Judicial Review – Page 2 – immigrationcourtside.com

⚖️🗽👍🏼⚔️NDPA NEWS: LAW YOU CAN USE: “Immigrants’ Access to Federal District Court: The Narrowing of § 1252(b)(9) Post-Jennings” — By Adam Garnick @ Penn Law

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3623142

Immigrants’ Access to Federal District Court: The Narrowing of § 1252(b)(9) Post-Jennings

University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Forthcoming

62 Pages Posted:

Adam Garnick

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: May 15, 2020

Abstract

Congress has long sought to limit immigrants’ access to federal district court. This was most evident in the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA), which channeled any judicial review of a final order of removal away from federal district courts and into courts of appeals through a petition for review (PFR). But IIRAIRA channeled more than just review of final orders into courts of appeals. With the addition of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), all claims “arising from” the immigration process would likewise be consolidated into a PFR in the court of appeals. Seemingly a wide range of claims—including many urgent challenges to potentially unconstitutional government action—would be swallowed by § 1252(b)(9) and thus precluded from immediate review in federal district court. However, when the Supreme Court first construed the provision, it did so narrowly. Indeed, in circuits that adopted the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the provision, immigrants were able to evade the strictures of § 1252(b)(9) and bring immigration-related claims directly to federal district court. But not all lower courts adhered to the Court’s reading of the provision. The First Circuit—and eventually the Ninth Circuit—adopted a far broader view of § 1252(b)(9), describing it as “breathtaking in scope” and finding it to channel an extensive set of claims. Against this backdrop, the Court, nearly two decades after its first in-depth discussion of the provision, revisited § 1252(b)(9). Though the result was a fractured opinion that explicitly failed to provide a comprehensive interpretation of the provision, the decision offered several important clues on the proper scope of § 1252(b)(9). First, it undercut the expansive interpretation of the provision offered by the First Circuit and adopted by the Ninth Circuit. Second, and relatedly, it altered several of the considerations lowers courts use when determining whether § 1252(b)(9) swallows an immigrant’s claims, which has led to a substantive narrowing of the provision’s scope. As such, the lower courts that previously adopted the broad view of § 1252(b)(9) should revisit and narrow the scope of the provision in accordance with Court precedent. This will ensure that immigrants who bring urgent claims challenging government action with potentially grave consequences are not categorically barred from immediate access to federal district court.

Keywords: 1252(b)(9), Jennings, jurisdiction, immigration, INA, district court

Suggested Citation:

Garnick, Adam, Immigrants’ Access to Federal District Court: The Narrowing of § 1252(b)(9) Post-Jennings (May 15, 2020). University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=

Download This Paper

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You can download Adam’s complete article from SSRN, with much helpful research and many helpful strategic suggestions, at the link in the above abstract.

Thanks for being such an important part of the “New Due Process Army” (NDPA), Adam!

Due Process Forever!

PWS

06-11-20

⚖️👍🏼SUPREMES UPHOLD JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CAT DENIAL, 7-2 — NASRALLAH v. BARR, Opinion By Justice Kavananaugh — Round Table ⚔️🛡 Files Amicus For Winners!

NASRALLAH v. BARR, No. 18-432, June 1, 2020

SUPREME COURT SYLLABUS:

OCTOBER TERM, 2019 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

NASRALLAH v. BARR, ATTORNEY GENERAL CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 18–1432. Argued March 2, 2020—Decided June 1, 2020

Under federal immigration law, noncitizens who commit certain crimes are removable from the United States. During removal proceedings, a noncitizen who demonstrates a likelihood of torture in the designated country of removal is entitled to relief under the international Conven- tion Against Torture (CAT) and may not be removed to that country. If an immigration judge orders removal and denies CAT relief, the noncitizen may appeal both orders to the Board of Immigration Ap- peals and then to a federal court of appeals. But if the noncitizen has committed any crime specified in 8 U. S. C. §1252(a)(2)(C), the scope of judicial review of the removal order is limited to constitutional and legal challenges. See §1252(a)(2)(D).

The Government sought to remove petitioner Nidal Khalid Nasral- lah after he pled guilty to receiving stolen property. Nasrallah applied for CAT relief to prevent his removal to Lebanon. The Immigration Judge ordered Nasrallah removed and granted CAT relief. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals vacated the CAT relief order and ordered Nasrallah removed to Lebanon. The Eleventh Circuit declined to review Nasrallah’s factual challenges to the CAT order because Nasrallah had committed a §1252(a)(2)(C) crime and Circuit precedent precluded judicial review of factual challenges to both the final order of removal and the CAT order in such cases.

Held: Sections 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D) do not preclude judicial review of a noncitizen’s factual challenges to a CAT order. Pp. 5–13.

(a) Three interlocking statutes establish that CAT orders may be re- viewed together with final orders of removal in a court of appeals. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 authorizes noncitizens to obtain direct “review of a final order of re-

2

NASRALLAH v. BARR Syllabus

moval” in a court of appeals, §1252(a)(1), and requires that all chal- lenges arising from the removal proceeding be consolidated for review, §1252(b)(9). The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA) implements Article 3 of CAT and provides for judicial review of CAT claims “as part of the review of a final order of removal.” §2242(d). And the REAL ID Act of 2005 clarifies that final orders of removal and CAT orders may be reviewed only in the courts of appeals. §§1252(a)(4)–(5). Pp. 5–6.

(b) Sections 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D) preclude judicial review of factual challenges only to final orders of removal. A CAT order is not a final “order of removal,” which in this context is defined as an order “con- cluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation,” §1101(a)(47)(A). Nor does a CAT order merge into a final order of re- moval, because a CAT order does not affect the validity of a final order of removal. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 938. FARRA provides that a CAT order is reviewable “as part of the review of a final order of removal,” not that it is the same as, or affects the validity of, a final order of removal. Had Congress wished to preclude judicial review of factual challenges to CAT orders, it could have easily done so. Pp. 6– 9.

(c) The standard of review for factual challenges to CAT orders is substantial evidence—i.e., the agency’s “findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” §1252(b)(4)(B).

The Government insists that the statute supplies no judicial review of factual challenges to CAT orders, but its arguments are unpersua- sive. First, the holding in Foti v. INS, 375 U. S. 217, depends on an outdated interpretation of “final orders of deportation” and so does not control here. Second, the Government argues that §1252(a)(1) sup- plies judicial review only of final orders of removal, and if a CAT order is not merged into that final order, then no statute authorizes review of the CAT claim. But both FARRA and the REAL ID Act provide for direct review of CAT orders in the courts of appeals. Third, the Gov- ernment’s assertion that Congress would not bar review of factual challenges to a removal order and allow such challenges to a CAT order ignores the importance of adherence to the statutory text as well as the good reason Congress had for distinguishing the two—the facts that rendered the noncitizen removable are often not in serious dis- pute, while the issues related to a CAT order will not typically have been litigated prior to the alien’s removal proceedings. Fourth, the Government’s policy argument—that judicial review of the factual components of a CAT order would unduly delay removal proceedings— has not been borne out in practice in those Circuits that have allowed factual challenges to CAT orders. Fifth, the Government fears that a

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 3 Syllabus

decision allowing factual review of CAT orders would lead to factual challenges to other orders in the courts of appeals. But orders denying discretionary relief under §1252(a)(2)(B) are not affected by this deci- sion, and the question whether factual challenges to statutory with- holding orders under §1231(b)(3)(A) are subject to judicial review is not presented here. Pp. 9–13.

762 Fed. Appx. 638, reversed.

KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined.

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Score at least a modest victory for the NDPA over the “Deportation Railroad.”

Once again the Round Table 🛡⚔️ intervened with an amicus brief on the side of justice. Here’s a report from Judge Jeffrey Chase:

Hi All: Our Round Table filed an amicus brief in Nasrallah v. Barr. The Supreme Court issued it’s 7-2 decision in the case today, and we were on the winning side.

Kavanaugh wrote the decision, and was joined by Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Alito.

The decision reverses the 11th Cir. and holds that federal courts may review factual issues as well as legal and constitutional issues in CAT appeals filed by noncitizens with criminal convictions falling under 8 C.F.R. section 1252(a)(2)(C).

Gibson Dunn assisted us with the drafting of the brief.

Best, Jeff

Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Retired Immigration Judges

And, of course, as Jeffrey notes, we couldn’t have done it without help from our pro bono heroes 🥇 over at Gibson Dunn! Many, many thanks!

Great that Justice Kavanaugh, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Gorsuch “saw the light” on this one! Not sure how often it will happen in the future, but gotta take what we can get.

Also, given the “haste makes waste” policies thrust on EOIR by the DOJ under Trump, and the significant number of fundamental legal and factual errors made by the BIA, judicial review is likely to turn up additional instances of substandard decision-making.

PWS

06-01-20

THE “GOOD GUYS” FINALLY WIN ONE @ THE SUPREMES: Judicial Review Exists For Application Of Law To Settled Facts In Immigration Cases (Here “Equitable Tolling”) — GUERRERO-LASPRILLA v. BARR (7-2, Justice Breyer, Majority Opinion)

GUERRERO-LASPRILLA v. BARR, No. 18-776, 03-23-20

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/18-776_8759.pdf

MAJORITY: BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.

DISSENT: THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined as to all but Part II–A–

SYLLABUS BY REPORTER OF DECISIONS:

The Immigration and Nationality Act provides for judicial review of a final Government order directing the removal of an alien from this country. 8 U. S. C. §1252(a). Section 1252(a)(2)(C) limits the scope of that review where the removal rests upon the fact that the alien has committed certain crimes. And §1252(a)(2)(D), the Limited Review Provision, says that in such instances courts may consider only “con- stitutional claims or questions of law.”

Petitioners Guerrero-Lasprilla and Ovalles, aliens who lived in the United States, committed drug crimes and were subsequently ordered removed (Guerrero-Lasprilla in 1998 and Ovalles in 2004). Neither filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings “within 90 days of the date of entry of [the] final administrative order of removal.” §1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). Nonetheless, Guerrero-Lasprilla (in 2016) and Ovalles (in 2017) asked the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen their removal proceedings, arguing that the 90-day time limit should be equitably tolled. Both petitioners, who had become eligible for dis- cretionary relief due to various judicial and Board decisions years after their removal, rested their claim for equitable tolling on Lugo- Resendez v. Lynch, 831 F. 3d 337, in which the Fifth Circuit had held that the 90-day time limit could be equitably tolled. The Board denied both petitioners’ requests, concluding, inter alia, that they had not demonstrated the requisite due diligence. The Fifth Circuit denied their requests for review, holding that, given the Limited Review Pro-

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*Together with No. 18–1015, Ovalles v. Barr, Attorney General, also on certiorari to the same court.

vision, it “lack[ed] jurisdiction” to review petitioners’ “factual” due dil- igence claims. Petitioners contend that whether the Board incorrectly applied the equitable tolling due diligence standard to the undisputed facts of their cases is a “question of law” that the Provision authorizes courts of appeals to consider.

Held: Because the Provision’s phrase “questions of law” includes the ap- plication of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts, the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that it had no jurisdiction to consider petitioners’ claims of due diligence for equitable tolling purposes. Pp. 3–13.

(a) Nothing in the statute’s language precludes the conclusion that Congress used the term “questions of law” to refer to the application of a legal standard to settled facts. Indeed, this Court has at times re- ferred to the question whether a given set of facts meets a particular legal standard as presenting a legal inquiry. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U. S. 319, 326 (“Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law”); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 528, n. 9 (“[T]he appealable issue is a purely legal one: whether the facts alleged . . . support a claim of violation of clearly established law”); cf. Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U. S. 373, 376 (“The effect of admitted facts is a question of law”). That judicial usage indi- cates that the statutory term “questions of law” can reasonably encom- pass questions about whether settled facts satisfy a legal standard. The Court has sometimes referred to such a question as a “mixed ques- tion of law and fact.” See, e.g., U. S. Bank N. A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U. S. ___, ___. And the Court has often used the phrase “mixed questions” in determining the proper standard for appellate re- view of a district, bankruptcy, or agency decision that applies a legal standard to underlying facts. But these cases present no such question involving the standard of review. And, in any event, nothing in those cases, nor in the language of the statute, suggests that the statutory phrase “questions of law” excludes the application of law to settled facts. Pp. 4–5.

(b) A longstanding presumption, the statutory context, and the stat- ute’s history all support the conclusion that the application of law to undisputed or established facts is a “questio[n] of law” within the meaning of §1252(a)(2)(D). Pp. 5–11.

A “well-settled” and “strong presumption,” McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U. S. 479, 496, 498, “favor[s] judicial review of administrative action,” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 251. That presumption, which can only be overcome by “‘“clear and convincing evidence” ’ ” of congressional intent to preclude judicial review, Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U. S. 43, 64, has consistently been applied to immigration statutes, Kucana, 558 U. S., at 251. And thereis no reason to make an exception here. Because the Court can rea- sonably interpret the statutory term “questions of law” to encompass the application of law to undisputed facts, and given that a contrary interpretation would result in a barrier to meaningful judicial review, the presumption indicates that “questions of law” does indeed include mixed questions. Pp. 6–7.
(2) The Limited Review Provision’s immediate statutory context belies the Government and the dissent’s claim that “questions of law” excludes the application of law to settled facts. The Provision is part of §1252, which also contains §1252(b)(9), the “zipper clause.” The zip- per clause is meant to “consolidate judicial review of immigration pro- ceedings into one action in the court of appeals.” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 313. The zipper clause’s language makes clear that Con- gress understood the statutory term “questions of law and fact,” to in- clude the application of law to facts. One interpretation of the zipper clause at the very least disproves the Government’s argument that Congress consistently uses a three-part typology, such that “questions of law” cannot include mixed questions. And another interpretation— that “questions of law” in the zipper clause includes mixed questions— directly supports the holding here and would give the term the same meaning in the zipper clause and the Limited Review Provision. Pp. 7–8.
(3) The Provision’s statutory history and relevant precedent also support this conclusion. The Provision was enacted in response to INS v. St. Cyr, in which the Court interpreted the predecessor of §1252(a)(2)(C) to permit habeas corpus review in order to avoid the serious constitutional questions that would arise from a contrary in- terpretation, 533 U. S., at 299–305, 314. In doing so, the Court sug- gested that the Constitution, at a minimum, protected the writ of ha- beas corpus “ ‘as it existed in 1789.’ ” Id., at 300–301. The Court then noted the kinds of review that were traditionally available in a habeas proceeding, which included “detentions based on errors of law, includ- ing the erroneous application or interpretation of statutes.” Id., at 302 (emphasis added). Congress took up the Court’s invitation to “provide an adequate substitute [for habeas review] through the courts of ap- peals,” id., at 314, n. 38. It made clear that the limits on judicial review in various §1252 provisions included habeas review, and it consoli- dated virtually all review of removal orders in one proceeding in the courts of appeals. Congress also added the Limited Review Provision, permitting review of “constitutional claims or questions of law.” Con- gress did so, the statutory history strongly suggests, because it sought an “adequate substitute” for habeas in view of St. Cyr’s guidance. If “questions of law” in the Provision does not include the misapplication of a legal standard to undisputed facts, then review would not includean element that St. Cyr said was traditionally reviewable in habeas. Lower court precedent citing St. Cyr and legislative history also sup- port this conclusion. Pp. 8–11.
(c) The Government’s additional arguments in favor of its contrary reading are unpersuasive. More than that, the Government’s inter- pretation is itself difficult to reconcile with the Provision’s basic pur- pose of providing an adequate substitute for habeas review. Pp. 11– 13.
No. 18–776, 737 Fed. Appx. 230; No. 18–1015, 741 Fed. Appx. 259, va- cated and remanded.,

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Congrats to Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, admittedly frequent “pincushions” here at “Courtside” for often voting to uphold injustice and authoritarianism in immigration cases, for “seeing the light” and voting with the “forces of justice” on this one. Justices Thomas and Alito, perhaps predictably, continue to side with the “forces of darkness and oppression.”

As to the impact, just offhand I would hazard a guess that most Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) cases involving those whose crimes make them mandatorily ineligible for asylum and withholding involve the application of law (Is it “torture?” Will the government “acquiesce?” Is it “probable?”) to established facts (“Individuals are frequently beaten, starved, and raped in detention while the government looks the other way”). Immigration Judges, driven by inappropriate “production quotas,” officially sanctioned anti-migrant attitudes, and intentionally misleading “politicized precedents” where the migrant always loses no matter how strong their case, too often get these questions wrong. Sometimes, “dead wrong!”

Also, given the delays in Immigration Courts, most resulting from politically-motivated “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” within EOIR or just plain administrative incompetence under an overwhelming, largely self-created backlog, the issue of “equitable tolling” regularly comes up. Since the DOJ politicos and the OIL litigators “hate equitable tolling,” the BIA almost always strains to deny such claims no matter how well-documented and meritorious. Indeed, I suspect that the unavailability of effective judicial review by “real courts” has contributed to the disturbingly low quality of the BIA’s work in cases like this.

However welcome, and it certainly is, this is just a “limited fix” in what remains a blatantly unconstitutional and dysfunctional “court” system (where the courts are not actually fair and impartial tribunals) that threatens lives and American institutions every day it is allowed to continue to operate by the Supremes and the other Article IIIs, not to mention a feckless Congress.

Due Process Forever!

PWS

03-23-20

TESS HELLGREN @ INNOVATION LAW LAB: When It Comes To The Captive BIA & Weaponized Immigration Courts, The Article IIIs Need To Put Away The Rubber Stamp & Restore Integrity To The Law! — “Faced with the Trump Administration’s weaponization of the immigration courts against asylum-seeking individuals, the role of the federal courts is more important than ever.”

http://innovationlawlab.org/blog/the-role-of-judges-to-say-what-the-law-is-judicial-oversight-of-immigration-adjudication/

THE ROLE OF JUDGES TO “SAY WHAT THE LAW IS”: JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION

By Tess Hellgren, Staff Attorney and Justice Catalyst Legal Fellow

January 31, 2020

Since the beginning of the Trump Administration, the immigration court system has been used as a tool to further the executive branch’s anti-immigrant agenda. The Attorney General and other executive officials have enabled widespread due process violations and skyrocketing case backlogs while imposing case quotas and docketing rules that prevent judges from serving as impartial adjudicators.[1]

Last week, the Seventh Circuit highlighted a new abuse of power: the refusal of executive officials in the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to follow a direct order from a federal court.

The BIA is the administrative body responsible for reviewing decisions that are appealed from sixty-eight immigration courts across the country. Like these immigration courts, the BIA is part of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) – the immigration court system, located in the executive branch, that is ultimately overseen by the Attorney General of the United States. Despite the serious flaws inherent in the design of this system, BIA decisions may at least be appealed up to the appropriate federal circuit court, providing a crucial layer of independent judicial review in individual cases.[2]

In the case of Baez-Sanchez v. Barr, the Seventh Circuit had previously held that the immigration laws unambiguously grant immigration judges the power to waive a noncitizen’s inadmissibility to the United States, overruling the BIA’s prior decision to the contrary.[3] On remand, the BIA “flatly refused to implement” the court’s direct order.[4] Writing that the BIA’s decision “beggars belief,” the Seventh Circuit stated that

We have never before encountered defiance of a remand order, and we hope never to see it again. Members of the Board must count themselves lucky that [the Respondent] has not asked us to hold them in contempt, with all the consequences that possibility entails.[5]

This language is an extraordinary rebuke: it is very rare for a circuit court to issue an implicit threat to hold members of an administrative agency in contempt for directly disregarding a court order. The Seventh Circuit was clear that the BIA was mistaken if it thought that “faced with a conflict between our views and those of the Attorney General it should follow the latter.”[6] Affirming foundational separation of powers principles, the Seventh Circuit admonished that

[I]t should not be necessary to remind the Board, all of whose members are lawyers, that the “judicial Power” under Article III of the Constitution is one to make conclusive decisions, not subject to disapproval or revision by another branch of government . . . Once we reached a conclusion, both the Constitution and the statute required the Board to implement it.[7]

The Seventh Circuit’s decision also noted that the Attorney General had submitted a brief asking the court to give the BIA another opportunity to issue “an authoritative decision” on this issue, arguing that such a decision could be entitled to judicial deference.[8] The court aptly responded that this “request is bizarre,” as the court had already held that the applicable regulation was unambiguous – and an agency “cannot rewrite an unambiguous [law] through the guise of interpretation.”[9] As the Supreme Court made clear in Kisor v. Wilkie, “if the law gives an answer—if there is only one reasonable construction of a regulation—then a court has no business deferring to any other reading, no matter how much the agency insists it would make more sense.”[10]

Notably, even if the Seventh Circuit had found the laws in question to be ambiguous, the Attorney General and members of the BIA do not have free reign to impose any interpretation they choose. It is true that federal courts must defer to the reasoned decisions of administrative agencies when Congress has left the agency’s discretion to interpret an ambiguous provision of law, under the doctrine of Chevron deference.[11] But this deference is not boundless. As the Supreme Court made clear in Chevron, courts should defer to agencies’ interpretation of ambiguous statutes when the agency interpretation is “a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the statute.”[12] The agency’s interpretation must thus still fall “within the bounds of reasonable interpretation.”[13]

This standard, and the Seventh Circuit’s reprimand, is especially important as the Attorney General attempts to aggressively expand his control of immigration court adjudication. Under the Trump Administration, the Attorneys General have issued a number of “certified” decisions that attempt to restrict eligibility for asylum based on factors such as domestic violence, gang violence, or past persecution due to family membership.[14] In these decisions, which upend years of established immigration precedent, the Attorney General has pointedly asserted his authority to construe the terms of the Immigration and Nationality Act and implied that federal courts must fall in line with his interpretations.[15]

Yet the Attorney General’s reasoning holds only if his interpretations are actually entitled to judicial deference: if the laws in question are ambiguous and the federal courts find his interpretations reasonable.[16] And as the Supreme Court has admonished, “let there be no mistake: That is a requirement an agency can fail.”[17] Indeed, in addressing the application of the Attorney General’s certified decision in Matter of A-B-, at least one federal court has already held that a “general rule against domestic violence and gang-related claims during a credible fear determination is arbitrary and capricious and violates the immigration laws.”[18]

Faced with the Trump Administration’s weaponization of the immigration courts against asylum-seeking individuals, the role of the federal courts is more important than ever. As the Attorney General and other executive officials attempt to expand their authority to define the terms of immigration adjudication, federal courts should heed the Seventh Circuit’s decision – and remember the foundational legal principle that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”[19]

[1] See generally Innovation Law Lab and Southern Poverty Law Center, The Attorney General’s Judges: How the U.S. Immigration Courts Became a Deportation Tool, 14–15 (June 2019), https://innovationlawlab.org/reports/the-attorney-generals-judges/; Complaint, Las Americas v. Trump, No. 3:19-cv-02051-SB (D. Or. Dec. 18, 2019), https://innovationlawlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/ECF-1-Las-Americas-v.-Trump-No.-19-cv-02051-SB-D.-Or..pdf.

[2] See Immigration and Nationality Act § 242; 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

[3] Baez-Sanchez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 854, 856 (7th Cir. 2017); Baez-Sanchez v. Barr, No. 19-1642, slip op. at 2–3 (7th Cir. Jan. 23, 2020).

[4] Baez-Sanchez, slip op. at 3.

[5] Id. at 3–4.

[6] Id. at 4.

[7] Id.

[8] Id. at 4–5.

[9] Id. at 5.

[10] Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S.Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019).

[11] Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).

[12] Id. at 844–45; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (a reviewing court shall set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”).

[13] See Kisor, 139 S.Ct. at 2416, quoting Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013).

[14] See Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (2018); Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 581 (2019). Note inconsistencies

[15] See Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N at 326–27; Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N at 591–92.

[16] See Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (allowing for agency interpretation to override judicial interpretation in certain circumstances, when the agency interpretation is “otherwise entitled to Chevron deference”).

[17] See Kisor, 139 S.Ct. at 2416.

[18] Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 127 (D.D.C. 2018).

[19] See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

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Well said, Tess!

Thanks for being such a NDPA stalwart!

Due Process Forever!

PWS

02-01-20

THE GIBSON REPORT — 09-11-17

The Gibson Report, 09-11-17

TOP UPDATES

DACA
· Memorandum on Rescission Of Deferred Action For Childhood Arrivals (DACA)
· Overview of proposed legislation to replace DACA
· Litigation: AGs, Make the Road, University of California
· ILRC DACA Info Sheets
· DACA renewal loan fund
· Wellness: NYC WELL is a free and confidential resource that is available regardless of immigration status, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and in 200 languages – regardless of your immigration status. Dial 1-888-NYC-WELL, text WELL to 65173 or chat with a counselor online at nyc.gov/NYCWELL.
· Removal: DHS is already moving to recalendar DACA cases. Argue that this is premature and a waste of judicial resources.
· See Resources below for more.

DA Election for Kings County
Primaries tomorrow (Tuesday) include selecting a new DA. Medium has a breakdown of the candidates’ stances on immigration and broken windows policies.

Operation Mega
After word leaked that ICE was planning to target 6,000 to 10,000 immigrants in raids Sept. 17-22, ICE announced it was rescheduling the raids due to hurricanes. However, this does not mean there won’t necessarily be any raids. ICE Statement Regarding Questions on Enforcement Planning.

Bill bars transfer of PRM from State to DHS
FP: “In a stark repudiation of the Trump administration, lawmakers on Thursday passed a spending bill that overturned the president’s steep proposed cuts to foreign aid and diplomacy. Folded into the bill are management amendments that straitjacket some of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s efforts to redesign the State Department.”

US Justice Department Set to Appeal Ninth Circuit Travel Ban Ruling to Supreme Court
VOA: “According to a Justice Department official, the agency plans to ask the high court to weigh in on an appeals court ruling that says grandparents and cousins are close enough relatives to constitute an exemption from the Trump administration’s travel order. The court also said that refugees accepted by a resettlement agency should be allowed to travel to the United States.”

OIL filed a petition for panel rehearing in Harbin v. Sessions
IDP: I’m sad to report that OIL filed a petition for panel rehearing in Harbin v. Sessions. IDP and Legal Aid are working with Mr. Harbin’s lawyers on plans moving forward. Hopefully the panel will stick to its guns and deny the government’s request. And quickly.

CALLS TO ACTION

Call Congress to Pass the Dream Act (S. 1615/H.R. 3440)
Call your Congress members and urge them to pass the Dream Act, a bipartisan bill that would provide Dreamers a chance to adjust their immigration status, if they meet certain requirements. If Congress fails to act, 800,000 Dreamers who were protected by DACA will be at risk of being deported.
AILA Doc. No. 17090533

DACA Fee Donations Outside NYC
New York has several resources for assisting DACA recipients with renewal fees. Consider donating to organizations outside New York where the need may be greater. RAICES DACA fund.

Detention of UACs
NYLCU: Reaching out to the listserv to see if anyone has heard of any UACs that have been re-detained & placed in either secure facilities or at the non-secure Dobb’s Ferry facility in Westchester. NYCLU has heard reports that kids are being held with no good reason and we are doing some work around this issue. We’re hoping to speak to some kids or their parents, preferably at Dobb’s Ferry! Feel free to forward if you know folks who do a lot of UAC work or to other listservs! Please send any sensitive info to my work email, pgarciasalazar@nyclu.org.

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I see the DOJ just won’t quit on some of its positions that have been rejected by the Article IIIs on review. Hopefully, the Sessions’ DOJ will wear out its welcome and further tank its credibility with the Article IIIs.

PWS

09-11-17

SPLIT 7th CIRCUIT VACATES EXPEDITED REMOVAL — FINDS IL OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE NOT AN AGFEL — VICTORIA-FAUSTINO V. SESSIONS

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2017/D08-01/C:16-1784:J:Williams:aut:T:fnOp:N:2003083:S:0

Key quote:

“In light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision to remand the petition to the Board for further proceedings, we will not defer to the In re Valenzuela Gallardo articulation of what constitutes a crime relating to the obstruction of justice under the INA. See Cruz v. Sessions, No. 15‐60857, 2017 WL 2115209, at *1 (5th Cir. May 12, 2017) (remanding petition to the Board for further proceedings because the Board relied on “the now‐vacated Valenzuela Gallardo decision … .”) (unpub.). This leaves us with the definition as articulated in In re Espinoza‐Gonzalez. Because the Illinois statute under which Victoria‐Faustino was convicted does not require interference with the proceed‐

No. 16‐1784 13

ings of a tribunal, it cannot be said that the statute categorically fits within the meaning of the INA’s definition of obstruction of justice. Therefore, we must remand this petition to the Board for further proceedings. We caution that we do not, and need not, determine at this juncture whether Victoria‐Faustino is removable under the INA. Rather, we hold that Victoria‐Faustino was improperly placed in the expedited removal proceedings based upon his 2000 Illinois conviction under 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/31‐4.”

PANEL: CIRCUIT JUDGES FLAUM, MANION, and WILLIAMS

OPINION BY: JUDGE WILLIAMS

DISSENTING OPINION: JUDGE MANION

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Interesting that the 7th Circuit remands to the BIA, even though it does not appear that proceedings were ever conducted before a U.S. Immigration Judge or appealed to the BIA. In dissent, Judge Manion found that 1) the respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies, thereby depriving the court of jurisdiction, and 2) that the crime of obstruction of justice under IL law is an agfel.

PWS

08-03-17

DEPORTATION EXPRESS: U.S. Courts Appear Ready To “Green Light” Summary Removal Of Asylum Seekers Without Regard To Due Process — Advocates Striking Out In Attempts To Get Meaningful Judicial Review Of Expedited Removal — Trump Administration’s Plans To Expand Expedited Removal Likely To Deny Thousands Day In Court!

http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/17/politics/supreme-court-castro-expedited-removal/index.html

By Ariane de Vogue, CNN Supreme Court Reporter writes:

“(CNN)The Supreme Court on Monday left in place a lower court opinion rejecting claims by undocumented Central American women and children — who were apprehended immediately after arriving in the country without authorization — seeking asylum.

Lawyers for the families sought to challenge their expedited removal proceedings in federal court arguing they face gender-based violence at home, but a Philadelphia-based federal appeals court held that they have no right to judicial review of such claims.

The court’s action means the government can continue to deny asylum seekers placed in expedited removal a chance to have their cases heard by federal court.

Justice Neil Gorsuch, who has his first full week on the court starting Monday, did not participate in the decision.

The case, initially brought under the Obama administration, comes as the Trump administration has vowed to more strictly enforce immigration laws.

Originally, 28 mothers and their children entered the US border in Texas in late 2015. They were immediately placed in expedited removal proceedings. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, they argue they suffered “gender-based violence, including sexual assault, by men from whom they could not escape” and that they were targeted by gangs because “they are single women residing without a male household member to protect them.” They sought to challenge their removal proceedings in federal court, arguing that they did not receive substantive procedural rights to which they were entitled.

A federal appeals court ruled against the petitioners, arguing that Congress could deny review for those who have been denied initial entry into the country who were apprehended close to the border. The court essentially treated the petitioners as equal to those who arrived at the border but had not yet entered.

“We conclude that Congress may, consonant with the Constitution, deny habeas review in federal court of claims relating to an alien’s application for admission to the country, at least as to aliens who have been denied initial entry or who, like Petitioners, were apprehended very near the border and, essentially, immediately after surreptitious entry into the country,” wrote the majority of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

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Here’s a link to the Third Circuit’s decision in Castro v. DHS: http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/161339p.pdf

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This could be the real “sleeper” in the Trump Administration’s “get tough” immigration enforcement plan. Given the 540,000+ backlog in the U.S. Immigration Courts, the Administration appears to be looking for ways to circumvent the court process entirely wherever possible.

DHS could easily change the existing regulations to “max out” so called “Expedited Removal” by DHS enforcement officers by applying it to everyone unable to establish at least two years’ continuous residence in the U.S. (Currently, the cutoff is 14 days if apprehended within 100 miles of the border.)

Even individuals who meet the two-year requirement could be subsumed in the Expedited Removal regime. Without a right to be represented by counsel, to have a full hearing before an impartial decision maker, and to appeal to the Article III Federal Courts, an individual wrongly placed in the expedited process would have little chance of avoiding summary removal without a chance to apply for relief that might be available before the Immigration Court.

While the Supreme Court’s refusal to grant certiorari in Castro is not a decision on the merits, to date no circuit has ruled in favor of the claimants. Unless and until that happens, it is unlikely that the Supremes will even consider the advocates’ arguments for at least some degree of judicial review of Expedited Removal.

PWS

04-17-17

New From 4th Cir: BIA Applied Wrong Standard In Determining Bona Fides Of Marriage — Upatcha v. Sessions, 02-22-17

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_6gbFPjVDoxS2F5M2NJYkFMbURsWmxkMWFRMWJYdGdSSHR3/edit

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The “good faith marriage standard” for waiver is a legal determination subject to de novo (rather than “clear error”) review.

PWS

02/27/17

Tag: Judicial Review

⚖️🗽👍🏼⚔️NDPA NEWS: LAW YOU CAN USE: “Immigrants’ Access to Federal District Court: The Narrowing of § 1252(b)(9) Post-Jennings” — By Adam Garnick @ Penn Law

Due Process Forever!

⚖️👍🏼SUPREMES UPHOLD JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CAT DENIAL, 7-2 — NASRALLAH v. BARR, Opinion By Justice Kavananaugh — Round Table ⚔️🛡 Files Amicus For Winners!

THE “GOOD GUYS” FINALLY WIN ONE @ THE SUPREMES: Judicial Review Exists For Application Of Law To Settled Facts In Immigration Cases (Here “Equitable Tolling”) — GUERRERO-LASPRILLA v. BARR (7-2, Justice Breyer, Majority Opinion)

Due Process Forever!

THE ROLE OF JUDGES TO “SAY WHAT THE LAW IS”: JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION

By Tess Hellgren, Staff Attorney and Justice Catalyst Legal Fellow

Due Process Forever!

THE GIBSON REPORT — 09-11-17

SPLIT 7th CIRCUIT VACATES EXPEDITED REMOVAL — FINDS IL OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE NOT AN AGFEL — VICTORIA-FAUSTINO V. SESSIONS

New From 4th Cir: BIA Applied Wrong Standard In Determining Bona Fides Of Marriage — Upatcha v. Sessions, 02-22-17

Due Process Forever!

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Due Process Forever!

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THE ROLE OF JUDGES TO “SAY WHAT THE LAW IS”: JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION

By Tess Hellgren, Staff Attorney and Justice Catalyst Legal Fellow

Due Process Forever!

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