UNADULTERATED BS — CONEY BARRETT’S CLAIM OF “IMPARTIAL JUSTICE” FLUNKS “STRAIGHT FACE TEST” — “Amy Coney Barrett’s originalism does not work as a method of safeguarding democracy against an activist, ideologically motivated judiciary. It does, however, function quite well as a means of obscuring a far-right movement’s efforts to impose its unpopular agenda by judicial fiat.”

Judge Amy Coney Barrett
Supreme Court Nominee by Bob Englehart, PoliticalCartoons.com
Published under license
Eric Levitz
Eric Levitz
Associate Editor
Intelligencer
New York Magazine
Photo source: Twitter

https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/10/amy-coney-barrett-confirmation-hearing-originalism.html

Eric Levitz reports for NY Magazine:

. . . .

Even Republicans don’t have the stomach to outsource judgment on all modern constitutional questions to the slaveholding elite of a preindustrial, post-colonial backwater. As Dean of Berkeley Law Erwin Chemerinsky has observed, a ruthless adherence to text and history would require forfeiting judicial protection of “liberties such as the right to marry, the right to procreate, the right to custody of one’s children, the right to keep the family together, the right of parents to control the upbringing of their children, the right to purchase and use contraceptives, the right to abortion, [and] the right to refuse medical care,” none of which are guaranteed by the Constitution.

Amy Coney Barrett herself has acknowledged the undesirability of applying originalism indiscriminately, noting in 2016, “Adherence to originalism arguably requires, for example, the dismantling of the administrative state, the invalidation of paper money, and the reversal of Brown v. Board of Education,” and other institutions that “no serious person would propose to undo,” even if they lack constitutional grounding. Barrett’s proposed solution to this conundrum is for courts to simply avoid ruling on cases where originalism would dictate socially unthinkable overturnings of precedent; she wrote in 2017 that “discretionary jurisdiction generally permits [the Court] to choose which questions it wants to answer.”

But this expedient degrades originalism’s claim to neutrality. If an originalist Supreme Court can apply its doctrine opportunistically — taking only those cases in which its “neutral” juridical method will yield outcomes acceptable to a “serious” person (as they define that adjective) — then originalism isn’t much of a binding restriction on judicial discretion.

What’s more, Barrett’s concession tacitly betrays awareness of a critical fact that originalists love to elide when speaking for a lay audience: Amending the Constitution has become so phenomenally difficult it’s not at all clear that the American people could promptly replace an overturned Brown v. Board of Education with an amendment forbidding school segregation, despite overwhelming popular support for that Supreme Court decision. Originalists like to portray their judicial approach as highly democratic, since they purport to defer to the letter of a democratically enacted Constitution. But once one stipulates that the demos is manifestly no longer capable of passing constitutional amendments with regularity, it becomes clear that the originalist practice of striking down democratically elected laws in deference to the letter of a centuries-old document is profoundly anti-democratic.

Of course, in real life, “originalist” Supreme Court justices haven’t just applied their method opportunistically by selecting cases in which originalism will produce a favored outcome; they’ve also simply declined to abide by their method when they feel like it. On Monday, Barrett named Antonin Scalia as her guiding light on judicial philosophy. But as Georgia State University Law professor Eric J. Segall notes, Scalia voted “for broad rules limiting congressional power to enact campaign finance reform, to commandeer state legislatures and executives to help implement federal law, and to allow lawsuits against the states for money damages by citizens of other states” without “justifying these broad rules from a textual or historical perspective,” presumably because they have no textual or historical basis.

In sum: Amy Coney Barrett’s originalism does not work as a method of safeguarding democracy against an activist, ideologically motivated judiciary. It does, however, function quite well as a means of obscuring a far-right movement’s efforts to impose its unpopular agenda by judicial fiat.

************

Read Eric’s complete article, which is an outstanding debunking of  “originalism” — a totally bogus invention of the reactionary right — intended to pervert the law and promote far-right attacks on humanity — at the link. 

Just think about it: Supposedly a bunch of guys who risked everything on a never-before-realized long shot of defeating the British King and setting up a republic actually  intended that 230 years after the fact the governors of that republic would be so backwards, unimaginative, and intellectually limited that they would still be attempting to divine the “true meaning” of various two-centuries out of date words and concepts that nobody agreed upon in the first place! Preposterous! Not to mention totally intellectually dishonest!

Obviously, if the GOP Senators actually believed that Coney Barrett would be an unbiased judge with an open mind to progressive, liberal, humane, common sense interpretations of law and committed to implementing the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection and due process under the law for all persons, they would be apoplectic. They would be outraged at Trump for foisting such an unreliable and unpredictable jurist on them! 

I’m not necessarily saying that Coney Barrett couldn’t educate herself and “get smarter” on the bench — abandoning her false dogma and actually showing some empathy, courage, independence, and commitment to equal justice for all. She wouldn’t be the first GOP-appointed Judge or Justice to move left on the bench. After all, spending a lifetime mired on the wrong side of history screwing up the lives of your fellow humans can get old, even for well-trained right-wing ideologues.

Also, she will have the benefit of the only current Justice who actually appears up to the job and consistently understands the proper role of a High Court in a democratic republic — Justice Sonia Sotomayor. Sotomayor actually “gets it right” in an amazing number of cases and usually explains her reasoning in coherent, non-legalistic terms that most folks can understand. 

But, sadly, I find relatively little in Coney Barrett’s career to predict that type of self-awareness, intellectual honesty, moral courage, and capacity for human growth. Her family situation shows some capacity for empathy and human understanding. 

But, sadly, to date, she evidently has been unable to “connect the dots” between her kids’ lives and futures and the future of humanity. To understand that but for the grace of God, the refugee she is expelling based on BS non-defects could be someone she actually loves or regards as human. That the benefits that neo-Nazi Stephen Miller is unethically and illegally stripping from deserving immigrants could be the lifeline that, but for life’s quirks, would allow her, her family, or other loved ones to survive and achieve their full human potential. The capacity to function as a real jurist certainly is there, but the will and perspective seem to be largely lacking.

In a way, Coney Barrett’s squandered potential to achieve good is her own human tragedy. But, one for which those “other than Coney Barrett” are likely to pay the ultimate price.

PWS

10-14-20

👩‍⚖️⚖️ONE MEAN☠️🤮⚰️ MOTHER: Soon-To-Be Justice Barrett’s Immigration Jurisprudence Shows Cruelty, Legal Ignorance, Lack Of Empathy For The Vulnerable Humans Whose Lives Are At Stake In An Unconstitutional System Rigged Against Them!

Judge Amy Coney Barrett
Supreme Court Nominee by Bob Englehart, PoliticalCartoons.com
Published under license

 

Dahlia Lithwick
Dahlia Lithwick
Supreme Court Reporter
Slate
Wikimedia Commons — Public Domain
Mark Joseph Stern
Mark Joseph Stern
Reporter, Slate

 

https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/10/democrats-amy-coney-barrett-confirmation-supreme-court-chat.html

Dahlia Lithwick & Mark Joseph Stern in Slate:

. . . .

Dahlia: I wonder what you thought of Barrett’s statement, about how she reads each of her opinions through the eyes of the losing party. As you have written, the losing party tends to be the prisoners, the Black worker, the teen seeking abortion, the asylum seeker. It reminded me of Justice Samuel Alito testifying at his hearings about his great solicitude for immigrants.

Mark: Barrett’s opening statement made me think about one of her worst decisions (so far), in which she approved the deportation of an asylum seeker because there were small, trivial variations in his account of persecution. Over a dissent, Barrett said, yep, this asylum seeker must be sent home to be tortured and murdered because tiny details in his story changed over time. Would a judge who views the case through the eyes of the asylum seeker really dismiss his claims so cavalierly? I doubt it.

. . . .

************************

Read the complete dialogue at the link.

So much for intellectual honesty! It also shows Barrett’s fundamental lack of experience and legal understanding of what Immigration “Courts” really are and how they have been politicized and weaponized against asylum seekers by “judges” who report to overtly biased and xenophobic politicos in the Executive Branch. Just how would this “naked farce” satisfy any rudimentary concept of Due Process? Clearly it doesn’t. And just as clearly, intentionally tone-deaf judges like Barrett don’t care!  They lack the guts, relevant experience representing migrants, and the intellectual presence to stand up for the Constitutional and human rights of “the other.” 

How would YOU like to be sentenced to torture and/or death based on trivial inconsistencies found by an Immigration “Judge” working directly for the Attorney General and his regime in a badly flawed assembly line process designed to achieve political policy objectives, not justice?

Also, did anyone else pick up the facial absurdity of Barrett’s disingenuous claim to be “apolitical” while pledging allegiance to GOP “superhero” the late Justice Antonin Scalia, probably the most overtly “political Justice” of modern times?

Bottom Line: Once you’re out of the womb, this is one mother you don’t want on your case!🏴‍☠️☠️⚰️

Better Judges For A Better America! Judge/Justice Barrett is part of the problem, not the solution! The best way to insure that she is among the last, far-right, anti-democracy, inhumane judges given life tenure on the Supremes or anywhere else, vote ‘em out, vote ‘em out! Then, we’ll discover the “true meaning” of Barrett’s “I’m not there to make policy nonsense!” (Indeed, I would submit that the sole reason for her appointment was the GOP’s belief and expectation that she will reliably elevate disingenuous right-wing policies, biases, and prejudices over the Constitutional, individual, and human rights of individuals and that she will be a steadfast opponent of Constitutionally-required equal justice under law.)

Justice for the George Floyds, Breonna Taylors, dehumanized dead asylum seekers, and wrongfully imprisoned migrant kids of the world (e.g., the end of unconstitutional “Baby Jails”) will require a different type of “Justice” than Amy Coney Barrett in the future! Far from being truly “independent” and “apolitical,” Barrett is likely to be the perfect representative of the warped man who appointed her and his anti-democracy party. And, that’s likely to cause problems for all Americans of good will far into the future!

PWS

10-13-20

GONZO’S WORLD: BOGUS “COURT SYSTEM” REVEALED IN ALL OF ITS DISINGENUOUS INGLORIOUSNESS — SESSIONS MOVES TO TRASH THE “LIMITED DURESS” DEFENSE FOR ASYLEES BEFORE TRUMP TURNS HIM BACK INTO A PUMPKIN (AFTER HALLOWEEN) – Why Have A BIA If It Is Only Permitted To Decide Major Issues In Favor Of The DHS Position? — Matter of Daniel Girmai NEGUSIE, 27 I&N Dec. 481 (A.G. 2018)

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1101746/download

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 481 (A.G. 2018) Interim Decision #3943

Matter of Daniel Girmai NEGUSIE, Respondent

Decided by Attorney General October 18, 2018

U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General

BEFORE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2018), I direct the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) to refer this case to me for review of its decision. The Board’s decision in this matter is automatically stayed pending my review. See Matter of Haddam, A.G. Order No. 2380-2001 (Jan. 19, 2001). To assist me in my review, I invite the parties to these proceedings and interested amici to submit briefs on: Whether coercion and duress are relevant to the application of the Immigration and Nationality Act’s persecutor bar. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(2)(A)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) (2012).

The parties’ briefs shall not exceed 15,000 words and shall be filed on or before November 8, 2018. Interested amici may submit briefs not exceeding 9,000 words on or before November 15, 2018. The parties may submit reply briefs not exceeding 6,000 words on or before November 15, 2018. All filings shall be accompanied by proof of service and shall be submitted electronically to AGCertification@usdoj.gov, and in triplicate to:

United States Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General, Room 5114 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530

All briefs must be both submitted electronically and postmarked on or before the pertinent deadlines. Requests for extensions are disfavored.

**************************************

Here’s the BIA headnote a link to Matter of NEGUSIE, 27 I&N Dec. 347 (BIA 2018):

(1) An applicant who is subject to being barred from establishing eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal based on the persecution of others may claim a duress defense, which is limited in nature.

(2) To meet the minimum threshold requirements of the duress defense to the persecutor bar, an applicant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he acted under an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to himself or others; (2) he reasonably believed that the threatened harm would be carried out unless he acted or refrained from acting; (3) he had no reasonable opportunity to escape or otherwise frustrate the threat; (4) he did not place himself in a situation in which he knew or reasonably should have known that he would likely be forced to act or refrain from acting; and (5) he knew or reasonably should have known that the harm he inflicted was not greater than the threatened harm to himself or others.

http://immigrationcourtside.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/3930.pdf

********************************************************

Remains to be seen whether Session’s November 16, 2018 “deadline for brief submission” will exceed his job tenure! But, don’t kid yourself: this decision has already been written, maybe with input or assistance from a “restrictionist” organization. And, even if Sessions departs shortly after the midterms, as most expect, I’m sure Trump will be able to find another “restrictionist patsy” to do his “immigration dirty work” for him.

Want to know how ludicrous Sessions’s action is:  This case has been pending before the Immigration Court, the BIA, the Supreme Court, and now the Attorney General for nearly 15 years, with no end in sight. After Sessions rules against Negusie, the case will go back to the Court of Appeals, and then, perhaps, back to the Supremes, assuming Mr. Negusie lives long enough to see it through to its conclusion. When it comes to removing folks without Due Process, “time is of the essence” for guys like Sessions; but, when it comes to screwing asylum seekers, “time has no essence” — whatever it takes, no matter how long it takes.

Additionally, this is a great illustration of the absurd dereliction of duty in the Supreme’s so-called “Chevron doctrine.” It’s a purely judge-created device that enables the Supremes to avoid deciding important and potentially controversial legal issues by, in effect, “shuffling them off to Buffalo” (a/k/a the Executive Branch). Once in “Buffalo,” sometimes dysfunctional and often biased Executive Branch agencies can exercise their (often purely imaginary) “expertise” in construing ambiguous statutes (which is, after all, a question of law that constitutes the only function of the Article III Courts). And, does anybody (other than Jeff Sessions) really think that a politico like Jeff Sessions has any real “expertise” in immigration adjudication?

Interestingly, Justice Gorsuch, like his conservative predecessor the late Justice Scalia, has been openly skeptical of the Chevron doctrine. Perhaps ironically, he, along with the outlandish actions of the Administration that appointed him, could ultimately spell the well-deserved end or limitation of “Chevron deference.”

As we say in the business, stay tuned.  But, please, please, don’t “hold your breath” on this one!

PWS

10-18-18

🎃🎃🎃

 

 

 

CRISTIAN FARIAS @ NEW YORK MAGGIE – THE HISTORY OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION GOING ALL THE WAY BACK TO THE “BERNSEN MEMO” – WHY, CONTRARY TO SESSIONS & THE RESTRICTIONISTS, IT IS A SOUND LEGAL CONCEPT – AND WHY THE SUPREMES SHOULD STAY OUT OF THE DACA ISSUE IN THE LOWER COURTS! – PLUS BONUS TRIVIA! – “Who REALLY wrote that four decades old memo?

http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/02/scotus-would-be-crazy-to-jump-into-the-daca-dispute.html

Cristian writes:

“The earliest, highest-profile critic of granting an executive reprieve to Dreamers was none other than Justice Antonin Scalia. The plight of young immigrants brought to the United States as children was not something the Supreme Court was concerned with in 2012, but the late justice somehow felt the need to protest, in open court, President Obama’s then weeks-old decision to not deport them for humanitarian reasons. “The president has said that the new program is, quote, the right thing to do, close quote, in light of Congress’ failure to pass the administration’s proposed revision of the immigration laws,” he said as he read from a summary of his partial dissent in Arizona v. United States. That case and decision had nothing to do with Dreamers.

Maybe Scalia’s real qualm was with the sitting president and not the recipients of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, better known as DACA. But his broader point, which a Supreme Court majority rejected, was that states should have leeway in enforcing federal immigration laws, since they — and not undocumented immigrants — face the “human realities” of a broken immigration system. The citizens of border states like Arizona “feel themselves under siege by large numbers of illegal immigrants who invade their property, strain their social services, and even place their lives in jeopardy,” Scalia complained. Somewhere, a future President Trump may have been taking notes.

More than five years since that screed, the Supreme Court could soon get a chance to judge the propriety, if not the legality, of Trump’s decision last September to pull the plug on DACA. A federal judge in California in January ordered the reinstatement of the program, reasoning that its rescission rested on a “flawed legal premise” — namely, Jeff Sessions’s paper-thin conclusion that DACA was illegal the moment it was conceived. The judge also rejected as “spin” and “post-hoc rationalization” the Trump administration’s contention that DACA was vulnerable to a legal challenge by Texas and other states, which had threatened Sessions with a lawsuit if he didn’t kill the initiative outright. “The agency action was not in accordance with law because it was based on the flawed legal premise that the agency lacked authority to implement DACA,” wrote the judge, William Alsup, in a ruling that effectively brought DACA back from the dead. Days later, the administration began accepting renewal applications as if the rollback had never happened.

Legal scholars weren’t impressed with the ruling. And Sessions, not one to give up on Trump’s anti-immigrant crusade, then took the “rare step” of appealing Alsup’s decision directly to the Supreme Court — and why not? The Ninth Circuit, Trump’s least favorite appeals court, is unruly, liberal, and anti-Trump, anyway; leapfrogging it seemed the smart thing to do. What’s more, Sessions wanted the justices to act expeditiously — his solicitor general filed an additional request to decide the case before the end of June. Not doing so, he suggested, would be the same as blessing “indefinitely an ongoing violation of federal law being committed by nearly 700,000 aliens.” So much for Trump’s wish to treat Dreamers “with heart.” There was only one problem: The Supreme Court rarely, if ever, lets anyone skip over the regular appeals process. And if Sessions is in such a hurry, why didn’t the administration seek to block Alsup’s ruling rather than comply with it? Last Friday, a coalition that includes the University of California, several states, a local chapter of the SEIU, and a number of Dreamers told the Supreme Court to reject the Trump administration’s request to hear the case. The DACA mess, this alliance broadly contended, is Trump’s and Congress’s to own, and the justices shouldn’t be the ones fixing it, at least not with the urgency Sessions is demanding.

. . . .

The principle of prosecutorial discretion, which is what holds DACA together, was never once discussed by Sessions when he announced the wind-down of DACA. He didn’t even try. Prosecutorial discretion wasn’t some novelty that Napolitano came up with at the time, let alone a quirk of immigration law. In a path-breaking memorandum written some 40 years ago, Sam Bernsen, the general counsel of the now-defunct Immigration and Naturalization Service, advised the agency’s commissioner that the “ultimate source for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion” lies with the inherent powers of the presidency. “Under Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, the executive power is vested in the President,” Bernsen wrote in what is believed to be the first in a long string of government memos justifying prosecutorial discretion in the immigration realm. “Article II, Section 3, states that the President ‘shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.’” Ironically, conservatives would later seize on this “take care” language to argue breathlessly that Obama’s immigration actions were an affront to the constitutional text, but no judge took that argument seriously.

Far and wide, executive officers enjoy similar discretion to enforce the law. From the president down to a lowly street cop, every law enforcer, state or federal, exercises some form of prosecutorial discretion over the laws they’re entrusted to oversee. It’s the reason you don’t always get ticketed for jaywalking or pulled over for doing 65 on a 55, even in instances where you happen to do those things in full view of the police: The government has ample discretion to not go after you if it feels you’re a low-priority lawbreaker. Maybe the 75-miles-per-hour driver is the bigger fish. Whichever the case, the decision is, by and large, unchallengeable. “Federal officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all,” wrote Justice Anthony Kennedy in the same immigration ruling that Scalia assailed in 2012. “Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces immediate human concerns,” he added.

Kirstjen Nielsen, the new DHS secretary, and Trump himself have all but conceded the point in recent weeks. In an interview with CBS’s John Dickerson, Nielsen said that it’s “not the policy of DHS” to go after Dreamers who are DACA recipients, even if the current legislative talks fail and the program isn’t renewed. “It’s not going to be a priority of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement to prioritize their removal,” Nielsen clarified, directly contradicting the Department of Justice’s position on DACA before the Supreme Court. (Dreamers and immigration advocates know better than to trust Nielsen’s assurances.) Asked last month if he might extend the arbitrary March 5 end date of the DACA rollback process — which is no longer the end date as a result of Judge Alsup’s ruling — Trump spoke as if he never truly believed, like Sessions did, that deferred action was unlawful: “I certainly have the right to do that if I want.”

In this climate, and with Trump still fielding immigration offers as Congress faces yet another deadline to fund the government, the Supreme Court would be crazy to jump into the DACA controversy. “I think for the Supreme Court to reach down to a district court decision and not allow the normal appellate process to proceed would necessarily, under the circumstances, involve or indicate that the Supreme Court is signaling its involvement in a deeply political matter,” Napolitano told me. Scalia may have felt comfortable criticizing policy choices from the bench, but that doesn’t mean Chief Justice John Roberts and his colleagues have to take the bait. For their own peace of mind and that of Dreamers, the Court is better off staying as far away as possible, and letting Trump take care of the laws that give him broad authority to spare young undocumented immigrants if he really wants to.”

***************************************************

Read the rest of Cristian’s analysis, including his detailed interview with former DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano, now President of the University of California System and a plaintiff in the District Court case, over at New York at the above link.

SPECIAL BONUS:

From the “archives” here’s a copy of the famous “Bernsen Memo” of July 15, 1976:

Bernsen Memo service-exercise-pd

YOUR TOSSUP IMMIGRATION TRIVIA QUESTION OF THE DAY:

Who actually wrote the “Bernsen Memo?”  

(Hint: Look at the bottom of the last page.)

3RD CIR REAFFIRMS THAT 18 USC 16(B) “CRIME OF VIOLENCE” AS INCORPORATED INTO THE INA IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE: Mateo v. Attorney General — Supremes Remain MIA

151160p

Before: McKEE, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: JUDGE VANASKIE

KEY QUOTE:

“The petitioner in Baptiste, like Mateo, faced removal on the basis of his purported status as an alien convicted of a crime of violence under § 16(b). As stated previously, § 16(b) defines a crime of violence as “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” In order to determine whether the crime of conviction is a crime of violence under § 16(b), courts utilize the same categorical approach that was applied to the ACCA’s residual clause. Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 617. The petitioner in Baptiste argued that the Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson striking down the residual clause should apply to negate § 16(b). After comparing the features of the § 16(b) analysis to those found to contribute to the unconstitutionality of the residual clause in Johnson, we agreed that the same defects were present in § 16(b), rendering the provision unconstitutional. Regarding the first feature, we recognized that the same “ordinary case inquiry” is used when applying the categorical approach in both contexts. Id. Like the residual clause, § 16(b) “offers no reliable way to choose between . . . competing accounts of what” that “judge- imagined abstraction” of the crime involves. Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2558. Thus, we concluded in Baptiste that “the ordinary case inquiry is as indeterminate in the § 16(b) context as it was in the residual clause context.” 841 F.3d at 617. Turning to the second feature—the risk inquiry—we observed that despite slight linguistic differences between the provisions, the same indeterminacy inherent in the residual clause was present in § 16(b). Id. “[B]ecause the two inquiries under the residual clause that the Supreme Court found to be indeterminate—the ordinary case inquiry and the serious potential risk inquiry—are materially the same as the inquiries under § 16(b),” we concluded that “§ 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague.” Id. at 621. This conclusion applies equally to Mateo’s petition. Our treatment of § 16(b) is in step with the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, which have all similarly deemed the provision to be void for vagueness in immigration cases. See Shuti, 828 F.3d at 451; Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1120; Golicov v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir. 2016). The Seventh Circuit has also taken this position in the criminal context. See United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 2015). In fact, the only circuit that has broken stride is the Fifth Circuit.7 See United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670, 677 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc). In the meantime, we await the Supreme Court’s decision in the appeal of Dimaya.”

*******************************************

The Dimaya case before the Supremes (again) should be a good test of whether newest Justice Gorsuch will adhere to his strict constructionist principles where they will produce a favorable result for a migrant under the immigration laws.

The Johnson case, relied on by the Third Circuit, was written by none other than the late Justice Antonin Scalia, a leading strict constructionist and conservative judicial icon, who nevertheless found that his path sometimes assisted migrants in avoiding removal.  So, on paper, this should be a “no brainer” for Justice Gorsuch, who has also been critical of some of the BIA’s “Chevron overreach” and non-responsiveness to Article III Courts.

PWS

09-07-17