"The Voice of the New Due Process Army" ————– Musings on Events in U.S. Immigration Court, Immigration Law, Sports, Music, Politics, and Other Random Topics by Retired United States Immigration Judge (Arlington, Virginia) and former Chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals Paul Wickham Schmidt and Dr. Alicia Triche, expert brief writer, practical scholar, emeritus Editor-in-Chief of The Green Card (FBA), and 2022 Federal Bar Association Immigration Section Lawyer of the Year. She is a/k/a “Delta Ondine,” a blues-based alt-rock singer-songwriter, who performs regularly in Memphis, where she hosts her own Blues Brunch series, and will soon be recording her first full, professional album. Stay tuned! 🎶 To see our complete professional bios, just click on the link below.
“This appeal presents the question of whether the emergency military construction authority provided by 10 U.S.C. § 2808 (“Section 2808”) authorized eleven border wall construction projects on the southern border of the United States. We conclude that it did not. We also consider whether the district court properly granted the Organizational Plaintiffs a permanent injunction and whether the district court improperly denied the State Plaintiffs’ request for a separate permanent injunction. We affirm the decision of the district court on both counts. … We hold that the States and Sierra Club both have Article III standing and a cause of action to challenge the Federal Defendants’ border wall construction projects, that Section 2808 did not authorize the challenged construction, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in either granting a permanent injunction to Sierra Club or in denying a separate permanent injunction to the States.”
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PANEL:THOMAS, Chief Judge, and WARDLAW and COLLINS, Circuit Judges
Opinion by Chief Judge Sidney R. Thomas; Dissent by Judge Collins
The only real question here is whether the Supremes will bail out the regime’s scofflaws once again.
Affirming in part, and vacating and remanding in part, the district court’s preliminary injunction ordering the United States to provide bond hearings to a class of noncitizens who were detained and found to have a credible fear of persecution, the panel affirmed the injunction insofar as it concluded that plaintiffs have a due process right to bond hearings, but remanded for further findings and reconsideration with respect to the particular process due to plaintiffs.
The district court certified a nationwide class of all detained asylum seekers who were subject to expedited removal proceedings, were found to have a credible fear of persecution, but were not provided a bond hearing with a record of hearing within seven days of requesting a hearing. Part A of the district court’s modified preliminary injunction provided: 1) bond hearings must take place within seven days of a class member’s request, or the member must be released; 2) the burden of proof is on the government to show why the
* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
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member should not be released; and 3) the government must produce recordings or verbatim transcripts of the hearings, as well as written decisions. Part B concluded that the class is constitutionally entitled to bond hearings. A motions panel of this court previously denied the government’s request to stay Part B, but granted the stay as to Part A.
The panel concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their due process claim, explaining that immigration detention violates the Due Process Clause unless a special justification outweighs the constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint. The panel also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that other processes—seeking parole from detention or filing habeas petitions—were insufficient to satisfy due process. The panel further rejected the government’s suggestion that noncitizens lack any rights under the Due Process Clause, observing the general rule that once a person is standing on U.S. soil—regardless of the legality of entry—he or she is entitled to due process.
The panel next concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its irreparable harm analysis, noting substandard physical conditions and medical care in detention, lack of access to attorneys and evidence, separation from family, and re-traumatization. The panel also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the balance of the equities and public interest favors plaintiffs, explaining that the district court weighed: 1) plaintiffs’ deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right and its attendant harms; 2) the fact that it is always in the public interest to prevent constitutional violations; and 3) the
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government’s interest in the efficient administration of immigration law.
As to Part A of the injunction, the panel concluded that the record was insufficient to support the requirement of hearings within seven days, and that the district court made insufficient findings as to the burdens that Part A may impose on immigration courts. The panel also noted that the number of individuals in expedited removal proceedings may have dramatically increased since the entry of the injunction. Thus, the panel remanded to the district court for further factual development of the preliminary injunction factors as to Part A.
The panel also rejected the government’s argument that the district court lacked authority to grant injunction relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), which provides: “no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of [8 U.S.C. §§ 1221–1232], other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.” Examining the relevant precedent, statutory scheme, and legislative history, the panel concluded that here, where the class is composed of individual noncitizens, each of whom is in removal proceedings and facing an immediate violation of their rights, and where the district court has jurisdiction over each individual member of that class, classwide injunctive relief is consistent with congressional intent.
Finally, the panel concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the injunction as to the nationwide class. However, the panel directed that, on
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remand, the district court must also revisit the nationwide scope.
Dissenting, Judge Bade wrote that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) barred injunctive relief in this case, concluding that the majority’s opinion does not square with the plain text of § 1252(f)(1), is inconsistent with multiple Supreme Court cases, and needlessly creates a circuit split with the Sixth Circuit. Judge Bade further wrote that, even if the district court had jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief, the preliminary injunction is overbroad and exceeds what the constitution demands. Judge Bade would vacate the preliminary injunction and remand for further proceedings with instructions to dismiss the claims for classwide injunctive relief.
PANEL: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Michael Daly Hawkins and Bridget S. Bade, Circuit Judges.
OPNION BY: Chief Judge Sydney R. Thomas
DISSENTING OPINION: Judge Bridget S. Bade
KEY QUOTE FROM MAJORITY OPINION:
The government also suggests that non-citizens lack any rights under the Due Process Clause. As we have discussed, this position is precluded by Zadvydas and its progeny. The government relies on inapposite cases that address the peculiar constitutional status of noncitizens apprehended at a port-of-entry, but permitted to temporarily enter the United States under specific conditions. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei (“Mezei”), 345 U.S. 206, 208–09, 213–15 (1953) (noncitizen excluded while still aboard his ship, but then detained at Ellis Island pending final exclusion proceedings gained no additional procedural rights with respect to removal by virtue of his “temporary transfer from ship to shore” pursuant to a statute that “meticulously specified that such shelter ashore ‘shall not be considered a landing’”); Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958) (noncitizen paroled into the United States while waiting for a determination of her admissibility was not “within the United States” “by virtue of her physical presence as a parolee”); Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925) (noncitizen excluded at Ellis Island but detained instead of being deported immediately due to suspension of deportations during World War I “was to be regarded as stopped at the boundary line”).
Indeed, these cases, by carving out exceptions not applicable here, confirm the general rule that once a person is standing on U.S. soil—regardless of the legality of his or her entry—he or she is entitled to due process. See, e.g., Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212 (“[A]liens who have once passed
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through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law.”); Leng May Ma, 357 U.S. at 187 (explaining that “immigration laws have long made a distinction between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission . . . and those who are within the United States after an entry, irrespective of its legality,” and recognizing, “[i]n the latter instance . . . additional rights and privileges not extended to those in the former category who are merely ‘on the threshold of initial entry’” (quoting Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212)); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “the entry fiction is best seen . . .as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away” because “[o]therwise, the doctrine would allow any number of abuses to be deemed constitutionally permissible merely by labelling certain ‘persons’ as non-persons”). We thus conclude that the district court did not err in holding that plaintiffs are “persons” protected by the Due Process Clause.
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First, and foremost, let’s give a big vote of appreciation to the All-Star Team at Wilmer Cutler who represented our Round Table on this:
Alan Schoenfeld and Lori A. Martin, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, New York, New York; Rebecca Arriaga Herche, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Washington, D.C.; Jamil Aslam, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Los Angeles, California; for Amici Curiae Retired Immigration Judges and Board of Immigration Appeals Members.
Alan Schoenfeld Partner Wilmer Cutler, NYLori A. Martin Partner Wilmer Cutler, NYKnightess of the Round Table
This team is it’s own “Special Forces Brigade” of the New Due Process Army (“NDPA”)!
WOW! Persons are “persons” under the Constitution even when they have brown skins and are asylum seekers! How “rad” can you get!What a blow to “business as usual” for the regime and their “Dred Scottification” program of dehumanizing and making non-persons out of migrants and other vulnerable minorities!
Too bad that the Supremes and other Circuit Courts have too often advanced “Dred Scottification,” hiding behind transparently bogus and contrived “national emergencies” and the doctrine of judicial dereliction of duty otherwise known as “Chevron deference.” I guess that’s why the regime has the contempt for both the law and the Article III Courts to press such legally, morally, and Constitutionally “bankrupt” arguments as they did in this case. Never know when you’ll get a “thumbs up” from those who sometimes don’t view oaths of office and their obligations to their fellow humans with enough seriousness!
Significantly, the panel found that “plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that they are constitutionally entitled to individualized bond hearings before a “neutral decisionmaker.” However, in doing so they “papered over” the obvious fact that the constitutional requirement of a “neutral decisionmaker” cannot be fulfilled as long as Billy Barr or other politicos control the Immigration Courts!
Indeed, the panel decision was a strong rebuke of Barr’s atrocious, unethical, scofflaw decision in Matter of M-S-, 27 I&N Dec. 509 (A.G. 2019) purporting to unilaterally change the rules to eliminate bond for those who had passed “credible fear.” Fact is that no individual appearing in today’s Immigration Courts has access to the constitutionally-required “neutral decisionmaker” because Barr retains the ability to simply unilaterally change any result that doesn’t match his White Nationalist nativist agenda and can hire and fire the so-called “judges” at will.
Indeed, under Barr’s totally illegal and professionally insulting “production quotas,” I’m not sure that the “judges” on the “deportation assembly line” even get “production credit” for bond decisions because they aren’t “final orders of removal.” However, denial of bond is actually an important “whistle stop” on the “deportation express.” Those kept in the “New American Gulag” have difficulty finding attorneys and the systematic mistreatment they receive in detention helps to demoralize them and coerce them into giving up claims or waiving appeals.
When are the Article IIIs finally going to stop “beating around the bush” and hold this whole mess to be unconstitutional, as it most clearly is?
In some ways, the panel’s decision reminds me of one of my own long-ago concurring/dissenting opinion in Matter of Joseph, 22 I&N Dec. 799, 810 (BIA 1999) (en banc) (“Joseph II”):
However, I do not share the majority’s view that the proper standard in a mandatory detention case involving a lawful permanent resident alien is that the Service is “substantially unlikely to prevail” on its charge. Matter of Joseph, 22 I&N Dec. 3398, at 10 (BIA 1999). Rather, the standard in a case such as the one before us should be whether the Service has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its charge that the respondent is removable because of an aggravated felony.
Mandatory detention of a lawful permanent resident alien is a drastic step that implicates constitutionally-protected liberty interests. Where the lawful permanent resident respondent has made a colorable showing in custody proceedings that he or she is not subject to mandatory detention, the Service should be required to show a likelihood of success on the merits of its charge to continue mandatory detention. To enable the Immigration Judge to make the necessary independent determination in such a case, the Service should provide evidence of the applicable state or federal law under which the respondent was convicted and whatever proof of conviction that is available at the time of the Immigration Judge’s inquiry.
The majority’s enunciated standard of “substantially unlikely to pre-vail” is inappropriately deferential to the Service, the prosecutor in this matter. Requiring the Service to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of its charge would not unduly burden the Service and would give more appropriate weight to the liberty interests of the lawful permanent res- ident alien. Such a standard also would provide more “genuine life to the regulation that allows for an Immigration Judge’s reexamination of this issue,” as referenced by the majority. Matter of Joseph, supra, at 10.
The Service’s failure to establish a likelihood of success on the merits would not result in the release of a lawful permanent resident who poses a threat to society. Continued custody of such an alien would still be war- ranted under the discretionary criteria for detention.
In conclusion, mandatory detention should not be authorized where the Service has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of its charge. Consequently, while I am in complete agreement with the decision to release this lawful permanent resident alien, and I agree fully that the Service is substantially unlikely to prevail on the merits of this aggravated felony charge, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s enunciation of “substantially unlikely to prevail” as the standard to be applied in all future cases involving mandatory detention of lawful permanent resident aliens.
Concern for Due Process and fundamental fairness have intentionally been eradicated in the Immigration “Courts” by Sessions,Whitaker, and Barr. It’s past time for this constitutional mockery to be put out of its misery (and the unending misery it causes for the humans coming before it) once and for all!
As my late BIA colleague Judge Fred W. Vacca once said, albeit in a different context, “It’s time to put an end to this pathetic imitation of an adjudication.” Fred and I didn’t always agree. In fact, we disagreed much of the time. But, he did know when it was finally time to “stop the nonsense,” even when some of our colleagues just kept the system churning long past the point of reason and sanity.
And, folks, that was back in the days when the BIA actually functioned more or less like an “independent appellate court” until the Ashcroft purge of ’03 forever ended that noble vision. Like the rest of the system and those who enable it to keep churning lives as if they were mere water under the bridge, the BIA and the rest of the Immigration “Courts” have now become a national disgrace — a blot on our national conscience. Human beings seeking justice are neither “numbers” to be achieved for “satisfactory ratings,” nor “enforcement problems” to be exterminated without Due Process.
Dehumanization of the “other”and stripping them of legal and human rights is a key part of fascism. It’s what allowed German judges and most of German society to “look the other way” or actively aid in the holocaust. It has no place in our justice system — now or ever!
Due Process Forever! Judicial Complicity in Weaponized Captive “Courts,” That Aren’t Courts At All, Never!
Quiroz Parada v. Sessions, 9th Cir., 08-29-18, Published
COURT STAFF SUMMARY:
The panel granted Moris Alfredo Quiroz Parada’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, in a case in which Quiroz Parada, a citizen of El Salvador, sought relief after he and his family were the victims of threats, home invasions, beatings, and killings at the hands of Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional guerillas.
The panel held that the record compelled a finding of past persecution. The panel explained that the Board mischaracterized what Quiroz Parada endured as simply threats against his family and attempts to recruit him, and ignored, among other evidence, his brother’s assassination, the murder of his neighbor as a result of Quiroz Parada’s own family being targeted, his experience being captured and beaten to the point of unconsciousness, repeated forced home invasions, and specific death threats toward his family. The panel concluded that the harm Quiroz Parada and his family suffered rose to the level of past persecution.
Applying pre-REAL ID Act standards, the panel held that the harm Quiroz Parada suffered bore a nexus to a protected ground, as the FMLN guerillas were motivated, at least in part, by his family’s government and military service. The panel noted that it was immaterial that the
FMLN’s attempted conscription of Quiroz Parada would have served the dual goal of filling their ranks in order to carry on their war against the government and pursue their political objectives, because their additional goal of retaliating against the Quiroz Parada family was a protected ground.
The panel held that substantial evidence did not support the agency’s determination that the government successfully rebutted the presumption of future persecution. The panel noted that by the time the IJ considered the country conditions information submitted into the record it was five years out of date, and predated the FMLN’s rise to power in government. The panel explained that the government cannot meet its burden of rebutting the presumption by presenting evidence of the Salvadoran government’s human rights record at a time when the government was run by a different political party, particularly when at the time of the IJ hearing it was run by the very same FMLN who persecuted the Quiroz Parada family. The panel joined the Second Circuit in holding that reliance on significantly or materially outdated country reports cannot suffice to rebut the presumption of future persecution.
The panel concluded that the agency erred as a matter of law in denying Quiroz Parada’s application for CAT relief because it ignored pertinent evidence in the record and erred by construing the “government acquiescence” standard too narrowly. The panel explained that acquiescence does not require actual knowledge or willful acceptance of torture, and that awareness and willful blindness will suffice. The panel further explained that the acquiescence standard is met where the record demonstrates that public officials at any level, even if not at the federal level, would acquiesce in the torture the petitioner is likely to suffer, and that evidence showing widespread corruption of public officials, as the record revealed in this case, can be highly probative on this point. The panel noted that the country conditions reports and exhibits submitted by Quiroz Parada indicate the acquiescence of the Salvadoran government, or at least parts of the Salvadoran government, in the rampant violence and murder perpetrated by the Mara Salvatrucha gang, at whose hands Quiroz Parada fears that he will be killed.
The panel remanded for reconsideration of his CAT claim, an exercise of discretion whether to grant asylum relief, and an appropriate order withholding Quiroz Parada’s removal.
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
PANEL: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judge, and Timothy J. Savage,* District Judge.
* The Honorable Timothy J. Savage, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
OPINION BY: Judge Paez
KEY QUOTES FROM OPINION:
Quiroz Parada applied for asylum5 and withholding of removal on September 27, 1994. If he is removed to El Salvador, Quiroz Parada fears he will be persecuted on account of his family status and political opinion. The source of that feared persecution is twofold: the MS gang members seeking revenge on behalf of their FMLN guerilla parents, as well as the FMLN itself—despite the fact that the FMLN is currently a political party, rather than a violent revolutionary movement. Because the FMLN is now the ruling political party, Quiroz Parada does not believe he can safely reside in any part of the country without falling victim to retribution by the FMLN. Moreover, simply laying low is not an option: Quiroz Parada believes the FMLN will learn of his return to the country and have the ability to locate him because he no longer has any Salvadoran documentation and would thus be required to renew all of his documents upon arriving in El Salvador. Quiroz Parada also testified that he is opposed to the FMLN’s “leftist wing” form of democracy and that he would feel compelled to speak out against the FMLN-run government’s policies, which he fears would result in persecution by the government. While Quiroz Parada is aware that the civil war ended several decades ago, he does not believe that the Salvadoran government would prosecute former FMLN guerillas if “they murder people, or behave badly.”6
5 Because Quiroz Parada applied for asylum prior to the effective date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, the one-year bar for asylum applications does not apply.See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a).
6 Regrettably, as with many critical pieces of his testimony, Quiroz Parada’s explanation for why he does not believe in the Salvadoran government’s ability or willingness to prosecute former FMLN members who murder or otherwise attack their former enemies is transcribed as “[indiscernible] and [indiscernible].”
Thirteen years passed before the government took any action on Quiroz Parada’s 1994 asylum application. In May 2007, a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officer finally interviewed Quiroz Parada. On May 31, 2007, Quiroz Parada’s asylum case was referred to an immigration judge; DHS simultaneously issued a notice to appear, charging him with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(I) for being present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. At a master calendar hearing in February 2008, an IJ sustained the charge of removability. Quiroz Parada requested relief in the form of asylum, withholding of removal, CAT protection, and cancellation of removal.
The delays for Quiroz Parada didn’t end there: nearly five years passed between his February 2008 hearing and his merits hearing before an IJ in November 2012. The government submitted its hearing exhibits back in 2008, including a 2007 Department of State Country Report and a 2007 Department of State Profile on El Salvador. Yet for unknown reasons, the government did not update their exhibits during the years that passed between submission of their exhibits and the actual hearing—despite the fact that the country conditions reports were five years out of date by the time of the merits hearing.
Quiroz Parada, by contrast, submitted his exhibits approximately one week before the November 2012 hearing. In addition to a written statement describing his past persecution and fear of future persecution, Quiroz Parada submitted a number of other exhibits corroborating his claims. For example, he submitted a 2010 letter from his sister—written prior to her fleeing the country—imploring him to not return to El Salvador for any reason because of the risk that he will be kidnapped or killed by MS. The letter explained that the “police do[] not help, and they even get killed,” and warned that if he were to come back to the country, “history would repeat itself.” Another one of his sisters sent him a copy of a handwritten threat she received from MS members, which said they knew she “snitched on the barrio” and warned her that if she failed to leave the area by a particular date, her “daughters will suffer the consequences.” His exhibits also included several newspaper articles about the violence perpetrated by MS in Quiroz Parada’s home region; these articles echoed a letter from the National Civil Police of El Salvador describing MS’s crimes, the gang’s pervasiveness in Quiroz Parada’s home region, and how the rampant violence has forced many families to flee.
The long-awaited hearing in November 2012 did not begin on a promising note. Prior to hearing any testimony from Quiroz Parada or argument from his attorney, the IJ conveyed his belief that Quiroz Parada’s asylum claim “may be a lost cause.” Nonetheless, despite the IJ’s significant skepticism, he allowed Quiroz Parada’s attorney to present Quiroz Parada’s case for asylum. On February 8, 2013, the IJ issued a written decision denying Quiroz Parada’s requests for asylum, withholding of removal, CAT protection, and cancellation of removal. The IJ first found that Quiroz Parada was credible under both the pre-REAL ID Act and REAL ID Act standards.7 The IJ then determined that Quiroz Parada had not shown past persecution, but further concluded that even if he had, DHS had rebutted the presumption with evidence of changed country conditions. The IJ also found that Quiroz Parada had not shown an independent well-founded fear of future persecution. Because the IJ determined that Quiroz Parada had not established eligibility for asylum through either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, Quiroz Parada necessarily failed to meet the higher bar required to obtain withholding of removal. The IJ also rejected Quiroz Parada’s claim for CAT relief.
7 Although the REAL ID Act governs Quiroz Parada’s claim for cancellation of removal, it does not govern his claims currently on appeal, which were filed prior to May 11, 2005. See Joseph v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1235, 1240 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010).
Quiroz Parada appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA, which dismissed his appeal. In its decision, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s determinations on Quiroz Parada’s asylum, withholding, and CAT claims, including the IJ’s alternative holding that even if Quiroz Parada had established past persecution, the government had rebutted the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA denied relief to Quiroz Parada, but granted him voluntary departure. Quiroz Parada timely petitioned us for review.
. . . .
As an initial matter, we reject the government’s contention that we lack jurisdiction to consider Quiroz Parada’s CAT claim because he did not raise it before the BIA. Although Quiroz Parada did not specifically appeal his CAT claim to the BIA, the agency addressed the merits of the claim. It is well-established that we may review any issue addressed on the merits by the BIA, regardless of whether the petitioner raised it before the agency. See Rodriguez-Castellon v. Holder, 733 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 355 (2014). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to review the claim.
The agency’s first error was its failure to consider all relevant evidence. CAT’s implementing regulations require the agency to consider “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture,” and we have repeatedly reversed where the agency has failed to do so.See, e.g., Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 770–72 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[W]here there is any indication that the BIA did not consider all of the evidence before it, a catchall phrase [that the agency has considered all of the evidence] does not suffice, and the decision cannot stand.”); Aguilar-Ramos v. Holder, 594 F.3d 701, 705 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The failure of the IJ and BIA to consider [relevant evidence] constitutes reversible error.”). Relevant evidence includes the petitioner’s testimony and country conditions evidence. See Cole, 659 F.3d at 771–72. Moreover, a petitioner’s credible testimony “may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).
Here, the relevant evidence included Quiroz Parada’s credible testimony, the 2007 country conditions reports, and exhibits submitted by Quiroz Parada. Yet the IJ summarily dismissed Quiroz Parada’s CAT claim, stating:
Based on the respondent’s testimony and the evidence in the record, the Court finds that the respondent has not shown that he is “more likely than not” to be tortured if he is removed to El Salvador. In addition, to be eligible for CAT relief, the respondent must establish that the torture feared would be inflicted by or with the acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. Matter of S-V-, 22 I&N Dec. 1306, 1311 (BIA 2000), disagreed with on other grounds by Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2003). “Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture does not
extend protection to persons fearing entities that a government is unable to control.” Id.at 1312. The respondent has not alleged that he fears torture inflicted by any governmental entities in El Salvador, nor by any other entity with the acquiescence of any government official. Thus, he has not established eligibility for CAT relief.
This conclusion ignored significant evidence in the record demonstrating that 1) Quiroz Parada credibly feared death at the hands of the MS gang, and 2) the country conditions reports and other evidence in the record established not only that the government “acquiescence[d]” in the MS gang’s violence, but also that Salvadoran security forces engaged in torture on a regular basis—as the IJ himself found in a section of his decision summarizing the country conditions evidence:
[P]rotection of human rights was undermined by widespread violent crime, rampant judicial and police corruption, intimidation by the ubiquitous violent street gangs, and violence against witnesses. Criminal gangs are a serious, widespread, and pervasive socio-economic challenge to the security, stability, and welfare of El Salvador. Indeed, gangs are blamed for the bulk of crimes and murders in El Salvador. While the government’s fight against the gangs has met with some success in areas, El Salvador remains an exceptionally violent country because of the pervasive gang violence.
Although arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention, and torture are prohibited in El Salvador, Salvadoran security forces apparently continue to participate in such practices on a regular basis. Conditions in detention are degrading and extremely dangerous. Many officials throughout all levels of government engage in corruption with impunity despite a recent increased emphasis on enforcement.
Thus, while the IJ did “consider” the country conditions reports, the significant and material disconnect between the IJ’s quoted observations and his conclusions regarding Quiroz Parada’s CAT claim indicate that the IJ did not properly consider all of the relevant evidence before him.See Cole, 659 F.3d at 771–72 (explaining that indications of the agency’s failure to properly consider all of the relevant evidence “include misstating the record and failing to mention highly probative or potentially dispositive evidence”).
The agency’s second error was its overly narrow construction of the “acquiescence” standard. In a similar case, we reversed and remanded where the agency “erred by construing ‘government acquiescence’ too narrowly,” noting that “acquiescence does not require actual knowledge or willful acceptance of torture; awareness and willful blindness will suffice.” Aguilar-Ramos, 594 F.3d at 705–06 (citing Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1194–95 (9th Cir. 2003)). In Aguilar-Ramos, we found “evidence in the record that suggests that gangs and death squads operate in El Salvador, and that its government is aware of and willfully blind to their existence.” Id. at 706. So too here.
Moreover, we have held that the acquiescence standard is met where the record demonstrates that public officials at any level—even if not at the federal level—would acquiesce in torture the petitioner is likely to suffer. Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 509–10 (9th Cir. 2013). Evidence showing widespread corruption of public officials—as the record reveals here—can be highly probative on this point.See id. at 510 (noting that “[v]oluminous evidence in the record explains that corruption of public officials in Mexico remains a problem”). As in Madrigal, the country conditions reports and exhibits submitted by Quiroz Parada indicate the acquiescence of the Salvadoran government (or at least parts of the Salvadoran government) in the “rampant” violence and murder perpetrated by the MS gang—at whose hands Quiroz Parada fears that he will be killed. And as we have previously held, “torture” under CAT includes killings. See Cole, 659 F.3d at 771.
Because the agency erred by failing to consider all relevant evidence and by improperly construing the government acquiescence standard, we reverse the BIA’s determination that Quiroz Parada is not eligible for CAT relief and remand to the agency for further consideration of his claim.
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The BIA’s and IJ’s fundamental errors included:
Failing to follow their regulations requiring them to consider all the evidence;
Incorrectly finding no “past persecution;”
Incorrectly applying the regulatory presumption of future persecution;
Incorrectly denying asylum and withholding of removal;
Applying an incorrect standard for CAT protection;
Incorrectly analyzing country conditions for CAT.
Wow, what did the BIA and the IJ get right here other than the name and “A#?”
Contrary to the “Sessions myth” about “dirty attorneys” and respondents “gaming the system,” this case presents the perhaps extreme, but certainly not atypical, example where “the government took thirteen years to process the asylum application and then another five years to hold a hearing before an IJ—during which time the government had every opportunity to submit more up-to-date evidence of changed country conditions, but failed to do so.”
The respondent, “by contrast, submitted his exhibits approximately one week before the November 2012 hearing. In addition to a written statement describing his past persecution and fear of future persecution, Quiroz Parada submitted a number of other exhibits corroborating his claims.”
Moreover, once the hearing finally took place, it was fairly obvious from the IJ’s negative pre-hearing comments that he had already “prejudged’ the case against the respondent.
The court also notes how the phenomenon I call “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” (“ADR”) by the Government, which Sessions has shoved into overdrive, fuels “our previously-expressed concern that ‘constant remands to the BIA to consider the impact of changed country conditions occurring during the period of litigation of an asylum case would create a “Zeno’s Paradox” where final resolution of the case would never be reached.’”Baballah, 367 F.3d at 1078 n.11 (quoting Hoxha v. Ashcroft,319 F.3d 1179, 1185 n.7 (9th Cir. 2003)) (alteration omitted).”
The grossly under-studied phenomenon of “ADR” by the DHS and EOIR/DOJ also requires the respondent and his or her often pro bono attorney to constantly update the record and the evidence to deal with changing conditions, while the DHS often takes the lackadaisical approach they did here, apparently counting on the IJ or the BIA to “fill in the gaps” necessary to “get to a denial of the facially grantable claim.”
Here’s the court’s accurate statement of both the CAT standard for acquiescence and the current conditions in El Salvador:
“In Aguilar-Ramos, we found “evidence in the record that suggests that gangs and death squads operate in El Salvador, and that its government is aware of and willfully blind to their existence.” Id. at 706. So too here.
Moreover, we have held that the acquiescence standard is met where the record demonstrates that public officials at any level—even if not at the federal level—would acquiesce in torture the petitioner is likely to suffer. Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 509–10 (9th Cir. 2013). Evidence showing widespread corruption of public officials—as the record reveals here—can be highly probative on this point.See id. at 510 (noting that “[v]oluminous evidence in the record explains that corruption of public officials in Mexico remains a problem”). As in Madrigal, the country conditions reports and exhibits submitted by Quiroz Parada indicate the acquiescence of the Salvadoran government (or at least parts of the Salvadoran government) in the “rampant” violence and murder perpetrated by the MS gang—at whose hands Quiroz Parada fears that he will be killed. And as we have previously held, “torture” under CAT includes killings. See Cole, 659 F.3d at 771″
Compare the above with Sessions’s completely disingenuous description of both the standard for “unwilling or unable to protect” — certainly “acquiescence” would meet or exceed “unwilling or unable to protect” — and the beyond deplorable country conditions in El Salvador in Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
This case also illustrates how in the “haste makes waste” world of EOIR, transcripts are often missing or garble testimony critical to the respondent’s case.
Unfortunately, this case is but an example of the deep, ugly hidden truth about our Immigration Courts. Even before Session’s White Nationalist restrictionist moves against asylum seekers, the Immigration Courts were mistreating too many asylum seekers, particularly those from the Northern Triangle fleeing life-threatening violence. Well prepared claims were often shunted to the end of the docket by ADR at both the courts and the DHS Asylum offices. They are often replaced by “prioritized” claims in detention settings or in other unnecessarily rushed situations where individuals have not had adequate time to obtain competent counsel and to prepare the necessary documentation to win a claim.
That’s compounded by the fact that even in the past, statements of politicos within Administrations of both parties and the generally negative tenor of BIA precedents on asylum for the Northern Triangle have encouraged some willing Immigration Judges to either prejudge the cases or give them “short shrift” to discourage such claims in the future and to act as a “deterrent,” as well as to jack up the number of “case completions” by cutting corners. This was happening in some Immigration Courts and on some BIA panels even before Sessions took over.
Certainly, the message from Sessions has been overtly anti-asylum, anti-Hispanic, anti-female, anti-family, anti-Due-Process, anti-scholarship, and anti-deliberation. In essence: “Just rubber stamp ’em, deny ’em, and move ’em out as fast as you can if you want to keep your job. And, don’t forget that your job involves ‘partnership’ with the DHS prosecutors.”
Obviously, our Immigration Court systems had some deep-seated Due Process problems with anti-asylum, anti-Northern Triangle attitudes, as well as fundamentally incorrect views of the asylum law and regulations, by some Immigration Judges and BIA Appellate Immigration judges even prior to Sessions’s advent. That’s one of the key reasons why gross discrepancies in approval-denial rates in similar cases among Immigration Judges and among BIA “panels” (which often can be nothing more than a single Appellate Judge) had no reasonable explanation even during the Obama Administration.
Sessions has made all of this immeasurably worse! Rather than fostering an attitude of judicial independence, courtesy, fairness, respect for both parties, Due Process, and the generous consideration of asylum claims mandated by the Supremes in Cardoza-Fonseca and at least mouthed by the BIA in Matter of Mogharrabi, Sessions has come up with ways of forcing the already broken Immigration Court system to take on even more cases, cut even more corners, and spew forth even more incorrect and unfair decisions, particularly in the area of asylum.
He has shown a simply horrible, outright hostility to working cooperatively with the individual Immigration Judges, the NAIJ, the private bar, the pro bono community, the NGO’s, and the academic community, along with the DHS, to develop methods of improving Due Process, fairness, and timeliness in the asylum adjudication system. Perhaps even worse, by reducing the status of judges to “denial officers,” and upping the stress levels to incredible heights, he’s also made the U.S. Immigration Judge and the BIA Appellate Immigration Judge jobs far less appealing to well-qualified individuals who would fairly, efficiently, correctly, and professionally adjudicate asylum claims. Such individuals also likely would have some of the “creative, yet practical” “think outside the box” approaches necessary to deal with the backlog in a timely manner without compromising Due Process. It’s painfully obvious that the Sessions and the other politicos now futilely trying to micromanage the Immigration Court system are devoid of any such insights.
Frankly, this is the type of case that probably could have been granted back in 1994 when it was first filed. Even by the time it finally got to Immigration Court, it appears to be the type of well-documented, clearly grantable case that could have been set for a “short block hearing” with the understanding that if certain aspects of the respondent’s background and experiences were verified under oath, the DHS would not oppose a grant of asylum.
Instead, this case has been “hanging around” the system for more than 24 years, and still hasn’t been finally resolved! More seriously, after taking five years on the docket to get to the merits hearing, both the IJ and the BIA clearly got it wrong!
The mess that currently exists in the Immigration Court and asylum systems is primarily the product of years of such abuse and mismanagement by a politically-driven adjudication system, aided and abetted by Congressional inaction and failure to provide adequate funding. Cutting more corners, pushing overwhelmed judges to turn out more cases in less time, and punishing asylum applicants by taking away their children, detaining them in substandard conditions, denying them reasonable access to counsel, denying them fairness, Due Process, and the life-saving protection to which many of them are entitled clearly isn’t the answer.
We need regime change (along with an attitude and culture change among some Immigration Judges and among some BIA panels)!
