Padilla v. ICE, 9th Cir., 03-27-20, published
SUMMARY BY COURT STAFF:
SUMMARY* Immigration
Affirming in part, and vacating and remanding in part, the district court’s preliminary injunction ordering the United States to provide bond hearings to a class of noncitizens who were detained and found to have a credible fear of persecution, the panel affirmed the injunction insofar as it concluded that plaintiffs have a due process right to bond hearings, but remanded for further findings and reconsideration with respect to the particular process due to plaintiffs.
The district court certified a nationwide class of all detained asylum seekers who were subject to expedited removal proceedings, were found to have a credible fear of persecution, but were not provided a bond hearing with a record of hearing within seven days of requesting a hearing. Part A of the district court’s modified preliminary injunction provided: 1) bond hearings must take place within seven days of a class member’s request, or the member must be released; 2) the burden of proof is on the government to show why the
* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
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member should not be released; and 3) the government must produce recordings or verbatim transcripts of the hearings, as well as written decisions. Part B concluded that the class is constitutionally entitled to bond hearings. A motions panel of this court previously denied the government’s request to stay Part B, but granted the stay as to Part A.
The panel concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their due process claim, explaining that immigration detention violates the Due Process Clause unless a special justification outweighs the constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint. The panel also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that other processes—seeking parole from detention or filing habeas petitions—were insufficient to satisfy due process. The panel further rejected the government’s suggestion that noncitizens lack any rights under the Due Process Clause, observing the general rule that once a person is standing on U.S. soil—regardless of the legality of entry—he or she is entitled to due process.
The panel next concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its irreparable harm analysis, noting substandard physical conditions and medical care in detention, lack of access to attorneys and evidence, separation from family, and re-traumatization. The panel also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the balance of the equities and public interest favors plaintiffs, explaining that the district court weighed: 1) plaintiffs’ deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right and its attendant harms; 2) the fact that it is always in the public interest to prevent constitutional violations; and 3) the
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government’s interest in the efficient administration of immigration law.
As to Part A of the injunction, the panel concluded that the record was insufficient to support the requirement of hearings within seven days, and that the district court made insufficient findings as to the burdens that Part A may impose on immigration courts. The panel also noted that the number of individuals in expedited removal proceedings may have dramatically increased since the entry of the injunction. Thus, the panel remanded to the district court for further factual development of the preliminary injunction factors as to Part A.
The panel also rejected the government’s argument that the district court lacked authority to grant injunction relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), which provides: “no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of [8 U.S.C. §§ 1221–1232], other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.” Examining the relevant precedent, statutory scheme, and legislative history, the panel concluded that here, where the class is composed of individual noncitizens, each of whom is in removal proceedings and facing an immediate violation of their rights, and where the district court has jurisdiction over each individual member of that class, classwide injunctive relief is consistent with congressional intent.
Finally, the panel concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the injunction as to the nationwide class. However, the panel directed that, on
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remand, the district court must also revisit the nationwide scope.
Dissenting, Judge Bade wrote that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) barred injunctive relief in this case, concluding that the majority’s opinion does not square with the plain text of § 1252(f)(1), is inconsistent with multiple Supreme Court cases, and needlessly creates a circuit split with the Sixth Circuit. Judge Bade further wrote that, even if the district court had jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief, the preliminary injunction is overbroad and exceeds what the constitution demands. Judge Bade would vacate the preliminary injunction and remand for further proceedings with instructions to dismiss the claims for classwide injunctive relief.
PANEL: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Michael Daly Hawkins and Bridget S. Bade, Circuit Judges.
OPNION BY: Chief Judge Sydney R. Thomas
DISSENTING OPINION: Judge Bridget S. Bade
KEY QUOTE FROM MAJORITY OPINION:
The government also suggests that non-citizens lack any rights under the Due Process Clause. As we have discussed, this position is precluded by Zadvydas and its progeny. The government relies on inapposite cases that address the peculiar constitutional status of noncitizens apprehended at a port-of-entry, but permitted to temporarily enter the United States under specific conditions. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei (“Mezei”), 345 U.S. 206, 208–09, 213–15 (1953) (noncitizen excluded while still aboard his ship, but then detained at Ellis Island pending final exclusion proceedings gained no additional procedural rights with respect to removal by virtue of his “temporary transfer from ship to shore” pursuant to a statute that “meticulously specified that such shelter ashore ‘shall not be considered a landing’”); Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958) (noncitizen paroled into the United States while waiting for a determination of her admissibility was not “within the United States” “by virtue of her physical presence as a parolee”); Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925) (noncitizen excluded at Ellis Island but detained instead of being deported immediately due to suspension of deportations during World War I “was to be regarded as stopped at the boundary line”).
Indeed, these cases, by carving out exceptions not applicable here, confirm the general rule that once a person is standing on U.S. soil—regardless of the legality of his or her entry—he or she is entitled to due process. See, e.g., Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212 (“[A]liens who have once passed
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through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law.”); Leng May Ma, 357 U.S. at 187 (explaining that “immigration laws have long made a distinction between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission . . . and those who are within the United States after an entry, irrespective of its legality,” and recognizing, “[i]n the latter instance . . . additional rights and privileges not extended to those in the former category who are merely ‘on the threshold of initial entry’” (quoting Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212)); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “the entry fiction is best seen . . .as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away” because “[o]therwise, the doctrine would allow any number of abuses to be deemed constitutionally permissible merely by labelling certain ‘persons’ as non-persons”). We thus conclude that the district court did not err in holding that plaintiffs are “persons” protected by the Due Process Clause.
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First, and foremost, let’s give a big vote of appreciation to the All-Star Team at Wilmer Cutler who represented our Round Table on this:
Alan Schoenfeld and Lori A. Martin, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, New York, New York; Rebecca Arriaga Herche, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Washington, D.C.; Jamil Aslam, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Los Angeles, California; for Amici Curiae Retired Immigration Judges and Board of Immigration Appeals Members.
Partner
Wilmer Cutler, NY
Partner
Wilmer Cutler, NY
This team is it’s own “Special Forces Brigade” of the New Due Process Army (“NDPA”)!
WOW! Persons are “persons” under the Constitution even when they have brown skins and are asylum seekers! How “rad” can you get! What a blow to “business as usual” for the regime and their “Dred Scottification” program of dehumanizing and making non-persons out of migrants and other vulnerable minorities!
Too bad that the Supremes and other Circuit Courts have too often advanced “Dred Scottification,” hiding behind transparently bogus and contrived “national emergencies” and the doctrine of judicial dereliction of duty otherwise known as “Chevron deference.” I guess that’s why the regime has the contempt for both the law and the Article III Courts to press such legally, morally, and Constitutionally “bankrupt” arguments as they did in this case. Never know when you’ll get a “thumbs up” from those who sometimes don’t view oaths of office and their obligations to their fellow humans with enough seriousness!
Significantly, the panel found that “plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that they are constitutionally entitled to individualized bond hearings before a “neutral decisionmaker.” However, in doing so they “papered over” the obvious fact that the constitutional requirement of a “neutral decisionmaker” cannot be fulfilled as long as Billy Barr or other politicos control the Immigration Courts!
Indeed, the panel decision was a strong rebuke of Barr’s atrocious, unethical, scofflaw decision in Matter of M-S-, 27 I&N Dec. 509 (A.G. 2019) purporting to unilaterally change the rules to eliminate bond for those who had passed “credible fear.” Fact is that no individual appearing in today’s Immigration Courts has access to the constitutionally-required “neutral decisionmaker” because Barr retains the ability to simply unilaterally change any result that doesn’t match his White Nationalist nativist agenda and can hire and fire the so-called “judges” at will.
Indeed, under Barr’s totally illegal and professionally insulting “production quotas,” I’m not sure that the “judges” on the “deportation assembly line” even get “production credit” for bond decisions because they aren’t “final orders of removal.” However, denial of bond is actually an important “whistle stop” on the “deportation express.” Those kept in the “New American Gulag” have difficulty finding attorneys and the systematic mistreatment they receive in detention helps to demoralize them and coerce them into giving up claims or waiving appeals.
When are the Article IIIs finally going to stop “beating around the bush” and hold this whole mess to be unconstitutional, as it most clearly is?
In some ways, the panel’s decision reminds me of one of my own long-ago concurring/dissenting opinion in Matter of Joseph, 22 I&N Dec. 799, 810 (BIA 1999) (en banc) (“Joseph II”):
However, I do not share the majority’s view that the proper standard in a mandatory detention case involving a lawful permanent resident alien is that the Service is “substantially unlikely to prevail” on its charge. Matter of Joseph, 22 I&N Dec. 3398, at 10 (BIA 1999). Rather, the standard in a case such as the one before us should be whether the Service has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its charge that the respondent is removable because of an aggravated felony.
Mandatory detention of a lawful permanent resident alien is a drastic step that implicates constitutionally-protected liberty interests. Where the lawful permanent resident respondent has made a colorable showing in custody proceedings that he or she is not subject to mandatory detention, the Service should be required to show a likelihood of success on the merits of its charge to continue mandatory detention. To enable the Immigration Judge to make the necessary independent determination in such a case, the Service should provide evidence of the applicable state or federal law under which the respondent was convicted and whatever proof of conviction that is available at the time of the Immigration Judge’s inquiry.
The majority’s enunciated standard of “substantially unlikely to pre-vail” is inappropriately deferential to the Service, the prosecutor in this matter. Requiring the Service to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of its charge would not unduly burden the Service and would give more appropriate weight to the liberty interests of the lawful permanent res- ident alien. Such a standard also would provide more “genuine life to the regulation that allows for an Immigration Judge’s reexamination of this issue,” as referenced by the majority. Matter of Joseph, supra, at 10.
The Service’s failure to establish a likelihood of success on the merits would not result in the release of a lawful permanent resident who poses a threat to society. Continued custody of such an alien would still be war- ranted under the discretionary criteria for detention.
In conclusion, mandatory detention should not be authorized where the Service has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of its charge. Consequently, while I am in complete agreement with the decision to release this lawful permanent resident alien, and I agree fully that the Service is substantially unlikely to prevail on the merits of this aggravated felony charge, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s enunciation of “substantially unlikely to prevail” as the standard to be applied in all future cases involving mandatory detention of lawful permanent resident aliens.
Concern for Due Process and fundamental fairness have intentionally been eradicated in the Immigration “Courts” by Sessions, Whitaker, and Barr. It’s past time for this constitutional mockery to be put out of its misery (and the unending misery it causes for the humans coming before it) once and for all!
As my late BIA colleague Judge Fred W. Vacca once said, albeit in a different context, “It’s time to put an end to this pathetic imitation of an adjudication.” Fred and I didn’t always agree. In fact, we disagreed much of the time. But, he did know when it was finally time to “stop the nonsense,” even when some of our colleagues just kept the system churning long past the point of reason and sanity.
And, folks, that was back in the days when the BIA actually functioned more or less like an “independent appellate court” until the Ashcroft purge of ’03 forever ended that noble vision. Like the rest of the system and those who enable it to keep churning lives as if they were mere water under the bridge, the BIA and the rest of the Immigration “Courts” have now become a national disgrace — a blot on our national conscience. Human beings seeking justice are neither “numbers” to be achieved for “satisfactory ratings,” nor “enforcement problems” to be exterminated without Due Process.
Dehumanization of the “other”and stripping them of legal and human rights is a key part of fascism. It’s what allowed German judges and most of German society to “look the other way” or actively aid in the holocaust. It has no place in our justice system — now or ever!
Due Process Forever! Judicial Complicity in Weaponized Captive “Courts,” That Aren’t Courts At All, Never!
PWS
03-28-20