UNPUBLISHED 2D CIR REMINDS BIA THAT “PERSECUTION”DOESN’T REQUIRE ACTUAL PHYSICAL HARM — Mann v. Sessions

MANN AKA v. SESSIONS III | FindLaw

KEY QUOTE:

“Were the only grounds available to Mann those of future persecution, we would be inclined to affirm. But however unsuccessful Mann’s case may be with respect to future persecution, without a full consideration of the first prong of “persecution”, that is, of “past persecution”, the IJ’s analysis is incomplete, and thus the result in this suit invalid. In evaluating a past persecution claim, the agency must consider the harm suffered in the aggregate.

In evaluating a past persecution claim, the agency must consider the harm suffered in the aggregate. Poradisova, 420 F.3d at 79-80. Past persecution can be established by harm other than threats to life or freedom, including “non-life-threatening violence and physical abuse,” Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223, 226 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006). And, while the harm must be severe, rising above “mere harassment,” Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006), it is sufficient, in order to show past persecution, that the applicant was “within the zone of risk when [a] family member was harmed, and suffered some continuing hardship after the incident.” Tao Jiang v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 2007).

Mann’s claim of past persecution rested on the following incidents: Mann and his brother were longtime members of the Congress Party. Members of opposition parties, the Akali Dal Party and the Bharatiya Janata Party (“BJP”) had successively solicited Mann and his brother’s departure from the Congress Party to join their parties. After Mann and his brother refused to depart the Congress Party, the opposition party members stopped Mann and his brother in the street and assaulted Mann’s brother. At the time of the assault, both Mann and his brother were in a car in the middle of doing political work. Mann managed to escape the car and their attackers. His brother, however, was severely injured: he both lost a leg and suffered mental incapacitation. Subsequently, Mann fled his hometown, residing in Chandigarh, a neighboring city, for two months, and, after that, moved to Delhi. During that time, his family was responsible for caring for his brother’s permanent disabilities and injuries.

Upon review, the IJ found the fact that Mann himself had not suffered physical harm to be dispositive of his past persecution claim. Yet physical harm is not always needed for a showing of past persecution. And, it is not required in an analysis undertaken under Tao Jiang’s “zone of risk” and “continuing hardship” tests.

Because (i) the IJ’s analysis does not directly address the question of whether Mann was sufficiently within “the zone of risk” when a family member (here, his brother) was seriously harmed, and, (ii) it is certainly conceivable that on direct reconsideration Mann’s flight from his hometown and help to his family in caring for his brother constitutes the sufferance of “some continuing hardship,” we hereby GRANT Mann’s petition for review, and VACATE the decision of the BIA. We REMAND Mann’s claim of persecution to the BIA for further consideration in light of Tao Jiang’s “zone of risk” and “continuing hardship” requirements.”

****************************************

Another example of faulty asylum analysis by the BIA. Why does the Supreme Court require Federal Courts to “defer” to a supposedly “expert” administrative tribunal that all too often appears to have less expertise in applying asylum law than the Article III Courts? Also, why doesn’t the Second Circuit publish helpful cases like this so that they can be widely cited and used as a tool to improve BIA adjudications?

According to the UN Handbook, credible asylum seekers should be given “the benefit of the doubt.” That’s not happening in some Immigration Courts and on some BIA panels.Why not? What’s the excuse?

Just another example of why we need an independent Article I Immigration Court. And, we need a diverse BIA with real expertise and an overriding commitment to fairness, due process, careful appellate adjudication, and correct application of  human rights laws.

PWS

09-11-17

 

“JRUBE” IN WASHPOST: DEPT OF IN–JUSTICE: Under “Gonzo Apocalypto” White Nationalist, Xenophobic, Homophobic Political Agenda Replaces “Rule Of Law” — Latest DOJ Litigation Positions Fail “Straight Face” Test: “making up rules willy-nilly so as to show its rabid xenophobic base it is adhering to its promise of racial and ethnic exclusion!” — Read My “Mini-Essay” On How Advocates and U.S. Courts Could Restore Justice & Due Process To Our Broken U.S. Immigration Courts!

https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2017/09/08/trump-is-getting-rotten-legal-advice-and-once-again-it-shows/?utm_term=.e34528c36b2c

Jennifer Rubin writes in “Right Turn” in the Washington Post:

“The 9th Circuit gave the back of the hand to the argument that the Trump administration could borrow a definition from another section of the immigration statute to exclude grandmothers. The Supreme Court had used mothers-in-law as an example of a close familial relationship it wanted to protect. The 9th Circuit judges wrote: “Plaintiffs correctly point out that the familial relationships the Government seeks to bar from entry are within the same ‘degree of kinship’ as a mother-in-law.” It’s hard to make a case that grandmothers would not qualify. It does not appear that the government even made a good-faith effort to apply the Supreme Court’s direction.

On one level, it’s shocking that a Republican administration that is supposed to be a defender of “family values” would take such a miserly position. But, of course, family values are of little consequence to an administration that is more than willing to repeal the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, auguring for the breakup of intimate family relations (e.g., one sibling gets deported but American-born siblings remain).

The 9th Circuit also looked at the administration’s argument that a refugee with a formal assurance of settlement lacks a bona fide relationship with some entity or individual in the United States. The court set out the laborious screening process refugees undertake (making a mockery of the notion these people are a security threat) and noted that after all those steps are completed the refugee gets a sponsorship assurance “from one of nine private non-profit organizations, known as resettlement agencies.” The 9th Circuit held: “The Government contends that a formal assurance does not create a bona fide relationship between a resettlement agency and a refugee, and stresses that ‘[t]he assurance is not an agreement between the resettlement agency and the refugee; rather, it is an agreement between the agency and the federal government.’ But the Supreme Court’s stay decision specifies that a qualifying relationship is one that is ‘formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course, rather than for the purpose of evading [the Executive Order].”’”

Again, one cannot help but come away with the impression that the government is throwing up every half-baked idea it can find to limit the number of people entering the country, regardless of the national security risk or the hardship its action inflicts. The Trump administration is plainly reasoning backward — deny as many people as possible admittance and then think up a reason to justify its position.

In its fixation with keeping as many immigrants out of the United States as possible, the Trump administration cannot claim to merely be following the dictates of the law. (Gosh it’s out of our hands — “Dreamers” and grandmas have to go!) It is making up rules willy-nilly so as to show its rabid xenophobic base it is adhering to its promise of racial and ethnic exclusion. It’s hard to believe seasoned career Justice Department lawyers agree with these arguments. In its oversight hearings Congress should start grilling Attorney General Jeff Sessions as to how he comes up with his cockamamie legal arguments and whether political appointees are running roughshod over career DOJ lawyers.

*************************************************

Read Rubin’s full article at the link.

Mini-Essay:

TIME FOR ACTION ON THE BROKEN U.S. IMMIGRATION COURTS — IF CONGRESS WON’T ACT, THE FEDERAL COURTS MUST

By

Paul Wickham Schmidt

United States Immigration Judge (Retired)

If nothing else, the Trump Administration has given me a new appreciation for the Post’s “JRube.” She certainly has “dialed up” Gonzo’s number and exposed what’s behind his pompous, disingenuous misuse of the term “rule of law.”

No chance that a GOP Senate with Chuck Grassley as Judiciary Chair is going to hold Gonzo accountable for his daily perversions of “justice.” But, at some point, Federal Courts could begin sanctioning DOJ lawyers for willful misrepresentations (the Hawaii arguments before the 9th contained several) and frivolous positions in litigation. It’s possible that some DOJ lawyers all the way up to Gonzo himself could be referred by Federal Judges to state bar authorities for a look at whether their multiple violations of ethical standards should result suspension of their law licenses.

Another thought kicking around inside my head is that Gonzo’s actions and his public statements are starting to make a plausible case for a due process challenge to the continued operation of the U.S. Immigration Courts.

As with school desegregation, prison reform, and voting rights, a Federal Court could find systematic bias and failure to protect due process. That could result in something like 1) a requirement that the DOJ submit a “due process restoration” plan to the court for approval, or 2) the court appointment of an independent “judicial monitor” to run the courts in a fair and unbiased manner consistent with due process, or 3) the Federal Courts could take over supervision of the US Immigration Courts pending the creation of an Article I (or Article III) replacement.

High on the list of constitutionally-required reforms would be ending the location of courts within DHS detention facilities. All courts should be located in areas where adequate pro bono counsel is reasonably available and accessible. Immigration Courts should be located outside of DHS facilities in buildings accessible to the public with reasonable security requirements. Immigration Judges must be required to continue cases until pro bono counsel can be retained. Alternatively, the Government could provide for appointed counsel. 

Another obvious due process reform would be to strip the Attorney General of his (conflict of interest) authority to establish or review precedents and operating procedures for the U.S.  Immigration Courts. Along with that, the DHS should be given an equal right to appeal adverse BIA appellate decisions to the Courts of Appeals (rather than seeking relief from the AG — clearly an interested party in relation to immigration enforcement).

There also should be an immediate end to the appointment and supervision of U.S. Immigration Judges by the politically-biased AG. U.S. Immigration Judges and BIA Appellate Immigration Judges should be appointed on a strict merit basis by either an independent judicial monitor or by the U.S. Courts of Appeals until Congress enacts statutory reforms.

The current U.S. Immigration Court system mocks justice in the same way that Jeff “Gonzo Apocalypto” Sessions mocks it almost every day. There might be no practical way to legally remove Gonzo at present, but the Federal Courts could step in to force the U.S. Immigration Courts to undertake due process reforms. The current situation is unacceptable from a constitutional due process standpoint. Something has to change for the better!

PWS

09-09-17\

ABA JOURNAL: “Dickie The P” Reportedly Quit 7th Over Rift With Colleagues About Treatment Of Pro Se Litigants — Perhaps He Should Check Out In Person How Sessions’s DOJ & Captive Immigration Courts Intentionally Abuse & Deny Due Process To Unrepresented Migrants!

http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/why_did_posner_retire_he_cites_difficulty_with_his_colleagues_on_one_issue/?utm_source=maestro&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=weekly_email

Debra Cassens Weiss reports:

“Judge Richard Posner had intended to stay on the federal appellate bench until he reached 80, an age he believed to be the upper limit for federal judges.

But on Friday, at the age of 78, he abruptly announced his retirement from the Chicago-based 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, effective the next day. The reason is due to “difficulty” with his colleagues over the court’s treatment of people who represent themselves, he told the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin in an email.

“I was not getting along with the other judges because I was (and am) very concerned about how the court treats pro se litigants, who I believe deserve a better shake,” Posner said. The issue will be addressed in an upcoming book that will explain his views and those of his colleagues “in considerable detail,” Posner said.

Posner said he did not time his retirement to allow President Donald Trump to appoint his replacement. “I don’t think it’s proper for judges or justices to make their decision to retire depend on whom they think the president will appoint as replacements,” he told the Law Bulletin. With Posner’s retirement, the 7th Circuit has four vacancies.

Posner was appointed by President Ronald Reagan in 1981, and was widely considered a conservative. He has since written more than 3,300 judicial opinions, and not all please conservatives, according to the Law Bulletin. On the one hand, he struck down the Illinois ban on carrying weapons in public, called for fewer restrictions on domestic surveillance, and limited class certification in class-action lawsuits. But he has also written opinions favoring abortion rights and same-sex marriage.

In a 2012 interview with National Public Radio, Posner said he has become less conservative “since the Republican Party started becoming goofy.” But he won’t remain above the fray in politics.

He told the Law Bulletin that his retirement will allow him to assist his cat, Pixie, in a run for president in 2020. Above the Law had endorsed Pixie last year, but Posner was unable to participate in the campaign.”

*****************************************************

Perhaps “Dickie The P” can take some time away from Pixie to visit the kangaroo courts that DOJ has established in prisons intentionally located in out of the way places where traumatized individuals seeking refuge from life-threatening conditions are held in substandard conditions and forced to represent themselves in “death penalty cases” involving some off the most complex and (intentionally) obtuse concepts in modern American law.

Love him or loathe him (or both), Posner is a prolific writer and thinker whose views can’t be ignored or swept under the table. What’s happening in the U.S. Immigration Courts under Sessions is a national disgrace. A high profile legal commentator like Posner, who frankly doesn’t care whom he pisses off, could shed some light on the travesty now passing for due process in the Immigration Courts and how too many of his former Article III colleagues have turned their backs on their constitutional duties rather than taking a strong legal stand against intentional abuse of the most vulnerable  by our legal system. A voice like Posner’s advocating for an Article I Court would be heard!

PWS

09-08-15

3RD CIR FINDS BIA ERRED IN CLASSIFYING BANGLADESH BNP AS “LEVEL III TERRORIST ORGANIZATION” — DECRIES BIA PANEL INCONSISTENCIES, LACK OF ACCESS TO UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS — Uddin v. Attorney General

171056p-Uddin

Uddin v. Attorney General, 3rd Cir., Sept. 6, 2017

BEFORE: GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges

OPINION BY: Judge Rendell

KEY QUOTE:

“While we will deny the petition for review challenging the Board’s ruling dismissing Uddin’s Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) claim, we will grant the petition in part and remand on his withholding of removal claim. The Board has pointed to terrorist acts by BNP members. But it did not find that BNP leadership authorized any of the terrorist activity committed by party members. Today, we join the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit and the Board in many of its own opinions by holding as follows: unless the agency finds that party leaders authorized terrorist activity committed by its members, an entity such as the BNP cannot be deemed a Tier III terrorist organization.

. . . .

Second, the rule we announce mirrors the Board’s own reasoning in the mine-run of its cases involving the BNP’s status as a Tier III organization. In fact, in some cases where IJs did not make a finding as to BNP leaders’ authorization of allegedly terrorist acts, the Board found error in the IJs’ omissions, and remanded to the IJs to take up that very question of authorization. In such cases, the Board bolstered

used the RAB to conduct numerous extra-judicial killings of BNP members. Thus, for purposes of the BNP’s status as a terrorist organization, the RAB’s conduct cannot be ascribed to that group during the time period relevant to Uddin’s case.

16

its reasoning by referencing Seventh Circuit opinions suggesting that some finding on authorization is necessary to assign a group Tier III status. See Khan v. Holder, 766 F.3d 689, 699 (7th Cir. 2014) (“An entire organization does not automatically become a terrorist organization just because some members of the group commit terrorist acts. The question is one of authorization.”); Hussain v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 534, 538 (7th Cir. 2008) (“An organization is not a terrorist organization just because one of its members commits an act of armed violence without direct or indirect authorization . . . .”).

. . . .

Further, today’s ruling should help provide the Board a principled method of adjudicating Tier III cases, an area of law with little guidance from the Courts of Appeals. This dearth of precedential opinions has resulted in highly inconsistent results regarding the BNP’s status as a terrorist organization: our preliminary research in preparation for oral argument turned up several Board rulings concluding that the BNP was not in fact a terrorist organization. These conclusions were in stark contrast to the Board’s finding in Uddin’s case.

Faced with these contradictory opinions, in advance of oral argument we asked the Government to submit all Board opinions from 2015-2017 addressing the terrorism bar as it applies to the BNP. (Those opinions are not all publicly available.) The Government’s submission—fifty-four opinions in total—did not bolster our confidence in the Board’s adjudication of these cases.

18

In six of the opinions, the Board agreed with the IJ that the BNP qualified as a terrorist organization based on the record in that case. But in at least ten, the Board concluded that the BNP was not a terrorist organization. In at least five cases, the Government did not challenge the IJ’s determination that the BNP is not a terrorist organization. And in one case, the Board reversed its own prior determination, finding that that “the Board’s last decision incorrectly affirmed the Immigration Judge’s finding that the BNP is a Tier III terrorist organization.” Many of the cases discussed the BNP’s terrorist status during the same time periods, reaching radically different results.

We recognize that the Board’s decisions are unpublished, and thus lack precedential value. We also note the Government’s argument that the BNP’s status as an undesignated terrorist organization is a “case-specific” determination based on the facts presented. That said, something is amiss where, time and time again, the Board finds the BNP is a terrorist organization one day, and reaches the exact opposite conclusion the next.

Even more concerning, the IJ in this case stated that he was “aware of no BIA or circuit court decision to date which has considered whether the BNP constitutes a terrorist organization.” AR 68. At the time the IJ ruled, there were several such decisions, and now there are dozens. When asked at oral argument whether the IJ could access unpublished Board decisions regarding BNP’s terrorist status, the Government’s Attorney responded that he did not know. This is a troubling state of affairs.”

**********************************************

Gee whiz, the Article III’s are finally starting to figure out some of the problems with having a supposedly due-process focused Appellate Court resident in an agency of the U.S. Department of Justice. And the quality and consistency of administrative justice in immigration is hardly likely to improve under the Sessions “just peddle faster and deport more folks while we mindlessly fill the system with DACA immigrants” program.

The Third Circuit arguably now knows more about what the BIA is doing in this area than then BIA itself. And, I can guarantee that they know more than Jeff Sessions or anyone at the DOJ.

Oh yeah, and hiring more Immigration Judges, giving them less training, moving them around for enforcement purposes, and giving them less time to turn out quality decisions isn’t likely to improve this “troubling state of affairs.” Moreover, by failing to provide and enforce uniform guidance, the BIA encourages the DHS to abuse the system by “rolling the dice” on cases (like this one) they clearly should lose, but could win, at the Immigration Court, rather than being required to settle cases and exercise prosecutorial discretion in the way almost all other prosecutors do, on every level of the U.S. system except the Immigration Court. What Sessions disingenuously calls “enforcing the rule of law” is actually, in the words of Jason Dzubow, a “mixture of cruelty and incompetence” (with some just plain old stupidity thrown in).

The only thing that will improve the quality of justice in the U.S. Immigration Court system is to get it out of the Executive Branch and into an independent structure forthwith. Otherwise, the Article III’s are going to find themselves between a rock an a hard place: rubber stamp the BIA’s questionable work product or take over the BIA’s function and insist that constitutional due process be satisfied.

PWS

09-07-17

3RD CIR REAFFIRMS THAT 18 USC 16(B) “CRIME OF VIOLENCE” AS INCORPORATED INTO THE INA IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE: Mateo v. Attorney General — Supremes Remain MIA

151160p

Before: McKEE, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: JUDGE VANASKIE

KEY QUOTE:

“The petitioner in Baptiste, like Mateo, faced removal on the basis of his purported status as an alien convicted of a crime of violence under § 16(b). As stated previously, § 16(b) defines a crime of violence as “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” In order to determine whether the crime of conviction is a crime of violence under § 16(b), courts utilize the same categorical approach that was applied to the ACCA’s residual clause. Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 617. The petitioner in Baptiste argued that the Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson striking down the residual clause should apply to negate § 16(b). After comparing the features of the § 16(b) analysis to those found to contribute to the unconstitutionality of the residual clause in Johnson, we agreed that the same defects were present in § 16(b), rendering the provision unconstitutional. Regarding the first feature, we recognized that the same “ordinary case inquiry” is used when applying the categorical approach in both contexts. Id. Like the residual clause, § 16(b) “offers no reliable way to choose between . . . competing accounts of what” that “judge- imagined abstraction” of the crime involves. Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2558. Thus, we concluded in Baptiste that “the ordinary case inquiry is as indeterminate in the § 16(b) context as it was in the residual clause context.” 841 F.3d at 617. Turning to the second feature—the risk inquiry—we observed that despite slight linguistic differences between the provisions, the same indeterminacy inherent in the residual clause was present in § 16(b). Id. “[B]ecause the two inquiries under the residual clause that the Supreme Court found to be indeterminate—the ordinary case inquiry and the serious potential risk inquiry—are materially the same as the inquiries under § 16(b),” we concluded that “§ 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague.” Id. at 621. This conclusion applies equally to Mateo’s petition. Our treatment of § 16(b) is in step with the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, which have all similarly deemed the provision to be void for vagueness in immigration cases. See Shuti, 828 F.3d at 451; Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1120; Golicov v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir. 2016). The Seventh Circuit has also taken this position in the criminal context. See United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 2015). In fact, the only circuit that has broken stride is the Fifth Circuit.7 See United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670, 677 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc). In the meantime, we await the Supreme Court’s decision in the appeal of Dimaya.”

*******************************************

The Dimaya case before the Supremes (again) should be a good test of whether newest Justice Gorsuch will adhere to his strict constructionist principles where they will produce a favorable result for a migrant under the immigration laws.

The Johnson case, relied on by the Third Circuit, was written by none other than the late Justice Antonin Scalia, a leading strict constructionist and conservative judicial icon, who nevertheless found that his path sometimes assisted migrants in avoiding removal.  So, on paper, this should be a “no brainer” for Justice Gorsuch, who has also been critical of some of the BIA’s “Chevron overreach” and non-responsiveness to Article III Courts.

PWS

09-07-17

 

U.S. IMMIGRATION COURTS: Judge Lawrence O. “Burmanator” Burman (SOLELY In His NAIJ Officer Capacity) Gives Rare Peek Inside U.S. Immigration Courts’ Disaster Zone From A Sitting Trial Judge Who “Tells It Like It Is!”

Judge Burman appeared at a panel discussion at the Center for Immigration Studies (“CIS”). CIS Executive Director Mark Krikorian; Hon. Andrew Arthur, former U.S. Immigration Judge and CIS Resident Fellow; and former DOJ Civil Rights Division Official Hans von Spakovsky, currently Senior Legal Fellow at the Heritage Foundation were also on the panel entitled “Immigration Court Backlog Causes and Solutions” held at the National Press Club on Aug. 24, 2017.  Here’s a complete transcript furnished by CIS (with thanks to Nolan Rappaport who forwarded it to me).

Here’s the “meat” of Judge Burman’s remarks:

“First, the disclaimer, which is important so I don’t get fired. I’m speaking for the National Association of Immigration Judges, of which I am an elected officer. My opinions expressed will be my own opinions, informed by many discussions with our members in all parts of the country. I am not speaking on behalf of the Department of Justice, the Executive Office for Immigration Review, the chief judge, or anybody else in the government. That’s important.

What is the NAIJ, the National Association of Immigration Judges? We’re a strictly nonpartisan organization whose focus is fairness, due process, transparency for the public, and judicial independence. We’re opposed to interference by parties of both administrations with the proper and efficient administration of justice. We’ve had just as much trouble with Republican administrations as Democratic administrations.

It’s been my experience that the people at the top really don’t understand what we do, and consequently the decisions they make are not helpful. For example, the – well, let me backtrack a little bit and talk about our organization.

Immigration judges are the – are the basic trial judges that hear the cases. Above us is the Board of Immigration Appeals, who function as if they were an appellate court. We, since 1996, have been clearly designated as judges by Congress. We are in the statute. We have prescribed jurisdiction and powers. Congress even gave us contempt authority to be able to enforce our decisions. Unfortunately, no administration has seen fit to actually give us the contempt authority. They’ve never done the regulations. But it’s in the statute.

The Board of Immigration Appeals is not in the statute. It has no legal existence, really. It’s essentially an emanation of the attorney general’s limitless discretion over immigration law. The members of the Board of – Board of Immigration Appeals are – in some cases they’ve got some experience. Generally, they don’t have very much. They’re a combination of people who are well-respected in other parts of the Department of Justice and deserve a well-paid position. Very often they’re staff attorneys who have basically moved up to become board members, skipping the immigration judge process. Very few immigration judges have ever been made board members, and none of them were made board members because they had been immigration judges. If they were, it was largely a coincidence.

The administration of the Executive Office for Immigration Review in which we and the BIA are housed is basically an administrative agency. We are judges, but we don’t have a court. We operate in an administrative agency that’s a lot closer to the Department of Motor Vehicles than it is to a district court or even a bankruptcy court, an Article I type court.

Our supervisors – I’m not sure why judges need supervisors, but our supervisors are called assistant chief immigration judges. Some of them have some experience. Some of them have no experience not only as judges, but really as attorneys. They were staff attorneys working in the bowels of EOIR, and gradually became temporary board members, and then permanent board members.

Interestingly, when a Court of Appeals panel is short a judge, they bring up a district judge. EOIR used to do that, by bringing up an immigration judge to fill out a panel at the board. They don’t do that anymore. They appoint their staff attorneys as temporary board members, a fact that is very shocking when we tell it to federal judges. They can’t imagine that a panel would be one member short and they’d put their law clerk on the panel, but that’s what goes on.

The top three judges until recently – the chief judge and the two primary deputies – had no courtroom experience that I’m aware of. Two of them have gone on. Unfortunately, one of them has gone on to be a BIA member. The other retired.

Our direct supervisors are the assistant chief immigration judges. Some are in headquarters, and they generally have very little experience. Others are in the field, and they do have some experience – although, for example, the last two ACIJs – assistant chief immigration judges – who were appointed became judges in 2016. So they don’t have vast experience. Well, they may be fine people with other forms of experience, but this agency is not run by experienced judges, and I think it’s important to understand that.

There’s a severe misallocation of resources within EOIR. I think Congress probably has given us plenty of money, but we misuse it. In the past administration, the number of senior executive service – SES – officials has doubled. Maybe they needed some more administrative depth, although I doubt it. The assistant chief immigration judges are proliferating. I think there’s 22 of them now. These are people who may do some cases. Some of them do no cases. They generally don’t really move the ball when it comes to adjudicating cases. Somehow, the federal courts are able to function without all of these intermediaries and supervisory judges, and I think that we would function better without them as well.

To give you a few examples – I could give you thousands of examples, and if you want to stick around I’ll be happy to talk about it. Art was talking about the juvenile surge. I think it was approximately 50,000 juveniles came across the border. To appear to be tough, I guess, they were prioritized. The official line is, you know, we’re going to give them their asylum hearings immediately. I’m not sure what kind of asylum case that a 6-year-old might have, but we would hear the case and do it quickly, and then discourage people from coming to our country. But, in fact, what’s actually happened is the juvenile docket is basically a meet-and-greet. The judges are not – first of all, I’m not allowed to be a juvenile judge. The juvenile judges are carefully selected for people who get along well with children, I guess. (Laughter.) Really, what they do is they just – they see the kids periodically, and in the meantime the children are filing their asylum cases with the asylum office, where they’re applying for special immigrant juvenile status, various things. But judge time is being wasted on that.

Another example is the current surge. I have a really busy docket. Art was talking about cases being scheduled in 2021. The backlog for me is infinite. I cannot give you a merits hearing on my docket unless I take another case off. My docket is full through 2020, and I was instructed by my assistant chief immigration judge not to set any cases past 2020. So they’re just piling up in the ether somewhere.

As busy as I am, they send me to the border, but these border details are politically oriented. First of all, we probably could be doing them by tele-video. But assuming that they want to do them in person, you would think that they would only send the number of judges that are really needed. But, in fact, on my last detail of 10 business days, two-week detail, two days I had no cases scheduled at all. And back home having two cases off the docket, which almost never happens – or two days off the docket, which almost never happens, would be useful because I could work on motions and decisions. But when I’m in Jena, Louisiana, I can’t really work on my regular stuff. So I’m just reading email and hanging out there.

The reason for that is because there’s been no attempt to comply with the attorney general’s request that we rush judges to the border with, at the same time, making sure that there’s enough work or not to send more judges than is really necessary to do the work. I assume the people that run our agency just want to make the attorney general happy, and they send as many judges to the border as possible.

One particularly bizarre example was in San Antonio. The San Antonio judges were doing a detail to one of the outlying detention facilities by tele-video. But they wanted to rush judges to the border, so they assigned a bunch of judges in the country that had their own dockets to take over that docket by tele-video on one week’s notice. Well, one week’s notice meant that the judges in San Antonio couldn’t reset cases. You’ve got to give at least 10 days’ notice of a hearing by regulation. So we had judges taken away from their regular dockets to do that; judges who normally would have done that who already were on the border – San Antonio is pretty closer to the border – didn’t have anything to do.

Now, those may be extreme cases, but this happens all too much, and it’s because of political interference. And like I say, it’s got nothing to do with party. We’ve had the same problem with Democratic and Republican administrations. It comes from political decisions animating the process and people who don’t really understand what they’re managing, just attempting to placate the guy on the top. So that’s basically what’s been happening.

Am I over my 10 minutes here?

MR. KRIKORIAN: Yeah. Well, I mean, you’re right at it. If you’ve got a couple more minutes, that’s fine.

JUDGE BURMAN: Well, let me just go over some possible suggestions.

Let judges be judges – immigration judges that control their own courts and their own dockets. We should be able to supervise our own law clerks and our own legal assistants, which currently we don’t. And the contempt authority we were given in 1996 should eventually – should finally get some regulations to implement it.

EOIR’s overhead needs to be reduced. There’s too many positions at headquarters and too few positions in the field. When EOIR was originally set up, the idea was that each judge would need three legal assistants to docket the cases and find the files and make copies and all that. At one point last year we were down to less than one legal assistant per judge in Arlington, where I am, and in Los Angeles it was even worse. When you do that, the judge is looking for files, the judge is making copies, the judge doesn’t have the evidence that’s been filed. There’s nothing more annoying than to start a hearing and to find that evidence was filed that I don’t have. The case has to be continued. I have to have a chance to find the evidence and review it.

It would be nice if our management were more experienced than they are, or at least have some more courtroom experience.

We need an electronic filing system like all the other courts have. Fortunately, that’s one thing that Acting Director McHenry has said is his top priority, and I think that he will take care of that.

The BIA is a problem. The BIA doesn’t have the kind of expertise that the federal courts would defer to. Consequently, I think a lot of the bad appellate law that Art was referring to is caused by the fact that the BIA really doesn’t have any respect in the federal court system. They’re not immigration experts. They want their Chevron deference, but they are not getting it. They’re not getting it from the Court of Appeals. They’re not getting it from the Supreme Court, either.

The BIA also remands way too many cases. When we make a decision, we send it up to the BIA. We don’t really care what they do. They could affirm us. They could reverse us. We don’t want to see it back. We’ve got too much stuff to see them back. And this happens all the time. If they remand the case, they don’t ever have to take credit for the decision that they make. I assume that’s why they’re doing it, to try to make us do it.

We need a proper judicial disciplinary system. Starting in 2006, which is where the backlog problem began, the attorney general first of all subjected us to annual appraisals, evaluations, which previously OPM had waived due to our judicial function. So that’s a waste of time. Judges were punished for the – for things that are not punishment. Judges were punished because a Court of Appeals would say that you made a mistake or he was rude or – it’s just crazy. Judges were punished or could be punished for granting – for not granting continuances. No judge was ever punished for granting a continuance. So it’s no surprise that, as I pointed out, continuances have been granted at a much greater level – in fact, too great a level. But when in doubt, we continue now because if we don’t do that we’re subject to punishment, and nobody really wants that.

And finally, the ultimate solution, I think, is an Article I court like the bankruptcy court – a specialized court, could be in the judicial branch, could be in the executive branch – to give us independence, to ensure that we have judges and appellate judges who are appointed in a transparent way, being vetted by the private bar, the government, and anybody else.

And I’m way over my 10 minutes, so I’ll be – I’ll be sure to babble on later if you want me to. Thank you.”

****************************

Judge Arthur’s kind opening words about the late Juan Osuna were a nice touch. One of Juan’s great strengths as person, executive, judge, and teacher was his ability to maintain good friendships with and respect from folks with an assortment of ideas on immigration.

Judge Burman’s “no BS” insights are as timely as they are unusual. That’s because U.S. Immigration Judges are not encouraged to speak publicly and forthrightly about their jobs.

The Supervisory Judge and the EOIR Ethics Office must approve all public appearances by U.S. Immigration Judges including teaching and pro bono training. A precondition for receiving permission is that the judge adhere to the DOJ/EOIR “party line” and not say anything critical about the agency or colleagues. In other words, telling the truth is discouraged.

As a result, most Immigration Judges don’t bother to interact with the public except in their courtrooms. A small percentage of sitting judges do almost all of the outreach and public education for the Immigration Courts.

While EOIR Senior Executives and Supervisors often appear at “high profile events” or will agree to limited press interviews, they all too often have little if any grasp of what happens at the “retail level” in the Immigration Courts. Even when they do, they often appear to feel that their job security depends on making things sound much better than they really are or that progress is being made where actually regression is taking place.

In reality, the system functioned better in the 1990s than it does two decades later. Due Process protection for individuals — the sole mission of EOIR — has actually regressed in recent years as quality and fairness have taken a back seat to churning numbers, carrying out political priorities, not rocking the boat, and going along to get along. Such things are typical within government agency bureaucracies, but atypical among well-functioning court systems.

I once appeared on a panel with a U.S. District Judge. After hearing my elaborate, global disclaimer, he chuckled. Then he pointedly told the audience words to the effect of  “I’m here as a judge because you asked me, and I wanted to come. I didn’t tell the Chief Judge I was coming, and I wouldn’t dream of asking his or anyone else’s permission to speak my mind.”

I hope that everyone picked up Judge Burman’s point that “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” or “ADR” is still in full swing at EOIR. Cases are shuffled, moved around, taken off docket, and then restored to the docket to conceal that the backlog in Arlington goes out beyond the artificial “2020 limit” that Judge Burman has been instructed to use for “public consumption.” But there are other cases out there aimlessly “floating around the ether.” And, based on my experience, I’m relatively certain that many courts are worse than Arlington.

Judge Burman also makes another great  “inside baseball” point — too many unnecessary remands from the BIA. Up until the very ill-advised “Ashcroft Reforms” the BIA exercised de novo factfinding authority. This meant that when the BIA disagreed with the Immigration Judge’s disposition, on any ground, they could simply decide the case and enter a final administrative order for the winning party.

After Ashcroft stripped the BIA of factfinding  authority, nearly every case where the BIA disagrees with the lower court decision must be returned to the Immigration Court for further proceedings. Given the overloaded docket and lack of e-filing capability within EOIR, such routine remands can often take many months or even years. Sometimes, the file gets lost in the shuffle until one or both parties inquire about it.

The Immigration Courts are also burdened with useless administrative remands to check fingerprints in open court following BIA review. This function should be performed solely by DHS, whose Counsel can notify the Immigration Court in rare cases where the prints disclose previously unknown facts. In 13 years as an Immigration Judge, I had about 3 or 4 cases (out of thousands) where such “post hoc” prints checks revealed previously unknown material information. I would would have reopened any such case. So, the existing procedures are unnecessary and incredibly wasteful of limited judicial docket time.

I agree completely with Judge Burman that the deterioration of the Immigration Courts spans Administrations of both parties. Not surprisingly, I also agree with him that the only real solution to the Courts’ woes is an independent Article I Court. Sooner, rather than later!

PWS

09-03-17

 

 

 

 

 

 

PUBLISHED 9TH CIR DECISION SAYS DETENTION BASED SOLELY ON LATINO APPEARANCE IS “EGREGIOUS 4TH AMENDMENT VIOLATION,” TERMINATES PROCEEDINGS — Sanchez v. Sessions — BIA Flubs Serious Constitutional Issue!

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/08/30/14-71768.pdf

Sanchez v. Sessions, 9th Cir., 08-30-17

PANEL: Harry Pregerson, Richard A. Paez, and Morgan B. Christen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Pregerson; Concurrence by Judge Pregerson; Concurrence by Judge Christen

Here’s the Court Staff’s summary of the opinions. It’s NOT part of the Court’s opinion, but nevertheless quite informative.

“The panel granted, reversed, and remanded Luis Enrique Sanchez’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision affirming an immigration judge’s decision denying Sanchez’s motion to suppress evidence of his alienage and ordering his removal.

The panel held that Coast Guard officers who detained Sanchez committed an egregious Fourth Amendment violation because they seized Sanchez based on his Latino ethnicity alone. Accordingly, the panel held that the immigration judge erred in failing to suppress the Form I- 213 (Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien), which was prepared after his immigration arrest and which the Government introduced to establish Sanchez’s alienage and entry without inspection.

The panel also concluded that Sanchez was not seized at the United States border, where Fourth Amendment protections are lower. The panel further held that, because Coast Guard officers detained Sanchez solely on the basis of his Latino ethnicity, the officers violated an immigration regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b(2), which provides that an immigration officer may briefly detain an individual only if the officer has “reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable facts” that the person is engaged in an offense or is an alien illegally in the United States. Accordingly, the panel held that Sanchez’s removal proceedings must be terminated based on the regulatory violation because the regulation is designed to benefit Sanchez, and Sanchez was prejudiced by the violation.

Because the panel concluded Sanchez’s proceedings should have been terminated based on the regulatory violation, the panel did not reach the question whether Sanchez’s previously-submitted Family Unity Benefits and Employment applications, which the Government also introduced to establish alienage, are indirect fruits of the poisonous tree. The panel granted Sanchez’s petition for review and remanded to the Board with instructions to terminate Sanchez’s removal proceedings.

Concurring, Judge Pregerson wrote separately to explain why it is unfair for the Government to encourage noncitizens to apply for immigration relief, and later use statements in those relief applications against them in removal proceedings. Judge Pregerson expressed concern about the Government’s argument that the exclusionary rule does not apply to Sanchez’s Family Unity Benefits and Employment Authorization applications because they predated the egregious constitutional violation. He wrote that categorically exempting pre-existing applications from the exclusionary rule in this way allows law enforcement to unconstitutionally round up migrant-looking individuals, elicit their names, and then search through Government databases to discover incriminating information in pre- existing immigration records.

Concurring, Judge Christen agreed that the case did not concern a border stop, noting that the Coast Guard did not seize Sanchez at a port of entry and that the evidence did not show that Sanchez’s boat had sailed from international waters. Judge Christen also agreed that Sanchez’s removal proceedings must be terminated based on the regulatory violation.”

***********************************

This egregious Fourth Amendment violation generated three thoughtful opinions from U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Judges. Yet, it got a “free pass” from  the BIA. Just another ho-hum day at the office. But, what about the BIA’s responsibility to “guarantee fairness and due process for all?” Doesn’t it extend to constitutional rights?

Judge Pregerson’s concurring opinion also suggests a line of legal attack for “Dreamers” if legislative protections are not enacted and they are thrown into removal proceedings. In most cases, the Dreamers came forward voluntarily, in fact were encouraged to do so by the USG, and applied to the USCIS for DACA and work authorization. In the process they furnished information about their lack of legal status in the U.S.

In many cases, that will be the sole evidence supporting a charge of removability. Dreamers’ counsel can argue, and some Federal Courts are likely to agree, that the use of that information to establish removability is “fundamentally unfair” and therefore a violation of  constitutional due process.

PWS

09-03-17

DERELICTION OF DUTY! — Sessions’s DOJ Is MIA In Vindicating Public’s Constitutional Rights To Freedom From Police Brutality — State Of IL Forced To Do Feds’ Job For Them!

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/illinois-fills-in-for-the-missing-in-action-justice-department/2017/09/02/c8e16484-8e90-11e7-84c0-02cc069f2c37_story.html?utm_term=.ed2fa2d4a0d6

The Washington Post says in an editorial today:

“IN JANUARY, an investigation by the Justice Department found that the Chicago Police Department routinely used excessive force against the city’s residents, often along racial lines and without accountability. That report recommended federal court oversight of the Chicago police to prevent further abuses. Now, almost nine months later, a federal judge is set to begin supervising the process of reforming Chicago’s police.

But the city of Chicago won’t be working with the Justice Department. Instead, it’s Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan who is bringing the lawsuit to begin negotiations on a federal court decree for police oversight.

The state of Illinois is filling the hole left by Attorney General Jeff Sessions, under whose leadership the Justice Department pulled back from its agreement to negotiate with Chicago to find a mutually agreeable model for court supervision of the city’s police. After months, nothing came of Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel’s efforts to find a solution with the Justice Department outside the courts. Now, Mr. Emanuel — who has been reluctant to embrace judicial oversight of Chicago police — has pledged to partner with Ms. Madigan to achieve reform under the watchful eye of a judge.

Chicago is one of several cities left behind by Mr. Sessions’s emphasis on fighting crime over working with unsettled police departments in need of reform — as if protecting civil rights and public safety were somehow incompatible. Two months into his time as attorney general, Mr. Sessions issued a memorandum directing his deputies to review oversight agreements reached by the Obama administration with police departments found to have systematically violated civil rights. The Justice Department then tried to delay an agreement finalized by Obama officials from going into effect in Baltimore, over the objections of the police department itself — only to be rebuked by the judge who gave the reform plan his approval. And recently, the department’s Community Oriented Policing Services Office (COPS) has reportedly failed to provide assessments requested by at least seven local police departments that reached out for help with reform.”

******************************

Read the entire editorial at the above link.

Get this! While Gonzo Apocalypto is out spreading his knowingly false narrative about how nannies, gardeners, drywallers, carpenters, health care workers, fast food workers, students, soccer players, and emergency response personnel are threats to the public safety (not surprisingly, a tough sell in many diverse communities that depend on migrant labor and ethnic community participation without regard to legal status) and misusing statistics and anecdotes to support the Trump Administration’s bogus case that local police need tanks and other combat type military equipment to protect the public, the real law enforcement duties of the DOJ are going by the board. Nowhere is this more true than in the area of civil rights and voting rights, where the DOJ is actually working with some states and localities to undermine Americans’ constitutional rights. But, the Department’s “turn back the clock” approach to drug enforcement, prison reform, sentencing reform, forensic science, and community policing is also “built to fail” and deserves censure.

Then, there is the massive failure of justice in the overwhelmed U.S. Immigration Courts. Rather than setting forth a rational plan to restore due process and functionality by reducing dockets, providing more and better training for judges, hiring additional law clerks, closing down “kangaroo courts” in detention centers, giving judges control of individual dockets, implementing statutory contempt authority for judges, establishing a merit-based hiring system that promotes a diverse judiciary, putting resources into technology including e-filing, and making EOIR functionally independent from the DOJ’s political influence and the President’s immigration enforcement initiatives, Sessions has sent a “just peddle faster” message to Immigration Courts that are already peddling so fast that they are careening out of control. The DOJ’s handling of the U.S. Immigration Courts is a national disgrace that will come back to haunt the entire justice system unless or until Coongress or the Article III Courts call a halt!

And Jeff “Gonzo Apocalypto” Sessions is a key part of the problems that his White Nationalist agenda can never solve and, indeed, will continue to aggravate while he holds office.

PWS

09-03-17

 

 

U.S. IMMIGRATION JUDGES CAN BREATHE EASIER: Judge Richard “Dickie The P” Posner Retires — 7th Cir. Jurist Was Caustic, Unrelenting Critic Of U.S. Immigration Courts!

http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-judge-richard-posner-retires-met-20170901-story.html

The Chicago Tribune reports:

“Judge Richard A. Posner, one of the nation’s leading appellate judges, whose acerbic wit attracted an almost cultlike following within legal circles, is retiring after more than three decades with the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago.

Posner, 78, is stepping down effective Saturday, according to a news release Friday afternoon from the 7th Circuit. He was appointed to the court by President Ronald Reagan in 1981 and served as its chief judge from 1993 to 2000.

Posner said in a statement he has written more than 3,300 opinions in his time on the bench and is “proud to have promoted a pragmatic approach to judging.” He said he spent his career applying his view that “judicial opinions should be easy to understand and that judges should focus on the right and wrong in every case.”

Posner’s biting and often brilliant written opinions as well as his unrelenting questioning from the bench have made him an icon of the court for years.

 

Known as a conservative at the time of his appointment, Posner’s views skewed more libertarian through the years, and he often came down in favor of more liberal issues such as gay marriage and abortion rights.

Lawyers who regularly appeared before the 7th Circuit knew that when Posner was on a panel they had to be ready for a line of questioning that could come out of left field. The salty judge was known to abruptly cut off lawyers who he thought were off-point, often with a dismissive “No, no, no!” delivered in his trademark nasal tone.”

********************************

Read the full article at the link.

Here’s a classic Posner comment on the U.S. Immigration Courts from a 2016 case,  Chavarria-Reyes v. Lynch:

“POSNER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. This case involves a typical botch by an immigration judge. No surprise: the Immigration Court, though lodged in the Justice Department, is the least competent federal agency, though in fairness it may well owe its dismal status to its severe underfunding by Congress, which has resulted in a shortage of immigration judges that has subjected them to crushing workloads.”

See my prior blog on Chavarria-Reyes:

http://immigrationcourtside.com/2017/01/02/the-u-s-immigration-courts-vision-is-all-about-best-practices-guaranteeing-fairness-and-due-process-7th-circuits-judge-posner-thinks-its-a-farce-blames-congressional-underfunding/

Judge Posner was always provocative, often entertaining, and eminently quotable. While I found some of his commentary on the Immigration Courts and the BIA, and particularly some of his harsh words about individual Immigration Judges, to be “over the top,” his blunt criticism of the failure to provide due process to migrants and his recognition that the DOJ and Congress shared the majority of the responsibility for screwing up the system was spot on.

He was always a “player,” and he will be missed even by those who disagreed with him. I look forward to a “Posner commentary” on the state of due process in the Immigration Courts in the Sessions regime.

PWS

09-03-17

 

 

THE BIA ISSUED MATTER OF M-A-M- TO GUIDE IJS ON MENTAL COMPETENCY ISSUES — THE PROBLEM: THE BIA IGNORES ITS OWN PRECEDENT ACCORDING TO 9th CIR!

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/08/29/15-70155.pdf

Mejia v. Sessions, 9th Cir., 08-29-17 (Published)

PANEL: Susan P. Graber and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges, and Edward J. Davila,* District Judge

OPINION BY: Judge Davila

Key Excerpt:

“Here, there were clear indicia of Petitioner’s incompetency. He has a history of serious mental illness, including hallucinations, bipolar disorder, and major depression with psychotic features. During hearings before the IJ, Petitioner testified that he was not taking his medications and was feeling unwell. He said he was experiencing symptoms of mental illness and felt a “very strong pressure” in his head. He had difficulty following the IJ’s questions, and many of his responses were confused and disjointed. Under In re M-A-M-, those indicia triggered the IJ’s duty to explain whether Petitioner was competent and whether procedural safeguards were needed. The IJ failed to do so. On review, the BIA noted that Petitioner suffers from serious mental illness and “was feeling unwell without his medication” during the proceedings before the IJ.

Nonetheless, the BIA concluded that remand was not warranted because certain procedural safeguards were in place—for instance, Petitioner was represented by counsel, he “presented testimony in support of his claims,” and he “provided his parents as witnesses.” But the BIA did not address the IJ’s failure to articulate his assessment of Petitioner’s competence and why these procedural safeguards were adequate.

The BIA abused its discretion by failing to explain why it allowed the IJ to disregard In re M-A-M-’s rigorous procedural requirements. See Alphonsus, 705 F.3d at 1044 (“It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that an agency abuses its discretion if it clearly departs from its own standards.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).We therefore remand to the BIA with instructions to remand to the IJ for a new hearing consistent with In re M-A-M-.”

***********************************

The problem of the BIA not applying its own precedents to protect migrants’ rights is hardly new. But, it’s likely to get worse as Sessions pushes his “captive court system” to churn out more removal orders faster with only lip service to due process.

Question: Why would a reviewing court have to direct the BIA to apply the BIA’s own precedent? So much for the BIA as a “guarantor of due process.”

Rather than “jacking up the numbers” to meet the Trump-Sessions removal agenda, the BIA needs to slow things down, assign more cases to three-member panels, and do the kind of careful judicial review and deliberation necessary to insure due process. It’s also pretty obvious that the staff has been instructed to “default to denial.” They need some training from academic experts in due process and asylum law.

Too much “inbreeding”  — too much agency lingo — too much DOJ political influence.  The effects are obvious. The BIA needs to be removed from the DOJ and re-constituted as an independent appellate court. Otherwise, the Courts of Appeals need to step in and force the BIA to do its job!

PWS

09-02-17

 

 

ZOE TILLMAN ON BUZZFEED: Administration Has Nowhere To Hide As Stats Show Immigration Court Backlog Careening Out Of Control On Their Watch: Head Of Judges Assn Says Judges Are “canaries in the coal mine . . . still gasping for air.!”

https://www.buzzfeed.com/zoetillman/the-backlog-of-cases-in-immigration-courts-has-hit-a-record?utm_term=.gsZy1Gdqr#.pqmop3XAD

Zoe reports:

“The backlog of cases in US immigration courts has continued to worsen amid the Trump administration’s border crackdown, new statistics show.

As of the end of July, there were 617,527 cases pending in immigration courts. It’s the first time this number has crossed the 600,000 mark, according to information released on Thursday by the Transactional Records Action Clearinghouse, or TRAC, a research center at Syracuse University that tracks US government data.

The immigration court system, which is an arm of the US Department of Justice, has been grappling with growing caseloads for years. Immigration judges and lawyers have reported case delays stretching years out. But the latest numbers show a large jump in 2017. When Trump took office in January, there were approximately 540,000 pending cases.

“It is still overwhelming to the immigration judges,” said Judge Dana Leigh Marks, an immigration judge in San Francisco and president of the National Association of Immigration Judges. “The levels of caseload are higher than we’ve ever seen before.”

. . . .

As of Aug. 14, there were 334 immigration judges nationwide — 54 have been hired since Trump took office. The office is authorized by Congress to have 384 judges. Marks said that a large number of judges are eligible to retire, which could cut into any progress that DOJ makes in hiring new judges. New judges also don’t move as quickly as experienced ones, she said.

Under a Jan. 25 executive order on immigration enforcement, the Justice Department said in August that it had mobilized more than 100 immigration judges to hear cases at Department of Homeland Security detention facilities, either in-person or by video teleconferencing. Between Feb. 1 and July 31, immigration judges had issued nearly 28 percent more deportation orders as compared to the same time period last year, DOJ said.

Marks said that immigration judges had been warning officials about the backlog for years, and would continue to do so.

“The canaries in the coal mine are still gasping for air,” she said.”

*****************************************************

Read Zoe’s entire report at the link.

The DOJ is: clueless. planless, incompetent, and totally unqualified to manage a system of the size and importance of the current US Immigration Court consistently with due process. Systemically, knowingly running a system that engages in Aimless Docket Reshuffling (“ADR”), puts long pending cases that can be tried at the end of the line (many years out), while engaging in unnecessary detention and hustling more recent arrivals through without a reasonable chance to obtain representation or present their claims for relief, indeed sometimes without any hearings at all, is already a “default” on due process. Greater reliance on already outdated and overwhelmed “televideo court equipment” will further compromise due process. Even now, as most Immigration Judges and attorneys who have to use EOIR Televideo courts will tell you, the system is NQRFPT (“Not Quite Ready For Prime Time”).  Jamming more cases into it is asking for a complete breakdown.

I’m actually somewhat surprised that no group has found a way to bring a class action seeking to shut down the entire Immigration Court System and the DHS Administrative Removal System until improvements are made so that they comply with due process.  Sort of like the litigation that eventually required some prison systems to come into compliance with constitutional norms. In some cases, this is even worse than prisons, since many individuals in immigration detention haven’t been convicted of any crimes; they are just asserting their statutory and constitutional rights to have a fair adjudication of their ability to remain in the US.

Also, how is a system that treats its own judges as “canaries gasping for breath in the coal mine” going to deliver on due process for those individuals expecting it from those same judges? It isn’t.

And Congress should not get off the hook either. This problem has been growing very publicly for years over several Administrations while Congress has failed to deliver on proposals for an independent US Immigration Court that have been kicking around for more than a decade!

None of the DOJ’s statements deal with the real solution here: use of prosecutorial discretion “PD” on a widespread basis to resolve most of these cases and take them off the Immigration Courts’ docket. That needs to be followed by serious negotiations with Congress for: 1) a realistic legalization program, 2) an increase in legal immigration to put our immigration laws more in line with the actual market conditions that are bringing, and will continue to bring, more immigrant workers to the US, and an independent Immigration Court where the capacity to adjudicate cases consistently with due process is a primary consideration in both DHS’s deciding how many cases to place on the docket and how individual judges manage their individual dockets. That’s simply making changes to bring the Immigration Court system and the immigration laws into line with the rest of the U.S. legal system and our overall needs to maintain and administer a much more robust and inclusive legal immigration system that wouldn’t waste money on impractical walls and on “gonzo” immigration enforcement ands unnecessary detention.

 

PWS

09-01-17

 

 

 

 

TWO NEW FROM HON. JEFFREY CHASE — 8TH Cir. Blows Away BIA For Failure To Enforce R’s Right To Cross-Examine — The Importance Of Expert Testimony In Immigration Court!

Here’s Jeffrey”s analysis of the 8th Circuit case, Patel v. Sessions:

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2017/8/31/a-reasonable-opportunity-to-cross-examine

And here are his practice tips on expert witnesses:

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2017/8/24/theimportance-of-expert-witnesses

************************************************

I love Jeffrey’s clear, concise, practical analysis of complex issues!

The Patel case raises a recurring issue: How can a supposedly “expert” tribunal obviously hurrying to produce final orders of removal for the Administration’s deportation machine (thereby, probably not coincidentally, insuring their own job security) keep ignoring clear statutory and constitutional rights of individuals as well as their own precedents and those of Courts of Appeals? Unfortunately, the situation is likely to get worse before it gets better.

The Administration has announced that it’s looking for ways to deal with the backlog not by any rational means, but by ramming still more cases through the already overloaded system. Although the DOJ mouths “due process” that’s not true. As long as we have “gonzo enforcement” with hundreds of thousands of cases on the Immigration Courts’ dockets that should be settled out of court through grants of relief or prosecutorial discretion, there will continue to be insurmountable backlogs. And, as long as the Immigration Courts are part of the Executive Branch, lacking true judicial independence to put a stop to some of the more outrageous ICE and DOJ policies and practices, the problem will not be solved. Due process can’t be put on an assembly line. The only questions are if and when the Article III Courts will put a stop to the due process travesty in the Immigration Courts.  Or will they adopt the EOIR approach and “go along to get along.” Clearly, the Administration is banking on the latter.

I also note that the 8th Circuit is “hardly the 9th Circuit or even the 7th or 2d Circuits.”  Indeed, the 8th routinely defers to the BIA. Many critics say that the 8th gives the BIA far too much deference. So, when the 8th Circuit starts finding gaping holes in the BIA’s approach to due process in Immigration Court, we know that “we’ve got trouble, right here in River City.”

PWS

09-01-17

RECENT UNPUBLISHED REMANDS FROM 3RD & 2D CIRCUITS SHOW HOW BIA TILTS FACTS & LAW TO DENY PROTECTION TO CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES

HOW THE BIA UNFAIRLY DENIES PROTECTION TO CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES WHILE ENCOURAGING U.S. IMMIGRATION JUDGES TO DO THE SAME

By Paul Wickham Schmidt

U.S. Immigration Judge (Retired)

Two recent (alas unpublished) decisions from the Third and Second Circuits illustrate a key point that the Hon. Jeffrey Chase and I have made in our prior blogs: too often the BIA goes out of its way to bend the law and facts of cases to deny asylum seekers, particularly those from Central America, the protection to which they should be entitled. The BIA’s erroneous interpretations and applications of the asylum law have a corrupting effect on the entire fair hearing system in the U.S. Immigration Courts and the DHS Asylum Offices.

See:

http://immigrationcourtside.com/2017/08/13/analysis-by-hon-jeffrey-chase-bia-once-again-fails-refugees-matter-of-n-a-i-27-in-dec-72-bia-2017-is-badly-flawed/

http://immigrationcourtside.com/2017/06/03/introducing-new-commentator-hon-jeffrey-chase-matter-of-l-e-a-the-bias-missed-chance-original-for-immigrationcourtside/

http://immigrationcourtside.com/2017/08/14/politico-highlights-lack-of-due-process-cultural-awareness-proper-judicial-training-in-u-s-immigration-courts-handling-of-vietnamese-deportation-case/

http://immigrationcourtside.com/2017/08/11/4th-circuit-shrugs-off-violation-of-refugees-due-process-rights-mejia-v-sessions/

http://immigrationcourtside.com/2017/08/10/normalizing-the-absurd-while-eoir-touts-its-performance-as-part-of-trumps-removal-machine-disingenuously-equating-removals-with-rule-of-law-the-ongoing-assault-on-due-process-in-us-immig/

http://immigrationcourtside.com/2017/07/31/u-s-immigration-courts-apear-stacked-against-central-american-asylum-applicants-charlotte-nc-approval-rates-far-below-those-elsewhere-in-4th-circuit-is-precedent-being-misapplied/

 

Aguilar v. Attorney General, 3d Cir., 08-16-17

163921np

What happened:

Aguilar credibly testified that he was extorted by MS-13 because he was a successful businessman. Aguilar publicly complained to neighbors about the gang and said he would like them exterminated. Thereafter, the gang told him that because he had complained, they were doubling the amount of their extortion to $100 and would kill his family if he didn’t comply. Eventually, the gang increased the demand to $500 and threatened Aguilar at gunpoimt. Aguilar left the country and sought asylum in the U.S.

What should have happened:

Aguilar presented a classic “mixed motive” case.  In a gang-ridden society like El Salvador, public criticism of  gangs is a political opinion. This is particularly true because gangs have infiltrated many levels of government. Indeed in so-called “peace negotiations,” the Salvadoran government treated gangs like a separate political entity.

Undoubtedly, the gang’s increased extortion combined with death threats against Aguilar and his family resulted from his public political criticism of the gangs. Indeed, they told him that was the reason for increasing the amount to $100. There also is no doubt that gangs are capable of carrying out threats of harm up to the level of death and that the Salvadoran government is often unwilling or unable to protect its citizens from gangs.

Consequently, the respondent has established a well-founded fear (10% chance) of future persecution. He has also shown that political opinion is at least one central reason for such persecution. Consequently, Aguilar and his family should be granted asylum.

What actually happened:

The Immigration Judge denied Aguilar’s claim, finding  that Aguilar’s statements were not made “in a political context” and also that the increased extortion and threats of harm were motivated by “pecuniary interest or personal animus” not a political opinion. The BIA affirmed on appeal.

What the Third Circuit said:

“Nothing in this exchange indicates that Aguilar believed that MS continued asking him for money “over the years” solely because he was a business owner or that their motive did not evolve over time. Rather, Aguilar’s earlier testimony stated that after he had made his negative statements about MS, “a few days pass, less than a week, when I have them back, and three of them came, and they said, we heard that you talked badly about us, and because you did that we are going to charge you $100 a week from now on, and if you don’t pay that we are going to kill your family.” (A.R. 171 (emphasis added).) In other words, Aguilar testified that the gang specifically cited his statements as the reason why it was increasing his payments. This runs contrary to the BIA’s conclusion

that his testimony “did not indicate a belief that he was targeted on account of any beliefs, opinions, or actions,” (App. 10), and directly supports his mixed motive argument. Despite affirming the IJ’s determination that Aguilar was credible, (App. 10), the BIA failed to acknowledge this important portion of Aguilar’s testimony. Instead, both the BIA and IJ determined that Aguilar had failed to show that his increased extortion payments and threats were the result of a protected ground rather than the pecuniary interest or personal animus of MS. However, the BIA has recognized that [p]ersecutors may have differing motives for engaging in acts of persecution, some tied to reasons protected under the Act and others not. Proving the actual, exact reason for persecution or feared persecution may be impossible in many cases. An asylum applicant is not obliged to show conclusively why persecution has occurred or may occur. In Re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 489 (B.I.A. 1996). As such, “an applicant does not bear the unreasonable burden of establishing the exact motivation of a ‘persecutor’ where different reasons for actions are possible.” Id. While we must affirm factual determinations unless the record evidence would compel any reasonable factfinder to conclude to the contrary, Aguilar’s credible testimony supports his assertion that the increased payments were, at least in part, the result of his negative statements. Requiring him to show that the MS members were motivated by his membership in the particular social group of persons who have spoken out publicly against the MS and who have expressed favor for vigilante organizations, rather than personal animus because of those statements, would place an unreasonable burden on Aguilar. There is no clear delineation between these two motives, and there is

no additional evidence that we can conceive of that would allow Aguilar to hammer down the gang members’ precise motivations, short of their testimony. Rather, the immediacy with which the gang increased its demands coupled with its stated reason for the increase leads us to conclude that any reasonable fact finder would hold that Aguilar had demonstrated that the increased demands were at least in part motivated by his statements.

The question now becomes whether Aguilar’s statements were a political opinion or if they indicated his membership in a particular social group. The IJ determined that Aguilar’s criticism of MS was not made in a political context, and the BIA affirmed. (App. 2, 24 n.3.) However, neither the IJ nor the BIA provided reasoning to support this finding. Similarly, the IJ determined that Aguilar’s proposed particular social groups were not sufficiently particular or socially distinct. (App. 24 n.3.) Again, no reasoning was given. The BIA declined to weigh in on the issue because it found that Aguilar had not met his burden of showing a nexus between the persecution and a protected ground. Thus, we will vacate and remand the issue to the BIA to review whether Aguilar’s proposed groups are sufficiently particular or distinct, and to provide a more detailed review of whether his statements were a political opinion. Aguilar’s application for withholding of removal should similarly be reevaluated in light of our guidance.”

Martinez-Segova v. Sessions, 2d Cir., 08-18-17

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/c0292714-4831-4fb8-b31e-c1269886a55b/1/doc/16-955_so.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/c0292714-4831-4fb8-b31e-c1269886a55b/1/hilite/

What happened:

Martinez-Segova suffered domestic abuse at the hands of her husband. She suffered harm rising to the level of past persecution on account of a particular social group. However, the DHS claims that the Salvadoran government is not unwilling or unable to protect Martinez-Segova because she obtained a protective order from a court. After the protective order was granted the respondent’s husband “violated the order with impunity by showing up to her place of work kissing and grabbing her and begging her to return.”

According to the U.S. State Department,

“Violence against women, including domestic violence, was a widespread and serious problem. A large portion of the population considered domestic violence socially acceptable; as with rape, its incidence was underreported. The law prohibits domestic violence and generally provides for sentences ranging from one to three years in prison, although some forms of domestic violence carry higher penalties. The law also permits restraining orders against offenders. Laws against domestic violence were not well enforced, and cases were not effectively prosecuted.”

Martinez-Segova also submitted lots of documentary evidence showing “the Salvadoran government’s 13 inability to combat domestic violence.”

What should have happened:

Martinez-Sevova has a “slam dunk” case for asylum.  The Government’s argument that Salvador can protect her is basically frivolous. The Salvadoran government in fact was unable to protect the respondent either before or after the protective order. The State Department Country Report combined with the expert evidence show that the Salvadoran government t has a well-established record of failure to protect women from domestic violence.

The idea that the DHS could rebut a presumption of future persecution based on past persecution by showing fundamentally changed circumstances or the existence of a reasonably available internal relocation alternative is facially absurd in the context of El Salvador.

What really happened:

Incredibly, the Immigration Judge denied Martinez-Segova’s claim, and the BIA affirmed. The BIA made a bogus finding that Martinez-Segova failed to show that the Salvadoran government was unwilling or unable to protect her.

What the Secomd Circuit said:

“We conclude that the agency failed to sufficiently consider the country conditions evidence in analyzing whether Martinez-Segova demonstrated that the Salvadoran government was unable or unwilling to protect her from her husband. The BIA relied heavily on the fact that Martinez-Segova failed to report her husband’s violation of the protective order to the police. The agency’s decision in this regard was flawed. Where, as here,“the IJ and BIA ignored ample record evidence tending to show that”authorities are unwilling and unable to  protect against persecution, we need not decide “whether [a petitioner’s] unwillingness to confront the police is fatal to [her] asylum claim.” Pan v. Holder, 777 F.3d 540, 544-45 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Aliyev v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2008) (declining to determine “precisely what a person must show in order for the government to be deemed responsible for the conduct of private actors” where petitioner “introduced enough evidence to forge the link between private conduct and public responsibility” (emphasis added)).

Although the agency does not have to parse each individual piece of evidence, Zhi Yun Gao v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 86, 87 (2d Cir. 2007), there is no indication that the agency considered the ample record evidence of the Salvadoran government’s inability to combat domestic violence—a phenomenon that the U.S. State Department deems one of El Salvador’s “principal human rights problems” for which its efforts to ameliorate the problem are “minimally effective.” A declaration from an human rights attorney and expert on gender issues in El Salvador reveals that orders of protection, while difficult to procure, “do little to protect victims from further violence because judges often draft them inadequately and law enforcement officials neglect or refuse to enforce them” and “are little more than pieces of paper affording no more protection than the victims had prior to the legal process.” Where orders of protection are issued, the onus is on the government to ensure compliance; for example, judges are required to appoint an independent team to monitor compliance with orders of protection and that inadequate follow up “frequently renders victims of domestic violence virtually helpless to enforce their rights.” There is no indication that that judge did this in Martinez-Segova’s case. Moreover, the order of protection prohibited Martinez-Segova’s husband from “harassing, stalking, [and] intimidating” her, but her husband nonetheless violated the order with impunity by showing up to her place of work, kissing and grabbing her and begging her to return. Because the agency’s conclusion—that Martinez- Segova failed to establish that the Salvadoran government was unable or unwilling to protect her from her husband because she had been able to obtain a protective order —is in tension with the record evidence demonstrating that such orders are largely ineffective, we grant the petition and remand for consideration of this evidence. See Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Despite our generally deferential review of IJ and BIA opinions, we require a certain minimum level of analysis from the IJ and BIA opinions denying asylum, and indeed must require such if judicial review is to be meaningful.”). Because remand is warranted for the agency to consider whether Martinez-Segova established past persecution, we decline to reach its humanitarian asylum ruling at this time. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”). Moreover, the BIA did not address the IJ’s conclusion that the Government rebutted Martinez-Segova’s well-founded fear of persecution, and that determination generally precedes an analysis on whether humanitarian asylum is warranted. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(B)(iii) (humanitarian asylum is generally considered “in the absence of a well-founded fear of persecution”).”

CONCLUSION

The BIA and the Immigration Judges made an incredible number of serious errors in these two cases, from misreading the record, to ignoring the evidence, to botching the law.

So, while DOJ and EOIR are patting each other on the back for becoming such great cogs in the Trump deportation machine, and racing removals through the system, the real results are starkly illustrated here. Every day, vulnerable asylum applicants with sound, well-documented claims that should be quickly granted either at the Asylum Office or on an Immigration Court’s “short docket” are being screwed by the BIA’s failure to protect the rights of asylum seekers and to educate and in some cases force Immigration Judges to do likewise.

The Federal Courts are being bogged down with cases that a third-year law student who has had a course in asylum law could tell have been badly mis-analyzed. The idea that EOIR contains the world’s best administrative tribunals dedicated to guaranteeing fairness and due process for all has become a cruel joke.

Our Constitution and laws protecting our rights are meaningless if nobody is willing and able to stand up for the rights of individuals who are being railroaded through our system. We saw this in the era of Jim Crow laws directed at depriving Black Americans of their rights, and we are seeing it again today with respect to migrants caught up in the Trump Administration’s gonzo enforcement program.

Yeah, today it’s not you or me. But, when you or I need justice, why will we get (or deserve) any better treatment than the farce that the Trump Administration and EOIR are unloading on migrants now?

PWS

08-27-17

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CALLING ALL U.S. IMMIGRATION JUDGES, CURRENT & RETIRED — OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS — GREECE IN NOVEMBER — ATTEND THE WORLD CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF RFUGEE LAW JUDGES (“IARLJ”) IN ATHENS, NOV. 27 – DEC. 1, 2017

By Judge (Retired) Paul Wickham Schmidt

It is very important for the U.S. immigration Court to be represented at the IARLJ World Conference in Athens at the end of November. With all the focus on U.S. immigration issues in the news, it is more important than ever that we communicate with and share perspectives with our “brethren” throughout the world. The IARLJ Conference is always a first-class event with fantastic educational programs and many opportunities to meet administrative and constitutional judges engaged in various phases of refugee claim adjudication throughout the world.

The IARLJ is a great organization. Then Chief Immigration Judge Michael J. Creepy (now an Appellate Immigration Judge & BIA Member) and I were among the founding members of the IARLJ in the late 1990s. I am currently a Vice President, Americas. However, because of previous commitments, I unfortunately will be unable to attend the Athens Conference.

I encourage all U.S. Immigration Judges, current and former, to attend. You do not have to be a member of the IARLJ to attend, although I also encourage everyone to join (whether or not you attend the Conference). The IARLJ is like a “worldwide NAIJ” working to further justice and to protect the independence of the judicial process globally. Our friend and colleague the late great Hon. Juan P. Osuna was active in the IARLJ and his untimely death was mourned by many of our colleagues worldwide.

Please let me know at jennings12@aol.com if you might be interested in attending or want additional information. I can put you directly in touch with Judge Katelijne Declerck, President of the IARLJ.

Best wishes,
Paul

BIA ISSUES NEW PRECEDENT SAYING ORE. BURGLARY OF A DWELLING IS CATEGORICAL CIMT: MATTER OF J-G-D-F-, 27 I&N Dec. 87 (BIA 2017) — Hon. Lory Rosenberg Says They Got It Wrong! — + My “Bonus Analysis!”

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/990986/download

Here’s the BIA’s Headnote:

“Burglary of a dwelling in violation of section 164.225 of the Oregon Revised Statutes is a crime involving moral turpitude, even though the statute does not require that a person be present at the time of the offense, provided that the dwelling is at least intermittently occupied.”

PANEL: BIA Appelllate Immigration Judges PAULEY, WENTLAND & O’CONNOR,

DECISION BY: Judge Pauley

Here’s what former BIA Appellate Immigration Judge Lory D. Rosenberg had to say about it on her blog Appeal Matters and on ILW.com:

Lory D. Rosenberg on Appeal Matters

BIA and Reprehensible Determinations

Rate this Entry

by

, 08-18-2017 at 04:53 PM (600 Views)

In Matter of J-G-D-F-, 27 I&N Dec. 82 (BIA 2017), the BIA has ruled that the Oregon crime of burglary of a dwelling is a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) even though a defendant can be convicted of burglary under the Oregon statute for entering or remaining in an unoccupied home. The Board’s analysis is somewhat confounding, ultimately favoring a categorical conclusion that is clearly to the disadvantage of those in the respondent’s position.

(In one fell swoop, the BIA rejected the respondent’s request for withholding and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) on the basis that the respondent failed to identify an acceptable particular social group as the reason for the threat to his life or freedom and fear of torture, ruling that, “he asserted that he would be targeted by criminals because he would be recognized as someone who has lived in the United States for a long period of time based on his clothing and accent. However, this proposed group lacks particularity, because it is amorphous and lacks definable boundaries. As described, the proposed group could include persons of any age, sex, or background.” Id. at 86.)

There are two central issues presented: Does the Oregon statute in question and, if divisible, the crime of which the respondent was convicted under the Oregon statute, amount to a generic burglary? Assuming it amounts to a burglary, is the crime of which the respondent was convicted a CIMT, involving reprehensible conduct and some degree of scienter?

A few comments in response to the precedential aspects of this decision are warranted.

A conviction of the crime of burglary does not make removal inevitable, not only because there may be post-conviction remedies available, but because the underlying offense is not necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude or an aggravated felony conviction.

As we know, burglary convictions must be analyzed according to the state law under which the crime is defined. The elements of the offense described under state law must match the elements contained in the generic definition of burglary, i.e., unlawful entry into or remaining in a building or structure with the intent to commit a crime. Taylor v. U.S., 495 U.S. 575 (1990).

The respondent argued that the statute was overbroad. Although the respondent asserted that “a violation of the statute does not necessarily involve reprehensible conduct or a culpable mental state since it does not require that a defendant unlawfully enter a dwelling or intend to commit a crime involving moral turpitude at the time he or she enters the building,” id.at 83, the BIA rejected the respondent’s arguments.

The BIA concluded instead that the statute was divisible “with respect to whether a first degree burglary offense involved entering or remaining unlawfully in a dwelling, as opposed to a building other than a dwelling.” Id. at 84-85. Cf. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243,2249 (2016) (deeming a statute to be divisible if “it list[s] elements in the alternative, and thereby define[s] multiple crimes”)

Under section 164.205(2), the term “dwelling” means a building which regularly or intermittently is occupied by a person lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present. However, the BIA ruled that the statute was not divisible as to whether the building was occupied or not, cutting of any examination of the record with respect to that aspect of the crime.

The records in the instant case contained no equivocation regarding the nature of the respondent’s conviction. In fact, once the statute in the instant case was treated as divisible as to “entering or remaining unlawfully,” the record clearly identified the crime of which the respondent was convicted. As the BIA stated expressly, “the judgment and plea agreement for the respondent’s conviction show that he pleaded to “Burglary I” as charged in Count 2 of the charging document, which alleged that the offense occurred ‘in an occupied dwelling.’” Consequently, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s conclusion that, “according to the respondent’s record of conviction, he was convicted under the prong of section 164.225 that requires entering or remaining unlawfully in a “dwelling” with the intent to commit a crime.” Id. at 86.

But that begs the question.

Today’s decision in Matter of J-G-D-F-, expands on the BIA’s prior precedent in Matter of Louissaint, 24 I&N Dec. 754, 756 (BIA 2009), and distorts the longstanding BIA standard requiring that crimes involving moral turpitude must contain “two essential elements: reprehensible conduct and a culpable mental state,” Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I&N Dec. 826, 834 (BIA 2016). Prior to Louissant, the BIA honored the reasonable limitation that a crime was to be considered a CIMT only if the crime accompanying the unlawful entry was itself turpitudinous.

In Louissaint, the BIA held that the “conscious and overt act of unlawfully entering or remaining in an occupied dwelling with the intent to commit a crime is inherently ‘reprehensible conduct’ committed ‘with some form of scienter.’” Matter of F-G-D-F-, supra. at 87 (quoting Matter of Louissaint, 24 I&N Dec. at 758 (citation omitted)). The rationale underlying this conclusion was the fact that the building was occupied and the victim’s presence involved an expectation of privacy and security. By drawing the conclusion that every unlawful entry of a dwelling, whether occupied or not at the time of the offense, amounts to “reprehensible conduct” the BIA evades prior caselaw which had focused on the specific crime that was intended. Cf. Matter of M-, 2 I&N Dec. 721 (BIA, A.G. 1946).

c. 2017 Lory D. Rosenberg, www.Loryrosenberg.com

Submit "BIA and Reprehensible Determinations" to FacebookSubmit "BIA and Reprehensible Determinations" to TwitterSubmit "BIA and Reprehensible Determinations" to GoogleSubmit "BIA and Reprehensible Determinations" to StumbleUponSubmit "BIA and Reprehensible Determinations" to RedditSubmit "BIA and Reprehensible Determinations" to DiggSubmit "BIA and Reprehensible Determinations" to del.icio.us

**********************€*€€€

Nolan Rappaport  asked me what I think, pointing out that burglary is a serious crime. I agree that burglary is a serious crime, but that doesn’t necessarily answer the question of whether it involves moral turpitude.

As Lory points out, in an early precedent, Matter of M-, 2 I&N Dec. 721 (BIA, AG 1946), the BIA found that the key to moral turpitude in a burglary conviction is not the breaking and entering into the building itself, but the nature of the crime the individual intended to commit following the breaking and entering.

Later, in Matter of Louissaint, 24 I&N Dec. 754, 756 (BIA 2009), the BIA chipped away at the M- rule. The Board focused on the breaking and entering, rather than the crime, and held that burglary of an occupied dwelling is a categorical cimt, without regard to what crime the respondent might have intended.

In Matter of J-G-D-F-, 27 I&N Dec. 82 (BIA 2017) the BIA basically annihilated the M- rule by holding that entry into a dwelling that might be occupied was a categorical cimt without regard to the crime intended.

As a trial judge, I found the M- rule relatively straightforward and easy to apply (or as straightforward and easy to apply as anything in the convoluted cimt area).  Applying that rule to the facts in J-G-D-F-, under the “categorical” approach, the “least possible crime” included in NC first degree burglary would be entry into an unoccupied dwelling in possession of burglary tools. I would find that not to be a cimt.

Applying the Louissaint expansion, I would have concluded because unlike Louissant the dwelling was unoccupied, there was still no cimt.

But, of course applying J-G-D-F-, I would have been required to find a cimt.

So, the current state of the law at the BIA appears to be this. First, apply M– to see if you can find a cimt.

If not, second, see if an occupied dwelling was involved so that the respondent has committed a cimt under Louissaint.
If not, third, see if an unoccupied dwelling might have been involved so that it’s a cimt under J-G-D-F-
Fourth, if all of the foregoing steps fail to produce a cimt, the judge should think of some other rationale for finding a cimt. Because, if the judge doesn’t and the DHS appeals, the BIA will find one anyway. After all, burglary sounds bad.
I find it interesting and somewhat ironic that after the Matter of M- approach gained acceptance from the 9th Circuit, where most petitions to review BIA decisions arise, the BIA has chosen to basically overrule M- without specifically saying so.
In the past decade and one-half, the BIA has often taken the most inclusive position on criminal removal statutes. As a result, the BIA is overruled with some regularity on petitions for review by the Federal Circuit Courts all the way up to the Supreme Court. The latter has been particularly critical of the BIA’s inclusive approach to minor drug convictions.
Notwithstanding this, I wouldn’t expect any change in the BIA’s “hard line approach” to criminal removal under the Sessions regime. After all, the “new mission” of EOIR is to churn out as many final removal orders as possible as quickly as possible with as little due process as possible. And, expansive readings of criminal removal statutes also helps produce more mandatory detention (which Jeff Sessions loves, along with those who are making a killing running private detention centers with substandard conditions).
So from a “job retention” standpoint, getting reversed on review by the Federal Courts probably won’t be a problem for Immigration Judges and Appellate Immigration Judges within DOJ as long as the reversals come in the context of expanding removals and restricting due process.
Finally, I’d never bet against Judge Lory Rosenberg’s analysis on any criminal immigration matter. Lory always had a much better handle on where the Federal Courts were going on criminal removal than the rest of us BIA Appellate Judges, including me. And, over the years since she was forced out of her judicial position, she has been proved right over and over by Federal Courts including the Supremes. Indeed, the Supremes cited one of her dissents in reversing the BIA in St. Cyr (check out FN 52). I’m not aware of any other BIA Appellate Judge who has been cited by name. (Although my good friend and beloved former colleague Judge Wayne Stogner of the New Orleans Immigration Court did get an individual “shout out” for his carefully analyzed trial decision in Nuegusie v. Holder.)
At this point, I’m thinking that Lory’s view will prevail in at least come Circuits. Time will tell.
PWS
08-25-17