Torture? What torture? It’s merely “enhanced fact-finding!”

Carlos writes: 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/interactive/2021/911-books-american-values/

. . . .

Lawyering to death.

The phrase appears in multiple 9/11 volumes, usually uttered by top officials adamant that they were going to get things done, laws and rules be damned. Anti-terrorism efforts were always “lawyered to death” during the Clinton administration, Tenet complains in “Bush at War,” Bob Woodward’s 2002 book on the debates among the president and his national security team. In an interview with Woodward, Bush drops the phrase amid the machospeak — “dead or alive,” “bring ’em on” and the like — that became typical of his anti-terrorism rhetoric. “I had to show the American people the resolve of a commander in chief that was going to do whatever it took to win,” Bush explains. “No yielding. No equivocation. No, you know, lawyering this thing to death.” In “Against All Enemies,” Clarke recalls the evening of Sept. 11, 2001, when Bush snapped at an official who suggested that international law looked askance at military force as a tool of revenge. “I don’t care what the international lawyers say, we are going to kick some ass,” the president retorted.

The message was unmistakable: The law is an obstacle to effective counterterrorism. Worrying about procedural niceties is passe in a 9/11 world, an annoying impediment to the essential work of ass-kicking.

Except, they did lawyer this thing to death. Instead of disregarding the law, the Bush administration enlisted it. “Beginning almost immediately after September 11, 2001, [Vice President Dick] Cheney saw to it that some of the sharpest and best-trained lawyers in the country, working in secret in the White House and the United States Department of Justice, came up with legal justifications for a vast expansion of the government’s power in waging war on terror,” Jane Mayer writes in “The Dark Side,” her relentless 2008 compilation of the arguments and machinations of government lawyers after the attacks. Through public declarations and secret memos, the administration sought to remove limits on the president’s conduct of warfare and to deny terrorism suspects the protections of the Geneva Conventions by redefining them as unlawful enemy combatants. Nothing, Mayer argues of the latter effort, “more directly cleared the way for torture than this.”

To comprehend what our government can justify in the name of national security, consider the torture memos themselves, authored by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel between 2002 and 2005 to green-light CIA interrogation methods for terrorism suspects. Tactics such as cramped confinement, sleep deprivation and waterboarding were rebranded as “enhanced interrogation techniques,” legally and linguistically contorted to avoid the label of torture. Though the techniques could be cruel and inhuman, the OLC acknowledged in an August 2002 memo, they would constitute torture only if they produced pain equivalent to organ failure or death, and if the individual inflicting such pain really really meant to do so: “Even if the defendant knows that severe pain will result from his actions, if causing such harm is not his objective, he lacks the requisite specific intent.” It’s quite the sleight of hand, with torture moving from the body of the interrogated to the mind of the interrogator.

After devoting dozens of pages to the metaphysics of specific intent, the true meaning of “prolonged” mental harm or “imminent” death, and the elasticity of the Convention Against Torture, the memo concludes that none of it actually matters. Even if a particular interrogation method would cross some legal line, the relevant statute would be considered unconstitutional because it “impermissibly encroached” on the commander in chief’s authority to conduct warfare. Almost nowhere in these memos does the Justice Department curtail the power of the CIA to do as it pleases.

In fact, the OLC lawyers rely on assurances from the CIA itself to endorse such powers. In a second memo from August 2002, the lawyers ruminate on the use of cramped confinement boxes. “We have no information from the medical experts you have consulted that the limited duration for which the individual is kept in the boxes causes any substantial physical pain,” the memo states. Waterboarding likewise gets a pass. “You have informed us that this procedure does not inflict actual physical harm,” the memo states. “Based on your research . . . you do not anticipate that any prolonged mental harm would result from the use of the waterboard.”

You have informed us. Experts you have consulted. Based on your research. You do not anticipate. Such hand-washing words appear throughout the memos. The Justice Department relies on information provided by the CIA to reach its conclusions; the CIA then has the cover of the Justice Department to proceed with its interrogations. It’s a perfect circle of trust.

Yet the logic is itself tortured. In a May 2005 memo, the lawyers conclude that because no single technique inflicts “severe” pain amounting to torture, their combined use “would not be expected” to reach that level, either. As though embarrassed at such illogic, the memo attaches a triple-negative footnote: “We are not suggesting that combinations or repetitions of acts that do not individually cause severe physical pain could not result in severe physical pain.” Well, then, what exactly are you suggesting? Even when the OLC in 2004 officially withdrew its August 2002 memo following a public outcry and declared torture “abhorrent,” the lawyers added a footnote to the new memo assuring that they had reviewed the prior opinions on the treatment of detainees and “do not believe that any of their conclusions would be different under the standards set forth in this memorandum.”

In these documents, lawyers enable lawlessness. Another May 2005 memo concludes that, because the Convention Against Torture applies only to actions occurring under U.S. jurisdiction, the CIA’s creation of detention sites in other countries renders the convention “inapplicable.” Similarly, because the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment is meant to protect people convicted of crimes, it should not apply to terrorism detainees — because they have not been officially convicted of anything. The lack of due process conveniently eliminates constitutional protections. In his introduction to “The Torture Memos: Rationalizing the Unthinkable,” David Cole describes the documents as “bad-faith lawyering,” which might be generous. It is another kind of lawyering to death, one in which the rule of law that the 9/11 Commission urged us to abide by becomes the victim.

Years later, the Senate Intelligence Committee would investigate the CIA’s post-9/11 interrogation program. Its massive report — the executive summary of which appeared as a 549-page book in 2014 — found that torture did not produce useful intelligence, that the interrogations were more brutal than the CIA let on, that the Justice Department did not independently verify the CIA’s information, and that the spy agency impeded oversight by Congress and the CIA inspector general. It explains that the CIA purported to oversee itself and, no surprise, that it deemed its interrogations effective and necessary, no matter the results. (If a detainee provided information, it meant the program worked; if he did not, it meant stricter applications of the techniques were needed; if still no information was forthcoming, the program had succeeded in proving he had none to give.)

“The CIA’s effectiveness representations were almost entirely inaccurate,” the Senate report concluded. It is one of the few lies of the war on terror unmasked by an official government investigation and public report, but just one of the many documented in the 9/11 literature.

. . . ,.

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Sound painfully familiar? It should, to those of us “DOJ vets” who lived through this period. The use of the “third person,” “double and triple negatives,” “weasel words” like “you have given us to understand that,” “decision by committee” where a memo is routed through so many layers of bureaucracy that the original author or authors don’t even appear on its face — are all “devices” to diffuse and obscure responsibility and avoid clear accountability for controversial (and too often wrong) decisions!

During our time at the BIA, my fellow U.W. Badger, Judge Mike Heilman and I were often at odds on the law, particularly when it came to asylum. Anybody who doubts this should read Mike’s remarkable and famous (or infamous) “rabbi dissent” in Matter of H-, 21 I&N Dec. 337, 349 (BIA 1996) (Heilman, Board Member, dissenting). Nevertheless, one thing we agreed upon was requiring any decisions written for us to use the first person to reflect whose decision it actually was!

“Lawyers enable lawlessness.” How true! In 2002, DOJ lawyers (hand-chosen by the politicos) “tanked” and enabled, even encouraged, gross law violations by the CIA. 

Fast forward to 2018. Then, White Nationalist AG Jeff Sessions exhorted his wholly-owned “judges” at EOIR not to treat DHS enforcement as a party before the court, but rather as a worthy “partner” in combatting the largely-fabricated “scourge” of illegal immigration (that actually, as we can now see, was propping up Trump’s economy). Is it surprising that precedent decisions by Sessions, Whitaker, and Barr favored DHS nearly 100% of the time and the BIA thereafter issued almost no precedents where the individual prevailed (not that there were many of those following “the Ashcroft purge,” even before Sessions)?

Asylum grant rates in Immigration Court tumbled precipitously, while both the trial, and particularly appellate, levels at EOIR were “packed” with judges whose main qualification appeared to be an expectation that they would churn out large numbers of removal orders without much analysis or consideration of the factors favoring the individual. Misogyny and anti-asylum, anti-private-lawyer attitudes (those “dirty lawyers”) were encouraged by Sessions as part the “culture” at EOIR, sometimes visibly rewarded by “elevation” to the BIA.

Interestingly, at the same time in 2002 that the group of DOJ attorneys was furiously working in secret to justify torture, in clear violation of the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), another group in the DOJ, the BIA, was struggling to make the CAT work in “real world” litigated cases. A number of us dissented from the majority of our BIA colleagues’ wrong-headed and rather transparent attempt to “neuter” CAT protection from the outset. Unlike the “secret lawyers” at the DOJ, our work was public and had consequences not only for the humans involved, but for those of us who had the audacity to stand up for their rights under domestic and international law!

Here’s an excerpt from my long-forgotten dissenting opinion in Matter of J-E-, 22 I&N Dec. 291, 314-15 (BIA 2002) (Schmidt, Board Member, dissenting):

The majority concludes that the extreme mistreatment likely to befall this respondent in Haiti is not “torture,” but merely “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.” The majority further concludes that conduct defined as “torture” occurs in the Haitian detention system, but is not “likely” for this respondent. In short, the majority goes to great lengths to avoid applying the Convention Against Torture to this respondent.

We are in the early stages of the very difficult and thankless task of construing the Convention. Only time will tell whether the majority’s narrow reading of the torture definition and its highly technical approach to the standard of proof will be the long-term benchmarks for our country’s implementation of this international treaty.

Although I am certainly bound to follow and apply the majority’s constructions in all future cases, I do not believe that the majority adequately carries out the language or the purposes of the Convention and the implementing regulations. Therefore, I fear that we are failing to comply with our international obligations.

I conclude that the respondent is more likely than not to face officially sanctioned torture if returned to Haiti. Therefore, I would grant his application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture and the implementing regulations. Consequently, I respectfully dissent.

Within a year of that decision, my dissenting colleagues and I were among those “purged” from the BIA by Ashcroft because of our views. I’d argue that EOIR has continued to go straight downhill since then, and is now in total free fall! Surely, any “facade” of quasi-judicial independence at the BIA has long-since crumbled. Yet, AG Garland pretends there is no problem. Garland’s apparent belief that this is still Judge Bell’s or Ben Civiletti’s or even Ed Levi’s DOJ is simply, demonstrably, wrong. 

Today’s DOJ has been part and parcel of a highly inappropriate “weaponization” of the law and “Dred Scottification” directed against individual civil rights, migrants, voters, women, people of color, and a host of “others” who were on the far right “hit list” of the Trump kakistocracy. Nowhere has that been more evident than at the dysfunctional and institutionally biased EOIR. The problems plaguing American justice today have increased since 9-11. They will continue to fester and grow unless and until Garland faces reality and makes progressive leadership and judicial changes at EOIR to addresses the toxic culture of complicity and abusive use of the law to degrade individual and human rights. And, some real accountability at the rest of the badly-damaged DOJ should not be far behind.

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

09-05-21