⚖️🗽NDPA NEWS: VISITING PROF KRISTINA CAMPBELL 🦸🏼‍♀️ ESTABLISHES REFUGEE CLINIC @ U. OF UTAH’S S.J. QUINNEY LAW! — Training & Inspiring Tomorrow’s NDPA Superstars! 🌟😎

Kristina reports:

I just wanted to share with you that I launched a new Refugee Law Clinic at the University of Utah this semester! I am a visiting professor here & my students this semester are working with a Ukrainian family, as well as UACs from Afghanistan and Latin America. You can read more about the clinic here:

https://sjquinney.utah.edu/experiential-learning/clinics/

I also attached some photos of the clinic space at the law school:

Refugee Clinic @ S.J. Quinney
PHOTO: K. Campbell

**********************

Kristina and her UDC Clinic students were “regulars” at the “Legacy” Arlington Immigration Court during my tenure. Since retiring, I have had the pleasure of being a guest lecturer, along with my friend Judge Dorothy Harbeck, at clinic classes taught by Kristina and her amazing colleague, Professor Lindsay Harris. (Lindsay was a guest lecturer in my Refugee Law & Policy class @ Georgetown Law during her time as a CALS Asylum Clinic fellow.)

Thanks for the report Kristina. Those are lucky students and clients to have you working for and with them! And, my gratitude and admiration for all you have done and continue to accomplish for justice in America. Scholar, author, advocate, creative thinker, educator, administrator, organizer, inspiring role model, innovator: You “check all the boxes,” Kristina!

Your students are so fortunate to have you for a teacher and inspiring example of all that’s best in American law!

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

01-15-23

JEFFREY S. CHASE BLOG: In 1996, The BIA Was Functioning Like A Court & Trying To Develop & Apply Asylum Law In The Rational, Generous Way It Was Intended, Properly Giving The Applicant “The Benefit Of the Doubt” — Today, The BIA Is A Deadly ☠️☠️⚰️ Clown Show 🤡 Asylum Denial Factory!

EYORE — “Eyore In Distress”
Once A Symbol of Fairness, Due Process, & Best Practices, Now Gone “Belly Up”

Star Chamber Justice — “Justice”
Star Chamber
Style

Kangaroos — BIA Members: “Hey, let’s celebrate! We just sent a refugee to death for not being able to describe some obscure insignia irrelevant to the case. But, the big thing is we found ‘any reason to deny’ asylum making our handler ‘Billy the Bigot’ happy! He’s out to set new killing records before Jan. 20! Maybe he’ll find us jobs at Breitbart then!”
https://www.flickr.com/photos/rasputin243/
Creative Commons License

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2020/11/29/facts-reason-and-benefit-of-the-doubt

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Facts, Reason, and Benefit of the Doubt

On November 24, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an unpublished decision in Malonda v. Barr. In that case, the asylum-seeker was attacked by armed soldiers when they raided his family’s home in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The soldiers raped and killed three of his sisters, and abducted his father and brother, all due to the father’s membership in an opposition political party.

The Immigration Judge acknowledged the voluminous documentation and detailed testimony in support of the claim. However, asylum was denied because Malonda couldn’t identify the soldiers’ uniforms with absolute certainty, although he stated “they were working for the government, I can say.” And because he did not credit the attackers as working for the government, the judge did not find that the attack was necessarily motivated by the family’s political opinion, but could have simply been an act of random violence not protected under asylum law.

Malonda was not the only recent agency decision to employ this thought pattern. In the BIA’s precedent decision in Matter of O-F-A-S-, an applicant for protection under the Convention Against Torture testified that he was beaten, robbed, and threatened by five men wearing police uniforms bearing the insignia of a government law enforcement agency, who were armed with high-caliber weapons and handcuffs. The Immigration Judge determined that the respondent had not met his burden of establishing that the five were police officers, as the uniforms could have been fake, and criminals also carry weapons. The IJ further noted that the five did not arrive in an official police car, and immediately departed when they heard that a police car was en route in response to the disturbance. Of course, real police officers engaging in extracurricular criminal activity would behave the same way. Nevertheless, the BIA found no clear error on appeal.

In another recent decision presently pending at the Second Circuit, asylum was denied because the applicant was unable to state with certainty from the details of the uniform he wore that one of his persecutors was certainly a police officer, although he believed that he was. The IJ therefore did not conclude that police were involved, instead considering the persecutors to be non-state actors, from whom the respondent hadn’t proven that the police were unwilling or unable to protect him. The BIA affirmed in an unpublished decision. Obviously, a finding that a police officer participated in the persecution of the asylum applicant could well have led to a different finding as to the government’s willingness to protect.

In each of the above cases, the respondent was found to be a credible witness. There are only two types of witnesses in court proceedings: fact (or “lay”) witnesses and experts. Asylum applicants are fact witnesses, describing what they experienced. Although the Federal Rules of Evidence are not binding on immigration judges, they provide the best guidance available, as the Immigration Courts have no such evidentiary rules of their own. Rule 701 of the FRE allows a lay witness to express an opinion provided that it is (1) rationally based on their own perception; (2) helpful to clearly understand the testimony or to determine a fact in issue; and (3) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge reserved for expert witnesses. In the above cases, the asylum seekers’ opinions that the uniformed, armed attackers were government officials fit clearly within the parameters of Rule 701.

Of course, asylum applicants are not experts on uniforms worn by the various government forces in their home countries. I doubt most country experts who testify in asylum cases would possess such specific expertise. Even if they did, those experts weren’t present to witness the event in question to be able to affirm that the uniform was in fact the official government issue. So what is the solution in cases in which the Immigration Judge harbors doubt regarding the attackers?

The UNHCR Handbook at para. 196 advises that despite all efforts, “there may also be statements that are not susceptible of proof. In such cases, if the applicant’s account appears credible, he should, unless there are good reasons to the contrary, be given the benefit of the doubt.” The following paragraph adds that evidentiary requirements should not be applied too strictly to asylum seekers. But the Handbook sets limits on this practice, adding that “[a]llowance for such possible lack of evidence does not, however, mean that unsupported statements must necessarily be accepted as true if they are inconsistent with the general account put forward by the applicant.”1

It would seem that requiring absolute confirmation of the authenticity of the attacker’s uniform (which psychologists have testified is not one’s focus during a traumatic experience) places an insurmountable burden on asylum applicants. Given the purpose of asylum laws, where an asylum applicant expresses the reasonable opinion that attackers who look and behave like government officials are in fact government officials, in the absence of the type of inconsistencies flagged by the Handbook, the benefit of the doubt should be allowed to carry the day.

Addressing this issue in Malonda, the Second Circuit focused on the fact that the identity issue was tied to the question of political opinion. The court referenced its decision from earlier this year in Hernandez-Chacon v. Barr, in which it cited language from the BIA’s excellent 1996 decision in Matter of S-P- holding that political opinion is established by direct or circumstantial evidence.

The Second Circuit pointed to circumstantial evidence in Malonda’s testimony that the attackers were government soldiers motivated by the family’s political opinion. Such evidence included the facts that Malonda’s home was the only one attacked, and his father was the only resident of the street who was an active opposition party member. Furthermore, the likelihood of the attackers being anti-government rebels was undermined by Malonda’s testimony that the rebels ability to reach his neighborhood was impeded by the presence of state security forces, and that his brother, who was abducted by the attackers, was brought to a camp where he was trained to fight against (rather than for) the rebels.

In a footnote, the court noted that the BIA had added its own insinuation to the contrary by referencing general reports of rebel involvement in “widespread violence and civil strife” in the country. But the Second Circuit pointed out that such general information failed to consider that Malonda’s own region was protected by the government, and “more importantly, does not explain why the rebels would have targeted only Malonda’s house for such violence.”

The Second Circuit’s opinion in Malonda emphasizes the starkly different approaches of the 1996 BIA and its current iteration. In Matter of S-P- (an en banc decision which remains binding precedent on immigration judges and the BIA), the Board noted the difficulty in determining motive where “harm may have been inflicted for reasons related to government intelligence gathering, for political views imputed to the applicant, or for some combination of these reasons.” But the Board emphasized the importance of keeping “in mind the fundamental humanitarian concerns of asylum law,” which are “designed to afford a generous standard for protection in cases of doubt.”2

S-P- also included a reminder that a grant of asylum “is not a judgment about the country involved, but a judgment about the reasonableness of the applicant’s belief that persecution was based on a protected ground.” As the scholar Deborah Anker has emphasized, such reasonableness determinations require “that the adjudicator view the evidence as the applicant – or a reasonable person in his or her circumstances – would and does not simply substitute the adjudicator’s own experience as the vantage point.”3 In its decision in Sotelo-Aquije v. Slattery, the Second Circuit similarly emphasized the importance of vantage point by describing the standard as what a reasonable person would find credible “based on what that person has experienced and witnessed.”

Applying this standard, what reasonable person who had experienced and witnessed what Malonda did would say: “You know, I was pretty certain the attackers were government soldiers punishing us for my father’s political activities. But since you pointed out that I’m not completely certain about the uniforms, I guess I was mistaken. It was probably just a random incident. In which case, I can’t see any reason to fear return?”

Remarkably, that appears to have been the BIA’s approach in Malonda. Its decision lacked any indication of adopting the asylum applicant’s vantage point or applying the benefit of the doubt as described above. And while Matter of S-P- set out a rather complex set of elements for identifying motive through the types of circumstantial evidence pointed to by the Second Circuit, the present BIA pointed instead to whatever generalized information it could find in the record to justify affirming the asylum denial.

Although an unpublished decision involving a pro se petitioner that could easily evade our attention,4 Malonda underscores the need for a uniform application of the principles emphasized in the BIA’s decision in Matter of S-P-, instead of a “uniform” approach based on the ability to identify uniforms.

Notes:

Although not binding, the Supreme Court has recognized that “the Handbook provides significant guidance in construing the Protocol, to which Congress sought to conform [and] has been widely considered useful in giving content to the obligations that the Protocol establishes.” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n. 22 (1987). The BIA reached a similar conclusion in Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985) (finding the Handbook to be a useful tool “in construing our obligations under the Protocol”).

The majority opinion in Matter of S-P- was authored by now retired Board Member John Guendelsberger. Three current members of the Round Table of Immigration Judges, Paul W. Schmidt (the BIA Chairperson at the time), Lory D. Rosenberg, and Gustavo Villageliu, joined in Judge Guendelsberger’s opinion.

Deborah E. Anker, Law of Asylum in the United States (2020 Edition) (Thomson Reuters) at 76.

Thanks to attorney Raymond Fasano for bringing this decision to my notice.

Copyright 2020, Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

Reprinted With Permission.

***********************

Obviously, the BIA could resume court-like functions, provide scholarly, rational guidance and enforce uniformity for Immigration Judges (too many of whom lack true expertise in asylum laws), help cut backlogs, increase efficiency, and put an end to frivolous litigation by DHS which too often these days seeks to encourage IJs to deny cases where asylum grants clearly are warranted. (There was a time, at least in Arlington, when DHS Counsel actually worked cooperatively with the private bar and the Immigration Judges to promote fairness and use court time wisely on asylum cases. Those days are now long gone as the system has regressed horribly and disgracefully under the maliciously incompetent, White Nationalist, nativist, leadership of the current regime at DHS and DOJ).

But, due process, fundamental fairness, and best practices, can’t and won’t happen until the current “BIA Clown Court” 🤡 is replaced with a new group of expert Appellate Judges ⚖️👨🏻‍⚖️🧑🏽‍⚖️ from the NDPA who are “practical scholars” in immigration and human rights laws.

EOIR clown Show Must Go T-Shirt — “EOIR Clown Show Must Go” T-Shirt Custom Design Concept

Due Process Forever!

PWS

11-30-20

LAW YOU CAN USE: THE DEVIL👹 IS IN THE DETAILS: JEFFREY S. CHASE — OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGRATION LAW: “Just One More Thing…”

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“Just One More Thing…”

When reviewing asylum applications of late, I find myself thinking of the popular 1970s TV show “Columbo.” After interviewing a suspect, it’s title character, a disheveled homicide detective, would famously stop on his way out to ask “just one more thing.” What he asked next was always critical to proving the case.

Asylum claims are increasingly reliant on nuance. For example, in Hernandez-Chacon v. Barr, the Petitioner’s statement that she had resisted an attempted rape by one of the gang members “because [she had] every right to” was a significant reason for the Second Circuit’s conclusion that her subsequent persecution was on account of an imputed political opinion.

Similarly, in Lopez-Ordonez v. Barr, the Fourth Circuit’s finding of imputed political opinion relied largely on the Petitioner, while a soldier in the Guatemalan army, uttering a warning that he would “call the human rights right now” if a fellow soldier carried out his intent of harming a baby.

And in Orellana v. Barr, the Fourth Circuit found support for the Petitioner’s assertion that the Salvadoran government was unable or unwilling to provide protection from her domestic partner in her testimony that she would call the police when her partner would become abusive and lock herself in a room with her children while the partner paced outside with a machete, but that the police would not show up for hours, and sometimes not show up at all.

In the above examples, the critical statements came out during testimony in court. But under pressure to meet unrealistic case completion goals, immigration judges are increasingly suggesting that respondents forego testimony and rely on their written applications, or waive direct examination and reserve the right to redirect. In some instances, judges have imposed time limits on testimony. There has been even greater pressure to forego the testimony of other witnesses and instead rely on their written submissions alone.

This pressure to make asylum adjudication more administratively efficient conflicts with the process through which such claims develop. While the written evidence explains the claim, an unanticipated response to a probing question may provide a eureka moment that alters the legal analysis. In my first year on the bench in 1995, a response from a female asylum seeker uttered with a certain degree of conviction caused me to make a connection to a 1993 decision of the Third Circuit in Fatin v. INS. That decision, authored by then-circuit judge Samuel Alito, recognized a particular social group consisting of both gender and a refusal to conform to the government’s gender-specific laws. After weeks of subsequent research and analysis, the case before me ended in a grant of asylum, a result that never would have occurred without the extensive testimony that elicited that one critical utterance.

While EOIR management’s present focus is on efficiency, it bears noting that claims for asylum and related reliefs have life-or-death consequences. For example, a February report of Human Rights Watch documented 138 Salvadorans who were murdered after being deported from the U.S., and 70 other deportees who were subjected to beatings, sexual assault, or extortion. And those are just the statistics for one country.

It is therefore extremely important to find a way to anticipate the details that might turn a case from a denial to a grant, and to include those details in the written asylum application. And this can be best achieved through the Columbo method of asking “just one more thing.”

Examples:

Domestic violence claims

Typically, applications describe the brutal mistreatment suffered by the asylum-seeker. But in Matter of A-B-, the Attorney General claimed a lack of evidence that the persecutor “was aware of, and hostile to” a particular social group. The A.G. rather attributed the motive for the attack to the persecutor’s “preexisting personal relationship with the victim.”

In such cases, ask “just one more thing” to establish that the abusive partner was at least partially motivated to harm the asylum seeker because of her gender (which should in turn be argued to constitute her particular social group). For example, the respondent in A-B- described how her ex-husband believed “a woman’s place was in the home, like a servant.” This statement established (1) that the persecutor was aware of a particular social group, consisting of women, and (2) his own hostility towards such group, through his relegating its members to a subservient role in society.

Additional “Columbo” questions would inquire whether the persecutor’s verbal abuse included gender-specific derogatory terms; how he generally spoke of or treated other women in his life; and whether he would have inflicted the same forms of abuse on e.g. his brother, a close male friend, or a male roommate. The answers may well establish that the asylum seeker’s inclusion in a social group defined by her gender was at least “one central reason” for her being targeted for abuse.

“Just one more thing” should also be asked to flesh out imputed political opinion as a possible motive, as in the above-cited Hernandez-Chacon case.

Family-based claims

These claims often arise in the gang context, when gang members unable to target a particular individual target family members of that individual instead. Although courts for decades have held family to be the quintessential example of a particular social group for asylum purposes, two recent administrative decisions have complicated these claims. First, the BIA in Matter of L-E-A- dismissed the threat to the family member as being motivated by financial considerations and not by an actual animus towards the family. The Attorney General then weighed in, questioning whether a family enjoys the required distinction in the eyes of society to constitute a particular social group.

Regarding nexus, the “Columbo” questions should focus on circumstantial evidence of intent. Keep in mind the BIA’s decision in Matter of S-P–. One of the factors set out in that decision for determining when purported criminal prosecution might actually be political persecution is where the abuse is “out of proportion to nonpolitical ends.” For example, if someone accused of jaywalking is sentenced to ten years in prison and subjected to torture and interrogation sessions, it’s safe to assume that it isn’t really about the jaywalking.

With this in mind, the “just one more thing” issue in such cases is to elicit details about the purported motive vs. the seriousness of the threatened harm. Where the issue is extortion, and the Board might therefore view the motive as economic, ask exactly how much money was involved. Under the S-P- test, a threat to rape and kill someone because their family member neglected to pay $20 in renta probably isn’t about the money. The same might be found even where a larger sum is involved where the threats are directed at, e.g., a teenage child who lacks any realistic ability to pay. Or where the family has managed to avoid paying for years, is there a point where a dispute that began purely over money starts to take on some animus towards the family as well?

Regarding social distinction, “just one more thing” should be asked to establish how the asylum-seeker’s family was viewed in the society in which they lived, as well as the general distinctions that all families enjoy in such society. Was it known throughout the community that MS-13 is targeting the client’s family? If so, might that knowledge have caused the family to achieve social distinction? It is also worth asking whether the institution of family is addressed in the country’s constitution, or how kinship is treated regarding the country’s inheritance and guardianship laws.

Unwilling/unable issues:

As in Orellana v. Barr above, ask “just one more thing” about how many times your client turned to the police, and how many times they actually responded. Also, how long did it take them to respond, and what did the response consist of? How did the authorities treat the abuser? Did they take the position that the issue was a “personal matter” not proper for police intervention?

If the client did not bother to call the police because they viewed it as futile, ask “just one more thing” about what caused them to form such a view. Do they know of relatives, friends, or neighbors whose experiences with the authorities support such a view? Can they cite examples in which there were repercussions for those who called on the authorities for protection? Have the authorities asked for bribes, or made statements exhibiting bias or corruption? Or have they gone as far as to admit that they are unable to provide effective protection?

Copyright 2020 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

Reprinted by permission.

(Disclaimer: The foregoing is meant as “food for thought,” and is not to be interpreted or relied upon as legal advice, or to create an attorney-client relationship. And as the law changes, by the time you read this, the information contained therein might not be up to date.)

MAY 27, 2020

*********************************

Thanks, Jeffrey, my friend!

I’ve always said about asylum litigation in Immigration Court: The Devil 👹 is in the details. And, if you don’t find that Devil, the Assistant Chief Counsel will. And, YOU will burn🔥!

PWS

05-27-20

TWO-FER: Billy Barr Assaults First & Fifth Amendments In Frivolous Attack On NAIJ — Seeks To Harass, Silence Immigration Judges’ Union For Fearlessly Speaking Out Against Demise Of Due Process, Improper Political Influence, Gross Mismanagement In America’s Most Unfair & Dysfunctional “Courts!”

Judge Amiena Khan is the executive vice president of the National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ) — Judge Amiena Khan Executive Vice President National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ)

Judge Dorothy Harbeck, an immigration judge in New York City, is the secretary/treasurer of the NAIJ — Judge Dorothy Harbeck Secretary/Treasurer of the NAIJ

Immigration TFL_Mar-Apr2020

Judge Amiena Khan and Judge Dorothy Harbeck (in their capacities as NAIJ Officers) write in the Federal Lawyer:

DOJ Tries to Silence the Voice of the Immigration Judges—Again!

The Second Attempt to Decertify the National Association of Immigration Judges

by Judge Amiena Khan and Judge Dorothy Harbeck

Immigration Law

Judge Amiena Khan is the executive vice president of the National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ) and serves as the co-chair of the NAIJ Vulnerable Populations Committee. Judge Khan was appointed by Attorney General Eric Holder in December 2010. She is seated at the New York Immigration Court and is a member of the New York State Bar. Judge Khan is the programs chair of the FBA Immigration Law Section and is also a member of the National Association of Women Judges.

Judge Dorothy Harbeck, an immigration judge in New York City, is the secretary/treasurer of the NAIJ. She is also an adjunct professor of law at Columbia and Rutgers. She
is a fellow of the Federal Bar Foundation, is on the Executive Board of the FBA Immigration Law Section, and is a member of the bar in New Jersey and New York.

The 2019 DOJ Petition for Decertification
In August 2019, the Department of Justice (DOJ), in a veiled attempt to silence the voice of the immigration judges (IJs), filed a petition with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) to decertify the Nation- al Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ).1 The NAIJ—origi

The 2019 DOJ Petition for Decertification

In August 2019, the Department of Justice (DOJ), in a veiled attempt to silence the voice of the immigration judges (IJs), filed a petition with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) to decertify the Nation- al Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ).1 The NAIJ—originally certified in 1979 as the recognized representative for collective bargaining for all U.S. IJs—is a voluntary association that represents and speaks for the interests of the nation’s 440 IJs. The NAIJ was formed with the objectives of promoting independence and enhancing the professionalism, dignity, and efficiency of the immigration courts. DOJ asserts that IJs should be reclassified as “management officials.” This would mean IJs could no longer union- ize, be part of a collective bargaining unit, or speak independently.

NAIJ serves as the only voice of the IJs who cannot speak out without prior express permission of DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).2 NAIJ serves to afford transparency and accountability. The immigration courts are not independent courts under Article I or Article III of the Constitution. They are wholly contained within DOJ. Without a union,

IJs have no protection against the politicization of the process and their decisions. Without transparency,

the integrity of the process is in jeopardy. Without a union, the IJs cannot protest policy measures, such as the imposition of quotas and performance measures; the IJs cannot contest the numerous policies enacted by EOIR that encroach upon and undermine the inde- pendent decision-making ability of the IJs; and the IJs will not be able to rally against the effective speedup of the workforce, placing due process and fundamental fairness of the proceedings at risk.

How the Process Works

The burden to show that IJs are management officials is on the moving party (i.e., DOJ). The FLRA regional director (RD) has opened an investigation into the

NAIJ, seeking information about its responsibilities. DOJ can submit factual and legal arguments in support of its petition. The RD can then issue a decision or request a hearing to solicit more information. Either party can appeal the RD’s decision to the full FLRA board.

The Unsuccessful 2000 Attempt to Decertify

the Immigration Judges’ Union

This current effort follows a similar, and unsuccessful, strategy pursued by DOJ to decertify the immigration judges’ union approximately 20 years ago. In Septem- ber 2000, the FLRA’s RD rejected DOJ’s argument, and the full FLRA upheld the RD’s decision on appeal. In that prior decertification attempt,3 the FLRA reject- ed DOJ’s argument that IJs make policy through the issuance of decisions, noting that the trial court level IJs do not set precedent and that their rulings are often appealed and reviewed. The FLRA also said that the immigration court system was established specifically so that IJs do not maintain any management duties to enable them to focus on hearings.

The FLRA also ruled that there is a distinct differ- ence between the trial level IJs and the appellate level Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) members.4 The description of the duties of the IJ were described in the 2000 decertification attempt:

The daily routine of an Immigration Judge involves hearing and deciding cases that arise from the operation of the INS.5 A court’s juris- diction to decide these cases is determined at the time a case is filed. After filing, the cases are randomly assigned by the court administrator to an individual Judge and placed on a Judge’s calendar on his or her master calendar day. At that time, the Judge hears presentations from the parties and their attorneys, identifies the is- sues, and advises individuals as to their right to

March/April 2020 • THE FEDERAL LAWYER • 9

representation. The Judge also sets time frames and briefing schedules, as well as the date for trial.6

The nature of the IJs’ decisions and their position in the hierarchy of binding the EOIR was also set forth:

During a trial, the parties are represented by counsel and the rules of evidence are observed. Thereafter, in arriving at their decisions, Immigration Judges are required to apply immigra- tion statutes, applicable regulations, published decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals and federal appellate courts, and other foreign and state laws. After the trial, the Judge issues his or her decision, almost always orally, and advises the parties of their appeal rights. Oral decisions are not tran- scribed unless they are appealed; are not published; and are final and binding only with respect to the parties to the case. With limited exception, decisions of the Immigration Judges may be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals and review of their decisions is de novo. Certain cases may also be appealed to the appropriate U.S. circuit court.7

Citing its precedential case on the managerial status of BIA members (hereinafter “the BIA Management Case”),8 the FLRA specifically stated that the BIA appellate judges were management officials within the meaning of section 7103(a)(11) of the statute and, therefore, could not be included in the existing bargaining unit. In particular, it concluded that “the incumbent Board Member directly influences activity policy through his participation in the interpreta- tion of immigration laws and the issuance of decisions and, thereby, meets the definition of a management official set forth in section 7103(a)(11) of the Statute.”9

In the 2000 decertification attempt, the RD applied the BIA Management Case and concluded that “unlike decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the decisions of Immigration Judges are

not published, do not constitute precedent, are binding only on the parties to the proceedings, and are subject to de novo review.”10 The RD accordingly concluded that the decisions of the judges do not in- fluence and determine the Agency’s immigration policy, in contrast to the decisions of the BIA.

The FLRA concurred that the RD’s definition of a management official is defined as “an individual employed by an agency in a posi- tion the duties and responsibilities of which require or authorize the individual to formulate, determine, or influence the policies of the agency.”11

Critically, the full FLRA also found that management officials are individuals who: “(1) create, establish or prescribe general princi- ples, plans or courses of action for an agency; (2) decide upon or settle upon general principles, plans or courses of action for an agen- cy; or (3) bring about or obtain a result as to the adoption of general principles, plans or courses of action for an agency.”12

The FLRA distinguished the trial court IJs from the BIA appellate judges by specifically holding that IJs do not “make policy through the issuance of their decisions … that in arriving at their decisions, Immigration Judges are required to apply immigration laws and reg- ulations, that their decisions are not published and do not constitute precedent.” Finally, the RD observed that the decisions are binding only on the parties to the case, are “routinely” appealed, and are subject to de novo review.13 There is no difference in this now.

The FLRA specifically agreed with the RD’s rejection of the EOIR’s claims that “the sheer volume of decisions issued by the [immigration] Judges and the finality of their decisions, unless they are appealed,” affect the EOIR’s policy. This is because “no matter the volume of decisions issued, or number of appeals filed, the fact remains that when an Immigration Judge issues a decision [,] he or she is applying and following established Agency law and policy.”14 Again, there is no difference in this now.

While IJs have some authority to control practice in their own courtrooms, they have no authority to set overall policy as to how the courts as a whole will operate. Nor, critically, do they have the authority to direct or commit the EOIR to any policy or course of action. The IJs are highly trained professionals with the extremely important job of adjudicating cases.15 This organizational structure and supervisory delegation was established specifically so that the IJs are unencumbered by any supervisory and management obligations and are free to concentrate on hearings.16 Aspirationally, this is still the position of the IJs.

. . . .

************************

Read the rest of the article at the link. Many thanks to Judge Khan and Judge Harbeck for courageously speaking out and informing us in such a well-documented and scholarly manner.

It’s disgraceful that political leaders who are supposed to be committed to our Constitution and the rule of law instead misuse government funds and abuse their authority to cover up their wrongdoing and mismanagement. In a functional government, Barr and his toadies would be facing impeachment or referral for criminal investigation from Congress for their abuses of authority and attacks on our Constitution. Most certainly, a competent Congress would long ago have removed EOIR from the clutches of the DOJ politicos and placed it where it belongs: as an independent court system under either Article I or Article III.

Due Process Forever!

PWS

04-23-20

LAW YOU CAN USE: ALL-STAR PROFESSOR LINDSAY MUIR HARRIS TELLS US HOW TO STOP THE TRUMP, SESSIONS, NIELSEN PLAN FOR A “NEW AMERICAN GULAG:” “CONTEMPORARY FAMILY DETENTION AND LEGAL ADVOCACY” — 136 Harvard Latinx Law Review Vol. 21 — “This is our time to act and proudly join the brigade of “dirty immigration lawyers” to ensure protection and due process for the most vulnerable!”

FULL ARTICLE:

SSRN-id3179506

ABSTRACT:

Abstract

This essay explores the contemporary practice of detaining immigrant women and children — the vast majority of whom are fleeing violence in their home countries and seeking protection in the United States — and the response by a diverse coalition of legal advocates. In spite of heroic advocacy, both within and outside the detention centers from the courts to the media to the White House, family detention continues. By charting the evolution of family detention from the time the Obama Administration resurrected the practice in 2014 and responsive advocacy efforts, this essay maps the multiple levels at which sustained advocacy is needed to stem crises in legal representation and ultimately end family detention.

Due to a perfect storm of indigent detainees without a right to appointed counsel, remote detention centers, and under-resourced nonprofits, legal representation within immigration detention centers is scarce. While the Obama Administration largely ended the practice of family detention in 2009, the same administration started detaining immigrant families en masse just five years later. In response to the rise in numbers of child migrants seeking protection in the United States arriving both with and without their parents, and with the purported aim of deterring future flows, the Obama administration reinstituted the policy of detaining families. The Ad- ministration calls these detention centers “family residential centers,” while advocates use the term “baby jail.”

The response from the advocate community was swift and overwhelming. Lawyers and law students from all over the country traveled to the detention centers, in remote areas of New Mexico and later Texas, to meet the urgent need for representation of these asylum-seeking families. This essay calls for continued engagement by attorneys throughout the nation in filling the justice gap and providing representation to these asylum-seeking families and other detained immigrants.

The crisis in representation for detained immigrants is deepening. Given the success of intensive representation at the family detention centers discussed in this article, advocates are beginning to experiment with the same models in other locations. For example, at the Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin, Georgia, the Southern Poverty Law Center, in conjunction with four other organizations, launched the Southeast Immigrant Freedom Initiative in 2017. This initiative enlists and trains lawyers to provide free legal representation to immigrants detained in the Southeast who are facing deportation proceedings. The American Immigration Lawyers Association and the American Immigration Council have partnered to create the Immigration Justice Campaign, where pro bono attorneys are trained and mentored when providing representation to detained immigrants in typically underserved locations. Given the expansion of the volunteer model of providing legal services to detained immigrants, opportunities will continue to arise for lawyers, law students, and others to engage in crisis lawyering and advocacy. This article provides the background to understand the government’s practice of detaining families, to the extent that it can be understood, and to emphasize a continuing need for legal services for this population.

The introduction explains the population of asylum seekers and the law and procedure governing their arrival, detention, and release into the United States. The essay then traces the evolution of the U.S. government’s most recent experiment in detaining families from the summer of 2014 to present. The next part outlines the access to counsel crisis for immigrant mothers and children in detention and highlights the difference that representation makes. The article concludes with a call to action to attorneys and non-attorney volunteers nationwide to commit and re-commit to providing services to detained immigrant families and individuals.

MY FAVORITE QUOTE:

We are in an era of incredible need for immigration legal services. That need is most acute within detention centers located outside of major metro- politan areas, including within the family detention centers.

Ultimately, neither the Trump nor the Obama administration can claim to have won or be “winning” with the policy of family detention. The vast majority of women and children still receive a positive result during their credible fear interviews, because they are indeed individuals fleeing persecu- tion under the Refugee Convention. It is a poor use of resources, then, to continue to detain this population. Instead, tax-payer dollars, government energy, and resources, should be invested in providing representation and case management for this population to ensure that they appear in court and follow all required procedures to pursue their claims for protection.125 In the current era of intense immigration enforcement, combined with the Trump Administration’s plans to increase detention bed space and Attorney General Jefferson Beauregard Session’s clear attacks on asylum-seekers,126 family de- tention is, however, likely here to stay.

In light of this reality, crowdsourcing refugee rights, as Stephen Man- ning articulates, is more important than ever.127 It is heartening to see the expansion of the model of lawyering within immigration detention centers expand to centers in Georgia and Louisiana, where asylum grant rates are dismal, conditions of detention dire, with a historical extreme lack of access to counsel. Lawyers are needed to ensure that individuals can properly ac- cess their due process rights and to help the immigration court system run more smoothly.128

Lawyers, specialized in immigration or not, must arm themselves with the knowledge and tools to join this fight. Just as non-immigration lawyers quickly rose to a call to action in January at the airports,129 lawyers must again rise, and continue rising, to provide representation for families and individuals held in immigration detention. This is our time to act and proudly join the brigade of “dirty immigration lawyers” to ensure protection and due process for the most vulnerable.

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Lindsay is “one of the best.” We were colleagues at Georgetown Law when I was an Adjunct Professor and she held the prestigious “CALS Fellowship” working with Professors Andy Schoenholtz and Phil Schrag (of “Refugee Roulette fame”). Lindsay was a guest lecturer in my Refugee Law & Policy class, and I have since returned the favor at both George Mason Law and UDC Law where she now teaches with another of my good friends and superstars, Professor Kristina Campbell. Indeed, my friend Judge Dorothy Harbeck and I are “regulars” at their class and are in the process of planning another session this fall.

Lindsay and Kristina “talk the talk and walk the walk.” They appeared before me frequently at the Arlington Immigration Court with their clinical students. The have also gone “on site” at some of the worst immigration detention facilities in the country to help refugees in need.

In a truly unbiased, merit-based, independent, Immigration Court system (of the future) they would be ideal judges at either the trial or appellate level. They possess exactly the types of amazing scholarship, expertise and “hands on” experience representing actual individual clients before our Immigration Courts that is sorely lacking in, and in my view has largely been systematically banished from, the 21st Century immigration judiciary, to the detriment of our Immigration Courts, Due Process, and the entire American justice system. That’s one reason why our Immigration Courts are functioning so poorly in basic areas like efficiency, deliberation, quality control, and fundamental fairness!

Some important “take aways” from this article:

Contrary to Administration propaganda and false narratives, most of the recent arrivals who have lawyers are found to have credible claims for protection under our laws.
Similarly, if given fair access to competent counsel and time to prepare and present their claims in a non-coercive setting to a truly unbiased decision-maker, I believe that majority would be granted asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
This is the truth that Trump, Sessions, & Company don’t want revealed: most of the folks we are so cavalierly mistreating are, in fact, legitimate refugees, even under current legal rulings that have been intentionally and unfairly skewed against asylum applicants from Central America for years!
Even those who don’t currently fit the arcane legal categories for protection probably have a legitimate fear of harm or death upon return. They certainly are entitled to fully present and litigate their claims before being returned to life-threatening situations.
Finally, a better country, with better, wiser, more humane leaders, would devise ways of offering these individuals fleeing the Northern Triangle at least temporary protection, either here or in another stable country in this hemisphere, while doing something constructive to address the severe, festering, chronic human rights problems in the Northern Triangle that are sending us these refugees.
The “enforcement only” approach has failed over and over in the past and will continue to do so until we get better political leadership in the future.
In the meantime, join Lindsay, Kristina, and the other “Charter Members of the New Due Process Army” in resisting the evil, immoral, and illegal policies of the Trump Administration.
Due Process Forever! Harm to the most vulnerable among us is harm to all!

PWS

06-02-18

LAW YOU CAN USE: HON. DOROTHY HARBECK: “Objections in Immigration Court: Dost Thou Protest Too Much or Too Little?”

Objections in Immigration Court: Dost Thou Protest Too Much or Too Little?1

Hon. Dorothy Harbeck 2

5 Stetson J. Advoc. & L. 1 (2018)

I. Introduction

An objection is generally an expression or feeling of disapproval or opposition. In court, an objection is a reason for disagreeing with some introduction of evidence. 3 In most courts, the reasons and protocols for various objections are set forth in codified rules of evidence; however, the procedures in immigration courts are not so clearly defined since the Federal Rules of Evidence (F.R.E.) are not strictly applied in immigration courts. The rules of evidence applicable to criminal proceedings do not apply to removal hearings. Relevance and fundamental fairness are the only bars to admissibility of evidence in deportation cases. 4 Immigration courts are creatures of statute. They were created under the Immigration & Nationality Act (INA) as part of the Department of Justice (DOJ), specifically the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). The EOIR has a Practice Manual as well as guidance memoranda. 5 The trials are before the bench (with no jury) and a Digital Audio Recording (DAR) is made of the proceedings. Lawyers conduct direct and cross examinations and sometimes — but not often enough — make objections. The F.R.E. can provide some guidance in immigration court practice, although immigration proceedings are not bound by the strict rules of evidence. 6 The relevant F.R.E. citation for each objection has been included. Objections to questions must first be made at the trial court level, because if the objection is not made there, an argument based on that objection cannot be asserted on appeal. 7 In immigration court, as in other courts, evidentiary objections must be made in a timely fashion, and the grounds must, therefore, be identified with particularity. 8

The purpose of this article is to discuss verbal objections in immigration court removal/deportation proceedings. It is notan exhaustive and limiting list. It is merely a discussion of the main fourteen objections out of many potential objections that generally make the most sense in immigration court proceedings. This article does not include any objections based upon the potential mental capacity of a witness. The EOIR has extensive criteria for dealing with witnesses that exhibit such issues and that is well beyond the scope of this discussion. 9 Further, unlike many articles providing a “hip pocket” guide to objections at a trial court level, this article does not examine hearsay objections since hearsay is allowed in immigration court unless its use is fundamentally unfair. 10 The general rule with respect to evidence in immigration proceedings is that admissibility is favored, as long as the evidence is shown to be probative of relevant matters and its use is fundamentally fair so as not to deprive the alien of due process of law. 11

Since I was inspired to write this guide by the line from Shakespeare’s Hamlet where Queen Gertrude comments that a character in a play protests too much, I discuss each of the fourteen objections as though they were part of Shakespeare’s next best known medium, the fourteen line sonnet. 12 A Shakespearean sonnet has three four-line quatrains and then a two line “volta,” or twist, at the end. I have divided up three general groups of objections and saved the best two for the end.

II. The First Quatrain — Questions that Elicit an Organic Response

Argumentative

DISCUSSION: This is not an objection to opposing counsel making a good point. It should be used when the questioning attorney is not asking a question and is instead making an argument of law or application of law that should be argued in summation. It is only valid when the witness is not being asked a question that he or she can properly answer.

F.R.E. Reference: Argumentative (611(a))

RESPONSE: “Your Honor, I am testing the testimony of this witness.” 13

Form

DISCUSSION: An objection that the “form” is improper is a generalization; it is a sort of “catch-all” when the sense is that there is something wrong with a question. The objection is generally dealt with by a direction to counsel to rephrase. The best objections to “form” should state the specific issue.

RESPONSE: “Your Honor, may counsel be requested to inform the court in what specific way is the form of my question insufficient, so that I can remedy any problem?” (Then, when informed, restate the question to eliminate the bad form.)

Compound Question/Double Question

DISCUSSION: The question is really two questions posed as one. This objection should only be used when the question is misleading and the answer could be misconstrued by the jury.

F.R.E. Reference: Compound (611(a))

RESPONSE: Separate the question into the two parts.

Confusing/Vague/Ambiguous

DISCUSSION: Confusing/vague/misleading/ambiguous are all words that convey the objection that the question is not posed in a clear and precise manner so that the witness knows with certainty what information is being sought.

RESPONSE: “Your Honor, I can restate that question.”

Counsel is Testifying/Misstates Evidence/Misquotes Witness/Improper Characterization of Evidence

DISCUSSION: Basically, in immigration court, this is when a lawyer is leading his or her own witness on direct or deliberately misstating facts on cross. The immigration judge has inherent power to administer the trial so that it is fair. The value of making this objection is to both wake up the witness to pay attention and not mindlessly answer the question, and also to call the attention of the immigration judge to the fact that the earlier testimony was different.

RESPONSE: “Your Honor, it is not a misstatement, and certainly the court and jury have heard the evidence.” If the issue is counsel testifying, then, depending on the type of question, the best response is to revert back to non-leading who, what, where, when, how and why questions.

Narrative

DISCUSSION: This type of objection in immigration court is really only useful with expert witnesses. The point being that the immigration judge wants to hear from the respondent in a general narrative form, since so much of the respondent’s case will depend upon whether the immigration judge finds him or her credible. However, objecting to a long narrative by an expert witness has the advantage of preventing an expert witness or other verbally gifted witness from captivating the attention of the immigration judge.

RESPONSE: “Your Honor, this simply asks for a short description of the expert’s methodology.”

III. The Second Quatrain — Questions Based on What Has Happened in Court

Assumes Facts Not in Evidence

DISCUSSION: Facts which are not in evidence cannot be used as the basis of a question, unless the immigration judge allows the question “subject to later connecting up.” Generally, in the interest of good administration and usage of time, the immigration judge may allow the missing facts to be brought in later.

RESPONSE: “Your Honor, we will have those facts later in the case, but this witness is here now and it is the best use of time to ask that question now.”

Beyond The Scope of Direct/Cross/Redirect Examination

DISCUSSION: The testimony sought was not covered by the opposing counsel while questioning the witness and is not relevant to any of the previous issues covered. In the testimony of an expert, the scope of what is within the direct examination is not limited to the exact items the expert talked about. Because the expert is an expert in an entire field and is there to explain items in the field of endeavor, the scope of direct is usually understood to be everything in the expert’s field of knowledge that bears on the case in issue.

F.R.E. Reference: Beyond Scope (of Direct, Cross) (1002).

RESPONSE: “Your Honor, this is within the scope of the direct examination (cross-examination) because [explain].”

Speculative

DISCUSSION: The witness does not have first-hand knowledge of the fact about which he or she is testifying. Greater freedom is allowed with expert witnesses, but still the expert is limited by Rule 702 strictures. Expert witnesses are allowed in immigration court proceedings. 14

F.R.E. Reference: Speculation (602; 701)

RESPONSE: “Your Honor, this is an expert giving an expert opinion within the scope of her expertise.”

Foundation/Lack of Personal Knowledge

DISCUSSION: The predicate evidence has not been entered that would make this evidence admissible. This is a good objection to make when the evidence about to come in is objectionable in some way. The objecting attorney must identify what is necessary to correct the lack of foundation for the deponent to answer. 15 If the witness is a layperson, the usual foundation objection is a lack of showing that the witness has personal knowledge of the facts which the question seeks. If the witness is an expert, the usual foundation objection is a lack of showing that the expert is qualified to give the opinion sought. A (non-expert) witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but not must, consist of the testimony of the witness. With some qualifications, experts can testify to facts they used in their process of building an opinion, even if they do not have personal knowledge of the facts supporting the opinion.

F.R.E. Reference: Rule 602, 703; Lack of Foundation (602; 901(a))

RESPONSE: [Establish by preliminary questions that the person has actual personal knowledge.]

IV. The Third Quatrain — Imagery: Questions Based On Rules

Best Evidence Rule

“OBJECTION: Your Honor, this is not the best evidence. The original document is the best evidence.”

DISCUSSION: This objection can be used when the evidence being solicited is not the best source of the information. 16 It usually occurs when a witness is being asked a question about a document that is available to be entered into evidence. The document should be entered as proof of its contents. There are three aspects to the “Best Evidence Rule.” The first aspect is the one most often invoked: ordinarily a non-expert witness is not allowed to describe what is in a document without the document itself being introduced into evidence. Put the document into evidence first, and then have the lay witness talk about what is in it. The second aspect is requiring the original document to be introduced into evidence instead of a copy — if the original is available. Requiring the original document (the best evidence) to be available for examination insures that nothing has been altered in any way. The original document is not always available, especially in cases where a respondent may be fleeing persecution/prosecution. The third aspect is a summary of voluminous documents. The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation. The originals, or duplicates, shall be made available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and place. The court may order that they be produced in court.

F.R.E. Reference: Rules 1002, 1003, 1006.

RESPONSE: Dependent on the aspect of the Best Evidence rule involved in the objection: [Offer the document into evidence] [“Your Honor, this is admissible as a copy under Evidence Rule 1003”] [“Your Honor, this is a summary admissible under Evidence Rule 1006”].

Opinion

DISCUSSION: An improper lay (non-expert) opinion is when a witness is giving testimony that does not require an expertise, but is still an opinion that does not assist the jury in its understanding of the case. In regard to an expert, this objection is made to the competence of the expert due to the inability of the expert to pass the voir dire requirements for experts. If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical or other specialized expert knowledge.

F.R.E. Reference: Rule 701, 702.

RESPONSE to Objection Regarding Expert: “Your Honor, the witness is an expert and entitled to draw a conclusion.”

Privileged Communication

DISCUSSION: A privilege is a right of an individual not to testify.

Some general privileges are:

Attorney-Client 17

Attorney Work Product

Husband-Wife 18

Mental Health Records 19

Physician-Patient

Psychotherapist-Patient

RESPONSE: “Your Honor, the matter is not privileged because….”

Public Policy

DISCUSSION: The objection regarding public policy does not consist of an optional right of an individual not to testify. The objection based on public policy refers to a non-optional class of evidence that cannot be introduced, no matter that the person who holds the evidence wants to testify. Subjects forbidden by state and federal law are wide:

Medical Expense Payments. Evidence of the payment of medical expenses to show liability for negligence leading to the medical expenses is inadmissible.

Medical Review Records. Most states forbid discoverability or admissibility of the records of a medical review committee of a hospital. It is a legislative policy decision to promote the ability of a hospital to discover medical malpractice above that of the injured person to discover the malpractice.

Parole Evidence Rule. The “parole evidence rule” has long been a rule of law in the English speaking world. In the absence of fraud or mutual mistake, oral statements are not admissible to modify, vary, or contradict the plain terms of a valid written contract between two parties.

Witness is Attorney. Ethical rules prohibit a lawyer from serving simultaneously as a witness and an advocate. Generally, a party’s lawyer who attempts to testify is subject to having to choose between being a witness or continuing as a lawyer in a case.

F.R.E. Reference: 409

RESPONSE: [Depends on the statute or rule involved.]

V. The Couplet — The Volta: The Takeaway, Most Important Objections

Leading on Direct Examination

DISCUSSION: The question on direct suggests an answer. This is (1) not an objection on cross, and (2) actually allowed in some circumstances. The important factor is not whether the question is leading, irrelevant, or without foundation, but rather whether the answer would assist the immigration judge in formulating his or her opinion. The special inquiry officer should weigh this objective along with his obligation to keep the record within bounds when ruling upon objections made by either counsel for the alien or the trial attorney. 20 The problem with a leading question is that the question itself suggests the answer that the examiner wants to have. A leading question often, but not always, can be answered with a “yes.” To encourage witnesses telling facts in their own way, leading questions are not allowed on direct examination when an attorney is examining his/her own friendly or neutral witness. When an attorney has called a hostile witness (which may be someone other than the adverse party), leading questions are allowed in direct examination. Leading questions are always proper in cross-examinations.

F.R.E. Reference: Leading (611(c))

RESPONSE: “Your Honor, this question is only preliminary to move us quickly to the matters in issue.” OR “Your Honor, the witness is a hostile witness.” Depending on the type of question, the best response is often to revert back to non-leading who, what, where, when, how and why questions. 21

Rule 403 (Undue Waste of Time or Undue Prejudice/Immaterial/Irrelevant/Repetitive/Asked and Answered/Cumulative/Surprise)

DISCUSSION: The argument is that the evidence being introduced is highly prejudicial to your client and this prejudice far outweighs the probative value. An objectionable piece of evidence is one that not only hurts your case but is also not sufficiently relevant to the merits of your opponent’s case to be let in.

In immigration court, all relevant evidence should be admitted. 22 Determining “probative value” or “weight” is at the discretion of the immigration judge. 23 The amount of “unfair prejudicial effect” also is determined by the judge. The word “unfair” is the key. In determining whether to exclude evidence, immigration judges should give the evidence its maximum reasonable probative force and its minimum reasonable prejudicial value.

F.R.E. Reference: More Prejudicial Than Probative (401–403); Non-responsive (611a).

RESPONSE: “Your Honor, the exclusion of relevant evidence for unfairness is an extraordinary remedy. There is nothing unfair about this evidence.”

Do not be afraid to object in immigration court. The Federal Rules of Evidence are not strictly followed; however, evidence must be relevant and fundamentally fair. If the evidence is not, no protest is too much.

Footnotes

1 William Shakespeare, Gertrude to Hamlet, “The lady doth protest too much, methinks.”

2 Dorothy A. Harbeck is the Eastern Regional Vice President of the National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ). The views expressed here do not necessarily represent the official position of the United States Department of Justice, the Attorney General, or the Executive Office for Immigration Review. The views represent the author’s personal opinions, which were formed after extensive consultation with the membership of the NAIJ. This article is solely for educational purposes, and it does not serve to substitute for any expert, professional and/or legal representation and advice. Judge Harbeck is also an adjunct Professor of Law at Seton Hall University School of Law in trial skills.

7 See Matter of Edwards, 20 I. & N. Dec. 191, 196–197 n.4 (BIA 1990) (objections not lodged before the immigration judge are not appropriately raised first on appeal).

8 Thus, a party who fails to raise a timely and specific objection to the admission of evidence generally does not preserve such an objection as a ground for appeal. Matter of Lemhammad, 20 I. & N. Dec. 316, 325 (BIA 1991); see also Fed. Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1). See United States v. Adamson, 665 F. 2d 649, 660 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Arteaga-Limones, 529 F. 2d 1183, 1198 (5th Cir. 1976). See also 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(4) (the immigration judge shall “advise the respondent that he or she will have a reasonable opportunity to examine and object to the evidence against him or her.”).

13 The concept of suggesting a lawyer’s response to a judge after the judge has ruled on the objection was suggested to this author by the work of Leonard Bucklin from his Building Trial Notebooks series (James Publishing). Mr. Bucklin is a Felllow of the International Academy of Trial Lawyers, which attempts to identify the top 500 trial lawyers in the U.S. He served as a Director of the Academy from 1990 to 1996. He is also a member of the Million-Dollar Advocate’s Forum, which is limited to plaintiffs’ attorneys who have won million or multi-million dollar verdicts, awards, and settlements. On the other side of the table, Mr. Bucklin has been placed in Best’s Directory of Recommended Insurance Attorneys as a result of superior defense work and reasonable fees for over 35 insurers. His training materials have been used by the New Jersey Institute of Continuing Legal Education in basic skills classes.

14 Matter of D-R-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 445 (BIA 2011). An expert witness is broadly defined as one who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education and who has specialized knowledge that will assist the immigration judge to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. The “spirit of Daubert” is applicable in immigration court. See Pasha v. Gonzales, 433 F. 3d 530 (7th Cir. 2005) (discussing the rubric of expert testimony and referencing the seminal expert report case under the Federal Rules of Evidence, Daubert v. Merrill Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993)). The immigration judge has the discretion to exclude expert testimony. Matter of V-K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 500, fn. 2 (BIA 2008); Akinfolarin v. Gonzales, 423 F. 3d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 2005).

16 In the Matter of M-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 484 (BIA 1953) (failure to produce reports of Communist Party activity made by the Government witness to the police department is not a violation of the best evidence rule where the sole issue is whether the respondent was a Communist Party member. Such reports did not create Communist Party membership but reflected the witness’s report of such membership; they were not used by the witness or the Government in the hearing; and there was no showing that they were relevant for the purpose of impeachment).

17 See generally Immigration Court Practice Manual, Chapter 2, Sec. 2.3(d); Matter of Velazquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 384(BIA 1986); Matter of Athanasopoulos, 13 I. & N. Dec. 827 (BIA 1971) (finding that attorney-client privilege was lost when the representative was in pursuit of a fraudulent claim); see also Ann Naffier, Attorney-Client Privilege for Non-Lawyers? A Study of Board of Immigration Appeals-Accredited Representatives, Prilege, and Confidentially, 59 Drake L. Rev. 584(2011).

18 Matter of Gonzalez, 16 I. & N. Dec. 44 (BIA 1976); Matter of B-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 738 (BIA 1954).

19 Matter of B-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 738 (BIA 1954). (The testimony of a physician of the United States Public Health Service in a deportation hearing is competent and not privileged since he is performing a duty provided by applicable law and regulations and the ordinary relationship of physician and patient does not exist).

21 Dorothy Harbeck, The Commonsense of Direct and Cross Examinations in Immigration Court, 304 New Jersey Law. Mag. (2017) (NAIJ capacity); Dorothy Harbeck, Terms so Plain and Firm as to Command Assent: Preparing and Conducting Optimal Direct Examination of the Respondent, Fed. Law. 13 (Jan./Feb. 2017) (primary author, NAIJ capacity).

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Thanks for sharing, Judge Harbeck. “Good stuff” as usual! And, for those of you taking “Immigration Law & Policy” with me at Georgetown Law this summer, Judge Harbeck will be a “guest lecturer” at our June 14 class (along with Jones Day’s Worldwide Pro Bono Director Laura Tuell).

PWS

05-29-18

ASYLUM: LAW YOU CAN USE: All-Star Professor Michele Pistone Of Villanova Law Writes & Directs “Must See TV” — “Best Practices in Representing Asylum Seekers”

Go on over to Dan Kowalski’s LexisNexis Immigration Community here for all the links to the 19-part series on You Tube made possible by the American Law Institute with an introduction by none other than Justice Sandra Day O’Connor:

https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/immigration-law-blog/archive/2017/11/16/video-series-best-practices-in-representing-asylum-seekers.aspx?Redirected=true

Thanks, Michele, for all you do for the cause of Due Process for migrants and better Immigration Court practices!

PWS

11-17-17

FASCINATING “MUST READ:” “Dickie The P’s” Exit Interview With The NYT — See How Being A Judge Transformed A Conservative “Economic Analyst” Into A Pragmatic Humanist!

https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/09/11/us/politics/judge-richard-posner-retirement.html?module=WatchingPortal®ion=c-column-middle-span-region&pgType=Homepage&action=click&mediaId=thumb_square&state=standard&contentPlacement=1&version=internal&contentCollection=www.nytimes.com&contentId=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2017%2F09%2F11%2Fus%2Fpolitics%2Fjudge-richard-posner-retirement.html&eventName=Watching-article-click&_r=0&referer

KEY QUOTE:

“The basic thing is that most judges regard these people [unrepresented litigants] as kind of trash not worth the time of a federal judge,” he said.”

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Read the full, very revealing interview at the above link.

I do hope that Judge P will turn his attention and boundless energy to the way that unrepresented litigants are routinely mistreated, denied due process, and abused in our U.S. immigration Court system. Children forced to present their own asylum claims? He could also shed some needed light on how the DOJ is intentionally attacking and wearing down the NGOs and pro bono attorneys, who are indigent migrants’ sole lifeline to due process, with Aimless Docket Reshuffling (“ADR”).

I was interested in how he described the staff attorney system in the 7th Circuit as placing the real adjuducation of appeals in the hands of staff, with Article III Judges all too often merely “signing off” or “rubber stamping” results. Most Circuit Court staff attorney systems were instituted to deal with the overwhelming flow of petitions to review BIA decisions following the so-called “Ashcroft Purge and Reforms” that largely eliminated critical thinking and dialogue at the BIA and turned it into the “Falls Church Service Center.”

The current BIA is largely a staff-driven organization. That the Article III Courts have replicated the same system resulting in the same problems is disturbing, and shows why due process for migrants is being given short shrift throughout our legal system.

The good news: The New Due Process Army knows what’s going on in the system and is positioned to carry the fight to the entrenched status quo, for decades if necessary, until our legal system delivers on the constitutional guarantee of due process for all.

Many thanks to my good friend and colleague Judge Dorothy Harbeck for sending this item my way!

PWS

09-11-17

TWO NEW FROM HON. JEFFREY CHASE — 8TH Cir. Blows Away BIA For Failure To Enforce R’s Right To Cross-Examine — The Importance Of Expert Testimony In Immigration Court!

Here’s Jeffrey”s analysis of the 8th Circuit case, Patel v. Sessions:

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2017/8/31/a-reasonable-opportunity-to-cross-examine

And here are his practice tips on expert witnesses:

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2017/8/24/theimportance-of-expert-witnesses

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I love Jeffrey’s clear, concise, practical analysis of complex issues!

The Patel case raises a recurring issue: How can a supposedly “expert” tribunal obviously hurrying to produce final orders of removal for the Administration’s deportation machine (thereby, probably not coincidentally, insuring their own job security) keep ignoring clear statutory and constitutional rights of individuals as well as their own precedents and those of Courts of Appeals? Unfortunately, the situation is likely to get worse before it gets better.

The Administration has announced that it’s looking for ways to deal with the backlog not by any rational means, but by ramming still more cases through the already overloaded system. Although the DOJ mouths “due process” that’s not true. As long as we have “gonzo enforcement” with hundreds of thousands of cases on the Immigration Courts’ dockets that should be settled out of court through grants of relief or prosecutorial discretion, there will continue to be insurmountable backlogs. And, as long as the Immigration Courts are part of the Executive Branch, lacking true judicial independence to put a stop to some of the more outrageous ICE and DOJ policies and practices, the problem will not be solved. Due process can’t be put on an assembly line. The only questions are if and when the Article III Courts will put a stop to the due process travesty in the Immigration Courts. Or will they adopt the EOIR approach and “go along to get along.” Clearly, the Administration is banking on the latter.

I also note that the 8th Circuit is “hardly the 9th Circuit or even the 7th or 2d Circuits.” Indeed, the 8th routinely defers to the BIA. Many critics say that the 8th gives the BIA far too much deference. So, when the 8th Circuit starts finding gaping holes in the BIA’s approach to due process in Immigration Court, we know that “we’ve got trouble, right here in River City.”

PWS

09-01-17

“BASIC ASYLUM TRAINING FOR LITIGATORS” — Read My July 25, 2017 Pro Bono Training Presentation For Jones Day!

Click on this link for a “Printable Copy”:

JONES DAY TRAINING

Here’s the “complete text:”

BASIC ASYLUM LAW FOR LITIGATORS

OUTLINE

I. INTRODUCTION

II. WHO IS A REFUGEE?

A. Refugee Definition

B. Standard of Proof

C. What Is Persecution?

D. Nexus

III. PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP

A. The Three Requirements

B. Success Stories

C. The Usual Losers

D. What Can Go Wrong?

E. A Few Practical Tips on PSG

IV. PRACTICAL TIPS FOR PRESENTNG AN ASYLUM CASE IN IMMIGRATION COURT

V. CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION

Good afternoon, and thanks for attending. As a former U.S. Immigration Judge at both the trial and appellate levels, and someone who has spent over four decades working in the field of immigration at all levels, I want to personally thank you for what you are doing.

Welcome to the “New Due Process Army” and our critical mission of forcing the U.S. Immigration Court system to live up to its unfulfilled promise of “guaranteeing fairness and due process for all.” Nothing is more important to achieving that mission than providing effective representation to individuals at the “retail level” of the system – the U.S. Immigration Courts.

There is a due process crisis going on in our U.S. Immigration Court system that threatens the integrity and the functioning of our entire U.S. justice system. And, the biggest need in the Immigration Courts is for effective legal representation of individuals seeking, expecting, and deserving justice in Immigration Court. Never has the need for pro bono attorneys been greater than it is now!

I appreciate the outstanding leadership and amazing commitment of your managing partner Steve Brogan, your Global Pro Bono Coordinator Laura Tuell, and folks like Mary Hale and many others who have been making this happen on a daily basis. It’s what I call “due process in action.” I know that Steve feels very deeply about the overwhelming need for everyone to get a day in court. He has written very forcefully and eloquently on it in the past and has certainly helped to raise the profile of the representation crisis facing our Immigration Courts.

Jones Day isn’t just “talking the talk.” Although it’s now been 25 years since the end of my time as a partner in Jones Day’s Washington Office, I am well aware of the tremendous time and financial commitment that your partnership is making to saving and preserving our justice system and in many cases to saving the very lives of the folks who depend on it. For, as Steve and others at the firm realize, our justice system is only as strong as its weakest link. If we fail in our responsibility to deliver fairness and due process to the most vulnerable individuals at the “retail level” of our system, then eventually our entire system will fail.

I also congratulate and appreciate your willingness to undertake representation in all types of cases, rather than “cherry picking” likely winners as is always a temptation. As a judge, I found that cases that look like “sure losers” at the Master Calendar sometimes turn into “winners” when a knowledgeable and dedicated attorney enters the picture.

Our Government is going to remove those who lose their cases to countries where some of them undoubtedly will suffer extortion, rape, torture, forced induction into gangs, and even death. Before we return individuals to such possible fates, it is critical that they have a chance to be fully and fairly heard on their claims for protection and that they fully understand and have explained to them the reasons why our country is unwilling or unable to protect them. Neither of those things is going to happen without effective representation.

We should always keep in mind that contrary to the false impression given by some pundits and immigration “hard liners,” losing an asylum case means neither that the person is committing fraud nor that he or she does not have a legitimate fear of return. In most cases, it merely means that the dangers the person will face upon return do not fall within our somewhat convoluted asylum system. And, as a country, we have chosen not to exercise our discretion to grant temporary shelter to such individuals through Temporary Protected Status, Deferred Enforced Departure, or prosecutorial discretion (“PD”). In other words, we are returning them knowing that the effect might well be life threatening or even fatal in many cases.

I also predict that you will make a positive difference in the development of the law. The well-prepared and articulate arguments that you make in behalf of a detained migrant are going to get attention and consideration from judges at all levels far beyond those presented by unrepresented individuals who can’t even speak English. It’s simply a fact of life. And, if you can win these cases, everything else you do in the law will be a “piece of cake.” I guarantee it.

Obviously, in representing your clients it is important to be polite, professional, and to let the excellence of your preparation, research, and arguments speak for you. In an overwhelmed system, judges are particularly grateful for all the help they can get. However, they are also under excruciating pressure to complete cases, particularly detained cases. So it is important to clearly identify your issues, focus your examination, and make sure that your “phone books” of evidence are properly organized and that there is a “road map” to direct the Immigration Judge and the Assistant Chief Counsel to the key points. You want to help the judge, and your opponent, get to a “comfort zone” where he or she can feel comfortable granting, or not opposing or appealing, relief.

I do want to offer one important piece of advice up front. That is to make sure to ask your client if her or his parents or grandparents, whether living or dead, are or were U.S. citizens. Citizenship is jurisdictional in Immigration Court, and occasionally we do come across individuals with valid but previously undeveloped claims for U.S. citizenship. You definitely want to find out about that sooner, rather than later, in the process.

My presentation today will be divided into three sections. First, we will go over the basic refugee definition and some of its ramifications. Second, I will provide some basic information about particular social group or “PSG” claims. Third, I will give you fourteen practical pointers for effectively presenting asylum cases in Immigration Court.

Please feel free to ask questions as we go along, or save them until the end.

II. WHO IS A REFUGEE?

In this section, I will first discuss the INA’s definition of “refugee.” Second, I will talk about the standard of proof. Third, we will discuss the meaning of the undefined term “persecution.” I will conclude this section with a discussion of the key concept of “nexus.”

A. Refugee Definition

An “asylee” under U.S. law is basically an individual who satisfies the “refugee” definition, but who is in the U.S. or at our border in a different status, or with no status at all. Most of your clients will fall in the latter category.

The definition of “refugee” is set forth in section 101(a)(42) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). There are four basic elements:

Generally, outside the country of nationality (not usually an issue in border cases);
Unwilling or unable to return (failure of state protection);
Because of persecution (undefined) or a well founded fear of persecution;
On account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion (“nexus”).

There are some important exclusions to the refugee definition, the most frequent ones being the one-year filing deadline for asylum, those who have committed serious nonpolitical crimes outside the U.S. or particularly serious crimes in the U.S., persecutors of others, those who have rendered material support to a terrorist organizations, and those who are firmly resettled in another country. I won’t be going into these in detail today, but you should know that they are there, and I’d be happy to take questions on them. The ground most likely to come up in your cases is the one relating to individuals who have committed crimes.

Some individuals who are ineligible for asylum might still be eligible to receive withholding of removal under section 243(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C., § 1253(b) or withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). And, everyone can potentially seek so-called “deferral of removal” under the CAT.

Also, please note that because of the requirement of a “nexus” to a “protected ground” not all types of harm trigger protection. In particular, crimes, wars, random violence, natural disasters, and personal vengeance or retribution often do not qualify individuals for refugee status. However, some of these circumstances might be covered by the CAT, which has no nexus requirement.

The source of the “refugee” definition is he Refugee Act of 1980 which codified and implemented the U.N Convention and Protocol on the Status of Refugees to which the U.S. adhered in 1968. There are, however, some differences between the U.S. definition and the Convention definition, which I won’t go into today. But, again, you should be aware they exist, since some international or U.N. interpretations of the definition might be inapplicable under U.S. law.

B. Standard of Proof

The standard of proof in asylum cases was established by the Supreme Court in 1987 in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). In asylum cases, a “well-founded” fear is something far less than a probability. It is an “objectively reasonable fear” or the type of fear that a “reasonable person” would have under the circumstances. Most courts and authorities have adopted the “10% chance” example set forth in Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion in Cardoza.

The BIA’s implementation of Cardoza, the 1987 precedent Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987), makes the point that the persecution can be “significantly less than probable.” Your challenge as lawyers will be to get judges at all levels of our system to actually apply the generous Cardoza-Mogharrabi standard rather than just mouthing it. Sadly, the latter still happens too often, in my opinion.

A different and higher “more likely than not” standard applies to withholding of removal under the INA and to withholding and deferral of removal under the CAT. One great tool for satisfying the standard of proof for asylum or withholding under the Act is the rebuttable regulatory presumption of future persecution arising out of past persecution set forth in 8 C.F.R. 1208.13. This is a really important regulation that you should basically learn “by heart.” I will reference it again in the “practical tips” section of this presentation.

Withholding and CAT are more limited forms of relief than asylum. While they usually provide work authorization, they do not lead to green card status, allow the applicants to bring relatives, or travel abroad. They are also easier to revoke if conditions change. Nevertheless, there is one major advantage to withholding and CAT: they save your client’s life. Sometimes, that’s the best you can do. And, fundamentally, saving lives is really what this business is all about.

C. What Is Persecution?

Remarkably, neither the Convention nor the INA defines the term “persecution.” Consequently, U.S. Immigration Judges, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), and the U.S. Courts of Appeals are constantly referring to certain types of harm as “mere discrimination or harassment” not “rising to the level” of “persecution.” Often these highly subjective conclusions seem to be more in the mind of the judicial beholder than in the record or the law.

In the absence of a firm definition, I have found the most useful practical guidance to be in an opinion by the famous, or infamous, Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2011 case Stanojkova v. Holder, 645 F.3d 943, 947-48 (7^th Cir. 2011). Judge Posner gave three examples.

“The three forms are discrimination, harassment, and persecution. The first refers to unequal treatment, and is illustrated historically by India’s caste system and the Jim Crow laws in the southern U.S. states. Discrimination normally does not involve the application of physical force, except as punishment for violation of the discriminatory laws.”

Second: “Harassment involves targeting members of a specified group for adverse treatment, but without the application of significant physical force. Had [police] furious at [the respondent’s] being soft on Albanians followed his taxi (he was a taxicab driver in Macedonia) and ticketed him whenever he exceeded the speed limit by one mile per hour, that would be an example of harassment. A common form of sexual harassment is pestering a subordinate for a date or making lewd comments on her appearance, or perhaps hugging her, which is physical but generally not violent.”

Third: “Persecution involves, we suggest, the use of significant physical force against a person’s body, or the infliction of comparable physical harm without direct application of force (locking a person in a cell and starving him would be an example), or nonphysical harm of equal gravity—that last qualification is important because refusing to allow a person to practice his religion is a common form of persecution even though the only harm it causes is psychological. Another example of persecution that does not involve actual physical contact is a credible threat to inflict grave physical harm, as in pointing a gun at a person’s head and pulling the trigger but unbeknownst to the victim the gun is not loaded.”

These definitions are, of course, not binding outside the Seventh Circuit. But, I find them to be practical, usable definitions that I certainly found helpful in making asylum decisions in the Fourth and other circuits.

D. Nexus

The concept of “nexus” or “on account of” has become critical in asylum adjudication. Indeed, that is where many of your upcoming battles will be focused. In many cases these days the DHS will concede the “particular social group” (“PSG”) and just argue that the harm has no “nexus” to that PSG or any other protected ground.

The REAL ID Act amended the INA to require that for an asylum applicant to prove ”nexus” or “on account” of any protected ground, he or she must show that the protected ground is “at least one central reason” for the feared persecution. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1208(b)(1)(B)(i) While this did not eliminate the frequently encountered “mixed motive” situation, it was intended to “tighten up” prior case law that had referred to the persecution as stemming “in whole or in part” from a protected ground.

The BIA ruled in Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I & N Dec. 341 (BIA 2010) that the “one central reason” test also applies to nexus in the withholding of removal context. However, the Ninth Circuit rejected the BIA’s interpretation in Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351 (BIA 2014), maintaining that the more generous “in whole or in part” test should continue to apply to withholding cases under the INA. To my knowledge, the Fifth Circuit has not directly addressed the issue. So, I believe that C-T-L- would apply in the Immigration Courts in the Fifth Circuit at present.

Unfortunately, the BIA has given a very narrow reading to the “one central reason” test. In a recent precedent, Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I &N Dec. 40 (BIA 2017), the respondent was a member of a family social group. He clearly was targeted by a cartel in Mexico because he was a member of a family that owned a grocery store. In other words, “but for” the respondent’s family membership, he would not have been targeted by the gang.

Nevertheless, instead of granting the case, the BIA looked beyond the initial causation. The BIA found that “the respondent was targeted only as a means to achieve the cartel’s objective to increase its profits by selling drugs in the store owned by his father. Therefore the cartel’s motive to increase its profits by selling contraband in the store was one central reason for its actions against the respondent. Any motive to harm the respondent because he was a member of his family was, at most, incidental.” 27 I&N Dec. at 46 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the BIA denied the case.

Unfortunately, the BIA cited and relied upon an analysis of nexus in a similar case by the Fifth Circuit in Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485n (5^th Cir. 2015). Consequently, you will have to deal with the restrictive interpretation in L-E-A- and Ramirez-Mejia.

The BIA, and to some extent the Fifth Circuit, have essentially used the “nexus” requirement to “squeeze the life” out of the family PSG. We can see that the normal rules of legal causation have been suspended. The respondent would not have been targeted by the cartel had he not belonged to this particular family. Yet, the BIA searched for and found an “overriding motive” that did not relate to a protected ground and determined that to be the “central reason” and the family PSG to be “tangential.”

What kind of case could succeed under L-E-A-? Well, perhaps not wanting to give anyone any practical ideas on how to qualify, the BIA searched history and came up with the execution of the Romanov family by the Bolsheviks as an example of a where family was a “central reason” for the persecution. So, maybe if the respondent’s father were a major donor to a political party that opposed cartels, a member of a religion that opposed drugs, or a member of a hated minority group, the respondent’s family membership could have been “at least one central reason.”

But the Romanov family case would have been grantable on actual or imputed political opinion grounds. The other examples I gave would have been more easily grantable on actual or implied political opinion, religion, or nationality grounds. So the BIA appears to made the family PSG ground largely superfluous.

This leaves you as litigators in a tricky situation. The IJ will be bound by L-E-A-, the BIA is unlikely to retreat from L-E-A-, and the Fifth Circuit seems disposed to go along with the L-E-A- view.

On the other hand, to my knowledge, L-E-A- has not actually been considered and endorsed by any circuit to date. To me, it appears to be inconsistent with some of the existing family-based nexus case law in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits. So, I wouldn’t be shocked if a “circuit split” eventually develops and the issue finally wends its way to the Supreme Court. Who knows, maybe one of you will be arguing it.

In any event, in my view, it is too early for you to “waive” strong nexus arguments even if they will be rejected under L-E-A-. On the other hand, that’s not likely to solve your detained client’s current problems.

So, what can you do? First, look for legitimate ways to distinguish L-E-A-. Assume that the DHS will “pull out the stops” in arguing that everything but family was the central reason –greed, lust, crime, random violence, personal vengeance, envy, resentment, etc. Look for evidence in the record that the dispute really was, to a major extent, about family, rather than one of the non-qualifying grounds.

Second, look for some qualifying non-family PSG or a “more conventional” religious, nationality, racial, or political motive.

Third, consider the possibility of CAT protection. The advocacy community probably underutilizes CAT. CAT doesn’t have a specific nexus requirement and often can be proved by extensive documentary or expert evidence, both Jones Day specialties. Sure, the standard of proof is high and CAT is a lesser form of relief than asylum. But, it saves your client’s life! And, if the nexus law changes in your favor, you can always file a motion to reopen to re-apply for asylum under the changed law.

This is an area of the law where creativity, preparation, and persistence often pay off in the long run. So, don’t give up. Keep on fighting for a reasonable and proper application of the “refugee” definition and for the rights of your clients.

III. PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP

In this section I will talk about the three basic requirements for a PSG, the success stories, the usual failures, things that can go wrong, and offer you a few practice pointers directly related to PSG claims.

A. The Three Requirements

The BIA has established three requirements for a PSG.

Immutability or fundamental to identity;
Particularity; and
Social distinction.

These three requirements are usually used to deny rather than grant protection. Indeed, most of the BIA’s recent precedents on PSG are rendered in a decidedly negative context.

There was a time about two decades ago when many of us, including a number of BIA Members, thought that immutability or fundamental to identity was the sole factor. But, following our departure, the BIA attached the additional requirements of “particularity” and “social visibility” now renamed “social distinction” to narrow the definition and facilitate denials, particularly of gang-based PSG claims.

The particularity and social distinction requirements basically work like a “scissors” to cut off claims. As you make your definition more specific to meet the “particularity” requirement it often will become so narrow and restrictive that it fails to satisfy “social distinction.” On the other hand, as your proposed PSG becomes more socially distinct, it’s likely that it will become more expansive and generic so that the BIA will find a lack of “particularity.”

While the UNHCR and many advocacy groups have argued for a return of immutability as the basic requirement with “social distinction” as an alternative, not an additional requirement, the BIA recently reaffirmed its “three criteria” approach. These cases, Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I &N Dec. 227 (BIA 2014) and its companion case Matter of W-E-G-, 26 I &N Dec. 208 (BIA 2014), are “must reads” for anyone doing PSG work.

About the only bright spot for advocates was that the BIA in M-E-V-G– rejected the commonly held view that no gang-based case could ever succeed. The BIA said that its decisions “should not be read as a blanket rejection of all factual scenarios involving gangs. Social group determinations are made on a case-by-case basis. For example, a factual scenario in which gangs are targeting homosexuals may support a particular social group claim. While persecution on account of a protected ground cannot be inferred merely from acts of random violence and the existence of civil strife, it is clear that persecution on account of a protected ground may occur during periods of civil strife if the victim is targeted on account of a protected ground.” 26 I&N Dec. at 251 (citations omitted).

In other words, the Board is asking for evidence intensive case-by-case adjudications of various proposed PSGs. Leaving aside the fairness of doing this in a context where we know that most applicants will be detained and unrepresented, I cannot think of an organization better suited to give the BIA what it asked for than Jones Day – you guys!

B. Success Stories

There are four basic groups that have been relatively successful in establishing PSG claims.

LGBT individuals under Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I&N Dec. 819 (BIA 1990);
Women who fear or suffered female genital mutilation (“FGM”) under my decision in Matter of Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357 (BIA 1996);
Victims of domestic violence under Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014); and
Family under the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117 (4^th 2011), a case in which I was the Immigration Judge and Jones Day was pro bono counsel.

You should note that the first three of these success stories had something in common: strong support across a wide spectrum of the political universe. In fact, in LGBT, FGM, and domestic violence cases the DHS eventually changed its position so as to not oppose the recognition of the PSG. This, in turn, either facilitated or perhaps effectively forced the BIA to recognize the PSG in a precedent.

Family, on the other hand, has generally not developed the same type of political consensus as a PSG for asylum purposes. I have already discussed in detail how notwithstanding the clear logic of family as a PSG, the BIA uses a highly restrictive reading of the “nexus” requirement that prevents many family groups from qualifying for protection.

You probably will not encounter too many FGM cases at the Southern Border. Nevertheless, there are two additional important points established by Kasinga. First, the respondent does not have to establish that the persecutor acted or will act with “malevolent intent.” Persecution may be established even where the persecutor was inflicting the harm with the intent to “help” or “treat” the respondent. This comes up frequently in connection with LGBT claims.

Second, Kasinga holds that to justify a discretionary denial of asylum for a respondent who otherwise meets all of the statutory requirements, the adverse factors must be “egregious” so as to outweigh the likely danger of persecution.

You are likely to find a number of Southern Border cases involving LGBT individuals, domestic violence, and family. In the Arlington Immigration Court during my tenure these cases succeeded at an extremely high rate, so much so that many of them went on my “short docket.” However, that was then and this is now. And, sadly, you won’t be presenting these cases in Arlington.

Finally, there are some “up and comer” PSG’s that have had success in some of the circuits and might eventually gain widespread acceptance. Among these are witnesses, landowners, and women subjected to forced marriages. The latter often can more successfully be presented under the domestic violence category. The Fourth Circuit actually has recognized “former gang members” as a potential PSG, although many such individuals will have difficulties under the criminal exclusions from the refugee definition. Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902 (4^th Cir. 2014).

C. The Usual Losers

PSGs that don’t fit any of the categories I just mentioned are usually “losers.” Chief among the “usual losers” are victims of crime other than domestic violence, informants, extortion victims, and those resisting gang recruitment. You’ll probably see a fair number of such cases at the Southern border. Your challenge will be how to present them in a way that overcomes the negative connotations normally associated with such claims.

D. What Can Go Wrong?

Lots of things can go wrong with a PSG case. First, there is the issue of “circularity.” Generally, a PSG cannot be defined in terms of itself. For example “victims of crime” would generally be a “circular” social group.

An easy test is to use your proposed PSG in a simple sentence: “This respondent was harmed to overcome the characteristic of being _________. If you can’t say with with a straight face in open court, don’t use it. For example, “this respondent was raped to overcome her characteristic of being a victim of rape” isn’t going to make it as a PSG.

We’ve already talked about how PSG claims can be attacked by denying the nexus. There are also the old favorites of lack of credibility or corroboration. Then, there is failure to meet the one-year filing deadline, no failure of state protection, reasonably available internal relocation, and fundamentally changed country conditions.

That’s why if you’re considering a PSG claim, it’s always wise to have “Plan B.” The problem today, however, is that the Administration has restricted or limited many of the “Plans B.” For example, until recently, the number one “Plan B” was to request prosecutorial discretion (“PD”) from the Assistant Chief Counsel if the respondent had sympathetic humanitarian factors, a clean criminal record, and strong ties to the U.S. However, for all practical purposes, this Administration has eliminated PD.

Nevertheless, its always worthwhile to think about whether things like Wilberforce Act treatment for certain unaccompanied juveniles, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, “T” visas for trafficking victims, “U” visas for victims of crime, or benefits under the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”) might be realistic possibilities for your client.

E. A Few Practical Tips on PSG

I’m going to close this section by offering you a few practical tips on presenting PSG cases that will also tie into my next major section.

First, think “25 words or fewer.” Just like the old boxtop contests from my youth. There are few, if any, known examples of success using lengthy, convoluted social group definitions.

Second, remember folks, it isn’t “making sausages.” The definition that goes in must be the same one that comes out the other end. Social groups that “morph” during the hearing just have no chance.

Third, be prepared to explain how your proposed particular social group meets the current BIA criteria of immutability, particularity, and social distinction, formerly known as “social visibility.”

Fourth, make sure that your respondent is actually a member of the particular social group you propose. You would be surprised at the number of counsel who propose a particular social group definition and then fail to offer proof that their client actually fits within that group.

Fifth, as I just mentioned, check your particular social group for “circularity.”

Sixth, and finally, be prepared for an onslaught of other arguments against your case, the chief of which probably will be “no nexus.” Normally, the DHS will “pull out all the stops” to prevent the recognition of a new PSG.

IV. PRACTICAL TIPS FOR PRESENTING AN ASYLUM CASE IN IMMIGRATION COURT

You should all have received a copy of my comprehensive three-page treatise on asylum law entitled “Practical Tips For Presenting an Asylum Case In Immigration Court,” Feb. 2017 Revised Edition. I’m going to quickly take you through the fourteen practical tips outlined there.

My first tip is, “Read a Good Book.” My strong recommendation is the one that has always been at the top of the Immigration Court Best Seller List: Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 2017 edition.

Specifically, I invite your attention to Chapter 1208, which contains the seeds of all winning theories of asylum law, past, present, and future. It will also give you gems like how to shift the burden of proof to the DHS and how to win your case even if your client does not presently have a well-founded fear of persecution.

Second, “Get Real.” The REAL ID Act, P.L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005), deals with credibility and burden of proof issues in asylum and other cases and applies to applications “made” on or after May 11, 2005, which will be all of your cases. Read it and decide how it can help you and how you can respond to DHS arguments.

Third, “Know One When You See One.” The one-year filing requirement of section 208(a)(2)(B) of the INA bars asylum in some cases. Your burden of proof on the one-year filing issue is very high: “clear and convincing evidence.” Judicial review might be limited. But, there are exceptions. Read the statute and the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4 to find out how the filing requirement works and what arguments might be made to preserve a late asylum application. Remember that the one-year requirement does not apply to withholding of removal under the INA or to CAT applications.

At the beginning of each asylum case, I asked the parties to identify the issues. Respondents’ attorneys invariably told me about past persecution, future persecution, nexus, gender-based persecution, exceptions to the one year filing deadline, weird social groups, and so forth. The issue they sometimes fail to identify is the one that’s always first on my list. What is it?

That’s right, credibility, is the key issue in almost all asylum litigation. So, my fourth rule is “Play To Tell the Truth.” You must understand what goes into making credibility determinations and why the role of the Immigration Judge is so critical. Often, adverse credibility determinations are difficult to overturn on appeal. It’s all about deference.

But, credible testimony might not be enough to win your case. That’s why my fifth rule is “Don’t Believe Everything You Read.” Both appellate and trial court decisions often recite rote quotations about asylum being granted solely on the basis of credible testimony.

However, to give your client the best chance of winning his or her asylum case in immigration Court, under the law applicable in most circuits, you’re likely to need a combination of credible testimony and reasonably available corroborating evidence. Read Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 722 (BIA 1997), largely codified by REAL ID, and find out what it really takes to win an asylum case in most Immigration Court.

In this respect, you should remember my corollary sixth rule “Paper Your Case.” According to Fourth Circuit precedent, even a proper adverse credibility ruling against your client might not be enough for an Immigration Judge to deny the asylum claim. The Judge must still examine the record as a whole, including all of the documentation supporting the claim, to determine whether independent documentary evidence establishes eligibility for asylum. Read Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361 (4th Cir. 2004) and discover how the power of independent documentary evidence can overcome even a sustainable adverse credibility finding. Also, remember that the REAL ID Act directs Immigration Judges to consider “the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors.”

“Read Your Paper” is my seventh important rule. You and your client are responsible for all the documentation you present in your case. Nothing will give you nightmares faster than having a client present false or fraudulent documentation to the Immigration Court. In my experience, I’ve had very few attorneys able to dig out of that hole. So, don’t let this happen to you.

My eighth rule is “Pile it On.” Sometimes, as demonstrated in one of my very favorite cases Matter of O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 I&N Dec. 23 (BIA 1998), reaffirmed in Matter of L-K-, 23 I&N Dec. 677, 683 (BIA 2004), you will be able to take a series of events happening to your respondent, his or her family, or close associates, none of which individually perhaps rises to the level of persecution, and combine them to win for your client.

My ninth rule is “Don’t Get Caught by the Devil.” The devil is in the details. If you don’t find that devil, the DHS Assistant Chief Counsel almost certainly will, and you will burn. Also, make sure to put your client at ease by carefully explaining the process and by going over the direct and cross-examinations in advance. Remember the cultural and language barriers that can sometimes interfere with effective presentation of your case.

I found the DHS Assistant Chief Counsel in Arlington were all very nice folks. They were also smart, knowledgeable, well prepared, and ready to vigorously litigate their client’s positions. They handled more trials in a year than most litigators do in a lifetime. So, beware and be prepared. You would also be wise to contact the Assistant Chief Counsel in advance of any merits hearing to discuss ways of narrowing the issues and possible “Plans B.”

My tenth rule is “Know Your Geography.” Not all Immigration Courts and Circuit Courts of Appeals are located on the West Coast. The BIA certainly is not. You must know and deal with the law in the jurisdiction where your case actually is located, not in the one you might wish it were located.

For example, the Arlington Immigration Court is in Crystal City. That is in Virginia, which is not presently part of the Ninth Circuit. Nor are the courts in Texas where most of you will be appearing.

This is something that I once had trouble with, coming to the Arlington Court from a job where the majority of asylum cases arose in the Ninth Circuit. But, I got over it, and so can you.

My eleventh rule is to “Get Physical.” In defining persecution, some Circuits have emphasized “the infliction or threat of death, torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom.” See, e.g., Niang v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2007). While the Circuits and the BIA have also recognized non-physical threats and harm, your strongest case probably will be to emphasize the physical aspects of the harm where they exist. Mirisawo v. Holder, 599 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2010); Matter of T-Z-, 24 I & N Dec. 163 (BIA 2007).

I particularly recommend the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117 (4th Cir. 2011), which found that the BIA erred in rejecting my conclusion that “unrebutted evidence of death threats against [the respondent] and his family members, combined with the MS-13’s penchant for extracting vengeance against cooperating witnesses, gave rise to a reasonable fear of future persecution.” In other words, I was right, and the BIA was wrong. But, who’s keeping track?

My twelfth rule is “Practice, Practice, Practice.” The Immigration Court Practice Manual, available online at the EOIR web site http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/ocij_page1.htm was effective July 1, 2008, and replaced all prior local rules. All filings with the Immigration Court must comply with the deadlines and formats established in this Practice Manual. The Practice Manual has a very helpful index, and it covers just about everything you will ever want to know about practice before the Immigration Courts. It contains useful appendices that give you contact information and tell you how to format and cite documents for filing in Immigration Court. Best of all, it’s applicable nationwide, so you can use what you learn in all Immigration Courts.

My thirteenth, rule is “It’s Always Wise to Have ‘Plan B.’” As I have pointed out, asylum litigation has many variables and opportunities for a claim to “go south.” Therefore, it is prudent to have a “Plan B” (alternative) in mind.

Among the “Plans B” that regularly came up in Arlington were: prosecutorial discretion (“PD”), Special Rule Cancellation of Removal (“NACARA”), Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”), non-Lawful Permanent Resident Cancellation of Removal (“EOIR 42-B”), Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”), Special Immigrant Juvenile (“SIJ”) status, I-130 petition with a “stateside waiver” (“I-601A”), “Wilberforce Act” special processing for unaccompanied children (“UACs”), T nonimmigrant status (for certain human trafficking victims), and U nonimmigrant status (for certain victims of crime). In my experience, many, perhaps the majority, of the “happy outcome” asylum cases coming before me were resolved on a basis “OTA,” that is “other than asylum.”

But, unfortunately in my view, the “Plan B” world is rapidly changing. So, please listen very carefully to the caveat that comes next.

Fourteenth, hope for the best, but prepare for the worst. As some have said “there’s a new Sheriff in town,” and he’s announced a “maximum immigration enforcement” program targeting anyone who has had any run-in with the law, whether convicted or not. He also intends to detain all undocumented border crossers or applicants for admission at the border. So, you can expect more arrests, more detention (particularly in far-away, inconvenient locations like, for instance, Laredo, TX), more bond hearings, more credible and reasonable fear reviews, more pressure to move cases even faster, and an even higher stress level in Immigration Court.

The “Plans B” involving discretion on the part of the Assistant Chief Counsel, like PD, DACA, and stateside processing, and even waiving appeal from grants of relief, are likely to disappear in the near future, if they have not already. In many cases, litigating up through the BIA and into the Article III Federal Courts (where the judges are, of course, bound to follow the law but not necessarily to accept the President’s or the Attorney General’s interpretation of it) might become your best, and perhaps only, “Plan B.”

V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I have told you about the basic elements of the refugee definition and how it is used in adjudicating asylum cases. I have also discussed the requirements and the pros and cons of the PSG protected ground. And, I have shared with you some of my practical tips for presenting an asylum case in U.S. Immigration Court.

Obviously, I can’t make you an immigration litigation expert in in afternoon. But, I trust that I have given you the basic tools to effectively represent your clients in Immigration Court. I have also given you some sources that you can consult for relevant information in developing your litigation strategy and your case.

I encourage you to read my blog, immigrationcourtside.com, which covers many recent developments in the U.S. Immigration Courts. As you come up with victories, defeats, good ideas, appalling situations, or anything else you think should be made more widely available, please feel free to submit them to me for publication. I also welcome first-hand accounts of how the system is, or isn’t, working at the “retail level.”

Thanks again for joining the New Due Process Army and undertaking this critical mission on behalf of the U.S. Constitution and all it stands for! Thanks for what you are doing for America, our system of justice, and the most vulnerable individuals who depend on that system for due process and justice.

Thanks for listening, good luck, do great things, and Due Process Forever! I’d be pleased to answer any additional questions.

(08-01-17++)

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PROGRAM NOTE: I am a former Partner at Jones Day. resident in the Washington, D.C. Office.

JUDGES JOURNAL, SUMMER 2017: “IN BORROWED ROBES — A Day in the Life of an IMMIGRATION JUDGE” By Judge Dorothy A. Harbeck

JJ_SUM17_56_3_Harbeck

Excerpt:

“It was a Sunday afternoon of particular autumn splendor when I found myself trying on vampire capes for work. I had been three-quarters of the way to the York County Correctional Facility in Pennsylvania, a detention center, for my week-long detail of hearing removal cases of noncitizens when I realized I had forgotten my judicial robe. I was supposed to be on the bench in the immigration court the next morning. I was a new immigration judge (IJ), assigned to a detention facility in Eliz- abeth, New Jersey, and I did not want any problems on my detail to York. I gured forgetting my robe was a rookie move, and I wanted to project authority. Also, there is a specific Operating Policy and Procedure Memorandum (OPPM) on the subject. That OPPM requires that I wear a robe when presiding over cases so that I convey the proper dignity of the court and foster the aims of due process and a fair hearing.”

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Read the entire, wonderful first-hand account of a trial judge’s life at the “retail level” of our immigration system by my good friend Judge Dorothy Harbeck of the Elizabeth, N.J. Immigrant Court.

PWS

07-17-17

NEW SCHOLARSHIP: Hon. Dorothy Harbeck Compares Immigration Bonds With The NJ Bail Reform Act

Harbeck – BondArticle for Dissemination

The article is entitled

“A NEW CALCULUS FOR THE MEASURE OF MERCY: DOES THE NEW JERSEY BAIL REFORM AFFECT THE IMMIGRATION COURT BOND HEARINGS?” It’s published in the Rutgers Law Record.

Judge Harbeck writes:

“[T]he New Jersey Bail Reform will not directly affect how the immigration courts determine immigration bonds. However, while the state criminal system is wholly distinct from the federal immigration system, there are increasing intersections of state law having unintended consequences in immigration proceedings. Under the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution, federal law is the “Supreme Law of the Land,” and states have no authority to regulate immigration enforcement. That said, there are a number of similar rationales between the new state bail reform and the existing bond determination criteria in the immigration court. This article outlines those similarities as well as the differences between the two. It is also important to note from a practical point of view that New Jersey bail reform has no impact on immigration detainers. An immigration detainer is the process by which Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) may detain a non-citizen without a warrant, but only if ICE has “reason to believe” that the non-citizen “is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.”

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Read the full article at the link. While Judge Harbeck’s timely scholarship is of particular interest to New Jersey lawyers, it is also helpful for any lawyer seeking to understand the bond setting process in U.S. Immigration Courts. With the Administration’s new enforcement initiatives underway, bond is sure to be a “hot topic.”

PWS

02/26/17

Immigration Is Hot — Asylum Is Hotter — Get The Asylum Litigation “Triple Play” (Free) — 1) My Newly Revised Comprehensive Three-Page Treatise “Practical Tips For Presenting An Asylum Case In Immigration Court:” 2) My Accompanying “Practical Tips” Lecture (UDC Law School Version); 3) Judge Dorothy Harbeck’s “The Commonsense Of Direct and Cross-Examinations In Immigration Court!”

Click Here for my 3-page treatise “Practical Tips for Presenting An Asylum Case In Immigration Court” (Rev. Feb. 2017); PRACTICAL TIPS FOR PRESENTING AN ASYLUM CASE-02-17-17

Click here for my accompanying lecture, “Practical Tips, UDC Law Version:” Practical Tips for Presenting an Asylum Case in Immigration Court-UDCVersion-02-21-17

Click here for Judge Harbeck’s “The Commonsense of Direct and Cross-Examinations In Immigration Court” (NJ Lawyer @ 30): NJLFeb2017

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PWS

02/22/17

Read The Feb. 2017 New Jersey Lawyer Dedicated To Immigration — Law You Can Use — Articles by the Hon. Dorothy Harbeck (Elizabeth Immigration Court) and Others!!

NJLFeb2017

Check out the Table of Contents:

FEATURES

Raising the Bar for Immigrant Representation in New Jersey 10

by Farrin Anello and Lori A. Nessel

A Step Toward Justice—Universal Representation
and Access to Counsel for New Jersey Immigrants 14

by Amy Gottlieb and Nicole Polley Miller

Naturalization, Jersey Style—
The Process, the Perks, and the Pitfalls 20

by Angie Garasia

Born as Equals and Subject to Lady Liberty 26

by Cesar Martin Estela

A View from the Bench—The Commonsense
of Direct and Cross-Examinations in Immigration Court 30

by Hon. Dorothy Harbeck

Immigration and Mental Health Forensics—
An Unexpected Interdisciplinary Connection 37

by Lauren Anselowitz and Daniel L. Weiss

Lessons Learned from the Trenches—Best Practices
for Immigration-related Federal Investigations 42

by Valentine Brown

Tips to Effectively Recruit, Retain and Terminate
Foreign Workers 46

by Scott R. Malyk and Anthony F. Siliato

Responding to the Child Migrant Crisis 54

by Joanne Gottesman, Anju Gupta, and Randi Mandelbaum

PWS

02/11/17

Experts Share Secrets Of Effective Cross Examination In Immigration Court!

My good friend and former colleague Judge Dorothy Harbeck of the United States Immigration Court, Newark New Jersey and Dr. Alicia Triche have written a terrific short article on cross examination in Immigration Court, “Terms so Plain and Firm as to Command” for the upcoming January/February 2017 Edition of The Federal Lawyer, published by the Federal Bar Association.

As a former trial judge, there were few things more frustrating than spending an afternoon with an attorney who was unable to present his or her case in a concise, effective manner so that it kept my attention (and made it easy for me to follow the story and take notes). You also have to think about the interpreter; a convoluted compound question in English will be virtually incomprehensible after translation.

So thanks to Judge Harbeck and Dr. Triche for helping to make judicial afternoons shorter, more productive, and, hopefully, more enjoyable for all.

The full article is reproduced below (alas without pictures and some of the fancy formatting) by permission from judge Harbeck.

PWS

01/11/17

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Terms so Plain and Firm as to Command

Assent: Preparing and Conducting Optimal

Direct Examination of the Respondent
by Hon. Dorothy Harbeck and Dr. Alicia Triche
Immigration Law Update
Hon. Dorothy Harbeck is the eastern regional vice president of the National Association of Immigra- tion Judges (NAIJ) and a federal Immigration Judge stationed in Elizabeth, N.J. Dr. Alicia Triche is sole proprietor at Triche Immigration Law, a Memphis, Tenn. based private practice that focuses on appeals, research support for fellow attorneys, and refugee cases. In 2013, Dr. Triche received a D.Phil. in international refugee law from Oxford University.
[T]o place before mankind the common sense of the subject, in terms so plain and firm as to com- mand their assent.—Thomas Jefferson, describing the purpose of the Declaration of Independence1

Courtroom drama is a mainline artery in U.S. culture. From Atticus Finch to the ill-fitting glove, legendary trial-tales etch themselves into our blood- streams, solidifying the core value of the rule of law. The centerpiece of these trials is direct examination, during which the skillful attorney is expected to draw the best possible answers from a story-filled witness. Immigration Court is also a part of this landscape. “Individual calendar hearings” go forward with great frequency, and, though often truncated compared to their federal counterparts, they do usually feature that great legal classic—direct examination. Still, despite its legendary importance, nothing in immigration trial practice is more overlooked than direct examination.

It is well known that the federal rules of immigra- tion do not apply in immigration proceedings. Instead, “immigration judges have broad discretion to conduct and control immigration proceedings and to admit
and consider relevant and probative evidence.”2 As a practical matter, however, certain types of evidence should be avoided as much as possible—most notably, leading questions. The basic tools of direct examina- tion are open-ended, non-leading questions that call for a narrative response. The lawyer should effectively blend into the background, allowing the witness to be the featured act. It is the respondent, not the attorney, who must present the coherent and logical statement of facts that is essential to the court’s decision.

In order to make that happen, both the attorney and the witness must be utterly prepared. Both must know the story that is being elicited—including the weak parts of the claim, which should be brought forward and addressed upfront. The attorney should have a list of every required element of the claim and know which facts are material to each. The witness must understand their own story and the trial process,
be ready to work with an interpreter, know how
to listen to the question posed and how to answer (truthfully) no more than the questioned asked, and be ready to remain calm on stand. All of this takes specific practice and thorough preparation. Simply telling the witness that they will be questioned on the stand is not enough. The attorney must ensure that everyone is thoroughly prepared.

When both attorney and witness know and under- stand the story to be told, questions can be formatted properly for direct examination. A leading question
is one that suggests an answer; contains an answer within it; or, in the strictest application of the category, calls for a “yes or no” response. Non-leading questions are open-ended and begin with “who,” “what,” “when,” “where,” and “why,” as opposed to “are,” “did,” “will,” “won’t,” and “isn’t.” Here is an example of the same
set of standard opening questions, in both leading and non-leading form:

Non-Leading:

What is your name?

Anna Ahmatova.

What is your birthday?

Sept. 19, 1962.

Where were you born?

Leningrad, USSR. Now, it’s St. Petersburg, Russia, again, just like when my grandmother was born there.

Are you a citizen of any country or countries?

Yes.

What country are you a citizen of?

Russia. Used to be a Soviet citizen.

Are you a citizen of any other country?

USSR.

Leading:

Your name is Anna Ahmatova, right?

Yes.

And were you born on Sept. 19, 1962?
January/February 2017 • THE FEDERAL LAWYER • 13
Yea.

In St. Petersburg, Russia?

No, in Leningrad, USSR.

But you told the ICE officer it was St. Petersburg, right?

Yes.

And Russia is the only country you are a citizen of, right?

Right.

Leading questions cannot be avoided altogether, but they must be avoided whenever possible because they compromise the accuracy of the evidence and the fundamental fairness of proceedings. And, even among non-leading questions, some are better than others. In particular, there is a difference between a “narrative” and a “specific” approach. Consider the following two sets of questions.

The first set:

Have you ever been convicted of a crime?

Yes.

What happened?

I had a DUI.

When was this?

June 15, 2003.

Where was the conviction?

Sevierville, Tenn.

What happened?

I was out drinking at a bar with my friends after work. This was before I met my girlfriend. I got pulled over because I was speeding, and I got a DUI. I went to jail for a few days, but I paid all my fines now.

Here is the second set:

Have you ever been convicted of a crime?

Yes.

How many times?

One.

What month and year did this conviction occur?

June 2003.

In what county and state did this conviction occur?

Sevierville, Tenn.

What sort of penalty, if any, did you receive?

A few days of jail time.

Was any person injured as a result of your drinking and driving that night?

No.

The first is the “narrative” approach, allowing the witness to tell her own story about how the DUI occurred. The second approach asks mostly non-leading, but highly specific questions designed to make sure the essential facts of the claim are elicited with efficien- cy. From a persuasive standpoint, the narrative approach is usually preferred. However, not every witness is able to tell their story effectively in that context. It is up to the attorney to be flexible and make sure that all essential facts are elicited in the manner that best works for the individual.

Direct examination should also be crafted so as to avoid ob- jections. Though there are no set rules of evidence, immigration regulations do specifically require that all testimony be “material and relevant.”3 In addition, proceedings must be fundamentally fair
and comport with due process.4 Objections in immigration court are generally guided by those two standards. Information must not be more prejudicial than probative, and a “relevant” statement has a tendency to make the existence of a fact “more or less probable.”5 Objections to relevancy are common (if not commonly sustained) and counsel should be ready to articulate the materiality of any ques- tion being asked. Other immigration court objections include: calls for an unqualified opinion; compound question; calls for speculation; mischaracterizes earlier testimony; calls for a legal conclusion; and coaching of the witness. If a witness is being harassed, that objection can also be stated for the record, with a specific description of the objectionable conduct.

When direct examination metes out its purpose, the respondent’s story is clear, complete, and, above all, persuasive. Says clinical pro- fessor David Chavkin: “If we think about the stories that have stayed with us over time, about the stories that have been most persuasive, these stories do not focus solely on a single critical event or a single moment in time…. Instead, they ordinarily represent a detailed, chronological narration of interrelated events with a beginning point, a connected point, and a termination point.”6 But, most importantly, to be legally effective, that chronology must be presented in its prop- er legal format: in terms so plain and firm, as to command assent. 

The views expressed here do not necessarily represent the official position of the U.S. Department of Justice, the attorney general, or the Executive Office for Immigration Review. The views represent the author’s personal opinions, which were formed after extensive consultation with the membership of the NAIJ. This article is solely for educational purposes, and it does not serve to substitute for any expert, professional and/or legal representation and advice.

Endnotes

1Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee, May 8, 1825, available at tjrs.monticello.org/letter/436 (last visited Oct. 10, 2016).
This column is based upon a trials skills presentation by Judge Harbeck, “Probative and Fundamentally Fair: Testimony in U.S. Immigration Court” (Seton Hall Law School and New Jersey State Bar Association) and Judge Harbeck’s article, “The Commonsense of Direct and Cross Examinations in Immigration Court,” New Jersey Lawyer Magazine #296, expected publication Jan. 2017.

2Matter of Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. 264, 265 (BIA 2010), citing § 240(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(l) (2006); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.36, 1240.1(c), 1240.7(a) (2010).
38 C.F.R. § 1240.7(a) (2016).
4See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596-598 (1953).
5FED. R. EVID. 401.8.
6DAVID F. CHAVKIN, CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION: A TEXTBOOK FOR LAW SCHOOL CLINICAL PROGRAMS 97 (LexisNexis 2002).
14 • THE FEDERAL LAWYER • January/February 2017

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🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

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Objections in Immigration Court: Dost Thou Protest Too Much or Too Little?1

Hon. Dorothy Harbeck 2

I. Introduction

II. The First Quatrain — Questions that Elicit an Organic Response

Argumentative

Form

Compound Question/Double Question

Confusing/Vague/Ambiguous

Counsel is Testifying/Misstates Evidence/Misquotes Witness/Improper Characterization of Evidence

Narrative

III. The Second Quatrain — Questions Based on What Has Happened in Court

Assumes Facts Not in Evidence

Beyond The Scope of Direct/Cross/Redirect Examination

Speculative

Foundation/Lack of Personal Knowledge

IV. The Third Quatrain — Imagery: Questions Based On Rules

Best Evidence Rule

Opinion

Privileged Communication

Public Policy

V. The Couplet — The Volta: The Takeaway, Most Important Objections

Leading on Direct Examination

Rule 403 (Undue Waste of Time or Undue Prejudice/Immaterial/Irrelevant/Repetitive/Asked and Answered/Cumulative/Surprise)

Footnotes

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“The basic thing is that most judges regard these people [unrepresented litigants] as kind of trash not worth the time of a federal judge,” he said.”

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II. WHO IS A REFUGEE?

A. Refugee Definition

B. Standard of Proof

C. What Is Persecution?

D. Nexus

III. PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP

A. The Three Requirements

B. Success Stories

C. The Usual Losers

D. What Can Go Wrong?

E. A Few Practical Tips on PSG

V. CONCLUSION

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