Tag: Reyes-Corado v. Garland

The panel granted a petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of Francisco Reyes-Corado’s motion to reopen removal proceedings based on changed circumstances, and remanded.

The Board denied reopening based, in part, on Reyes- Corado’s failure to include a new application for relief, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The government acknowledged that under Aliyev v. Barr, 971 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2020), the Board erred to the extent it relied on Reyes- Corado’s failure to submit a new asylum application for relief. Here, however, unlike in Aliyev, Reyes-Corado did not include his original asylum application with his motion to reopen. Consistent with the plain text of § 1003.2(c)(1) and various persuasive authorities, the panel held that a motion to reopen that adds new circumstances to a previously considered application need not be accompanied by an application for relief.

The Board also denied reopening after concluding that Reyes-Corado did not establish materially changed country conditions to warrant an exception to the time limitation on his motion to reopen. Reyes-Corado initially sought asylum relief based on threats he received from his uncle’s family members to discourage him from avenging his father’s murder by his uncle’s family. The Board previously concluded that personal retribution, rather than a protected

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

REYES-CORADO V. GARLAND 3

 ground, was the central motivation for the threats of harm. In his motion to reopen, Reyes-Corado presented evidence of persistent and intensifying threats.

As an initial matter, the panel explained that the changed circumstances Reyes-Corado presented were entirely outside of his control, and thus were properly understood as changed country conditions, not changed personal circumstances. The panel also held that these changed circumstances were material to Reyes-Corado’s claims for relief because they rebutted the agency’s previous determination that Reyes-Corado had failed to establish the requisite nexus between the harm he feared and his membership in a familial particular social group. The panel explained that the Board’s previous nexus rationale was undermined by the fact that the threats, harassment, and violence persisted despite the lack of any retribution by Reyes-Corado’s family against his uncle’s family for at least fourteen years after Reyes-Corado’s father’s murder, and where multiple additional family members were targeted, including elderly and young family members who would be unlikely to carry out any retribution. Thus, the panel held that the Board abused its discretion in concluding that Reyes-Corado’s evidence was not qualitatively different than the evidence at his original hearing.

The panel also declined to uphold the Board’s determination that Reyes-Corado failed to establish prima facie eligibility for relief because Reyes-Corado’s new evidence likely undermined the Board’s prior nexus finding, and the Board applied the improperly high “one central reason” nexus standard to Reyes-Corado’s withholding of removal claim, rather than the less demanding “a reason” standard.

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 The panel remanded for the Board to reconsider whether Reyes-Corado established prima facie eligibility for relief and to otherwise reevaluate the motion to reopen in light of the principles set forth in the opinion.

COUNSEL

David A. Schlesinger

(argued), Kai Medeiros, and Paulina

Reyes, Jacobs & Schlesinger LLP, San Diego, California, for Petitioner.

 

Enitan O. Otunla (argued), Trial Attorney; Bernard A. Joseph, Senior Litigation Counsel; Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice; Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.

OPINION

KOH, Circuit Judge:

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Congrats to David A. Schlesinger & colleagues!