HALLOWEEN HORROR STORY: Opaque & Biased Politicized Judicial Hiring Denies Migrants The Fair & Impartial Adjudication To Which They Are Constitutionally Entitled – Given The Generous Legal Standards, A Worldwide Refugee Crisis, & Asylum Officers’ Positive Findings In Most Cases, Asylum Seekers Should Be Winning The Vast Majority Of Immigration Court Cases — Instead, They Are Being “Railroaded” By A Biased System & Complicit Article III Courts!

Tanvi Misra
Tanvi Misra
Immigration Reporter
Roll Call

 

https://www.rollcall.com/news/congress/doj-changed-hiring-promote-restrictive-immigration-judges?fbclid=IwAR2VfI3AKcttNoXlc_MX0sa-6X94bsOWF4btxb7tWDBz7Es4bvqB63oZA-0

 

Tanvi Misra reports for Roll Call:

 

DOJ changed hiring to promote restrictive immigration judges

New practice permanently placed judges on powerful appellate board, documents show

Posted Oct 29, 2019 2:51 PM

Tanvi Misra

@Tanvim

More non-Spanish speaking migrants are crossing the borderDHS advances plan to get DNA samples from immigrant detaineesWhite House plans to cut refugee admittance to all-time low

 

Error! Filename not specified.

James McHenry, director of the Justice Department’s Executive Office for Immigration Review, testifies before a Senate panel in 2018. Memos from McHenry detail changes in hiring practices for six restrictive judges placed permanently on the Board of Immigration Appeals. (Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)

The Department of Justice has quietly changed hiring procedures to permanently place immigration judges repeatedly accused of bias to a powerful appellate board, adding to growing worries about the politicization of the immigration court system.

Documents obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests describe how an already opaque hiring procedure was tweaked for the six newest hires to the 21-member Board of Immigration Appeals. All six board members, added in August, were immigration judges with some of the highest asylum denial rates. Some also had the highest number of decisions in 2017 that the same appellate body sent back to them for reconsideration. All six members were immediately appointed to the board without a yearslong probationary period.

[More non-Spanish speaking migrants are crossing the border]

“They’re high-level deniers who’ve done some pretty outrageous things [in the courtroom] that would make you believe they’re anti-immigrant,” said Jeffrey Chase, a former immigration judge and past senior legal adviser at the board. “It’s a terrifying prospect … They have power over thousands of lives.”

Among the hiring documents are four recommendation memos to the Attorney General’s office from James McHenry, director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, which oversees the nation’s immigration court system.

DOCUMENT

PAGES

TEXT

Zoom

«

Page 1 of  4

»

The memos, dated July 18, recommend immigration judges William A. Cassidy, V. Stuart Couch, Earle B. Wilson, and Keith E. Hunsucker to positions on the appellate board. McHenry’s memos note new hiring procedures had been established on March 8, to vet “multiple candidates” expressing interest in the open board positions.

A footnote in the memos states that applicants who are immigration judges would be hired through a special procedure: Instead of going through the typical two-year probationary period, they would be appointed to the board on a permanent basis, immediately. This was because a position on the appellate board “requires the same or similar skills” as that of an immigration judge, according to the memo.

Appellate board members, traditionally hired from a variety of professional backgrounds, are tasked with reviewing judicial decisions appealed by the government or plaintiff. Their decisions, made as part of a three-member panel, can set binding precedents that adjudicators and immigration judges rely on for future cases related to asylum, stays of deportation, protections for unaccompanied minors and other areas.

McHenry, appointed in 2018 by then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions, concludes his recommendation memos by noting that the judge’s “current federal service was vetted and no negative information that would preclude his appointment” was reported. He does not mention any past or pending grievances, although public complaints have been filed against at least three of the judges.

Want insight more often? Get Roll Call in your inbox

These documents, obtained through FOIA via Muckrock, a nonprofit, collaborative that pushes for government transparency, and shared with CQ Roll Call, reflect “the secrecy with which these rules are changing,” said Matthew Hoppock, a Kansas City-based immigration attorney. “It’s very hard to remove or discipline a judge that’s permanent than when it’s probationary, so this has long term implications.”

‘If I had known, I wouldn’t have left’: Migrant laments ‘Remain in Mexico’ policy

Volume 90%

 

The Department of Justice declined to answer a series of questions asked by CQ Roll Call regarding the new hiring practices, why exemptions were made in the case of these immigration judges and whether complaints against any of the judges were considered.

“Board members, like immigration judges, are selected through an open, competitive, and merit-based process involving an initial review by the Office of Personnel Management and subsequent, multiple levels of review by the Department of Justice,” a DOJ official wrote via email. “This process includes review by several career officials. The elevation of trial judges to appellate bodies is common in almost every judicial system, and EOIR is no different.”

Homestead: On the front lines of the migrant children debate

Volume 90%

 

Opaque hiring process

When the department posted the six board vacancies in March, the openings reflected the first time that board members would be allowed to serve from immigration courts throughout the country. Previously, the entire appellate board worked out of its suburban Virginia headquarters.

In addition, the job posts suggested that new hires would be acting in a dual capacity: They may be asked to adjudicate cases at the trial court level and then also review the court decisions appealed to the board. Previously, board members stuck to reviewing appeals cases, a process that could take more than a year.

Ultimately, all six hires were immigration judges, although past board candidates have come from government service, private sector, academia and nonprofits.

“This was stunning,” MaryBeth Keller, chief immigration judge until she stepped down this summer, said in a recent interview with The Asylumist, a blog about asylum issues. “I can’t imagine that the pool of applicants was such that only [immigration judges] would be hired, including two from the same city.”

Keller said immigration judges are “generally eminently qualified to be board members, but to bring in all six from the immigration court? I’d like to think that the pool of applicants was more diverse than that.”

Paul Wickham Schmidt, a retired immigration judge who headed the board under President Bill Clinton, said the panel always had arbitrary hiring procedures that changed with each administration and suffered from “quality control” issues. But the Trump administration has “pushed the envelope the furthest,” he said.

“This administration has weaponized the process,” he told CQ Roll Call. “They have taken a system that has some notable weaknesses in it and exploited those weaknesses for their own ends.”

The reputation and track record of the newest immigration judges has also raised eyebrows.

According to an analysis of EOIR data by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse University, each of these newest six judges had an asylum denial rate over 80 percent, with Couch, Cassidy, and Wilson at 92, 96, and 98 percent, respectively. Nationally, the denial rate for asylum cases is around 57 percent. Previous to their work as immigration judges, all six had worked on behalf of government entities, including the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice and the military.

“It mirrors a lot of the concerns at the trial level,” said Laura Lynch, senior policy counsel at the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA). She said several new hires at the trial level have been Immigration and Customs Enforcement attorneys.

“Every day across the country, people’s lives hang in the balance waiting for immigration judges to decide their fate,” she said. “Asylum grant rates for immigration court cases vary widely depending on the judge, suggesting that outcomes may turn on which judge is deciding the case rather than established principles and rules of law.”

Immigration experts note that denial rates depend on a variety of factors, including the number and types of cases that appear on a judge’s docket. Perhaps a better measure of an immigration judge’s decision-making may be the rate that rulings get returned by the appeals board.

For 2017, the last full year for which data is available, Couch and Wilson had the third and fourth highest number of board-remanded cases — at 50 and 47 respectively, according to federal documents obtained by Bryan Johnson, a New York-based immigration lawyer. The total number of cases on their dockets that year were 176 and 416, respectively.

Some of the behavior by the newer judges also have earned them a reputation. In 2018, AILA obtained 11 complaints against Cassidy that alleged prejudice against immigrant respondents. In a public letter the Southern Poverty Law Center sent last year to McHenry, the group complained that Cassidy bullied migrants in his court. He also asked questions that “exceeded his judicial authority,” Center lawyers wrote.

Another letter, sent in 2017 by SPLC lawyers and an Emory University law professor whose students observed Cassidy’s court proceedings, noted the judge “analogized an immigrant to ‘a person coming to your home in a Halloween mask, waving a knife dripping with blood’ and asked the attorney if he would let that person in.”

SPLC also has documented issues with Wilson, noting how he “routinely leaned back in his chair, placed his head in his hands and closed his eyes” during one hearing. “He held this position for more than 20 minutes as a woman seeking asylum described the murders of her parents and siblings.”

Couch’s behavior and his cases have made news. According to Mother Jones, he once lost his temper with a 2-year-old Guatemalan child, threatening to unleash a dog on the boy if he didn’t stop making noise. But he is perhaps better known as the judge who denied asylum to “Ms. A.B.,” a Salvadoran domestic violence survivor, even after the appellate board asked him to reconsider. Sessions, the attorney general at the time, ultimately intervened and made the final precedent-setting ruling in the case.

Couch has a pattern of denying asylum to women who have fled domestic violence, “despite clear instructions to the contrary” from the appellate board, according to Johnson, the immigration lawyer who said Couch “has been prejudging all claims that have a history of domestic violence, and quite literally copying and pasting language he used to deny other domestic violence victims asylum.”

Jeremy McKinney, a Charlotte-based immigration lawyer and second vice president at AILA, went to law school with Couch and called him “complex.” While he was reluctant to characterize the judge as “anti-immigrant,” he acknowledged “concerning” stories about the Couch’s court demeanor.

“In our conversations, he’s held the view that asylum is not the right vehicle for some individuals to immigrate to the U.S. — it’s one I disagree with,” McKinney said. “But I feel quite certain that that’s exactly why he was hired.”

Politicizing court system

Increasingly, political appointees are “micromanaging” the dockets of immigration judges, said Ashley Tabaddor, head of the union National Association of Immigration Judges. Appointees also are making moves that jeopardize their judicial independence, she said. Among them: requiring judges to meet a quota of 700 completed cases per year; referring cases even if they are still in the midst of adjudication to political leadership, including the Attorney General, for the final decision; and seeking to decertify the immigration judges’ union.

These are “symptoms of a bigger problem,” said Tabaddor. “If you have a court that’s situated in the law enforcement agency … that is the fundamental flaw that needs to be corrected.”

In March, the American Bar Association echoed calls by congressional Democrats to investigate DOJ hiring practices in a report that warned the department’s “current approach will elevate speed over substance, exacerbate the lack of diversity on the bench, and eliminate safeguards that could lead to a resurgence of politicized hiring.”

“Moreover, until the allegations of politically motivated hiring can be resolved, doubt will remain about the perceived and perhaps actual fairness of immigration proceedings,” the organization wrote. “The most direct route to resolving these reasonable and important concerns would be for DOJ to publicize its hiring criteria, and for the inspector general to conduct an investigation into recent hiring practices.”

Get breaking news alerts and more from Roll Call on your iPhone.

*******************************************

One of the most disgusting developments, that the media sometimes misses, is that having skewed and biased the system specifically against Central American asylum seekers, particularly women and children, the Administration uses their “cooked” and “bogus” statistics to make a totally disingenuous case that the high denial rates show the system is being abused by asylum seekers and their lawyers. That, along with the “fiction of the asylum no show” been one of “Big Mac’s” most egregious and oft repeated lies! There certainly is systemic abuse taking place here — but it is by the Trump Administration, not asylum seekers and their courageous lawyers.

 

This system is a national disgrace operating under the auspices of a feckless Congress and complicit Article III courts whose life-tenured judges are failing in their collective duty to put an end to this blatantly unconstitutional system: one that  also violates statutory provisions intended to give migrants access to counsel, an opportunity to fully present and document their cases to an unbiased decision maker, and a fair opportunity to seek asylum regardless of status or manner of entry. Basically, judges at all levels who are complicit in this mockery of justice are “robed killers.”

 

Just a few years ago, asylum seekers were winning the majority of individual rulings on asylum in Immigration Court. Others were getting lesser forms of protection, so that more than 60 percent of asylum applicants who got final decisions in Immigration Court were receiving much-needed, life-saving protection. That’s exactly what one would expect given the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in 1987 about the generous standards applicable to asylum seekers in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.

 

Today, conditions have not improved materially in most “refugee sending countries.” Indeed, this Administration’s bogus designation of the Northern Triangle “failed states” as “Safe Third Countries” is absurd and shows their outright contempt for the system and their steadfast belief that the Federal Judiciary will “tank” on their responsibility to hold this Executive accountable.

 

As a result of this reprehensible conduct, the favorable trend in asylum adjudication has been sharply reversed. Now, approximately two-thirds of asylum cases are being denied, many based on specious “adverse credibility” findings, illegal “nexus” findings that intentionally violate the doctrine of “mixed motives”enshrined in the statute, absurdly unethical and illegal rewriting of asylum precedents by Sessions and Barr, intentional denial of the statutory right to counsel, and overt coercion through misuse of DHS detention authority to improperly “punish” and “deter” legal asylum seekers.

 

Right under the noses of complicit Article III Judges and Congress, the Trump Administration has “weaponized” the Immigration “Courts” and made them an intentionally hostile environment for asylum seekers and their, often pro bono or low bono, lawyers. How is this acceptable in 21st Century America?

 

That’s why it’s important for members of the “New Due Process Army” to remember my “5 Cs Formula” – Constantly Confront Complicit Courts 4 Change. Make these folks with “no skin the game” feel the pain and be morally accountable for those human lives they are destroying by inaction in the face of Executive illegality and tyranny from their “ivory tower perches.”  

We’re in a war for the survival of our democracy and the future of humanity.  There is only one “right side” in this battle. History will remember who stood tall and who went small when individual rights, particularly the rights to Due Process and fair treatment for the most vulnerable among us, were under attack by the lawless forces of White Nationalism and their enablers!

 

PWS

 

10-31-19

HON. JEFFREY CHASE: More Than Three Decades After The Supremes’ Decision On Well- Founded Fear In Cardoza-Fonseca, Immigration Judges and BIA Judges Continue To Get It Wrong — 2d Cir. Recognizes Problem, But Fails To Take Effective Corrective Action Through Publishing Its Important Decision!

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/10/25/when-does-fear-become-well-founded

Oct 25 When Does Fear Become “Well-Founded?”

During a recent radio interview, the reporter interviewing me expressed surprise when I mentioned that an asylum applicant need only show a ten percent chance of being persecuted in order to succeed on her claim.  That standard was recognized 32 years ago by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of INS v Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).  The holding represented a dramatic shift in asylum eligibility, as prior to the decision, the BIA (and therefore, the immigration judges bound by its decisions) had interpreted “well-founded fear” to require a greater than fifty percent chance of persecution.  But what was the practical impact of this change on the adjudication of asylum claims?

Following the Supreme Court’s decision, the BIA and circuit courts set out to define what an asylum seeker must show to satisfy the lower standard.  The general test adopted by the circuit courts requires a finding that the asylum seeker possess a genuine subjective fear of persecution, and that there is some objective basis for such fear in the reality of the circumstances so as to make such fear reasonable.1  Prof. Deborah Anker in her treatise The Law of Asylum in the United States emphasizes the link between the subjective and objective standards, noting that while the objective element is meant to ensure “that protection is not provided to those with purely fanciful or neurotic fears,” it is “critical, however, that the adjudicator view the evidence as the applicant – or a reasonable person in his or her circumstances – would and does not simply substitute the adjudicator’s own experience as the vantage point.”  This is obviously quite different than the purely objective approach necessary under the prior “more likely than not” standard.

In Qosaj v. Barr, No. 17-3116 (2d. Cir. Sept. 18, 2019), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in an unpublished decision, once again considered the question of what is required for a fear of persecution to be “well-founded.”  Although the primary target of the government’s persecution was the petitioner’s husband, an activist with the opposition Democratic Party in their native Albania, police twice sprayed the restaurant jointly owned by the couple with bullets, pushed the petitioner herself to the ground during raids of their home, and at one point threatened to kidnap the petitioner and sell her into prostitution if her husband did not back the ruling Socialist Party candidate for parliament.  The local Socialist Party leader also threatened the petitioner that the restaurant would be burned to the ground with her family in it if they did not stop hosting Democratic Party meetings there.

The immigration judge found the petitioner to be completely credible and to have a genuine subjective fear of persecution.  However, the IJ denied asylum on the ground that the fear was not objectively reasonable, because the authorities had opportunities to harm her when they were persecuting her husband, but in the IJ’s opinion, did not do so.  The judge thus concluded that nothing suggests that the authorities would “suddenly” be inclined to harm the petitioner in the future if they had not done so in the past.

The Second Circuit rejected the above standard as “too exacting,” adding that the applicant’s fear can be objectively reasonable “even if it is improbable that he will be persecuted upon his return to his own country.”  The court added that there only need be “a slight, though discernible, chance of persecution,” noting that the standard is whether “a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have such a fear.”

At oral argument, the Chief Judge of the Second Circuit, Hon. Robert Katzmann, directly asked the government attorney if she would be afraid to return to Albania if she faced the same facts as the respondent, adding that he himself would be.

The question of whether one in the asylum seeker’s shoes would be afraid to return is the proper approach to determining if the subjective fear is reasonable.  Back in 1992, before either of us were appointed judges, my former colleague William Van Wyke, a brilliant legal mind, authored a much talked about article entitled “A New Perspective on ‘Well-Founded Fear.’”  Judge Van Wyke’s approach was to consider the asylum seeker the factfinder: having assessed all of the facts in the home country, the asylum seeker decided that the threat of persecution was enough to warrant fleeing the country.  In Judge Van Wyke’s perspective, the asylum adjudicator is placed in the position of an appeals court, reviewing the asylum seeker’s decision for reasonableness.  Although such approach sounds radical, it’s really just another way of applying the circuit court standard.

However, too many decisions deny asylum because they pose the wrong question.  If a traveler is told that the flight she has booked has a 10 percent chance of crashing, the question isn’t whether it would thus seem unlikely under an objective analysis that that the plane would crash, or whether in fact the plane did actually crash, or whether those passengers that did board the same flight landed safely and went on with their lives without incident.  The question is whether based on the knowledge she possessed, was it reasonable for the passenger not to board the flight?  Of course, the answer is yes.  The objective likelihood that all would be fine wouldn’t be enough to cause any of us to board the plane.  Therefore, that slight risk of danger was enough to render the passenger’s subjective fear reasonable.  Or as the Second Circuit held in Qosaj, “no reasonable factfinder could conclude that” the petitioner “did not show at least a ‘discernible [ ] chance of persecution,’” which the Second Circuit confirmed as enough “to render her subjective fear objectively reasonable.”

But how often is this standard applied correctly in asylum adjudication?  For example, case law allows an asylum adjudicator to conclude that an asylum applicant’s fear is not objectively reasonable based on the continued safety of family members who remain in the country of origin.  But if there is a sufficient ten percent risk of persecution, that means that there is 90 percent chance that nothing will happen.  Wouldn’t that mean that it is overwhelmingly likely that the remaining family would suffer no harm?  If so, why should their safety to present undermine the claim?  Or in assessing whether the government is unable or unwilling to control a non-state actor persecutor, shouldn’t the proper inquiry be whether there is a ten percent chance that the government would not afford such protection?2

It’s a shame that Qosaj wasn’t issued as a published decision.  Nevertheless, attorneys might find it useful to reference at least in the Second Circuit as a reminder of the proper application of the burden for determining well-founded fear.  And Congrats to attorney Michael DiRaimondo (who argued the case) and fellow attorneys Marialaina Masi and Stacy Huber of DiRaimondo & Masi on the brief (Note: I am of counsel to the firm, but had no involvement with this case).

Notes:

1. See, e.g., Blanco-Comarribas v. INS, 830 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1987).

2. I thank attorney Joshua Lunsford for bringing this point to my attention.

Copyright 2019 Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved.

************************************************

Here’s a link to the full decision in 

Qosaj v. Barr, No. 17-3116 (2d. Cir. Sept. 18, 2019):

https://casetext.com/case/qosaj-v-barr

Jeffrey’s article raises two important points.

First, three decades after Cardoza-Fonseca, and nearly four decades after the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980, EOIR Judges are still getting the fundamentals wrong: basics, like the correct legal standards to be used in evaluating asylum claims. 

Getting that asylum standard correct should be neither complex nor difficult. Just look at how relatively short, concise, and to the point the Second Circuit’s reversal in Qosaj was, particularly in comparison with the legal gibberish spouted by Barr and Sessions in attempting to rewrite the law intentionally to screw migrants in some of their unconstitutional and unethical precedents.

Improper adjudication by Immigration Judges is hardly surprising in a system that emphasizes law enforcement and speedy removals over quality and Due Process. Then, it’s compounded by politicos attempting to improperly and unethically influence the judges by spreading false narratives about asylum applicants being malafide and their attorneys dishonest. 

It’s really quite the opposite. There is substantial reason to believe that the system has been improperly, dishonestly,  and  politically “gamed” by the DOJ to deny valid claims (or even access to the system) to “discourage” legitimate asylum seekers and further to intentionally abuse those (often pro bono or low bono) lawyers courageously trying to help them.

Also, massive appointments of Immigration Judges at both the trial and appellate levels, some with questionable qualifications, and all with no meaningful training on how to recognize and grant asylum claims have compounded the problem. 

Does anyone seriously think that the “New Appellate Immigration Judges” on the BIA, some of whom denied asylum at rates upwards of 95%, were properly applying the generous legal standards of Cardoza-Fonseca to asylum seekers? Of course not! So why is this unconstitutional and dysfunctional system allowed to continue?

Which brings me to my second point. It’s nice that the Second Circuit actually took the time to correct the errors, unlike some of the “intentionally head in the sand Circuits” like the 5th and the 11th, who all too often compound the problem with their own complicity and poor judging. But, failing to publish important examples of DOJ/EOIR “malicious incompetence” like this is a disservice to both the country and the courts. 

It leaves the impression that the Second Circuit doesn’t really value the rights of asylum seekers or view them as important.  It also signals that the court doesn’t really intend to hold Barr and EOIR accountable for lack of quality control and fundamental fairness in the Immigration Court system. 

Furthermore, it deprives immigration practitioners of the favorable Article III precedents they need to fight the abuses of due process and fundamental fairness being inflicted on asylum seekers every day at the “retail level” — in Immigration Court. It also fails to document a public record of the widespread “malicious incompetence” of DOJ and EOIR under Trump’s White Nationalist restrictionist regime.

It’s also horrible for the court. You don’t have to be a judicial genius to see where this is going. Unqualified, untrained Immigration Judges are being pushed to cut corners and railroad asylum seekers out of the country. The BIA has been “dumbed down” and weaponized to “summarily affirm” this substandard work product. That means that the circuit courts are going to be flooded with garbage — sloppy, unprofessional work. As the work piles up or is sent back for quality reasons, the Administration will blast and blame the Article III courts for their backlogs and for delaying deportations.

So why wait for the coming disaster? Why not be proactive? 

The Second Circuit and the other Circuits should be publishing precedents putting the DOJ and EOIR on notice that Due Process, fair treatment, and quality work is required from the Immigration Courts. If it’s not forthcoming, why shouldn’t Barr and the officials at DOJ and EOIR responsible for creating this mess be held in contempt of court?

Two historical notes. First, our good friend and former colleague, Judge Dana Leigh Marks, then known as Dana Marks Keener, successfully represented the respondent before the Supremes in Cardoza-Fonseca (for the record, as DHS DGC. I was aligned with the SG on the “losing” side). Therefore, I sometimes call Judge Marks the “Founding Mother” of modern U.S. asylum law.

Second, immigration practitioner Michael DiRaimondo who successfully argued Qosaj before the Second Circuit began his career in the General Counsel’s Office of the “Legacy INS” during the “Inman-Schmidt Era.” He then went on to a distinguished career as the INS Special Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of New York before entering private practice. Way to go, Michael D! 

PWS

10-27-19

COURTS OF INJUSTICE: How Systemic Bias, Bad Precedents, Gross Mismanagement, & Poor Decision-Making Threaten Lives In Immigration Court — What Should Be “Slam Dunk” Grants Of Protection Are Literally “Litigated To Death” Adding To Backlogs While Mocking Justice! — Featuring Quotes From “Roundtable” Leader Hon. Jeffrey Chase!

Beth Fertig
Beth Fertig
Senior Reporter
Immigration, Courts, Legal
WNYC & The Gothamist
Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog

https://gothamist.com/news/they-fled-gang-violence-and-domestic-abuse-nyc-immigration-judge-denied-them-asylum

Beth Fertig reports for WNYC:

They Fled Gang Violence And Domestic Abuse. An NYC Immigration Judge Denied Them Asylum

BY BETH FERTIG, WNYC

SEPT. 26, 2019 5:00 A.M.

Seventeen year-old Josue and his mom, Esperanza, were visibly drained. They had just spent more than four hours at their asylum trial inside an immigration court at 26 Federal Plaza in Lower Manhattan, answering questions from their attorney and a government lawyer. We are withholding their full names to protect their identities because they’re afraid.

“It was exhausting,” said Josue, whose angular haircut was neatly combed for the occasion. In Spanish, he told us the judge seemed nice but, “you feel bad if you don’t know if you are going to be allowed to stay or if you have to go.”

The teen and his mother crossed the U.S. border in California in the summer of 2018. At the time, a rising number of families were entering the country, and the Trump administration wanted to send a message to them by swiftly deporting those who don’t qualify for asylum. But immigration judges are so busy, they can take up to four years to rule on a case. In November, judges in New York and nine other cities were ordered to fast track family cases and complete them within a year.

This is how Esperanza and Josue wound up going to trial just 10 months after they arrived in the U.S. and moved to Brooklyn. They were lucky to find attorneys with Central American Legal Assistance, a nonprofit in Williamsburg that’s been representing people fleeing the troubled region since 1985.

Listen to reporter Beth Fertig’s WNYC story on Josue and Esperanza’s cases.

Play/Pause

Volume

EMBED

Winning asylum was never easy. But in 2018, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions made it tougher for people like Josue and Esperanza when he issued his own ruling on an immigration case involving a woman from El Salvador who was a victim of domestic violence. He wrote: “The mere fact that a country may have problems effectively policing certain crimes—such as domestic violence or gang violence—or that certain populations are more likely to be victims of crime, cannot itself establish an asylum claim.”

Immigration judges were bound to give heavy weight to that ruling. Their courts are run by the Department of Justice, whose boss is the Attorney General. And the AG’s boss, President Trump, frequently asserts that too many migrants lie about being threatened by gangs when they’re just coming for jobs. “It’s a big fat con job, folks,” he said at a Michigan rally this year.

Esperanza and Josue went to court soon after Sessions’ decision. She was fighting for asylum as a victim of domestic abuse; Josue claimed a gang threatened his life. Both would eventually lose their cases.

Josue’s case

Esperanza and Josue are typical of the Central American families seeking asylum these days, who say they’re escaping vicious drug gangs, violence and grinding poverty. The two of them came from a town outside San Pedro Sula, one of the most dangerous cities in the world.

During their trial, Josue testified under oath about how gang members repeatedly approached him outside his high school, asking him to sell drugs to the other students. He tried to ignore them, and gave different excuses for resisting, until one day when they spotted him playing soccer and became more aggressive. That’s when he said the gang leader put a gun in his face.

“He told me that if I didn’t accept what he wanted he was going to kill my whole family, my mother and sister,” he said, through a Spanish interpreter.

“I was in shock,” he said. “I had no other choice to accept and said yes.”

He told his mother and they left Honduras the next day. When Josue’s lawyer, Katherine Madison, asked if he ever reported the threat to the police he said no. “That was practically a suicide,” he said, explaining that the police are tied to the gang, because it has so much power.

Josue said his older sister later moved to Mexico because she was so afraid of the gang.

Winning asylum is a two-step process. You have to prove that you were persecuted, and that this persecution was on account of your race, religion, nationality, social group or political opinion. Madison, Josue’s attorney, argued that in Honduras, defying gangs is a risky political statement.

“They function in many ways as the de facto government of the areas where people like Josue lived,” she told WNYC/Gothamist, summing up the arguments she submitted to the judge. “They make rules. They charge basically taxes, they say who can live there and who can’t.”

And they’re known to kill people who don’t obey.

In her ruling, issued in August, Immigration Judge Oshea Spencer found Josue did experience persecution. But she denied his application for asylum. She said much of what he described “were threats and harm that exist as part of the larger criminal enterprise of the gangs in Honduras and not on the basis of any actual or perceived opposition to the gangs.”

Esperanza’s case

Esperanza’s attorney argued that her life was at risk because the gang member threatened Josue’s family. But Spencer didn’t find that specific enough. She wrote that the gang members “were motivated by their efforts to expand their drug trade, not the family relationship.” Among other cases, she referred to a recent decision by the current Attorney General, William Barr, that makes it harder for the relatives of someone who’s been threatened to win asylum.

Esperanza also lost on a separate claim that she deserved asylum because she was repeatedly beaten by Josue’s father. In court, she testified about years of abuse culminating in an incident in which he chased her with a machete. She said she couldn’t get the police to issue a restraining order, and said he kept threatening her after she moved to another town to stay with relatives.

Madison argued that women like Esperanza belong to a persecuted social group: they can’t get help from the authorities in Honduras because they’re viewed as a man’s property. The country is one of the deadliest places to be a woman; police are known to ignore complaints; and it’s extremely hard for women to get justice.

But Spencer ruled that there is no persecuted social group made up of “Honduran women who are viewed as property” for being in a domestic relationship.

Echoing the Sessions’ ruling, the judge said these categories “all lack sufficient particularity,” and called them “amorphous” because they could be made up of a “potentially large and diffuse segment of society.”

She also cited evidence submitted by the government that showed conditions in Honduras are improving for women. This evidence came from a 2018 State Department report on human rights in Honduras. Immigration advocates claim it’s been watered down from the much harsher conditions described in the last report from 2016. It’s also much shorter in length.

Jeffrey Chase, an immigration lawyer and former New York immigration judge, said it’s not surprising that Esperanza and Josue would each lose asylum. Judge Spencer only started last fall and is on probation for her first two years in the job.

“This was decided by a brand new judge who didn’t have any immigration experience prior to becoming an immigration judge,” he said, referring to the fact that Spencer was previously an attorney with the Public Utility Commission of Texas. He said she went through training which, “These days, includes being told that we don’t consider these to be really good cases.”

Sitting judges don’t talk to the media but Chase noted that they must consider the facts of each individual case, meaning the former Attorney General’s ruling doesn’t apply to all cases. He noted that some women who were victims of abuse are still winning asylum. He pointed to a case involving a Guatemalan woman who was raped by her boss. A Texas immigration judge found she did fit into a particular social group as a woman who defied gender norms, by taking a job normally held by a man.

During Josue and Esperanza’s trial, there was a lot of back and forth over their individual claims. A trial attorney from Immigration and Customs Enforcement questioned why Esperanza didn’t contact the police again after moving to another town, where she said her former partner continued to threaten her. Esperanza said it was because her brother chased him away and the police “don’t pay attention to you.”

The ICE attorney also asked Josue if his father was physically violent with anyone besides Esperanza. Josue said he did fight with other men. San Diego immigration lawyer Anna Hysell, who was previously an ICE trial attorney, said that could have hurt Esperanza’s case.

“The government was able to make the arguments that he didn’t target her because of being a woman that was in his relationship,” she explained. “He just was probably a terrible person and targeted many people.”

Hysell added that this was just her analysis and she wasn’t agreeing with the decision.

Attorney Anne Pilsbury said she believes Esperanza would have won her case, prior to the asylum ruling by Sessions, because she suffered years of abuse. But she said Josue would have had a more difficult time because gang cases were always tough. And like a lot of migrants, Josue had no evidence — he was too afraid to go to the cops. Pilsbury said immigration judges are even more skeptical now of gang cases.

“They’re getting so that they won’t even think about them,” she said. “They aren’t wrestling with the facts. They’re hearing gang violence and that’s it.”

She said Judge Spencer does sometimes grant asylum, and isn’t as harsh as other new judges. New York City’s immigration court used to be one of the most favorable places for asylum seekers. In 2016, 84 percent of asylum cases were granted. Today, that figure has fallen to 57 percent, according to TRAC at Syracuse University. Meanwhile, the government is forcing migrants to wait in Mexico for their immigration court cases or seek asylum in other countries before applying in the U.S., as the national backlog of cases exceeds one million.

Pilsbury, who founded Central American Legal Assistance in 1985, said immigration courts are now dealing with the result of a regional crisis south of the border that’s never been properly addressed since the wars of the 1980s.

“The anti-immigrant people feel it’s broken because people get to come here and ask for asylum and we feel it’s broken because people’s asylum applications aren’t seriously considered,” she explained. “We should be doing more to understand what’s going on in those countries and what we can do to help them address the chronic problems.”

Esperanza and Josue’s cases will now be appealed. Madison said she believes the judge ignored some of her evidence about gangs. She’s now turning to the Board of Immigration Appeals. However, it’s also controlled by the Justice Department — meaning the odds of getting a reversal are slim. If they lose again, the family can go to a federal circuit court which may have a broader definition of who’s eligible for asylum.

But Esperanza and Josue won’t be deported as long as their case is being appealed. On a late summer day, they seemed relaxed while sitting in a Brooklyn park. Esperanza talked about how happy she is that Josue is safe at his public high school, and can even ride a bike at night with his friends.

“He goes out and I’m always trusting the Father that just as he goes out, he comes back,” she said.

Even if they knew they would lose their asylum case, both said they still would have come to the U.S. because the risk of staying in Honduras was too great. Josue said the gang would definitely find him if he ever returned because their networks are so deep throughout the country. He’s now taking the long view. He knows there will be a Presidential election next year.

“It’s like a game of chess,” Josue said. “Any mindset can change at any moment. Maybe Trump changes his mind or maybe not. But I would have always made the decision to come.”

With translation assistance from Alexandra Feldhausen, Lidia Hernández-Tapia and Andrés O’Hara.

Beth Fertig is a senior reporter covering immigration, courts and legal affairs at WNYC. You can follow her on Twitter at @bethfertig.

******************************************

CORRECTION: An earlier version of this posting incorrectly identified Beth’s network affiliation. She reports for WNYC.

By clicking on the link at the top and going to Beth’s article on The Gothamist, you will be able to get a link to the original WNYC audio broadcast of this story.

It’s not “rocket science.” Better, fairer outcomes were available that would have fulfilled, rather than mocked, our obligation to provide Due Process and protection under our own laws and international treaties.

Here’s how:

  • Esperanza’s claim is a clear asylum grant for “Honduran women” which is both a “particular social group” (“PSG”) and a persecuted group in Honduras that the government is unwilling or unable to protect.
  • Although the last two Administrations have intentionally twisted the law against Central American asylum seekers, Josue has a clear case for asylum as somebody for whom opposition to gang violence was an “imputed political opinion” that was “at least one central reason” for the persecution. See, e.g, https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/6/3/3rd-generation-gangs-and-political-opinion.
  • In any event, on this record, Josue clearly showed that he faced a probability of torture by gangs with the acquiescence of the Honduran government, and therefore should have been granted mandatory protection by the Immigration Judge under the Convention against Torture (“CAT”).
  • The Immigration Judge’s assertion that things are getting better for women in Honduras, one of the world’s most dangerous countries for women where femicide is rampant, not only badly misapplies the legal standard (“fundamentally changed conditions that would eliminate any well founded fear”) but is also totally disingenuous as a factual matter. See, e.g., https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/05/opinion/honduras-women-murders.html.
  • Additionally, Honduras remains in a state of armed conflict. See, e.g., https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23740973.2019.1603972?needAccess=true. Under an honest Government, granting TPS to Hondurans (as well as Salvadorans and Guatemalans affected by environmental disasters heightened by climate change) would be more than justified.
  • Under honest Government following the rule of law, well-documented cases like this one could be quickly granted by the USCIS Asylum Officer or granted on stipulation in short hearings in Immigration Court. Many more Central Americans could be granted CAT relief, TPS, or screened and approved for asylum abroad. They could thereby be kept off of Immigraton Court dockets altogether or dealt with promptly on “short dockets” without compromising anybody’s statutory or constitutional rights (compromising individual rights is a “specialty” of all the mostly ineffective “enforcement gimmicks” advanced by the Trump Administration).
  • Over time, the overwhelming self-inflicted Immigration Court backlogs caused by the Trump Administration’s “maliciously incompetent” administration of immigration laws (e.g., “Aimless Docket Reshuffling”) would be greatly reduced.
    • That, in turn, would allow the Immigration Courts to deal with cases on a more realistic timeline that would both aid rational, non-White-Nationalist immigration enforcement and provide real justice for those seeking protection under our legal system.
  • As I’ve said before, it’s not “rocket science.” All it would take is more honest and enlightened Government committed to Due Process, good court management, and an appropriate legal application of laws relating to refugees and other forms of protection. I doubt that it would cost as much as all of the bogus “enforcement only gimmicks” now being pursued by Trump as part of his racist, anti-migrant, anti-Hispanic agenda.
  • Poor judicial decision making, as well illustrated by this unfortunate wrongly decided case, not only threatens the lives of deserving applicants for our protection, but also bogs down an already grossly overloaded system with unnecessarily protracted litigation and appeals of cases  that should be “clear grants.”
  • Contrary to the intentionally false “party line” spread by “Big Mac With Lies” and other corrupt Trump sycophants at the DHS and the DOJ, a much, much higher percentage, probably a majority, of asylum applicants from the Northern Triangle who apply at our Southern Border should properly be granted some type of legal protection under our laws if the system operated in the fair and impartial manner that is Constitutionally required. The Trump Administration aided by their sycophants and enablers, all the way up to the feckless Supremes, are literally “getting away with murder” in far, far too many instances. 
  • Consequently, quickly identifying and granting relief to the many deserving applicants would be a more efficient, humane, and lawful alternative to the “Kill ‘Em Before They Get Here” deterrence  programs being pursued by Trump, with the complicity of the Supremes, the Ninth Circuit, and some of the other Federal Circuit Courts who have been afraid to put a stop to the extralegal nonsense going on in our Immigraton Courts, detention centers (the “New American Gulag”), our Southern Border, and countries like Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and El Salvador where we are basically encouraging extralegal abuses and gross human right violations against migrants. It will eventually come back to haunt our nation, or whatever is left of our nation after Trump and his gang of White Nationalist thugs, supporters, appeasers, apologists, and enablers, are done looting and destroying it.

PWS

09-30-19

HON. JEFFREY S. CHASE BLOG PRESENTS “THE FLORES EXHIBITS” – Truth, No Matter How Terrible & Disturbing, Is The Best Antidote To Notorious Human Rights Abuser “Big Mac With Lies” & His Truly Despicable Knowingly False Narratives & Immoral Actions! – “At this time when our nation is led by scoundrels, we are in need of heroes.”

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Elora Mukherjee
Elora Mukherjee
“American Hero”
Clinical Professor of Law & Director of the Immigrants’ Rights Clinic
Columbia Law School

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/9/22/vjwdefjb62lfre600ktwsfj8q1dsab

The Flores Exhibits

“I’m held with my son in a cage.  There are about 60 people in my cages, and more in some of the other cages.  There are six cages in my area. They are all very, very full.”

The above words are part of “Exhibit 29,” which is read by my friend Lenni Benson, a professor at New York Law School and founder of the school’s Safe Passage Project, which provides representation to unaccompanied children in immigration court.  The words are the sworn declaration of a 17-year-old girl, identified by the initial “L.”

There are 65 such declarations, each the actual statement of a child detained at border detention facilities in this country  in June 2019. Recently, Waterwell, the wonderful civic-minded theater and film production company responsible for the immigration court based play The Courtroom filmed a number of actors, lawyers, clinical professors, advocates, and other interested individuals in a dark studio in the East Village in New York City.  I was honored to be one of those filmed. We each sat at a simple table with the written exhibit and a glass of water, and under the direction of Waterwell’s Artistic Director, Lee Sunday Evans, each read a single declaration.

Article 37(b) of the Convention of the Rights of the Child states that “No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.”  A 1997 settlement agreement, known as the Flores Settlement, legally binds our government in limiting the length of time it can detain immigrant children, and holding the government to a standard of humane treatment under prescribed conditions of health, hygiene, education, and privacy. From the contents of the declarations, the Trump Administration has made a mockery of these rules.

Exhibit 3, read by David Gomez, the president of Hostos Community College, memorializes the words of a five year old from Honduras separated from his father upon arrival at the border, as he states “I have not been told how long I have to stay here.  I am frightened, scared, and sad.” My fellow former immigration judge, Betty Lamb, read the statement of a 14 year old girl, who was taking care of two younger parentless girls (one of them 4 years old and sick), who said that she was holding the two in her lap as she spoke trying to comfort them.  She then added “I need comfort, too. I’m bigger than they are, but I am a child, too.” (Exhibit 54).

At this time when our nation is led by scoundrels, we are in need of heroes.  Towards this end, please take a moment to write down the name of Elora Mukherjee, a true hero.  She is a clinical professor of law and Director of the Immigrants’ Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School.  She has devoted her career to aiding immigrant children, whom she began visiting in detention facilities in 2007, and litigating violations of the Flores Settlement. Watching her read her own 22 minute statement gave me nightmares.  She described the overwhelming stench of the hundreds of detained children, who were very hungry and seriously traumatized. One six year old she tried to question ended up sitting in her lap crying inconsolably, until a guard eventually gave him a lollipop “as an incentive to bring him back to his cell.”  (Exhibit 63). Many of the children were seriously in fear of the guards. A number of the children were sick.

I am a native-born American citizen.  I have lived here my entire life. Yet I never felt more foreign than while watching these videos.  I hope that readers of these words feel the same way. No government of a country that is truly ours, that reflects the morals and values that we possess and believe in, could ever treat children this way.  And no decent, moral people, regardless of their political affiliation or their views on immigration, could ever support or approve of the government responsible for such treatment. These children will never get over this.  It is one thing for children to arrive here already traumatized and be granted safe haven under our laws. It is entirely another matter for the government of this country to deliberately cause children to suffer in a way that will scar them for life.

Please visit the site of these powerful videos through this link.  You can also view the one-minute trailer here.  And then please, please help amplify by sharing through social media and email.

Thanks for this project go to Columbia Law School’s Center for Institutional and Social Change and Immigrants’ Rights Clinic; to Waterwell, the Broadway Advocacy Coalition, and Project Amplify; and to all those who participated as readers in the videos.

Copyright 2019 Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved.

(Below: iPhone photo of me filming my segment, taken by Elizabeth Lamb).

Go to Jeff’s blog at the link for the picture of him presenting.

******************************************************

What kind of country tortures and torments vulnerable children in search of legal protection while actually employing their corrupt, cowardly, and totally dishonest abusers, like Kevin “Big Mac With Lies” McAleenan, on the public payroll? Big Mac was at it again today, presenting a fictionalized defense of the Administration’s policy of promoting and encouraging human rights abuses, lying about the Flores settlement, and endangering the lives of refugee families!

McAleenan and his fellow immoral sycophants are a disgrace to America!

And, as I have said before, both Congress and the Federal Judges who have enabled these crimes against humanity by failing to take strong action to stop the Trump Administration’s abuse and to hold perpetrators like McAleenan legally accountable also share a major part of the responsibility!

 

PWS

09-23-19

 

 

HON. JEFFREY CHASE: Barr Intended To Attack The “Quintessential Particular Social Group In Society” — The Family — As Part Of His Restrictionist Deconstruction of Asylum Protections For Vulnerable Refugees — But, Can He Really Rewrite Reality? — Chase On Matter of L-E-A-!

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/8/11/l-e-a-how-much-did-the-ag-change

Aug 11 L-E-A-: How Much Did the AG Change?

In June 2018, the Attorney General issued his precedent decision in Matter of A-B-.  The AG intended his decision to lead to the denial of asylum claims based on domestic violence and gang violence by asylum officers, immigration judges, the BIA, and the circuit courts.  The decision also aimed to compel asylum officers to find those arriving at the southern border to lack the credible fear necessary for entry into the court system, allowing for their immediate deportation.

However, the decision failed to achieve these goals.  A U.S. District Court decision, Grace v. Whitaker, prohibited USCIS from applying A-B- in credible fear determinations. And Immigration Judges have continued to grant significant numbers of domestic violence claims, concluding that A-B- did not prevent them from doing so, but only required their decisions to contain an in-depth analysis of their reasoning.  The case of A-B- herself presently remains pending before the BIA.

More recently, the Attorney General took the same approach to the question of whether family may constitute a particular social group.  While once again, the administration’s goal is to prevent such claims from passing credible fear interviews and from being granted asylum, the effort also seems likely to fail.

                         *                *                    *

“There can, in fact, be no plainer example of a social group based on common, identifiable and immutable characteristics than that of the nuclear family.  Indeed, quoting the Ninth Circuit, we recently stated that ‘a prototypical example of a “particular social group” would consist of the immediate members of a certain family, the family being a focus of fundamental affiliational concerns and common interests for most people.'”

The above language is from a 1994 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 1994).  It pretty much reflects the view of every circuit court over the past 25 years.  Since Gebremichael, the BIA has added additional requirements of particularity and social distinction to the particular social group (“PSG”) requirements in a series of six precedent decisions issued between 2006 and 2014.  But as a recent practice advisory of CLINIC points out, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have all recognized that family can constitute a PSG, and all have reiterated that opinion in decisions issued in 2014 or later, meaning that those courts have not found the BIA’s subsequent requirements to alter their longstanding view on the matter.

For this reason, when L-E-A- was first decided by the BIA in 2017, the parties were not in disagreement on this point – the issue had acquired a “the sky is blue” certainty.  The issue before the BIA was rather about nexus – i.e.  what was required to show that one’s feared persecution was in fact “on account of” such family membership.  The Board settled on a highly restrictive standard for establishing nexus, illustrated by the single example of the Romanov family in 1918 Russia.

Possibly fearing an influx of asylum-seeking Romanovs, Matthew Whitaker, during his very brief tenure as Acting Attorney General, felt the need to certify the decision to himself.  And on July 29, his successor, WIlliam Barr, issued a decision very reminiscent of A-B-.

As in A-B-, Barr justified vacating the Board’s decision because it relied on the parties’ stipulation to the issue in question.   In Barr’s view, this caused the resulting decision to lack the rigorous analysis deserving of a precedent decision.  While it remains unclear why rigorous legal analysis is required where everyone agrees to the correctness of the assertion (do we require rigorous mathematical analysis to the proposition that 2+2 = 4?), it should be noted that unlike Matter of A-R-C-G-, which was the single precedent decision holding that victims of domestic violence could be eligible for asylum, there is 25 years worth of circuit court case law on this point, plus the BIA’s own statement in Matter of Acosta that kinship could be a basis for a PSG, which dates to 1985, a point that the BIA reaffirmed over the next three decades, in Matter of C-A- (2006), and then, by reference to that case, in Matter of M-E-V-G- (2014).  Barr’s excuse is that, in his view, multiple circuits “have relied upon outdated dicta from the Board’s early cases.”

As in A-B-, the AG’s decision affects no change in the applicable legal standard.  The holding is quite narrow, simply overruling the part of the BIA’s decision discussing the cognizability of family as a PSG.  The decision doesn’t preclude such findings, but rather requires adjudicators to spend more time on each case, providing a detailed, step-by-step analysis before granting relief.  This is a critical point, as at least one IJ has said that L-E-A- has closed the door on family-based PSGs.  IJs had a similar reaction in the immediate aftermath of A-B-, stating that they can no longer grant domestic violence claims, only to realize otherwise over time.  Barr specifically states that his decision “does not bar all family-based social groups from qualifying for asylum,” adding “[t]o the contrary, in some societies, an applicant may present specific kinship groups or clans that, based on the evidence in the applicant’s case, are particular and socially distinct.”  He also cautions adjudicators to “be skeptical of social groups that appear to be “defined principally, if not exclusively, for the purposes of [litigation] . . . without regard to the question of whether anyone in [a given country] perceives [those] group[s] to exist in any form whatsoever.”  These are restatements of long-existing law.  Of course, the concept of family was not artificially created for litigation purposes.

In L-E-A-, Barr specifically referenced the canon of ejusdem generis, which the BIA applied in Matter of Acosta to conclude that a particular social group should not be interpreted more broadly than the other four terms (race, religion, nationality, and political opinion) that surround it in the statute.1  As the canon was applied to counter the argument that the legislative intent of the PSG ground was to serve as a broad, catch-all “safety net” for those deserving of protection but unable to fit within the other four protected categories, the AG is happy to rely on the premise in his decision as well.

However, ejusdem generis is a two-edged sword.  In the same way as it prevents the PSG category from being interpreted more broadly than its fellow protected grounds, it similarly prevents those other categories from being interpreted more broadly than PSG.

And therein lies the flaw in Barr’s argument that “as almost every [noncitizen] is a member of a family of some kind, categorically recognizing families as particular social groups would render virtually every [noncitizen] a member of a particular social group. There is no evidence that Congress intended the term “particular social group” to cast so wide a net.”

Every noncitizen is also a member of a race and a nationality.  And most believe in a religion of some type.  But no court has suggested that those categories are therefore too wide to form a protected ground for asylum purposes.  Barr fails to explain that belonging to a protected ground does not make one a refugee; everyone in the world belongs to one or more such categories; many of us belong to all five.  Asylum requires persecution (either suffered in the past, or a sufficient likelihood of suffering in the future), as well as a showing that such persecution was motivated more than tangentially in the persecutor’s view by the victim’s possessing one or more of the protected bases.  When one also considers how extreme the harm must be to be constitute persecution; that such harm must either be by the government, or by a person or group that the government is unable or unwilling to control, and that the asylum seeker must not be able to avoid such harm through reasonable relocation to a safer place within their own country, it is not an easy standard to satisfy.

Barr then further errs in claiming that the test for social distinction is not whether the nuclear family carries societal importance (which in fact is the test), but rather, whether the applicant’s “specific nuclear family would be ‘recognizable by society at large.’”  In that sentence, Barr supported his erroneous claim by misquoting Jeff Sessions in Matter of A-B-, by omitting the word “classes.”  The actual quote, “social groups must be classes recognizable by society at large,” actually supports the argument that nuclear families would enjoy social distinction.  By manipulating the language of case law, Barr attempts to equate “social distinction” with fame.  Under his proposed interpretation, an asylum seeker must be a Kardashian to satisfy the PSG standard, and a Romanov to then prove nexus.  (While such interpretation is clearly incorrect, I am nevertheless coining the term “Czardashian” here).

The true test for social distinction is whether the proposed group is consistent with how society divides itself.  And families are the most basic way that society divides itself into groups.  We are often identified in society as someone’s child, spouse, parent, or sibling.  When we meet someone with a familiar last name, the first thing we ask is “are you related to so and so?”  The reason we care to ask such question is precisely because families are socially distinct.  By comparison, no one has ever asked me if I’m a member of the group of “tall, gray-haired, left-handed immigration lawyers with glasses,” because that is the type of artificially concocted group that in no way reflects how society divides itself.

Barr’s statement that “unless an immediate family carries greater societal import, it is unlikely that a proposed family-based group will be ‘distinct’ in the way required by the INA for purposes of asylum” is nonbinding dicta, expressing the likelihood of success in claims not before him.2  Nevertheless, his statement also overlooks an important aspect of PSG analysis: the impact of persecution on public perception.  Social distinction is measured not in the eyes of the persecutors, but of society.  But as UNHCR points out in its 2002 Particular Social Group Guidelines, at para. 14, even though left-handed people are not a particular social group, “if they were persecuted because they were left-handed, they would no doubt quickly become recognizable in their society as a particular social group.”  So even if we were to accept Barr’s flawed premise that a regular, non-celebrity family lacks his misconstrued version of social distinction, as word spread of the targeting of its members, that family would gain social recognition pretty quickly.

And as CLINIC’s practice advisory astutely notes, societies accord social distinction to even non-famous families in its laws determining how property is inherited, or to whom guardianship of surviving children is determined.

Notes:

  1. For a highly detailed analysis of the Chevron deference test as applied to Matter of A-B-, including the use of ejusdem generis as a canon of construction in step one of Chevron, see Kelley-Widmer, Jaclyn and Rich, Hillary, A Step Too Far: Matter of A-B-, ‘Particular Social Group,’ and Chevron (July 15, 2019). Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 19-30. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3410556 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3410556
  2. See CLINIC’s Practice Advisory at 3. Much thanks to CLINIC attorneys Victoria Neilson, Bradley Jenkins, and Rebecca Scholtz for so quickly authoring this excellent guide.

Copyright 2019 Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved.

********************************************

There can be no doubt of Bill Barr’s anti-asylum bias, his poor lawyering skills, his lack of ethics, and his willingness to serve as a weapon of White Nationalist racist nonsense.  If you serve the cause like a toady, whether or not you “truly believe” becomes irrelevant. 

But, as Jeffrey points out, no matter how much the Barrs of the world would like to rewrite the law without going through the legislative or regulatory process, there is a long history of Article III Courts and the Immigration Courts themselves recognizing family-based asylum cases. 

There is also an irreducible truth staring Barr and his fellow restrictionists in the face: folks have been identifying themselves based on kinship ties from the beginning of history and other folks have been protecting, rejecting, joining, or excluding themselves from those family-based kinship groups since humans first walked the earth. Sometimes these processes have been peaceful, other times violent, sometimes cooperative, and sometimes coercive.

But, the reality is that family-based persecution happens every day of the week, through out our world.  In many many  instances it’s “at least one central reason” for the persecution.

Ironically, folks like Trump and Barr are doing their best to divide our country into as many hostile and sometimes violent, ethnic, racial and social groups as it can. But, in the end, whether within my lifetime or not, the truth will “eat up” the lies and false ideologies that drive Barr and the rest of the Trumpists. Sadly, however, by the time they are rightfully dislodged from power, too many will have died or been irrevocably harmed by their false doctrines and conscious disregard for human life, human decency, and well-established truths of human history.

PWS

08-17-19

ROUNDTABLE NEWS: Judge Jeff Chase & I Quoted By Nicole Narea In Law360 On How Trump’s Latest Assault On Immigrants’ Rights Could Go Belly Up Even With Some Statutory Support!

Nicole Narea
Nicole Narea
Reporter, Law360
Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Me
Me

https://www.law360.com/immigration/articles/1182014/deportation-rule-may-violate-due-process-procedural-law

Deportation Rule May Violate Due Process, Procedural Law

By Nicole Narea

Law360 (July 25, 2019, 8:31 PM EDT) — The Trump administration’s recent expansion of its power to fast-track deportations is likely to invite legal challenges if the new process is seen as a violation of administrative law and the Constitution’s due process guarantees.

Under a rule published Monday, unauthorized noncitizens across the entire U.S. — not just those apprehended within 100 air miles of a land border — who arrived in the last two years via a land border could be subject to expedited removal proceedings and deported without an immigration court hearing. The American Civil Liberties Union has vowed to challenge the rule, which went into effect Tuesday and, by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s estimates, will affect more than 20,000 immigrants a year.

Contrary to the Trump administration’s claims, however, the rule may not qualify for an exception to the Administrative Procedure Act’s public notice requirements that allows the DHS secretary to unilaterally change the scope of the agency’s expedited removal authority. It also raises due process concerns for individuals who may not be able to prove their period of residency in the U.S. and for asylum-seekers who might be erroneously subject to expedited deportation.

“Unleashed expedited removal undermines our immigration system and the rule of law,” said Shoba Wadhia, a professor at Penn State Law in University Park.

Administrative Procedure Act

To justify the rule, acting DHS Secretary Kevin McAleenan invoked his authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act to have “sole and unreviewable discretion” to alter the scope of expedited removal proceedings. The rule is therefore exempt from the Administrative Procedure Act’s requirement to give the public an opportunity to comment on it before it goes into effect, DHS said in its announcement.

But Paul Schmidt, former chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals during the Clinton administration, said there “does not appear to be any legitimate reason” for noncompliance with the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements, especially given that the rule had such a long gestation period. Trump has been considering such a rule since the first days of his administration.

Wadhia said opponents of the rule could argue that the government failed to show “good cause” that invoking notice and comment is in fact “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest” as the APA requires.

“The government’s position that there is a ‘good cause’ lacks integrity,” she said.

Most lawsuits that have succeeded in challenging Trump immigration policies have brought claims under the APA, including the recent challenge to a question about citizenship status on the 2020 census. The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately found that the decision to include the question on the census did not abide by the APA’s requirement that agencies provide a reasoned explanation for their actions.

Due Process Issues

Ken Johnson, dean of University of California, Davis School of Law, said the new rule could also be subject to due process challenges in light of the Supreme Court’s 1982 case Landon v. Plasencia, in which the justices applied a balancing test of interests in deciding the constitutionality of immigration admission procedures. That decision established that the interests of a noncitizen who has lived in the country for two years are much weightier than the interest at stake for a noncitizen who has been in the country for only two weeks because they have stronger ties to their community, he said.

Since the new rule expands expedited removal to apply to individuals who have lived in the U.S. for up to two years, they may be entitled to a higher standard of due process. Trump’s expansion of expedited removal also appears to exceed the limits provided by the Immigration and Nationality Act, resulting in further due process concerns.

Jeff Chase, a former legal adviser to the BIA and immigration judge, said the original intent of expedited removal was to stem an increase of inadmissible noncitizens arriving at airports in the 1990s who were paroled into the U.S. after announcing they were seeking asylum. The new rule, however, far surpasses that purpose.

“The present rule extends the application well beyond the purpose of controlling entry to the country, and now threatens to deprive those already here of their rights to apply for relief,” he said.

He said he also anticipates that expedited removal will be mistakenly applied to those beyond the scope of the rule, impacting those with a period of residence longer than two years, whose “attempts to stay under the government’s radar will create difficulty meeting their burden of establishing their period of residence in the U.S.”

Wadhia said that genuine refugees may also be erroneously denied due process, turned away as opposed to referred to an asylum officer to determine whether they have fear of persecution in their home countries, as required by law. Even if they have a credible fear interview, they are unlikely to pass in light of reports that asylum officers have been pressured to significantly lower their credible fear approval rates, Chase said.

Even U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, unaccompanied children and others who are exempt from expedited removal by statute could be unfairly and unlawfully targeted by the DHS, Wadhia said.

“The opportunity for profiling and violations of due process by DHS is rampant,” she said.

–Editing by Breda Lund and Kelly Duncan.

**************************************

The Government’s case for an “emergency” exemption to the APA is laughable. This bogus “immigration emergency” is actually a human rights tragedy that has been unfolding in “super slow motion” before us since before last Thanksgiving. Virtually every part of it is a predictable result of Trump’s “maliciously incompetent” racist-driven approach to migration situations. To say that it now requires an “emergency” exemption, when Trump announced the proposed policy change in an Executive Order over two years ago, and his incompetent agencies have been fiddling around with it ever since, is simply absurd.

The Constitutional problem raised by Dean Johnson and others is very real.

And, there is no question that Trump’s DHS will misuse this authority to detain and deport lawful permanent residents and even U.S. citizens. Indeed, it’s already happening even without the regulatory change. See, e.g., “Texas-Born Student Held In Immigration Custody For Weeks Released,” https://www.huffpost.com/entry/texas-student-immigration-custody-detention_n_5d36f637e4b020cd99498588.

Yes, some Federal Judges can be tone deaf to the plight of ordinary individuals, particularly when they wrongly think that they are “above the fray.”

Perhaps we need to hope that the DHS wrongfully detains a Federal Judge, a Federal Judge’s spouse, or the child of a Federal Judge so that the message about how Trump’s misguided policies affect ALL of us gets through to the “Judicial Ivory Tower” sooner, rather than later.

PWS

07-26-19

HON. JEFFREY S. CHASE SLAMS BIA, BARR FOR INSTITUTIONALIZING SLOPPY WORK — BIA “Has Certainly Not Earned The Deference”

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog

Jul 5 EOIR’s Troubling New Regulations

On July 2, the Department of Justice published final regulations impacting how decisions of immigration judges will be reviewed, both on appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals and by certification to the Attorney General.  I plan to cover the topic in depth in a later article, but I wanted to post my quick take on the fact that the new rule encourages the BIA to decide cases using two sentences of boilerplate language (plus a citation) that provides no insight into its determination process.  However, the regs imbue such decisions with a presumption that the Board “properly and thoroughly considered all issues, arguments, and claims raised or presented by the parties on appeal or in a motion that were deemed appropriate to the disposition of the appeal or motion, whether or not specifically mentioned in the decision.”

Just to be clear, the boilerplate denials look like this (in their entirety):

“ORDER: The Board affirms, without opinion, the result of the decision below. The decision below is, therefore, the final agency determination. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4).”

The above decision is referred to as an “affirmance without opinion,” or “AWO” for short.  In its commentary accompanying the publication of the final rule, the Department of Justice addressed a commenter’s concern that the BIA may use such AWOs to quickly deny cases even if a favorable disposition is warranted where “the Board member reviewing the case simply lacked the time or inclination to spend his or her resources writing a reasoned, public opinion for that particular case.’’  The Department responded by summarizing the BIA’s process of having staff attorneys first review the record of proceedings before making a recommendation to the Board member.  The Department offered such process as proof that “the use of an AWO does not reflect an abbreviated review of a case, but rather reflects the use of an abbreviated order to describe that review…”

Several facts are at odds with this claim.  There is an excellent corps of staff attorneys at the BIA, but over the past few years, those staff attorneys have been pushed to decide more cases in less time or risk discipline or termination.  Staff attorneys are encouraged to produce 40 decisions per month that are actually signed by Board Members, but are being assigned increasingly difficult cases to decide.  One staff attorney reported needing 18 hours to complete one decision on a very unique legal issue, but was still expected to meet the overall quota.  Such extreme pressure would make it tempting if not necessary for attorneys to resort to AWOs simply to keep their jobs.  Furthermore, as the present EOIR Director has downgraded the staff attorney positions to entry level with no upward progression, and as the agency is strapped for funds, the Board is extremely short of such attorneys at present, further increasing the pressure on those remaining to decide more cases more quickly.

As for review by the Board Members themselves, there were always those who were known to sign anything handed to them.  In a 2007 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, former Judge Richard Posner noted that one Board Member, Ed Grant, “was discovered to have decided more than 50 immigration cases in one day, requiring a decision ‘nearly every 10 minutes if he worked a nine-hour day without a break,’” or 7 minutes per case if he worked an 8 hour day and took lunch.  See Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 2007).  I hope we can all agree that reviewing a complete record of an immigration court hearing, plus the decision drafted for such case, in seven minutes does in fact reflect an abbreviated review of the case.

In its comments to the new regs, the Department further defended its presumption argument by citing the language from a Ninth Circuit decision, Angov v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 893, 905 (9th Cir. 2015), relating to the reliability of a State Department consular investigation which undermined some of the factual claims of an asylum claim.  In that case, the court (in a 2-1 decision) upheld the IJ’s reliance on the report (in spite of its author’s unavailability to testify), stating that such reports “aren’t just a collection of statements by disconnected individuals.  Rather, they are the unified work product of a U.S. government agency carrying out governmental responsibilities. As such, the report itself, and the acts of the various individuals who helped prepare it, are clothed with a presumption of regularity.”

However, the situation in Angov was not analogous to a BIA decision.  In carrying out an investigation to confirm or disprove factual aspects of the asylum claim, the issue of reliability in Angov related to the likelihood of government misconduct: i.e., whether the investigator lied, and in fact had not taken the investigatory steps claimed in the report.  The presumption cited by the court was that the State Department officials did their job “fairly, conscientiously, and thoroughly,” that none had a personal stake in the outcome, and that “no one lied or fabricated evidence.”  It should also be noted that the Court found that, because the petitioner had not formally entered the U.S., he had no constitutional due process rights, and thus could not challenge the admission of the report on such grounds.  And the court conceded that the outcome would have been different had the claim arisen in the Second Circuit, whose case law favored the petitioner’s argument.

However, in the context of the BIA’s review on appeal, the question isn’t whether the single Board member fabricated facts or had a personal stake in the claim.  The question is whether the Board Member got it right – i.e. whether he or she properly interpreted the law, and applied that law correctly to the proper facts.  History has demonstrated that they often do not, nor would they be expected to when signing a decision every seven minutes.

Yet through the new regulations, the Department of Justice is essentially saying that, due to the crushing case load, just trust that it is doing everything correctly, and defer to its two-sentence boilerplate decisions without requiring further explanation of its reasoning.  The retort to this may be found a little later in Judge Posner’s decision in Kadia: “Deference is earned; it is not a birthright. Repeated egregious failures of the Immigration Court and the Board to exercise care commensurate with the stakes in an asylum case can be understood, but not excused, as consequences of a crushing workload that the executive and legislative branches of the federal government have refused to alleviate.”  Kadia, supra at 821 (emphasis added).  I am not aware of any other court that would expect Circuit Court judges to grant them carte blanche to simply affix rubber-stamp denials on appeals, particularly those involving life-or-death determinations arising in the asylum context.  Furthermore, regular readers of my blog or that of my friend Paul Schmidt will know that the BIA errs not infrequently in its interpretation of fact and law.  And for the record, the caseload has become far more crushing in the 12 years since Judge Posner penned those words in Kadia.

Take for example a recent decision of the Fourth Circuit.   In Orellana v. Barr, No. 18-1513 (4th Cir. May 23, 2019), the court found that the BIA had distorted the evidence of record in order to conclude that the government had been willing and able to control the non-government persecutor by ignoring the many credible instances in which the police did not respond to the petitioner’s call for help, and instead focusing on the few isolated incidents in which they did respond.  So had the BIA chosen to decide the case with a two-sentence AWO, should the same circuit court have credited the Board with properly considering and weighing all of the police’s responses and non-responses, without such distortion, because government employees are presumed to properly carry out their duties?  The Third Circuit reversed the BIA for its troubling, erroneous overreach in Alimbaev v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 872 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2017), finding the Board to have violated its proper standard of review, and then wrongly reversed based on false insinuation and nitpicking.  Had the BIA relied on a two-sentence AWO in that case, should the circuit court have just assumed that none of those errors had occurred, and that the BIA had instead reached the correct conclusion for the right reasons?

The BIA has certainly not earned the deference the Department of Justice believes it deserves based on the regulatory presumption.  Hopefully, the circuit courts will waste no time in pointing this out in future appeals of the AWOs we can expect to see frequently from the BIA.

Copyright 2019 Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved.

***********************************

Like Jeffrey, I’ve been saying for some time now that under the control of Attorneys General who are neither experts in immigration and refugee law nor qualified quasi judicial adjudicators, the Federal Courts should stupor giving “Chevron deference” to BIA decisions.

PWS

07-07-19

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S MALICIOUS INCOMPETENTS DENY MIGRANTS INTERPRETERS IN KANGAROO COURTS WHILE LYING ABOUT RATIONALE — Money For Tanks & Golf, None For Due Process? — Why Are The Article III Courts Complicit By Not Blowing Whistle On “Courts” That Don’t Come Close To Providing Due Process?

Tal Kopan
Tal Kopan
Washington Reporter, SF Chronicle

Link might help for sharing…

https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/Trump-administration-ending-in-person-14070403.php

Trump administration ending in-person interpreters at immigrants’ first hearings

Tal Kopan, San Francisco Chronicle

WASHINGTON — The Trump administration is preparing to replace in-court interpreters at initial immigration court hearings with videos informing asylum seekers and other immigrants facing deportation of their rights, The Chronicle has learned.

The administration portrays the change as a cost-saving measure for an immigration court system bogged down under a growing backlog. But advocates for immigrants are concerned the new procedure could jeopardize their due-process rights, add confusion and potentially make the system less efficient by causing more of them to go underground or appeal cases.

The Justice Department informed the nation’s immigration judges of the change last month at a training session, multiple sources familiar with the situation told The Chronicle.

At issue are “master calendar” hearings where immigration judges meet with undocumented immigrants, usually dozens of them, in rapid succession to schedule their cases and to inform them of their rights. The quick sessions are intended mainly to be sure the immigrants understand what is happening and know when their next hearing will be and what steps they need to take in the interim.

Under the new plan, which the Justice Department told judges could be rolled out by mid-July, a video recorded in multiple languages would play informing immigrants of their rights and the course of the proceedings. But after that, if immigrants have questions, want to say something to the judge or if the judge wants to confirm they understand, no interpreter would be provided.

Many of the immigrants come from Central America, but collectively they speak a diverse range of indigenous languages and sometimes don’t know Spanish. Immigrants from all over the world also come before the court system, which is run by the Justice Department.

The shift would especially affect immigrants who do not have attorneys to explain proceedings. Many immigrants lack representation at the initial hearing, and legal services around the country say they are being stretched thin. The government does not provide attorneys.

Instead of turning to an in-court interpreter, judges would have to rely on any who happen to be in the building for other purposes, or call a telephone service for on-demand translation that judges say can be woefully inadequate or substantially delayed.

“It’s a disaster in the making,” one judge said, speaking on condition of anonymity because the person did not have Justice Department approval to talk publicly. “What if you have an individual that speaks an indigenous language and has no education and is completely illiterate? You think showing them a video is going to completely inform them of their rights? How are they supposed to ask questions of the judge?”

The Justice Department billed the move as a cost-saving measure. Sources familiar with the interpreter situation say there have been ongoing issues with the budget and the contract with the primary interpreter provider, leading the administration to encourage more use of the telephone service and look for other ways to keep costs down.

A Justice Department who was not authorized to speak on the record said the shift away from in-person interpretation was “part of an effort to be good stewards of (the department’s) limited resources.” The official said the direction to judges was not a policy change, but declined to elaborate.

The immigration judges union, the National Association of Immigration Judges, said the change was another in a line of steps the administration has taken to force judges to do more with fewer resources at the risk of fairness.

Asked to comment, union President Ashley Tabaddor, a judge in Los Angeles, said the Justice Department had not given enough notice for the union to raise objections or provide input on the change.

She dismissed budget concerns as a justification.

“Interpreter cost is not a surprise cost — it’s an integral part of every case,” Tabaddor said. “If they actually look at the courts as a real court, they would never be dismissive of the role of an interpreter. But the fact that we are here and have these budget shortfalls means they have prioritized the budget in a way that is dismissive of the integral role of the interpreters, and reflects the flaw of having the courts run by a law enforcement agency.”

The immigration courts have been overwhelmed for years with a burgeoning load that is now approaching 1 million cases. The judges association has advocated for the courts to be removed from the Justice Department and made an independent system.

The Trump administration has made a series of efforts it says are intended to speed up the process and avoid having hundreds of thousands of immigrants build lives in the U.S. while waiting to learn if they will be deported. Critics, including immigration lawyers and advocates and some judges, say many of the changes have actually undermined the system, confusing immigrants and creating grounds for lengthy appeals.

Some judges said it’s common at master calendar hearings for immigrants to misunderstand the advice to find a lawyer. Some conclude that means they should not return for their next hearing if they don’t have a lawyer. Failing to appear is grounds for a deportation order.

The system is “not an assembly line,” said Jeffrey Chase, a former immigration judge and former senior legal adviser to the immigration appeals court who now volunteers for organizations that provide legal assistance to immigrants. He said the master calendar is most immigrants’ first impression ever of a court system, and that a lack of interpreters and interaction with a judge could foster a sense of distrust.

“You’re dealing with people’s lives,” Chase said. “All kinds of crazy issues arise. Sometimes there’s a health issue, and you need to be able to communicate to find this stuff out.

“And also, people come in so afraid,” Chase said. “If they’re able to talk with the judge and realize, ‘This person is a human being and they’re able to work with me’ — being played a tape reinforces this feeling that, ‘I’m dealing with this deportation machine.’ ”

Chase said concerns about the cost and length of the process are legitimate, but he questioned the administration’s way of addressing them.

“You always hear the word ‘efficiency’ from this administration now, and it’s very infrequent that you hear ‘due process’ or ‘justice,’ ” Chase said. “There’s no longer concern about the balance. It’s totally efficiency-heavy these days, and I think it’s being decided by people who haven’t been in the court much and don’t understand the consequences.”

Tal Kopan is The San Francisco Chronicle’s Washington correspondent. Email: tal.kopan@sfchronicle.com Twitter: @talkopan

*****************************

My suggestion: In the future, any legal claims involving Members of Congress or Article III Judges and any members of their immediate families should be tried only in U.S. Immigration Court. The opposing party should be given the ability to:

  • Select the judge;
  • Write or rewrite the rules governing the litigation; 
  • Change any result with which they might disagree; and perhaps most important
  • The proceedings shall be conducted in a language that only the opposing party and the “judge” understand.

That way, these folks would be receiving the same type of “justice” under the Constitution that they are happy to inflict on individuals in today’s Immigration Courts. Seems fair to me.

PWS

07-03-19

“ABSURD, FARCE” — Chase, Musalo, Other Asylum Experts Lambaste Trump’s Scheme To Designate One Of World’s Most Dangerous Counties, Without A Functioning Asylum System, As “Safe” For Asylum Seekers!

https://www.law360.com/articles/1170313/guatemala-is-not-as-safe-for-asylum-seekers-as-trump-says

Nicole Narea
Nicole Narea
Reporter, Law360
Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Karen Musalo
Professor Karen Musalo
Director, Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, Hastings Law

Nicole Narea reports for Law360:

. . . .

Trump tweeted Monday night that Guatemala is “getting ready to sign” a so­called safe third country agreement with the U.S., and he lauded Mexico for “using their strong immigration laws” to stop migrants well before they reach the southern U.S. border. Mexico said Friday it would also weigh a safe third country agreement with the U.S. if its efforts to ramp up immigration enforcement as part of a trade deal do not succeed within 45 days.

The announcements came as the Trump administration moved to reduce its obligations to asylum­ seekers by expanding its “Remain in Mexico” policy, officially known as the Migrant Protection Protocols, by which migrants are sent back to Mexico while they await hearings in U.S. immigration court.

As for Guatemala, experts have protested that Mexico’s southern neighbor cannot offer asylum­ seekers the kind of security intended by a safe third country agreement.

But the Trump administration is not proposing such an agreement with Guatemala because it believes the country to be safe, said Jeffrey Chase, a former immigration judge and ex ­senior legal adviser to the Board of Immigration Appeals. Rather, the White House believes the accord will stop asylum­ seekers from countries farther south from entering the U.S., Chase said.

Migrants from El Salvador and Honduras have to travel through Guatemala en route to the U.S., and if Guatemala were subject to such an agreement, the Trump administration would have an “excuse to turn away those fleeing violence in those countries,” he said.

Karen Musalo, the founding director of the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies at University of California, Hastings College of the Law, said that to call Guatemala safe is absurd.

“I don’t think that anyone familiar with the human rights situation in Guatemala — with its extremely high levels of homicides, femicides, gender violence, gang and organized crime violence, corruptions, etc. — could say with a straight face that asylum­ seekers would be safe there,” she said.

. . . .

***********************************************

Those with access to Law360 can read Nicole’s complete article at the above link.

It isn’t just that Trump (supported by some equally dishonest and nasty GOP legislators and flunkies like Mike Pence, Mike Pompeo, Ken “Cooch Cooch” Cuccinelli, and Kevin McAleenan) is blatantly lying about asylum seekers and Guatemala being “safe.” What he essentially proposes is the U.S.-sanctioned murder of innocent asylum seekers from the Northern Triangle.

Why is this outrage against the law and humanity “below the radar screen?” Seems like it’s actually the most clear “impeachable offense” that Trump has committed to date. And, it’s right out in plain view for all to see, with irrefutable proof that Guatemala is NOT a safe country for anyone, let alone asylum seekers. That’s exactly why folks are fleeing Guatemala for their lives every day.

PWS

06-21-19

DUE PROCESS: “Roundtable of Former Immigration Judges” Gets AILA Award For Due Process Advocacy!

https://www.aila.org/advo-media/press-releases/2019/aila-presents-the-roundtable-of-former-immigration

Roundtable
Representing “The Roundtable”: Judge Polly Webber, Judge Jeffrey S. Chase, Judge Lory D. Rosenberg, Judge Cecelia Espenoza, Judge Sue Roy, Judge Carol KIng

AILA Presents the Roundtable of Former Immigration Judges with the 2019 Advocacy Award

AILA Doc. No. 19062032 | Dated June 19, 2019

CONTACTS:
George Tzamaras

202-507-7649

gtzamaras@aila.org

Belle Woods

202-507-7675

bwoods@aila.org

WASHINGTON, DC – The American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) will recognize the Roundtable of Former Immigration Judges, with the 2019 Advocacy Award for outstanding efforts in support of AILA’s advocacy agenda. The roundtable will accept the award this week during AILA’s Annual Conference in Orlando, FL.

The Round Table of Former Immigration Judges was formed in June 2017 when seven former Immigration Judges and BIA Members united for an amicus brief in Matter of Negusie. In the two years since, the group has grown to more than 30 members, dedicated to the principle of due process for all. Its members have served as amici in 14 cases before six different circuit courts, the Attorney General, and the BIA. The group has made its voice heard repeatedly in support of the rights of victims of domestic violence to asylum protection, and has also lent its arguments to the issue of children’s need for counsel in removal proceedings, the impact of remote detention in limiting access to counsel, and the case against indefinite detention of immigrants. The Round Table of Former Immigration Judges has submitted written testimony to Congress and has released numerous press statements. Its individual members regularly participate in teaching, training, and press events.

Cite as AILA Doc. No. 19062032.

And here are Judge Chase’s “acceptance remarks” in behalf of our entire group:

Thank you; we are humbled and honored to receive this award.  Due to the time constraints on our speeches, I don’t have time to either name all of the members of our group, or to thank all those to whom thanks is due.  So I will do that in a blog post.

 

In terms of advocacy, we are all advocates – everyone in this room, all AILA members.  The past experience of our group as former judges gives us more of a platform. But it is a special group, in that so many have chosen to spend their post-government careers or their retirement actively fighting to make a difference in these trying times.  

 

In fighting to make that difference, we must all speak for those who have no voice, and must serve as the conscience in a time of amoral government actions.  Those whom we advocate for had the courage and strength to not only escape tragedy and make their way to this country, but once here, to continue to fight for their legal rights against a government that makes no secret of its disdain for their existence.  We owe it to them to use our knowledge and skills to aid them in this fight.

 

In conclusion, I will quote the response of one of our group members who isn’t here tonight upon learning of this award: “It’s nice to be recognized.  Now let’s get back to work.”

 

Thank you all again.
 
************************************

Congrats to all of my 30+ wonderful colleagues in “The Roundtable.” It’s an honor to be part of this group. Also, many, many thanks to all of the firms and individual lawyers who have provided hundreds of hours of pro bono assistance to us so that we could have a “voice.” It’s been a real team effort!

PWS

06-21-19

BAD LAW: BIA Evades Supremes Again To Aid DHS Enforcement — Matter of NAVARRO GUADARRAMA, 27 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 2019)

https://go.usa.gov/xmutz

Matter of NAVARRO GUADARRAMA, 27 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 2019)

BIA HEADNOTE:

Where an alien has been convicted of violating a State drug statute that includes a controlled substance that is not on the Federal controlled substances schedules, he or she must establish a realistic probability that the State would actually apply the language of the statute to prosecute conduct involving that substance in order to avoid the immigration consequences of such a conviction. Matter of Ferreira, 26 I&N Dec. 415 (BIA 2014), reaffirmed.

PANEL: Appellate Immigration Judges  MALPHRUS, MANN, and KELLY

OPINION BY: Judge Ana L. Mann

***************************************

Seems to me the BIA got this one all wrong.  The Florida statute was amended specifically to broaden the definition of “marihuana” to include things that aren’t marihuana. How can the BIA say that there is no chance of prosecution? Since stalks, etc. are now “marihuana” it wouldn’t even be a defense to point out that you just possessed stalks.

The BIA has twisted item the concept of “far fetched” to include things that the legislature clearly contemplated when amending the statute.

The Supreme’s decision in Moncrieffe was clearly intended to be ameliorative.  But the BIA has turned it into a “sword” for DHS. Moreover, since “stalks only” would no longer be a defense, why would any state case discuss it?

Generally the “Ferreira test” is impossible for any unrepresented respondent to meet. Indeed, I doubt that most detention center judges would have access to the necessary materials to research something so technical.

As my good friend and colleague in the Roundtable of Retired Judges, Judge Jeff Chase, added:

The Supreme Court and some of the circuits created case law that was designed to be clearer – i.e. it doesn’t matter what the respondent actually did, or what the actual sentence was, just look at the least culpable behavior covered by the statute.And the Supremes and some circuits obviously intended it to be ameliorative, given the harsh consequences of the immigration laws.

The BIA sees its mission as trying to render those higher court decisions meaningless.

How far we have come from an organization supposdly dedicated to using teamwork and best practices to “guarantee fairness and Due Process for all.”

PWS

06-16-19

UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: Professor Richard Price Tells Us Why The Immigration Courts Are Unconstitutional Under The Due Process Clause & Why It’s Past Time For The Supremes To “Confess Error” & End This Mockery Of Our Constitution!

https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/publications/judges_journal/2019/spring/the-scope-the-removal-power-ripe-reconsideration/

Professor Richard J. Price, Jr., writes for the ABA’s Judges Journal:

May 01, 2019 FEATURE

The Scope of the Removal Power Is Ripe for Reconsideration

By Richard J. Pierce Jr.

I have been teaching and writing about the power of the president to remove officers of the United States for over 40 years. Until recently, however, I have been content to describe the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinions that address the scope issue without attempting to persuade the Court to change its approach to the issue.
The issue has become particularly important in the last few years for two reasons. First, the scope issue has become particularly important because of the increasing controversy that surrounds the scope of the removal power in the context of officers who perform purely adjudicatory functions. In its 2018 opinion in Lucia v. SEC, the Supreme Court held that Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) administrative law judges (ALJs) are officers of the United States.1 The holding is broad enough to encompass virtually all ALJs and administrative judges (AJs).2 In a brief filed in the Supreme Court in that case, the solicitor general (SG) tried to persuade the Court to hold that the longstanding limits on the power to remove an ALJ are either invalid or meaningless.3 Those limits are based on due process. The Court decided not to address the removal issue in that case, but it is only a matter of time until the Court addresses the issue.The second reason the scope issue has become particularly important is tied to the growing movement to broaden the scope of the power of the president to remove officers who perform executive functions. That effort is motivated by concern that limits on the removal power interfere impermissibly with the president’s responsibility to perform the functions vested in the president by Article II of the Constitution.Thus, for instance, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of the removal power and reduced the power of Congress to limit the removal power in its 2010 opinion in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.4 The Court held that Congress cannot limit the president’s removal power by imposing two or more layers of for-cause limits on the removal power. Because the president can only remove a member of the SEC for cause, the Court wrote that the for-cause limit on the SEC’s power to remove members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) violated Article II.

A panel of the D.C. Circuit took a step beyond Free Enterprise Fund in 2016, holding that the single layer for-cause limit on the president’s power to remove the director of the Consumer Financial Protection Board (CFPB) violated Article II.5 The en banc D.C. Circuit overturned that decision, but there are reasons to believe that final resolution of the issue is far from over. The judge who wrote the panel opinion, Judge Brett Kavanaugh, was appointed to the Supreme Court, where he will be in a better position to influence the outcome of the inevitable future disputes about the scope of the removal power. In 2018, a panel of the Fifth Circuit renewed the dispute in an analogous context by holding unconstitutional the for-cause limit on the president’s power to remove the director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).6

This article looks at the history of Supreme Court cases addressing removal power. Based on a discussion of those cases, including a landmark opinion written by former chief justice (and former president) William Howard Taft, the article concludes that the Supreme Court should hold that the president must have the power to remove at will any officer who performs executive functions to enable the president to perform the functions vested in the president by Article II. By contrast, the article concludes that the Court should hold that due process precludes the president from having the power to remove at will an officer whose sole responsibilities are to adjudicate disputes between private parties and the government.

Methodology and Findings

I began my effort to understand the scope issue by reading and studying with care all of the major judicial decisions that have addressed the scope issue. I came away from that effort with two pleasant surprises. First, with two exceptions, the opinions are better reasoned than I remembered. Second, with the same two exceptions, the opinions form a coherent and consistent pattern. Courts consistently protect the president’s power to perform the functions vested in him by Article II by holding that he or one of his immediate subordinates must have the power to remove at will any officer who performs purely executive functions. At the same time, courts consistently protect the due process rights of parties to disputes with the government by limiting the power of the president or an agency head to remove any officer who performs purely adjudicatory functions.

The President Must Have the Power to Remove At Will Officers Who Perform Executive Functions

The logical starting point in any attempt to understand the opinions that address the scope of the removal power is the 1926 opinion of Chief Justice William Howard Taft in Myers v. United States.7 That opinion upheld President Woodrow Wilson’s decision to remove a postmaster from office. It is often described as holding that Congress cannot limit in any way the president’s power to remove any officer. That description is incomplete in ways that are misleading. Taft’s 71-page opinion addressed many issues with care.

Taft did not focus on President Wilson’s removal of postmaster Myers in the 1920s. He focused primarily on President Andrew Johnson’s decision to remove the Secretary of War in the 1860s. He also did not address explicitly the issue that has drawn most of the attention of courts—whether Congress can limit the president’s removal power by requiring a statement of cause for removing an officer. The restriction on removal at issue in Myers was the Tenure in Office Act, a statute that Congress enacted in 1867. That statute purported to limit the president’s removal power by requiring the president to obtain the permission of the Senate before removing any officer. The opinion in Myers was the logical antecedent to modern opinions like INS v. Chadha8 and Bowsher v. Synar,9 in which the Court held that Congress cannot aggrandize itself by giving itself a role in performing functions that are vested in the president by Article II.

Taft discussed in detail the controversy that led Congress to enact the Tenure in Office Act and to impeach and attempt to remove from office President Johnson for refusing to comply with that statute by firing the Secretary of War without first obtaining the permission of the Senate. Congress and President Johnson differed dramatically with respect to the most important question at the time—how to reconstruct the country after the Civil War. Congress enacted the Tenure in Office Act in an effort to make it impossible for President Johnson to exercise the powers vested in him by Article II in the context of his attempt to reunite and reconstruct the country.

In the course of his lengthy opinion, Taft described and supported three broad propositions that are important to an understanding of the removal power. First, he explained why the president must be able to appoint many officers to be able to perform effectively the functions vested in the president by Article II. The task is far too massive to be accomplished by a president without the aid of agents. Second, he explained why the president must have the discretion to remove officers at will. If an officer attempts to move the nation in a direction that is inconsistent with the president’s policies, the president cannot perform the functions vested in him by Article II unless he has the discretion to remove that officer. Third, if Congress wants to make it impossible for the president to perform the functions vested in him by Article II, it can do so most effectively by limiting the power of the president to remove an officer. To Chief Justice (and former president) Taft, it followed that Congress cannot limit the president’s discretion to remove officers with executive functions.

I find Taft’s explanation of his three broad propositions persuasive, particularly coming from a former president. Many of the most important later opinions repeat and build on Taft’s reasoning and conclusions in Myers. Thus, for instance, the opinion in Free Enterprise Fund supports its ban on multiple levels of for-cause limits on the removal power with reference to the reasoning in Myers.10The Free Enterprise Fund opinion supplements the reasoning in Myers with reasoning based on political accountability, such as the public cannot know who is responsible for a government policy decision unless the president has the power to remove a policymaking official at will.

Similarly, Judge (now Justice) Kavanaugh used reasoning like the reasoning in Myers, supplemented by reasoning based on political accountability, in his opinion that held unconstitutional the for-cause limit on the president’s power to remove the director of the CFPB. Thus, for instance, he emphasized that the director “unilaterally implements and enforces [19] federal consumer protection statutes, covering everything from home finance to credit cards to banking practices.”11 He reasoned that anyone with that broad range of executive responsibilities must be removable by the president at will to allow the president to perform the functions vested in him by Article II and to allow the public to hold the president accountable for the policies the government adopts and attempts to further in each of the many contexts in which the director has the unilateral power to make and implement policy on behalf of the government. The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in support of its holding of the for-cause limit on the president’s power to remove the director of the FHFA12 is virtually identical to the reasoning in Judge (now Justice) Kavanaugh’s opinion with respect to the director of the CFPB.

Taft’s opinion in Myers also includes another discussion that is important to an understanding of the Court’s views with respect to the appropriate scope of the removal power. He devoted several pages of his opinion to discussion of the postmaster’s argument that he could not be removed at will because the Court had upheld limits on the power of the president to remove territorial judges.13 After discussing the conflicting opinions in which the Court had addressed that question, the chief justice referred with apparent approval to the opinion of Justice John McLean:

He pointed out that the argument upon which the decision rested was based on the necessity for presidential removals in the discharge by the President of his executive duties and his taking care that the laws be faithfully executed, and that such an argument could not apply to the judges, over whose judicial duties he could not properly exercise any supervision or control after their appointment and confirmation.14

The chief justice then explicitly disavowed any intent to apply the reasoning and holding in Myers to non-Article III judges: “The questions, . . . whether * * * Congress may provide for [a territorial judge’s] removal in some other way, present considerations different from those which apply in the removal of executive officers, and therefore we do not decide them.”15

The opinion in Free Enterprise Fund includes a similar explicit disavowal of any intent to apply its reasoning or holding to officers who perform adjudicative functions, noting that “administrative law judges perform adjudicative functions rather than enforcement functions.”16

Due Process Limits the Power to Remove Officers Who Perform Only Adjudicative Functions

A few years after it issued its opinion in Myers, the Court issued its famous opinion in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States.17 The Court upheld the statutory for-cause limit on the president’s power to remove a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) commissioner. The opinion in Humphrey’s Executor has traditionally been interpreted to be inconsistent with the opinion in Myers and to authorize Congress to create agencies with vast power that are “independent” of the president. Neither of those interpretations is supported by the reasoning in the Humphrey’s Executor opinion and the context in which the opinion was issued. The opinion in Humphrey’s Executor can support an interpretation that reconciles it with the opinion in Myers and that does not legitimate the concept of multifunction agencies that are independent of the president.

The FTC of 1935 was nothing like the modern FTC or the agencies that have been the subject of the recent decisions that have held invalid restrictions on the removal of officers—PCAOB, CFPB, and FHFA. Each of those agencies has the power to make policy decisions on behalf of the government by issuing legislative rules that have the same legally binding effect as a statute. By contrast, the FTC of 1935 had no power to make policy through the issuance of rules or through any other means.

The Court distinguished the functions performed by the FTC from the executive functions performed by the officers who were the subject of the holding in Myers. The Court characterized the FTC of 1935 as a “quasi legislative and quasi-judicial” body.18 In its capacity as a quasi-legislative body, the FTC of 1935 performed the functions that are performed by congressional staff and the Congressional Research Service (CRS) today. Congress had little staff support until 1946, and CRS was not created until 1970.19 In 1935, Congress had to rely on the FTC to study the performance of markets and to make recommendations with respect to the need to enact legislation to authorize regulation of markets. FTC reports to Congress were the basis for many statutes, including the Natural Gas Act and the Federal Power Act.20 It made sense for Congress to insulate the officers in charge of conducting research for Congress from at-will removal by the president.

In its capacity as a quasi-judicial body, the FTC acted as a specialized forum to adjudicate trade disputes. The Court analogized it to the Court of Claims.21 In its adjudicative capacity, the FTC of 1935 was also analogous to the Territorial Courts that the MyersCourt distinguished from agencies that perform executive functions. As the Myers Court recognized, the president “could not properly exercise any supervision or control” over judges who were appointed to the Territorial Courts.22 It follows that a for-cause limit on the power of the president to remove a commissioner of the FTC of 1935 was entirely consistent with the holding in Myers that the president must have the power to remove at-will officers who perform executive functions.

The Court followed its opinion in Humphrey’s Executor with its 1958 opinion in Wiener v. United States.23 The Court held that the president could not remove a member of the three-member War Claims Tribunal without stating a cause for removal. Wiener can be interpreted to support the proposition that due process limits the power of the president to remove an officer with adjudicative responsibilities. There was no statutory limit on the president’s power to remove a member of the War Claims Tribunal. The Court adopted a construction of the statute that included such a limit because the Tribunal was tasked only with “adjudicating [claims] according to law, that is on the merits of each claim, supported by evidence and governing legal considerations.”24 The Court reasoned that Congress intended the members of the Tribunal to have the same freedom from potential outside influences that the judges of the district courts and the Court of Claims had.25 It followed that the president could not remove a member of the Tribunal without stating a cause for removal.

In the meantime, Congress was engaged in a lengthy investigation and debate to devise and implement means of ensuring that the hearing examiners (later renamed ALJs) who presided in hearings to adjudicate disputes between private parties and the government did so in an unbiased manner.26 Many parties who participated in those adjudications complained that ALJs behaved in ways that reflected a powerful bias in favor of the government. Many studies supported the claims of bias.

After 17 years of investigation and debate, Congress addressed the problem of bias in 1946 by enacting the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by unanimous voice vote in both the House and Senate.27 The most important provisions of the APA are designed to ensure that ALJs preside over adjudicatory hearings in an unbiased manner. They include provisions that prohibit an agency from determining the compensation of an ALJ,28 assigning an ALJ responsibilities that are inconsistent with the duties of an ALJ,29and, most important, removing or otherwise punishing an ALJ. An ALJ can be removed only for cause found by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) after conducting a formal hearing.30

In its 1950 opinion in Wong Yang Sun v. McGrath,31 the Court praised Congress for investigating the serious problem of bias in hearings conducted to adjudicate disputes between private parties and the government. The Court also praised Congress for including in the APA provisions that greatly reduced the risk of bias by protecting ALJs from agency pressure to conduct hearings in a manner that reflected bias in favor of the agency.32 The Court compared the blatantly biased hearing that the immigration service had provided the private party in the case before the Court with the unbiased hearing that the APA assures.33 The Court held the APA applicable to immigration hearings even though Congress had not explicitly incorporated the APA safeguards of independence in the Immigration Act.34 The Court adopted a saving construction of the Immigration Act to avoid having to hold the statute unconstitutional as a violation of due process.35

Congress reacted angrily to the decision in Wong Yang Sun. It amended the Immigration Act to make it explicit that the APA safeguards of the independence of ALJs did not apply to immigration judges (IJs). Faced with a direct conflict between its views of due process and those of Congress, the Court backed down and upheld the constitutionality of the amended Immigration Act over an argument that it violates due process in its 1955 opinion in Marcello v. Bonds.36 That opinion is one of only two opinions on the removal power that were not well-reasoned and that do not fit the otherwise consistent pattern of opinions that resolve scope of removal disputes based on the functions performed by the officer whose removal is at issue.

In every other opinion, the Court distinguished clearly between officers who perform executive functions and officers who perform adjudicative functions. The Court concluded that officers who perform executive functions must be removable at will in order to ensure that the president can perform the functions vested in him by Article II. The Court concluded that officers who perform adjudicative functions must be protected from at-will removal in order to reduce the risk that they will conduct adjudicatory hearings in ways that reflect pro-government bias in violation of due process. The Court should overrule its holding in Marcello v. Bonds based on the powerful reasoning in its opinion in Wong Yang Sun.

Asylum cases provide the context in which it is most important to ensure that officers with adjudicative responsibilities are able to perform their duties without fear that they will be removed or otherwise punished if they do not act in ways that reflect whatever bias the president and the attorney general might have. Denial of a meritorious application for asylum is almost always followed by removal of the alien from the United States. Thus, denial of a meritorious application for asylum has devastating effects on the applicant, often including a high risk that the applicant will be killed when the applicant is forced to return to the applicant’s country of origin.

The present circumstances illustrate the extreme risk of bias particularly well. Both the president and the attorney general have expressed powerful antipathy toward aliens who seek asylum and have applied extraordinary pressure on IJs to deny applications for asylum. That pressure is virtually certain to influence at least some IJs to deny applications for asylum in some cases in which their unbiased view of the merits would yield a decision granting the application.37 The attorney general has the power to evaluate the performance of IJs and to remove an IJ at will.38 It is unrealistic to believe that all IJs will have the extraordinary courage and strength of character required to act in a manner that is inconsistent with the expectations of the president and the attorney general. The Supreme Court should put an end to the blatantly unconstitutional practice of pressuring IJs to deny applications for asylum.

The only other opinion in which the Court departed from the important principles of constitutional law that underlie most of its decisions was its 1988 opinion in Morrison v. Olson.39 The Court upheld the statutory for-cause limit on the power of the attorney general to remove an independent counsel who had the power to investigate and potentially prosecute a high-ranking executive officer for allegedly engaging in criminal conduct. The Court held that the limit on the removal power was permissible even though the Court characterized prosecution as an executive function.40

As I have explained at length elsewhere, the opinion in Morrison did no harm because, as the Court emphasized repeatedly, the independent counsel had no power to make any policy decision.41 The Court has never upheld a limit on the power to remove an officer who has the power to make policy decisions on behalf of the government. That is by far the most important function that is vested in the president in Article II.

Conclusion

I hope that the Supreme Court holds that the president must have the power to remove at will any officer who performs executive functions to enable the president to perform the functions vested in the president by Article II. I also hope that the Court holds that due process precludes the president from having the power to remove at will an officer whose sole responsibilities are to adjudicate disputes between private parties and the government. With one glaring exception, the Court’s opinions are consistent with those principles when they are read with care and in the context in which they were decided. I hope that the Court eliminates the one outlier by overruling its 1955 decision in Marcello v. Bonds and holding that immigration judges cannot be removed at will.

Endnotes

1. 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).

2. The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) has solicited several reports that describe in detail the functions performed by the roughly 2,000 ALJs and 11,000 AJs who preside in hearings conducted by federal agencies. Those studies are available on the ACUS website.

3. Brief for Respondent Supporting Petitioners at 39–56, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (Feb. 2018) (No. 17-130).

4. 561 U.S. 477 (2010).

5. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bd., 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’d en banc, 881 F.3d 75 (2018).

6. Collins v. Mnuchin, 908 F.3d 151 (5th Cir. 2018).

7. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).

8. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).

9. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).

10. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).

11. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bd., 839 F. 3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’d en banc, 881 F.3d 75 (2018).

12. Collins v. Mnuchin, 908 F. 3d 151 (5th Cir. 2018).

13. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 154–59 (1926).

14. Id. at 156–57 (emphasis added).

15. Id. at 157–58.

16. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 507 (2010).

17. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).

18. Id. at 629.

19. See the descriptions of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 and the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 in Wikipedia.

20. See Ewin L. Davis, Influence of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigations on Federal Regulation of Interstate Electric and Gas Utilities, 14 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 21 (1945).

21. Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 629.

22. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 156–57 (1926).

23. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).

24. Id. at 353–56.

25. Id. at 355–56.

26. The Court described this process of debate and investigation in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 37–41 (1950).

27. The Court described the process of enacting the APA in Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 131–32 (1953).

28. 5 U.S.C. § 5372.

29. Id. § 3105.

30. Id. § 7521.

31. 339 U.S. at 40.

32. Id. at 41.

33. Id. at 45–46.

34. Id. at 51.

35. Id. at 49–50.

36. 349 U.S. 302 (1955).

37. Catherine Y. Kim, The President’s Immigration Courts, 68 Emory L. Rev. 1, 3–6 (2018).

38. Kent Barnett, Logan Cornett, Malia Redick & Russell Wheeler, Non-ALJ Adjudicators in Federal Agencies: Status, Selection, Oversight and Removal, Final Report to Administrative Conference of the United States 52–61 (2018).

39. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).

40. Id. at 691.

41. Richard J. Pierce Jr., Morrison v. Olson, Separation of Powers, and the Structure of Government, 1988 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1. See also Richard J. Pierce Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive Theory from Those Who Would Distort and Abuse It, 12 Penn. J. Const. L. 593 (2010) (explaining why political limits on the power to remove a special counsel are far more effective than legal limits).

***************************************

Seems to me that the bottom lime here is that ALL so-called “Administrative Courts” established within the Executive Branch are unconstitutional. They either 1) violate the Appointments Clause, if the President can’t remove the judge; or 2) violate the Due Process Clause, if the President can remove the judge.

So, either way, the Supremes have been complicit in a constitutional travesty.

Conclusion:  all Administrative Courts within the Executive Branch, including the U.S. Immigration Court are unconstitutional. They must be abolished and reestablished as independent courts under either Article I or Article III of the Constitution. “Courts” are simply not an Executive function under Article I. And this Administration is giving us a vivid demonstration of why no legitimate court system can function under its authority.

Many thanks to my colleagues retired Judges Denise Slavin and Jeffrey Chase of the “Roundtable” for bringing this to my attention.

PWS

06-02-19

ALL THINGS CONSIDERED: “Roundtable” Leader Judge Jeffrey Chase Tells NPR’s Michel Martin How Trump’s “Malicious Incompetence” & EOIR’s “Dysfunctional Bias” Are Increasing Backlog & Killing Due Process In Failing Immigration Court System

https://www.npr.org/2019/05/19/724851293/how-trumps-new-immigration-plan-will-affect-backlog-of-pending-cases

Here’s the transcript:

LAW

How Trump’s New Immigration Plan Will Affect Backlog Of Pending Cases

NPR’s Michel Martin speaks with Jeffrey Chase, a former immigration judge, about how President Trump’s new proposals will affect immigration courts.

MICHEL MARTIN, HOST:

This is ALL THINGS CONSIDERED from NPR News. I’m Michel Martin. Immigration, both legal and unauthorized, has been a central issue for Donald Trump since he announced his candidacy for president. Last week, he announced his plan for an overhaul to the current system, which emphasizes family ties and employment, moving to a system that would prioritize certain education and employment qualifications.

Overshadowing all of this, however, is the huge backlog of immigration cases already in the system waiting to go before the courts. More than 800,000 cases are waiting to be resolved, according to The New York Times. We wanted to get a sense of how the immigration courts are functioning now and how the new system could affect the courts, so we’ve called Jeffrey Chase. He is a retired immigration judge in New York. He worked as a staff attorney at the Board of Immigration Appeals. We actually caught up with him at the airport on his way back from a conference on national immigration law, which was held in Austin, Texas.

Mr. Chase, welcome. Thank you so much for joining us.

JEFFREY CHASE: Thank you. Yeah, it seems appropriate to be at JFK Airport talking about immigration. So…

MARTIN: It does.

CHASE: It worked out.

MARTIN: So, first of all, just – as you said, you’re just coming back from this conference. Could you just give me – just overall, what are you hearing from your colleagues, particularly your former colleagues in the courts, about how this system is functioning now? How do they experience this backlog? Is it this unending flow of cases that they can’t do anything with? Or – how are they experiencing this?

CHASE: Yeah. You know, the American Bar Association just put out a report on the immigration courts recently in which they said it’s a dysfunctional system on the verge of collapse. And that was, basically, agreed to by everybody at the conference, including sitting immigration judges. What the judges have said is that the new judges being hired are pretty much being told in their training that they’re not really judges, that instead, they should view themselves as loyal employees of the attorney general and of the executive branch of government. They are basically being trained to deny cases not to fairly consider them.

So, you know, the immigration court itself has to be neutral, has to be transparent and has to be immune from political pressures. And unfortunately, the immigration courts have always been housed within the Department of Justice, which is a prosecutorial agency that does not have transparency and which is certainly not immune from political pressures. So there’s always been this tension there, and I think they’ve really come to a head under this administration.

MARTIN: Well, the president has said that his new proposal should improve the process by screening out meritless claims. And I think his argument is that because there will be a clearly defined point system for deciding who is eligible and who is not, that this should deter this kind of flood of cases. What is your response to that?

CHASE: Yeah, I don’t think it addresses the court system at all because he’s talking – his proposal addresses, you know, the system where people overseas apply for visas and then come here when their green cards are ready. And those are generally not the cases in the courts. The courts right now are flooded with people applying for political asylum because they’re fleeing violence in Central America.

MARTIN: Well, can I just interrupt here? So you’re just saying – I guess on this specific question, though, you’re saying that this proposal to move to a system based on awarding points for certain qualifications would not address the backlog because that is not where applicants come in. Applicants who are a part of this backlog are not affected by that. Is that what you’re saying?

CHASE: Yes. Applying for asylum is completely outside of that whole point system and visa system. And that’s saying that anyone who appears at the border or at an airport and says, I’m unable to return; I’m in fear for my life, goes on a whole different track.

MARTIN: And so, finally, what would affect this backlog? What would be the most – in your view, based on your experience – the most effective way to address this backlog – this enormous backlog of cases?

CHASE: I think, to begin with, any high-volume court system – criminal courts, you know, outside of the immigration system – can only survive when you have – the two parties are able to conference cases, are able to reach pre-case settlements, are able to reach agreements on things. If you could imagine in the criminal court system, if every jaywalking case had to go through a – you know, a full jury trial and then, you know, get appealed all the way up as high as it could go, that system would be in danger of collapse as well. So I think you have to return to a system where you allow the two sides to negotiate things.

And you also have to give the judges – let them be judges. Give them the tools they need to be judges and the independence they need to be judges. And lastly, you have to prioritize the cases.

MARTIN: Before we let you go, I assume that there were different political perspectives at this conference, given that people come from all different sectors of that – of the bar. And I just wondered – and I assume that there are some there who favor more restrictionist methods and some who don’t. I was wondering, overall, was there a mood at this conference?

CHASE: I think the overall mood, even amongst the restrictionist ones – the idea that, you know, look; judges have to be allowed to be judges and have to be given the respect and the tools they need to do their job is one that’s even held by the more restrictionist ones. And although the government people aren’t allowed to speak publicly under this administration, I think privately, they’re very happy about a lot of the advocates fighting these things and bringing – making these issues more public.

MARTIN: Jeffrey Chase is a former immigration judge. He’s returned to private practice. And we actually caught up with him on his way back from an immigration law conference in Austin, Texas. We actually caught up with him at the airport in New York.

Jeffrey Chase, thank you so much for talking to us.

CHASE: Thank you so much for having me on the show.

*********************************

Go to the link for the full audio from NPR.

I agree with my friend Jeffrey that the sense at the FBA Immigration Conference in Austin, TX was that EOIR had hit “rock bottom” from all angles: ethics, bias, and competence, but amazingly was continuing in “free fall” even after hitting that bottom. It’s difficult to convey just how completely FUBAR this once promising “court system” has become after nearly two decades of politicized mismanagement from the DOJ culminating in the current Administration’s “malicious incompetence” and EOIR’s aggressive disdain for its former “Due Process mission.”

PWS

05-21-19

SPECIAL: “ROUNDTABLE OF FORMER IMMIGRATION JUDGES” BLASTS EOIR DIRECTOR McHENRY FOR SPREADING LIES & MISREPRESENTATIONS, POLITICAL PANDERING, UNDERMINING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, AND GROSS DERELICTION OF DUTY TO PROTECT DUE PROCESS! — “The time for you to renew the agency mission is long overdue. Your job is to insulate the agency from political influences from the Department of Justice and beyond. Nothing short of judicial independence, neutrality, and fairness is acceptable for courts that make life and death determinations such as those which arise in immigration claims.” Today’s EOIR Is A Massive Fraud That Must Be Replaced With Real Courts Committed To Providing Justice To All!

https://www.naij-usa.org/news/setting-the-record-straight

Judge Jeffrey S. Chase, Leader of the Roundtable of Former Immigration Judges

James McHenry, Director
Executive Office for Immigration Review 5107 Leesburg Pike, 26th Floor
Falls Church, VA 22041
Re: EOIR “Myth vs. Fact” memo Mr. McHenry:
As former Immigration Judges and BIA Board Members, we write to state our offense at EOIR’s recently issued memo purporting to present imagined “myths” and wildly inaccurate and mis- leading information labeled as “fact.” The issuance of such a document can only be viewed as political pandering, at the expense of public faith in the immigration courts you oversee.
Even if anything contained in the memo is actually correct, it is simply not EOIR’s place to be issuing such a document. EOIR’s function is to protect the independence and integrity of the hundreds of judges who sit in its Immigration Courts, on the BIA, and within OCAHO.
American courts do not issue propaganda implying that those whose cases it rules on for the most part have invalid claims; that the participation of lawyers in its hearings provides no real value and has no impact on outcome; that the government’s own program to assist litigants in obtaining legal representation is a waste of taxpayer money; or that those unable to surmount the government-created obstacles to filing asylum applications are somehow guilty of deceit. Such statements indicate a bias which is absolutely unacceptable and, frankly, shocking.
We all had the honor of serving as judges within EOIR. Many of us remember when EOIR’s stated vision was “through teamwork and innovation, [to] be the world’s best administrative tri- bunals guaranteeing fairness and due process for all.” We remember a time when EOIR’s lead- ership took that mission seriously, and strove to achieve it.
The time for you to renew the agency mission is long overdue. Your job is to insulate the agency from political influences from the Department of Justice and beyond. Nothing short of judicial independence, neutrality, and fairness is acceptable for courts that make life and death determinations such as those which arise in immigration claims.
May 13, 2019

Hon. Steven Abrams, Immigration Judge, New York, Varick St., and Queens Wackenhut Detention Center, 1997-2013
Hon. Sarah M. Burr, Assistant Chief Immigration Judge and Immigration Judge, New York, 1994-2012
Hon. Esmerelda Cabrera, Immigration Judge, New York, Newark, and Elizabeth, NJ, 1994-2005 Hon. Teofilo Chapa, Immigration Judge, Miami, 1995-2018
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase, Immigration Judge, New York, 1995-2007
Hon. George T. Chew, Immigration Judge, New York, 1995-2017
Hon. Bruce J. Einhorn, Immigration Judge, Los Angeles, 1990-2007 Hon. Cecelia M. Espenoza, Board Member, BIA, 2000-2003
Hon. Noel Ferris, Immigration Judge, New York, 1994-2013
Hon. John F. Gossart, Jr., Immigration Judge, Baltimore, 1982-2013 Hon. Miriam Hayward, Immigration Judge, San Francisco, 1997-2018 Hon. Rebecca Jamil, Immigration Judge, San Francisco, 2016-2018 Hon. William P. Joyce, Immigration Judge, Boston, 1996-2002
Hon. Carol King, Immigration Judge, San Francisco, 1995-2017
Hon. Elizabeth A. Lamb, Immigration Judge, New York, 1995-2018
Hon. Donn L. Livingston, Immigration Judge, New York and Denver, 1995-2018 Hon. Margaret McManus, Immigration Judge, New York, 1991 – 2018
Hon. Charles Pazar, Immigration Judge, Memphis, 1998-2017
Hon. Laura Ramirez, Immigration Judge, 1997-2018
Hon. John W. Richardson, Immigration Judge, Phoenix, 1990-2018
Hon. Lory D. Rosenberg, Board Member, BIA, 1995 – 2002.
Hon. Susan G. Roy, Immigration Judge, Newark, 2008-2010.

Paul W. Schmidt, Chairman and Board Member, BIA, 1995 – 2003; Immigration Judge, Arlington, 2003-2016.
Hon. Denise Slavin, Immigration Judge, Miami, Krome, and Baltimore, 1995-2019 Hon. Ilyce Shugall, Immigration Judge, San Francisco, 2017-2019
Hon. Andrea Hawkins Sloan, Immigration Judge, Portland, 2010 – 2017
Hon. Polly A. Webber, Immigration Judge, San Francisco, 1995-2017

****************************************

Right on!  EOIR, which has become an spreader of lies and false marratives, and which has abandoned its due process focused mission, needs to be eliminated. More will be coming on the disgusting “Lie Sheet” put out by EOIR last week. EOIR “Management,” which has demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt its inability to competently administer the Immigration Court system, is also a morass of intellectual dishonesty and political toadyism. What a waste of taxpayer money and public trust!

 

PWS

05-12-19

 

VAL BAUMAN @ DAILY MAIL: Stripped Of Its Toxic Rhetoric, Trump’s Plan To Send Asylum Applicants To Cities Where They Would Be Welcomed & Have Access To Opportunities Actually Seems Pretty Rational — That’s Why It’s Unlikely To Happen!

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6955263/Trumps-bus-immigrants-sanctuary-cities-actually-HELP-migrants.html

Val writes:

EXCLUSIVE: Trump’s move to bus immigrants to sanctuary cities could actually HELP migrants by putting them in courts where judges are more likely to grant them asylum, experts reveal

  • Sanctuary cities, counties and states are regions where officials have passed laws to protect immigrants who are in the country illegally – for example by limiting cooperation between ICE and local law enforcement 
  • Trump’s proposal to bus immigrants to sanctuaries could have an unintended effect by relocating migrants to immigration court districts where judges are statistically more likely to grant asylum, experts say
  • Trump’s idea could backfire because the likelihood of whether an immigrant’s asylum application will be successful varies dramatically depending on the state in which their case is heard, federal data shows
  • Many sanctuary cities are home to court districts that are statistically more likely to approve asylum claims 
  • For example, New York – a sanctuary city – was the most likely to welcome asylum seekers, with only 34% denied in 2018, while immigration judges in North Carolina and Georgia had a 96% denial rate

Donald Trump‘s proposal to bus immigrants to sanctuaries could have an unintended effect by relocating migrants to immigration court districts where judges are statistically more likely to grant asylum, according to multiple immigration experts and attorneys.

One major reason Trump’s idea could backfire is that the likelihood of whether an immigrant’s asylum application will be successful varies dramatically depending on the state in which their case is heard – and many of the courts that tend to favor granting asylum are located in sanctuary cities, said former immigration Judge Jeffrey S. Chase.

For example, New York – a sanctuary city – was the most likely to welcome asylum seekers, with only 34 percent denied in 2018, while immigration judges in North Carolina and Georgia had a 96 percent denial rate.

‘It not only gets them to the districts that have better courts and judges, but it gets them to where the pro bono lawyers and (immigration assistance) clinics are,’ Chase told DailyMail.com.

This map, created by the Center for Immigration Studies using ICE data, highlights the locations of sanctuary cities, counties and states around the United States. Yellow markers represent sanctuary counties, while red ones represent cities and green represent states

‘A lot of times when people do bond out they head straight to New York and San Francisco anyway, so they’re saving them the bus ticket,’ he added.

A Department of Homeland Security official declined to comment to DailyMail.com.

Sanctuary cities, counties and states are regions where officials have decided to pass laws that tend to protect immigrants who are in the country illegally.

For example, some sanctuary cities refuse to allow local law enforcement to hand people over to ICE after the immigrants were arrested on minor violations.

They were largely established and gained traction under the Obama administration as local officials sought to assert their own authority on immigration issues.

Trump has proposed busing immigrants to sanctuary cities because he says the mostly Democratic safe havens for migrants should be ‘very happy’ to take in people who have entered the country illegally.

It remains unclear if the White House will go through with the proposal, which the president said the administration was still strongly considering in a series of tweets on April 12.

. . . .

*************************************

Thanks, Val, for your thoughtful analysis. Go on over to the Daily Mail at the link to  read Val’s complete article.

One thing the Trumpsters never want to be caught doing is something reasonable that will help the immigration system work the way it is supposed to. That’s why facilitating the assistance asylum seekers need to get fair and timely hearings before fair and impartial U.S. Immigration Judges under a correct interpretation of U.S. asylum law has never been part of this Administration’s equation.

Too bad it isn’t. While perhaps not what “the base” had in mind, a program of working with localities and NGOs to get asylum applicants represented and before fair and impartial Immigration Judges on a timely cycle would certainly be much cheaper and easier to administer than mass detention, wall building, child separation, “Return to Mexico,” and endless crippling backlogs in the Immigration Courts.

Undoubtedly, it would result in more asylum grants. It also would require a much more robust, sensible, and realistic use of prosecutorial discretion (“PD”) by the DHS to  “free up” earlier time slots on the Immigration Court dockets without touching off yet another mindless round of “Aimless Docket Reshuffling.”

But, it also should result in fairer, more timely, more humane removals of those who do not qualify for asylum or other protection under our laws as properly interpreted and fairly administered.

To the extent that such removals serve as a “deterrent” to future unqualified arrivals (something I doubt based on the evidence to date, but am willing to see what happens), the Administration would also have empirical evidence supporting at least part of its theory of “control through deterrence.”

A program such as I’ve outlined also could receive bipartisan support from Congress.

Won’t happen, at least under Trump.  But, that doesn’t mean that it shouldn’t.

PWS

04-25-19