Honorable Jeffrey S. Chase – Page 7 – immigrationcourtside.com

HON. JEFFREY CHASE ON HOW MANY U.S. IMMIGRATION JUDGES ARE DENYING DUE PROCESS RIGHT AND LEFT TO ASYLUM SEEKERS BY NOT ALLOWING ATTORNEYS TO PARTICIATE IN THE CREDIBLE FEAR REVIEW AND RUBBER-STAMPING DENIALS WITHOUT ANY ANALYSIS!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/7/22/attorneys-and-credible-fear-review

Jul 22 Attorneys and Credible Fear Review

It is difficult not to cry (as I did) while listening to the recording of a recent immigration court hearing at a detention facility near the border. The immigration judge addresses a rape victim who fled to this country seeking asylum. She indicates that she does not feel well enough to proceed. When asked by the judge if she had been seen by the jail’s medical unit, the woman responds that she just wants to see her child (who had been forcibly separated from her by ICE), and breaks down crying. The judge is heard telling a lawyer to sit down before he can speak. The woman, still crying, repeats that she just wants to see her child. The immigration judge proceeds to matter-of-factly affirm the finding of DHS denying her the right to apply for asylum. The judge then allows the attorney to speak; he points out for the record that the woman was unable to participate in her own hearing. The judge replies “so noted.” He wishes the woman a safe trip back to the country in which she was raped, and directs her to be brought to the medical unit. He then moves on to the next case on his docket. Neither DHS (in its initial denial) nor the immigration judge (in his affirmance) provided any explanation or reasoning whatsoever for their decisions. According to immigration attorneys who have recently represented asylum seekers near the border, this is the new normal.

Under legislation passed in 1996, most non-citizens seeking entry to the U.S. at airports or borders who are not deemed admissible are subjected to summary removal by DHS without a hearing. However, those who express a fear of harm if returned to their country are detained and subjected to a “credible fear interview” by a USCIS asylum officer. This interview is designed as a screening, not a full-blown application for asylum. The noncitizen being interviewed has just arrived, is detained, often has not yet had the opportunity to consult with a lawyer, probably does not yet know the legal standard for asylum, and has not had the opportunity to compile documentation in support of the claim. Therefore, the law sets what is intended to be a very low standard: the asylum officer need only find that there is a significant possibility that the noncitizen could establish in a full hearing before an immigration judge eligibility for asylum.1

If the asylum officer does not find credible fear to exist, the noncitizen has one chance for review, at a credible fear review hearing before an immigration judge. This is an unusual hearing. Normally, immigration judges are trial-level judges, creating the record of testimony and other evidence, and then entering the initial rulings on deportability and eligibility for relief. But in a credible fear review hearing, the immigration judge also functions as an appellate judge, reviewing the decision of the asylum officer not to vacate an already entered order of removal. The immigration judge either affirms the DHS determination (meaning that the respondent has no right to a hearing, or to file applications for relief, including asylum), or vacates the DHS removal order. There is no further appeal from an immigration judge’s decision regarding credible fear.

Appeal courts do not hear testimony. At the appellate level, it is the lawyers who do all of the talking, arguing why the decision below was or was not correct. The question being considered by the immigration judge in a credible fear review hearing – whether the asylum officer reasonably concluded that there is not a significant possibility that the applicant could establish eligibility for asylum at a full hearing before an immigration judge – is clearly a lawyer question. The noncitizen applicant would not be expected to understand the legal standard.

At the present time, determining the legal standard is especially complicated. In light of the Attorney General’s recent decision in Matter of A-B-, all claims involving members of a particular social group fearing what the A.G. refers to as “private criminal actors” must clearly delineate the particular social group, explain how such group satisfies the requirements of immutability, particularity, and social distinction, meet a heightened standard of showing the government’s inability or unwillingness to protect, and show that internal relocation within the country of nationality is not reasonable.

An experienced immigration lawyer could make these arguments in a matter of minutes, by delineating the group, and explaining what evidence the applicant expects to present to the immigration judge to meet the required criteria.

However, the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge’s Practice Manual states the following:

(C) Representation. — Prior to the credible fear review, the alien may consult with a person or persons of the alien’s choosing. In the discretion of the Immigration Judge, persons consulted may be present during the credible fear review. However, the alien is not represented at the credible fear review. Accordingly, persons acting on the alien’s behalf are not entitled to make opening statements, call and question witnesses, conduct cross examinations, object to evidence, or make closing arguments. (emphasis added).

Therefore, at best, a credible fear review hearing consists of the immigration judge asking the respondent an abbreviated version of the questions already asked and answered by the asylum officer. Often, the judge merely asks if the information told to the asylum officer was true (without necessarily mentioning what the asylum officer notes contain), and if there is anything else they wish to add. If the issue was whether the respondent was believable, this might make sense.2 However, the issue is more often whether the facts will qualify for asylum under current case law.

I have canvassed retired immigration judges, as well as attorneys whose clients have been through such hearings. The good news is that it is the practice of a number of judges (past and present) to allow attorney participation. And in some cases, it is making a difference. One lawyer who recently spent a week in south Texas was allowed by the judge there to make summary arguments on behalf of the respondents; the judge ended up reversing DHS and finding credible fear in all but one case. In Fiscal Year 2016 (the last year for which EOIR has posted such statistics), immigration judges nationally reversed the DHS decision and found credible fear less than 28 percent of the time (i.e. in 2,086 out of 7,488 total cases).

However, other judges rely on the wording of the practice advisory to deny attorneys the right to participate. According to a July 14 CNN article, one lawyer recently had a judge deny 29 out of 29 separated parents claiming credible fear. Another lawyer was quoted in the same article citing a significant increase in credible fear denials since the Attorney General’s decision in A-B- last month. https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/14/politics/sessions-asylum-impact-border/index.html This demonstrates why it is now even more important to allow attorney participation to assist judges in analyzing the facts of the respondent’s case in light of this confusing new decision that many judges are still struggling to interpret. And as I recently reported in a separate blog post, USCIS just recently issued guidelines to its asylum officers to deny credible fear to victims of domestic violence and gang violence under a very wrong interpretation of Sessions’ A-B- decision.

It is hoped that, considering the stakes involved, the Office of the Chief Judge will consider amending its guidelines to ensure the right to meaningful representation in credible fear review hearings.

Notes:

1. It should be noted that when legislation created the “well-founded fear” standard for asylum in 1980, both INS and the BIA seriously misapplied the standard until the Supreme Court corrected them seven years later. Although when it created the “credible fear” standard in the 1990s, INS assured that it would be a low standard, as credible fear determinations may not be appealed, there can be no similar correction by the federal courts.

2. Although credibility is not usually an issue, attorneys point out that while they are merely notes which contain inaccuracies and are generally not read back to the asylum-seeker to allow for correction, the notes are nevertheless often treated as verbatim transcripts by immigration judges.

Copyright Jeffrey S. Chase 2018. All rights reserved.

JEFF CHASE

Jeffrey S. Chase is an immigration lawyer in New York City. Jeffrey is a former Immigration Judge, senior legal advisor at the Board of Immigration Appeals, and volunteer staff attorney at Human Rights First. He is a past recipient of AILA’s annual Pro Bono Award, and previously chaired AILA’s Asylum Reform Task Force.

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Amen, Jeffrey, my friend, colleague, and fellow fighter for Due Process and human rights! Jeffrey[s article was also republished by our good friend and colleague Dan Kowalski in BIBDaily here http://www.bibdaily.com/

Not that the EOIR OCIJ is going to do anything to change the process and further Due Process in the “Age of Sessions.” After all, they all want to hold onto their jobs, at any cost to the unfortunate human beings whose lives are caught up in this charade of a “court system.”

In what kind of “court system” don’t lawyers have a right to represent their clients? The Star Chamber? Kangaroo Court? Clown Court? And, to be fair, this outrageous “advice” from OCIJ on how to deny Due Process and fundamental fairness preceded even Sessions. The well had already been well-poisoned!

But, let’s not forget the real culprits here. First, the spineless Article III Courts who have shirked their duty to intervene and require U.S. Immigration Judges to comply with Due Process, respect human rights and dignity, and use at least a minimum of common sense.

And, the greatest culprit is, of course, Congress, which created this monstrosity and has failed for decades to take the necessary corrective action to comply with our Constitution!

PWS

07-23-18

THE HONORABLE JEFFREY CHASE: HOW THE PERNICIOUS INFLUENCE OF JEFF SESSIONS IS STANGLING THE US ASYLUM SYSTEM AND ITS “GO ALONG TO GET ALONG” ADJUDICATORS AND “JUDGES” — “Matter of A-B- Being Misapplied by EOIR, DHS”

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/7/13/matter-of-a-b-being-misapplied-by-eoir-dhs

Jul 13 Matter of A-B- Being Misapplied by EOIR, DHS

One month after Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued his cruel, misguided decision in Matter of A-B-, we are seeing the first signs of how the decision is being implemented by the BIA, USCIS, and ICE.

There is no question that Sessions’ intent was to eliminate domestic violence and gang violence as bases for asylum. How can I be so certain of this? While Matter of A-B- was pending before him, Sessions told a Phoenix radio station in March: “We’ve had situations in which a person comes to the United States and says they are a victim of domestic violence, therefore they are entitled to enter the United States. Well, that’s obviously false but some judges have gone along with that.” (here’s the link: https://ktar.com/story/2054280/ag-jeff-sessions-says-closing-loopholes-can-fight-illegal-immigration/).

However, Sessions chose to attempt to achieve this goal by issuing a precedent decision. A decision is not a fiat. It must be analyzed in the same manner as any other legal decision and applied to the facts accordingly.

Asylum experts and advocacy groups analyzing the decision have reached the following conclusions. The main impact of Sessions’ decision is to vacate the Board’s 2014 precedent decision, Matter of A-R-C-G-, holding that a victim of domestic violence was eligible for asylum as a member of a particular social group. Therefore, asylum applicants can no longer rely on that decision.

However, Sessions’ decision otherwise cobbled together already existing case law (which was taken into consideration in deciding Matter of A-R-C-G-), and added non-binding dicta, i.e. his statement that “generally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence or gang violence…will not qualify for asylum.” (Note the use of the pejorative “aliens” to describe individuals applying for asylum.)

Furthermore, most of the items covered by Sessions involved questions of fact (which are specifically dependent on the evidence in the individual case, and which the BIA and AG have very limited ability to reverse on appeal) as opposed to questions of law, which can be considered de novo on appeal and have more general applicability. The questions of fact raised by Sessions include whether the persecutor was aware of the existence of the group and was motivated to harm the victim on account of such membership; whether the society in question recognizes the social group with sufficient distinction; whether the authorities in the home country are unable or unwilling to protect the victim, and whether the victim could reasonably relocate to another part of the country to avoid the feared harm.

So in summary, Sessions felt that the Board’s decision in Matter of A-R-C-G- did not provide a sufficiently detailed legal analysis, therefore vacated it, and laid out all of the legal analysis that future decisions must address. Domestic violence and gang violence claims still remain very much grantable, provided that all of the requirements laid out by the Attorney General are satisfied. Hearings on these cases may now take much longer, as testimony will need to be more detailed, additional social groups will need to be proposed and ruled on, more experts must be called, and more documents considered. But nothing in A-B- prevents these cases from continuing to be granted.

Therefore, how discouraging that the first decision of the BIA to apply this criteria failed to do what is now required of them. A single Board Member’s unpublished decision issued shortly after A-B-’s publication did not engage in the detailed legal analysis that is now warranted in domestic violence cases. Instead, the decision noted that the case involved a social group “akin to the group defined in Matter of A-R-C-G-.” The Board then found that the AG’s decision in A-B- “has foreclosed the respondent’s arguments,” because “the Attorney General overruled Matter of A-R-C-G- and held that it was wrongly decided.”

What is particularly dispiriting is that the decision was authored by Board Member Linda Wendtland. A former OIL attorney whose views are more conservative than my own, I have always respected her scholarly approach and her intellectual honesty. At the BIA, staff attorneys draft the decisions which the Board Members then edit. Judge Wendtland always took the time to write her edits as academic lessons from which I always learned something. She recently authored the lone dissenting opinion in a case involving a determination of whether a women was barred from relief for having provided material support to terrorists; Judge Wendtland correctly determined that the cooking and cleaning that the woman was forced to perform after having been kidnapped by rebels did not constitute “material support.” It is therefore perplexing why she would sign the post-A-B- decision that so sorely lacked her usual degree of analysis.

In addition to the BIA, on July 11, both USCIS and ICE issued guidance on applying A-B- to asylum adjudications. Much like the BIA decision, the USCIS guidelines to its asylum officers, which serve as guidance not only in adjudicating asylum applications, but also for making credible fear determinations, seem to apply the personal opinion of Sessions rather than the actual legal holdings of his decision. USCIS decided to print in boldface Sessions’ nonbinding dicta that such cases will generally not establish eligibility for asylum, refugee status, or credible or reasonable fear of persecution.

Credible fear interviews are conducted right after an asylum seeker arrives in this country, while they are detained, scared, often unrepresented by counsel, before having a chance to understand the law or gather documents or witnesses. The interviewer is supposed to find credible fear if there is a significant possibility that the applicant will be able to establish eligibility for relief at a future hearing before an immigration judge. It is likely that, at such future hearing, the applicant will have an attorney who will make the proper legal arguments, call expert witnesses, formulate the particular social group according to the requirements of case law, submit other supporting evidence, etc. But now asylum officers are being instructed to ignore all of that and deny individuals the chance to even have the opportunity to apply for asylum before an immigration judge essentially because Jeff Sessions doesn’t believe these are worthy cases.

ICE (through its Office of the Public Legal Advisor) has issued guidance that, while probably reflecting internal conflict within the bureau, is nevertheless somewhat more reasonable than the interpretations of either USCIS or the Board. The ICE guidance does ask its attorneys to hold asylum applicants to some exacting legal standards, to look for flaws in supporting evidence, and to question asylum applicants in great detail. It also asks its attorneys not to opine on whether gender alone may constitute a PSG until further guidance is offered (again, probably reflecting internal conflict within the bureau on the issue). But the guidance does not simply conclude that all domestic violence and gang violence cases should be denied. It even encourages attorneys to employ a “collaborative approach” by pointing out flawed social groups offered by pro se applicants in the hope that the IJ might help the applicant remedy the situation early on.

However, let’s remember that ICE stipulated to grants of asylum for victims of domestic violence in both Matter of R-A- (during the Bush administration, and to the consternation of then Attorney General John Ashcroft), and in Matter of A-R-C-G-. ICE argued in its brief to Sessions in Matter of A-B- that Matter of A-R-C-G- was good law and should not be vacated. So then shouldn’t ICE be applying these same principles to its guidance to attorneys?

It should also be noted that ICE and USCIS could see a way to granting worthy cases in spite of Sessions’ decision. In the early 1990s, then INS General Counsel Grover Joseph Rees III took exception with the BIA’s precedent decision holding that forcible abortions and sterilization under China’s family planning policies did not constitute persecution on account of a protected ground. Rees instructed his attorneys to seek to remand cases involving such claim to the INS Asylum Office, where per his instructions, such claims were granted affirmatively by asylum officers. There is no reason that a similar practice could not be employed now, particularly as both ICE and USCIS are not part of the Department of Justice and therefore are not controlled by Sessions. The only thing lacking is the political will to take such a stand. In the early 1990s, Rees’s stance involving abortion played to the Bush Administration’s political base. Today, ICE and USCIS would have to take action contrary to the wishes of that same base because doing so is the just and humane thing to do. Unfortunately, based on the tone of their recent advisals, doing the right thing is not enough of a motive in the present political climate.

Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

JEFF CHASE

HON. JEFFREY CHASE: Speaking Out Against The “Notable Minority” Of U.S. Immigration Judges Who Demonstrated Bias Against Women & Asylum Seekers – “Think about that: some federally appointed immigration judges cheered the fact that women who had been violently raped and beaten in their country can no longer find refuge here, and will be sent back to face more violence, and possibly death. Will there be any consequences for their actions? Were the many outstanding immigration judges who have been proud to grant such cases in the past, who were saddened and sickened by this decision, able to openly jeer or weep or curse this decision? Or would that have been viewed as dangerous?”

Jun 14 Women Need Not Apply

Those looking for legal analysis should read no further. The following is a cry from the heart.

The respondent’s personal nightmare began the year after her marriage. For the next 15 years, she was subjected to relentless physical, sexual, and emotional abuse.

It is most apt that Donald Trump became president by beating a woman. His campaign historically provoked millions to march in angry protest of his denigration of women on his first full day in office.

“The violence inflicted on [her] took many forms. Her husband beat her repeatedly, bashing her against the wall and kicking her, including while she was pregnant. He raped her on countless occasions.”

On Monday, Trump’s Attorney General announced that women who are victims of domestic violence should no longer be deemed to merit protection from our government in the form of political asylum.

Sessions’ action was shockingly tone deaf. As the wonderful Rebecca Solnit wrote in her 2013 essay “The Longest War:” “We have an abundance of rape and violence against women in this country and on this Earth, though it’s almost never treated as a civil rights or human rights issue, or a crisis, or even a pattern. Violence doesn’t have a race, a class, a religion, or a nationality, but it does have a gender.” The year after Solnit wrote those words, our Department of Justice took a step in the right direction. In recognizing domestic violence as a basis for asylum, our government was finally recognizing such gender-based abuse as a human rights issue, at least in the limited forum of immigration law.

“He also frequently threatened to kill her, at times holding a knife to her neck, and at other times brandishing a gun or, while she was pregnant, threatening to hang her from the ceiling by a rope.” The above were supported by sworn statements provided by the respondents’ neighbors.

It is only very recently that our society has begun to hold accountable those who commit gender-based abuses against women. #MeToo is a true civil rights movement, one that is so very long overdue. In opposing such movement, Jeff Sessions is casting himself as a modern day George Wallace. It bears repeating that no one, no one, was challenging the settled precedent that victims of domestic violence may be granted asylum as members of a particular social group. When the precedent case was before the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Department of Homeland Security, i.e. the enforcement agency prosecuting the case, filed a brief in which it conceded that the group consisting of “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” satisfied all of the legal criteria, and was therefore a proper particular social group under the law. No one has appealed or challenged that determination in the four years since. Who is Jeff Sessions, who has never practiced immigration law in his life, to just toss out such determination because he and only he disagrees?

The respondent’s “husband controlled, humiliated, and isolated her from others. He insulted her ‘constantly,’ calling her a ‘slut’ or ‘dog.’ He did not want her to work outside the house and believed ‘a woman’s place was in the home like a servant.’ When he came home in the middle of the night, he forced her out of bed to serve him food, saying things like ‘Bitch, feed me.”

Like Wallace before him, who in 1963 stood in front of the door of the University of Alabama trying in vain to block the entry of four black students, Sessions is trying to block a national movement whose time has come. As with Wallace and the Civil Rights Movement, justice will eventually prevail. But now as then, people deserving of his protection will die in the interim.

“Although [her] husband frequently slept with other women, he falsely accused her of infidelity, at times removing her undergarments to inspect her genitals. He also beat their children in front of her, causing her serious psychological damage.”

The AG’s decision was intentionally released during the first day of the Immigration Judges’ Training Conference. There have been ideological-based appointments of immigration judges under both the Trump and Bush administrations. Several persons present at the conference reported that when the decision was announced, some immigration judges cheered. It was definitely a minority; the majority of immigration judges are very decent, caring people. But it was more than a few; one of my sources described it as “many,” another as “a noteworthy minority.”

Think about that: some federally appointed immigration judges cheered the fact that women who had been violently raped and beaten in their country can no longer find refuge here, and will be sent back to face more violence, and possibly death. Will there be any consequences for their actions? Were the many outstanding immigration judges who have been proud to grant such cases in the past, who were saddened and sickened by this decision, able to openly jeer or weep or curse this decision? Or would that have been viewed as dangerous?

The respondent “believes her life will be in danger” if returned to her country, “where her ex-husband, supported by his police officer brother, has vowed to kill her. She does not believe there is anywhere” in her country “she could find safety.

Victims of domestic violence will continue to file applications for asylum. They will argue before immigration judges that their claims meet the legal criteria even under the AG’s recent decision. Unfortunately, some of those applicants will have their cases heard by immigration judges who, when they heard that the woman whose claim was described in the italicized sections was denied asylum by Jeff Sessions, and will now likely be deported to suffer more such abuse or death, cheered.

The sections in italics are the facts of the asylum-seeker in Matter of A-B-, (including quotes from her appeal brief) who was denied asylum on Monday by Jeff Sessions.

Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

JEFF CHASE

HON. JEFFREY CHASE: PUNISHING THE PERSECUTED — In Matter of A-C-M-, BIA “Adjusts” View Of FMLN As Necessary To Deny Asylum To El Salvadoran Refugees!

Jun 9 Punishing the Victims: Matter of A-C-M-

On June 6, the BIA published its precedent decision in Matter of A-C-M-. As the Board seems to no longer issue precedent decisions en banc, the decision is that of a divided three-judge panel. The two-judge majority found the respondent to be barred from asylum eligibility because in 1990, she had been kidnaped by guerrillas in her native El Salvador, who after forcing her to undergo weapons training, made her do the group’s cooking, cleaning, and laundry while remaining its captive.

In 2011, an immigration judge granted the respondent’s application for cancellation of removal. The DHS appealed the decision to the BIA, which reversed the IJ’s grant, finding that the respondent was ineligible for cancellation under section 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(VIII), which makes inadmissible to the U.S. anyone who has received military-type training from a terrorist organization. The BIA stated in its 2014 decision that it found the guerrillas to be a terrorist organization at the time of the respondent’s abduction in 1990.

The case was remanded back to the immigration judge, where the respondent then applied for asylum, a relief from which she was not barred by the military training. However, the IJ ruled that she was ineligible for asylum under another subsection of the law, which bars anyone who commits “an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support, including a safe house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or training” for either the commission of a terrorist activity, someone who has committed or is planning to commit a terrorist act, or to a terrorist organization or member of such organization.

The respondent in A-C-M- clearly wasn’t providing her labor by choice; she was forcibly abducted by the guerrillas and was then held against her will. However, the BIA decided in a 2016 decision, Matter of M-H-Z-, that there is no duress exception to the material support bar. Therefore, in the Board’s view, the involuntary nature of the labor was irrelevant.

In her well-reasoned dissent, Board Member Linda Wendtland acknowledged a critical question: “whether the respondent reasonably should have known that the guerrillas in 1990 in El Salvador were a terrorist organization.” Note that the statutory language quoted above requires that the actor “knows or reasonably should know” that the support will aid a terrorist activity or organization.

The decision doesn’t name the guerrilla organization (presumably the FMLN). It also fails to mention when the Board itself concluded that the group had been a terrorist organization in 1990. The Board’s view of the guerrillas was not always so, as witnessed in its 1988 precedent decision in Matter of Maldonado-Cruz. The case involved an asylum-seeker from El Salvador who had been kidnaped by guerrillas in that country, given brief military training, and then forced to serve in the group’s military operations. He managed to escape, and legitimately feared that if returned to El Salvador, he would be killed by death squads the guerrillas dispatch to punish deserters.

The BIA denied asylum. In doing so, it expressed the following rationale: “It is entirely proper to apply a presumption that a guerrilla organization, as a military or para-military organization, has the need to control its members, to exercise discipline.” The Board noted that the guerrillas needed non-volunteer troops to fill out the military units required to fight against the government. It continued: “To keep them as cohesive fighting units they must impose discipline; and an important form of discipline…is the punishment of deserters.”

The Board’s language in Maldonado-Cruz really does not sound as if it is describing a terrorist organization. Frankly, it’s tone wouldn’t sound out of place in describing the penalties imposed by the Park Slope Food Coop towards members who miss their shifts. If the Board didn’t contemporaneously view the guerrillas as terrorists, why would they expect the respondent to have done so?

Judge Wendtland did not need to answer that question, because she convincingly argued that the respondent’s cooking and cleaning did not constitute “material support” under the statute. She is correct. Notice the examples of support contained in the statutory language: safe houses, funds, transportation, weapons, explosives, and training. All of these are of a quite different nature from cooking, cleaning, and doing laundry.

The respondent in A-C-M- was not someone whom Congress intended to exclude under the anti-terrorism provisions. She did not provide money or weapons to ISIS to carry out terrorist acts. To the contrary, she performed labor completely unrelated to any violent objective. She was forced to perform such labor – in the words of Judge Wendtland, “as a slave” – for a group whose terrorist nature was far from clear.

In adopting the two-member majority’s view, the Board has chosen an interpretation of the statute that turns Congressional intent on its head by punishing the victims of terrorism, and adds insult to injury by labeling these victims as terrorists themselves. Hopefully, the lone dissenting opinion will prevail on appeal.

Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

JEFF CHASE

Jun 3 3rd-Generation Gangs and Political Opinion

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The BIA has a long-standing history of finding ways to construe the law and facts to deny protection to refugees from Central America, one of the most violent areas in the world for decades.

Judge Linda Wendtland is one of the few BIA jurists since the 2003 “Ashcroft Purge” to stand up to her colleagues and the Attorney General for the rights of Central American asylum seekers to fair treatment under the asylum laws.

As most of us familiar with Immigration Court and immigration enforcement know, the “material support” bar is very seldom used against real terrorists and security threats. Most caught up in its absurdly overbroad web are minor players — victims of persecution themselves or “freedom fighters” many of whom actually supported forces allied with or assisting the US Government.

Probably one of the biggest and most grotesque examples of “legislative overkill” in recent history. And, the BIA has made the situation much worse by construing the bar in the broadest, most draconian, and least reasonable way possible.

Moreover, the DHS waiver process is totally opaque compared with the Immigration Court process, thereby encouraging arbitrary and capricious decision-making that escapes any type of judicial review.

PWS

06-10-18

HON. JEFFREY CHASE WITH “LAW YOU CAN USE” TO FORCE THIS ADMINISTRATION TO RECOGNIZE REFUGEES FROM THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE — Yes, Many Recently Arrived Refugees From The Northern Triangle Qualify As “Political” Refugees – Here’s How To Argue & Support Their Cases!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/6/3/3rd-generation-gangs-and-political-opinion

Jun 3 3rd-Generation Gangs and Political Opinion

When Attorney General Jeff Sessions issues his decision in Matter of A-B- (the case he certified to himself to decide whether “being a victim of private criminal activity” can constitute a particular social group for asylum purposes), it may negatively impact those asylum applicants who fear gang violence on account of their membership in a particular social group. Attorneys representing such claimants should consider whether their clients may alternatively claim a well-founded fear of persecution based on their political opinion under a “third-generation gang” theory, supported by country condition evidence.

In their article ‘Third Generation’ Gangs, Warfare in Central America, and Refugee Law’s Political Opinion Ground,1 Deborah Anker and Palmer Lawrence make a very important point: that “the Refugee Convention’s concept of political opinion incorporates ‘any opinion on any matter in which the machinery of the State, government, and policy may be engaged,’ or that of other persecutory agents where the state is unwilling or unable to provide protection” (citing Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 746 (Can.)).

Relying on this broad interpretation of political opinion, Anker and Lawrence next note that some military and law enforcement experts have concluded that the larger Central American gangs (including MS-13 and Mara 18) “have developed a degree of politicization, sophistication, and international reach to qualify them as ‘third generation gangs,’” which “function as de facto governments, controlling significant territory (competing with the state for power).” Anker and Lawrence cite Lieutenant Colonel Howard L. Gray, Gangs and Transnational Criminals Threaten Central American Stability, 7 U.S. Army War College, Strategy Research Project (2009)); in documenting such claims, practitioners should also reference John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker, “Third Generation Gang Studies: An Introduction,” 14-4 Journal of Gang Research 1 (Summer 2007), and “Third General Gangs Strategic Note No. 1: Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) 500 Man Commando Unit Planned for El Salvador,” Small Wars Journal, Sept. 10, 2016. The last article quotes Douglas Farah, Visiting Senior Fellow, National Defense University Center for Complex Operations as stating that “The MS has strong political and military ambitions and now views itself as political/military rather than a gang…MS 13 now has troops, weapons, and a cause…efforts to form a joint force with the 18 is less likely but both sides are in discussion to at least have lines of communication open.”2

Under the definition of political opinion cited above, gangs such as MS-13 and Mara 18 are at least other persecutory agents from which the state is unable or unwilling to provide protection. Such gangs might also be the de facto “state” itself in areas they control. The idea that opinions or matters that engage such gangs might constitute political opinion finds support from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which has recently published Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum Seekers from Guatemala (January 2018), El Salvador (March 2016), and Honduras (July 2016). These can be found on the website Refworld.org. UNHCR has been described as “the entity that most resembles a supervisory body of the [1951] Convention.”3 Although U.S. courts and the BIA have been inconsistent in the deference accorded to its opinions, given the clearly stated intent of Congress in passing the Refugee Act of 1980 to conform U.S. asylum law to the language of the 1951 Convention (which was binding on the U.S. based on its ratification of the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees), it has been argued that courts should defer more consistently to UNHCR’s interpretations of the Convention’s provisions.4

UNHCR’s 2016 Eligibility Guidelines for El Salvador includes an “Assessment of International Protection Needs of Asylum-seekers from El Salvador.” The agency concludes that “depending on the particular circumstances of the case, UNHCR considers that persons perceived by a gang as contravening its rules or resisting its authority may be in need of international protection on the grounds of their (imputed) political opinion…”5 The UNHCR Guidelines report at p. 12 that “gangs are reported to exercise extraordinary levels of social control over the population of their territories.” According to UNHCR, residents in such gang-controlled zones “are reportedly required to ‘look, listen and keep quiet’ (‘mirar, oir, callar’), and often face a plethora of gang-imposed restrictions on who they can talk with and what about, what time they must be inside their homes, where they can walk or go to school, who they can visit and who can visit them, what they can wear, and even, reportedly, the color of their hair.”

At p. 28 of its Guidelines, UNHCR states:

The ground of political opinion needs to reflect the reality of the specific geographical, historical, political, legal, judicial, and sociocultural context of the country of origin. In contexts such as that in El Salvador, expressing objections to the activities of gangs may be considered as amounting to an opinion that is critical of the methods and policies of those in control and, thus, constitute a “political opinion” within the meaning of the refugee definition. For example, individuals who resist being recruited by a gang, or who refuse to comply with demands made by the gangs, such as demands to pay extortion money, may be perceived to hold a political opinion.

Anker and Lawrence note in their conclusion that many denials of such claims “reflect adjudicators’ and courts’ lack of knowledge (often because they are not presented with evidence) of regarding the political nature and context of the present conflict in that region.” This is an extremely important point. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated in Castro v. Holder6 that “a claim of political persecution cannot be evaluated in a vacuum….” The court noted that it has “remanded cases in which the agency denied an application for asylum based on its failure to properly engage in the “complex and contextual factual inquiry” that such claims often require…Nevertheless, in this case, the agency has once again embraced an ‘impoverished view of what political opinions are, especially in a country where certain democratic rights have only a tenuous hold’” in denying the asylum claim “without any coherent examination of the surrounding political environment.”

Immigration judges dealing with seriously overloaded dockets, limited authority to grant continuances, and completion quotas will be hard pressed to engage in “complex and contextual factual inquiry.” Practitioners should do their best to educate adjudicators through country condition evidence, expert testimony, memoranda of law, and through detailed direct examination of the asylum-seeker.

Practitioners should also rely on the BIA’s precedent decision in Matter of S-P-, 21 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 1996), which held that imputed political opinion may satisfy the refugee definition (relying in part on the UNHCR Handbook and Procedures for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention; and that asylum applicants need not show conclusively why persecution may occur, but need only produce facts to establish that a reasonable person would fear that the danger arises on account of a protected ground. The Board in S-P- also set forth five elements to consider in identifying motive, including “indications in the particular case that the abuse was directed toward modifying or punishing opinion rather than conduct (e.g., statements or actions by the perpetrators or abuse out of proportion to nonpolitical ends)” (Id. at 494). With the support of the UNHCR Guidelines, a strong argument can be made that death threats or actual killings for offenses such as “looking mistrustfully at a gang member,” “wearing certain clothing.” or “accidentally turning up uninvited in a gang zone” constitute “statements or actions…out of proportion to nonpolitical ends” under the criteria found in Matter of S-P-.7

Where another motive exists for the feared harm, practitioners should argue that mixed motives will support a grant of asylum where one of the motives is tethered to a statutory ground. See Matter of S-P-, supra at 495. In Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017 (2d Cir. 1994), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit responded to INS’ argument that a labor union leader could not establish a nexus to political opinion because his dispute with the Guatemalan government was economic in nature by finding “any attempt to unravel economic from political motives is untenable in this case.” The court concluded that the petitioner’s union activities “imply a political opinion,” concluding that “the Government’s view of what constitutes a political opinion is too narrow.” Or, as Anker and Lawrence explain, “gangs can, for example, view a person who refuses extortion as an enemy opposing them and, at the same time, also want the funds.”

Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

Notes:

1. 14-10 Immigration Briefings 1 (October 2014).

2. I first heard Farah speak at a country condition training on gang violence in the Northern Triangle held by USCIS for its asylum officers; at my invitation, Farah was a speaker on the same topic at the 2015 EOIR Training Conference for its immigration judges and BIA staff.

3. American Courts and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: A Need for Harmony in the Face of a Refugee Crisis (Note), 131 HARVARD L.R. 1399 (March 2018).

4. See, e.g., American Courts and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, supra; Bassina Farbenblum, Executive Deference in U.S. Refugee Law: Internationalist Paths Through and Beyond Chevron,” 60 DUKE L.J. 1059 (2011); Joan Fitzpatrick, The International Dimension of U.S. Refugee Law, 15 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1 (1997).

5. UNHCR, Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from El Salvador (March 2016) at 30. http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&docid=56e706e94&skip=0&query=guidelines%20on%20&coi=SLV

6. 597 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).

7. See UNHCR Guidelines on El Salvador at 29; Matter of S-P-, supra at 494.

JEFF CHASE

HON. JEFFREY CHASE – DON’T BELIEVE EOIR’S DISINGENUOUS CLAIMS ABOUT “TRANSPARENCY” — Agency Hits New Low In FOIA Obfuscation By Purporting To “Redact” Legal Citations From Unpublished Decisions!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/5/27/eoirs-knee-jerk-redaction

May 27 EOIR’s Knee-Jerk Redaction?

In an action reflecting on the agency’s transparency, EOIR responded to a Freedom of Information Act request by Long Island, NY attorney Bryan Johnson for the remanded decisions of Charlotte Immigration Judge Barry Pettinato by redacting pretty much everything from all of the decisions, including sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the names and citations of published BIA precedent decisions that were referenced in the Board’s judgments. For example, one such redacted BIA decision provided pursuant to the FOIA request now reads that the appeal was from the IJ’s decision denying the respondent’s “applications for [BLANK] pursuant to section [BLANK] of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“Act”); [BLANK], for [BLANK] pursuant to section [BLANK] of the Act, [BLANK], and for [BLANK] pursuant to [BLANK].” A later section of the same redacted decision now reads: “During the pendency of this appeal, the Board issued [BLANK][BLANK] (BIA 2014) and [BLANK] [BLANK] (BIA 2014, which clarifies the elements required to establish [BLANK] under the Act.” Here is the link to all 58 redacted decisions: https://amjolaw.com/2018/05/24/doj-redacts-all-the-relevant-facts-and-law-in-all-58-remand-decisions-of-immigration-judge-barry-pettinato/.

As names and all other identifying information were (correctly) redacted from each decision, it is unclear why EOIR saw the removal of virtually all information from the decisions to be necessary. The BIA publishes precedent decisions in which it substitutes initials for the respondent’s name, but otherwise includes the facts and law relevant to the case. As attorney Johnson points out, “Almost all the cites to BIA and Circuit Court decisions are redacted under the (b)(6) exemption, which is supposed to protect private personal information. The title to a published BIA decision is about as far from personal information as it gets.”

Ironically, the redactions came two weeks after EOIR announced a new “transparency initiative”: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/executive-office-immigration-review-releases-court-statistics-announces-transparency. According to the May 9 announcement, posted on EOIR’s website, “Releasing immigration court data to the American public introduces accountability to a system that has been neglected for years,” said EOIR Director James McHenry.

Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

JEFF CHASE

PWS

05-18-18

HON. JEFFREY CHASE: In-Depth Analysis Of “Our Gang’s” Amicus Brief In Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/5/28/amicus-brief-filed-in-w-y-c-h-o-b-appeal

May 28 Amicus Brief Filed in W-Y-C- & H-O-B- Appeal

On May 23, an amicus brief was filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on behalf of a group of 13 former immigration judges (including myself) and BIA members in the appeal of the BIA’s precedent decision in Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-. In that decision, a three-judge panel of the BIA held that an asylum applicant must clearly delineate its proposed particular social group before the immigration judge. The Board held that the asylum applicant may not alter the social group formulation on appeal to the BIA, citing the “inherently factual nature of the social group analysis.”

Our brief argues that the Board’s reasoning is flawed. The Board has held that the determination of whether a particular social group is cognizable is a question of law which the Board may review de novo. Our brief also points out that the Board’s arguments as to why it will generally not consider a new group on appeal overlooks the fact that it has done just that in the past.

One member of our group, former BIA chairperson Paul W. Schmidt, was the author if the Board’s 1996 landmark decision in Matter of Kasinga, the first BIA precedent to grant a gender-based asylum claim. Two other members of our group, former Board Members Gus Villageliu, and Lory D. Rosenberg, respectively joined in the majority opinion and wrote a concurring opinion in Kasinga. As the three pointed out in the drafting process, the particular social group that the Board approved in that case was neither delineated before the IJ nor proposed by either party on appeal. It was crafted for the first time by the Board itself, in a manner that was consistent with the factual record below and which allowed the Board to grant relief. The three noted that the ability of the Board itself to alter the group’s contours is often necessary to allow an en banc Board to reach consensus.

Our brief also pointed to the Board’s decision in Matter of M-E-V-G- to remand the record where “the respondent’s proposed particular social group has evolved during the pendency of his appeal.” We also point out how circuit courts have frequently cited to the Board’s decades-long practice of clarifying proposed groups.

Our brief additionally underscores the extreme complexity of particular social group formulation, particularly in light of the highly-criticized additional requirements of particularly and social distinction imposed by the Board in recent years. We note that group delineations will often be made by pro se respondents, often with a limited mastery of English, sometimes in detained facilities with limited access to counsel or law libraries.

This was the sixth Amicus brief filed by our group. We are most thankful for the outstanding assistance of attorneys Jean-Claude Andre and Katelyn Rowe of the law firm of Sidley Austin for lending their assistance pro bono for the second time in the drafting of our group’s brief. We also acknowledge the distinguished counsel for the respondents, led by Fatma Marouf of Texas A&M Law School, Geoff Hoffman of the University of Houston Law Center, and Deborah Anker of Harvard Law School.

The link to our full brief is here: http://immigrationcourtside.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Cantarero-Amicus-Brief.pdf

The cooperation and assistance of so many brilliant minds and caring hearts is a source of great comfort in these challenging times.

Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

JEFF CHASE

HON. JEFFREY CHASE: MORE INTERNAL EVIDENCE OF POLITICIZED HIRING AND UNNECESSARY DELAYS UNDER SESSIONS AS EOIR APPEARS TO JOIN TRUMP’S “WAR ON THE CAREER CIVIL SERVICE” BY ATTACKING THE CAREER PROMOTION SYSTEM FOR BIA ATTORNEY ADVISORS!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/5/27/eoirs-hiring-practices-raise-concerns

May 27 EOIR’s Hiring Practices Raise Concerns

In response to a whistleblower’s letter from within EOIR, ranking Senate Democrats have requested an investigation into improper political influence in EOIR’s hiring criteria for immigration judges and members of the Board of Immigration Appeals. https://democrats-judiciary.house.gov/news/press-releases/top-dems-request-inspector-general-investigation-allegations-illegal-hiring. Following up on an April 17 letter to Attorney General Sessions, the Democratic leaders on May 8 stated that in subsequent weeks, more whistleblowers have come forward to corroborate the delaying or withdrawal of IJ appointments to candidates whose political views are not believed to align with those of the present administration.

There seems to be little if any doubt among EOIR employees that this is in fact happening. The resulting slowdown in IJ hiring is further exacerbating the huge backlog of cases plaguing the immigration courts. There are presently no judges sitting in the Louisville, Kentucky immigration court; other courts are simply understaffed. In what my friend and fellow blogger Hon. Paul W. Schmidt has termed “ADR” (Aimless Docket Reshuffling), sitting IJs are being detailed to hear cases in courts with vacancies, forcing the continuance of cases on their own dockets, some of which have been waiting two or more years for their day in court.

It was just under 10 years ago that a 140 page report of the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General found similar wrongdoing in the hiring of IJs under the Bush administration. https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0807/final.pdf That report noted at p.135 that “both Department policy and federal law prohibit discrimination in hiring for career positions on the basis of political affiliations.” That investigation found that such policy and law had been violated, and included recommendations to prevent a future recurrence of such improper conduct. Then as now, the slowdown in IJ hiring caused by the improper political screening of candidates compromised EOIR’s mission (in the words of the agency’s Director at the time, at p.96), and contributed to the growing case backlog.

In another employment-related development that has drawn little public notice, the Department of Justice on May 17 posted a hiring ad for 38 vacant staff attorney positions at the BIA. The twist is that for the first time, the positions were advertised as being entry level grade positions with no potential for promotion.

EOIR Director James McHenry had hinted since his appointment that he believed BIA attorney positions should be downgraded. There is something disingenuous about such statement. I can think of at least three immigration judges who were appointed to the bench directly from their positions as non-supervisory BIA staff attorneys. Two of the four temporary BIA Board Members at present are long-term BIA staff attorneys. The present BIA chairperson, David Neal, previously served as a Board staff attorney for 5 years, a position that apparently qualified him to directly become chief counsel to the Senate Immigration Subcommittee. Nearly all of the BIA’s decisions, including those that are published as precedent binding on the agency and DHS, are drafted by its staff attorneys. Some of those attorneys have accumulated significant expertise in complex areas of immigration law. A number of Board staff attorneys have participated as speakers at the immigration judge training conferences.

The question thus becomes: how are experienced attorneys who are deemed qualified to move directly into immigration judge and BIA Board Member positions, to craft precedent decisions and to train immigration judges only deemed to be entry level, non-career path employees?

There has been much attention paid to the nearly 700,000 cases pending before the nation’s immigration courts. As the agency moves to hire more judges and limit continuances, and recently had its power to administrative close cases revoked by the AG, the number and pace of cases appealed to the BIA will speed up significantly. It would seem like a good time for the BIA to be staffed with knowledgeable and experienced staff attorneys. Instead, the agency’s move essentially turns new BIA attorney hires into short-term law clerks. New attorneys undergo a full year of legal training to bring them up to speed to handle the high volume and variety of complex legal issues arising on appeal. However, attorneys are unlikely to remain in such positions for much more than a year without the possibility of promotion.

Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

As an Attorney-Manager and Government Senior Executive, I always had high expectations for the professionals working for me, which they achieved in the vast, vast majority of cases. My experience told me that everyone had their strengths and weaknesses and that it was the job of a good manager to find ways for everyone to succeed whenever possible.

If I do say so myself, I believe that I was good at finding the right “sweet spots” for folks to “be the best that they can be.” And, I’ll freely acknowledge getting some of my ideas from watching the late “Legacy INS” General Counsel Mike Inman operate. Whatever else one might think or say about “Iron Mike,” he did have an “eye for talent.” He also could take people who seemed to be “bouncing along” in their careers and position them to be outsized contributors and “superstars,” in his lingo.

At the same time, I saw the importance of insuring that folks working for me had the maximum number of career advancement opportunities and a fair chance to be recognized and move up the “career ladder.” Indeed, former EOIR Director Anthony “Tony” Moscato and I finished the work begun by my predecessor as BIA Chair, the late Judge David Milhollan and his then “Chief Attorney Advisor” now retired BIA Appellate Immigration Judge David B. Holmes in creating a career ladder where all qualified BIA Attorney Advisers could eventually reach the full DOJ career level for attorneys of GS-15.

Additionally, with the support of Tony and then Attorney General Janet Reno, I created various supervisory and leadership positions for senior Attorney Advisors that allowed them to assist in the management of the BIA staff while preparing themselves for other senior-level careers both at EOIR and elsewhere. Indeed a significant number of todays Appellate Immigration Judges, Immigration Judges, and senior EOIR managers, and managers in other divisions of the DOJ got their start in management at the BIA.

Disappointingly, under Sessions, EOIR appears to have joined the fight against the career civil service by “dumbing down” in various ways both the Immigration Judge and BIA Attorney Advisor position by making them less attractive to those seeking a career in public service.

I recently was discussing the politicized hiring process with a retired colleague who had worked elsewhere in the DOJ but had knowledge of both the past and current problems at EOIR. She said “It’s happening again, Paul. Just wait till it all comes out — ‘you ain’t seen nothin’ yet!'”

It’s time for EOIR to be removed from the DOJ and its politicized policies and practices! In this instance, “past performance predicts future results!” And, that’s not a good thing!

PWS

05-28-18

HON. JEFFREY CHASE: Sessions’s Quotas Attack Fairness, Due Process, Undermine U.S. Immigration Court System!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/4/7/eoir-imposes-completion-quotas-on-ijs

Apr 7 EOIR Imposes Completion Quotas on IJs

Ten years ago, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided Hashmi v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S.1 The case involved a request to continue a removal proceeding which the Department of Homeland Security did not oppose. The respondent was married to a U.S. citizen; he would become eligible to adjust his status in immigration court once the visa petition she had filed on his behalf was approved by DHS. However, the approval was delayed for reasons beyond the respondent’s control. One of those reasons was that a part of the respondent’s DHS file was needed by both the office in Cherry Hill, NJ adjudicating the visa petition and the DHS attorney in Newark prosecuting the removal case.

The immigration judge decided that he could wait no longer. Noting that the pendency of the case had exceeded the agency’s stated case completion goals, the judge denied the continuance and ordered the respondent deported. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that “to reach a decision about whether to grant or deny a motion for a continuance based solely on case-completion goals, with no regard for the circumstances of the case itself, is impermissibly arbitrary.”

In response to Hashmi, the BIA issued a precedent decision stating that unopposed motions of that type should generally be granted.2 In subsequent decisions, the BIA provided further guidance in allowing IJs to make reasonable determinations to continue such cases,3 and to administratively close proceedings where it would further justice (as in Hashmi, where the need for the DHS file to be in two places at once was preventing the case from proceeding).4

In subjecting immigration judges to strict, metrics-based reviews last week, EOIR’s director, James McHenry, may pressure immigration judges into taking the types of actions barred by Hashmi. Under the newly-announced metrics, individual judges may run the risk of disciplinary action for granting reasonable requests for continuance, or for other delays necessary for reaching a fair result. The combined actions of McHenry (who prior to being promoted to the position of agency director had worked for EOIR for approximately 6 months as an administrative law judge with OCAHO, the only component of EOIR that doesn’t deal with immigration law or the immigration courts), and Attorney General Jeff Sessions in recently certifying four BIA decisions to himself, could erase the above positive case law developments of the past decade, and replace them with an incentive for rushed decisions that do not afford adequate safeguards to non-citizens facing deportation.

Allowing reasonable continuances for the parties to obtain counsel, present evidence, and formulate legal theories, or to allow other agencies to adjudicate applications impacting eligibility, is an essential part of affording justice. Judges also need to fully understand the legal arguments presented. When an issue arises in the course of a hearing, it is not uncommon for a judge to ask the parties for briefs, and for the judge to then conduct his or her own legal research before deciding the matter. A detailed decision is also necessary to allow for meaningful review on appeal. However, all of this takes time, and the performance of individual judges will be found to be unsatisfactory or in need of improvement if they complete less than 700 cases per year, complete less than 95 percent of cases at their first merits hearing, or have 15 percent of their cases remanded on appeal.

Some recently reported actions by immigration judges in the name of expediency are troubling. Last Sunday’s episode of Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (for which my colleague Carol King and I served as subject-matter sources) featured a credible-fear review hearing by an immigration judge that lasted one minute and 43 seconds in its entirety (and was probably doubled in length by the need for an interpreter). The judge asked the unrepresented respondent a total of two questions before reaching this decision: “Well, the government of the United States doesn’t afford you protection for this type of reason. I affirm the Asylum Officer’s decision.” It’s not clear how the judge could have been confident in such conclusion. The respondent was detained and had not yet had an opportunity to consult with counsel. Her claim was only sketched in the broadest outline; upon further development by an attorney, it may well have fallen into the “type of reason” for which asylum may be granted. Her credibility was never doubted; in fact, the program reported that she was assaulted at gunpoint by the man she fled after she was deported to her country.

In another case arising in the Ninth Circuit, C.J.L.G. v. Sessions,5 an immigration judge told the mother of a child in removal proceedings who was unable to retain counsel that she could represent her son, and proceeded with the child’s asylum hearing. Of course, the mother was not qualified for the task. Although the son had been threatened with death for resisting gang recruitment efforts, he was denied asylum in a hearing in which many critical questions that could have helped develop a nexus between his fear and a legally protected ground for asylum were never asked. This occurred because the judge did not feel that he could grant another continuance to provide the respondent an additional opportunity to retain counsel.

All of the above-described actions by IJs occurred prior to last week’s announcement by the EOIR director. Should judges struggling to meet the benchmarks feel their job security to be at risk, will actions such as those described above become the norm?

As previously mentioned, the Attorney General certified four decisions of the BIA to himself shortly before the director’s announcement of the new metrics. In one of those cases, Matter of E-F-H-L-,6 Sessions vacated a 2014 BIA precedent decision requiring immigration judges to provide asylum applicants a full hearing on their claim. In another, Matter of A-B-,7 Sessions chose a case in which the BIA twice reversed an immigration judge’s denial of asylum to a victim of domestic violence, and on certification has made the case a referendum on whether victims of private criminal activity may constitute a particular social group for asylum purposes.

Should Sessions decide this issue in the negative, the two decisions taken together may allow for the type of quick denials of the “Government…doesn’t afford you protection for this type of reason” variety discussed above. Fair-minded judges who will continue to hold full hearings and consider legal arguments in favor of granting relief may find it more difficult to meet all of the above benchmarks.

Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

Notes:

531 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2008)

Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785 (BIA 2009).

See Matter of Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. 127 (BIA 2009) (concerning continuances due to pending employment-based visa petitions) ; Matter of C-B-, 25 I&N Dec. 888 (BIA 2012) (requiring reasonable and realistic continuances to obtain counsel); Matter of Montiel, 26 I&N Dec. 555 (BIA 2015) (allowing delaying proceedings for adjudication of criminal appeals).

See Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012); Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. 17 (BIA 2017).

No. 16-73801 (9th Cir. Jan. 29, 2018); Pet. for rehearing and rehearing en banc pending.

27 I&N Dec. 226 (A.G. March 5, 2018)

27 I&N Dec. 227 (A.G. March 7, 2018)

JEFF CHASE

MATTER OF A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 247 (AG 2018) (“A-B- II”) – Session’s Latest Abuse of Certification Process Illustrates Judge Chase’s Point On Why This Unethical & Unfair Procedure Must End!

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1047666/download

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 247 (A.G. 2018) Interim Decision #3922

Matter of A-B-, Respondent

Decided by Attorney General March 30, 2018

U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General

The Attorney General denied the request of the Department of Homeland Security that the Attorney General suspend the briefing schedules and clarify the question presented, and he granted, in part, both parties’ request for an extension of the deadline for submitting briefs in this case.

BEFORE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

On March 7, 2018, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2017), I directed the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) to refer its decision in this case to me for review. To assist in my review, I invited the parties to submit briefs not exceeding 15,000 words in length and interested amici to submit briefs not exceeding 9,000 words in length. I directed that the parties file briefs on or before April 6, 2018, that amici file briefs on or before April 13, 2018, and that the parties file any reply briefs on or before April 20, 2018.

On March 14, 2018, the respondent filed a request for an extension of the deadline for submitting briefs from April 6, 2018, to May 18, 2018. On March 16, 2018, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) submitted a motion containing three requests: (1) that I suspend the briefing schedules to permit the Board to rule on the Immigration Judge’s August 18, 2017, certification order; (2) that I clarify the question presented in this case; and (3) that I extend the deadline for submitting opening briefs to May 18, 2018. The respondent subsequently filed a response requesting that I grant the same relief.

This Order addresses all pending requests from the parties.
I. DHS’s Request To Suspend the Briefing Schedules

DHS’s request to suspend the briefing schedules until the Board acts on the Immigration Judge’s certification request is denied. DHS suggests that this case “does not appear to be in the best posture for the Attorney General’s review,” because the Board has not yet acted on the Immigration Judge’s attempt, on remand from the Board, to certify the case back to the Board. See DHS’s Mot. on Cert. to the Att’y Gen. at 2 (citing United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954)).

247

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 247 (A.G. 2018) Interim Decision #3922

The certification from the Immigration Judge pending before the Board does not require the suspension of briefing because the case is not properly pending before the Board. The Immigration Judge did not act within his authority, as delineated by the controlling regulations, when he purported to certify the matter. The Immigration Judge noted in his order that an “Immigration Judge may certify to the [Board] any case arising from a decision rendered in removal proceedings.” Order of Certification at 4, (Aug. 18, 2017) (emphasis added) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3), (c)). The regulations also provide that an “Immigration Judge or Service officer may certify a case only after an initial decision has been made and before an appeal has been taken.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.7 (2017).

Here, the Immigration Judge did not issue any “decision” on remand that he could certify to the Board. The Board’s December 2016 decision sustained the respondent’s appeal of the Immigration Judge’s initial decision and remanded the case to the Immigration Judge “for the purpose of allowing [DHS] the opportunity to complete or update identity, law enforcement, or security investigations or examinations, and further proceedings, if necessary, and for the entry of an order as provided by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(h).” Matter of A-B- at 4 (BIA Dec. 8, 2016). Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(h) (2017), the Immigration Judge on remand was directed to “enter an order granting or denying the immigration relief sought” after considering the “results of the identity, law enforcement, or security investigations.” “If new information is presented, the immigration judge may hold a further hearing if necessary to consider any legal or factual issues . . . .” Id.

In this matter, DHS informed the Immigration Judge that the respondent’s background checks were clear. See Order of Certification at 1. Given the scope of the Board’s remand and the requirements of the regulations, the Immigration Judge was obliged to issue a decision granting or denying the relief sought. If the Immigration Judge thought intervening changes in the law directed a different outcome, he may have had the authority to hold a hearing, consider those legal issues, and make a decision on those issues. Cf. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(h). Instead, the Immigration Judge sought to “certify” the Board’s decision back to the Board, essentially requesting that the Board reconsider its legal and factual findings. That procedural maneuver does not fall within the scope of the Immigration Judge’s authority upon remand. Nor does it fall within the regulations’ requirements that cases may be certified when they arise from “[d]ecisions of Immigration Judges in removal proceedings,” id. § 1003.1(b)(3); see also id. § 1003.1(c), and that an Immigration Judge “may certify a case only after an initial decision has been made and before an appeal has been taken,” id. § 1003.7. Because the Immigration Judge failed to issue a decision on remand, the Immigration Judge’s attempt to certify the case back to the Board was procedurally

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Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 247 (A.G. 2018) Interim Decision #3922

defective and therefore does not affect my consideration of the December 16, 2016, Board decision.

Furthermore, the present case is distinguishable from Accardi, because, here, the Board rendered a decision on the merits, consistent with the applicable regulations. It is that December 8, 2016, decision that I directed the Board to refer to me for my review. See Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 227, 227 (A.G. 2018) (directing the Board “to refer this case to me for review of its decision” (emphasis added)). The Board issued that decision “exercis[ing] its own judgment” and free from any perception of interference from the Attorney General. Accardi, 347 U.S. at 266. My certification of that decision for review complies with all applicable regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (“The Board shall refer to the Attorney General for review of its decision all cases that . . . [t]he Attorney General directs Board to refer to him.” (emphasis added)). It is therefore unnecessary to suspend the briefing schedule pending a new decision of the Board.

II. DHS’s Request To Clarify the Question Presented

I deny DHS’s request to clarify the question presented. In my March 7, 2018, order, I requested briefing on “[w]hether, and under what circumstances, being a victim of private criminal activity constitutes a cognizable ‘particular social group’ for purposes of an application for asylum or withholding of removal.” Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 227. Although “there is no entitlement to briefing when a matter is certified for Attorney General review,” Matter of Silva-Trevino, A.G. Order No. 3034-2009 (Jan. 15, 2009), I nevertheless invited the parties and interested amici “to submit briefs on points relevant to the disposition of this case” to assist my review. Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 227. As the Immigration Judge observed in his effort to certify the case, several Federal Article III courts have recently questioned whether victims of private violence may qualify for asylum under section 208(b)(1)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012), based on their claim that they were persecuted because of their membership in a particular social group. If being a victim of private criminal activity qualifies a petitioner as a member of a cognizable “particular social group,” under the statute, the briefs should identify such situations. If such situations do not exist, the briefs should explain why not.

DHS requests clarification on the ground that “this question has already been answered, at least in part, by the Board and its prior precedent.” Board precedent, however, does not bind my ultimate decision in this matter. See section 103(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2012) (providing that “determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all

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questions of law shall be controlling”). The parties and interested amici may brief any relevant issues in this case—including the interplay between any relevant Board precedent and the question presented—but I encourage them to answer the legal question presented.

III. The Parties’ Requests for an Extension of the Deadline for Submitting Briefs

I grant, in part, both parties’ request for an extension of the deadline for submitting briefs in this case. The parties’ briefs shall be filed on or before April 20, 2018. Briefs from interested amici shall be filed on or before April 27, 2018. Reply briefs from the parties shall be filed on or before May 4, 2018. No further requests for extensions of the deadlines from the parties or interested amici shall be granted.

In support of respondent’s request for an extension, she asserted that “an extension of the briefing deadline is warranted because [r]espondent intends to submit additional evidence with her brief in support of her claim,” including the possibility that she might obtain new evidence from El Salvador. Resp’t Request for Extension of Briefing Deadline at 4 (Mar. 14, 2018). Although I retain “full decision-making authority under the immigration statutes,” Matter of A-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 774, 779 n.4 (A.G. 2005), I requested briefing on a purely legal question to assist my review of this case, and I encourage the parties to focus their briefing on that question. Further factual development may be appropriate in the event the case is remanded, but the opportunity to gather additional factual evidence is not a basis for my decision to extend the briefing deadline.

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Back in law school, we were taught that court jurisdiction existed to decide “cases or controversies.” Not so in the US Immigration Court in the “Age of Sessions.”

The latest outrageous “certified” decision by Attorney General Jeff “Gonzo Apocalyoto” Sessions shows that he has abused his power by intervening in a case where neither party sought his intervention and where both parties essentially consider the law to be settled by prior BIA precedents. Indeed, the DHS is basically asking Sessions not to intervene in a case that it lost before the BIA and instead let the BIA deal with the issue. Remarkably, though, Sessions treats DHS with the same arrogant and biased dismissiveness that he treats migrants and private lawyers.

Even the DHS (to its credit) appears to be appalled by Sessions’s unwarranted and unneeded interference in the quasi-judicial process before the US Immigration Courts. Apparently, the DHS understands (as Gonzo apparently does not or will not) that the destruction of the credibility and integrity of the Immigration Courts will also hurt their enforcement efforts by making US Courts of Appeals more skeptical of the validity of final orders of removal entered by the BIA! Indeed, it was similar concerns by enforcement officials in the “Legacy INS” during the Reagan Administration that led to the removal of the Immigration Judges from the INS and creation of EOIR as a separate, non-enforcement, agency within the DOJ in the first place.

Although Sessions in his latest decision in Matter of A-B– basically concedes that the Immigration Judge should have followed the BIA’s instructions and granted the respondent’s asylum application, he nevertheless is misusing the case as a “vehicle” for a reexamination of fundamental, well-established principles of asylum law that neither party requested. Talk about abuse of authority!

Sessions has been on the wrong side of legal history on an astounding range of legal issues throughout his sorry career. Yet, having been rebuffed on most of his extremist views by his colleagues of both parties in the Senate and by the courts, he is now using his “captive court system” — the U.S. Immigration Courts — to interfere with the fair administration of justice and to impose his self-styled, White Nationalist inspired rules that no party has requested. Seldom has there been such a clear abuse of the American legal system. Yet, to date he is getting away with it!

This is precisely the type of improper use of the arcane “certification authority” that my colleague Judge Jeffrey Chase discussed in his article reprinted in the previous post. When and where will this mockery of justice end?

PWS

03-30-18

HON. JEFFREY CHASE: Sessions’s Abuses Of “Certification Power” Show Why It’s Past Time To End This Unfair, Unethical, & (Probably) Unconstitutional Mockery of Justice!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/3/29/the-ags-certifying-of-bia-decisions

Mar 29 The AG’s Certifying of BIA Decisions

The recent flurry of case certifications by Attorney General Jeff Sessions (he has certified four BIA decisions to himself since January) raises the question of the continued appropriateness of the practice. Certification allows a political appointee who heads an enforcement agency, and is subject to the policy agenda of the administration he or she serves, absolute authority to overrule or completely rewrite the decisions of an ostensibly neutral and independent tribunal comprised of judges possessing greater subject matter expertise.

The issue has only become a matter of legitimate concern under the two most recent Republican administrations. In her eight years as Attorney General during the Clinton Administration, Janet Reno decided a total of three cases pursuant to certification. Under the Obama administration, AGs Loretta Lynch and Eric Holder decided a comparable number of cases (four). The number is artificially inflated by the fact that two of those consisted of Holder vacating late-term decisions by his predecessor, Michael Mukasey. In one of the vacated decisions, Mukasey’s reasoning had been rejected by five separate U.S. circuit courts of appeal.

In contrast, during the eight year administration of George W. Bush, his three Attorneys General issued 16 precedent decisions through the certification process. Sessions so far seems to be on a similar pace.

One of Bush’s AGs, Alberto Gonzales, co-authored an article in 2016 defending the use of certification.1 As part of his argument, Gonzales traced the history of the practice to the BIA’s origins as an advisory-only panel in the Department of Labor in the 1920s and 30s. When the Board was transferred to the Department of Justice in 1940, it was provided only limited decision-making authority, but was required to refer to the AG certain categories of cases, including those “in which a dissent has been recorded” or where “a question of difficulty is involved.”

I will add that the early appointees to the BIA were career bureaucrats with no prior expertise or experience in the field of immigration law. To me, such history seems to provide no real justification for the continued practice. The BIA has for decades enjoyed the authority to independently decide a broad class of cases. It’s members all come to the Board with far more expertise and experience in the field of immigration law than the AG possesses (although since the 2003 purge by then-AG John Ashcroft, its make-up is far more conservative). Furthermore, whereas in the past, it was the BIA itself, and later, the Commissioner of INS, requesting certification, at present, the AG is handpicking the cases and certifying them to himself, sometimes in order to decide an issue that wasn’t part of the decision below.

Law Professor Margaret H. Taylor has noted that the practice of AG certification “might be seen as objectionable because it conflicts with a core value of our legal system: that disputes are resolved by an impartial adjudicator who has no interest in the outcome.”2 Taylor further points out that many such decisions were issued in the final days of an AG’s term, meaning that the AG “refers a controversial issue to himself and renders a decision upending agency precedent on his way out the door.”3

In an article calling for the implementation of procedural safeguards on the AG’s certification power, the author accurately notes that the practice of “agency head review” is common and non-controversial.4 However, Professor Stephen Legomsky has pointed out that the strongest arguments for agency head review – inter-decisional consistency, and agency control (by politically-accountable officials) over policy – don’t translate well to the process of deciding asylum applications, for example.5 This harks back to a point I made in an earlier article – that immigration judges (including BIA Board member) are the only judges in the otherwise enforcement-minded Department of Justice, and that the Department has never really grasped the concept of independent decision-makers existing under its jurisdiction.

Legomsky pointed out in the same article that the BIA, as an appellate authority, “can yield the same consistency as agency head review” through the issuance of en banc decisions; adding that the AG could require the Board to decide certain cases en banc.6 Interestingly, the BIA has given up the use of en banc decisions in recent years. It has not decided a precedent decision en banc even in cases of major import, or following remands from the AG or circuit courts.

Sessions’ use of certification thus far is unique in his redetermination of what the case he chooses is even about. In Matter of Castro-Tum, the DHS appealed an immigration judge’s decision to administratively close proceedings in which an unaccompanied minor did not appear on the grounds that it had met its burden of establishing proper notice of the hearing on the minor respondent. The BIA actually agreed with DHS and remanded the matter. However, Sessions has now turned the case into a referendum on whether any IJ or the BIA has the legal authority to administratively close any case, an argument that was never raised below. In Matter of A-B-, an immigration judge, in defiance of the BIA’s order to grant asylum on remand, refused to calendar the case for a hearing for an excessive length of time, and then disobeyed the Board’s order by denying asylum again for spurious reasons. Somehow, Sessions decided to certify this case to decide whether anyone seeking asylum based on membership in a particular social group relating to being a victim of private criminal activity merits such relief. His ultimate decision could curtail asylum eligibility for victims of domestic violence, members of the LGBTQ community, targets of gang violence, and victims of human trafficking.

Furthermore, two of the cases certified by Sessions involve tools of docket management, i.e. administrative closure and continuances. As immigration judges are the only judges within the Department, and as the BIA has set out uniform procedures for the proper use of these tools, how can the AG justify his need to weigh in on these issues, which clearly do not involve the need for intra-department consistency (as no other component of the department employs such tools), or for control by a politically-accountable official to ensure the coherent expression of agency policy?

Once again, the solution is to create an independent, Article I immigration court, allowing IJs to continue to decide cases with fairness and neutrality free from such policy-driven interference.

Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

Notes:

Alberto Gonzales and Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch Immigration Policy Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority, 101 Iowa L.Rev. 841 (2016).

Margaret H. Taylor, Midnight Agency Adjudication: Attorney General Review of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 18 (2016).

Id.

Laura S. Trice, Adjudication by Fiat: The Need for Procedural Safeguards in Attorney General Review of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1766 (2010).

Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to Consistency, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 413, 458 (2007).

6. Id.

JEFF CHASE

THE LATEST FROM THE HON. JEFFREY CHASE: “Amicus Brief Filed in 10th Cir. Petition for Remotely-Detained Asylum Seeker” — PLUS: A Link To The Actual Brief! — MATUMONA V. SESSIONS, 10th Cir.

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/3/22/amicus-brief-filed-in-10th-cir-petition-for-remotely-detained-asylum-seeker

Mar 22 Amicus Brief Filed in 10th Cir. Petition for Remotely-Detained Asylum Seeker

An amicus brief was filed yesterday by attorneys at the law firm of Sidley Austin on behalf of an asylum seeker from the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of Matumona v. Sessions. Fleeing for his life and seeking asylum in the U.S., the petitioner upon arrival was detained by DHS in the Cibola County Detention Center in New Mexico.

To call Cibola remotely located is truly an understatement. If you Google Map it, you will see that the detention center is surrounded on the east, south, and west by the stunningly scenic, 263,000 acre El Malpais National Conservation Area. Moving out a bit further, the map shows reservations of the Zuni, Navajo, and Apache nations, beyond which lies the Sevilleta National Wildlife Refuge, and both the Carson and Santa Fe National Forests.

In fairness, Albuquerque is an hour and a half drive away. However, that city has a total of 36 attorneys who are members of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, working for 25 offices or organizations. By comparison, New York City has well over a thousand AILA members (not including many others located in the surrounding suburbs). The problem of representation is compounded by the fact that the petitioner, although detained at Cibola, had his removal hearings in the Immigration Court in Denver, 500 miles away. The National Immigrant Justice Center was able to identify only 21 attorneys in all of New Mexico and Texas who would be willing to represent detainees at Cibola in their removal proceedings. For those requiring pro bono representation, the options are even fewer. According to the latest figures provided by DHS, there were 689 non-citizens being detained in Cibola, and that was less than the facility’s full capacity.

Therefore, close to none of those detained at Cibola are able to exercise their constitutional right to be represented by an attorney, as assigned counsel at government expense does not exist in immigration proceedings. A study by the Vera Institute of Justice found a staggering 1,100 percent increase in successful outcomes when universal representation was made available to the detained population at the Varick Street Detention Facility in New York City. I will note that universal representation was possible there because the Varick Street facility is located in the heart of New York City, within walking distance of a multitude of immigration law offices, law school clinics, and not-for-profit organizations.

Left to represent themselves, asylum seekers detained at Cibola and other similar remote facilities are further hampered in their limited access to phones (which are necessary to contact friends and relatives abroad who might provide evidence to corroborate the asylum claim), and lack of access to the internet (which would allow detainees to research the law and to access and download country condition materials in support of their claims). Additionally, detention centers tend to have inadequate law libraries. Furthermore, detainees are required to complete their applications, conduct research, and file supporting documents in English, which is incredibly difficult for someone such as the petitioner, whose native language is Lingala. EOIR’s own statistics show that only ten percent of respondents in removal proceedings last year had enough of a command of English to allow them to participate in their proceedings in that language. As asylum seekers have often suffered torture or other violence, post-traumatic stress disorder and other physical or psychological remnants of their past mistreatment (which might be further exacerbated by their detention) creates an additional obstacle to self-representation. All of this overlooks the fact that U.S. asylum law is highly complex even for educated English-speakers.

The latest amicus brief raises these and other points on behalf of a group of former immigration judges and BIA Board members. The brief further makes recommendations for practices to be adopted by immigration judges to help mitigate the above-cited obstacles to pro se applicants in pursuing relief. These recommendations include having the immigration judges explain the applicable legal standard (and any bars to relief) to pro se applicants; introducing country condition evidence (as well as making applicants aware of country condition resources available on EOIR’s own Virtual Law Library); and advocating for free, uninterrupted access to telephones for respondents in detention centers.

To my knowledge, our amicus brief filed with the BIA last summer in the U.S. Supreme Courts remand of Negusie v. Holder was the first time that former immigration judges and Board members identified as a group for amicus purposes. The seven of us who participated in that brief doubled to 14 for the next such brief, filed with the Attorney General last month in Matter of Castro-Tum. I see it as a positive development that in the short time since these briefs were filed, we have been called upon to provide our experience in expertise in two more cases, one filed last week in the Ninth Circuit on the issue of representation for children in immigration proceedings (C.J.L.G. v. Sessions), and now in this case filed yesterday in the Tenth Circuit. Hopefully, this outstanding group will continue to contribute to the cause of justice for vulnerable noncitizens in removal proceedings.

And our heartfelt thanks to the dedicated attorneys at Sidley Austin, Jean-Claude Andre and Katelyn Rowe, for drafting the outstanding brief.

Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

JEFF CHASE

HON. JEFFREY CHASE RETURNS WITH MORE ANALYSIS OF RETIRED JUDGES’ AMICUS BRIEF IN C.J.L.G. V. SESSIONS

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/3/21/amicus-brief-filed-in-cjlg-v-sessions

Mar 21 Amicus Brief Filed in C.J.L.G. v. Sessions

On March 15, lawyers with the firm of Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett filed an amicus brief with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on behalf of 11 former immigration judges and BIA Board members in the case of C.J.L.G. v. Sessions. The case involves a child from Honduras who appeared in immigration court accompanied only by his mother. As the respondent could not obtain a lawyer in the time afforded, the immigration judge went forward with the hearing, informing the mother that she would “represent” her son.

The respondent is an asylum applicant whose gang-related claim rested on his ability to precisely delineate a particular social group pursuant to requirements complex enough to stump most attorneys. As his mother lacked any legal training, his hearing did not go well. On appeal, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of the claim. In its decision, the BIA determined that the respondent did not suffer past persecution when at the age of 13, members of MS-13, a brutal, multinational gang, threatened to kill him, his mother, and his aunt if he refused to join their ranks, put a gun to his head to emphasize their point, and told him that he had one day to decide. The BIA also found the hearing before the IJ to have been fair, and that the respondent was not denied due process because the immigration laws do not require the appointment of counsel in removal proceedings.

Hon. Dana Marks, an outstanding jurist and president emeritus of the National Association of Immigration Judges, often states that immigration judges hear “death penalty cases under traffic court conditions.” What she means by this is that a genuine asylum seeker who is denied relief and deported faces the risk of death in the country from which he or she fled. Yet the conditions under which such life-or-death claims are heard are inadequate; the limited time and resources afforded to the judges hearing such claims are better suited for a court hearing much lower stakes matters such as traffic tickets. Courts hearing cases involving matters of life and liberty have a higher obligation to afford due process. First and foremost, a defendant facing criminal charges in a state or federal court is entitled to assigned counsel. However, although the stakes may be higher in an asylum case, respondents in immigration court have no such entitlement. Although the respondent in C.J.L.G. may face death if deported, having a judge determine it was fine to proceed, and telling his mother that she would represent him sounds like something that might be appropriate in traffic court.

A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit denied the respondent’s petition for review. Interestingly, the respondent was found credible in his recounting of the death threats he suffered and as to his fear of return; the court accepted the statistics provided by respondent’s counsel that unrepresented respondents succeed on their claims only 10 percent of the time, whereas as represented minors enjoy a 47 percent success rate. The court also assumed that the respondent qualifies as an indigent (due to his mother’s inability to afford private counsel), and that ordering him removed would send him “back to a hostile environment where he has faced death threats in the past implicates his freedom.” The court further acknowledged that the immigration laws and regulations include assuring minors “the right to a ‘full and fair hearing,’ which includes the ‘opportunity to present evidence and testimony on one’s behalf,’ cross-examine witnesses, and examine and object to adverse evidence.” It would be difficult to argue that an unrepresented minor is capable of exercising such rights.

In spite of this, the court denied the petition, determining that there was no Constitutional right to assigned counsel at government expense to minors in removal proceedings. The court further found that the respondent had not demonstrated prejudice, as he had not established a nexus to a protected ground as required to establish eligibility.

The ACLU has filed a petition for the Ninth Circuit to rehear the case en banc. It is in support of this latest petition that the latest amicus brief was filed. I am one of the former IJs included in the brief; I join my colleagues in being proud to assist in such a noble effort as securing assigned counsel for immigrant children facing the legal complexities and dire consequences of immigration proceedings. In a nutshell, the brief argues that the efforts of an immigration judge to provide a fair hearing is no substitute for counsel. Immigration judges can only do so much faced with “overburdened and growing dockets, the complexity of immigration law, and, as Department of Justice (DOJ) employees, the constraints of administrative policy.”

The problem is compounded in cases in which the asylum claim is based on membership in a particular social group. The BIA has recently held that an asylum applicant must specifically delineate such group, a requirement that is clearly beyond the ability of a child (or his or her mother) to do. As the brief points out, in this case, the respondent “ and his mother showed no understanding of why a gang-related threat alone would not warrant asylum, but the IJ’s cursory inquiry ended without seeking the motivation for the threat.”

Of course, the entire issue could be resolved by the Department of Justice choosing to do what is right by agreeing to provide assigned counsel at government expense to this most vulnerable group.

Heartfelt thanks to partner Harrison J. “Buzz” Frahn and associate Lee Brand of the law firm of Simpson Thacher & Bartlett for their dedication and effort in drafting the excellent brief.

Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

JEFF CHASE
Mar 10 The AG’s Strange Decision in Matter of E-F-H-L-
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Jeffrey S. Chase is an immigration lawyer in New York City. Jeffrey is a former Immigration Judge, senior legal advisor at the Board of Immigration Appeals, and volunteer staff attorney at Human Rights First. He is a past recipient of AILA’s annual Pro Bono Award, and previously chaired AILA’s Asylum Reform Task Force.

Blog Archive Contact

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As pointed out by Jeffrey, this is an incredibly important case for Due Process under our Constitution! Let’s hope that the en banc Ninth gives it a close look.

PWS

03-22-18

RETIRED US IMMIGRATION JUDGES FILE AMICUS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MINOR RESPONDENT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN 9TH CIRCUIT EN BANC REQUEST – C.J.L.G. v. Sessions, 9th Cir., Filed March 15, 2018 – Read It Here!

FIRST, AND FOREMOST, A BIG THANKS TO THE “REAL HEROES” AT SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, SAN FRANCISCO, AND THEIR OUTSTANDING SUPPORT TEAM, WHO DID ALL THE “HEAVY LIFTING:”

Harrison J. (Buzz) Frahn, Partner

Lee Brand, Associate

HERE’S THE TABLE OF CONTENTS:

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ………………………………………….. 1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ……………………………………………………………………… 3 ARGUMENT ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4

I. Immigration Judges Cannot Independently Develop a Child’s Case to Permit the Fair Adjudication that Due Process Requires ……………………………………..

4 A. Immigration Judges Are Overwhelmed ………………………………………… 5

B. DOJ Policy Mandates Efficiency and Skepticism ………………………….. 7

C. Immigration Law Is Exceedingly Complex …………………………………… 9

D. Counsel Dramatically Improve Outcomes …………………………………… 12

II. The Panel Vastly Overstates the Value of Existing Procedures for Unrepresented Minors ……………………………………………………………………….. 13

A. The Duty to Develop the Record Does Not Obviate the Need for Counsel …………………………………………………………………………………… 13

B. A Parent Does Not Obviate the Need for Counsel ………………………… 17

C. A Pro Bono List Does Not Obviate the Need for Counsel …………….. 18

CONCLUSION ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 19

HERE’S THE “CAST OF CHARACTERS” & THE SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT:

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Amici curiae are former Immigration Judges (IJs) who collectively have over 175 years’ experience adjudicating immigration cases, including thousands of cases involving children. A complete list of amici is as follows:

Sarah M. Burr served as an IJ in New York from 1994 to 2012 and as Assistant Chief Immigration Judge for New York from 2006 to 2011. She currently serves on the board of Immigrant Justice Corps.

Jeffrey S. Chase served as an IJ in New York from 1995 to 2007 and as an advisor at the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) from 2007 to 2017. Previously, he chaired the Asylum Reform Task Force of the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) and received AILA’s pro bono award.

George T. Chew served as an IJ in New York from 1995 to 2017. Previously, he served as a trial attorney at the INS.

Cecelia M. Espenoza served as a member of the BIA from 2000 to 2003 and as Senior Associate General Counsel at the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) from 2003 to 2017.

Noel Ferris served as an IJ in New York from 1994 to 2013 and as an advisor at the BIA from 2013 to 2016. Previously, she led the Immigration Unit of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. 2

John F. Gossart, Jr. served as an IJ from 1982 to 2013. Previously, he served in various positions at the INS. Judge Gossart served as president of the National Association of Immigration Judges, co-authored the National Immigration Court Practice Manual, and received the Attorney General Medal.

Eliza Klein served as an IJ in Miami, Boston, and Chicago from 1994 to 2015.

Lory D. Rosenberg served as a member of the BIA from 1995 to 2002. Previously, she served on the board of AILA and received multiple AILA awards. Judge Rosenberg co-authored the treatise Immigration Law and Crimes.

Susan G. Roy served as an IJ in Newark. Previously, she served as a Staff Attorney at the BIA and in various positions at the INS and its successor Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

Paul W. Schmidt served as chair of the BIA from 1995 to 2001, as a member of the BIA from 2001 to 2003, and as an IJ in Arlington from 2003 to 2016. Previously, he served as acting General Counsel and Deputy General Counsel at the INS.

Polly A. Webber served as an IJ in San Francisco from 1995 to 2016, with details in Tacoma, Port Isabel, Boise, Houston, Atlanta, Philadelphia, and Orlando. Previously, she served a term as National President of AILA. 3

Amici have dedicated their careers to improving the fairness of the immigration system, particularly in the administration of justice to children. In amici’s personal judicial experience, children are incapable of meaningfully representing themselves in this nation’s labyrinthine immigration system. Absent legal representation, IJs cannot independently develop a child’s case to permit the fair adjudication that due process requires. Accordingly, amici have a profound interest in the resolution of this case.1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Respectfully, the Panel erred in determining that IJs can and will ensure the due process rights of pro se children without the aid of counsel. This error is painfully clear from the vantage point of IJs, who face overburdened and ever-growing dockets, the complexity of immigration law, and, as Department of Justice (DOJ) employees, the constraints of administrative policy. As such, and as demonstrated by the impact of counsel on a child’s likelihood of success in immigration court, IJs lack the necessary time, resources, and power to ensure that unrepresented minors receive meaningful adjudication of their eligibility to remain in this country. 1 No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part; no party, party’s counsel, nor anyone other than amici or their counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief. All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. 4

The Panel further erred in vastly overstating the value to pro se children of certain extant procedural safeguards. While the Panel correctly identifies an IJ’s duty to develop the record, it fails to understand the practical and procedural limits of this duty in the context of an adversarial proceeding, and wrongly transforms it into a cure-all for the otherwise overwhelming lack of due process an unrepresented minor would receive. The Panel similarly holds up the hypothetical availability of pro bono counsel as a potential due process panacea, and Judge Owens’s concurrence suggests the same of the presence of a parent. But these factors also fall far short of remedying the basic unfairness of forcing children to represent themselves in immigration court.

If the Panel’s decision is not revisited, thousands of minors will be forced to navigate the complex immigration system without representation. In many instances, these children will be returned to life-threatening circumstances despite their eligibility to legally remain in this country. It is hard to imagine a question of more exceptional importance.

HERE’S A LINK TO THE COMPLETE BRIEF FOR YOUR ENTERTAINMENT, EDUCATION, AND READING ENJOYMENT:

2018.03.15 CJLG Amicus Brief of IJs

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A special “shout out” of appreciation to my 10 wonderful colleagues who joined in this critically important effort. It’s an honor to work with you and to be a part of this group.

DUE PROCESS FOREVER!

PWS

03-20-18

HON. JEFFREY CHASE ON MATTER OF E-F-H-L- — SESSIONS’S OUTRAGEOUS ATTTACK ON DUE PROCESS AND RIGHTS OF VULNERABLE ASYLUM SEEKERS SHOWS WHY COURT SYSTEM CONTROLLED BY BIASED A.G. IS A FARCE!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/3/10/the-ags-strange-decision-in-matter-of-e-f-h-l-

Mar 10 The AG’s Strange Decision in Matter of E-F-H-L-

On Monday, the Attorney General’s strange decision in Matter of E-F-H-L- had many of us talking well into the night. As background, the BIA published its precedent decision in Matter of E-F-H-L- in 2014. The case involved an immigration judge’s decision that an asylum applicant’s claim was not deserving of a merits hearing. Instead of a hearing at which he would have had the opportunity to testify, present witnesses, file documentary evidence, and present legal arguments, the immigration judge simply denied the case on the written application alone. On appeal, the BIA reached the obvious conclusion that all asylum applicants merit the right to a hearing, and remanded the record back to the immigration judge for that purpose.

Four years later (i.e. this past Monday), Attorney General Jeff Sessions unexpectedly inserted himself into the matter. It seems that by the time the record arrived back in immigration court, the respondent was now eligible to obtain lawful permanent residence based on a relative petition. As such petition is a far more certain and direct route to legal status, and carries greater benefits, the respondent followed the common practice of withdrawing his application for asylum in order to proceed on the visa petition alone. Furthermore, because USCIS (and not the immigration judge) has the authority to decide the visa petition, both the respondent and DHS agreed to administratively close proceedings in order to allow USCIS to adjudicate the petition (which often takes some time) without either having such effort delayed by removal proceedings, or wasting the court’s valuable time by holding unnecessary status-check hearings. Ordinarily, once the visa petition is decided one way or the other, the parties will move the immigration judge to recalendar the case.

However, such cooperation, efficiency, and consideration is apparently not to the AG’s liking. On Monday, he determined that because the matter was remanded for an asylum hearing, but the asylum application was subsequently withdrawn, the Board’s precedent guaranteeing asylum applicants the right to a hearing should for some reason be vacated. He further ordered an end to administrative closure, and that the case be placed back on the IJ’s active hearing calendar, where time and taxpayer money can be wasted on unnecessary hearings, which could possibly delay USCIS in adjudicating the visa petition.

So what does all of this mean? First, Sessions has now done away with a Board precedent decision entitling all asylum applicants to a full hearing. The Board’s original decision in E-F-H-L- cited regulations, statute, the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, case law, and common sense in reaching such conclusion. The fact that years later, the respondent became eligible for another form of relief in no way negates the Board’s reasoned conclusion.

Additionally, the AG’s action might have a chilling effect on immigration judges. In the past, Attorneys General have certified cases to themselves where they disagreed with a decision reached by the Board. However, I don’t believe an AG has ever before followed a case years later all the way down to the immigration court level and chosen to certify a case because of an action taken by the immigration judge in the normal course of proceedings. Administratively closing a proceeding to allow USCIS to adjudicate a visa petition is standard procedure – DHS agreed to such action. Yet now, immigration judges have to worry that the AG is watching. How quickly will judges administratively close under the same circumstances, even if everyone agrees it is the correct thing to do?

Furthermore, as it is extremely unlikely that Sessions is reviewing every decision every immigration judge is making, someone – in DHS? In EOIR? – is signalling the AG’s office of cases such as this one. Although the immigration courts and BIA are supposed to be neutral, the playing field is not level when the respondent must appeal an unfavorable to the federal circuit courts, whereas DHS can simply ask the Attorney General to reverse a decision of which it disapproves.

Copyright 2017 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

REPRINTED BY PERMISSION.

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How many innocent, vulnerable individuals will die or have their lives ruined by the travesty of justice unfolding under Jeff Sessions before Congress takes the necessary action to free the U.S. Immigration Courts from blatant and unwarranted political interference in decision-making?

We need an independent Article I U.S. Immigration Court now!

PWS

03-12-18

Tag: Honorable Jeffrey S. Chase

HON. JEFFREY CHASE ON HOW MANY U.S. IMMIGRATION JUDGES ARE DENYING DUE PROCESS RIGHT AND LEFT TO ASYLUM SEEKERS BY NOT ALLOWING ATTORNEYS TO PARTICIATE IN THE CREDIBLE FEAR REVIEW AND RUBBER-STAMPING DENIALS WITHOUT ANY ANALYSIS!

Jul 22 Attorneys and Credible Fear Review

HON. JEFFREY CHASE: PUNISHING THE PERSECUTED — In Matter of A-C-M-, BIA “Adjusts” View Of FMLN As Necessary To Deny Asylum To El Salvadoran Refugees!

Jun 9 Punishing the Victims: Matter of A-C-M-

Harm to the most vulnerable among us is harm to all. Join the New Due Process Army and fight for the legal rights of refugees!

HON. JEFFREY CHASE – DON’T BELIEVE EOIR’S DISINGENUOUS CLAIMS ABOUT “TRANSPARENCY” — Agency Hits New Low In FOIA Obfuscation By Purporting To “Redact” Legal Citations From Unpublished Decisions!

May 27 EOIR’s Knee-Jerk Redaction?

HON. JEFFREY CHASE: MORE INTERNAL EVIDENCE OF POLITICIZED HIRING AND UNNECESSARY DELAYS UNDER SESSIONS AS EOIR APPEARS TO JOIN TRUMP’S “WAR ON THE CAREER CIVIL SERVICE” BY ATTACKING THE CAREER PROMOTION SYSTEM FOR BIA ATTORNEY ADVISORS!

May 27 EOIR’s Hiring Practices Raise Concerns

HON. JEFFREY CHASE: Sessions’s Quotas Attack Fairness, Due Process, Undermine U.S. Immigration Court System!

Apr 7 EOIR Imposes Completion Quotas on IJs

MATTER OF A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 247 (AG 2018) (“A-B- II”) – Session’s Latest Abuse of Certification Process Illustrates Judge Chase’s Point On Why This Unethical & Unfair Procedure Must End!

HON. JEFFREY CHASE: Sessions’s Abuses Of “Certification Power” Show Why It’s Past Time To End This Unfair, Unethical, & (Probably) Unconstitutional Mockery of Justice!

Mar 29 The AG’s Certifying of BIA Decisions

THE LATEST FROM THE HON. JEFFREY CHASE: “Amicus Brief Filed in 10th Cir. Petition for Remotely-Detained Asylum Seeker” — PLUS: A Link To The Actual Brief! — MATUMONA V. SESSIONS, 10th Cir.

Mar 22 Amicus Brief Filed in 10th Cir. Petition for Remotely-Detained Asylum Seeker

HON. JEFFREY CHASE RETURNS WITH MORE ANALYSIS OF RETIRED JUDGES’ AMICUS BRIEF IN C.J.L.G. V. SESSIONS

HON. JEFFREY CHASE ON MATTER OF E-F-H-L- — SESSIONS’S OUTRAGEOUS ATTTACK ON DUE PROCESS AND RIGHTS OF VULNERABLE ASYLUM SEEKERS SHOWS WHY COURT SYSTEM CONTROLLED BY BIASED A.G. IS A FARCE!

Mar 10 The AG’s Strange Decision in Matter of E-F-H-L-

We need an independent Article I U.S. Immigration Court now!

Jul 22 Attorneys and Credible Fear Review

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Jul 13 Matter of A-B- Being Misapplied by EOIR, DHS

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Jun 14 Women Need Not Apply

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Jun 9 Punishing the Victims: Matter of A-C-M-

Jun 3 3rd-Generation Gangs and Political Opinion

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Jun 3 3rd-Generation Gangs and Political Opinion

Harm to the most vulnerable among us is harm to all. Join the New Due Process Army and fight for the legal rights of refugees!

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May 27 EOIR’s Knee-Jerk Redaction?

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May 28 Amicus Brief Filed in W-Y-C- & H-O-B- Appeal

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May 27 EOIR’s Hiring Practices Raise Concerns

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Apr 7 EOIR Imposes Completion Quotas on IJs

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Mar 29 The AG’s Certifying of BIA Decisions

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Mar 22 Amicus Brief Filed in 10th Cir. Petition for Remotely-Detained Asylum Seeker

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Harrison J. (Buzz) Frahn, Partner

Lee Brand, Associate

HERE’S THE TABLE OF CONTENTS:

HERE’S THE “CAST OF CHARACTERS” & THE SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT:

HERE’S A LINK TO THE COMPLETE BRIEF FOR YOUR ENTERTAINMENT, EDUCATION, AND READING ENJOYMENT:

DUE PROCESS FOREVER!

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Mar 10 The AG’s Strange Decision in Matter of E-F-H-L-

We need an independent Article I U.S. Immigration Court now!

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