Former AG William Barr – immigrationcourtside.com

CHASE, SCHMIDT, & THE REST OF “OUR GANG” READY TO “STEP UP” TO TEACH ASYLUM LAW FOR FURLOUGHED U.S. IMMIGRATION JUDGES! – Read The Latest From Hon. Jeffrey Chase On How Asylum Law Can Be Properly Interpreted To Save Lives (What It’s Supposed To Do) & “Move” Dockets Without Curtailing Anyone’s Rights!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/1/20/ijs-grant-gender-based-asylum-claims

Jan 20 IJs Grant Gender-Based Asylum Claims

As my friend Paul Schmidt announced on his excellent blog immigrationcourtside.com, immigration judges in San Francisco and Arlington, VA recently issued written decisions granting asylum to victims of domestic violence. Notably, the decisions concluded that “Mexican females” and “women in Honduras” constituted cognizable particular social groups under applicable case law, including the former Attorney General’s decision in Matter of A-B-.

Asylum advocates have sought for many years to have the Board of Immigration Appeals recognize a particular social group defined by gender alone. However, the BIA has declined to consider the issue.1 The need for such guidance from the Board has increased significantly since the issuance of Matter of A-B- last June. Even under the holdings of that decision, gender continues to meet all of the criteria for a cognizable particular social group, as gender is an immutable characteristic fundamental to one’s identity, is sufficiently particular to provide a clear benchmark for inclusion, is socially distinct in all societies, and is not defined by the harm which gives rise to the applicant’s fear of persecution.

In the seven months since Matter of A-B- was issued, the BIA has yet to respond with a precedent decision affirming the continued viability of domestic violence-based asylum claims. Nor has the BIA affirmed that gender alone may constitute a cognizable particular social group for the above reasons, in spite of the fact that its members have had years to consider the issue, and could rely on so many outstanding legal sources on the topic. The BIA showed an ability to respond quickly in issuing a precedent decision in only two months time following the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions. So the present silence should be interpreted as a specific choice by the BIA to remain silent, likely motivated by its fear of upsetting its higher-ups in the present administration.

In the absence of guidance from the BIA, and while waiting for appeals to work their way through the circuit courts (I am aware of appeals relating to this issue currently pending in the First and Fourth Circuits), the two recent immigration judge decisions are encouraging. In the San Francisco case, Judge Miriam Hayward (who has since retired from the bench) found “Mexican females” to constitute a cognizable particular social group. In Arlington, Assistant Chief Immigration Judge Deepali Nadkarni made the same finding for the group consisting of “women in Honduras.” Redacted copies of their written decisions may be read here: http://immigrationcourtside.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/SF-IJ-Hayward-DV-PSG-grant.pdf; http://immigrationcourtside.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Nadkarni-Grant-Women-in-Honduras-PSG.pdf

In addition to their particular social group analysis, both decisions conclude that at least one central reason for the persecution suffered was the asylum applicant’s membership in the gender-defined group. For example, in the San Francisco case, Judge Hayward found such nexus was established by a combination of specific statements made by the male persecutor (i.e. “a woman’s only job was to shut up and obey her husband,” and “I’m the man and you’re going to do what I say”); a report of an expert on domestic violence citing gender as a motivating factor for domestic violence; and a statement in a multi-agency report that violence against women in Mexico “is perpetrated, in most cases, to conserve and reproduce the submission and subordination of them derived from relationships of power.”

In her decision, Judge Nadkarni held that the size of the group defined by gender does not prevent it from being defined with particularity, and noted that the BIA “has routinely recognized large groups as defined with particularity.” It also bears mentioning that the ICE prosecutor in Judge Nadkarni’s case “conceded that the Honduran police was unable or unwilling to protect the respondent…” Without such concession in her case, Judge Hayward found that country reports and Mexican law itself were sufficient to establish that the government was unable or unwilling to protect the respondent even under the heightened standard expressed by the former AG in Matter of A-B-.

As I stated in an earlier article, immigration judges have received no guidance or training from EOIR in analyzing domestic violence claims in the aftermath of Matter of A-B-. As a result, some immigration judges remain uncertain as to whether the law allows them to grant such claims at present. It is hoped that these decisions will serve as a useful template for judges. It seems particularly instructive that one such decision was issued by Judge Nadkarni, a management-level judge who supervises all immigration judges sitting in the Arlington, Batavia, Buffalo, and Charlotte Immigration Courts, as well as the Headquarters court which hears cases remotely by televideo. Judge Nadkarni is the direct boss of V. Stuart Couch, the Charlotte-based immigration judge whose refusal to grant asylum as directed by the BIA in Matter of A-B- led to the former Attorney General’s certifying that case to himself.

Congratulations to attorneys Kelly Engel Wells of Delores Street Community Services and Mark Stevens of Murray Osorio PLLC for successfully representing the asylum applicants.

In light of these decisions, and in the absence of guidance from EOIR, our group of former immigration judges and BIA members would be happy to provide sitting judges with outside training and resources on this topic. Interested judges may contact me, and perhaps we can set up group training sessions for furloughed judged during the present shutdown.

Notes:

See, e.g. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388, 395, n. 16, acknowledging the argument of amici “that gender alone should be enough to constitute a particular social group in this matter,” but declining to reach the issue.

Copyright 2019 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

JEFF CHASE

Jeffrey S. Chase is an immigration lawyer in New York City. Jeffrey is a former Immigration Judge, senior legal advisor at the Board of Immigration Appeals, and volunteer staff attorney at Human Rights First. He is a past recipient of AILA’s annual Pro Bono Award, and previously chaired AILA’s Asylum Reform Task Force.

EOIR would do much better if it were to lose the venomous “(junior) partner of DHS Enforcement, no sympathy, compassion, or kindness for the most vulnerable among us, and scofflaw” persona that it acquired under White Nationalist AG Jeff “Gonzo Apocalypto” Sessions and act more like a real court of law (or at least a fair and impartial quasi-judicial tribunal) again.

While there is zero chance of it happening, soon to be AG Bill Barr (who grotesquely has painted himself as a great admirer of his biased and incompetent predecessor) would do himself and our country a great and lasting service if he hired a retired Federal Judge with a strong record in (positive) humanitarian law, individual due process, and court administration (e.g., a “reincarnation” of the late Judge Patricia Wald) to run and rebuild EOIR with a Due Process, independent adjudication, and judicial efficiency focus, and kept the politicos out of the process, no matter how much they might complain or not like fair results on the “deportation railway.” But, not going to happen till we get “regime change.”

Viewing “law enforcement” as a solemn responsibility to insure that individuals’ rights are protected, individuals are treated fairly regardless of status, creed, gender, or race, and that life-saving protection is generously granted whenever legally possible is as much a part of the Attorney General’s Constitutional responsibility as booting folks out of the country. It’s sad, disturbing, and very damaging to our country, that so few Attorneys General have taken this responsibility seriously, particularly in recent years.

PWS

01-21-18

HON. JEFFREY S. CHASE: DHS’S ARROGANT “IN YOUR FACE” APPROACH TO “PEREIRA NOTICE” CASES APPEARS TO BE BACKFIRING WITH ARTICLE IIIs — US District Judge in Nevada Latest To Find That “Pereira Defective NTAs” Gave Immigration Judge No Jurisdiction Over Removal Case!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/12/8/interpreting-pereira-a-hint-of-things-to-come

I haven’t posted for a while. I’ve been extremely busy, but there was something else: my response to so many recent events has been just pure anger. Although I’ve written the occasional “cry from the heart,” I don’t want this blog to turn into the rantings of an angry old man.

So I resume posting with a case that provides a glimmer of hope (and, hopefully, a hint of things to come?). Last week, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, a court generally known for its conservatism, issued an order granting an emergency stay of removal in the case of Manuel Leonidas Duran-Ortega v. U.S. Attorney General. As is common in such types of grants, the three-judge panel issued a decision consisting of two sentences, granting the stay, and further granting the request of interested organizations to allow them to file an amicus (“friend of the court”) brief.

What made this decision noteworthy is that one of the judges on the panel felt the need to write a rather detailed concurring opinion. Among the issues discussed in that opinion is the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions (which I wrote about here: https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/9/1/the-bia-vs-the-supreme-court) on Mr. Duran-Ortega’s case. As in Pereira, the document filed by DHS with the immigration court in order to commence removal proceedings lacked a time and date of hearing. In her concurring opinion, Judge Beverly B. Martin observed that under federal regulations, jurisdiction vests, and immigration proceedings commence, only when a proper charging document is filed. The document filed in Mr. Duran-Ortega’s case purported to be a legal document called a Notice to Appear. But as Judge Martin noted, “The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Pereira appears to suggest, as Duran-Ortega argues, that self-described “notice to appears” issued without a time or place are not, in fact, notice to appears” within the meaning of the statute.

Judge Martin (a former U.S. Attorney and Georgia state Assistant Attorney General) continued that the Pereira decision “emphasized” that the statute does not say that a Notice to Appear is “complete” when it contains a time and date of the hearing; rather, he quotes the Pereira decision as holding that the law defines that a document called a “Notice to Appear” must specify “at a minimum the time and date of the removal proceeding.” The judge follows that quote with the highlight of her decision: “In other words, just as a block of wood is not a pencil if it lacks some kind of pigmented core to write with, a piece of paper is not a notice to appear absent notification of the time and place of a petitioner’s removal proceeding.”

As this Reuters article reported (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-terminations/u-s-courts-abruptly-tossed-9000-deportation-cases-heres-why-idUSKCN1MR1HK) enough immigration judges had a similar reading of Pereira to terminate 9,000 removal cases in the two months between the Supreme Court’s decision and the issuance of a contrary ruling by the Board of Immigration Appeals, in which the BIA’s judges, out of fear of then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions, chose appeasement of their boss over their duty to reach fair and independent decisions.

Judge Martin referenced that BIA decision, Matter of Bermudez-Cota, but stated: “This court need not defer to Bermudez-Cota if the agency’s holding is based on an unreasonable interpretation of the statutes and regulations involved, or if its holding is unambiguously foreclosed by the law…In light of Pereira and the various regulations and statutes at issue here, it may well be the case that deference is unwarranted.”

For those readers who are not immigration practitioners, attorneys with ICE (which is part of the Department of Homeland Security) and the Office of Immigration Litigation (“OIL”) (which is part of the Department of Justice, along with the BIA) have been filing briefs opposing motions to terminate under Pereira using language best described as snarky. A recent brief fled by OIL called the argument that proceedings commenced with a document lacking a time and date must be terminated under Pereira “an unnatural, distorted interpretation of the Supreme Court’s opinion,” and a “labored interpretation of Pereira.” A brief recently filed by ICE called the same argument an “overbroad and unsupported expansion of Pereira [which] is unwarranted and ignores the Court’s clear and unmistakable language.”

There is an old adage among lawyers that when the facts don’t favor your client, pound the law; when the law doesn’t favor your client, pound the facts; and when neither the law nor the facts favor your client, pound the table. I find the tone of the government’s briefs as sampled above to be the equivalent of pounding the table. The government is claiming that to interpret the Supreme Court’s language that “a notice that lacks a time and date is not a Notice to Appear” as meaning exactly what it says is an unnatural, distorted interpretation that is labored and ignores the clear language of the Court. The government then counters by claiming that the natural, obvious, clear interpretation is the exact opposite of what Pereira actually says.

So although it is just the view of one judge in one circuit in the context of a concurring opinion, it nevertheless feels very good to see a circuit court judge calling out the BIA, OIL, and DHS on their coordinated nonsense. Three U.S. district courts have already agreed with the private bar’s reading of Pereira, in U.S. v. Virgen Ponce (Eastern District of Washington); in U.S. v. Pedroza-Rocha (Western District of Texas); and just yesterday, in U.S. v. Soto-Mejia (D. Nev.). At this point, this is only cause for cautious optimism. But as an immigration lawyer named Aaron Chenault was articulately quoted as saying in the above Reuters article, for now, Pereira (and its proper interpretation by some judges) has provided “a brief glimmer of hope, like when you are almost drowning and you get one gasp.” Well said.

Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

REPRINTED WITH PERMISSION

JEFF CHASE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v.
RAUL SOTO-MEJIA, Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-cr-00150-RFB-NJK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA

December 6, 2018

ORDER

        Before the Court is Mr. Soto-Mejia’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 21] the Indictment in this case, for the reasons stated below the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss.

        I. Factual Findings

        Based upon the record, including the joint stipulation of fact submitted by the parties [ECF No. 41], the Court makes the following factual findings. Mr. Soto-Mejia was encountered by immigration officials on February 7, 2018 in California. On that same day, February 7, the Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear for Removal Proceedings (NTA) against Soto-Mejia. The Notice to Appear stated that Soto-Mejia was to appear before an immigration judge on a date and time “[t]o be set” and at a place “[t]o be determined.” Soto-Mejia was personally served with the Notice to Appear at 10400 Rancho Road in Adelanto, California, 92401. The Notice to Appear contained allegations and provided a potential legal basis for Soto-Mejia’s removal from the United States. The Notice to Appear was filed with the Immigration Court in Adelanto, California on February 12, 2018.

        On February 27, 2018 an order advancing the removal hearing was served on a custodial officer for Soto-Mejia. On February 27, 2018, a letter entitled “Notice of Hearing in Removal Proceedings” addressed to Soto-Mejia at the Adelanto Detention Facility on 10250 Rancho Road

Page 2

in Adelanto, California, 92301 was served on a custodial officer for Soto-Mejia. The letter indicated that a hearing before Immigration Court was scheduled for March 7, 2018 at 1:00 p.m. The Notice of Hearing did not reference the nature or basis of the legal issues or charges for the removal proceedings. The Notice of Hearing also did not reference any particular Notice to Appear.

        On March 7, 2018, the “Order of the Immigration Judge” indicates that Soto-Mejia appeared at the Immigration Court hearing and that he was ordered removed from the United States to Mexico. Soto-Mejia was deported on March 8, 2018. Subsequently, Soto-Mejia was encountered in the United States again and was ordered removed on March 19, 2018. The March 19 Order, as a reinstate of the prior order, derived its authority to order removal from the March 7 Order. The Indictment in this case explicitly references and relies upon the March 7 and March 19 removal orders as a basis for establishing a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 by Soto-Mejia.

        II. Legal Standard

        Since a prior order of removal is a predicate element of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, a defendant may collaterally attack the underlying removal order.United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2004). To prevail on such a collateral challenge to a deportation order, the individual must demonstrate that (1) he exhausted any administrative remedies he could have used to challenge the order (or is excused from such exhaustion); (2) the deportation proceedings deprived the individual of judicial review (or is excused from seeking judicial review); (3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair. 8 U.S.C. 1326(d); Ramos, 623 F.3d at 680.

        A removal order is “fundamentally unfair” if (1) an individual’s due process rights were violated by defects in the underlying proceeding, and (2) the individual suffered prejudice as a result. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d at 1048.

        III. Discussion

        The Defendant argues that this case must be dismissed because his criminal prosecution derives from a defective immigration proceeding in which the immigration court did not have

Page 3

jurisdiction to commence removal proceedings against him because the Notice to Appear initiating the proceeding was defective. He argues that the March 7 Order is thus void as the immigration court did not have jurisdiction to issue an order. He further argues that, as the initial March 7, 2018 deportation order is void, the subsequent reinstatement removal order of March 19, 2018 is also void as it derived its authority from the March 7 Order. Specifically, Soto-Mejia argues that the initial Notice to Appear that issued in his case did not include a time and location for the proceeding. Relying upon the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S.Ct. 2105 (2018), Soto-Mejia argues that a notice to appear must contain a location and time for a removal hearing in order to create jurisdiction for the immigration court. Id. at 2110. As the Notice to Appear in this case did not contain such information, the immigration court, according to Soto-Mejia, did not have jurisdiction to issue a removal or deportation order.

        The government responds with several arguments. First, the government argues that Soto-Mejia waived his argument regarding jurisdiction—claiming that it is personal rather subject matter jurisdiction which is at issue—by not raising a jurisdictional objection in the immigration proceeding and conceding to the immigration court’s jurisdiction by appearing. Second, the government avers that the immigration court’s jurisdiction is determined by the federal regulations and that the Notice to Appear in this case contained the information it must pursuant to those regulations to vest the immigration court with jurisdiction. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.14(a), 1003.15(b) and (c). Third, the government argues that the holding in Pereia is limited to the cases in which a court must determine the validity of a particular notice to appear as it relates to the triggering of the “stop-time rule.” Id. at 2116. Fourth, the government argues that there is no prejudice to Soto-Mejia as any defect was cured by the Notice of Hearing and Soto-Mejia’s participation in the removal proceedings. The Court rejects all of the government’s arguments.

        A. The Removal Orders of March 7 and March 19 Violated Due Process As the Immigration Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction

        The Court finds that Supreme Court’s holding in Pereira to be applicable and controlling in this case. First, the Court finds pursuant to the plain language of the regulations that the jurisdiction of the immigration court “vests” only “when a charging document is filed with the

Page 4

Immigration Court.” 8 C.F.R. §1003.14. A “Notice to Appear” is such a “charging document.” Id. at § 1003.13. Relying upon the reasoning of Pereira, this Court finds that the definition of a “Notice to Appear” is controlled by statute and not regulation, as the Supreme Court expressly rejected in Pereira the regulation-based interpretation by the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644 (2011). Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2111-14. And, pursuant to Pereira, a Notice to Appear must include the time and location for the hearing. Id. at 2114-17. As the Notice to Appear in this case failed to include the time and location for the hearing, the immigration court did not have jurisdiction to issue its March 7 deportation order.

        The Court rejects the government’s argument that Soto-Mejia waived his jurisdictional argument by not raising it earlier and by participating in the underlying immigration proceeding. The government’s argument conflates personal jurisdiction with subject matter jurisdiction. Soto-Mejia’s argument is founded upon his assertion that the immigration court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and not personal jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction is a limitation on “federal power” that “cannot be waived” so “a party does not waive the requirement [of subject matter jurisdiction] by failing to challenge jurisdiction early in the proceedings.” Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 (1982). Moreover, the plain language of the regulation establishing the immigration court’s jurisdiction explicitly notes that an immigration court’s authority only “vests” with the filing of a “charging document” and the regulation makes no reference to a waiver exception to this requirement for subject matter jurisdiction. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a).

        The Court also rejects the government’s argument that the holding in Pereira is limited to cases determining the applicability of the stop-time rule. As noted, the Supreme Court’s holding in Pereira was based upon the plain language of the text of 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.13 and 1003.14 and 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2111-13. Section 1003.13 specifies which documents can constitute a “charging document” for immigration proceedings after April 1, 1997. The parties all concede in this case that the only document in this record that is a “charging document” is the Notice to Appear. Id. The Court in Pereira explained that the text of Section 1229(a) lays out the statutory definition of and requirements for a “Notice to Appear” which includes the time and

Page 5

location for the hearing. 138 S. Ct. at 2114. The Supreme Court unambiguously proclaimed: “A putative notice to appear that fails to designate the specific time or place of the noncitizen’s removal proceedings is not a ‘notice to appear under section 1229(a).“‘” Id. at 2113-14 (emphasis added). While the Supreme Court applied this definition to the determination of the applicability of the stop-time rule, the express language of this holding does not suggest any limitation on the Court’s definition of what is and is not a “Notice to Appear” under Section 1229(a) with respect to the requirement for the notice to contain a time and location.

        There is no basis to assume or conclude that the definition of a “Notice to Appear” under Section 1229(a) would be different without reference to the stop-time rule. That is because the fundamental question that the Supreme Court was answering in Pereira is whether a notice must contain the time and location of the hearing to be a “notice to appear” under Section 1229(a). 138 S. Ct. at 2113-17. In answering this foundational question, the Court did not rely upon the stop-time rule to determine the definition of a notice to appear under Section 1229(a). To the contrary, the Court spent considerable time explaining why consideration of the stop-time rule’s “broad reference” to all of the paragraphs of Section 1229(a) did not alter the fact that the essential definition of and requirements for the notice arise in the first paragraph. 138 S. Ct. at 2114 (noting that the “broad reference to §1229(a) is of no consequence, because as even the Government concedes, only paragraph (1) bears on the meaning of a ‘notice to appear'”). This first paragraph requires that the notice contain the time and location for the removal proceeding.

        The Court is also unpersuaded that a defect in a “Notice to Appear” can be ‘cured’ as the government suggests by the filing and/or serving of the Notice of Hearing on Soto-Mejia. That is because such an argument is contrary to the plain text of the regulation, Section 1003.14(a), which unequivocally states that an immigration court’s jurisdiction only “vests” or arises with the filing of a “charging document.” A Notice of Hearing is not one of the “charging documents” referenced in Section 1003.13. A Notice of Hearing cannot therefore commence an immigration proceeding by subsequently providing a time and location for a removal hearing. Consequently, if the immigration court’s jurisdiction never arose because the Notice to Appear was invalid, then there is no proceeding in which a Notice of Hearing could properly be filed. There is nothing to cure.

Page 6

        Moreover, the Court also finds that the Notice of Hearing in this case did not reference a specific Notice to Appear. Indeed, the government conceded and the Court finds that the Notice of Hearing form does not generally, or in this case, reference a prior specific Notice to Appear and it does not contain information about the legal issues or charges which serve as a basis for the removal proceedings. The two documents only common identifying information is the A-file number of the particular person—Soto-Mejia in this case. This means that if an individual had multiple potential charges or legal issues related to his immigration status, the Notice of Hearing could not inform him about which charges were at issue in the upcoming hearing and the Notice of Hearing could be filed months or years after the Notice to Appear. Indeed, this is the very reason that the Supreme Court in Pereira rejected the argument that the “Notice to Appear” did not have to include the time and location of the removal proceeding, because that would defeat the ultimate objective of requiring notice—allowing the person to prepare for the hearing and potentially consult with counsel. 138 S. Ct. at 2114-15. As the Court noted, if there was no requirement for this information “the [g]overnment could serve a document labeled ‘notice to appear’ without listing the time and location of the hearing and then, years down the line, provide that information a day before the removal hearing when it becomes available.” Id. at 2115. Under such an interpretation “a noncitizen theoretically would have had the ‘opportunity to secure counsel,’ but that opportunity will not be meaningful” as the person would not truly have the opportunity to consult with counsel and prepare for the proceeding.” Id. As a Notice of Hearing, like the one here, is not explicitly connected to a particular Notice to Appear and the associated charges, the Court finds that it cannot serve to ‘cure’ a defective Notice to Appear such as in this case.

        B. The Defendant Suffered Prejudice¹

        The Court further finds that the Soto-Mejia suffered prejudice as a result of the defect in the underlying proceeding. Specifically, he was subjected to removal twice based upon the initial

Page 7

March 7 Order which the immigration court did not have jurisdiction to issue. The government’s argument that Soto-Mejia was not prejudiced because he “participated” in the removal proceedings misses the point. It is immaterial if he participated in the proceedings. He suffered prejudice by the issuance of the deportation orders because the immigration court lacked jurisdiction to order his removal on March 7, 2018.

        IV. Conclusion

        For the reasons stated, the Court finds that the March 7 and March 19 deportation orders are void due to the immigration court’s lack of jurisdiction. As these orders are void, the Court finds that the government cannot establish a predicate element—the prior removal or deportation of Soto-Mejia—of the sole offense in the Indictment. The Indictment in this case must therefore be dismissed.

        Accordingly,

        IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. The Indictment in this case is DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court shall close this case.

        IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as this Court has no authority to detain Defendant Soto-Mejia pursuant to this case, he is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED.

        DATED this 6th day of December, 2018.

        /s/_________

        UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

——–

Footnotes:

        ^1. The Court finds that Soto-Mejia is not required to have exhausted any possible administrative remedies, because (a) the Supreme Court decision in Pereira issued after his March 7, 2018 proceeding and (b) defects as to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 702-03.

************************************

Unlike the BIA’s convoluted reasoning in Matter of Bemudez-Cota, 27 I&N Dec. 441 (BIA 2018), Judge Boulware’s analysis is very straightforward and complies with both the statutory language and the Supreme Court decision. What’s not to like about that?

As I’ve pointed out before, Sessions was so busy artificially “jacking up” the backlog and intimidating the Immigration Judges working for him that he never bothered to address the many solvable legal and administrative problems facing the Immigration Courts. That could mean not only more failed criminal prosecutions, but perhaps more significantly, could invalidate the vast majority of the 1.1 million case backlog that Sessions artificially increased with his short-sighted, racially motivated “gonzo” polices and interpretations.

And Whitaker is following in his footsteps by taking issues off the “restrictionist checklist” for screwing asylum seekers and migrants, rather than addressing the real legal and administrative deficiencies that make the Immigration Court a parody of justice in America.

Sadly, I wouldn’t expect any improvement under Barr, whose recent totally revolting “paean to Jeff Sessions” (co-authored with former GOP AGs Meese & Mukasey) projects that until we get “regime change,” justice in America will continue to be reserved for well-to-do straight evangelical White men. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/jeff-sessions-can-look-back-on-a-job-well-done/2018/11/07/527e5830-e2cf-11e8-8f5f-a55347f48762_story.html?utm_term=.aaad2f8e6250

People of color and other vulnerable minorities should continue to beware of the “Department of Injustice.”

Here’s a very compelling article by ACLU Legal Director David Cole on why Bill Barr is likely to be a “Button Down Corporate Version of Jeff Sessions.” https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/no-relief-william-barr-bad-jeff-sessions-if-not-worse

Darn, perhaps carried away with all the tributes to Bush I, I had hoped for a conservative, law enforcement oriented, but non-racist, non-White-Nationalist approach to immigration. Something like firm, but fair, unbiased, professional, and rationally managed. Guess that just isn’t going to happen under a GOP that has made racist appeals, xenophobia, false narratives, and anti-democracy part of its official agenda. I have a tendency to give everyone the “benefit of the doubt” at least until proven otherwise. I guess I have to alter that when dealing with anyone associated with today’s GOP.

That’s why the New Due Process Army must continue to be America’s bastion against the forces of darkness that threaten us all.

PWS

12-10-18

WE EX-DOJ FOLKS AREN’T THE ONLY ONES CHALLENGING WHITAKER’S QUALIFICATIONS: WASHINGTON POST EDITORIAL SAYS “Mr. Whitaker should not have been acting attorney general for a day.”

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-still-unanswered-questions-surrounding-matthew-whitaker/2018/12/05/88f3f32e-f8c4-11e8-863c-9e2f864d47e7_story.html?utm_term=.6cb55b7e9ff5

By Editorial Board

December 5 at 6:54 PM

DID ACTING attorney general Matthew G. Whitaker examine the memo that special counsel Robert S. Mueller III released Tuesday? Has he seen the material that Mr. Mueller redacted from the document? Has he sought the advice of Justice Department ethics experts on how much he should be involved in the Russia investigation? If so, what did those experts say?

A month into Mr. Whitaker’s reign as the nation’s chief law enforcement officer, these and other questions remain unanswered. A Justice Department spokeswoman declined to answer when we put them to her on Wednesday. Also mysterious is when President Trump intends to nominate a permanent attorney general. The White House did not respond when we asked. And then there’s the still-contested question of whether Mr. Whitaker’s appointment violated the Constitution.

All of these questions matter, because Mr. Mueller’s investigation continues, and Mr. Whitaker had previously attacked the probe. His past statements alone would raise questions about his judgment and the reasoning behind Mr. Trump’s desire for him to lead the Justice Department. Though Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein remains in charge of the Mueller investigation, it is unclear whether the acting attorney general has butted in or intends to. Senators have pushed to pass a bill that would protect Mr. Mueller from improper firing, the approval of which would send a message to Mr. Trump and Mr. Whitaker to keep their hands off. But Senate Republicans have blocked it, and Mr. Whitaker might find subtle ways of undermining the probe.

Mr. Whitaker does not belong at the top of the Justice Department, regardless of his stance on Mr. Mueller. His résumé would be thin even for an inferior post at the department. His past involvement with a company the Federal Trade Commission accused of being a scam raises further red flags. He holds crackpot views on judicial power. His primary qualification seems to be that he gets along with Mr. Trump and other White House staff, while Mr. Rosenstein, whom the Senate has vetted and who should be running the department right now, does not. There is a reason the Constitution bars the president from appointing anyone he wants at any time to top executive-branch positions: to prevent the Mr. Whitakers of the world from suddenly controlling one of the most powerful governmental organizations on the planet.

Yet, if the Trump administration’s view of the law holds, Mr. Whitaker could wield the powers of the attorney general’s office for most of the rest of Mr. Trump’s term. Senate Democrats are upset at the lack of vetting, sending a letter to the department on Tuesday noting that ethics officials only just got through certifying Mr. Whitaker’s financial disclosures, and that “the Department has not produced prior versions of Mr. Whitaker’s financial disclosures, any ethics agreements he entered into with the Department, or any other ethics-related counseling he has received.” Senate Republicans, on the other hand, have mostly insisted that the president will appoint a permanent replacement soon.

It has already been a month. Mr. Whitaker should not have been acting attorney general for a day. It is time the Senate demands a reasonable replacement.

**********************************************

Here’s my post yesterday about the letter by members of “Our Gang” of retired Immigration Judges and other DOJ employees: https://wp.me/p8eeJm-3mr

Like this editorial, I think Whitaker’s qualifications and resume wouldn’t have gotten him into the “Attorney General’s Honors Program” nor would it have gotten him to the “Interview Round” for selection as a U.S. Immigration Judge. It’s worth remembering that among the many other “trivializations of justice at Justice” during his tenure, Sessions made this supremely unqualified and unethical guy his “Chief of Staff.” It’s the “Ethically and Professionally Challenged” advising the “Morally and Legally Challenged.”

It does seem to me that former AG Bill Barr would be capable of bringing ethics and professionalism back to the DOJ. My only questions are 1) why would he want the job; and 2) why would Trump want a “real” Attorney General who knows that he works for “We the People,” not Donald Trump, the Trump family, or their corrupt cronies and who, while staunchly conservative, is not known as a racist, misogynist, or xenophobe? Unlike Sessions, Barr also has a reputation as a capable and experienced manager who can see that justice is dispensed in a fair and unbiased manner, both of which are an anathema to guys like Sessions and Trump.

One thing I remember learning abut Bill Barr “after the fact” was that following the 1992 election (when I was in private practice), he reportedly specifically refused pressure to make some key high level career “midnight appointments” at EOIR, saying that it properly should be left for his successor in the Clinton Administration. That turned out to be Attorney General Janet Reno (who eventually appointed me to the position of BIA Chair, although that was not one of the then-existing vacancies involved).

PWS

12-06-18

VARIOUS SUITS FILED CHALLENGING AUTHORITY OF U.S. IMMIGRATION JUDGES IN THE “ERA OF WHITAKER” – Is It Really Possible That All DOJ Actions Since Sessions’s Firing Are Invalid?

https://www.kolkoassociates.com/immigration-and-firm-news/lawsuit-challenges-immigration-judges-whitaker

Here’s a timely update from Jennifer Casey, Partner at Kolko & Associates in Denver, CO:

Lawsuit Challenges Power of Immigration Judges to Hear Cases Due to Unlawful Designation of their Delegating Authority: Acting Attorney General Matthew Whitaker

Posted by Jennifer Caseyon Wednesday, 05 December 2018 in Immigration and Firm News

On December 4, 2018, Mr. Carlos Rojo-Ramirez, of Colorado, through his attorneys David. L. Kolko and Jennifer Casey (Kolko & Associates, P.C.), challenged President Trump’s unlawful designation of Matthew G. Whitaker as Acting Attorney General of the United States.

In, Rojo-Ramirez v. Trump, et. al., (18-cv-03125), filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, Mr. Rojo-Ramirez asserted that U.S. Immigration Judges are temporarily operating without any legal authority because their power over individuals in immigration removal proceedings is based solely on a delegation of authority from a (lawfully appointed) Attorney General of the United States.

On November 7, 2018, President Trump announced via Twitter that he designated Matthew Whitaker to serve as the Acting Attorney General of the United States. The designation was made without Senate confirmation as required by the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and was executed in violation of the Attorney General Succession Act and Federal Vacancies Reform Act.

This follows other legal actions brought by the State of Maryland and Senators Blumenthal, Whitehouse and Hirono, as well as an amicus brief in Matter of Negusie, 27 I&N Dec. 481 (A.G.) by the American Immigration Council, each of which challenge the unconstitutional appointment of the Acting Attorney General and the resulting legal implications from the unlawful designation.

The Immigration Judges serving at the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) are not independent administrative judges, and operate solely by statute and regulation as delegates of the Attorney General. Plaintiff’s counsel asserts that because Whitaker has not been constitutionally appointed, he does not hold any power to delegate the authority of the office of the Attorney General to the Immigration Judges serving at the EOIR. As a result, these Immigration Judges do not presently have legal authority to preside over the cases before them.

Due to the unique legal structure of the EOIR, with Immigration Judges acting as delegates of a (lawfully appointed) Attorney General, this case calls in to question the legal authority of any actions by the EOIR’s Immigration Judges after November 7, 2018. Nationwide, there are over one million cases pending before approximately 400 Immigration Judges serving in 62 Immigration Courts.

The Plaintiff’s legal challenge includes a request for declaratory judgment and injunction until such time as a lawfully appointed Attorney General is serving in this role, and is able to lawfully delegate the authority of that office to the Immigration Judges of the United States.

For more information, please contact David Kolko or Jennifer Casey at Kolko & Associates, P.C.

***********************************************

As usual, Trump has taken the most idiotic approach to governing. He could have gotten rid of Sessions (hard to argue with that, no matter what his reason) and avoided any problems by 1) appointing the duly confirmed Deputy, Rod Rosenstein, as Acting AG; and 2) having another suitable candidate, such as former AG Bill Barr, ready to submit to Congress. I suspect that Barr would have been easily confirmed during the “lame duck” session. But, making government function in a reasonable and lawful manner isn’t what Trump and his cronies are about.

PWS

12-06-18

WashPost: Another View — Former AG Bill Barr Says Comey Firing Is All Good!

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/former-attorney-general-trump-made-the-right-call-on-comey/2017/05/12/0e858436-372d-11e7-b4ee-434b6d506b37_story.html?hpid=hp_no-name_opinion-card-b%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.cac253d3cd55

Barr writes in an op-ed:

William Barr was U.S. attorney general from 1991 to 1993.

“Having served as both attorney general and deputy attorney general in the Justice Department, I had responsibility for supervising the FBI, working on virtually a daily basis with its senior leadership. From that experience I came to understand how fortunate we are as a nation to have in the FBI the finest law-enforcement organization in the world — one that is thoroughly professional and free of partisanship. I offer this perspective on President Trump’s removal of FBI Director James B. Comey.

Comey is an extraordinarily gifted man who has contributed much during his many years of public service. Unfortunately, beginning in July, when he announced the outcome of the FBI investigation into Hillary Clinton’s use of a private email server while secretary of state, he crossed a line that is fundamental to the allocation of authority in the Justice Department.

While the FBI carries out investigative work, the responsibility for supervising, directing and ultimately determining the resolution of investigations is solely the province of the Justice Department’s prosecutors. With an investigation as sensitive as the one involving Clinton, the ultimate decision-making is reserved to the attorney general or, when the attorney general is recused, the deputy attorney general. By unilaterally announcing his conclusions regarding how the matter should be resolved, Comey arrogated the attorney general’s authority to himself

It is true, as I pointed out in a Post op-ed in October, that Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch, after her tarmac meeting with Bill Clinton, had left a vacuum by neither formally recusing herself nor exercising supervision over the case. But the remedy for that was for Comey to present his factual findings to the deputy attorney general, not to exercise the prosecutorial power himself on a matter of such grave importance.

Until Comey’s testimony last week, I had assumed that Lynch had authorized Comey to act unilaterally. It is now clear that the department’s leadership was sandbagged. I know of no former senior Justice Department official — Democrat or Republican — who does not view Comey’s conduct in July to have been a grave usurpation of authority.

. . . .

It is telling that none of the president’s critics are challenging the decision on the merits. None argue that Comey’s performance warranted keeping him on as director. Instead, they are attacking the president’s motives, claiming the president acted to neuter the investigation into Russia’s role in the election.

The notion that the integrity of this investigation depends on Comey’s presence just does not hold water. Contrary to the critics’ talking points, Comey was not “in charge” of the investigation.

. . . .

According to news reports, the investigation is in full swing, with the Justice Department using a grand jury to subpoena relevant information, indicating a degree of thoroughness not evident in the investigation into Clinton’s email server. Comey’s removal simply has no relevance to the integrity of the Russian investigation as it moves ahead.”

************************************************

Read Barr’s entire op-ed at the link.

So, according to Barr, that the Administration lied about the real reasons for firing Comey, the Russia investigation, should be of no concern to us. We should be reassured because the investigation is proceeding under the direction of DOJ underlings, who owe their continued employment to Jeff Sessions and report to DAG Rod “The Dupe” Rosenstein, who helped the White House provide a “non-Russian” rationale for the firing, which Trump later repudiated. And, we should believe that the Director of the FBI was not “in charge” of the Bureau’s most significant and high-profile investigation. So then, it doesn’t make any difference who Trump picks for the next Director because he (or she) will just be a figurehead, having no responsibility for the work of subordinates.

Wow! Why have an FBI Director at all, if you believe Barr. Maybe you buy Barr’s reasoning, but I don’t. In fact, I find his entire argument highly disingenuous.

PWS

05-13-17

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/1/20/ijs-grant-gender-based-asylum-claims

Jan 20 IJs Grant Gender-Based Asylum Claims

Related posts:

That’s why the New Due Process Army must continue to be America’s bastion against the forces of darkness that threaten us all.

Related posts:

Related posts:

Lawsuit Challenges Power of Immigration Judges to Hear Cases Due to Unlawful Designation of their Delegating Authority: Acting Attorney General Matthew Whitaker

Related posts:

Related posts: