Hon. Jeffrey Chase – Page 18 – immigrationcourtside.com

HON. JEFFREY CHASE: MORE INTERNAL EVIDENCE OF POLITICIZED HIRING AND UNNECESSARY DELAYS UNDER SESSIONS AS EOIR APPEARS TO JOIN TRUMP’S “WAR ON THE CAREER CIVIL SERVICE” BY ATTACKING THE CAREER PROMOTION SYSTEM FOR BIA ATTORNEY ADVISORS!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/5/27/eoirs-hiring-practices-raise-concerns

May 27 EOIR’s Hiring Practices Raise Concerns

In response to a whistleblower’s letter from within EOIR, ranking Senate Democrats have requested an investigation into improper political influence in EOIR’s hiring criteria for immigration judges and members of the Board of Immigration Appeals. https://democrats-judiciary.house.gov/news/press-releases/top-dems-request-inspector-general-investigation-allegations-illegal-hiring. Following up on an April 17 letter to Attorney General Sessions, the Democratic leaders on May 8 stated that in subsequent weeks, more whistleblowers have come forward to corroborate the delaying or withdrawal of IJ appointments to candidates whose political views are not believed to align with those of the present administration.

There seems to be little if any doubt among EOIR employees that this is in fact happening. The resulting slowdown in IJ hiring is further exacerbating the huge backlog of cases plaguing the immigration courts. There are presently no judges sitting in the Louisville, Kentucky immigration court; other courts are simply understaffed. In what my friend and fellow blogger Hon. Paul W. Schmidt has termed “ADR” (Aimless Docket Reshuffling), sitting IJs are being detailed to hear cases in courts with vacancies, forcing the continuance of cases on their own dockets, some of which have been waiting two or more years for their day in court.

It was just under 10 years ago that a 140 page report of the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General found similar wrongdoing in the hiring of IJs under the Bush administration. https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0807/final.pdf That report noted at p.135 that “both Department policy and federal law prohibit discrimination in hiring for career positions on the basis of political affiliations.” That investigation found that such policy and law had been violated, and included recommendations to prevent a future recurrence of such improper conduct. Then as now, the slowdown in IJ hiring caused by the improper political screening of candidates compromised EOIR’s mission (in the words of the agency’s Director at the time, at p.96), and contributed to the growing case backlog.

In another employment-related development that has drawn little public notice, the Department of Justice on May 17 posted a hiring ad for 38 vacant staff attorney positions at the BIA. The twist is that for the first time, the positions were advertised as being entry level grade positions with no potential for promotion.

EOIR Director James McHenry had hinted since his appointment that he believed BIA attorney positions should be downgraded. There is something disingenuous about such statement. I can think of at least three immigration judges who were appointed to the bench directly from their positions as non-supervisory BIA staff attorneys. Two of the four temporary BIA Board Members at present are long-term BIA staff attorneys. The present BIA chairperson, David Neal, previously served as a Board staff attorney for 5 years, a position that apparently qualified him to directly become chief counsel to the Senate Immigration Subcommittee. Nearly all of the BIA’s decisions, including those that are published as precedent binding on the agency and DHS, are drafted by its staff attorneys. Some of those attorneys have accumulated significant expertise in complex areas of immigration law. A number of Board staff attorneys have participated as speakers at the immigration judge training conferences.

The question thus becomes: how are experienced attorneys who are deemed qualified to move directly into immigration judge and BIA Board Member positions, to craft precedent decisions and to train immigration judges only deemed to be entry level, non-career path employees?

There has been much attention paid to the nearly 700,000 cases pending before the nation’s immigration courts. As the agency moves to hire more judges and limit continuances, and recently had its power to administrative close cases revoked by the AG, the number and pace of cases appealed to the BIA will speed up significantly. It would seem like a good time for the BIA to be staffed with knowledgeable and experienced staff attorneys. Instead, the agency’s move essentially turns new BIA attorney hires into short-term law clerks. New attorneys undergo a full year of legal training to bring them up to speed to handle the high volume and variety of complex legal issues arising on appeal. However, attorneys are unlikely to remain in such positions for much more than a year without the possibility of promotion.

Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

As an Attorney-Manager and Government Senior Executive, I always had high expectations for the professionals working for me, which they achieved in the vast, vast majority of cases. My experience told me that everyone had their strengths and weaknesses and that it was the job of a good manager to find ways for everyone to succeed whenever possible.

If I do say so myself, I believe that I was good at finding the right “sweet spots” for folks to “be the best that they can be.” And, I’ll freely acknowledge getting some of my ideas from watching the late “Legacy INS” General Counsel Mike Inman operate. Whatever else one might think or say about “Iron Mike,” he did have an “eye for talent.” He also could take people who seemed to be “bouncing along” in their careers and position them to be outsized contributors and “superstars,” in his lingo.

At the same time, I saw the importance of insuring that folks working for me had the maximum number of career advancement opportunities and a fair chance to be recognized and move up the “career ladder.” Indeed, former EOIR Director Anthony “Tony” Moscato and I finished the work begun by my predecessor as BIA Chair, the late Judge David Milhollan and his then “Chief Attorney Advisor” now retired BIA Appellate Immigration Judge David B. Holmes in creating a career ladder where all qualified BIA Attorney Advisers could eventually reach the full DOJ career level for attorneys of GS-15.

Additionally, with the support of Tony and then Attorney General Janet Reno, I created various supervisory and leadership positions for senior Attorney Advisors that allowed them to assist in the management of the BIA staff while preparing themselves for other senior-level careers both at EOIR and elsewhere. Indeed a significant number of todays Appellate Immigration Judges, Immigration Judges, and senior EOIR managers, and managers in other divisions of the DOJ got their start in management at the BIA.

Disappointingly, under Sessions, EOIR appears to have joined the fight against the career civil service by “dumbing down” in various ways both the Immigration Judge and BIA Attorney Advisor position by making them less attractive to those seeking a career in public service.

I recently was discussing the politicized hiring process with a retired colleague who had worked elsewhere in the DOJ but had knowledge of both the past and current problems at EOIR. She said “It’s happening again, Paul. Just wait till it all comes out — ‘you ain’t seen nothin’ yet!'”

It’s time for EOIR to be removed from the DOJ and its politicized policies and practices! In this instance, “past performance predicts future results!” And, that’s not a good thing!

PWS

05-28-18

WITH HELP FROM SIDLEY AUSTIN (LA), “OUR GANG” OF RETIRED IJs WEIGHS IN WITH 5th CIR. AGAINST BIA’S WRONG-HEADED PRECEDENT IN Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 189 (BIA 2018)!

Cantarero – Amicus Brief

Thanks to “Our Heroes” Jean-Claude Andre and Katelyn N Rowe of Sidley Austin LPP, LA:

HERE’S THE TITLE PAGE AND TOC:

No. 18-60115

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

WENDY YESSENIA CANTARERO LAGOS & HENRY OMAR BONILLACANTARERO,

Petitioners,

v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals, BIA Nos. A206-773-719 & A206-773-720

AMICI CURIAE BRIEF OF RETIRED IMMIGRATION JUDGES AND FORMERMEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS IN SUPPORT OFPETITIONERS AND VACATUR AND REMAND

Jean-Claude André
Katelyn N. Rowe
Sidley Austin LLP
555 West Fifth Street, Suite 4000 Los Angeles, CA 90013

(213) 896-6007 jcandre@sidley.com krowe@sidley.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

May 23, 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Identity and Interest of Amici Curiae ……………………………………………… 1

ARGUMENT …………………………………………………………………………………3

Because particular social group jurisprudence is unduly
complex and applicants face various access-to-justice
barriers, Immigration Judges and Board Members will
frequently clarify an applicant’s proposed particular social
group ……………………………………………………………………………………. 9

The decision below disregards prior precedent in which Immigration Judges and Board Members have clarified an applicant’s proposed particular social group or allowed an applicant to present a revised particular social group on
appeal ………………………………………………………………………………… 21

This Court should vacate the decision below because its ambiguous holding will encourage Immigration Judges to be intolerant of applicants’ efforts to revise their PSGs and will enable the Board to issue boilerplate decisions denying relief ….. 28

CONCLUSION ……………………………………………………………………………. 31 APPENDIX …………………………………………………………………………… App. 1

HERE’S A SUMMARY OF OUR ARGUMENT:

ARGUMENT

In their decades of experience on the bench, amici regularly assisted applicants in the process of clarifying their proposed PSGs.Amici also allowed applicants to present revised PSGs during their administrative appeals. This judicial practice has afforded Board Members the flexibility to engage in an independent, meaningful review of the evidentiary record and provide appropriate relief to applicants based on revised PSGs. See, e.g., Matter of Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357, 365 (BIA 1996) (granting the applicant asylum based on a revised PSG that the Board itself formulated). In light of the complexity of PSG jurisprudence and the various access-to-justice barriers that applicants must navigate in immigration court, it is essential that the judicial practice of clarifying PSGs is not chilled by the decision below. See, e.g.,Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 138 (1991) (noting “the complexity of

3

immigration procedures, and the enormity of the interests at stake . . . .”).

Because PSG cognizability is a legal determination, amici believe that Immigration Judges and Board Members are obligated to consider any potential PSG that is supported by the factual record—even if the PSG is being proposed for the first time on appeal. PSG clarification is consistent with the requirement that administrative immigration decisions “must reflect meaningful consideration of the relevant substantial evidence supporting the alien’s claims.” Abdel-Masieh v. I.N.S., 73 F.3d 579, 585 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388, 390-91 (BIA 2014) (“The question whether a group is a ‘particular social group’ within the meaning of the Act is a question of law that we review de novo.”). In this way, the judicial practice of clarifying an applicant’s PSG to match the evidentiary record falls squarely within the traditional roles of impartial administrative immigration tribunals. SeeUNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, 16 (2011) (“It is for the examiner, when investigating the facts of the case, to ascertain the reason or reasons for the persecution feared . .

4

. .”); Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 722, 723 (BIA 1997) (“Although we recognize that the burden of proof in asylum and withholding of [removal] cases is on the applicant, we do have certain obligations under international law to extend refuge to those who qualify for such relief.”). Importantly, Amici did not receive reproach from the Board for clarifying proposed PSGs. Nor were amici overturned by circuit courts on the basis that the Board should not consider newly revised PSGs on appeal.

Amici believe that the decision below, Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 189 (BIA 2018), if affirmed by this Court, will constitute a significant departure from the current judicial practice of PSG clarification. The Board held that it “generally will not address a newly articulated particular social group that was not advanced before the Immigration Judge.” (AR 3) This decision completely ignores an important reality of the immigration court system: that Immigration Judges and Board Members have frequently clarified applicants’ proposed PSGs.

HERE’S THE “CAST OF CHARACTERS:”

APPENDIX BIOGRAPHIES OF AMICI CURIAE

The Honorable Steven R. Abrams was appointed as an Immigration Judge in September of 1997. From 1999 to June 2005, Judge Abrams served as the Immigration Judge at the Queens Wackenhut Immigration Court at JFK Airport in Queens. He has also worked at the Immigration Courts in New York and Varick Street Detention facility. Prior to becoming an Immigration Judge, he was the Special Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of New York in the Criminal Division in charge of immigration. Judge Abrams retired in 2013 and now lectures on immigration in North Carolina.

The Honorable Sarah M. Burr began serving as an Immigration Judge in New York in 1994. She was appointed Assistant Chief Immigration Judge in charge of the New York, Fishkill, Ulster, Bedford Hills, and Varick Street immigration courts in 2006. Judge Burr served in this capacity until January 2011, when she returned to the bench full-time until she retired in 2012. Prior to her appointment, she worked as a staff attorney for the Criminal Defense Division of the Legal Aid Society in its trial and appeals bureaus. She also worked as

App. 1

the supervising attorney in the Legal Aid Society immigration unit. Judge Burr currently serves on the Board of Directors of the Immigrant Justice Corps.

The Honorable Jeffrey S. Chase served as an Immigration Judge in New York City from 1995 to 2007 and was an attorney advisor and senior legal advisor at the Board of Immigration Appeals from 2007 to 2017. He is presently in private practice as an independent consultant on immigration law, and is of counsel to the law firm of DiRaimondo & Masi in New York City. Prior to his appointment, he was a solo practitioner and volunteer staff attorney at Human Rights First. He was also the recipient of the American Immigration Lawyers Association’s (“AILA”) annual pro bono award in 1994 and chaired AILA’s Asylum Reform Task Force.

The Honorable George Chew was appointed as an Immigration Judge in 1995 and served until 2017, when he retired. He also previously served as a trial attorney for the former Immigration and Naturalization Service in New York from 1979 to 1981.

The Honorable John F. Gossart, Jr. served as an Immigration Judge from 1982 until his retirement in 2013 and is the former

App. 2

president of the National Association of Immigration Judges. At the time of his retirement, he was the third most senior immigration judge in the United States. Judge Gossart was awarded the Attorney General Medal by then Attorney General Eric Holder. From 1975 to 1982, he served in various positions with the former Immigration Naturalization Service, including as general attorney, naturalization attorney, trial attorney, and deputy assistant commissioner for naturalization. From 1997 to 2016, Judge Gossart was an adjunct professor of law and taught immigration law at the University of Baltimore School of Law and more recently at the University of Maryland School of Law. He has been a faculty member of the National Judicial College, and has guest lectured at numerous law schools, the Judicial Institute of Maryland, and the former Maryland Institute for the Continuing Education of Lawyers. Judge Gossart is a past Board member of the Immigration Law Section of the Federal Bar Association. Judge Gossart served in the United States Army from 1967 to 1969 and is a veteran of the Vietnam War.

The Honorable William P. Joyce served as an Immigration Judge in Boston, Massachusetts. After retiring from the bench, he became the Managing Partner of Joyce and Associates and has 1,500

App. 3

active immigration cases. Prior to his appointment to the bench, he served as legal counsel to the Chief Immigration Judge. Judge Joyce also served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, and Associate General Counsel for enforcement for INS. He is a graduate of Georgetown School of Foreign Service and Georgetown Law School.

The Honorable Carol King served as an Immigration Judge from 1995 to 2017 in San Francisco and was a temporary member of theBoard of Immigration Appeals for six months between 2010 and 2011. Judge King previously practiced immigration law for ten years, both with the Law Offices of Marc Van Der Hout and in her own private practice. She also taught immigration law for five years at Golden Gate University School of Law and is currently on the faculty of the Stanford University Law School Trial Advocacy Program. Judge King now works as a Removal Defense Strategist, advising attorneys and assisting with research and writing related to complex removal defense issues.

The Honorable Lory D. Rosenberg served on the Board of Immigration Appeals from 1995 to 2002. She then served as Director of the Defending Immigrants Partnership of the National Legal Aid &

App. 4

Defender Association from 2002 until 2004. Prior to her appointment to the Board, she worked from 1991-1995 as Director of the Legal Action Center at the American Immigration Law Foundation, was in private practice, and was the 1982 co-founder of the asylum and legal program at Centro Presente in Cambridge, Massachusetts. She is the author ofImmigration Law and Crimes, and was an adjunct professor of law and taught immigration law at American University Washington College of Law between 1997 and 2004. An excerpt from one of Judge Rosenberg’s separate opinions was quoted by the United States Supreme Court in its 2001 decision in I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). Judge Rosenberg has served as a member of the International Association of Refugee Law Judges, an elected member of the Board of Governors of AILA, a Board Member of the Federal Bar Association, Immigration Law Section. She also frequently lectures and trains immigration attorneys on current topics of complexity, including asylum and refugee law, human rights, and the intersection of criminal and immigration law. Judge Rosenberg is the founder of the Immigration Defense and Expert Advocacy Solutions (IDEAS) Consulting and Coaching, LLC, where she provides legal mentoring, consulting, and personal and

App. 5

business coaching for immigration lawyers. She currently serves as Senior Attorney and Advisor for the Immigrant Defenders Law Group, PLLC.

The Honorable Susan Roy started her legal career as a Staff Attorney at the Board of Immigration Appeals, a position she received through the Attorney General’s Honors Program. She served as Assistant Chief Counsel, National Security Attorney, and Senior Attorney for the Department of Homeland Security Office of Chief Counsel in Newark, New Jersey. She then became an Immigration Judge in Newark, New Jersey. Judge Roy has been in private practice for nearly five years, and two years ago she opened her own immigration law firm. She also currently serves as the New Jersey Chapter Liaison to the Executive Office for Immigration Review for AILA and the Vice Chair of the Immigration Law Section of the New Jersey State Bar Association. In 2016, Judge Roy was awarded the Outstanding Pro Bono Attorney of the Year by the New Jersey Chapter of the Federal Bar Association.

The Honorable Paul W. Schmidt served as an Immigration Judge from 2003 to 2016 in Arlington, Virginia. He previously served

App. 6

as Chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals from 1995 to 2001, and as a Board Member from 2001 to 2003. Judge Schmidt authored the landmark decision Matter of Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357 (BIA 1995), which extended asylum protection to victims of female genital mutilation. He served in various positions with the former Immigration Naturalization Service, including Acting General Counsel (1986-1987, 1979-1981) and Deputy General Counsel (1978-1987). He also worked as the managing partner of the Washington, D.C. office of Fragomen, DelRey & Bernsen from 1993 to 1995. Judge Schmidt practiced business immigration law with the Washington, D.C. office of Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue from 1987 to 1992 and was a partner at the firm from 1990 to 1992. Judge Schmidt served as an adjunct professor of law at George Mason University School of Law in 1989 and at Georgetown University Law Center from 2012 to 2014 and 2017 to present. He was a founding member of the International Association of Refugee Law Judges and presently serves as Americas Vice President. He also serves on the Advisory Board of AYUDA, a nonprofit that provides direct legal services to immigrant communities in Washington, D.C. and Maryland. Judge Schmidt assists the National Immigrant Justice

App. 7

Center/Heartland Alliance on various projects, as well as writes and lectures on immigration law topics at various forums throughout the country. Judge Schmidt created immigrationcourtside.com, an immigration law blog.

The Honorable Gustavo D. Villageliu served as a Board of Immigration Appeals Member from July 1995 to April 2003. He then served as Senior Associate General Counsel for the Executive Office for Immigration Review and helped manage FOIA, Privacy, and Security as EOIR Records Manager until he retired in 2011. Before becoming aBoard Member, Villageliu was an Immigration Judge in Miami and oversaw both detained and non-detained dockets, as well as the Florida Northern Region Institutional Criminal Alien Hearing Docket from 1990 to 1995. Mr. Villageliu was a member of the Iowa, Florida, and District of Columbia Bars. He graduated from the University of Iowa College of Law in 1977. After working as a Johnson County Attorney prosecutor intern in Iowa City, he joined the Board of Immigration Appeals as a staff attorney in January 1978 and specialized in war criminal, investor, and criminal alien cases.

App. 8

The Honorable Polly Webber served as an Immigration Judge from 1995 to 2016 in San Francisco, with details in facilities in Tacoma, Port Isabel, Boise, Houston, Atlanta, Philadelphia, and Orlando. Previously, Judge Webber practiced immigration law from 1980 to 1995 in her own private practice in San Jose. She was a national officer in AILA from 1985 to 1991 and served as National President of AILA from 1989 to 1990. Judge Webber also taught immigration and nationality law at both Santa Clara University School of Law and Lincoln Law School.

The Honorable Robert D. Weisel served as an Immigration Judge in the New York Immigration Court from 1989 until his retirement at the end of 2016. Judge Weisel was an Assistant Chief Immigration Judge, supervising court operations both in New York City and New Jersey. He was also in charge of the nationwide Immigration Court mentoring program for both Immigration Judges and Judicial Law Clerks. During his tenure as Assistant Chief Immigration Judge, the New York court initiated the first assigned counsel system within the Immigration Court’s nationwide Institutional Hearing Program.

*************************************

A warm welcome to our good friend and colleague Judge (and former Assistant Chief Immigration Judge) of the U.S. Immigration Court in New York, NY!

Due Process Forever!

PWS

05-25-18

HON. JEFFREY CHASE: EVERYONE IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS/WOMEN’S RIGHTS ADVOCACY COMMUNITY NEEDS TO UNITE AND TAKE AGGRESSIVE ACTION AGAINST JEFF SESSIONS’S PLAN TO PASS DEATH SENTENCE ON FEMALE REFUGEES FLEEING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE –Many Will Be Killed, Raped, Maimed, Disfigured, Or Sentenced To A “Life Worse Than Death” If Sessions Has His Way!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/5/6/7r3izq486dxxtzlrsythpmr2kg35j3

May 6 Briefs Filed in Matter of A-B-

Briefs of the parties and amici have now been filed with the Attorney General in Matter of A-B-. Once again, a group of former immigration judges and BIA members, which this time numbered 16 (including myself) filed an amicus brief (which can be viewed here: http://www.aila.org/infonet/amicus-brief-matter-of-a-b- ).* The respondent’s brief was submitted by the outstanding legal team of Ben Winograd of IRAC; Karen Musalo, Blaine Bookey, and Eunice Lee of CGRS, and Charlotte attorney Andres Lopez. DHS’s brief was submitted by Michael P. Davis of ICE, whose reasoned positions are to be commended.

The issue in the case below involved the actions of immigration judge V. Stuart Couch in failing to abide by the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, which reversed Couch’s denial of asylum in a particularly strong claim involving a victim of severe domestic violence. The BIA reversed the judge’s decision, and remanded with instructions to grant asylum following the required updated security clearance by DHS. However, Couch took some nine months to schedule the case for a hearing. When at that hearing, DHS stated that the clearances had been completed, Judge Couch did not issue a new decision (as he was directed to do by the BIA). Instead, he stated that he was recertifying the case to the BIA, something that he lacked the authority to do without first issuing a new decision.

The case sat for another seven months, during which time it is not clear whether the record actually made its way back to the BIA. But before the Board could rule on the propriety of Judge Couch’s actions, the case was somehow plucked from wherever it had been by AG Jeff Sessions, who on his own transformed the case into a vehicle to answer a question that no one but himself seems to understand, namely, whether being the victim of private criminal activity constitutes a cognizable particular social group for asylum purposes. (There is an interesting question of how Sessions even knew that this case existed.)

In response, the Department of Homeland Security appealed to reason. It requested the AG to hold off until the BIA ruled on the propriety of Couch’s attempted recertification. DHS also requested Sessions to provide further clarification of his question, and noted that “this question has already been answered, at least in part, by the Board and its prior precedent.” Sessions denied both requests, adding that he is not bound by BIA precedent, nor is he required to allow briefing on an issue before him on certification. It seems as if Sessions might be saying that as he’s bestowing the privilege of allowing briefs, he doesn’t further need to let everyone know what it is they are being asked to brief.

Depending on how Sessions is choosing to interpret the question, his decision might impact not only domestic violence claims, but any asylum claim based on a particular social group involving private criminal activity (which could include claims based on sexual orientation or sexual identity; as well as victims of female genital cutting, human trafficking, gang violence, blood feuds and honor killings). Or then again, maybe not. Because if Sessions is asking whether a particular social group delineated as “victims of private criminal activity” is cognizable, his answer wouldn’t impact the outcome of this case, as the respondent never claimed to be a member of such group. Nor would it matter to the outcome if Sessions is asking whether a group which includes the element of victimization by a criminal acting in a private capacity is cognizable, as no element of victimization is included in the respondent’s delineated group of “El Salvadoran women who are unable to leave their domestic relationships where they have children in common.” Nowhere in the wording of such group is there a mention of being the victim of private criminal activity, nor is the respondent claiming that she was targeted for abuse because of her being a victim of private criminal activity.

But could Sessions be questioning whether any particular social group merits asylum where its members fear persecutors who are not government officials? If that’s his question, a decision in the negative would run counter to not only more than a half century of BIA precedent, but also to decisions of all eleven Federal circuit courts, and to international law, all of which universally agree that for asylum purposes, persecution may be by private actors that the government is unable or unwilling to control.

Does Sessions himself understand the question he is asking? Let’s just assume that since this case involves a credible victim of severe domestic violence, and that her particular social group was found by the BIA to be substantially similar to the one it recognized as cognizable in its 2014 precedent decision in Matter of A-R-C-G-, that Sessions is considering invalidating that decision.

The purpose of courts and tribunals is to resolve disputes between the parties. The issue that Sessions now wishes to address has been settled, and is not being contested by either party. The Department of Homeland Security itself made this point to Sessions. Had this case been allowed to run its course and result in a grant of asylum, it is far from clear that such result would have been contested or appealed by DHS. In its brief to Sessions, DHS states more than once that it “generally supports the legal framework set out by the Board in Matter of A-R-C-G-.” DHS continued that the group in that case of “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” was not defined by the respondent’s being subject to domestic violence. DHS specifically stated that like the BIA, it “understands ‘unable to leave a relationship’ to signify an inability to do so based on a potential range of ‘religious, cultural, or legal constraints…’” DHS continued that neither the PSG in A-R-C-G- nor the group offered by A-B- herself violate the principle that such group “must exist independently of the persecution suffered and/or feared.”

In refusing DHS’s request for clarification, Sessions claimed that “several Federal Article III courts have recently questioned whether victims of private violence may qualify for asylum” based on their membership in a particular social group. However, in responding to such statement in its subsequent brief, DHS noted that “none of the circuit court decision cited by the Immigration Judge questioned the underlying validity of A-R-C-G-.” In response to Sessions’ statement that he is not bound by the BIA’s precedent decisions, DHS recognized this, but “avers that the Attorney General should not directly or indirectly abrogate A-R-C-G-,” but should “rather…emphasize the importance of case and society-specific analysis.”

There is thus agreement between the parties of the validity of the Board’s holding in A-R-C-G-. In revisiting the issue, Sessions is not attempting to resolve a dispute, as no such dispute exists.

To me, the most shocking aspect of Sessions’ action is its timing. Case law concerning human rights (including the law of asylum) and civil rights does not develop in a vacuum. Much as courts have extended civil rights protections based on race, gender, and sexual orientation throughout the history of this country, the idea of what constitutes persecution and which of its victims are deserving of protection evolves along with the views of society. Sessions is choosing, unprompted, to challenge whether victims of domestic violence are deserving of asylum just as our society has undertaken a powerful, long-overdue, and much needed correction in the form of the #metoo movement. Many hundreds of thousands of us (“us” of course referring to people regardless of gender, as women’s rights are human rights) have filled the streets of cities all over America (and the world) the past two Januarys in a powerful, emotional rebuke to sexual assault and all forms of sexism. Powerful men who for years had engaged in all forms of sexual abuse and harassment are for the first time experiencing the consequences of their actions. And it is at this particular time that Sessions seeks to revoke protection to women who are domestic violence victims?

Briefs are good, but more is needed. The wonderful Tahirih Justice Center collected 60,000 signatures on a petition which it delivered to Sessions in March calling on him to uphold asylum protection for survivors of domestic violence: https://www.tahirih.org/news/tahirih-delivers-petition-on-asylum-for-domestic-violence-survivors-to-the-attorney-general/. More organizations need to follow Tahirih’s example. In addition to the briefs submitted, there needs to be a true public outcry addressed to Sessions on this issue. Asylum protection for victims of domestic violence is not just an immigration issue or a women’s issue. It is a human right, on which all of us should make ourselves heard.

*Heartfelt thanks to the law firm of Gibson Dunn (Megan Kiernan, Ronald Kirk, Chelsea Glover, Lalitha Madduri, and Amer Ahmed) for drafting the brief, and to former BIA member Lory D. Rosenberg for organizing and coordinating the effort.

Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

JEFF CHASE

WITH HELP FROM GIBSON DUNN, “GANG OF 16” RETIRED US IMMIGRATION JUDGES FILES AMICUS BRIEF OPPOSING AG’S INTERFERENCE IN MATTER OF A-B-

HERE’S THE BRIEF:

AB-Brief Amici Curiae of Sixteen Former Immigration Judges and Members of t…

HERE’S THE “STATEMENT OF INTEREST:”

Amici Curiae are sixteen former immigration judges and members of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”). Out of respect for the law to which they have dedicated their careers, Amici feel compelled to file this brief in support of Respondent. Amici are deeply concerned about the procedural violations in this case—in particular the Attorney General’s certification of a question that was not properly considered by the Immigration Judge and was not considered at all by the Board. This complete disregard for established procedure is alarming. It plainly violates binding federal regulations governing the narrow circumstances under which Attorney General certification is permitted and it raises serious due process concerns.

Ultimately, it is within Congress’s authority—not the Attorney General’s—to define the boundaries of asylum. And Congress has already determined that a person can qualify for asylum based on persecution that independently might constitute private criminal activity.

Amici urge the Office of the Attorney General not to take any further action on a question that is not properly before it, and therefore urge that the referral order be vacated.

HERE’S THE TOC:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 1 STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE………………………………………………………….. 1 BACKGROUND ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 6 ARGUMENT …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 8

This case is not properly before the Attorney General ……………………………………. 8

Federal regulations require that the Immigration Judge issue a
decision on asylum before certifying a case to the Board. ……………………. 9

The Attorney General may only review a Board decision, but there
was none………………………………………………………………………………………. 12

Bypassing the Board nullifies critical procedural safeguards…………………………. 13

The Board, a neutral and independent body, with deep knowledge
of its own precedent, should consider the effect of new case law on
that precedent in the first instance. ………………………………………………….. 13

Bypassing the Board raises serious due process concerns…………………… 14

The Attorney General cannot override Congress’s judgment under the
guise of a procedural mechanism……………………………………………………………….. 16

“Persecution” can be carried out or threatened by private actors that the government cannot or will not control………………………………………………………… 19

CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 21

HERE’S THE “GANG OF 16”

 The Honorable Steven Abrams served as an Immigration Judge at the New York, VarickStreet, and Queens Wackenhut Immigration Courts in New York City. Prior to his appointment to the bench, he worked as a Special U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of New York, and before that as District Counsel, Special Counsel for criminal litigation, and general attorney for the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”).

 The Honorable Sarah M. Burr served as an Immigration Judge in New York starting in 1994 and was appointed as Assistant Chief Immigration Judge in charge of the New York, Fishkill, Ulster, Bedford Hills, and Varick Street immigration courts in 2006. She served in this capacity until January 2011, when she returned to the bench full time until her retirement in 2012. Prior to her appointment, she worked as a staff attorney for the Criminal Defense Division of the Legal Aid Society in its trial and appeals bureaus and also as the supervising attorney in its immigration unit.

 The Honorable Jeffrey S. Chase served as an Immigration Judge in New York City from 1995 to 2007 and was an attorney advisor and senior legal advisor at the Board from 2007 to 2017. He now works in private practice as an independent consultant on immigration law, and is of counsel to the law firm of DiRaimondo & Masi in New York City. He received the American Immigration Lawyers Association’s (“AILA”) annual pro bono award in 1994 and chaired AILA’s Asylum Reform Task Force.

 The Honorable George T. Chew served as an Immigration Judge in New York from 1995 to 2017. Previously, he served as a trial attorney at the former INS.

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 The Honorable Bruce J. Einhorn served as an Immigration Judge in Los Angeles from 1990 to 2007. He now serves as an Adjunct Professor of Law at Pepperdine University School of Law, and is a Visiting Professor of International, Immigration, and Refugee Law at the University of Oxford.

 The Honorable Cecelia M. Espenoza served as a Member of the Board from 2000 to 2003 and in the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) Office of the General Counsel from 2003 to 2017 where she served as Senior Associate General Counsel, Privacy Officer, Records Officer, and Senior FOIA Counsel. She now works in private practice as an independent consultant on immigration law. Prior to her EOIR appointments, she was a law professor at St. Mary’s University (1997–2000) and the University of Denver College of Law (1990–97), where she taught Immigration Law and Crimes and supervised students in the Immigration and Criminal Law Clinics. She has published several articles on immigration law. She received the Outstanding Service Award from the Colorado Chapter of AILA in 1997.

 The Honorable Noel Ferris served as an Immigration Judge in New York from 1994 to 2013 and as an attorney advisor to the Board from 2013 until her retirement in 2016. Previously, she served as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of New York from 1985 to 1990 and as Chief of the Immigration Unit from 1987 to 1990.

 The Honorable John F. Gossart, Jr. served as an Immigration Judge from 1982 until his retirement in 2013. He is the former president of the National Association of Immigration Judges. At the time of his retirement, he was the third most senior immigration judge in the United States. From 1975 to 1982, he served in various positions with the former INS, including as a general attorney, naturalization attorney, trial attorney, and deputy assistant

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commissioner for naturalization. He is also the co-author of the National Immigration Court Practice Manual, which is used by all practitioners throughout the United States in immigration-court proceedings. From 1997 to 2016, Judge Gossart was an adjunct professor at the University of Baltimore School of Law teaching immigration law, and more recently was an adjunct professor at the University of Maryland School of Law, also teaching immigration law. He is also a past board member of the Immigration Law Section of the Federal Bar Association.

 The Honorable Carol King served as an Immigration Judge from 1995 to 2017 in San Francisco and was a temporary member of the Board for six months between 2010 and 2011. She previously worked in private practice for ten years, focusing on immigration law. She also taught immigration law for five years at Golden Gate University School of Law and is currently on the faculty of the Stanford University Law School Trial Advocacy Program. Judge King currently works as an advisor on removal proceedings.

 The Honorable Margaret McManus was appointed as an Immigration Judge in 1991 and retired from the bench this January after twenty-seven years. Before her time on the bench, she worked in several roles, including as a consultant to various nonprofit organizations on immigration matters (including Catholic Charities and Volunteers of Legal Services) and as a staff attorney for the Legal Aid Society, Immigration Unit, in New York.

 The Honorable Lory D. Rosenberg served on the Board from 1995 to 2002. She then served as Director of the Defending Immigrants Partnership of the National Legal Aid & Defender Association from 2002 until 2004. Prior to her appointment, she worked with the American Immigration Law Foundation from 1991 to 1995. She was also an adjunct Immigration Professor at American University Washington College of Law from 1997 to

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2004. She is the founder of IDEAS Consulting and Coaching, LLC, a consulting service for immigration lawyers, and is the author of Immigration Law and Crimes. She currently works as Senior Advisor for the Immigrant Defenders Law Group.

 The Honorable Susan Roy started her legal career as a Staff Attorney at the Board, a position she received through the Attorney General Honors Program. She served as an Assistant Chief Counsel, National Security Attorney, and Senior Attorney for the DHS Office of Chief Counsel in Newark, NJ, and then became an Immigration Judge, also in Newark. She has been in private practice for nearly five years, and two years ago, opened her own immigration law firm. She is the New Jersey AILA Chapter Liaison to EOIR and is the Vice Chair of the Immigration Law Section of the New Jersey State Bar Association.

 The Honorable Paul W. Schmidt served as an Immigration Judge from 2003 to 2016 in Arlington, VA. He previously served as Chairman of the Board from 1995 to 2001, and as a Board Member from 2001 to 2003. He authored the landmark decision Matter of Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357 (BIA 1995), extending asylum protection to victims of female genital mutilation. He served as Deputy General Counsel of the former INS from 1978 to 1987, serving as Acting General Counsel from 1979 to 1981 and 1986 to 1987. He was the managing partner of the Washington, DC office of Fragomen, DelRey & Bernsen from 1993 to 1995, and practiced business immigration law with the Washington, DC office of Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue from 1987 to 1992, where he was a partner from 1990 to 1992. He was a founding member of the International Association of Refugee Law Judges (IARLJ), which he presently serves as Americas Vice President. He also consults, speaks, writes, and lectures at various forums throughout the country on immigration law topics.

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 The Honorable William Van Wyke served as an Immigration Judge from 1995 until 2015 in New York City and York, PA.

 The Honorable Gustavo D. Villageliu served as a Member of the Board from July 1995 to April 2003. He then served as Senior Associate General Counsel for the EOIR until he retired in 2011. Before becoming a Board Member, Villageliu was an Immigration Judge in Miami, with both detained and non-detained dockets, as well as the Florida Northern Region Institutional Criminal Alien Hearing Docket from 1990 to 1995. Mr. Villageliu joined the Board as a staff attorney in January 1978, specializing in war criminal, investor, and criminal alien cases.

 The Honorable Polly A. Webber served as an Immigration Judge from 1995 to 2016 in San Francisco, with details to the Tacoma, Port Isabel (TX), Boise, Houston, Atlanta, Philadelphia, and Orlando immigration courts. Previously, she practiced immigration law from 1980 to 1995 in her own firm in San Jose, California. She served as National President of AILA from 1989 to 1990 and was a national AILA officer from 1985 to 1991. She also taught Immigration and Nationality Law for five years at Santa Clara University School of Law. She has spoken at seminars and has published extensively in the immigration law field.

HERE ARE THE ATTORNEYS AT GIBSON DUNN WHO MADE THIS HAPPEN:

Amer S. Ahmed

Ronald Kirk

Megan B. Kiernan

Lalitha D. Madduri

Chelsea G. Glover

Counsel for Amici Curiae

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Thanks to all for making this happen. Great teamwork in the name of Due Process!

Special thanks to our colleague Judge Lory Diana Rosenberg who served as our “Group Leader” in working with Gibson Dunn and to Judge Jeffrey Chase for assembling the group and putting the “finishing touches” on the filing.

PWS

04-27-18

HON. JEFFREY CHASE: Sessions’s Quotas Attack Fairness, Due Process, Undermine U.S. Immigration Court System!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/4/7/eoir-imposes-completion-quotas-on-ijs

Apr 7 EOIR Imposes Completion Quotas on IJs

Ten years ago, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided Hashmi v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S.1 The case involved a request to continue a removal proceeding which the Department of Homeland Security did not oppose. The respondent was married to a U.S. citizen; he would become eligible to adjust his status in immigration court once the visa petition she had filed on his behalf was approved by DHS. However, the approval was delayed for reasons beyond the respondent’s control. One of those reasons was that a part of the respondent’s DHS file was needed by both the office in Cherry Hill, NJ adjudicating the visa petition and the DHS attorney in Newark prosecuting the removal case.

The immigration judge decided that he could wait no longer. Noting that the pendency of the case had exceeded the agency’s stated case completion goals, the judge denied the continuance and ordered the respondent deported. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that “to reach a decision about whether to grant or deny a motion for a continuance based solely on case-completion goals, with no regard for the circumstances of the case itself, is impermissibly arbitrary.”

In response to Hashmi, the BIA issued a precedent decision stating that unopposed motions of that type should generally be granted.2 In subsequent decisions, the BIA provided further guidance in allowing IJs to make reasonable determinations to continue such cases,3 and to administratively close proceedings where it would further justice (as in Hashmi, where the need for the DHS file to be in two places at once was preventing the case from proceeding).4

In subjecting immigration judges to strict, metrics-based reviews last week, EOIR’s director, James McHenry, may pressure immigration judges into taking the types of actions barred by Hashmi. Under the newly-announced metrics, individual judges may run the risk of disciplinary action for granting reasonable requests for continuance, or for other delays necessary for reaching a fair result. The combined actions of McHenry (who prior to being promoted to the position of agency director had worked for EOIR for approximately 6 months as an administrative law judge with OCAHO, the only component of EOIR that doesn’t deal with immigration law or the immigration courts), and Attorney General Jeff Sessions in recently certifying four BIA decisions to himself, could erase the above positive case law developments of the past decade, and replace them with an incentive for rushed decisions that do not afford adequate safeguards to non-citizens facing deportation.

Allowing reasonable continuances for the parties to obtain counsel, present evidence, and formulate legal theories, or to allow other agencies to adjudicate applications impacting eligibility, is an essential part of affording justice. Judges also need to fully understand the legal arguments presented. When an issue arises in the course of a hearing, it is not uncommon for a judge to ask the parties for briefs, and for the judge to then conduct his or her own legal research before deciding the matter. A detailed decision is also necessary to allow for meaningful review on appeal. However, all of this takes time, and the performance of individual judges will be found to be unsatisfactory or in need of improvement if they complete less than 700 cases per year, complete less than 95 percent of cases at their first merits hearing, or have 15 percent of their cases remanded on appeal.

Some recently reported actions by immigration judges in the name of expediency are troubling. Last Sunday’s episode of Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (for which my colleague Carol King and I served as subject-matter sources) featured a credible-fear review hearing by an immigration judge that lasted one minute and 43 seconds in its entirety (and was probably doubled in length by the need for an interpreter). The judge asked the unrepresented respondent a total of two questions before reaching this decision: “Well, the government of the United States doesn’t afford you protection for this type of reason. I affirm the Asylum Officer’s decision.” It’s not clear how the judge could have been confident in such conclusion. The respondent was detained and had not yet had an opportunity to consult with counsel. Her claim was only sketched in the broadest outline; upon further development by an attorney, it may well have fallen into the “type of reason” for which asylum may be granted. Her credibility was never doubted; in fact, the program reported that she was assaulted at gunpoint by the man she fled after she was deported to her country.

In another case arising in the Ninth Circuit, C.J.L.G. v. Sessions,5 an immigration judge told the mother of a child in removal proceedings who was unable to retain counsel that she could represent her son, and proceeded with the child’s asylum hearing. Of course, the mother was not qualified for the task. Although the son had been threatened with death for resisting gang recruitment efforts, he was denied asylum in a hearing in which many critical questions that could have helped develop a nexus between his fear and a legally protected ground for asylum were never asked. This occurred because the judge did not feel that he could grant another continuance to provide the respondent an additional opportunity to retain counsel.

All of the above-described actions by IJs occurred prior to last week’s announcement by the EOIR director. Should judges struggling to meet the benchmarks feel their job security to be at risk, will actions such as those described above become the norm?

As previously mentioned, the Attorney General certified four decisions of the BIA to himself shortly before the director’s announcement of the new metrics. In one of those cases, Matter of E-F-H-L-,6 Sessions vacated a 2014 BIA precedent decision requiring immigration judges to provide asylum applicants a full hearing on their claim. In another, Matter of A-B-,7 Sessions chose a case in which the BIA twice reversed an immigration judge’s denial of asylum to a victim of domestic violence, and on certification has made the case a referendum on whether victims of private criminal activity may constitute a particular social group for asylum purposes.

Should Sessions decide this issue in the negative, the two decisions taken together may allow for the type of quick denials of the “Government…doesn’t afford you protection for this type of reason” variety discussed above. Fair-minded judges who will continue to hold full hearings and consider legal arguments in favor of granting relief may find it more difficult to meet all of the above benchmarks.

Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

Notes:

531 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2008)

Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785 (BIA 2009).

See Matter of Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. 127 (BIA 2009) (concerning continuances due to pending employment-based visa petitions) ; Matter of C-B-, 25 I&N Dec. 888 (BIA 2012) (requiring reasonable and realistic continuances to obtain counsel); Matter of Montiel, 26 I&N Dec. 555 (BIA 2015) (allowing delaying proceedings for adjudication of criminal appeals).

See Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012); Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. 17 (BIA 2017).

No. 16-73801 (9th Cir. Jan. 29, 2018); Pet. for rehearing and rehearing en banc pending.

27 I&N Dec. 226 (A.G. March 5, 2018)

27 I&N Dec. 227 (A.G. March 7, 2018)

JEFF CHASE

MATTER OF A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 247 (AG 2018) (“A-B- II”) – Session’s Latest Abuse of Certification Process Illustrates Judge Chase’s Point On Why This Unethical & Unfair Procedure Must End!

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1047666/download

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 247 (A.G. 2018) Interim Decision #3922

Matter of A-B-, Respondent

Decided by Attorney General March 30, 2018

U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General

The Attorney General denied the request of the Department of Homeland Security that the Attorney General suspend the briefing schedules and clarify the question presented, and he granted, in part, both parties’ request for an extension of the deadline for submitting briefs in this case.

BEFORE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

On March 7, 2018, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2017), I directed the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) to refer its decision in this case to me for review. To assist in my review, I invited the parties to submit briefs not exceeding 15,000 words in length and interested amici to submit briefs not exceeding 9,000 words in length. I directed that the parties file briefs on or before April 6, 2018, that amici file briefs on or before April 13, 2018, and that the parties file any reply briefs on or before April 20, 2018.

On March 14, 2018, the respondent filed a request for an extension of the deadline for submitting briefs from April 6, 2018, to May 18, 2018. On March 16, 2018, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) submitted a motion containing three requests: (1) that I suspend the briefing schedules to permit the Board to rule on the Immigration Judge’s August 18, 2017, certification order; (2) that I clarify the question presented in this case; and (3) that I extend the deadline for submitting opening briefs to May 18, 2018. The respondent subsequently filed a response requesting that I grant the same relief.

This Order addresses all pending requests from the parties.
I. DHS’s Request To Suspend the Briefing Schedules

DHS’s request to suspend the briefing schedules until the Board acts on the Immigration Judge’s certification request is denied. DHS suggests that this case “does not appear to be in the best posture for the Attorney General’s review,” because the Board has not yet acted on the Immigration Judge’s attempt, on remand from the Board, to certify the case back to the Board. See DHS’s Mot. on Cert. to the Att’y Gen. at 2 (citing United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954)).

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The certification from the Immigration Judge pending before the Board does not require the suspension of briefing because the case is not properly pending before the Board. The Immigration Judge did not act within his authority, as delineated by the controlling regulations, when he purported to certify the matter. The Immigration Judge noted in his order that an “Immigration Judge may certify to the [Board] any case arising from a decision rendered in removal proceedings.” Order of Certification at 4, (Aug. 18, 2017) (emphasis added) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3), (c)). The regulations also provide that an “Immigration Judge or Service officer may certify a case only after an initial decision has been made and before an appeal has been taken.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.7 (2017).

Here, the Immigration Judge did not issue any “decision” on remand that he could certify to the Board. The Board’s December 2016 decision sustained the respondent’s appeal of the Immigration Judge’s initial decision and remanded the case to the Immigration Judge “for the purpose of allowing [DHS] the opportunity to complete or update identity, law enforcement, or security investigations or examinations, and further proceedings, if necessary, and for the entry of an order as provided by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(h).” Matter of A-B- at 4 (BIA Dec. 8, 2016). Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(h) (2017), the Immigration Judge on remand was directed to “enter an order granting or denying the immigration relief sought” after considering the “results of the identity, law enforcement, or security investigations.” “If new information is presented, the immigration judge may hold a further hearing if necessary to consider any legal or factual issues . . . .” Id.

In this matter, DHS informed the Immigration Judge that the respondent’s background checks were clear. See Order of Certification at 1. Given the scope of the Board’s remand and the requirements of the regulations, the Immigration Judge was obliged to issue a decision granting or denying the relief sought. If the Immigration Judge thought intervening changes in the law directed a different outcome, he may have had the authority to hold a hearing, consider those legal issues, and make a decision on those issues. Cf. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(h). Instead, the Immigration Judge sought to “certify” the Board’s decision back to the Board, essentially requesting that the Board reconsider its legal and factual findings. That procedural maneuver does not fall within the scope of the Immigration Judge’s authority upon remand. Nor does it fall within the regulations’ requirements that cases may be certified when they arise from “[d]ecisions of Immigration Judges in removal proceedings,” id. § 1003.1(b)(3); see also id. § 1003.1(c), and that an Immigration Judge “may certify a case only after an initial decision has been made and before an appeal has been taken,” id. § 1003.7. Because the Immigration Judge failed to issue a decision on remand, the Immigration Judge’s attempt to certify the case back to the Board was procedurally

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defective and therefore does not affect my consideration of the December 16, 2016, Board decision.

Furthermore, the present case is distinguishable from Accardi, because, here, the Board rendered a decision on the merits, consistent with the applicable regulations. It is that December 8, 2016, decision that I directed the Board to refer to me for my review. See Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 227, 227 (A.G. 2018) (directing the Board “to refer this case to me for review of its decision” (emphasis added)). The Board issued that decision “exercis[ing] its own judgment” and free from any perception of interference from the Attorney General. Accardi, 347 U.S. at 266. My certification of that decision for review complies with all applicable regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (“The Board shall refer to the Attorney General for review of its decision all cases that . . . [t]he Attorney General directs Board to refer to him.” (emphasis added)). It is therefore unnecessary to suspend the briefing schedule pending a new decision of the Board.

II. DHS’s Request To Clarify the Question Presented

I deny DHS’s request to clarify the question presented. In my March 7, 2018, order, I requested briefing on “[w]hether, and under what circumstances, being a victim of private criminal activity constitutes a cognizable ‘particular social group’ for purposes of an application for asylum or withholding of removal.” Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 227. Although “there is no entitlement to briefing when a matter is certified for Attorney General review,” Matter of Silva-Trevino, A.G. Order No. 3034-2009 (Jan. 15, 2009), I nevertheless invited the parties and interested amici “to submit briefs on points relevant to the disposition of this case” to assist my review. Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 227. As the Immigration Judge observed in his effort to certify the case, several Federal Article III courts have recently questioned whether victims of private violence may qualify for asylum under section 208(b)(1)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012), based on their claim that they were persecuted because of their membership in a particular social group. If being a victim of private criminal activity qualifies a petitioner as a member of a cognizable “particular social group,” under the statute, the briefs should identify such situations. If such situations do not exist, the briefs should explain why not.

DHS requests clarification on the ground that “this question has already been answered, at least in part, by the Board and its prior precedent.” Board precedent, however, does not bind my ultimate decision in this matter. See section 103(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2012) (providing that “determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all

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questions of law shall be controlling”). The parties and interested amici may brief any relevant issues in this case—including the interplay between any relevant Board precedent and the question presented—but I encourage them to answer the legal question presented.

III. The Parties’ Requests for an Extension of the Deadline for Submitting Briefs

I grant, in part, both parties’ request for an extension of the deadline for submitting briefs in this case. The parties’ briefs shall be filed on or before April 20, 2018. Briefs from interested amici shall be filed on or before April 27, 2018. Reply briefs from the parties shall be filed on or before May 4, 2018. No further requests for extensions of the deadlines from the parties or interested amici shall be granted.

In support of respondent’s request for an extension, she asserted that “an extension of the briefing deadline is warranted because [r]espondent intends to submit additional evidence with her brief in support of her claim,” including the possibility that she might obtain new evidence from El Salvador. Resp’t Request for Extension of Briefing Deadline at 4 (Mar. 14, 2018). Although I retain “full decision-making authority under the immigration statutes,” Matter of A-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 774, 779 n.4 (A.G. 2005), I requested briefing on a purely legal question to assist my review of this case, and I encourage the parties to focus their briefing on that question. Further factual development may be appropriate in the event the case is remanded, but the opportunity to gather additional factual evidence is not a basis for my decision to extend the briefing deadline.

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Back in law school, we were taught that court jurisdiction existed to decide “cases or controversies.” Not so in the US Immigration Court in the “Age of Sessions.”

The latest outrageous “certified” decision by Attorney General Jeff “Gonzo Apocalyoto” Sessions shows that he has abused his power by intervening in a case where neither party sought his intervention and where both parties essentially consider the law to be settled by prior BIA precedents. Indeed, the DHS is basically asking Sessions not to intervene in a case that it lost before the BIA and instead let the BIA deal with the issue. Remarkably, though, Sessions treats DHS with the same arrogant and biased dismissiveness that he treats migrants and private lawyers.

Even the DHS (to its credit) appears to be appalled by Sessions’s unwarranted and unneeded interference in the quasi-judicial process before the US Immigration Courts. Apparently, the DHS understands (as Gonzo apparently does not or will not) that the destruction of the credibility and integrity of the Immigration Courts will also hurt their enforcement efforts by making US Courts of Appeals more skeptical of the validity of final orders of removal entered by the BIA! Indeed, it was similar concerns by enforcement officials in the “Legacy INS” during the Reagan Administration that led to the removal of the Immigration Judges from the INS and creation of EOIR as a separate, non-enforcement, agency within the DOJ in the first place.

Although Sessions in his latest decision in Matter of A-B– basically concedes that the Immigration Judge should have followed the BIA’s instructions and granted the respondent’s asylum application, he nevertheless is misusing the case as a “vehicle” for a reexamination of fundamental, well-established principles of asylum law that neither party requested. Talk about abuse of authority!

Sessions has been on the wrong side of legal history on an astounding range of legal issues throughout his sorry career. Yet, having been rebuffed on most of his extremist views by his colleagues of both parties in the Senate and by the courts, he is now using his “captive court system” — the U.S. Immigration Courts — to interfere with the fair administration of justice and to impose his self-styled, White Nationalist inspired rules that no party has requested. Seldom has there been such a clear abuse of the American legal system. Yet, to date he is getting away with it!

This is precisely the type of improper use of the arcane “certification authority” that my colleague Judge Jeffrey Chase discussed in his article reprinted in the previous post. When and where will this mockery of justice end?

PWS

03-30-18

HON. JEFFREY CHASE: Sessions’s Abuses Of “Certification Power” Show Why It’s Past Time To End This Unfair, Unethical, & (Probably) Unconstitutional Mockery of Justice!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/3/29/the-ags-certifying-of-bia-decisions

Mar 29 The AG’s Certifying of BIA Decisions

The recent flurry of case certifications by Attorney General Jeff Sessions (he has certified four BIA decisions to himself since January) raises the question of the continued appropriateness of the practice. Certification allows a political appointee who heads an enforcement agency, and is subject to the policy agenda of the administration he or she serves, absolute authority to overrule or completely rewrite the decisions of an ostensibly neutral and independent tribunal comprised of judges possessing greater subject matter expertise.

The issue has only become a matter of legitimate concern under the two most recent Republican administrations. In her eight years as Attorney General during the Clinton Administration, Janet Reno decided a total of three cases pursuant to certification. Under the Obama administration, AGs Loretta Lynch and Eric Holder decided a comparable number of cases (four). The number is artificially inflated by the fact that two of those consisted of Holder vacating late-term decisions by his predecessor, Michael Mukasey. In one of the vacated decisions, Mukasey’s reasoning had been rejected by five separate U.S. circuit courts of appeal.

In contrast, during the eight year administration of George W. Bush, his three Attorneys General issued 16 precedent decisions through the certification process. Sessions so far seems to be on a similar pace.

One of Bush’s AGs, Alberto Gonzales, co-authored an article in 2016 defending the use of certification.1 As part of his argument, Gonzales traced the history of the practice to the BIA’s origins as an advisory-only panel in the Department of Labor in the 1920s and 30s. When the Board was transferred to the Department of Justice in 1940, it was provided only limited decision-making authority, but was required to refer to the AG certain categories of cases, including those “in which a dissent has been recorded” or where “a question of difficulty is involved.”

I will add that the early appointees to the BIA were career bureaucrats with no prior expertise or experience in the field of immigration law. To me, such history seems to provide no real justification for the continued practice. The BIA has for decades enjoyed the authority to independently decide a broad class of cases. It’s members all come to the Board with far more expertise and experience in the field of immigration law than the AG possesses (although since the 2003 purge by then-AG John Ashcroft, its make-up is far more conservative). Furthermore, whereas in the past, it was the BIA itself, and later, the Commissioner of INS, requesting certification, at present, the AG is handpicking the cases and certifying them to himself, sometimes in order to decide an issue that wasn’t part of the decision below.

Law Professor Margaret H. Taylor has noted that the practice of AG certification “might be seen as objectionable because it conflicts with a core value of our legal system: that disputes are resolved by an impartial adjudicator who has no interest in the outcome.”2 Taylor further points out that many such decisions were issued in the final days of an AG’s term, meaning that the AG “refers a controversial issue to himself and renders a decision upending agency precedent on his way out the door.”3

In an article calling for the implementation of procedural safeguards on the AG’s certification power, the author accurately notes that the practice of “agency head review” is common and non-controversial.4 However, Professor Stephen Legomsky has pointed out that the strongest arguments for agency head review – inter-decisional consistency, and agency control (by politically-accountable officials) over policy – don’t translate well to the process of deciding asylum applications, for example.5 This harks back to a point I made in an earlier article – that immigration judges (including BIA Board member) are the only judges in the otherwise enforcement-minded Department of Justice, and that the Department has never really grasped the concept of independent decision-makers existing under its jurisdiction.

Legomsky pointed out in the same article that the BIA, as an appellate authority, “can yield the same consistency as agency head review” through the issuance of en banc decisions; adding that the AG could require the Board to decide certain cases en banc.6 Interestingly, the BIA has given up the use of en banc decisions in recent years. It has not decided a precedent decision en banc even in cases of major import, or following remands from the AG or circuit courts.

Sessions’ use of certification thus far is unique in his redetermination of what the case he chooses is even about. In Matter of Castro-Tum, the DHS appealed an immigration judge’s decision to administratively close proceedings in which an unaccompanied minor did not appear on the grounds that it had met its burden of establishing proper notice of the hearing on the minor respondent. The BIA actually agreed with DHS and remanded the matter. However, Sessions has now turned the case into a referendum on whether any IJ or the BIA has the legal authority to administratively close any case, an argument that was never raised below. In Matter of A-B-, an immigration judge, in defiance of the BIA’s order to grant asylum on remand, refused to calendar the case for a hearing for an excessive length of time, and then disobeyed the Board’s order by denying asylum again for spurious reasons. Somehow, Sessions decided to certify this case to decide whether anyone seeking asylum based on membership in a particular social group relating to being a victim of private criminal activity merits such relief. His ultimate decision could curtail asylum eligibility for victims of domestic violence, members of the LGBTQ community, targets of gang violence, and victims of human trafficking.

Furthermore, two of the cases certified by Sessions involve tools of docket management, i.e. administrative closure and continuances. As immigration judges are the only judges within the Department, and as the BIA has set out uniform procedures for the proper use of these tools, how can the AG justify his need to weigh in on these issues, which clearly do not involve the need for intra-department consistency (as no other component of the department employs such tools), or for control by a politically-accountable official to ensure the coherent expression of agency policy?

Once again, the solution is to create an independent, Article I immigration court, allowing IJs to continue to decide cases with fairness and neutrality free from such policy-driven interference.

Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

Notes:

Alberto Gonzales and Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch Immigration Policy Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority, 101 Iowa L.Rev. 841 (2016).

Margaret H. Taylor, Midnight Agency Adjudication: Attorney General Review of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 18 (2016).

Id.

Laura S. Trice, Adjudication by Fiat: The Need for Procedural Safeguards in Attorney General Review of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1766 (2010).

Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to Consistency, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 413, 458 (2007).

6. Id.

JEFF CHASE

THE LATEST FROM THE HON. JEFFREY CHASE: “Amicus Brief Filed in 10th Cir. Petition for Remotely-Detained Asylum Seeker” — PLUS: A Link To The Actual Brief! — MATUMONA V. SESSIONS, 10th Cir.

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/3/22/amicus-brief-filed-in-10th-cir-petition-for-remotely-detained-asylum-seeker

Mar 22 Amicus Brief Filed in 10th Cir. Petition for Remotely-Detained Asylum Seeker

An amicus brief was filed yesterday by attorneys at the law firm of Sidley Austin on behalf of an asylum seeker from the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of Matumona v. Sessions. Fleeing for his life and seeking asylum in the U.S., the petitioner upon arrival was detained by DHS in the Cibola County Detention Center in New Mexico.

To call Cibola remotely located is truly an understatement. If you Google Map it, you will see that the detention center is surrounded on the east, south, and west by the stunningly scenic, 263,000 acre El Malpais National Conservation Area. Moving out a bit further, the map shows reservations of the Zuni, Navajo, and Apache nations, beyond which lies the Sevilleta National Wildlife Refuge, and both the Carson and Santa Fe National Forests.

In fairness, Albuquerque is an hour and a half drive away. However, that city has a total of 36 attorneys who are members of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, working for 25 offices or organizations. By comparison, New York City has well over a thousand AILA members (not including many others located in the surrounding suburbs). The problem of representation is compounded by the fact that the petitioner, although detained at Cibola, had his removal hearings in the Immigration Court in Denver, 500 miles away. The National Immigrant Justice Center was able to identify only 21 attorneys in all of New Mexico and Texas who would be willing to represent detainees at Cibola in their removal proceedings. For those requiring pro bono representation, the options are even fewer. According to the latest figures provided by DHS, there were 689 non-citizens being detained in Cibola, and that was less than the facility’s full capacity.

Therefore, close to none of those detained at Cibola are able to exercise their constitutional right to be represented by an attorney, as assigned counsel at government expense does not exist in immigration proceedings. A study by the Vera Institute of Justice found a staggering 1,100 percent increase in successful outcomes when universal representation was made available to the detained population at the Varick Street Detention Facility in New York City. I will note that universal representation was possible there because the Varick Street facility is located in the heart of New York City, within walking distance of a multitude of immigration law offices, law school clinics, and not-for-profit organizations.

Left to represent themselves, asylum seekers detained at Cibola and other similar remote facilities are further hampered in their limited access to phones (which are necessary to contact friends and relatives abroad who might provide evidence to corroborate the asylum claim), and lack of access to the internet (which would allow detainees to research the law and to access and download country condition materials in support of their claims). Additionally, detention centers tend to have inadequate law libraries. Furthermore, detainees are required to complete their applications, conduct research, and file supporting documents in English, which is incredibly difficult for someone such as the petitioner, whose native language is Lingala. EOIR’s own statistics show that only ten percent of respondents in removal proceedings last year had enough of a command of English to allow them to participate in their proceedings in that language. As asylum seekers have often suffered torture or other violence, post-traumatic stress disorder and other physical or psychological remnants of their past mistreatment (which might be further exacerbated by their detention) creates an additional obstacle to self-representation. All of this overlooks the fact that U.S. asylum law is highly complex even for educated English-speakers.

The latest amicus brief raises these and other points on behalf of a group of former immigration judges and BIA Board members. The brief further makes recommendations for practices to be adopted by immigration judges to help mitigate the above-cited obstacles to pro se applicants in pursuing relief. These recommendations include having the immigration judges explain the applicable legal standard (and any bars to relief) to pro se applicants; introducing country condition evidence (as well as making applicants aware of country condition resources available on EOIR’s own Virtual Law Library); and advocating for free, uninterrupted access to telephones for respondents in detention centers.

To my knowledge, our amicus brief filed with the BIA last summer in the U.S. Supreme Courts remand of Negusie v. Holder was the first time that former immigration judges and Board members identified as a group for amicus purposes. The seven of us who participated in that brief doubled to 14 for the next such brief, filed with the Attorney General last month in Matter of Castro-Tum. I see it as a positive development that in the short time since these briefs were filed, we have been called upon to provide our experience in expertise in two more cases, one filed last week in the Ninth Circuit on the issue of representation for children in immigration proceedings (C.J.L.G. v. Sessions), and now in this case filed yesterday in the Tenth Circuit. Hopefully, this outstanding group will continue to contribute to the cause of justice for vulnerable noncitizens in removal proceedings.

And our heartfelt thanks to the dedicated attorneys at Sidley Austin, Jean-Claude Andre and Katelyn Rowe, for drafting the outstanding brief.

Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

JEFF CHASE

HON. JEFFREY CHASE RETURNS WITH MORE ANALYSIS OF RETIRED JUDGES’ AMICUS BRIEF IN C.J.L.G. V. SESSIONS

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/3/21/amicus-brief-filed-in-cjlg-v-sessions

Mar 21 Amicus Brief Filed in C.J.L.G. v. Sessions

On March 15, lawyers with the firm of Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett filed an amicus brief with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on behalf of 11 former immigration judges and BIA Board members in the case of C.J.L.G. v. Sessions. The case involves a child from Honduras who appeared in immigration court accompanied only by his mother. As the respondent could not obtain a lawyer in the time afforded, the immigration judge went forward with the hearing, informing the mother that she would “represent” her son.

The respondent is an asylum applicant whose gang-related claim rested on his ability to precisely delineate a particular social group pursuant to requirements complex enough to stump most attorneys. As his mother lacked any legal training, his hearing did not go well. On appeal, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of the claim. In its decision, the BIA determined that the respondent did not suffer past persecution when at the age of 13, members of MS-13, a brutal, multinational gang, threatened to kill him, his mother, and his aunt if he refused to join their ranks, put a gun to his head to emphasize their point, and told him that he had one day to decide. The BIA also found the hearing before the IJ to have been fair, and that the respondent was not denied due process because the immigration laws do not require the appointment of counsel in removal proceedings.

Hon. Dana Marks, an outstanding jurist and president emeritus of the National Association of Immigration Judges, often states that immigration judges hear “death penalty cases under traffic court conditions.” What she means by this is that a genuine asylum seeker who is denied relief and deported faces the risk of death in the country from which he or she fled. Yet the conditions under which such life-or-death claims are heard are inadequate; the limited time and resources afforded to the judges hearing such claims are better suited for a court hearing much lower stakes matters such as traffic tickets. Courts hearing cases involving matters of life and liberty have a higher obligation to afford due process. First and foremost, a defendant facing criminal charges in a state or federal court is entitled to assigned counsel. However, although the stakes may be higher in an asylum case, respondents in immigration court have no such entitlement. Although the respondent in C.J.L.G. may face death if deported, having a judge determine it was fine to proceed, and telling his mother that she would represent him sounds like something that might be appropriate in traffic court.

A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit denied the respondent’s petition for review. Interestingly, the respondent was found credible in his recounting of the death threats he suffered and as to his fear of return; the court accepted the statistics provided by respondent’s counsel that unrepresented respondents succeed on their claims only 10 percent of the time, whereas as represented minors enjoy a 47 percent success rate. The court also assumed that the respondent qualifies as an indigent (due to his mother’s inability to afford private counsel), and that ordering him removed would send him “back to a hostile environment where he has faced death threats in the past implicates his freedom.” The court further acknowledged that the immigration laws and regulations include assuring minors “the right to a ‘full and fair hearing,’ which includes the ‘opportunity to present evidence and testimony on one’s behalf,’ cross-examine witnesses, and examine and object to adverse evidence.” It would be difficult to argue that an unrepresented minor is capable of exercising such rights.

In spite of this, the court denied the petition, determining that there was no Constitutional right to assigned counsel at government expense to minors in removal proceedings. The court further found that the respondent had not demonstrated prejudice, as he had not established a nexus to a protected ground as required to establish eligibility.

The ACLU has filed a petition for the Ninth Circuit to rehear the case en banc. It is in support of this latest petition that the latest amicus brief was filed. I am one of the former IJs included in the brief; I join my colleagues in being proud to assist in such a noble effort as securing assigned counsel for immigrant children facing the legal complexities and dire consequences of immigration proceedings. In a nutshell, the brief argues that the efforts of an immigration judge to provide a fair hearing is no substitute for counsel. Immigration judges can only do so much faced with “overburdened and growing dockets, the complexity of immigration law, and, as Department of Justice (DOJ) employees, the constraints of administrative policy.”

The problem is compounded in cases in which the asylum claim is based on membership in a particular social group. The BIA has recently held that an asylum applicant must specifically delineate such group, a requirement that is clearly beyond the ability of a child (or his or her mother) to do. As the brief points out, in this case, the respondent “ and his mother showed no understanding of why a gang-related threat alone would not warrant asylum, but the IJ’s cursory inquiry ended without seeking the motivation for the threat.”

Of course, the entire issue could be resolved by the Department of Justice choosing to do what is right by agreeing to provide assigned counsel at government expense to this most vulnerable group.

Heartfelt thanks to partner Harrison J. “Buzz” Frahn and associate Lee Brand of the law firm of Simpson Thacher & Bartlett for their dedication and effort in drafting the excellent brief.

Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

JEFF CHASE
Mar 10 The AG’s Strange Decision in Matter of E-F-H-L-
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Jeffrey S. Chase is an immigration lawyer in New York City. Jeffrey is a former Immigration Judge, senior legal advisor at the Board of Immigration Appeals, and volunteer staff attorney at Human Rights First. He is a past recipient of AILA’s annual Pro Bono Award, and previously chaired AILA’s Asylum Reform Task Force.

Blog Archive Contact

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As pointed out by Jeffrey, this is an incredibly important case for Due Process under our Constitution! Let’s hope that the en banc Ninth gives it a close look.

PWS

03-22-18

RETIRED US IMMIGRATION JUDGES FILE AMICUS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MINOR RESPONDENT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN 9TH CIRCUIT EN BANC REQUEST – C.J.L.G. v. Sessions, 9th Cir., Filed March 15, 2018 – Read It Here!

FIRST, AND FOREMOST, A BIG THANKS TO THE “REAL HEROES” AT SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, SAN FRANCISCO, AND THEIR OUTSTANDING SUPPORT TEAM, WHO DID ALL THE “HEAVY LIFTING:”

Harrison J. (Buzz) Frahn, Partner

Lee Brand, Associate

HERE’S THE TABLE OF CONTENTS:

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ………………………………………….. 1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ……………………………………………………………………… 3 ARGUMENT ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4

I. Immigration Judges Cannot Independently Develop a Child’s Case to Permit the Fair Adjudication that Due Process Requires ……………………………………..

4 A. Immigration Judges Are Overwhelmed ………………………………………… 5

B. DOJ Policy Mandates Efficiency and Skepticism ………………………….. 7

C. Immigration Law Is Exceedingly Complex …………………………………… 9

D. Counsel Dramatically Improve Outcomes …………………………………… 12

II. The Panel Vastly Overstates the Value of Existing Procedures for Unrepresented Minors ……………………………………………………………………….. 13

A. The Duty to Develop the Record Does Not Obviate the Need for Counsel …………………………………………………………………………………… 13

B. A Parent Does Not Obviate the Need for Counsel ………………………… 17

C. A Pro Bono List Does Not Obviate the Need for Counsel …………….. 18

CONCLUSION ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 19

HERE’S THE “CAST OF CHARACTERS” & THE SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT:

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Amici curiae are former Immigration Judges (IJs) who collectively have over 175 years’ experience adjudicating immigration cases, including thousands of cases involving children. A complete list of amici is as follows:

Sarah M. Burr served as an IJ in New York from 1994 to 2012 and as Assistant Chief Immigration Judge for New York from 2006 to 2011. She currently serves on the board of Immigrant Justice Corps.

Jeffrey S. Chase served as an IJ in New York from 1995 to 2007 and as an advisor at the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) from 2007 to 2017. Previously, he chaired the Asylum Reform Task Force of the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) and received AILA’s pro bono award.

George T. Chew served as an IJ in New York from 1995 to 2017. Previously, he served as a trial attorney at the INS.

Cecelia M. Espenoza served as a member of the BIA from 2000 to 2003 and as Senior Associate General Counsel at the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) from 2003 to 2017.

Noel Ferris served as an IJ in New York from 1994 to 2013 and as an advisor at the BIA from 2013 to 2016. Previously, she led the Immigration Unit of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. 2

John F. Gossart, Jr. served as an IJ from 1982 to 2013. Previously, he served in various positions at the INS. Judge Gossart served as president of the National Association of Immigration Judges, co-authored the National Immigration Court Practice Manual, and received the Attorney General Medal.

Eliza Klein served as an IJ in Miami, Boston, and Chicago from 1994 to 2015.

Lory D. Rosenberg served as a member of the BIA from 1995 to 2002. Previously, she served on the board of AILA and received multiple AILA awards. Judge Rosenberg co-authored the treatise Immigration Law and Crimes.

Susan G. Roy served as an IJ in Newark. Previously, she served as a Staff Attorney at the BIA and in various positions at the INS and its successor Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

Paul W. Schmidt served as chair of the BIA from 1995 to 2001, as a member of the BIA from 2001 to 2003, and as an IJ in Arlington from 2003 to 2016. Previously, he served as acting General Counsel and Deputy General Counsel at the INS.

Polly A. Webber served as an IJ in San Francisco from 1995 to 2016, with details in Tacoma, Port Isabel, Boise, Houston, Atlanta, Philadelphia, and Orlando. Previously, she served a term as National President of AILA. 3

Amici have dedicated their careers to improving the fairness of the immigration system, particularly in the administration of justice to children. In amici’s personal judicial experience, children are incapable of meaningfully representing themselves in this nation’s labyrinthine immigration system. Absent legal representation, IJs cannot independently develop a child’s case to permit the fair adjudication that due process requires. Accordingly, amici have a profound interest in the resolution of this case.1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Respectfully, the Panel erred in determining that IJs can and will ensure the due process rights of pro se children without the aid of counsel. This error is painfully clear from the vantage point of IJs, who face overburdened and ever-growing dockets, the complexity of immigration law, and, as Department of Justice (DOJ) employees, the constraints of administrative policy. As such, and as demonstrated by the impact of counsel on a child’s likelihood of success in immigration court, IJs lack the necessary time, resources, and power to ensure that unrepresented minors receive meaningful adjudication of their eligibility to remain in this country. 1 No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part; no party, party’s counsel, nor anyone other than amici or their counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief. All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. 4

The Panel further erred in vastly overstating the value to pro se children of certain extant procedural safeguards. While the Panel correctly identifies an IJ’s duty to develop the record, it fails to understand the practical and procedural limits of this duty in the context of an adversarial proceeding, and wrongly transforms it into a cure-all for the otherwise overwhelming lack of due process an unrepresented minor would receive. The Panel similarly holds up the hypothetical availability of pro bono counsel as a potential due process panacea, and Judge Owens’s concurrence suggests the same of the presence of a parent. But these factors also fall far short of remedying the basic unfairness of forcing children to represent themselves in immigration court.

If the Panel’s decision is not revisited, thousands of minors will be forced to navigate the complex immigration system without representation. In many instances, these children will be returned to life-threatening circumstances despite their eligibility to legally remain in this country. It is hard to imagine a question of more exceptional importance.

HERE’S A LINK TO THE COMPLETE BRIEF FOR YOUR ENTERTAINMENT, EDUCATION, AND READING ENJOYMENT:

2018.03.15 CJLG Amicus Brief of IJs

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A special “shout out” of appreciation to my 10 wonderful colleagues who joined in this critically important effort. It’s an honor to work with you and to be a part of this group.

DUE PROCESS FOREVER!

PWS

03-20-18

HON. JEFFREY CHASE ON MATTER OF E-F-H-L- — SESSIONS’S OUTRAGEOUS ATTTACK ON DUE PROCESS AND RIGHTS OF VULNERABLE ASYLUM SEEKERS SHOWS WHY COURT SYSTEM CONTROLLED BY BIASED A.G. IS A FARCE!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/3/10/the-ags-strange-decision-in-matter-of-e-f-h-l-

Mar 10 The AG’s Strange Decision in Matter of E-F-H-L-

On Monday, the Attorney General’s strange decision in Matter of E-F-H-L- had many of us talking well into the night. As background, the BIA published its precedent decision in Matter of E-F-H-L- in 2014. The case involved an immigration judge’s decision that an asylum applicant’s claim was not deserving of a merits hearing. Instead of a hearing at which he would have had the opportunity to testify, present witnesses, file documentary evidence, and present legal arguments, the immigration judge simply denied the case on the written application alone. On appeal, the BIA reached the obvious conclusion that all asylum applicants merit the right to a hearing, and remanded the record back to the immigration judge for that purpose.

Four years later (i.e. this past Monday), Attorney General Jeff Sessions unexpectedly inserted himself into the matter. It seems that by the time the record arrived back in immigration court, the respondent was now eligible to obtain lawful permanent residence based on a relative petition. As such petition is a far more certain and direct route to legal status, and carries greater benefits, the respondent followed the common practice of withdrawing his application for asylum in order to proceed on the visa petition alone. Furthermore, because USCIS (and not the immigration judge) has the authority to decide the visa petition, both the respondent and DHS agreed to administratively close proceedings in order to allow USCIS to adjudicate the petition (which often takes some time) without either having such effort delayed by removal proceedings, or wasting the court’s valuable time by holding unnecessary status-check hearings. Ordinarily, once the visa petition is decided one way or the other, the parties will move the immigration judge to recalendar the case.

However, such cooperation, efficiency, and consideration is apparently not to the AG’s liking. On Monday, he determined that because the matter was remanded for an asylum hearing, but the asylum application was subsequently withdrawn, the Board’s precedent guaranteeing asylum applicants the right to a hearing should for some reason be vacated. He further ordered an end to administrative closure, and that the case be placed back on the IJ’s active hearing calendar, where time and taxpayer money can be wasted on unnecessary hearings, which could possibly delay USCIS in adjudicating the visa petition.

So what does all of this mean? First, Sessions has now done away with a Board precedent decision entitling all asylum applicants to a full hearing. The Board’s original decision in E-F-H-L- cited regulations, statute, the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, case law, and common sense in reaching such conclusion. The fact that years later, the respondent became eligible for another form of relief in no way negates the Board’s reasoned conclusion.

Additionally, the AG’s action might have a chilling effect on immigration judges. In the past, Attorneys General have certified cases to themselves where they disagreed with a decision reached by the Board. However, I don’t believe an AG has ever before followed a case years later all the way down to the immigration court level and chosen to certify a case because of an action taken by the immigration judge in the normal course of proceedings. Administratively closing a proceeding to allow USCIS to adjudicate a visa petition is standard procedure – DHS agreed to such action. Yet now, immigration judges have to worry that the AG is watching. How quickly will judges administratively close under the same circumstances, even if everyone agrees it is the correct thing to do?

Furthermore, as it is extremely unlikely that Sessions is reviewing every decision every immigration judge is making, someone – in DHS? In EOIR? – is signalling the AG’s office of cases such as this one. Although the immigration courts and BIA are supposed to be neutral, the playing field is not level when the respondent must appeal an unfavorable to the federal circuit courts, whereas DHS can simply ask the Attorney General to reverse a decision of which it disapproves.

Copyright 2017 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

REPRINTED BY PERMISSION.

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How many innocent, vulnerable individuals will die or have their lives ruined by the travesty of justice unfolding under Jeff Sessions before Congress takes the necessary action to free the U.S. Immigration Courts from blatant and unwarranted political interference in decision-making?

We need an independent Article I U.S. Immigration Court now!

PWS

03-12-18

HON. JEFFREY CHASE WITH MORE ANALYSIS OF THE CASTRO-TUM AMICUS BRIEFS!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/3/4/14-former-ijs-and-bia-members-file-amicus-brief-with-ag

Mar 4 14 Former IJs and BIA Members File Amicus Brief with AG

On February 16, the law firm of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP filed an amicus curiae (i.e. “friend of the court”) brief on behalf of 14 former immigration judges and BIA board members with Attorney General Jeff Sessions pursuant to his request in Matter of Castro-Tum. In that decision, the Attorney General certified to himself an unpublished decision, in which he requested amicus briefs on the following: (1) whether IJs and the BIA have the authority administratively close cases, and if so, whether the BIA’s precedent decisions “articulate the appropriate standard for administrative closure” (2) If it is determined that IJs lack such authority, should the AG delegate it, or conversely, if the IJs have such authority, should the AG withdraw it; (3) can the purpose of administrative closure be satisfied through other docket management devices; and (4) if the AG determines that IJs and the BIA lack such authority, what should be done with the cases already closed.

As immigration judges and the BIA have exercised their authority to administratively close cases for decades, the AG suddenly raising these questions on his own would seem to signal his intent to do away with this important docket-management tool. As background, the respondent in Castro-Tum is an unrepresented, unaccompanied minor. When he did not appear for a scheduled removal hearing after the immigration court mailed a notice to what it was told was the minor’s address, the DHS attorney requested the immigration judge to order the child removed from the U.S. However, the IJ had questions concerning the reliability of the mailing address that the government provided to the immigration court, and declined to enter the removal order, administratively closing the proceedings instead. The DHS attorney appealed. It should be noted that the appeal did not challenge an immigration judge’s right generally to administratively close cases; the DHS believed that in this particular case, the evidence of record should have required the IJ to enter an order of removal. The BIA agreed with the DHS, and reversed the IJ’s order. It was at that point that the AG inserted himself into the matter by certifying an already-resolved matter to himself and turning it into a challenge to the overall authority to administratively close any case.

Numerous groups filed amicus briefs in this case; they include those that represent unaccompanied children; immigrant rights groups, and academic clinicians. The American Immigration Council (AIC) argued in its brief that AG Sessions’ history of hostility towards noncitizens renders him unfit to decide the issue raised in Castro-Tum. Our group of former IJs and Board members brought a unique perspective to the issue, based on our many years of collective experience managing case dockets and addressing the issues that administrative closure is designed to remedy.

Immigration Judges exist by statute. Therefore, the inherent powers delegated to them (including the power to control their own dockets, and to administratively close cases as a means of exercising such control) come from Congress, and not the Attorney General. As our brief explains, such authority of judges to control their dockets has been recognized by the Supreme Court and lower federal courts. Federal regulations issued by the Department of Justice grant immigration judges the power to “exercise their independent judgment and discretion,” including the ability to “take any action consistent with their authorities under the Act and regulations that is appropriate and necessary for the disposition” of the individual cases appearing before them.

Furthermore, the BIA has set out the proper standard for determining whether a case should be administratively closed or required to proceed. In Matter of Avetisyan, the Board laid out the criteria that may properly be considered in determining whether administrative closure is appropriate. In Matter of W-Y-U-, the Board added that the most important consideration is whether the party opposing administrative closure has provided a persuasive reason for the case to proceed and be resolved on the merits. The immigration judge is required set forth his or her reasons for administrative closure in a decision which may be reviewed on appeal to both the BIA and the federal circuit courts.

The brief additionally points out the inadequacy of other existing tools. In Avetisyan, the immigration judge granted multiple continuances to allow DHS to adjudicate a visa petition filed on behalf of the respondent. However, the petition could not be adjudicated because USCIS (which adjudicates such petitions) was required to keep returning the file to the ICE prosecutor before it could get to the petition because it was needed for the next immigration court hearing (which was only scheduled to check on the status of the visa petition). The file remained in constant orbit, never remaining with USCIS long enough to allow for adjudication of the petition, which in turn would require another continuance. Furthermore, federal regulation specifically requires that immigration proceedings by administratively closed before USCIS will adjudicate certain waivers of inadmissibility. As noted in the brief, DHS defended such administrative closure requirement when its necessity was questioned by a comment on the proposed regulation.

Our group of amici expresses our sincere gratitude to the outstanding attorneys at Akin Gump who provided their pro bono assistance: partner Steven H. Schulman; Andrew Schwerin, the primary drafter; and Martine Cicconi, Mallory Jones, and Chris Chamberlain, who drafted sections of the brief. We also thank Prof. Deborah Anker of Harvard Law School and the staff and students of the Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinic for its invaluable support and insights. The amici included in our brief were former BIA Chair and Board Member and former Immigration Judge Paul W. Schmidt; former Board Members Cecelia M. Espenoza, Lory D. Rosenberg, Gustavo D. Villageliu, and former Immigration Judges Sarah M. Burr, Bruce J. Einhorn, Noel Ferris, John F. Gossart, Jr., William P. Joyce, Edward Kandler, Carol King, Susan Roy, Polly A. Webber, and myself.

Copyright 2017 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

JEFF CHASE

BIA EXPOSEE: DID THE BIA SUPPRESS EVIDENCE IN MATTER OF J-C-H-F- THAT WOULD HAVE DIRECTLY UNDERMINED THEIR ANTI-IMMIGRANT RULING? — HON. JEFFREY CHASE THINKS SO, & HE HAS THE EVIDENCE TO BACK UP HIS CHARGE!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/3/2/matter-of-j-c-h-f-an-interesting-omission

Mar 2 Matter of J-C-H-F-: An Interesting Omission

In its decisions involving claims for protection under Article III of the U.N. Convention Against Torture, the BIA defines “government acquiescence” to include “willful blindness” by government officials.

In its recent decision in Matter of J-C-H-F-, the BIA addressed the criteria an immigration judge should use in assessing the reliability of a statement taken from a newly-arrived non-citizens at either an airport or the border. The BIA largely adopted the criteria set out by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in its 2004 decision in Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft.

Ramsameachire set out four reasonable factors for consideration: (1) whether the record of the interview is verbatim or merely summarizes or paraphrases the respondent’s statements; (2) whether the questions asked were designed to elicit the details of the claim, and whether the interviewer asked follow-up questions to aid the respondent in developing the claim; whether the respondent appears to have been reluctant to reveal information because of prior interrogation or other coercive experiences in his or her home country; and (4) whether the responses to the questions suggest that the respondent did not understand the questions in either English or through the interpreter’s translation.

Both the Second Circuit in Ramsameachire and the BIA in J-C-H-F- applied these criteria to the statement in question in their respective cases; both found the statement reliable, which led to an adverse credibility finding due to discrepancies between the statement and later testimony. But there is a big difference between the two cases. Ramsameachire was decided one year before the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), which is part of the U.S. government, published the first of its two reports (in 2005 and 2016) assessing the expedited removal system in which Bureau of Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) officers encounter arriving asylum seekers. USCIRF conducted field research over several years before issuing each report. As I wrote in an earlier blog post summarizing these reports, USCIRF’s first recommendation to EOIR was to “retrain immigration judges that the interview record created by CBP is not a verbatim transcript of the interview and does not document the individual’s entire asylum claim in detail, and should be weighed accordingly.”

As I already noted in my prior post, USCIRF described its findings of the airport interview process as “alarming.” It found that the reports were neither verbatim nor reliable; that they sometimes contained answers to questions that were never asked, that they indicate that information was conveyed when in fact it was not. USCIRF found that although the statements indicated that they were read back, they usually were not, and that a CBP officer explained that the respondent’s initials on each page merely indicated that he or she received a copy of each page, and not that the page was read back to the respondent and approved as to accuracy.

The Second Circuit in Ramsameachire would have no way of knowing any of this, and therefore reasonably considered the statement to be a verbatim transcript which had been read back to the respondent, whose initials on each page were deemed to indicate approval of the accuracy of its contents. But the BIA in 2018 could claim no such ignorance. USCIRF had specifically discussed its reports at a plenary session of the 2016 Immigration Judge Legal Training Conference in Washington D.C., where the report’s co-author told the audience that the statements were not verbatim transcripts in spite of their appearance to the contrary. As moderator of the panel, I pointed out the importance of this report in adjudicating asylum claims. The person in charge of BIA legal training at the time was present for the panel, and in fact, had the same panelists from USCIRF reprise its presentation two months later at the BIA for its Board Members and staff attorneys. I personally informed both the chair and vice-chair of the BIA of the report and its findings, and recommended that they order a hard copy of the report. The report was even posted on EOIR’s Virtual Law Library, which at the time was a component of the BIA, under the supervision of the vice-chair (along with training and publication). I can say this with authority, because I was the Senior Legal Advisor at the BIA in charge of the library, and I reported directly to the BIA vice-chair.

In spite of all of the above, J-C-H-F- simply treats the statement as if it is a verbatim transcript, and noted that the pages of the statement were initialed by the respondent; in summary, the Board panel acted as if the two USCIRF reports did not exist. Very interestingly, sometime in 2017, the USCIRF report was removed from the EOIR Virtual Law Library. Based on my experience overseeing the library, I can’t imagine any way this could have happened unless it was at the request of the BIA vice-chair. But why would he have required the report’s removal?

If any reader has information as to when J-C-H-F- was first considered for possible precedent status by the BIA, please let me know via the contact link below.

Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

*****************************************

I can largely corroborate what Jeffrey is saying. I, of course, have been gone from “The Tower” for 15 years.

But I know 1) that BIA judges and staff were present during the USCIRF sessions at the Annual Immigration Judges Conference (in fact, I believe it was “required training” on religious asylum claims), 2) as an Immigration Judge I had access to the Annual Reports of the USCIRF and used them in my adjudications; 3) I was well aware, and believe that any competent EOIR judge would also have been aware, that airport statements and statements taken by the Border Patrol were a) not verbatim, and b) often unreliable for a host of reasons as pointed out by the USCIRF.

I am certainly as conscious as anyone of the precarious positions of BIA Appellate Immigration Judges as administrative judges working for the Attorney General. I’m also very well aware of the human desire for self-preservation, job preservation, and institutional survival, all of which are put in jeopardy these days by siding with immigrants against the DHS in the “Age of Trump & Sessions,” where “the only good migrant is a deported migrant.”

But, the job of a BIA Appellate Immigration Judge, or indeed any Immigration Judge, is not about any of these things. It’s about “guaranteeing fairness and due process for all.”

That means insuring that migrants’ rights, including of course, their precious right to Due Process under our Constitution, are fully protected. Further, an EOIR judge must insure that the generous standards for asylum set forth by the Supreme Court in Cardoza-Fonseca and by the BIA itself in Matter of Mogharrabi are fully realized, not just “rote cited.”

If standing up for migrants’ rights turns out to be job threatening or institutionally threatening, then so be it. Lives are at stake here, not just senior level US Government careers, as important as I realize those can be!

Unfortunately, I think today’s BIA has become more or less of a “shill” for the enforcement heavy views of Jeff Sessions, DHS, the Office of Immigration Litigation, and the Trump Administration in general.

What good is “required training” in adjudicating asylum requests based on religion if the BIA and Immigration Judges merely ignore what is presented? It isn’t like DHS or CBP had some “counterpresentation” that showed why their statements were reliable.

Indeed, I had very few DHS Assistant Chief Counsel seriously contest the potential reliability issues with statements taken at the border. And never in my 13 years on the bench did the DHS offer to bring in a Border Patrol Agent to testify as to the reliability or the process by which these statements are taken.

I can’t imagine any other court giving border statements the weight accorded by the BIA once the problems set forth in the USCIRF Report were placed in the record. And, I’m not aware that the DHS has ever set forth any rebuttal to the USCIRF report or made any serious attempt to remedy these glaring defects.

We need an independent Article I United States Immigration Court that guarantees Due Process and gives migrants a “fair shake.” Part of that must be an Appellate Division that functions like a true appellate court and holds the Government and the DHS fully accountable for complying with the law.

PWS

03-03-18

9TH STOMPS BIA’S “ABSURD” INTERPRETATION OF THE CHILD STATUS PROTECTION ACT (“CSPA”) IN Matter of Zamora-Molina, 25 I. & N. Dec. 606 (BIA 2011) – TOVAR V. SESSIONS – Congress Intended The CSPA To Help Immigrant Kids – But, You’d Never Know It From The Anti-Immigrant Interpretations Of DHS & The BIA!

9th-Tovar-CSPA-Absurd

Tovar v. Sessions, 9th Cir., 02-14-18, Published

PANEL: Dorothy W. Nelson and Stephen Reinhardt, Circuit Judges, and George Caram Steeh,* District Judge.

* The Honorable George Caram Steeh III, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

OPINION BY: Judge Stephen Reinhardt

SUMMARY (BY COURT STAFF):

“Immigration

The panel granted and remanded Margarito Rodriguez Tovar’s petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision rejecting his application for adjustment of status.

Relying on the BIA’s published opinion in Matter of Zamora-Molina, 25 I. & N. Dec. 606 (BIA 2011), the immigration judge and BIA rejected Rodriguez Tovar’s application for adjustment of status. The agency held that, because Rodriguez Tovar was over 21 years old in biological age on the date of his father’s naturalization, his F2A visa petition (for a minor child of a lawful permanent resident) immediately converted to an F1 visa petition (for an adult child of a U.S. citizen), and not to an immediate relative petition. The agency came to this conclusion even though Rodriguez Tovar was classified by statute as under 21 years old for purposes of his F2A petition, pursuant to the age calculation formula set forth by the Child Status Protection Act. The BIA concluded that Rodriguez Tovar was not eligible for adjustment of status because no visa was immediately available and that Rodriguez Tovar would be subject to removal forthwith.

The panel observed that if Rodriguez Tovar’s father had remained an LPR instead of becoming a citizen, Rodriguez Tovar would have been eligible for a visa in the F2A category

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

RODRIGUEZ TOVAR V. SESSIONS 3

in 2007, at which point his age under the statute would have been 20. Similarly, had he been afforded his statutory age when his father became a citizen, he would have been eligible for a visa immediately. The panel also noted that the government’s position would lead to the absurd result that Rodriguez Tovar would have to wait in line for a visa abroad and not become eligible for an F1 visa until more than twenty years after he would have been eligible for an F2A visa but for his father’s naturalization.

Concluding that Congress had clear intent on the question at issue, the panel did not defer to the BIA’s opinion in Matter of Zamora-Molina. Reading the statue as a whole, the panel concluded that Congress intended “age of the alien on the date of the parent’s naturalization,” 8 U.S.C. § 1151(f)(2), to refer to statutory age—that is, age calculated according to 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1). Under that statute, Rodriguez Tovar’s age was only 19 on the date of his father’s naturalization. Accordingly, the panel concluded that Rodriguez Tovar’s visa application must be treated as one for an immediate relative of a U.S. citizen, for which visas are always immediately available.”

KEY QUOTE:

“[I]nterpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available.” Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982). Accordingly, we conclude “that Congress had a clear intent on the question at issue,” The Wilderness Soc’y, 353 F.3d at 1059: children of LPRs may take advantage of the age- calculation formula in 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1) for purposes of converting to immediate relative status under § 1151(f)(2) when their parents naturalize.

22 RODRIGUEZ TOVAR V. SESSIONS

In other words, “age” in 8 U.S.C. § 1151(f)(2) refers unambiguously to age as calculated under 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1). We reject the BIA’s contrary holding in Matter of Zamora-Molina, 25 I. & N. Dec. 606, as well as the district court’s parallel reasoning in Alcaraz v. Tillerson, No. 2:17- cv-457-ODW (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2017). The petition for review is granted and the case is remanded to the BIA with instructions to find that Rodriguez Tovar has an immediately available visa as the immediate relative of a U.S. citizen and to conduct further proceedings regarding the other requirements for adjustment of status.”

*******************************

As I have pointed out before, the BIA generally chooses the interpretation of law that is most favorable to DHS and least favorable to the individual. Rather than the BIA acting to protect individual rights under the Due Process clause of our Constitution, today’s BIA basically engages in a “tag team match” with the DHS to defeat individual interests, even those as compelling as the rights of immigrant families and children!

Meanwhile, as these glaring problems with pro-DHS bias and poor quality work from a supposedly “expert tribunal” fester, Sessions actively pushes to have Immigration Judges at all levels “pedal faster” so that more mistakes are made and more individuals are deported in violation of our laws. Remember, very few of the individuals wronged by poor work by Immigration Judges or the BIA can afford to go to the Courts of Appeals for vindication! The problems that my colleague Hon. Jeffrey Chase and I, along with others, have been highlighting are literally just the “tip of the iceberg” of the monumental legal quality and fairness issues working against individual migrants in today’s out of control, failing, U.S. Immigration Courts.

Another thing to consider: take a look at the complexity of this decision, charts and all. How would an unrepresented individual, particularly a child, fairly be able to represent him or herself in Immigration Court and before the BIA. The obvious answer: They wouldn’t!

How will these glaring Due Process, fairness, and quality control problems be solved by Sessions’s anti-Due Process “round ’em up and move ’em out” policies? Answer: They won’t!

We need an independent Article I U.S. Immigration Court. Harm to our most vulnerable is harm to all of us!

PWS

03-01-18

BIA PROVIDES FEEBLE GUIDANCE ON BORDER STATEMENTS — MATTER OF J-C-H-F-, 27 I&N DEC. 211(BIA 2018)! PLUS SPECIAL BONUS: MY “CRITICAL ANALYSIS!”

3915

Matter of J-C-H-F-, 27 I&N Dec. 211 (B IA 2018)

BIA HEADNOTE:

“When deciding whether to consider a border or airport interview in making a credibility determination, an Immigration Judge should assess the accuracy and reliability of the interview based on the totality of the circumstances, rather than relying on any one factor among a list or mandated set of inquiries.”

PANEL: BIA Appellate Immigration Judges MALPHRUS, CREPPY, and LIEBOWITZ

OPINION BY: JUDGE GARRY D. MALPHRUS

************************************************

MY ANALYSIS

Predictably, the respondent loses. Even though faulty analysis leading to unwarranted denial of asylum cases by the BIA and Immigration Judges is a recurring problem (see, e.g., Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, recent 4th Circuit, Blogged here https://wp.me/p8eeJm-2aS), when was the last time the BIA explained how U.S. Immigration Judges should analyze and grant asylum? No, the BIA’s recent asylum jurisprudence is basically a one-sided “blueprint for denials that will pass appellate muster.” In reality, Due Process is supposed to be about protecting individuals (whether documented or undocumented) from Government overreach, not how to maximize DHS removals. But, you’d be hard pressed to get that from reading the BIA precedents.
What this decision really tells Immigration Judges: “Presume that sworn statements taken at the border are reliable. Feel free to use any inconsistencies against the asylum applicant. Go ahead and reject all efforts to explain. Deny the application based on credibility Don’t worry, we’ve ‘got your back’ on appeal.”
Even more seriously, although the BIA is supposed to consider “all relevant factors,” the panel totally ignored strong, impartial, widely disseminated evidence that statements taken at the border on Form I-867A are highly unreliable. Not only that, but such evidence is in the public realm and in fact was actually presented at EOIR training conferences at which Board Judges and staff were present!
Let’s reprIse a recent article by Hon. Jeffrey Chase, who was both an Immigration Judge and a BIA Attorney Adviser:”

In August 2016 I [Judge Chase] organized and moderated the mandatory international religious freedom training panel at the immigration judges’ legal training conference in Washington, D.C. One of the panelists from the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (“USCIRF”) informed me of a just-published report she had co-authored. The report, titled Barriers to Protection: The Treatment of Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal, is the follow-up to a 2005 study by USCIRF of the treatment of arriving asylum seekers in their interactions with the various components of DHS and the Department of Justice involved in the expedited removal process. What jumped out at me from the report was the first key recommendation to EOIR: “Retrain immigration judges that the interview record created by CBP is not a verbatim transcript of the interview and does not document the individual’s entire asylum claim in detail, and should be weighed accordingly.”

The new report referenced the Commission’s 2005 findings, which it described as “alarming.” The earlier study found that “although they resemble verbatim transcripts, the I-867 sworn statements” taken from arrivees by agents of DHS’s Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”) component “were neither verbatim nor reliable, often indicating that information was conveyed when in fact it was not and sometimes including answers to questions that were never asked. Yet immigration judges often used these unreliable documents against asylum seekers when adjudicating their cases.”

The 2016 report found similar problems with the airport statements taken a decade later. The study found the use of identical answers by CBP agents in filling out the form I-867 “transcript,” including clearly erroneous answers (i.e. a male applicant purportedly being asked, and answering, whether he was pregnant, and a four year old child purportedly stating that he came to the U.S. to work). For the record, USCIRF is a bipartisan organ of the federal government. So this is a government-issued report making these findings.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has long recognized the problems inherent in the reliability of airport statements. In Ramseachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 179 (2d Cir. 2004), the Second Circuit held that “a record of the interview that merely summarizes or paraphrases the alien’s statements is inherently less reliable than a verbatim account or transcript.” The court determined that the airport statement in that case bore “hallmarks of reliability, as it is typewritten, signed by Ramseachire, and initialed on each page. The record also indicates that he was given the opportunity to make corrections to the transcription.”

But was that truly the case? The USCIRF study (the first of which was published a year after the Ramseachire decision) shows that the Second Circuit’s reliance may have been misplaced. The USCIRF researchers found instances in which the statement was not read back; when asked, a CBP agent stated “that he only reads back the contents if the interviewee requests it because it takes too long, and that the interviewee initialing each page only indicates that s/he received a copy of that page.”

As noted in the USCIRF study, the problems with airport statements go beyond merely summarizing or paraphrasing, to include actual misstatements and omissions. But the I-867 statements as prepared by the CBP agents give the appearance of being verbatim transcripts, and further claim to contain multiple safeguards to guarantee their accuracy which, pursuant to the findings of the USCIRF studies, may not have actually been employed. And based upon the appearance of those safeguards, immigration judges have relied on the contents of these statements to reach adverse credibility findings that result in the denial of asylum. And as in Ramseachire, many of those credibility findings are being affirmed on appeal.

This is not to say that all airport statements are unreliable. But the point is that, as in Ramseachire, courts see something that looks like a verbatim transcript, see additional signs that safeguards were employed to ensure accuracy, and as a result, afford the document more evidentiary weight than it might actually deserve. Under such circumstances, an immigration judge might reasonably rely on an airport statement purporting that the respondent had stated he came to the U.S. to work when in fact, he or she said no such thing. And the judge might discredit the respondent’s denial of such statement when the words are recorded in a seemingly verbatim transcript bearing the respondent’s signature and initials which says it was read back to him and found accurate.

Attorneys and immigration judges should therefore be aware of the report and its findings. The link to the report is: https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Barriers%20To%20Protection.pdf

You can find Jeffrey’s commentary with my additional comments on “Courtside” here: http://immigrationcourtside.com/2017/09/22/use-with-extreme-caution-hon-jeffrey-chase-on-the-use-of-so-called-airport-statements-in-removal-proceedings-they-often-prove-to-be-highly-unreliable/
So we have clearly documented “credibility and reliability problems” with Forms I-867A, uncovered by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (“USCIRF”), a highly respected non-partisan body of experts. These problems have been festering for years, and remained just as bad in 2016 as they were more than a decade earlier when the USCIRF did its initial study! And, we have clear evidence that BIA Judges and staff were well aware of these unresolved problems, yet totally ignored them in this decision.
No wonder EOIR barely bothers to do judicial training any more! Obviously, anything that might require critical thinking or judicial analysis unfavorable to the DHS just goes in one ear and out the other!
How bad are Forms -867? Here’s a description of a well-publicized recent incident in which the Border Patrol “Sworn Statement” on Form I-867 asserted that a three-year old toddler was coming to America to “find work!” AllGov reports from June 20, 2015 (http://www.allgov.com/news/unusual-news/border-patrol-agents-accused-3-year-old-of-crossing-border-in-search-of-work-150520?news=856769):

Border Patrol agents claim that a 3-year-old boy said the reason he came to the United States was to look for work, thus making it easier for the undocumented immigrant to be deported.

The boy, hailing from Honduras and identified in court documents as Y.F., was allegedly interviewed in the summer of 2014 by Border Patrol agents trying to determine if immigrants had a credible fear of harm or death if they returned to their home countries. Those who claim such fear—and can prove it—have a shot at getting asylum in the United States, while those who say they came looking for work are most often deported.

Agents interviewed Y.F. and wrote on the appropriate form that he said he was looking for work. A brief (pdf) filed by the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) with the Justice Department Board of Immigration Appeals points out the unlikelihood of that being true. “Y-F-’s interview, so painstakingly transcribed, sworn, signed and counter-signed, almost certainly never happened in the format in which it was memorialized. The impossibility of the interview, in spite of the DHS officers’ affirmations of veracity and the rule of government regularity is plain on the face of the writings themselves: Y-F- was three years old at the time he was interrogated,” the brief said.

AILA says that information on those forms, I-867 A/B, “are not inherently reliable because they often contain fake responses, do not accurately reflect testimony presented, and were almost always created under coercive conditions,” according to AILA.

The case of Y.F. isn’t unique. Earlier this year, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) argued that a particular undocumented immigrant should be deported because she came to the United States to find work in Dodge City, Kansas, according to Elise Foley of Huffington Post. The immigrant was 11 days old at the time.

The case against the infant girl was thrown out because her mother claimed the baby was born in the United States. The boy, now 4, has been living in a detention center in Texas for a year. He has been approved for release, but his mother has not, so he remains in detention.

Maybe he can apply for a work release.

Let’s see what else the BIA Judges “blew by” in J-C-H-F-.
- The Border Patrol agent acted as the Spanish interpreter. Interpretation is a professional job. It’s different from being “bilingual.” Indeed, at one past ImmigratIon Judge Conference, we actually received a graphic demonstration from the EOIR Interpretation Staff of how and why being bilingual wouldn’t necessarily qualify someone to interpret accurately in a legal setting! In one ear, out the other, I guess. The BIA gives no explanation of how and why a Border Patrol Agent would be qualified to interpret accurately.
- Yeah, but the BIA says it’s all OK because the respondent “understands English.” I probably “understand” German. If you said something slowly and clearly to me in German I probably could “get the gist” and say “Ja,” “Nein,” or “Nicht Verstehen.” But, would that mean I really understood what was going on? Highly unlikely!
- There is a body of evidence out there that asylum applicants are often traumatized as well as afraid of figures of authority such as “border police.” That can have something do with border statements. Indeed this respondent made such a claim. But, the panel simply blew it off, saying that the respondent was offered an opportunity to speak “confidentially with an officer.” How would that address trauma and fear of authorities? The BIA never tells us.
- The BIA reassures us that the statement is reliable because it “contains a detailed recitation of the questions and answers relating to the applicant’s claim, including the purpose of his visit, the length of his stay, and the issue whether he feared any harm if returned to Mexico.” Yet these are the very aspects of the I-867 that the USCIRF has said are often inaccurate, manipulated, or outright falsified.

The BIA could have selected as a precedent a case that illustrated the inherent shortcomings of the Form I-867 and why they should be viewed critically by Immigration Judges with at least a degree of skepticism, if not an outright presumption of unreliability. The BIA could further have used such a decision as a forum to demand that the DHS show what steps it has taken to address the problems discovered by the USCIRF and to improve the process for insuring accuracy of border statements if they want them treated with a “presumption of reliability” in Immigration Court.
Instead, the BIA once again “stuck its collective head in the sand” and ignored the real due process, fairness, and integrity problems plaguing our asylum adjudication system at all levels!
We can only hope that some independent Court of Appeals will take a more critical and objective look at the “border statement issue” than the BIA has chosen to do in J-C-H-F.
I also hope that in the future, respondents’ counsel make better use of readily available public materials to challenge over-reliance on border statements than apparently was done in this case.

PWS

02-22-18

May 27 EOIR’s Hiring Practices Raise Concerns

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May 6 Briefs Filed in Matter of A-B-

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Apr 7 EOIR Imposes Completion Quotas on IJs

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Mar 29 The AG’s Certifying of BIA Decisions

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Mar 22 Amicus Brief Filed in 10th Cir. Petition for Remotely-Detained Asylum Seeker

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Harrison J. (Buzz) Frahn, Partner

Lee Brand, Associate

HERE’S THE TABLE OF CONTENTS:

HERE’S THE “CAST OF CHARACTERS” & THE SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT:

HERE’S A LINK TO THE COMPLETE BRIEF FOR YOUR ENTERTAINMENT, EDUCATION, AND READING ENJOYMENT:

DUE PROCESS FOREVER!

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Mar 10 The AG’s Strange Decision in Matter of E-F-H-L-

We need an independent Article I U.S. Immigration Court now!

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Mar 4 14 Former IJs and BIA Members File Amicus Brief with AG

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