😭A LAWYER’S LAMENT FROM TSUI YEE: “Oh, For The Good Old Days Of Public Service & Positive Personal Contact With The Immigration Bureaucracy!”

Tsui H. Yee, Esquire
Tsui H. Yee, Esquire
Law Offices of Tsui H. Yee, PC
New York, NY
PHOTO: Linkedin

From LinkedIn:

The longer I have been practicing immigration law, the more I long for ‘the good old days.’

I remember being able to call the Vermont Service Center, and being able to speak to an immigration officer to go over issues on a case. These officers were friendly, knowledgeable, and willing to help resolve issues. They were not adversarial or looking for ways to deny your client’s petition or application. In fact, a few of these officers would give me their home phone to call them, because some of them worked from home during the work week.

I remember when NVC was super-efficient, organized and a pleasure to deal with. Yes, there was a time when NVC actually knew what they were doing and were responsive. I went on a tour to visit NVC’s offices in Portsmouth, NH, and the NVC staff who led the tour were completely transparent about their process.

I remember being able to walk into the local USCIS office, and speak to a supervisor in person about a problem. For example, if USCIS denied an application in error, it was possible to convince the supervisor to reopen the denied case with proof that USCIS’ denial was incorrect. This is known as a “Service motion” and if granted, USCIS would not require the motion to reopen / reconsider filing fee because it was their own mistake.

Nowadays, none of the above would be possible. The immigration government agencies have removed themselves almost completely from having to deal with the public, which makes an immigration attorney’s job all that more challenging. Sadly, USCIS and NVC are really out of touch with the hurdles that attorneys and clients face in navigating an extremely complex area of law.

#immigration #USCIS #NVC #governmentaccountability #immigrationlawyer

***********************

Thanks, Tsui!

Very true and perceptive! Public service seems to be an afterthought these days. The Trump Administration actually took it out of USCIS’s mission statement! And, they squandered funds that were supposed to be spent on timely, professional adjudications and wasted it on a variety of bogus enforcement gimmicks designed to discourage the public from applying for ANY immigration benefit! 

The Biden Administration has tried to make some improvements. For example, USCIS just announced a new system for scheduling appointments. But, there is still a long, long way to go!

Some of the comments on Tsui’s post on Linkedin are making me almost nostalgic for my days in the “Legacy INS” in the 1970’s and 80’s. It could be a strange place. (My good friend and colleague Joanna London used to say, “Truth is stranger than fiction. And INS is stranger than truth.”)

But, there definitely were human connections, efforts to solve problems, and institutional/legal knowledge there that seem to be largely missing from today’s DHS and DOJ/EOIR. Certainly, the “INS years” were the formative ones in my legal career.

I know there are some very good folks at DHS and EOIR now. But, they seem to be hidden from the public and largely inaccessible. I learned tons from individuals like Maury Roberts, Charlie Gordon, Louisa Wilson, Sam Bernsen, Ralph Farb, “Iron Mike” Inman, Doris Meissner, Leon Ulman, Dick Scully, James P. “Phil” Morris, Sol Isenstein, Andy Carmichael, Neil Leary, Hugh Brien, Irv Appleman, Charlie McCarthy, Glen Bertness, (fellow Wisconsinite) Roger “Buck” Brandemuehl, “Cousin Bob” Schmidt, et al. Can’t think of many folks of that stature in today’s rather bloated and largely faceless immigration bureaucracy.

During my days in private practice, I remember a Service Center adjudicator calling to tell me we had inadvertently overpaid the filing fee, rather than “rejecting” the application and returning it to us by mail. Another time, an adjudicator called with a request for an additional document, saying the application was so obviously carefully and thoughtfully prepared and indexed that he saw no point in returning it with a “deficiency notice.” Can’t see those types of personal touches, which actually promoted efficiency, happening today.

Even EOIR, which used to be the “human face of American justice” (for better or worse), has now moved largely to televideo hearings, e-filing, and “remote adjudication centers” masquerading as “courts.” There are pros and cons to these moves. Certainly, many of us have been calling for e-filing for years; a number of attorneys I have talked with appreciate the convenience and flexibility provided by televideo hearings. So, it’s a mixed bag. 

I will say that having done thousands of both televideo and in person hearings over my years on the bench, I always found in person hearings easier to conduct and more conducive to justice. I also enjoyed and benefitted from consistent professional relationships with the Arlington private bar and the Arlington Chief Counsel’s Office, something that has been largely lost with the advent of adjudication centers removed from the public and the unilateral decision by ICE to only “selectively participate” in Immigration Court litigation. (Just today, “Arlington Court Alum” Nicole Lillibridge Radakovich, now an attorney on the staff of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Brunswick, Georgia (where I used to teach on an occasional basis during my “Legacy INS” days) “reconnected” with me through Linkedin!)

I used to view my “courtroom as a classroom” where we were all learning and improving case-by-case. I wonder if that era has passed at today’s EOIR?

Tsui’s post also reminds me of one of my first published “separate opinions” during my tenure as BIA Chair. Matter of Ponce De Leon, 22 I&N Dec. 154, 159 (BIA 1996, 1997; AG 1997) (Schmidt, Chairman, concurring). It was immediately dubbed “The Chairman’s Lament” by my BIA colleague the late Judge Fred W. Vacca. Turned out to be one of many to follow!

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

08-22-23

⚖️😎 THE BLUM REPORT: Roberto Covers A “212(c) Redux” In Houston, Highlighting Garland’s Disturbing Failure to “Harvest The Low Hanging Fruit” 🍒 @ EOIR!

Roberto Blum, Esquire Immigration Attorney Houston, TX PHOTO: LinkedinRoberto Blum, Esquire, reports from Houston:

Hello Judge, it has been a while since I reported from Houston. Although I have not reported, I have kept reading (and learning from) your writings. So it was a pleasant surprise when I recently came across some BIA decisions and saw your name written on them.

They are Matter of Arreguin, 21 I&N Dec. 38 (BIA 1995) and Matter of Fuentes-Campos, 21 I&N Dec. 905 (BIA 1997).

You see, I was preparing for a individual hearing on the merits, where the client, a 65-year old Mexican national, who has lived in the U.S. since about 1979, and was admitted as a Legal Permanent Resident in 1991, was found to be deportable under INA section 237(a)(2)(b)(i) due to a controlled substance conviction from 1994. His relief: Section 212(c).

The saga started in early January 2012, when he was encountered by ICE, was detained, and placed into removal proceedings. The firm I work for began to represent him at that point. While waiting for his detained merits date, the client suffered a medical condition and was not expected to survive, so ICE released him to family members, essentially so he wouldn’t die in their custody. However, he did not die, he survived, and made a full recovery.

Fast forward to today. Ever since his release, his case got stuck in the “aimless docket reshuffling” that you so often write about. It was not until today, June 28, 2023, that he finally got his day in court for an immigration judge (IJ) to consider his case.

Not knowing whether the assigned IJ or DHS trial attorney (TA) would have any experience with Section 212(c) because this is an old type of relief that is not very common anymore and also due to the hostility often encountered at Houston EOIR, I prepared for the worst case scenario, and feared that the client might not get a fair shake.

Fortunately on the day of trial, I saw an experienced TA was representing the government. Before the IJ went on the record the TA and I discussed the case, and the TA told me that he did not have any issues with the case. I asked if he would stipulate to a grant of relief and he said yes, but warned the IJ might still want to take testimony. The IJ came on the record shortly thereafter, and asked if we had any agreements, at which point I told the IJ that we had an agreement for stipulation to a grant of relief because the evidence submitted was sufficient to carry our burden. The TA confirmed our agreement, and the IJ responded that she had reviewed the record, and also agreed that the client was eligible and deserving of relief because of his long-time physical presence, the conviction was very old, and the client had not had any recent criminal history.

In less than 5 minutes, this case that had been pending over 11 years and 5 months (or about 4,184 days), was resolved by agreement of all parties! The client was stunned and did not even know what happened. He did not expect it to be this fast after waiting so long. The client confided in me that his mother passed away a few days ago in Mexico, and he had been very worried because all of his witnesses (family members) went to Mexico to attend the funeral and were not available to testify on his behalf. I remembered something my grandmother would tell me as a child, that when a close loved one dies, they go to heaven and become your guardian angel, so I thought… just maybe… his mother had been his guardian angel today and whispered in the TA and IJ’s ear before the hearing.

In all seriousness, I ask myself (as this is not the only case I have had that has been pending for over 10 years, only to be resolved by stipulation at the final hearing in less than 5 minutes) how much $$$ is the government spending to fight a case like this for more than a decade–only for it to be resolved in 5 minutes of discussion. (Of course if it had not been resolved favorably, we would have continued litigating the case and appealed to the BIA, something that under current wait times would last another 3 or more years and who knows how much more resources). I imagine that between the IJ and TA’s salary, the court staff, support staff, and even utilities of operating a court, the price tag might be well above $100,000 for a case like this. This is not sustainable.

I asked the client for permission to share the photo we took after the hearing, and if I get the permission I will share it with you.

I am glad the case was resolved favorably by agreement, however, I was ready to use your cases to help defend my client.

DPF!

RB

************************

Love this, Roberto! Makes my day! Good precedents, great scholarship, collegiality, good judging, teamwork combining to make the system work in a just and humane manner! Thanks for forwarding and DPF!

Matter of Arreguin, written by the late Judge Fred W. Vacca,  was one of the first precedents issued, in Volume 21 of the I&N Dec., during my time as BIA Chair. That Volume also reflected the “new style” of BIA precedent format with the “bound volume” citation and pagination available in the “slip opinion” and the individual author of the majority and separate opinions clearly identified. 

Always gratifying to see that the now “old” precedents turned out by the long-gone “Schmidt Board” still have something to say and teach. It was a time when intellectual dialogue and meaningful debate of important issues was encouraged, rather than being discouraged and avoided as has happened in today’s “assembly line culture” at EOIR!

Additionally, Roberto’s report raises a continuing question. What if rather than misusing EOIR as a “deterrent,” and thereby engaging in “Aimless Docket Reshuffling,” Garland and the other “powers that be within the Administration” returned EOIR to its original purpose of insuring due process, fundamental fairness, and best, most efficient judicial practices? 

I’m sure there is lots of “low hanging fruit,” 🍒exemplified by this case, that could be prioritized for quick disposition or reassigned to a better-functioning version of USCIS for more efficient completion. Indeed, with guidance and some institutional discipline by a “Better BIA” of true asylum expert Appellate Judges, I’d guess that the majority of the hundreds of thousands of asylum cases pending for more than two years could be granted without full hearings, either at EOIR or a better functioning Asylum Office. Additionally, many of the long-pending “Non-LPR Cancellation Cases” now clogging the EOIR docket could be more efficiently handled by a better functioning and better staffed USCIS.

It appears that nobody with any realistic vision of what the future could and should look like, and an appreciation of both the cosmic importance and great positive potential of a functional EOIR, has paid any attention to 1) the composition of the EOIR backlog, 2) the abundant opportunities for positive resolutions that would benefit everyone, 3) the lack of quality control at today’s EOIR, and 4) the glaring absence of practical problem solving skills among senior EOIR management and the BIA (not to mention DOJ management and leadership in this area, such as it is). 

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

06-29-23

☠️ PERSECUTED IN CUBA, NIT-PICKED BY IJ 🤮, RUBBER-STAMPED BY BIA 👎🏼, REFUGEE FINALLY GETS SOME JUSTICE ⚖️ FROM 11TH CIR!😎

Kangaroos
“Any reason to deny, any reason to deny, any reason to deny, any reason to deny, any reason to deny, any reason to deny, any reason to deny . . . .”
https://www.flickr.com/photos/rasputin243/
Creative Commons License

Dan Kowalski reports for LexisNexis Immigration Community:

https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/insidenews/posts/ca11-on-credibility-substantial-evidence-cuba-serra-v-atty-gen

CA11 on Credibility, Substantial Evidence, Cuba: Serra v. Atty. Gen.

Serra v. Atty. Gen.

“For decades, the authoritarian regime in Cuba has utilized its police force to intimidate and physically assault political dissidents and peaceful demonstrators throughout the island. Ignacio Balaez Serra, a Cuban immigrant seeking asylum in the United States, maintains he experienced this abuse first-hand after multiple arrests, imprisonments, and beatings by the Cuban police. Serra seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of Serra’s application for asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”) (together, “Application”). The IJ denied Serra’s Application, finding Serra’s testimony “not credible.” In reaching this adverse credibility determination, the IJ cited two inconsistencies between Serra’s hearing testimony and Application. The first purported inconsistency dealt with the timing of Serra’s passage of a kidney stone; specifically, whether he passed it on the day he was beaten by Cuban police or several days thereafter. The second pertained to the number of countries Serra passed through en route to the United States; he listed ten countries in his written Application but later testified that he traveled through “about 11 or 12.” The IJ also reached his adverse credibility determination based on Serra’s perceived non-responsiveness to certain questions. On appeal, the BIA rejected the IJ’s finding that Serra was non-responsive but affirmed the IJ’s adverse credibility determination based on the two inconsistencies alone. After careful review and with the benefit of oral argument, we conclude the record lacks substantial evidence that would allow us to affirm the adverse credibility determination. We therefore reverse and remand. … [T]he IJ perceived two instances of non-responsiveness and two discrepancies in the record, resulting in an adverse credibility determination. The BIA rejected the IJ’s findings of non-responsiveness. Thus, the IJ’s adverse credibility determination hinged only on two purported inconsistencies in the record. But upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances, it is clear these inconsistences are unsupported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence—and thus cannot form the basis for an adverse credibility determination. Therefore, we grant Serra’s petition. We further vacate the BIA’s decision and the IJ’s opinion and remand this case to the IJ to rule on Serra’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under CAT in accordance with this opinion. In doing so, the IJ must ensure that all relevant factors are considered—and the totality of the circumstances ascertained—before reaching a conclusion as to credibility. PETITION GRANTED, VACATED and REMANDED.”

[Hats off to Marty High and Joshua Carpenter and Jonathan Morton for amici American Immigration Council and Immigration Justice Campaign!]

**************************

Super congrats to NDPA superstar litigators Marty High, Joshua Carpenter, and Jonathan Morton. 

This respondent was a unrepresented before the IJ. Thus, we see another example of how EOIR routinely mistreats pro se litigants and why counsel is a due process necessity even in a very straightforward asylum case like this. Obviously, here, the IJ played the role of “co-counsel” to the ICE Assistant Chief Counsel. Yet, AG Garland has intentionally established “dedicated dockets” and bogus “adjudication timelines” that have been shown to reduce opportunities for representation and diminish the chances of success for asylum seekers.

To borrow a memorable phrase used by my late BIA colleague Appellate Judge Fred W. Vacca, “this pathetic attempt at an adjudication” by EOIR was actually defended before the Circuit by the DOJ’s OIL. The glaring problems with immigration and asylum adjudication at DOJ begin at EOIR, but by no means end there. 

This case isn’t “rocket science,” nor is it legally or factually complicated. It’s a very straightforward asylum grant to somebody persecuted by Cuba, where, in the words of the 11th Circuit, “[f]or decades, the authoritarian regime . . . has utilized its police force to intimidate and physically assault political dissidents and peaceful demonstrators throughout the island!”

I also note the statutory provision on credibility that the IJ completely bolluxed here and the “any reason to deny” BIA then “rubber stamped” (in part, even while noting that some of the IJ’s analysis was wrong) was part of the REAL ID Act, passed in 2005. That’s 15 years before the the IJ hearing in this case! Heck, I used to give training classes for incoming EOIR JLCs where decisions very much like this IJ’s were used as “teaching examples” of how NOT TO APPLY Real ID! EOIR not only isn’t making “progress,” it’s actually stuck in reverse!

Having spent eight years as an Appellate Judge at the BIA and having reviewed thousands of records, I know that when an IJ goofs up one part of the analysis it’s often indicative of an overall careless, flawed analysis that should be viewed with considerable skepticism. Yet, here the IJ’s “clear error,” acknowledged by the BIA, in basically inventing “unresponsiveness” doesn’t appear to have inspired the BIA to critically examine the rest of the adverse credibility ruling below. On the contrary, it appears to have spurred the BIA to find “any other reason to deny” despite the indication that this was an inaccurate and unreliable analysis by an IJ having a bad day.

It also appears from the Circuit’s decision that there might have been interpretation issues before both the IJ and the Asylum Office. That makes the IJ’s “cherry picking” and “excessive focus on insignificant testimonial inconsistencies” particularly egregious.

The 11th Circuit decision here was written by U.S. District Judge Rodolfo A. Ruiz II, SD FL, sitting by designation. Judge Ruiz is a Trump appointee. He was joined on the panel by Judge Jill Pryor (Obama) and Judge Charles R. Wilson (Clinton) of the 11th Circuit. Thus, apparently the abysmal performance of EOIR is one of the few things capable of uniting and creating “bipartisan agreement among Article III Judges!”

Perhaps Senator Gillibrand is right, and she will be able to obtain sufficient bipartisan support for her Article I Immigration Court bill, which would remove this system from the DOJ’s chronic mismanagement. See https://immigrationcourtside.com/2023/02/17/⚖️🗽-teas-coffee- Because the current situation at EOIR, the continuing indifference to injustice, and its damage to human lives and the law is totally unacceptable! 

Also, what about the legal and judicial resources consumed on this and similar cases? Wouldn’t it be great if both the USG and the private sector could “redeploy” them to making the immigration justice system work, rather than correcting sophomoric, yet life threatening, errors? (Admittedly, describing the errors made by DOJ attorneys at all three levels here as “sophomoric” could be viewed as a slight to sophomores everywhere.)

Not only is EOIR’s “any reason to deny” system patently unjust, it’s a colossal waste of public resources! “Bureaucracy 101” — “Get it right at the initial level of the system.” 

Of course the battle here hasn’t concluded. The remand gives EOIR yet another opportunity to screw up. Given EOIR’s current indifference to quality and fairness, I wouldn’t count on them to “get it right this time around” — even with Judge Ruiz basically providing them with the correct answer!

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

02-20-23

DUE PROCESS WINS IN THE WEST: Split 9th Cir. Slams DOJ’s Vile/Unethical “No Due Process Due” Argument — Orders Bond Hearings For Asylum Applicants Who Passed Credible Fear — Padilla v. ICE — Round Table Amicus Brief Helps Save Due Process!

Padilla v. ICE

Padilla v. ICE, 9th Cir., 03-27-20, published

SUMMARY BY COURT STAFF:

SUMMARY* Immigration

Affirming in part, and vacating and remanding in part, the district court’s preliminary injunction ordering the United States to provide bond hearings to a class of noncitizens who were detained and found to have a credible fear of persecution, the panel affirmed the injunction insofar as it concluded that plaintiffs have a due process right to bond hearings, but remanded for further findings and reconsideration with respect to the particular process due to plaintiffs.

The district court certified a nationwide class of all detained asylum seekers who were subject to expedited removal proceedings, were found to have a credible fear of persecution, but were not provided a bond hearing with a record of hearing within seven days of requesting a hearing. Part A of the district court’s modified preliminary injunction provided: 1) bond hearings must take place within seven days of a class member’s request, or the member must be released; 2) the burden of proof is on the government to show why the

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

    

4 PADILLA V. ICE

member should not be released; and 3) the government must produce recordings or verbatim transcripts of the hearings, as well as written decisions. Part B concluded that the class is constitutionally entitled to bond hearings. A motions panel of this court previously denied the government’s request to stay Part B, but granted the stay as to Part A.

The panel concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their due process claim, explaining that immigration detention violates the Due Process Clause unless a special justification outweighs the constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint. The panel also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that other processes—seeking parole from detention or filing habeas petitions—were insufficient to satisfy due process. The panel further rejected the government’s suggestion that noncitizens lack any rights under the Due Process Clause, observing the general rule that once a person is standing on U.S. soil—regardless of the legality of entry—he or she is entitled to due process.

The panel next concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its irreparable harm analysis, noting substandard physical conditions and medical care in detention, lack of access to attorneys and evidence, separation from family, and re-traumatization. The panel also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the balance of the equities and public interest favors plaintiffs, explaining that the district court weighed: 1) plaintiffs’ deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right and its attendant harms; 2) the fact that it is always in the public interest to prevent constitutional violations; and 3) the

 

PADILLA V. ICE 5

government’s interest in the efficient administration of immigration law.

As to Part A of the injunction, the panel concluded that the record was insufficient to support the requirement of hearings within seven days, and that the district court made insufficient findings as to the burdens that Part A may impose on immigration courts. The panel also noted that the number of individuals in expedited removal proceedings may have dramatically increased since the entry of the injunction. Thus, the panel remanded to the district court for further factual development of the preliminary injunction factors as to Part A.

The panel also rejected the government’s argument that the district court lacked authority to grant injunction relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), which provides: “no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of [8 U.S.C. §§ 1221–1232], other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.” Examining the relevant precedent, statutory scheme, and legislative history, the panel concluded that here, where the class is composed of individual noncitizens, each of whom is in removal proceedings and facing an immediate violation of their rights, and where the district court has jurisdiction over each individual member of that class, classwide injunctive relief is consistent with congressional intent.

Finally, the panel concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the injunction as to the nationwide class. However, the panel directed that, on

 

6 PADILLA V. ICE

remand, the district court must also revisit the nationwide scope.

Dissenting, Judge Bade wrote that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) barred injunctive relief in this case, concluding that the majority’s opinion does not square with the plain text of § 1252(f)(1), is inconsistent with multiple Supreme Court cases, and needlessly creates a circuit split with the Sixth Circuit. Judge Bade further wrote that, even if the district court had jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief, the preliminary injunction is overbroad and exceeds what the constitution demands. Judge Bade would vacate the preliminary injunction and remand for further proceedings with instructions to dismiss the claims for classwide injunctive relief.

PANEL: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Michael Daly Hawkins and Bridget S. Bade, Circuit Judges.

OPNION BY: Chief Judge Sydney R. Thomas

DISSENTING OPINION: Judge Bridget S. Bade

KEY QUOTE FROM MAJORITY OPINION:

The government also suggests that non-citizens lack any rights under the Due Process Clause. As we have discussed, this position is precluded by Zadvydas and its progeny. The government relies on inapposite cases that address the peculiar constitutional status of noncitizens apprehended at a port-of-entry, but permitted to temporarily enter the United States under specific conditions. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei (“Mezei”), 345 U.S. 206, 208–09, 213–15 (1953) (noncitizen excluded while still aboard his ship, but then detained at Ellis Island pending final exclusion proceedings gained no additional procedural rights with respect to removal by virtue of his “temporary transfer from ship to shore” pursuant to a statute that “meticulously specified that such shelter ashore ‘shall not be considered a landing’”); Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958) (noncitizen paroled into the United States while waiting for a determination of her admissibility was not “within the United States” “by virtue of her physical presence as a parolee”); Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925) (noncitizen excluded at Ellis Island but detained instead of being deported immediately due to suspension of deportations during World War I “was to be regarded as stopped at the boundary line”).

Indeed, these cases, by carving out exceptions not applicable here, confirm the general rule that once a person is standing on U.S. soil—regardless of the legality of his or her entry—he or she is entitled to due process. See, e.g., Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212 (“[A]liens who have once passed

PADILLA V. ICE 25

through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law.”); Leng May Ma, 357 U.S. at 187 (explaining that “immigration laws have long made a distinction between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission . . . and those who are within the United States after an entry, irrespective of its legality,” and recognizing, “[i]n the latter instance . . . additional rights and privileges not extended to those in the former category who are merely ‘on the threshold of initial entry’” (quoting Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212)); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “the entry fiction is best seen . . .as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away” because “[o]therwise, the doctrine would allow any number of abuses to be deemed constitutionally permissible merely by labelling certain ‘persons’ as non-persons”). We thus conclude that the district court did not err in holding that plaintiffs are “persons” protected by the Due Process Clause.

*******************************

First, and foremost, let’s give a big vote of appreciation to the All-Star Team at Wilmer Cutler who represented our Round Table on this:

Alan Schoenfeld and Lori A. Martin, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, New York, New York; Rebecca Arriaga Herche, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Washington, D.C.; Jamil Aslam, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Los Angeles, California; for Amici Curiae Retired Immigration Judges and Board of Immigration Appeals Members.

Alan Schoenfeld
Alan Schoenfeld
Partner
Wilmer Cutler, NY
Lori a. Martin
Lori A. Martin
Partner
Wilmer Cutler, NY
Knjightess
Knightess of the Round Table

This team is it’s own “Special Forces Brigade” of the New Due Process Army (“NDPA”)!

WOW! Persons are “persons” under the Constitution even when they have brown skins and are asylum seekers! How “rad” can you get! What a blow to “business as usual” for the regime and their “Dred Scottification” program of dehumanizing and making non-persons out of migrants and other vulnerable minorities!

Too bad that the Supremes and other Circuit Courts have too often advanced “Dred Scottification,” hiding behind transparently bogus and contrived “national emergencies” and the doctrine of judicial dereliction of duty otherwise known as “Chevron deference.” I guess that’s why the regime has the contempt for both the law and the Article III Courts to press such legally, morally, and Constitutionally “bankrupt” arguments as they did in this case. Never know when you’ll get a “thumbs up” from those who sometimes don’t view oaths of office and their obligations to their fellow humans with enough seriousness!

Significantly, the panel found that “plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that they are constitutionally entitled to individualized bond hearings before a “neutral decisionmaker.” However, in doing so they “papered over” the obvious fact that the constitutional requirement of a “neutral decisionmaker” cannot be fulfilled as long as Billy Barr or other politicos control the Immigration Courts! 

Indeed, the panel decision was a strong rebuke of Barr’s atrocious, unethical, scofflaw decision in Matter of M-S-, 27 I&N Dec. 509 (A.G. 2019) purporting to unilaterally change the rules to eliminate bond for those who had passed “credible fear.” Fact is that no individual appearing in today’s Immigration Courts has access to the constitutionally-required “neutral decisionmaker” because Barr retains the ability to simply unilaterally change any result that doesn’t match his White Nationalist nativist agenda and can hire and fire the so-called “judges” at will.

Indeed, under Barr’s totally illegal and professionally insulting “production quotas,” I’m not sure that the “judges” on the “deportation assembly line” even get “production credit” for bond decisions because they aren’t “final orders of removal.” However, denial of bond is actually an important “whistle stop” on the “deportation express.” Those kept in the “New American Gulag” have difficulty finding attorneys and the systematic mistreatment they receive in detention helps to demoralize them and coerce them into giving up claims or waiving appeals.

When are the Article IIIs finally going to stop “beating around the bush” and hold this whole mess to be unconstitutional, as it most clearly is? 

In some ways, the panel’s decision reminds me of one of my own long-ago concurring/dissenting opinion in Matter of Joseph, 22 I&N Dec. 799, 810 (BIA 1999) (en banc) (“Joseph II”):

However, I do not share the majority’s view that the proper standard in a mandatory detention case involving a lawful permanent resident alien is that the Service is “substantially unlikely to prevail” on its charge. Matter of Joseph, 22 I&N Dec. 3398, at 10 (BIA 1999). Rather, the standard in a case such as the one before us should be whether the Service has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its charge that the respondent is removable because of an aggravated felony.

Mandatory detention of a lawful permanent resident alien is a drastic step that implicates constitutionally-protected liberty interests. Where the lawful permanent resident respondent has made a colorable showing in custody proceedings that he or she is not subject to mandatory detention, the Service should be required to show a likelihood of success on the merits of its charge to continue mandatory detention. To enable the Immigration Judge to make the necessary independent determination in such a case, the Service should provide evidence of the applicable state or federal law under which the respondent was convicted and whatever proof of conviction that is available at the time of the Immigration Judge’s inquiry.

The majority’s enunciated standard of “substantially unlikely to pre-vail” is inappropriately deferential to the Service, the prosecutor in this matter. Requiring the Service to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of its charge would not unduly burden the Service and would give more appropriate weight to the liberty interests of the lawful permanent res- ident alien. Such a standard also would provide more “genuine life to the regulation that allows for an Immigration Judge’s reexamination of this issue,” as referenced by the majority. Matter of Joseph, supra, at 10.

The Service’s failure to establish a likelihood of success on the merits would not result in the release of a lawful permanent resident who poses a threat to society. Continued custody of such an alien would still be war- ranted under the discretionary criteria for detention.

In conclusion, mandatory detention should not be authorized where the Service has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of its charge. Consequently, while I am in complete agreement with the decision to release this lawful permanent resident alien, and I agree fully that the Service is substantially unlikely to prevail on the merits of this aggravated felony charge, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s enunciation of “substantially unlikely to prevail” as the standard to be applied in all future cases involving mandatory detention of lawful permanent resident aliens.

Concern for Due Process and fundamental fairness have intentionally been eradicated in the Immigration “Courts” by Sessions, Whitaker, and Barr. It’s past time for this constitutional mockery to be put out of its misery (and the unending misery it causes for the humans coming before it) once and for all!

As my late BIA colleague Judge Fred W. Vacca once said, albeit in a different context, “It’s time to put an end to this pathetic imitation of an adjudication.” Fred and I didn’t always agree. In fact, we disagreed much of the time. But, he did know when it was finally time to “stop the nonsense,” even when some of our colleagues just kept the system churning long past the point of reason and sanity.

And, folks, that was back in the days when the BIA actually functioned more or less like an “independent appellate court” until the Ashcroft purge of ’03 forever ended that noble vision. Like the rest of the system and those who enable it to keep churning lives as if they were mere water under the bridge, the BIA and the rest of the Immigration “Courts” have now become a national disgrace — a blot on our national conscience. Human beings seeking justice are neither “numbers” to be achieved for “satisfactory ratings,” nor “enforcement problems” to be exterminated without Due Process.

Dehumanization of the “other”and stripping them of legal and human rights is a key part of fascism. It’s what allowed German judges and most of German society to “look the other way” or actively aid in the holocaust. It has no place in our justice system — now or ever!

Due Process Forever! Judicial Complicity in Weaponized Captive “Courts,” That Aren’t Courts At All, Never!

PWS

03-28-20