🛡⚔️⚖️🗽😎GOOD NEWS, AS ROUND TABLE BESTS BIA AGAIN: 9th Cir. Zaps BIA’s Denial Of Guatemalan Woman’s Asylum & CAT Cases Involving Matter of A-B-! — Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr

Sontos, 9th 18-72833_Documents

Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 9th Cir., 08-07-20, published

 

SYNOPSIS BY COURT STAFF:

 

Immigration

Granting Sontos Diaz-Reynoso’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision affirming the denial of her application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture, and remanding, the panel held that the Board misapplied Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), as well as Board and circuit precedent, in concluding that Diaz-Reynoso’s proposed social group comprised of “indigenous women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” was not cognizable, and that she failed to establish that the government of Guatemala would acquiesce in any possible torture.

The panel rejected Diaz-Reynoso’s contention that Matter of A-B- was arbitrary and capricious and therefore not entitled to Chevron deference. The panel concluded that, despite the general and descriptive observations set forth in the opinion, Matter of A-B- did not announce a new categorical exception to withholding of removal for victims of domestic violence or other private criminal activity, but rather it reaffirmed the Board’s existing framework for analyzing the cognizability of particular social groups, requiring that such determinations be individualized and conducted on a case-by-case basis.

The panel observed that the Board rejected Diaz- Reynoso’s proposed social group, with almost no analysis,

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 

Case: 18-72833, 08/07/2020, ID: 11780830, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 3 of 76

DIAZ-REYNOSO V. BARR 3

because it “suffered from the same circularity problem articulated by the Attorney General in Matter of A-B-.” The panel explained that in doing so, the Board appeared to misapprehend the scope of Matter of A-B- as forbidding any mention of feared harm within the delineation of a proposed social group. The panel concluded that this was error, explaining that Matter of A-B- did not announce a new rule concerning circularity, but instead merely reiterated the well- established principle that a particular social group must exist independently of the harm asserted. The panel recognized that a proposed social group may be deemed impermissibly circular if, after conducting the proper case-by-case analysis, the Board determines that the group is defined exclusively by the fact that its members have been subjected to harm. The panel explained, however, that a proposed social group is not impermissibly circular merely because the proposed group mentions harm.

The panel concluded that the Board also erred in assuming that domestic violence was the only reason Diaz- Reynoso was unable to leave her relationship, and in failing to conduct the rigorous case-by-case analysis required by Matter of A-B-. The panel therefore remanded Diaz- Reynoso’s withholding of removal claim for the Board to undertake the required analysis applying the correct framework.

Because the Board failed to discuss evidence that Diaz- Reynoso reported her husband’s abuse to authority figures in her village community, and the government conceded remand was warranted, the panel also remanded Diaz-Reynoso’s CAT claim for further consideration.

4 DIAZ-REYNOSO V. BARR

Concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, Judge Bress agreed with remand of the CAT claim in light of the government’s concession, but disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the Board misread Matter of A-B- in rejecting Diaz-Reynoso’s proposed social group. In Judge Bress’s view, Matter of A-B- held that a proposed group that incorporates harm within its definition is not a group that exists independently of the harm asserted in an application for asylum or statutory withholding of removal. Judge Bress wrote that substantial evidence supported the Board’s assessment that Diaz-Reynoso’s social group was defined exclusively by the harm suffered, and that the Board correctly applied Matter of A-B-, and the circularity rule, in rejecting Diaz-Reynoso’s proposed social group.

COUNSEL:

Gary A. Watt, Stephen Tollafield, and Tiffany J. Gates, Supervising Counsel; Shandyn H. Pierce and Hilda Kajbaf, Certified Law Students; Hastings Appellate Project, San Francisco, California; for Petitioner.

Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General; John S. Hogan and Linda S. Wernery, Assistant Directors; Susan Bennett Green, Senior Litigation Counsel; Ashley Martin, Trial Attorney; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.

Blaine Bookey, Karen Musalo, Neela Chakravartula, and Anne Peterson, Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, U.S. Hastings College of Law, San Francisco, California, for Amicus Curiae Center for Gender & Refugee Studies.

Richard W. Mark, Amer S. Ahmed, Grace E. Hart, and Cassarah M. Chu, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, New York New York, for Amici Curiae Thirty-Nine Former Immigration Judges and Members of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Sabrineh Ardalan, Nancy Kelly, John Willshire Carrera, Deborah Anker, and Zachary A. Albun, Attorneys; Rosa Baum, Caya Simonsen, and Ana Sewell, Supervised Law Students; Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program, Cambridge, Massachusetts; for Amicus Curiae Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program.

Ana C. Reyes and Alexander J. Kasner, Williams & Connolly LLP, Washington, D.C.; Alice Farmer, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

PANEL: Ronald M. Gould, Morgan Christen, and Daniel A. Bress, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: Judge Cristen

CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION: Judge Bress

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Just another example of how under this regime, EOIR’s perverted efforts to deny and deport, especially targeting female asylum seekers from the Northern Triangle for mistreatment and potential deportation to death, waste time and effort that could, in a wiser more just Administration, be used to reduce dockets and waiting times by ensuring that well-documented, deserving cases like this one are rapidly granted. EOIR’s biased performance also reeks of both anti-Latino racism and misogyny. Here we are, two decades into the 21st Century with our immigration “justice” system still being driven by invidious factors.

The Supremes’ majority may feign ignorance and or indifference to Trump’s and Miller’s overtly racist immigration agenda. But, those of us working in the field of immigration had it figured out long ago. It’s not rocket science! The Trumpsters make little or no real attempt to hide their scofflaw intent and invidious motives. It has, disgustingly, taken a concerted and disingenuous effort by the Supremes’ majority to sweep these unconstitutional attacks on humanity under the carpet.

That’s why we need “regime change” in both the Executive and the Senate which will lead to the appointment of better judges for a better America. Justices and judges who will ditch the institutionalized racism and misogyny and who will make equal justice for all under our Constitution a reality rather than the cruel hoax and “throwaway line” that it is today under GOP mis-governance.

Many thanks to our good friends and pro bono counsel at Gibson Dunn for the help in drafting our Amicus Brief!

Knightess
Knightess of the Round Table

 

Due Process Forever!

 

PWS

 

08-07-20

 

 

 

 

🛡⚔️⚖️🗽 ROUND TABLE ASSISTS FIGHT AGAINST “AMERICA’S STAR CHAMBERS” — Here’s Our Amicus Brief In Las Americas v. Trump! — With Thanks To Our Pro Bono Friends STOLL STOLL BERNE LOKTING & SHLACHTER P.C. in Portland, OR!

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges

Excerpt:

The immigration court system lacks independence. An agency within the Department of Justice, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) houses the immigration court system, which consists of trial-level immigration courts and a single appellate tribunal known as the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Immigration judges, including appellate immigration judges, are viewed by EOIR “management” not as judges, but as Department of Justice attorneys who serve at the pleasure and direction of the Nation’s prosecutor-in-chief, the Attorney General.

As former immigration judges, we offer the Court our experience and urge that corrective action is necessary to ensure that immigration judges are permitted to function as impartial adjudicators, as required under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The INA and its implementing regulations set forth procedures for the “timely, impartial, and consistent” resolution of immigration proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103, 1230; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1) (charging the Board with appellate review authority to “resolve the questions before it in a manner that is timely, impartial, and consistent with the [INA] and regulations”) (emphasis added); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) (similarly requiring “immigration judges . . . to resolve the questions before them in a timely and impartial manner”) (emphasis added).

Although housed inside an enforcement agency and led by the Nation’s chief prosecutor, immigration judges must act neutrally to protect and adjudicate the important rights at stake in immigration cases and check executive overreach in the enforcement of federal immigration law. Applying a detached and learned interpretation of those laws, judges must correct overzealous bureaucrats and policy makers when they overstep the bounds of reasonable interpretation and the requirements of due process.

Here’s the full brief:

Las Americas Amicus (full case)

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As I often say, it’s an honor to be a part of this group with so many of my wonderful colleagues. It’s also an honor to be able to assist so many wonderful “divisions and brigades” of the New Due Process Army, like the SPLC and Immigration Law Lab.

Here’s another thought I often express: What if all of this talent, creativity, teamwork, expertise, and energy were devoted to fixing our broken Immigration Court System rather than constantly fighting to end gross abuses that should not be happening? There is a “systemic cost” to “maliciously incompetent” administration and the White Nationalist agenda promoted by the Trump kakistocracy!

Knightess
Knightess of the Round Table

Due Process Forever!

PWS

08-04-20

🛡⚔️⚖️ROUND TABLE RIPS REGIME’S FRAUDULENT PROPOSED REGS ELIMINATING ASYLUM IN 36-PAGE COMMENTARY — “The proposed rules are impermissibly arbitrary and capricious. They attempt to overcome, as opposed to interpret, the clear meaning of our asylum statutes.”

Knightess
Knightess of the Round Table

Asylum Ban Reg Comments_July 2020_FINAL

INTRODUCTION

In their introduction, the proposed regulations misstate the Congressional intent behind our asylum laws.2 Since 1980, our nation’s asylum laws are neither an expression of foreign policy nor an assertion of the right to protect resources or citizens. It is for this reason that the notice of proposed rulemaking must cite a case from 1972 that did not address asylum at all in order to find support for its claim.

The intent of Congress in enacting the 1980 Refugee Act was to bring our country’s asylum laws into accordance with our international treaty obligations, specifically by eliminating the above- stated biases from such determinations. For the past 40 years, our laws require us to grant asylum to all who qualify regardless of foreign policy or other concerns. Furthermore, the international treaties were intentionally left broad enough in their language to allow adjudicators flexibility to provide protection in response to whatever types of harm creative persecutors might de- vise. In choosing to adopt the precise language of those treaties, Congress adopted the same flexibility. See e.g. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804), pursuant to which national statutes should be interpreted in such a way as to not conflict with international laws.

The proposed rules are impermissibly arbitrary and capricious. They attempt to overcome, as opposed to interpret, the clear meaning of our asylum statutes. Rather than interpret the views of Congress, the proposed rules seek to replace them in furtherance of the strongly anti-immigrant views of the administration they serve.3 And that they seek to do so in an election year, for political gain, is clear.

In attempting to stifle clear Congressional intent in service of its own political motives, the ad- ministration has proposed rules that are ultra vires to the statute.

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Read our full comment at the above link.

Special thanks to the following Round Table Team that took the lead in drafting this comment (listed alphabetically):

Judge Jeffrey Chase

Judge Bruce Einhorn

Judge Rebecca Jamil

Judge Carol King

Judge Lory Diana Rosenberg

Judge Ilyce Shugall

Due Process Forever! Crimes Against Humanity, Never!

PWS

07-14-20

ROUND TABLE STRIKES ANOTHER BLOW IN SUPPORT OF JUSTICE⚔️🛡: Immigration Detainees Have a Right to Due Process in Bond Hearings — PADILLA RAUDALES V. DECKER, 2D CIR.

CHRISTOPHER T. CASAMASSIMA
CHRISTOPHER T. CASAMASSIMA
Partner
Wilmer Hale
Los Angeles
SOUVIK SAHA
SOUVIK SAHA
Counsel
Wilmer Hale
Washington, D.C.
Knightess
Knightess of the Round Table

 

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1

Amici curiae have served as Immigration Judges and as members of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Amici are invested in the resolution of this case because they have dedicated their careers to improving tghe fairness and

2

efficiency of the U.S. immigration system. Through their centuries-long collective experience, amici have adjudicated hundreds—if not thousands—of immigration detention hearings. Amici have substantial knowledge of immigration detention issues, including the practical impact of the burden of proof in such hearings.

INTRODUCTION AND ARGUMENT SUMMARY

Under the Fifth Amendment, “[n]o person” shall “be deprived of … liberty … without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. V. The “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). This liberty is so fundamental that the law tolerates its restraint only in limited circumstances.

1

Amici are invested in the resolution of

2

efficiency of the U.S. immigration system. Through their centuries-long collective experience, amici have adjudicated hundreds—if not thousands—of immigration detention hearings. Amici have substantial knowledge of immigration detention issues, including the practical impact of the burden of proof in such hearings.

INTRODUCTION AND ARGUMENT SUMMARY

Under the Fifth Amendment, “[n]o person” shall “be deprived of … liberty … without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. V. The “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). This liberty is so fundamental that the law tolerates its restraint only in limited circumstances.

1

Amici are invested in the resolution of this case because they have dedicated their careers to improving the fairness and

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).

Amici have filed substantially similar briefs in other cases involving burden of proof issues in proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Here, no party or party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, nor contributed money to preparing or submitting this brief. Only amici or their counsel contributed money to prepare or submit this brief. The parties have consented to the filing of this brief.

2

A complete list of amici is included in this brief’s addendum.

Case 19-3220, Document 116, 06/03/2020, 2854056, Page13 of 56

Such restraint violates the Due Process Clause “unless the detention is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural protections, or, in certain special and narrow nonpunitive circumstances, where a special justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Yet, federal law provides far greater protections to criminal defendants than it does to noncitizens in civil proceedings—even though the distinctions between criminal and non-criminal proceedings mean very little to a person sitting behind bars.

Accordingly, noncitizens already face significant hurdles in detention proceedings brought under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). At issue in this appeal is whether another, even higher and more fundamental, barrier to due process can be erected in this Circuit: do noncitizens bear the burden of justifying their freedom from detention? For noncitizens, the answer to this question is no mere technicality—it can mean the difference between freedom and confinement. This burden’s allocation, therefore, “reflects the value society places on individual liberty.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).

Given their collective experience in adjudicating immigration bond hearings, amici are particularly well-suited to address the monumental question in this case. To that end, amici wish to share the following observations for this Court’s benefit:

-2-

Case 19-3220, Document 116, 06/03/2020, 2854056, Page14 of 56

First, noncitizens already enjoy fewer procedural protections than criminal defendants. We contrast the procedural rules for detaining criminal defendants and noncitizens to underscore the challenges that noncitizens face in immigration bond hearings, and to highlight the need for a presumption against detention as one of the last remaining bulwarks to protect noncitizens’ liberty.

Second, detention of noncitizens consumes the government’s already- limited administrative and judicial resources. Amici highlight the staggering costs that are associated with immigration detention, as well as the strain on immigration courts resulting from the unnecessary detention of noncitizens.

Third, contrary to the government’s position, placing the burden of proof on the government would not generate fiscal or administrative hardship. Amici advance that position with confidence because the government previously shouldered that exact burden over a fifteen-year period. Several of the amici served as Immigration Judges within that period and found that this older system did not cause additional costs or administrative hurdles.

Fourth, in amici’s experience, detaining noncitizens actually increases the burden on the immigration court system. While in detention, noncitizens face significant challenges in adequately preparing their cases. Further, the Executive Branch now utilizes “performance metrics” to encourage Immigration Judges to accelerate the fact-finding process in detention proceedings. With less time for

-3-

Case 19-3220, Document 116, 06/03/2020, 2854056, Page15 of 56

individualized fact-finding, noncitizens will have even less opportunity to marshal the facts needed to satisfy the burden to avoid detention. Reallocating the burden of proof in immigration bond hearings, therefore, would reduce costs.

Fifth, and finally, amici offer alternatives to noncitizen detention that would inject much-needed resources to the immigration court system. The government’s aversion to such alternatives rest on a single statistic suggesting that the vast majority of noncitizens abscond upon release on bond. That statistic, however, is misleading and inconsistent with other available data, and bears little resemblance to the reality that amici encountered in years of adjudicating immigration cases.

Together, these observations should lead this Court to conclude that due process requires the government to make some sort of individualized showing before it may place noncitizens under lock and key.

. . . .

Read the full brief here: AS FILED No. 19-3220 Amici Br. Padilla Raudales v. Decker (2d Cir.)

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Thanks again not only to the signatory members of our Round Table, but especially to CHRISTOPHER T. CASAMASSIMA, SOUVIK SAHA, and the other members of their pro bono team over at  WILMER HALE.  Without assistance like yours, the “Voices of the Round Table” would not be heard in support of justice in so many cases throughout our nation!

DUE PROCESS FOREVER!

PWS

06-04-20

⚖️👍🏼SUPREMES UPHOLD JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CAT DENIAL, 7-2 — NASRALLAH v. BARR, Opinion By Justice Kavananaugh — Round Table ⚔️🛡 Files Amicus For Winners!

NASRALLAH v. BARR, No. 18-432, June 1, 2020

SUPREME COURT SYLLABUS:

OCTOBER TERM, 2019 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

NASRALLAH v. BARR, ATTORNEY GENERAL CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 18–1432. Argued March 2, 2020—Decided June 1, 2020

Under federal immigration law, noncitizens who commit certain crimes are removable from the United States. During removal proceedings, a noncitizen who demonstrates a likelihood of torture in the designated country of removal is entitled to relief under the international Conven- tion Against Torture (CAT) and may not be removed to that country. If an immigration judge orders removal and denies CAT relief, the noncitizen may appeal both orders to the Board of Immigration Ap- peals and then to a federal court of appeals. But if the noncitizen has committed any crime specified in 8 U. S. C. §1252(a)(2)(C), the scope of judicial review of the removal order is limited to constitutional and legal challenges. See §1252(a)(2)(D).

The Government sought to remove petitioner Nidal Khalid Nasral- lah after he pled guilty to receiving stolen property. Nasrallah applied for CAT relief to prevent his removal to Lebanon. The Immigration Judge ordered Nasrallah removed and granted CAT relief. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals vacated the CAT relief order and ordered Nasrallah removed to Lebanon. The Eleventh Circuit declined to review Nasrallah’s factual challenges to the CAT order because Nasrallah had committed a §1252(a)(2)(C) crime and Circuit precedent precluded judicial review of factual challenges to both the final order of removal and the CAT order in such cases.

Held: Sections 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D) do not preclude judicial review of a noncitizen’s factual challenges to a CAT order. Pp. 5–13.

(a) Three interlocking statutes establish that CAT orders may be re- viewed together with final orders of removal in a court of appeals. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 authorizes noncitizens to obtain direct “review of a final order of re-

2

NASRALLAH v. BARR Syllabus

moval” in a court of appeals, §1252(a)(1), and requires that all chal- lenges arising from the removal proceeding be consolidated for review, §1252(b)(9). The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA) implements Article 3 of CAT and provides for judicial review of CAT claims “as part of the review of a final order of removal.” §2242(d). And the REAL ID Act of 2005 clarifies that final orders of removal and CAT orders may be reviewed only in the courts of appeals. §§1252(a)(4)–(5). Pp. 5–6.

(b) Sections 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D) preclude judicial review of factual challenges only to final orders of removal. A CAT order is not a final “order of removal,” which in this context is defined as an order “con- cluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation,” §1101(a)(47)(A). Nor does a CAT order merge into a final order of re- moval, because a CAT order does not affect the validity of a final order of removal. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 938. FARRA provides that a CAT order is reviewable “as part of the review of a final order of removal,” not that it is the same as, or affects the validity of, a final order of removal. Had Congress wished to preclude judicial review of factual challenges to CAT orders, it could have easily done so. Pp. 6– 9.

(c) The standard of review for factual challenges to CAT orders is substantial evidence—i.e., the agency’s “findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” §1252(b)(4)(B).

The Government insists that the statute supplies no judicial review of factual challenges to CAT orders, but its arguments are unpersua- sive. First, the holding in Foti v. INS, 375 U. S. 217, depends on an outdated interpretation of “final orders of deportation” and so does not control here. Second, the Government argues that §1252(a)(1) sup- plies judicial review only of final orders of removal, and if a CAT order is not merged into that final order, then no statute authorizes review of the CAT claim. But both FARRA and the REAL ID Act provide for direct review of CAT orders in the courts of appeals. Third, the Gov- ernment’s assertion that Congress would not bar review of factual challenges to a removal order and allow such challenges to a CAT order ignores the importance of adherence to the statutory text as well as the good reason Congress had for distinguishing the two—the facts that rendered the noncitizen removable are often not in serious dis- pute, while the issues related to a CAT order will not typically have been litigated prior to the alien’s removal proceedings. Fourth, the Government’s policy argument—that judicial review of the factual components of a CAT order would unduly delay removal proceedings— has not been borne out in practice in those Circuits that have allowed factual challenges to CAT orders. Fifth, the Government fears that a

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 3 Syllabus

decision allowing factual review of CAT orders would lead to factual challenges to other orders in the courts of appeals. But orders denying discretionary relief under §1252(a)(2)(B) are not affected by this deci- sion, and the question whether factual challenges to statutory with- holding orders under §1231(b)(3)(A) are subject to judicial review is not presented here. Pp. 9–13.

762 Fed. Appx. 638, reversed.

KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined.

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Score at least a modest victory for the NDPA over the “Deportation Railroad.”

Once again the Round Table 🛡⚔️ intervened with an amicus brief on the side of justice.  Here’s a report from Judge Jeffrey Chase:

Hi All:  Our Round Table filed an amicus brief in Nasrallah v. Barr.  The Supreme Court issued it’s 7-2 decision in the case today, and we were on the winning side.
Kavanaugh wrote the decision, and was joined by Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch.  Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Alito.
The decision reverses the 11th Cir. and holds that federal courts may review factual issues as well as legal and constitutional issues in CAT appeals  filed by noncitizens with criminal convictions falling under 8 C.F.R. section 1252(a)(2)(C).
Gibson Dunn assisted us with the drafting of the brief.
Best, Jeff
Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Retired Immigration Judges
Knightess
Knightess of the Round Table

And, of course, as Jeffrey notes, we couldn’t have done it without help from our pro bono heroes 🥇 over at Gibson Dunn! Many, many thanks!

Great that Justice Kavanaugh, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Gorsuch “saw the light” on this one! Not sure how often it will happen in the future, but gotta take what we can get.

Also, given the “haste makes waste” policies thrust on EOIR by the DOJ under Trump, and the significant number of fundamental legal and factual errors made by the BIA, judicial review is likely to turn up additional instances of substandard decision-making.

PWS

06-01-20