitly states that the changes, particularly the addition of exemption and waiver categories, were made to address ‘judicial concerns,” 2d Order S1(i), including those raised by the Ninth Circuit, which upheld an injunction based on due process concerns, Washington, 847 F.3d at 1156.

The removal of the preference for religious minorities in the refugee system, which was the only explicit reference to religion in the First Executive Order, does not cure the Second Executive Order of Establishment Clause concerns. Crucially, the core policy outcome of a blanket ban on entry of nationals from the Designated Countries remains. When President Trump discussed his planned Muslim ban, he described not the preference for religious minorities, but the plan to ban the entry of nationals from certain dangerous countries as a means to carry out the Muslim ban. These statements thus continue to explain the religious purpose behind the travel ban in the Second Executive Order. Under these circumstances, the fact that the Second Executive Order is facially neutral in terms of religion is not dispositive. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 699-702 (1994) (holding that a facially neutral delegation of civic power to “qualified voters” of a village predominantly comprised of followers of Satmas Hasidism was a “purposeful and forbidden” violation of the Establishment Clause); cf Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534, 542 (1993) (holding that a facially neutral city ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifice and intended to target the Santeria faith violated the Free Exercise Clause because “the Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause, extends beyond facial discrimination” and action

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targeting religion “cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality”).

Defendants do not directly contest that this record of public statements reveals a religious motivation for the travel ban. Rather, they argue that many of the statements may not be considered because they were made outside the formal government decisionmaking process or before President Trump became a government official. Although McCreary, relied upon by Defendants, states that a court considers “the text, legislative history, and implementation” of an action and “comparable” official acts, it did not purport to list the only materials appropriate for consideration? 545 U.S. at 862. Notably, in Green v. Haskell County Board of Commissioners, 568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered quotes from county commissioners that appeared in news reports in finding that a Ten Commandments display violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 701. Likewise, in Glassroth, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found an Establishment Clause violation based on a record that included the state chief justice’s campaign materials, including billboards and television commercials, proclaiming him to be the “Ten Commandments Judge.” 335 F.3d at 1282, 1284-85, 1297.

Although statements must be fairly “attributed to [a] government actor,” Glassman v. Arlington Cty., 628 F.3d 140, 147 (4th Cir. 2010), Defendants have cited no authority concluding

2 In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 624 n.52 (2006), cited by Defendants, the Court criticized a dissent’s reliance on press statements by senior government officials, rather than the President’s formal written determination mandated by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, to provide justification for the government’s determination that applying court-martial rules to a terrorism suspect’s military commission was impracticable. Id. at 624 & n.52. It did not address what facts could be considered in assessing government purpose under the Establishment Clause, where courts have held that facts outside the specific text of the government decision may be considered. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594-95.

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that a court assessing purpose under the Establishment Clause may consider only statements made by government employees at the time that they were government employees. Simply because a decisionmaker made the statements during a campaign does not wipe them from the “reasonable memory” of a “reasonable observer.” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866. Notably, the record in Glassroth also included the fact that the state chief justice, before securing election to that position, had made a campaign promise to install the Ten Commandments in the state courthouse, as well as campaign materials issued by members of his campaign committee. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1285. Because the state chief justice was the ultimate decisionmaker, and his campaign committee’s statements were fairly attributable to him, such material is appropriately considered in assessing purpose under the Establishment Clause. See id. at 1285; Glassman, 628 F.3d at 147. Likewise, all of the public statements at issue here are fairly attributable to President Trump, the government decisionmaker for the Second Executive Order, because they were made by President Trump himself, whether during the campaign or as President, by White House staff, or by a close campaign advisor who was relaying a conversation he had with the President. In contrast, Defendants’ cited case law does not involve statements fairly attributable to the government decisionmaker. See, e.g., Glassman, 628 F.3d at

147 (declining to consider statements made by members of a church that was alleged to have benefited from government action); Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1031 (lOth Cir. 2008) (declining to consider statements by the artist where the government’s display of artwork is challenged); Modrovich v. Allegheny Cty., 385 F.3d 397, 411 (3d Cir. 2004) (declining to consider statements by a judge and county residents about a Ten Commandments display where the county government’s purpose was at issue).

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Defendants also argue that the Second Executive Order explicitly articulates a national security purpose, and that unlike its predecessor, it includes relevant information about national security concerns. In particular, it asserts that there is a heightened chance that individuals from the Designated Countries will be “terrorist operatives or sympathizers” because each country is “a state sponsor of terrorism, has’ been significantly compromised by terrorist organizations, or contains active conflict zones,” and those governments are therefore less likely to provide necessary information for the immigrant vetting process. 2d Order ~ 1(d). The Order also references a history of persons born abroad committing terrorism-related crimes in the United States and identifies three specific cases of such crimes. The Order further states that more than 300 persons who entered the United States as refugees are currently the subjects of counterterrorism investigations.

Plaintiffs argue that the stated national security rationale is limited and flawed. Among other points, they note that the Second Executive Order does not identify examples of foreign nationals from Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria, or Yemen who engaged in terrorist activity in the United States. They also note that a report from the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, concluded that “country of citizenship is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of potential terrorist activity” and that “few of the impacted countries have terrorist groups that threaten the West.” l.R. 158. Furthermore, they note that the 300 FBI investigations are dwarfed by the over 11,000 counterterrorism investigations at anyone time, only a fraction of which lead to actual evidence of illegal activity. Finally, they note that Secretary of Homeland Security Kelly stated that there are additional countries, some of which are not predominantly Muslim, that have vetting problems but are not included among the banned

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countries. These facts raise legitimate questions whether the travel ban for the Designated Countries is actually warranted.

Generally, however, courts should afford deference to national security and foreign policy judgments of the Executive Branch. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33-34 (2010). The Court thus should not, and will not, second-guess the conclusion that national security interests would be served by the travel ban. The question, however, is not simply whether the Government has identified a secular purpose for the travel ban. If the stated secular purpose is secondary to the religious purpose, the Establishment Clause would be violated. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 864, 866 n.14 (stating that it is appropriate to treat two like acts differently where one has a “history manifesting sectarian purpose that the other lacks”). Making assessments on purpose, and the relative weight of different purposes, is a core judicial function. See id. at 861-62.

In this highly unique case, the record provides strong indications that the national security purpose is not the primary purpose for the travel ban. First, the core concept of the travel ban was adopted in the First Executive Order, without the interagency consultation process typically followed on such matters. Notably, the document providing the recommendation of the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security was issued not before the First Executive Order, but on March 6, 2017, the same day that the Second Executive Order was issued. The fact that the White House took the highly irregular step of first introducing the travel ban without receiving the input and judgment of the relevant national security agencies strongly suggests that the religious purpose was primary, and the national security purpose, even if legitimate, is a

secondary post hoc rationale.

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Second, the fact that the national security rationale was offered only after courts issued injunctions against the First Executive Order suggests that the religious purpose has been, and remains, primary. Courts have been skeptical of statements of purpose “expressly disclaim(ing] any attempt to endorse religion” when made after a judicial finding of impermissible purpose, describing them as a “litigating position.” E.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky. v. McCreary Cty., 607 F.3d 439, 444, 448 (6t~ Cir. 2010). Indeed, the Second Executive Order itself acknowledges that the changes made since the First Executive Order were to address “judicial concerns.” 2d Order S l(i).

Third, although it is undisputed that there are heightened security risks with the Designated Countries, as reflected in the fact that those who traveled to those countries or were nationals of some of those countries have previously been barred from the Visa Waiver Program, see 8 U.S.C. S 1187(a)(12), the travel ban represents an unprecedented response. Significantly, during the time period since the Reagan Administration, which includes the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, there have been no instances in which the President has invoked his authority under S1182(f) or S1185 to issue a ban on the entry into the United States of all citizens from more than one country at the same time, much less six nations all at once. Kate M. Manuel, Congo Research Serv., R44743, Executive Authority to Exclude Aliens: In Brief (2017); l.R. 405-406. In the two instances in which nationals from a single country were temporarily

stopped, there was an articulable triggering event that warranted such action. Manuel, supra, at 10-11 (referencing the suspension of the entry of Cuban nationals under President Reagan after Cuba stopped complying with U.S. immigration requirements and the revocation of visas issued to Iranians under President Carter during the Iran Hostage Crisis). The Second Executive Order does not explain specifically why this extraordinary, unprecedented action is the necessary

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response to the existing risks. But while the travel ban bears no resemblance to any response to a national security risk in recent history, it bears a clear resemblance to the precise action that President Trump described as effectuating his Muslim ban. Thus, it is more likely that the primary purpose of the travel ban was grounded in religion, and even if the Second Executive Order has a national security purpose, it is likely that its primary purpose remains the effectuation of the proposed Muslim ban. Accordingly, there is a likelihood that the travel ban violates the Establishment Clause.

Finally, Defendants argue that because the Establishment Clause claim implicates Congress’s plenary power over immigration as delegated to the President, the Court need only consider whether the Government has offered a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for its action. See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 777. This standard is most typically applied when a court is asked to review an executive officer’s decision to deny a visa. See, e.g., Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2140 (Kennedy, J., concurring); or in other matters relating to the immigration rights of individual aliens or citizens, see Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 790 (1977). The Mandel test, however, does not apply to the “promulgation of sweeping immigration policy” at the “highest levels of the political branches.” Washington, 847 F.3d at 1162 (holding that courts possess “the authority to review executive action” on matters of immigration and national security for “compliance with the Constitution”). In such situations, the power of the Executive and Legislative branches to create immigration law remains “subject to important constitutional limitations.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,941-42 (1983)).

Even when exercising their immigration powers, the political branches must choose “constitutionally permissible means of implementing that power.” Chadha, 462 U.S. at 941. Courts have therefore rejected arguments that they forgo the traditional constitutional analysis

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when a plaintiff has challenged the Government’s exercise of immigration power as violating the Constitution. See, e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695 (rejecting deference to plenary power in determining that indefinite detention of aliens violated the Due Process Clause); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 941-43 (stating that Congress’s plenary authority over the regulation of aliens does not permit it to “offend some other constitutional restriction” and holding that a statute permitting Congress to overturn the Executive Branch’s decision to allow a deportable alien to remain in the United States violated constitutional provisions relating to separation of powers); Washington, 847 F.3d at 1167-68 (referencing standard Establishment Clause principles as applicable to the claim that the First Executive Order violated the Establishment Clause). Thus, although “[t]he Executive has broad discretion over the admission and exclusion of aliens,” that discretion “may not transgress constitutional limitations,” and it is “the duty of the courts” to “say where those statutory and constitutional boundaries lie.” Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1061.

Mindful of “the fundamental place held by the Establishment Clause in our constitutional scheme and the myriad, subtle ways in which Establishment Clause values can be eroded,” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984), the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have established that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim. Having reached this conclusion, the Court need not address Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on their Equal Protection Clause claim.

Read the full decision here:

https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3518169/Read-the-federal-judge-s-ruling-in-Md-on-Trump-s.pdf

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PWS 03/16/17

BREAKING: ENJOINED AGAIN! NATIONWIDE TRO! Judge in Hawaii Says Travel Ban Violates Establishment Clause! Trump Administration Basically Found “Not Credible” On Immigration/National Security Claims — Trump’s Own Statements & Those of Giuliani, Miller Used To Show Bias!

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-travel-ban-blocked_us_58c99d18e4b00705db4bc38f

Report from HuffPost:

“A federal judge in Hawaii has placed a nationwide hold on key aspects of President Donald Trump’s second attempt at a ban on travel ― a scaled-back version that targeted all non-visa holders from six Muslim-majority countries, as well as a halt on the U.S. refugee resettlement program ― just hours before the new restrictions were to take effect.

U.S. District Judge Derrick Watson said sections of the new travel order likely amounted to a violation of the First Amendment’s establishment clause, which forbids the government from disfavoring certain religions over others.

Watson gave short shrift to the Trump administration’s argument that the new restrictions applied to a “small fraction” of the world’s 50 predominantly Muslim nations ― and thus could not be read to discriminate Muslims specifically.

“The illogic of the Government’s contentions is palpable,” Watson wrote. “The notion that one can demonstrate animus toward any group of people only by targeting all of them at once is fundamentally flawed.”

The judge also discarded the government’s defense that the text of the new executive order was silent on religion, supposedly solving constitutional defects identified by courts with the first order.

“Any reasonable, objective observer would conclude … that the stated secular purpose of the Executive Order is, at the very least, secondary to a religious objective of temporarily suspending the entry of Muslims,” Watson wrote.”

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Here is Judge Watson’s written decision in State of Hawaii v. Trump:

http://www.hid.uscourts.gov/files/announcement142/CV17-50%20219%20doc.pdf

More bad news for the Administration — the Third Circuit has enjoined the removal of an Afghani interpreter with a visa who was denied admission and allegedly “withdrew” his application. Read about it in the WashPost here:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/immigration-authorities-to-deport-afghan-man-who-helped-us-government/2017/03/15/a7eecb9a-098e-11e7-a15f-a58d4a988474_story.html?hpid=hp_rhp-banner-main_travelban1010am:homepage/story&utm_term=.051c21ef8afe

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It’s early in the game on the Administration’s uncompromisingly hard line approach to immigration issues. So far, however, they have racked up an impressive string of losses from coast to coast from Article III Judges all across the spectrum.

In other words, the bombastically inappropriate statements made by Trump and his advisors have “poisoned the well,” and the Administration is probably going to find it difficult to “un-poison” it. And, as long as guys like Bannon, Sessions, Miller, and Kobach are calling the shots, that might never happen.

As some have suggested, perhaps the President and his advisors need a type of “Executive Miranda Warnings” before they shoot off their mouths (or their Twitters) in public: “Everything you say (or Tweet) can and will be used against you.”

The next stop for “Travel Ban 2.0” probably will be the 9th Circuit. But, since the Administration already lost there on its appeal of the TRO in State of Washington v. Trump, I wouldn’t hold my breath waiting for the 9th Circuit to lift the TRO. Like President Obama with the “DAPA Fiasco,” President Trump is learning that U.S. District Judges wield considerable power in our system. As one of my colleagues once said, “U.S. District Judges are the last living potentates.”

None of this bodes well for the Administration’s next ill-advised plan — to ramp up removals, increase the use of immigration detention, maximize “expedited removal,” and reduce what’s left of the U.S. Immigration Court to the equivalent of two-shift assembly line workers churning out removal orders. Chances are that the Article III Courts are going to have something to say about that too. And, unless the Administration moderates its approach, it’s not likely to be anything they like.

PWS

03/15/17

9th Cir. En Banc — After 80 Pages, 9-2 Majority Finds Mexican Gov. “Unwilling Or Unable To Prevent” Persecution Of Gays — Dissent Bemoans “Usurpation” Of BIA’s Fact-Finding Authority — BRINGAS-RODRIGUEZ V. SESSIONS

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/03/08/13-72682.pdf

Judge Wardlaw for the majority:

“In Castro-Martinez, we also failed to consider the difference between a country’s enactment of remedial laws and the eradication of persecutory practices, often long ingrained in a country’s culture. Rejecting Castro’s claim that, in Mexico, a systematic pattern or practice of persecution against homosexuals remained, we found Castro’s evidence unpersuasive “in light of recent country reports,” which showed that the “Mexican government’s efforts to prevent violence and discrimination against homosexuals . . . ha[d] increased in recent years.” Castro- Martinez, 674 F.3d at 1082.

Mexico is to be lauded for its efforts. But it is well recognized that a country’s laws are not always reflective of actual country conditions. It is not unusual that a country’s “de jure commitments to LGBTI protection do not align with the de facto reality of whether the State is able and willing to provide protection.” Brief for UNHCR as Amicus Curiae at 4. And we have recently recognized that Mexico has experienced “an increase in violence against gay, lesbian, and transgender individuals during the years in which greater legal protections have been extended to these communities.” Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original).

Moreover, the anti-discrimination efforts discussed in Castro-Martinez seem to have been made by the national government, and thus do not necessarily reveal anything about the practices within state or municipal jurisdictions. See Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 507 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that while Mexico’s national government was willing to control the drug cartel that attacked the petitioner, it was not necessarily able to do so, in part because state and local officials were involved with drug traffickers).”

Writing for the dissent, Judge Bea (who claims to be the only U.S. Circuit Judge to actually have been the subject of deportation proceedings), joined by Judge O’Scannlain:

“I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because it usurps the power of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to determine facts. It does this by reciting, but ultimately departing, from the “substantial evidence” standard which states that agency “findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added).”

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The Administration apparently believes that cases like this are going to be resolved on an “assembly line” operation with U.S. Immigration Judges sitting in “shifts” in detention centers from 6 AM until 10 PM.

While notable for its potential precedential effect, this case is not particularly unusual in terms of the difficult factual and legal issues that arise daily in U.S. Immigration Court in asylum cases coming from countries “south of our border.” This happened to be Mexico, but LGBT cases involving individuals from the Northern Triangle are quite common, even in jurisdictions like the Arlington Immigration Court.

I note that the amicus views of the UNHCR fare much better in the majority’s decision than they typically do these days at the BIA. For example, in Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227, 248 (BIA 2014), the BIA summarily “blew off” the views of the UNHCR on the issue of “particular social group.”

It’s also interesting that notwithstanding the dissent, the BIA actually lacks de novo fact finding authority of its own. Following a regulation change during the “Ashcroft era,” that authority belongs to the Immigration Judge with review by the BIA for “clear error.”

PWS

03/14/17

EAST BAY EXPRESS: Are U.S. Immigration Court Hearings For Unrepresented Individuals Unconstitutional? Darwin BondGrahm Seems To Think So — Perhaps Darwin Is Right!

http://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/inside-immigration-court-are-deportation-hearings-in-the-bay-area-unconstitutional/Content?oid=5642504

Darwin BondGraham reports in a profile of justice at the U.S. Immigration Court in San Francisco, CA:

“Ilyce Shugall can rattle off a similarly long list of due-process problems. The directing attorney of Community Legal Services in East Palo Alto, Shugall is one of a couple dozen pro-bono lawyers who try to provide counsel to a fraction of the people facing deportation in San Francisco.

“Procedural protections don’t really exist, despite the consequences of banishment,” she said at a recent legal symposium held by the Thelton E. Henderson Center for Social Justice in Berkeley. “There’s no right to an attorney, but the government is represented in every case by an ICE attorney.”

As Shugall sees it, the ICE attorney also has a kind of home-field advantage: Being in the same courtrooms day-in, day-out, allows an attorney to establish better rapport with judges.

And the judges and ICE attorneys all have the same boss: The President of the United States.

The immigration judges are employees of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, which is overseen by the attorney general — they’re not members of the independent judicial branch of government. The ICE attorneys work for the Department of Homeland Security.

Over her career practicing immigration law, Shugall said she’s seen ICE attorneys frequently miss filing deadlines without consequences; file motions on the day of a hearing, preventing review by the defense; and withhold records in a case from the person being targeted for deportation, thereby forcing them to file a burdensome Freedom of Information Act request to get the documents.

She’s also seen extended detention result, countless times, in what Mr. Gonzales apparently did in Judge Murry’s courtroom this past December: Give up on his case and beg to be deported, just to get escape the misery of jail.”

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The full article, which I found through ImmigrationProf Blog, is well worth a read.

I think that the Administration’s ill-advised “pedal to the metal” detention and removal plans, combined with elimination of funding for various Government sponsored outreach, information, and self-help programs is very likely to bring the due process weaknesses of the current U.S. Immigration Court system to a head.

I would not be surprised if a U.S. District Judge somewhere issues a TRO preventing the Government from proceeding in certain types of cases unless the individual is represented. After all, the Government was recently blocked in the 9th Circuit from proceeding against incompetent individuals without establishing some viable system for determining competency and representing those determined to be incompetent.

I also predict that the Administration’s ill-conceived plan to “jack up” detention, particularly by using private facilities which have been determined to have a greater incidence of problematic conditions, is likely to result in major “conditions of detention” litigation and, perhaps, further intervention by the Article III Courts.

Rather than studying the situation and looking for ways to fix our broken immigration justice system so that individuals receive the due process to which they are entitled, the Trump Administration seems determined to make matters worse by turning up the volume. That’s likely to have unhappy consequences not only for the individuals, but also for the Administration.

PWS

03/13/17

NEW FROM 4TH CIR: Cantallano-Cruz v. Sessions — 4th Rips BIA’s “Excessively Narrow” & “Shortsighted” Treatment Of “Nexus” Issue In Honduran Family PSG Asylum Case!

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/152511.P.pdf

“Our decision in Hernandez-Avalos is particularly instructive in the present case. There, the BIA denied asylum to a petitioner who fled El Salvador after gang members threatened to kill her because she prevented her son from joining the gang. 784 F.3d at 946-47. The petitioner had argued that at least one central reason for her persecution was her nuclear family relationship with her son. Id. at 949. The BIA disagreed, holding that she actually was targeted because she did not consent to her son’s criminal activity. Id.

We held that this application of the nexus requirement by the BIA was “excessively narrow,” and explained that there was no meaningful distinction between the existence of a maternal relationship and a mother’s decision to forbid her son from participating in a gang. Id. at 949–50. We held that the record compelled a factual conclusion that the petitioner’s relationship with her son was a central reason for her persecution, because that relationship was the reason “why she, and not another person, was threatened.” Id. at 950.

We likewise conclude in the present case that the BIA and IJ applied an improper and excessively narrow interpretation of the evidence relevant to the statutory nexus requirement. The BIA and IJ shortsightedly focused on Avila’s articulated purpose of preventing Cantillano Cruz from contacting the police, while discounting the very relationship that prompted her to search for her husband, to confront Avila, and to express her intent to contact the police. See Oliva, 807 F.3d at 59-60 (although the applicant’s refusal to pay the gang rent was the “immediate trigger” for an assault, the applicant’s membership in the social group of individuals who left the gang led to threats, and thus the two reasons were linked). The BIA’s and IJ’s focus on the explanation Avila gave for his threats, while failing to consider the intertwined reasons for those threats, manifests a misapplication of the statutory nexus standard.

The full record before us compels a conclusion that Avila’s threats were motivated, in at least one central respect, by Cantillano Cruz’s membership in Martinez’s nuclear family. Although, as the IJ observed, any person interested in Martinez’s disappearance may have confronted Avila concerning Martinez’s whereabouts, this fact does not adequately explain the ongoing threats Avila made against Cantillano Cruz and her children over a period of two years at her home. See Cordova, 759 F.3d at 339-40 (although the applicant was first attacked by the persecutor to force the applicant to join the gang, the BIA failed to consider evidence showing that later attacks were motivated by family ties). Avila persisted in threatening Cantillano Cruz after she promised him that she would not contact the police. Avila placed threatening telephone calls to Cantillano Cruz at her home, the center of life for Martinez and his nuclear family. Also at the Martinez family’s home, Avila and his associates killed the family’s dogs, brandished and fired weapons, and threatened to harm Cantillano Cruz and her children.”

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Read the full opinion at the link.

In too many cases, the BIA appears to strain the law and misconstrue facts to avoid granting protection to deserving applicants from Northern Triangle countries in Central America who clearly face harm upon return. Misapplication of the highly technical concept of “nexus” is a device sometimes used by by the Board and some Immigration Judges to deny claims of vulnerable individuals who could and should be granted protection under U.S. laws.

In doing so, the BIA jettisons the generous spirit of the Supreme Court’s decision in Cardoza-Fonseca and their own precedent decision in Mogharrabi warranting generous treatment of credible asylum seekers in need of protection. Indeed, the BIA often seems more willing to “rote cite” Mogharrabi than to actually follow their own precedent.

The purpose of asylum and other protections laws is to protect individuals facing harm wherever possible, not to find hyper-technical ways to deny or limit protections.

I am pleased that one of the cases cited by the Fourth Circuit is Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117 (4th Cir. 2011). Crespin is one of the “seminal” fourth Circuit cases recognizing family as a “particular social group” for asylum purposes. I had granted the asylum applications in Crespin only to have the BIA reverse those grants after the DHS appealed. However, upon judicial review, the Fourth Circuit agreed with me and reversed and remanded the case to the BIA.

This case also vividly illustrates the absurdity of forcing individuals to pursue these types of claims in Immigration Court without a lawyer. Even the Immigration Judge and the BIA were confused about the proper standards here! Fortunately, this individual not only had a lawyer but a good one.

But, how would an unrepresented individual, without English language skills, and perhaps with minimal education, and therefore no ability to access or understand the important and complicated Fourth Circuit precedents showing the BIA and the IJ to be wrong have any legitimate chance of achieving success? Yet, the Administration proposes to race just such individuals through expedited hearings at inconveniently located and often poorly run detention facilities where chances of getting competent legal assistance are minimal.

PWS

03/13/17

IMMIGRATION IMPACT: More Commentary On How The U.S. Immigration Court In Atlanta Mocks The Due Process Mission of EOIR

http://immigrationimpact.com/2017/03/10/atlanta-immigration-court/

Hilda Bonilla writes:

“Observers found that the immigration judges made prejudicial statements, demonstrated a lack of courtesy and professionalism and expressed significant disinterest toward respondents. In one hearing, an attorney argued that his client should be released from detention because he was neither a threat to society nor a flight risk. In rejecting the client’s bond request, the immigration judge reportedly compared an immigrant to a “person coming to your home in a Halloween mask, waving a knife dripping with blood” and asked the attorney if he would let him in.

When the attorney disagreed with this comparison, the immigration judge responded that the “individuals before [him] were economic migrants and that they do not pay taxes.” Another immigration judge reportedly “leaned back in his chair, placed his head in his hands, and closed his eyes” for 23 minutes while the respondent described the murder of her parents and siblings during an asylum hearing.

Other critical problems include disregard for legal arguments, frequent cancellation of hearings at the last minute, lack of individualized consideration of bond requests, and inadequate interpretation services for respondents who do not speak English. The observers also reported that immigration judges often refer to detention centers as “jails” and detainees as “prisoners,” undermining their dignity and humanity and suggesting that the IJs perceive detained immigrants as criminals. Compounding this problem, detained immigrants who appear in immigration court in Atlanta are required to wear jumpsuits and shackles.

Many of these practices stand in stark contrast with the Executive Office of Immigration Reviews’ Ethics and Professionalism Guide for Immigration Judges, which state, among other things, that “an immigration judge… should not, in the performance of official duties, by word or conduct, manifest improper bias or prejudice” and that immigration judge should be “patient, dignified, and courteous, and should act in a professional manner towards all litigants, witnesses, lawyers, and other with whom the immigration judge deals in his or her capacity.”

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“[P]atient, dignified, courteous, . . . professional,” unfortunately does not describe the judges of the U.S. Immigration Court in Atlanta as portrayed in this study and numerous articles from various sources. As I have pointed out before, although the BIA finally did “call out” one Immigration Judge in Atlanta for his outrageous disregard of due process and appropriate judicial conduct in Matter of Y-S-L-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2015) (denial of due process where IJ tried to bar the testimony of minor respondent by disqualifying him as an expert witness under the Federal Rules of Evidence), the BIA has let this problem fester for far, far too long. Indeed, the indefensible 2% asylum grant rate suggests that the BIA has been derelict in its duty to insure due process, fairness, and compliance with the appropriate, generous legal standards in asylum cases for some time.

Without a more effective effort by the BIA, this problem is unlikely to be solved any time in the near future. While administrative judges at EOIR Headquarters in Falls Church, VA may investigate complaints and correct instances of unprofessional conduct and rudeness, they (quite properly) lack authority to change the decisions in particular cases. Only the BIA, the Attorney General, the Court of Appeals (in this case the 11th Circuit), or the Supreme Court can correct legal errors.

The conduct of the Immigration Judges in Atlanta and some other locations diminishes the efforts of the vast majority of U.S. Immigration Judges, such as my former colleagues in the Arlington Immigration Court, who strive extremely hard to provide due process and impartial judging under extraordinarily difficult circumstances in a system that its not necessarily designed and operated with due process in mind. But, unfair as as the wayward judges might be to their colleagues elsewhere, the real victims of their unprofessional conduct are the individuals who do not receive the fair, courteous, impartial, professional due process adjudications to which they are entitled under our Constitution. And, one has to ask what purpose is served by a “court” which consistently fails to deliver on its one and only mission: guaranteeing fairness and due process for all?

PWS

03/13/17

REUTERS: U.S. Immigration Court’s “Night Court” Plan Shows Why Due Process Is A Mirage In A “Captive” Court System — Will EOIR Cave To Administration’s Move To Put “Due Process Veneer” On Assembly Line Removals!

http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN16H030

Julia Edwards Ainsley reports:

“The Department of Justice is deploying 50 judges to immigration detention facilities across the United States, according to two sources and a letter seen by Reuters and sent to judges on Thursday.

The department is also considering asking judges to sit from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m., split between two rotating shifts, to adjudicate more cases, the sources said. A notice about shift times was not included in the letter.

The Justice Department did not respond to a request for comment.”

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Thanks much to Zoe Tillman over at BuzzFeed News for bringing this article to my attention.

“Judges” working “shifts” on the “removal assembly line!” “Come on, man!” A “real” court would be strongly resisting this mockery of justice and due process.

But, because the U.S. Immigration Court is a “wholly owned subsidiary” of the Administration, EOIR leadership will likely “go along to get along” with a transparent scheme to railroad human beings in real danger back to the “death zone” of the Northern Triangle with “rubber stamp” justice. In other words, the Immigration Courts are considered by the Administration and the DOJ to be part of the “enforcement team,” rather than an independent due-process focused judiciary.

Scheduling early in the AM and late at night is likely to make it more difficult to get pro bono lawyers, witnesses, interpreters, etc. It isn’t just judges.

Also, some folks don’t function very well at those hours. Sounds sort of “gulag like” to me.

And, what about court clerks and other support staff? Additionally, by putting courts in out of the way detention locations and scheduling hearings at odd times, DOJ limits transparency. It’s harder for the press and other “outsiders” to observe.

Moreover, what happens to existing dockets of those IJs who “volunteer?” Reassigning 50 currently sitting Immigration Judges to the Southern Border on a rotating basis for one year would require the rescheduling of nearly 40,000 cases from their “home” dockets. Those cases, many already years old, are likely to be sent to the end of the docket, several years out. This is classic “aimless docket reshuffling” which increases backlogs and inhibits fairness and due process.

Finally, what’s going to happen to a “volunteer” Immigration Judge who takes due process seriously, slows down the cases so individuals can get lawyers, takes time for full presentation of the cases by both sides, and writes carefully reasoned decisions granting asylum or alternative forms of protection. Chances are they will be considered “unproductive,” “not with the program,” “not carrying their weight,” or “not committed to carrying out the Attorney General’s priorities” (yes, folks, Immigration Judges actually are given “performance ratings,” and one of the elements has to do with supporting “agency priorities”)? That’s likely to be “career limiting.”

Final question: How would you like to have your life determined by a judge working (for the “chief prosecutor”) under these conditions?

PWS

03/10/17

TIME: Deportation Can Be a Death Sentence — We Should Be Concerned About “Quick Removal Schemes” By The Administration & Continued Deterioration of Due Process And Fairness For Asylum Seekers – Particularly Those Unrepresented — In U.S. Immigration Court!

http://time.com/4696017/deportation-death-refugees-asylum/

Conchita Cruz and Swapna Reddy, co-founders of the Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project at the Urban Justice Center, write:

“For one immigrant group—asylum seekers already living in the United States—the fear is especially intense: deportation is a death sentence.
While thousands showed up to support refugee families at airports in response to the refugee ban, many Americans do not realize that a different group of refugee families stands to be picked up in raids, detained and wrongfully deported from the United States. These refugees are called “asylum seekers” because they are seeking refugee status from inside the United States instead of abroad.
For many asylum seekers, there is no mechanism to apply for refugee status abroad, which causes them to come to the U.S.-Mexico border and turn themselves in, seeking refuge. Like their counterparts in airports, they have experienced incredible violence in their countries of origin. They have been brutally raped, threatened by gunpoint to join gangs, or witnessed the murder of loved ones.
In response, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) holds asylum seekers in detention centers for weeks or months until they pass a preliminary interview with an asylum officer. If they secure release, they move in with relatives or friends while remaining in deportation proceedings pending a full asylum trial.
Asylum seekers do not have a right to government-appointed counsel though their lives hang in the balance. Instead, families are forced to navigate the complex immigration system alone in a language they do not understand. Many also suffer from trauma-based disabilities such as post-traumatic stress disorder due to the persecution they experienced in the countries they fled.”

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Perhaps contrary to popular perception, we often return individuals to dangerous and life-threatening situations. That’s because of the somewhat arcane “nexus” requirement for asylum that only covers persecution because of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

By manipulating these definitions, U.S. Government authorities often can deny protection even to individuals who clearly face life-threatening danger upon return. The Government has worked particularly hard to develop technical legal criteria to disqualify those fleeing danger in the Northern Triangle.

Given the complexity and the highly legalistic nature of the system, competent representation by an attorney is a requirement for due process. For example, according to TRAC, for a sample population of Northern Triangle “women with children,” slightly more than 26% of those with lawyers got favorable decisions from the Immigration Court. Without lawyers, only 1.5% succeeded.

And, if the law were interpreted more reasonably and generously, in accordance with the spirit of asylum protection, I think that a substantial majority of those applying for asylum from the Northern Triangle would be granted relief. Pressure for more favorable interpretations will not come from unrepresented individuals who can’t speak English, let alone articulate, document, and support sophisticated legal arguments for better interpretations of protection laws.

PWS

03/09/17

My Message To Cornell Law — “Fight For Due Process” — Join The “New Due Process Army” — Due Process In Peril At The U.S. Immigration Court!

I spoke to an audience of approximately 120 members of the Cornell University community in Ithaca on Wednesday, March 8, 2017, as part of the Berger International Programs Lecture Series at Cornell Law. Many thanks to Professor Stephen Yale-Loehr for inviting me.

Read my entire speech

“EXISTENTIALISM AND THE MEANING OF LIFE AT THE U.S. IMMIGRATION COURT – CORNELL LAW VERSION”

here:

EXISTENTIALISM — Cornell — AND THE MEANING OF LIFE AT THE U

Here are a few “Highlights:”

“Sadly, the Immigration Court System is moving further away from that due process vision. Instead, years of neglect, misunderstanding, mismanagement, and misguided priorities imposed by the U.S. Department of Justice have created judicial chaos with an expanding backlog now exceeding an astounding one half million cases and no clear plan for resolving them in the foreseeable future.”

“Nobody has been hit harder by this preventable disaster than asylum seekers, particularly scared women and children fleeing for their lives from the Northern Triangle of Central America. In Immigration Court, notwithstanding the life or death issues at stake, unlike criminal court there is no right to an appointed lawyer.”

“First, and foremost, the Immigration Courts must return to the focus on due process as the one and only mission. The improper use of our due process court system by political officials to advance enforcement priorities and/or send “don’t come” messages to asylum seekers, which are highly ineffective in any event, must end. That’s unlikely to happen under the DOJ – as proved by over three decades of history, particularly recent history.”

“This is hardly “through teamwork and innovation being the world’s best administrative tribunals guaranteeing fairness and due process for all!” These unusually low asylum grant rates are impossible to justify in light of the generous standard for well-founded fear established by the Supreme Court in Cardoza-Fonseca and the BIA in Mogharrabi, and the regulatory presumption of future fear arising out of past persecution that applies in many asylum cases. Yet, the BIA has only recently and fairly timidly addressed the manifest lack of respect for asylum seekers and failure to guarantee fairness and due process for such vulnerable individuals in some cases arising in Atlanta and other courts with unrealistically low grant rates.”

“Over the past 16 years, the BIA’s inability or unwillingness to aggressively stand up for the due process rights of asylum seekers and to enforce the fair and generous standards required by American law have robbed our Immigration Court System of credibility and public support, as well as ruined the lives of many who were denied protection that should have been granted. We need a BIA which functions like a Federal Appellate Court and whose overriding mission is to ensure that the due process vision of the Immigration Courts becomes a reality rather than an unfulfilled promise.”

“So, do we abandon all hope? No, of course not! Because there are hundreds of newer lawyers out there who are former Arlington JLCs, interns, my former student, and those who have practiced before the Arlington Immigration Court.”

“They form what I call the “New Due Process Army!” And, while my time on the battlefield is winding down, they are just beginning the fight! They will keep at it for years, decades, or generations — whatever it takes to force the U.S. immigration judicial system to live up to its promise of “guaranteeing fairness and due process for all!”

“Folks, the U.S Immigration Court system is on the verge of collapse. And, there is every reason to believe that the misguided “enforce and detain to the max” policies being pursued by this Administration will drive the Immigration Courts over the edge. When that happens, a large chunk of the entire American justice system and the due process guarantees that make American great and different from most of the rest of the world will go down with it.”

“Now is the time to take a stand for fundamental fairness! Join the New Due Process Army! Due process forever!”

PWS

03/10/17

THE HILL: Nolan Rappaport Says New Trump Travel Ban A Slam Dunk Winner In Court! Get Link Here!

http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/immigration/322720-trumps-travel-ban-legally-sound-defensible-all-the-way-to-the

Nolan writes:

“The Trump administration released Monday a revised version of its immigration Executive Order to address the concerns raised in an appeals court decision, but those criticisms were always fundamentally irrational and not based in the text of the Order.”

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Read Nolan’s complete article in The Hill at link.

As I indicated in my posts yesterday, the new travel ban appears to me just as bogus as the first one. Rather than being designed to solve a real national security problem, it is fear-mongering designed primarily to rev up public opinion, particularly among Trump’s base, against Muslims and refugees, neither of which pose a significant threat to the U.S. at present.

I noted that the Post “Fact-Checker” has already awarded “Three Pinocchios” to the misleading statistics that Secretary Kelly and AG Sessions cited in their “staged dialogue” asking the President to reimpose the travel ban. And, this is from a President and an Administration that already have pretty much zero credibility.

That being said, I don’t necessarily disagree with Nolan’s bottom line that Trump might well win this one if it even gets to the Supremes. This time, following the advice of Government litigators, he has applied the ban prospectively only to those foreign nationals overseas who have not previously been admitted or already documented to enter the U.S. He’s also eliminated the overt mention of religion.

Given that the standard for overseas visa denials is a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason,” the Administration might well be home free. Although the stated rationale might not stand up to a rigorous examination, it is unlikely that the Supremes, or even most lower Federal Courts, view engaging in a testing of the factual basis for this type of order affecting individuals overseas as something that can properly be adjudicated by Article III judges.

See my previous posts here:

http://wp.me/p8eeJm-ry

http://wp.me/p8eeJm-rH

PWS

03/07/17

DIFFERING VIEWS OF NEW “TRAVEL BAN” ON CNN: Jeffrey Toobin: It Could Stand Up — Advocates: It Stinks!

Jeffrey Toobin writes:

“CNN)For President Trump and his travel ban, the second time may be the charm.

The revised executive order, revealed Monday during a rare joint appearance by three Cabinet members, addresses many of the legal problems that led Trump’s first executive order to be stymied by the courts.
The new order makes plain that holders of green cards and valid visas are now clearly exempt. There is no longer an exception to allow Christian refugees to jump to the head of the line.

The government’s explanation for why it selected the covered countries does not mention religion; rather, the administration says the six countries — down from seven in the previous order — either support terrorism or lack sufficient controls to identify dangerous visitors to the United States. The order also removes Iraq as one of the countries covered by the order.
The courts, which invalidated the original ban, did so, in effect, because they found the order amounted to religious discrimination against Muslims. This new order, unlike the first, makes no mention of the religions of any applicants to come to the United States.
Still, opponents of the order will insist the new rules are merely pretexts — that the new order once again fulfills President Trump’s campaign promise to ban Muslims from entering the United States.”

http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/06/opinions/trump-travel-ban-toobin/index.html

On the other hand, Lauren Said-Moorhouse reports:

“(CNN)International humanitarian groups have slammed US President Donald Trump’s revised travel ban, which targets six Muslim-majority nations, for sharing many of the same flaws as its predecessor.

Similar to the January order, travel ban 2.0 again prevents citizens from Syria, Iran, Yemen, Libya, Somalia and Sudan from entering the United States for at least 90 days. In this iteration, Iraq is not on the list of barred countries.
The new order, which the Trump administration says is needed to protect the United States from foreign terrorists entering the country, will also suspend the admission of refugees for 120 days and urges US officials to improve vetting procedures for a resettlement program already regarded to be rigorous.
Aid groups, including the International Rescue Committee, or IRC, and Amnesty International USA, quickly condemned the new directive, arguing the ban still does not make the United States any safer.
David Miliband, IRC president and CEO, said in a statement that the revised executive order on immigration “heartlessly targets the most vetted and most vulnerable population to enter the United States.” He added that the new executive order could affect 60,000 people already screened for resettlement in America.

“The ban doesn’t target those who are the greatest security risk, but those least able to advocate for themselves. Instead of making us safer, it serves as a gift for extremists who seek to undermine the United States,” Miliband said.”

http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/06/world/trump-travel-ban-world-reaction/index.html

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PWS

03/06/17

Here Are All The Official Documents On The “New” Travel Ban From LexisNexis

For the new Executive Order click here:

https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/newsheadlines/archive/2017/03/06/trump-travel-ban-2-0-mar-6-2017.aspx?Redirected=true

For other materials from DHS relating to the travel ban click here:

https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/newsheadlines/archive/2017/03/06/4-dhs-documents-re-travel-ban-2-0-mar-6-2017.aspx?Redirected=true

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PWS

03/06/17

WashPost OPINION: Bipartisan Duo Of Prosecutors Sets Forth Case Against Sessions — Cites Kleindienst Example — Meanwhile, See Kate McKinnon As Jeff Sessions On SNL!

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/federal-prosecutors-have-brought-charges-in-cases-far-less-serious-than-sessionss/2017/03/03/d4345396-003d-11e7-8ebe-6e0dbe4f2bca_story.html

Philip Lacovara and Lawrence Robbins write in the Washington Post:

“Attorney General Jeff Sessions made a seemingly false statement under oath during his confirmation hearing. Admittedly, not every potential perjury case gets prosecuted, and Sessions may well have defenses to such a charge. But as lawyers at the Justice Department and attorneys in private practice who have represented individuals accused in such cases, we can state with assurance: Federal prosecutors have brought charges in cases involving far more trivial misstatements and situations far less consequential than whether a nominee to be the nation’s chief law enforcement officer misled fellow senators during his confirmation hearings.

. . . .

Certainly there is precedent for a prosecution in this context. Part of the fallout from Watergate included the special prosecutor’s investigation of Richard Kleindienst, who had resigned from his position as attorney general, for alleged false statements during his confirmation hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Kleindienst was asked whether the White House had interfered with a Justice Department antitrust action against the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation. He stated, “I was not interfered with by anybody at the White House” — but President Nixon and one of his top aides had each called Kleindienst regarding the case. Kleindienst pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge for “refus[ing] and fail[ing] to answer accurately and fully” questions at a congressional hearing.

Those facts left no room for any colorable defense on the “knowledge” issue. But when Justice Department officials decide whether to bring a case against Sessions — or, more appropriately, when an independent counsel is appointed and resolves that question — this must be done against the backdrop of other perjury cases that the department has chosen over the years to bring. And the department has prosecuted individuals who advanced defenses very similar to Sessions’s arguments here, often where there was far less at stake.”

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Read the full piece at the link:

And, Here’s Kate McKinnon as Jeff Sessions on SNL from Saturday, March 4:

http://www.nbc.com/saturday-night-live/video/jeff-sessions-gump-cold-open/3480395

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PWS

03/06/17

Arlington Immigration Court Report: New — 10 Judges, No Waiting (Well, At Least The First Part Isn’t “Fake News”)

The local AILA Chapter reports that effective on March 6, 2017, the U.S. Immigration Court in Arlington, Virginia will have ten publicly accessible courtrooms, on two floors “up and running.” Here’s the “lineup:”

2nd floor
Courtroom 1 – Judge Robert P. Owens
Courtroom 2 – Judge Thomas G. Snow
Courtroom 3 – Judge Lawrence O. Burman
Courtroom 4 – Judge J. Traci Hong
Courtroom 5 – Judge Rodger C. Harris
Courtroom 6 – Judge John M. Bryant
Courtroom 7 – Judge Quynh V. Bain
Courtroom 8 – Judge Emmett D. Soper

4th floor
Courtroom 15 – Judge Karen D. Stevens
Courtroom 16 – Judge Roxanne C. Hladylowycz

And, there are plans to open the 3rd floor with six new courtrooms and judges in the near future! Combined with the news that the Immigration Court has been exempted from the hiring freeze by AG Jeff Sessions, http://wp.me/p8eeJm-qP that should bring much-needed relief to the conscientious, hard-working judges of Arlington, the local immigration bar, and the Office of Chief Counsel, and the many individuals with cases pending in Arlington. With at least 30,000 cases by last count, help could not come fast enough!

The only question I have: Will progress be derailed by detailing some or all of the Arlington Judges to the Southern Border as part of the Administration’s new immigration enforcement and detention initiative? Only time will tell. Stay tuned.

But, for now, congrats to the Arlington Immigration Court and to EOIR for a job well done and for making needed progress on the due process front!

PWS

03/05/17

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