Judge Roger A. Pauley – immigrationcourtside.com

BARR CONTINUES RESTRICTIONIST ASSAULT ON IMMIGRATION COURTS: Intends To Reverse BIA Precedents Giving “Full Faith & Credit” To State Court Sentence Modifications — Another Disingenuous Request For “Amicus Briefing!”

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1166251/download

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 556 (A.G. 2019) Interim Decision #3954

556
Matter of Michael Vernon THOMAS, Respondent
Matter of Joseph Lloyd THOMPSON, Respondent
Decided by Attorney General May 28, 2019
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of the Attorney General
BEFORE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i), I direct the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“Board”) to refer these cases to me for review of its decisions. The
Board’s decisions in these matters are automatically stayed pending my
review. See Matter of Haddam, A.G. Order No. 2380-2001 (Jan. 19, 2001).
To assist me, I invite the parties to these proceedings and interested amici to
submit briefs that address whether, and under what circumstances, judicial
alteration of a criminal conviction or sentence—whether labeled “vacatur,”
“modification,” “clarification,” or some other term—should be taken into
consideration in determining the immigration consequences of the
conviction.
The parties’ briefs shall not exceed 15,000 words and shall be filed on or
before June 28, 2019. Interested amici may submit briefs not exceeding
9,000 words on or before July 12, 2019. The parties may submit reply briefs
not exceeding 6,000 words on or before July 12, 2019. All filings shall be
accompanied by proof of service and shall be submitted electronically to
AGCertification@usdoj.gov, and in triplicate to:
United States Department of Justice
Office of the Attorney General, Room 5114
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530
All briefs must be both submitted electronically and postmarked on or
before the pertinent deadlines. Requests for extensions are disfavored.

********************************

Like Barr’s entire tenure and continued interference with Due Process and judicial independence in the Immigration Courts, it’s highly unethical.

Nobody outside the White Nationalist restrictionist enclave would have any interest in revisiting the BIA’s reasonable rulings, going back more than a decade and one-half, recognizing sentence modifications entered by judges in criminal cases, mostly in state courts. Matter of Song, 23 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 2001) and Matter of Cota Vargas, 23 I&N Dec. 843 (BIA 2005).

Indeed, this action does not appear to have have been generated by any actual party participating in Immigration Court litigation or by any pending Circuit Court litigation. It has nothing to do with the current “border crisis” that has paralyzed this Administration’s immigration bureaucracy.

Rather, it appears to be part of a concerted politically-based attack on migrants and the independence of the Immigration Court system orchestrated by restrictionist groups outside of government who use unscrupulous and willing senior officials like Barr, and Sessions before him, as operatives.

After ignoring all of the compelling arguments favoring the current precedents, Barr will basically “adopt” or “adapt” Judge Roger Pauley’s dissenting opinion in Matter of Cota. The decision likely has already been drafted along the lines of the restrictionist groups’ agenda for stripping migrants of the few rights they still retain in what was already a bogus “court” system where the law had intentionally been skewed against them and in favor of DHS for political reasons.

The only question is whether the Article III Courts will continue to put up with Barr’s “charade of justice at Justice.” We’ll see. But, at some point, the damage to our system being inflicted by dishonest and unethical officials like Barr might become irreparable.

PWS

05-30-19

STOMPING ON THE PERSECUTED! — BIA MAJORITY FINDS WAY TO USE “MATERIAL SUPPORT BAR” TO DENY PROTECTION TO THE VICTIMS OF PERSECUTION – Judge Linda Wendtland, Dissenting, Gets It Right! — Matter of A-C-M-, 27 I&N Dec. 303 (BIA 2018)!

MATTER OF ACM 3928_0

BIA HEADNOTE:

(1) An alien provides “material support” to a terrorist organization if the act has a logical and reasonably foreseeable tendency to promote, sustain, or maintain the organization, even if only to a de minimis degree.

(2) The respondent afforded material support to the guerillas in El Salvador in 1990 because the forced labor she provided in the form of cooking, cleaning, and washing their clothes aided them in continuing their mission of armed and violent opposition to the Salvadoran Government.

PANEL: BIA APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGES COLE, PAULEY, & WENDTLAND

OPINION BY: JUDGE ROGER PAULEY

CONCURRING & DISSENTING OPINION: JUDGE LINDA WENDTLAND

KEY QUOTES FROM MAJORITY:

The Immigration Judge incorporated by reference the respondent’s credible testimony and all the documents submitted at her cancellation of removal hearing. In her August 8, 2016, decision, the Immigration Judge found that the respondent is ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal based on the material support bar in section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) of the Act. The Immigration Judge stated that, but for the material support bar, she would have granted the respondent’s asylum application on humanitarian grounds pursuant to Matter of Chen, 20 I&N Dec. 16 (BIA 1989), noting the horrific harm she experienced from the guerrillas in El Salvador because, in addition to being kidnapped and required to perform cooking and cleaning for the guerrillas under threat of death, the respondent was forced to witness her husband, a sergeant in the Salvadoran Army, dig his own grave before being killed. However, the Immigration Judge granted the respondent’s request for deferral of removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture.

KEY QUOTE FROM CONCURRING & DISSENTING OPINION:

In view of our relatively recent holding in Matter of M-H-Z-, 26 I&N Dec. 757 (BIA 2016), that the material support bar contains no exception for duress, “it is especially important to give meaning to the statutory limit of ‘material.’ That term calls for [I]mmigration [J]udges, the Board, and the courts to strike a balance written into the Act.” Jabateh v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 332, 348 (7th Cir. 2017) (Hamilton, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Individuals arriving in this country from “some of the most dangerous and chaotic places on earth . . . may not have been able to avoid all contact with terrorist groups and their members, but we should not interpret the statute to exclude on this basis those who did not provide ‘material’ support to them,” since “[m]any deserving asylum-seekers could be barred otherwise.” Id. Unlike the majority, which apparently would apply the bar without any meaningful limit, I would not decline to carry out our responsibility to strike the foregoing critical balance.

Nor do I believe that Congress intended to relegate the respondent, who did not afford support that qualifies as “material,” to the statutory waiver process under section 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Act, which is intended only for those individuals whose support did meet the threshold materiality requirement.2 And given my view that the respondent’s conduct does not come within the “material support” bar in the first place, I need not reach the question whether the respondent reasonably should have known that the guerrillas in 1990 in El Salvador were a terrorist organization.

*****************************************

Once again, faced with competing possible interpretations of the law, the BIA majority chooses the interpretation most unfavorable to the applicant. So, what else is new?

The majority judges engage in a wooden, lifeless, hyper-technical analysis, devoid of any obvious understanding of either the purpose of refugee laws or the actual human situation of refugees. By contrast, Judge Wendtland shows an understanding of both the human situation of refugees and undesirability and impracticality of construing the law so as to bar deserving refugees or force them to “jump through more hoops.”

Everybody actually agrees that “but for” this obtuse application of the law, this respondent deserves asylum! So, why not just take the readily available course of construing the ambiguous provision in favor of the applicant? Why go out of the way to create bad law and hurt innocent individuals? Why would Congress have desired this absurdly unpalatable result? And, I wouldn’t count on the USCIS under the policies of this Administration to grant a waiver in this case under their even more opaque and politicized processes.

This case also demonstrates a continuing practice of the BIA to render major precedents without considering the case en banc. How many of the other Appellate Immigration Judges agree with Judge Pauley’s decision? How many agree with Judge Wendtland? On which side are Chairman Neal and Vice Chair Adkins-Blanch?

We’ll never know, because today’s Board imposes life or death decisions on respondents and changes the course of the law while allowing the vast majority the Appellate Immigration Judges to hide in anonymity in their “Ivory Tower” chambers, without any accountability or taking any legal or moral responsibility for the decisions that they impose on others. It’s a national disgrace (originating with the bogus “Ashcroft reforms”) that must be changed for the BIA to once again become a credible appellate tribunal.

Due process and fairness to individuals are fictions in today’s broken and biased U.S. Immigration Court system. We shouldn’t pretend otherwise!

PWS

06-06-18

Judge Patricia A. Cole Dissents From BIA Panel Majority’s Rewriting Of The Agfel Definition Of “Prostitution” To “Zap” Respondent – Majority “Dings Ding” in Matter of Ding, 27 I&N Dec. 295 (BIA 2018)

Matter of Ding

BIA HEADNOTE:

(1) The term “prostitution” in section 101(a)(43)(K)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(K)(i) (2012), which provides that an offense relating to the owning, controlling, managing, or supervising of a prostitution business is an aggravated felony, is not limited to offenses involving sexual intercourse but is defined as engaging in, or agreeing or offering to engage in, sexual conduct for anything of value.

(2) The offense of keeping a place of prostitution in violation of section 944.34(1) of the Wisconsin Statutes is categorically an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(K)(i) of the Act.

PANEL: BIA APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGES COLE, PAULEY, WENDTLAND

OPINION BY: Judge Roger A. Pauly

DISSENTING OPINION: Judge Patricia A. Cole

KEY QUOTE FROM MAJORITY:

We disagree with the Immigration Judge and with the case law on which he relied because the term “prostitution” in section 101(a)(43)(K)(i) does not necessarily have the same meaning as it does in the inadmissibility provision at section 212(a)(2)(D). “It is not unusual for the same word to be used with different meanings in the same act, and there is no rule of statutory construction which precludes the courts from giving to the word the meaning which the Legislature intended it should have in each instance.” Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932); see also Evntl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007).

KEY QUOTE FROM DISSENT:

I respectfully dissent. I agree with the Immigration Judge’s decision that the respondent’s conviction is not for an aggravated felony under the existing Federal definition of “prostitution.” The majority has crafted a definition of prostitution for purposes of section 101(a)(43)(K)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(K)(i) (2012), as engaging in, or agreeing or offering to engage in, sexual conduct for anything of value. The majority decision concludes that this newly crafted definition categorically covers the conduct proscribed by the Wisconsin statute at issue in this case, but it notes that the precise contours of the term “sexual conduct” will be decided in future cases. This overly broad definition is supported by limited analysis, and it is contrary to immigration law, the law of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and the canons of statutory construction.

The majority does not provide any analytical authority for its definition other than noting that the definition is “similar” to that of Black’s Law Dictionary and providing, without any analysis, a survey of the definitions of “prostitution” from the 50 States and the District of Columbia in 1994. Additionally, the majority does not even discuss the ramifications of its new definition of prostitution for section 101(a)(43)(K)(ii) of the Act, which references the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421, 2422, and 2423 (2012), which relate to engaging in “prostitution, or in any sexual activity.”

********************************************

Judge Cole’s dissent makes sense to me. Nice to see that occasionally BIA Appellate Immigration Judges stand up for legal constructions that don’t invariably favor deportation of respondents who have been convicted of crimes.

While constructions of immigration statutes often divide Article III judges, all the way up to the Supremes, the BIA’s “Post Ashcroft Purge” jurisprudence has been intentionally bland and one-sided — largely without dissent or transparent deliberation. Moreover, as I have observed before, the BIA’s practice under the Ashcroft “Reforms” and the Obama Administration’s “Go Along to Get Along” approach has been largely to issue published precedents by three-judge panels, rather than en banc.

This allows 80% of the BIA’s permanent judges to avoid expressing a view for against any particular precedent. Indeed, some BIA judges appear hardly at all on “precedent panels,” while others appear frequently. Thus, some BIA judges regularly avoid both possible controversy as well as accountability for their legal positions and votes on critical, life-defining issues. Rather a strange way for a so-called “expert deliberative tribunal” to operate, if I do say so myself.

PWS

05-23-18

NEW BIA PRECEDENT EXPLAINS WHY IN SOME CASES THE ATTEMPT MIGHT BE WORSE THAN THE CRIME – MATTER OF CERVANTES NUNEZ, 20 I&N DEC. 238 (BIA 2018)

3920

Matter of CERVANTES NUNEZ, 20 I&N Dec. 238 (BIA 2018)

BIA HEADNOTE:

The crime of attempted voluntary manslaughter in violation of sections 192(a) and 664 of the California Penal Code, which requires that a defendant act with the specific intent to cause the death of another person, is categorically an aggravated felony crime of violence under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2012), notwithstanding that the completed offense of voluntary manslaughter itself is not such an aggravated felony.

PANEL: BIA Appellate Immigration Judges Pauley, Guendelsberger, Wendtland

OPINION BY: Judge Roger A. Pauley

KEY QUOTE:

“Although perhaps counterintuitive, we therefore hold that the respondent’s offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter under sections 192(a) and 664 of the California Penal Code is categorically a crime of violence under § 16(a). Unlike the completed crime of voluntary manslaughter under California law, which encompasses reckless conduct and is therefore not categorically a crime of violence under Ninth Circuit law, attempted voluntary manslaughter requires the specific intent to kill. Although “physical force” is not an express element of attempted voluntary manslaughter, we deem it evident under Ninth Circuit law that the offense, which requires a “volitional,” or intentional, mental state and contemplates a direct act on the part of the accused that is capable of causing the death of another person, inherently presupposes the use of “physical force.” Since the respondent’s offense necessarily involves the intentional use of physical force, it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).”

***********************************************

In this particular case, the respondent was convicted of both the completed crime of voluntary manslaughter and the attempt under California law. But, there could be cases where in negotiating a plea bargain, counsel would be better off from an immigration standpoint pleading her client to the completed crime, not the attempt.

PWS

03-18-18

WELCOME TO BIA-LAND! – Where You Might Be Better Off Committing A Felony Than Concealing It – Matter of Mendez, 27 I&N Dec. 219 (BIA 2018)

3916

Matter of Mendez, 27 I&N Dec. 219 (BIA 2018)

BIA HEADNOTE:

“Misprision of felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2006) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. Matter of Robles, 24 I&N Dec. 22 (BIA 2006), reaffirmed. Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 2012), followed in jurisdiction only.”

PANEL: BIA APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGES PAULEY, GUENDELSBERGER, and MALPHRUS

OPINION BY: Judge Roger A. Pauley

************************************

Pretty straight forward. There was a so-called “Circuit split.” Given alternative choices, the BIA almost always chooses the interpretation most favorable to the DHS and least favorable to the respondent.

Hence, the respondent loses, the BIA doesn’t “rock the boat,” the Office of Immigration Litigation can defend the most restrictive position in the Courts of Appeals and, if necessary, before the Supremes, Jeff Sessions remains happy, and BIA judges retain their jobs.

The only losers: Due Process, fairness, and the respondent. But, who cares about them anyway? It’s all about maximizing removals.

PWS

02-27-18

SPLIT BIA SPEAKS ON “WAVE THROUGH” – “PLAIN MEANING” APPLIES EXCEPT WHEN IT FAVORS THE RESPONDENT – JUDGE ROGER PAULEY, DISSENTING, APPEARS TO GET IT RIGHT! — MATTER OF CASTILLO ANGULO, 27 I&N DEC. 194 (BIA 2018)

3913

Matter of Castillo Angulo, 27 I&N Dec. 194 (BIA 2018)

BIA HEADNOTE:

“(1) In removal proceedings arising within the jurisdiction of the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, an alien who was “waved through” a port of entry has established an admission “in any status” within the meaning of section 240A(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2) (2012). Tula-Rubio v. Lynch, 787 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2015), and Saldivar v. Sessions, 877 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2017), followed in jurisdiction only.

(2) In removal proceedings arising outside the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, to establish continuous residence in the United States for 7 years after having been “admitted in any status” under section 240A(a)(2), an alien must prove that he or she possessed some form of lawful immigration status at the time of admission.”

BIA PANEL: Appellate Immigration Judges Greer, O’Connor, & Pauley

OPINION BY: Judge Blair O’Connor

CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION: Judge Roger A. Pauley

KEY QUOTE FROM DISSENT:

“I concur in the result, which the majority only reaches because it acknowledges that the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Saldivar v. Sessions, 877 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2017), which holds that a wave through constitutes an “admission in any status” for purposes of section 240A(a)(2) of the Act, is binding on the Board since this case arises in that circuit. However, unlike the majority, I conclude that both the Ninth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, whose similar holding in Tula-Rubio v. Lynch, 787 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2015), the Ninth Circuit followed, arrived at the correct result, even though, like the majority, I disagree with some aspects of those courts’ reasoning.

. . . .

I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion otherwise and would find that, in any circuit, an alien is eligible to seek cancellation of removal if he or she establishes an admission via a wave through, even if the alien cannot demonstrate the particular lawful status under which admission was authorized, and even if it is later found that he or she had no lawful status at that time.”

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Gee, to me, “any status” means “any” status. But, hey, I’m just an old retired trial judge who in ancient time was Chair of the BIA. What would I know about “modern” concepts of statutory interpretation at the BIA?

For a quasi-judicial body that 1) often gets carried away with obtuse linguistic analysis, and 2) claims to see its role as maintaining nationwide consistency, it seems odd that the BIA has gone out of its way to a) rewrite the statute to its own liking, and 2) create a Circuit conflict where none previously existed.

The best way of understanding it is probably “doing what’s necessary to get to ‘no” for respondents not fortunate enough to be in the 9th or 5th Circuits.

My compliments to Judge Pauley for 1) having the backbone, and 2) caring enough to file a separate opinion that better follows the statutory language, produces a much better practical result, and, not surprisingly, is much closer to what the only Article III Courts to address this particular issue already have decided.

PWS

01-30-18

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