👎🏽ANOTHER 4TH CIRCUIT PUTDOWN FOR GARLAND — AO & IJ COMPLETELY BOTCH “REASONABLE FEAR REVIEW” — OIL COMPOUNDS PROBLEM BY ADVANCING SEMI-FRIVOLOUS DEFENSES!

Dan Kowalski reports for LexisNexis:

Tomas-Ramos v. Garland

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/201201.P.pdf

https://www.lexisnexis.com/LegalNewsRoom/immigration/b/insidenews/posts/ca4-on-nexus-tomas-ramos-v-garland#

“After Adan de Jesus Tomas-Ramos, a citizen and native of Guatemala, reentered the United States illegally in 2018, a removal order previously entered against him was reinstated. But because Tomas-Ramos expressed a fear of returning to Guatemala, an asylum officer conducted a screening interview to determine whether he reasonably feared persecution or torture in his home country. The asylum officer determined that Tomas-Ramos failed to establish a reasonable fear of such harm, and so was not entitled to relief from his reinstated removal order. An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) concurred with that determination. Tomas-Ramos now petitions for review of the IJ’s order on two grounds. He first contends that the IJ’s finding that he lacked a reasonable fear of persecution or torture was erroneous. We agree. The primary ground for the IJ’s decision was that there was no “nexus” between the harm Tomas-Ramos faced and a protected ground. But the agency incorrectly applied the statutory nexus requirement. Instead, the record compels the conclusion that Tomas-Ramos was persecuted on account of a protected ground, in the form of his family ties. And in light of that error, we cannot determine that the other reason given by the IJ for her decision – that Tomas-Ramos could avoid harm by relocating – was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we grant the petition for review, vacate the agency’s decision, and remand for further proceedings.”

[Hats off to Michael D. Lieberman, Simon Y. Sandoval-Moshenberg, Stacy M. Kim, Paul F. Brinkman, and Michael A. Francus!]

 

Daniel M. Kowalski

Editor-in-Chief

Bender’s Immigration Bulletin (LexisNexis)

**********************

    • DOJ’s error-studded performance (or lack thereof) in this case is disgraceful!
    • I guarantee that there are plenty of other unjust, legally defective reasonable fear and credible fear decisions where these came from. Just most folks never get any meaningful judicial review.
    • Both the IJ and the AO got the basics of nexus and the applicable 4th Circuit case law totally wrong here. How are is this acceptable performance from what are supposed to be “expert” courts? Why hasn’t Garland brought in real experts, committed to due process and best practices, to take charge and straighten out this mess?
    • Disturbingly, the Biden Administration wants to turn this type of clearly inadequate procedure with poorly trained officers and judges and incorrect applications of the law loose on the merits determinations for all asylum seekers at the border!
    • Rather than being a check on bad judges, Garland’s OIL continues to “defend the indefensible” with arguments that don’t meet “the straight-face test.” Aren’t ethical codes equally applicable to Government lawyers?
    • Worse yet, Garland continues to unethically defend the scofflaw behavior of the Biden Administration by using a Stephen Miller era “COVID pretext” to deny most asylum seekers at the Southern Border any process, even the pathetic one used here!
    • The “wheels have come off” @ Garland’s DOJ and he’s driving on the axel hubs! When is someone going to pull him over and make him fix it?
    • Believe it or not, these are life or death cases! ☠️ Why is Garland allowed to treat the lives and rights of migrants and those associated with them so frivolously?
    • The IJ’s attempt to bar the R’s attorney from participating in the “credible fear” review is ridiculous! It shows the deep problems in Garland’s broken system which too often is deaf to due process, hostile to attorneys, and immune from common sense and best practices! Why would the “default” for regulatory silence be “no participation” rather than a “strong presumption that attorneys can fully participate?” What kind of “court” bars attorneys from speaking for their clients? Why would any judge not want to listen to attorneys, who are there to help them make correct decisions? The IJ’s conduct here was particularly egregious given that she had already made a clearly wrong decision before cutting off the attorney’s attempt to point out her errors! What a complete farce that Garland has failed to address!
    • This is another case where Circuit Judge Allison Jones Rushing, a Trump appointee with solid conservative credentials, once thought to be a possible contender for the “ACB seat,” joined her colleagues (Judge Harris and Chief Judge Gregory) to overturn a wrong, anti-immigrant decision by EOIR. Her approach in this and another recent case shows more sensitivity to due process, scholarship, and the rights of individual immigrants than many decisions emanating from Biden’s Immigration Courts under Garland.
    • I’m not suggesting that Judge R is necessarily going to become a leading defender of due process for immigrants. But, based on these somewhat random “snippets,” she seems more “reachable” and open to sound arguments on the issues than some other Trump appointees, points worth keeping in mind for NDPA advocates!
    • She’s also young. So, she will be reviewing immigration cases and making law for decades to come.

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

02-02/22

🇺🇸⚖️🗽ATTN NDPA: LAW YOU CAN USE: Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase’s “Practical Scholarship” Outs Garland BIA’s Disingenuous Approach To “Nexus” — Use These Arguments To Litigate Garland’s Dysfunctional “Denial Factory” To A Standstill!

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2021/12/21/the-proper-test-for-nexus1

The Proper Test for Nexus

On November 4, the Board of Immigration Appeals issued its precedent decision in Matter of M-F-O-.1,2  At first glance, the decision seems to be a correction regarding  when the accrual of continuous presence for voluntary departure ends, necessitated by a Supreme Court decision rejecting  the Board’s prior take on the question.  The headnote summarizing the decision mentions only this issue.

However, reading further into the decision reveals an additional motive.  It turns out that the respondent in M-F-O- sought asylum; it was the denial of that protection that brought voluntary departure into play.  The respondent stated that he feared being persecuted by a violent  gang on account of his membership in a particular social group consisting of “indigenous Guatemalan youths who have abstained from joining the street gangs.”

The BIA uncharacteristically assumed the above group to be a valid one for asylum purposes.  In doing so, the Board was aware of proposed regulations being drafted by the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, which are likely to create a more inclusive standard for particular social group determinations than that currently employed by the Board.

But in M-F-O-, the Board sought to make the point that even where such groups are legally recognized, no asylum will be forthcoming unless a nexus is found between the group membership and the harm.  And the Board in upholding the asylum denial in M-F-O- aimed to bolster a standard it has employed in recent years to make it remarkably easy to deny the existence of such a nexus.

Our asylum laws state that a nexus exists when persecution is “on account of” one of the five statutorily-protected grounds.3  Whether or not a nexus is found depends on what is meant by those three words.  Let’s therefore take a deeper dive into the meaning of that term.

The Traditional Standard 4

“On account of” is by no means a phrase specific to immigration law; it long predates the Refugee Act of 1980.  The Fifteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1870, states in part that  “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”  The Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in 1920, similarly prohibits denying or abridging one’s right to vote “on account of sex.”

As to how that term should be interpreted, the Supreme Court recently addressed the question outside of the asylum context in Bostock v. Clayton County,5  a case involving employment discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  The Court explained that the statutory term in question, “because of,” carries the same legal meaning as “on account of.”6

The Court continued that the standard requires a court to apply the “simple” and “traditional” “but-for” test.  As the Court explained, “a but-for test directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes. If it does, we have found a but-for cause.”7

The Court recognized that the “but-for” standard is a “sweeping” one, acknowledging that “[o]ften, events have multiple but-for causes.”8  The Court further observed that “[w]hen it comes to Title VII, the adoption of the traditional but-for causation standard means a defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor that contributed to its challenged employment decision.”9

According to the Court:

It doesn’t matter if other factors besides the plaintiff’s sex contributed to the decision. And it doesn’t matter if the employer treated women as a group the same when compared to men as a group. If the employer intentionally relies in part on an individual employee’s sex when deciding to discharge the employee—put differently, if changing the employee’s sex would have yielded a different choice by the employer—a statutory violation has occurred.10

The Court also provided a hypothetical:

Consider an employer with a policy of firing any woman he discovers to be a Yankees fan. Carrying out that rule because an employee is a woman and a fan of the Yankees is a firing “because of sex” if the employer would have tolerated the same allegiance in a male employee.11

So under the Court’s hypothetical, any argument that the “real” or “primary” reason for terminating the employment was being a Yankees fan, and that the gender of the employee was merely “incidental” because women who aren’t Yankees fans aren’t fired, and in fact are treated equally as a group to men, is rejected because removing the gender of the Yankees fan from the equation brings about a different result.  Note that under this test, the question is not the general treatment of women, but rather the impact of being a woman on the treatment of the specific employee.  Also, the test does not require a test to determine the dominant reason for the unequal treatment; in the hypothetical, there was no concern over whether being a Yankees fan or a woman was the stronger motivation for the termination. This is in fact a clear standard that is easy to both understand and apply in practice.

The Asylum “One Central Reason” Standard

Let’s turn back to the asylum context.   In 2005, Congress included language in the REAL ID Act requiring a statutorily-protected ground to be “at least one central reason” for the persecution in order to meet the “on account of” requirement.  Did this added language create a different standard for asylum cases than that described in Bostock?

One leading authority points out that an earlier version of the 2005 legislation would have required the protected ground to be “the central motive” behind the persecution.  However, in the final version, “the” was changed to “at least one,” meaning that a protected ground need be only one of multiple causes behind the harm.12

Also, note the replacing of “motive” with “reason.”  The Cambridge English Dictionary defines “reason” as “the cause of an event or situation or something that provides an excuse or explanation,” providing the example: “the reason for the disaster was engine failure, not human error.”  “Reason” would thus seem to cover more territory than “motive,” as an engine has no motive to fail.

The change from “motive” to “reason” lends itself to what scholars of international refugee law have termed the “predicament approach,” in which a causal connection between the persecution and a protected ground satisfies the nexus requirement irregardless of evidence of a specific persecutorial intent.13  The concept is illustrated through the example of a conscientious objector who is imprisoned for evading mandatory military service.  While the conscription law applies equally to all, the real cause may be a protected ground where noncompliance with the law was because of a religious or political belief.14

It is for this reason that one leading scholar viewed the choice of word as an indication “of increased conformity with international standards” in line with the fact that the Refugee Act was enacted to bring U.S. law into conformity with international treaty obligations under the 1967 Protocol.15

The BIA’s Initial Take on “One Central Reason”

The BIA initially interpreted “one central reason” as a reason that is not “incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for harm.”16   In doing so, the BIA  explicitly rejected the view that “one central reason” must be “dominant.”  As the Board explained, “[t]he problem in classifying one motive as “dominant” or “central” is that it renders all other motives, regardless of their significance to the case, secondary and therefore ultimately irrelevant.”17  (It is worth noting the Board’s use of the word “motive” rather than “reason.”).

However, the Board’s inclusion of the word “subordinate” in its definition was rebuffed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which found it to be the “mirror image of the rejected ‘dominance’ test: the requirement that a protected ground, even if a ‘central’ reason for persecution, not be subordinate to any other reason.”18  In other words, the court found no difference between requiring a reason to be dominant (which the Board correctly found it could not do) and prohibiting a reason from being subordinate (which the Board then did instead).  The Board has since dropped the word “subordinate” when describing the standard.

So in summary, the “at least one central reason” standard allows a cause for persecution to be one of many, and does not require the protected ground to be dominant in comparison with the others.  It only prevents the reason from being incidental, tangential, or superficial.  And again, the word is “reason” and not “motive;” surely, Congress saw a difference between those words or it wouldn’t have changed the latter to the former in the final version.

In its recognition that there may be multiple causes for persecution, in its substitution of “reason” for motive, and in its rejection of a dominance test, the “one central reason” test is indistinguishable from the standard described in Bostock.

Circuit Courts Have Applied the Bostock “But-For” Test in Asylum Cases

The Fourth Circuit has addressed the “one central reason” standard in a number of decisions in which it has consistently applied the “but-for” test.19  In one, a woman from El Salvador sought asylum after members of Mara 18 threatened to kill her for blocking them from recruiting her son.  The BIA upheld the Immigration Judge’s finding of no nexus, on the grounds “that gang recruitment was the central motivation for these threats;” while claiming that “the fact that the person blocking the gang members’ recruitment effort was their membership target’s mother was merely incidental to the recruitment aim.”20

Note the Board’s citing of a completely incorrect standard: “the central motivation,” referencing the wording that Congress rejected in place of the language it ultimately adopted.  As a practical matter, the Board viewed the recruitment aim as ending its nexus inquiry, whereas I would argue that it should have served as the starting point.  Once we know that the gang sought to recruit the son, we gain a perspective that allows us to better understand how the particular social group membership might put the asylum seeker in harm’s way.

Properly applying the “but-for” test described in Bostock to the above fact pattern required removing the family relationship from the equation to see if the threat of harm would remain.  Of course, it would not; it was the specific fact that the asylum-seeker was the intended recruit’s mother that put her between the gang and her son, blocking the recruitment.  And it was because she stood between the gang and her son that the former sought to kill her.  The maternal relationship wasn’t tangential or incidental to the recruitment; it was precisely the reason that the asylum-seeker was an obstacle that needed to be eliminated.

That is why the Fourth Circuit concluded that the family relationship was “at least one central reason” for the threatened harm: because the petitioner’s “relationship to her son is why she, and not another person, was threatened with death if she did not allow him to join Mara 18.  The court added “The BIA’s conclusion that these threats were directed at her not because she is his mother but because she exercises control over her son’s activities draws a meaningless distinction under these facts.”21

The Eleventh Circuit also applied the traditional “but-for” test in a 2019 decision in which the Board had found no nexus because a cartel  had a financial motive in targeting the Petitioner in order to extort money owed to the cartel by his uncle.22  The Eleventh Circuit found that “it is impossible to disentangle [the Petitioner’s] relationship to his father-in-law from the Gulf Cartel’s pecuniary motives: they are two sides of the same coin.”  The court continued that absent the familial relationship with the uncle, the cartel never would have hunted the Petitioner down or persecuted him.  The court thus rejected the Board’s view that the family relationship was merely incidental; to the court, it was “abundantly clear to us that the family relationship was one central reason, if not the central reason, for the harm visited upon Mr. Perez-Sanchez.”23

The Ninth Circuit has also held the “but-for” cause to be the correct  standard for determining nexus in asylum cases, citing the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of the term as “[t]he cause without which the event could not have occurred.”24

The Description of the Standard By the BIA (and an Acting Attorney General)

The BIA’s application of the “one central reason” standard is best summarized in a recent decision of the Third Circuit: “although the BIA correctly recited the ‘one central reason’ test, it applied something altogether different.”25

In 2011, the BIA recognized the “one central reason” standard as requiring the asylum seeker to “demonstrate that the persecutor would not have harmed the applicant if the protected trait did not exist.”26  What the BIA described is the traditional “but for” test.  And in 2017, in its decision in Matter of L-E-A-, the Board described  the test as “[i]f the persecutor would have treated the applicant the same if the protected characteristic of the family did not exist, then the applicant has not established a claim on this ground.”27

Interestingly, less than a week before the end of the Trump Administration, a  briefly serving Acting Attorney General issued a second decision in Matter of A-B- recognizing that to establish a nexus for asylum purposes, “the protected ground: (1) must be a but-for cause of the wrongdoer’s act; and (2) must play more than a minor role—in other words, it cannot be incidental or tangential to another reason for the act.”28

The Acting Attorney General listed the “but-for” test and the fact that the ground not be incidental or tangential as if they were two separate requirements, even though a ground that serves as a “but-for” cause for persecution cannot be incidental or tangential.  Also curious is the Acting A.G.’s statement that  the ground could not be incidental or tangential to another reason for the act. Was this meant to be a return to  the dominance test that was rejected by the Third Circuit and the BIA?   Or might this have simply been the result of sloppy drafting, in which the Board’s language from Matter of J-B-N- & S-M- was modified by removing the word “subordinate” that the Third Circuit had rejected, while neglecting to also remove the “to any other reason” language that followed?  The question was rendered moot when the decision was vacated in June by Attorney General Garland.29

The Board Has Applied an Incorrect Standard for Nexus

Descriptions aside, as noted by the Third Circuit, the standard actually applied by the BIA has been something entirely different.  In many of the Board’s decisions, asylum has been denied for lack of nexus simply because the adjudicator deemed a non-protected reason to be the persecutor’s primary motive, without regard to the impact of the protected ground on outcome. This approach is not only inconsistent with the test applied in the above-mentioned circuit court cases (and in Bostock), but is inconsistent with the standard described by the Board itself which rejected a test for dominance.

The Second Circuit made this point in 2014, reversing a decision in which the IJ applied a “the central reason” test, as opposed to “at least one central reason.” The court emphasized that this was not harmless error; rather, it “set up an ‘illogical’ rubric for analyzing motivation that presupposed that multiple motives for persecution must be analyzed in competition with one another, rather than in concert.”30  The court further pointed out that this was not an isolated error by the agency, citing three other decisions dating back to 2007 in which the Board had done precisely the same thing.31

And the Fourth Circuit this year identified an oft-repeated error of the Board in determining nexus on account of family “by incorrectly focusing on why the gang targeted Petitioner’s family, rather than on why they targeted Petitioner herself.”32  In another recent decision, the Fourth Circuit stated that “‘once the right question is asked’ — that is, why was Petitioner being targeted — the conclusion is quite clear: ‘whatever [the gang]’s motives for targeting [her] family, [Petitioner herself] was targeted because of [her] membership in that family.'”33

Returning to the Supreme Court’s Yankees fan hypothetical in Bostock, the Board has been doing the equivalent of looking to how women were generally treated as a group (which, in the Court’s hypothetical, was equivalent to men) to conclude that gender was only incidental to being a Yankees fan, rather than deeming gender to be “at least one central reason” for the particular employee being fired due to its impact on outcome, as male Yankees fans were not terminated.  Of course, the Supreme Court in Bostock directly refuted this approach.  Similarly, in the asylum context, as the Fourth Circuit made clear, it doesn’t matter what view (if any) the gang has of the asylum-seeker’s family.  It only matters that the individual asylum seeker was targeted by the gang because of the family membership.  If so, there is a nexus to a protected ground.

In Matter of M-F-O-, the Board specifically referenced its 2017 decision in Matter of L-E-A- (i.e. L-E-A- I”), noting that its nexus analysis in that case “remains good law.”34  Let’s take a closer look at that decision.  We will first see what standard the Board purported to apply to the facts of the case.  Next, we’ll apply the traditional “but-for” test described in Bostock to those facts.  And lastly, we’ll examine the standard actually applied by the Board.

Matter of L-E-A-: The Board’s Statement of the Law

In Matter of L-E-A-, a criminal cartel sought to kidnap the respondent in his native Mexico.  The respondent’s father owned a store from which the cartel wished to sell drugs.  When the father refused the cartel’s request for access, it targeted the respondent as a means of coercing the father.  The Immigration Judge denied asylum, finding that the cartel’s motive was to sell drugs, not to harm members of the respondent’s family.  The Immigration Judge continued that the cartel’s focus was the store, stating that if the store were to be sold, the cartel would then target the new owner.

On appeal the Board recognized in a footnote the Fourth Circuit’s case law on the matter.  Instead of being instructed by it, the Board simply stated that “[w]hile it is not clear how the Fourth Circuit would apply that precedent to the facts here, this case does not arise in the Fourth Circuit.”35  With those words, the Board dismissed the standard traditionally employed in such matters.  And with what did the Board replace it?

The Board started down the same road as both Bostock and the Fourth Circuit.  It said that nexus is not established “if the persecutor would have treated the applicant the same if the protected characteristic did not exist,” a correct description of Bostock’s “but for” test.  In then citing its own prior take on “one central reason,” the Board omitted the word “subordinate,” stating instead that the protected characteristic “cannot be incidental [or] tangential…”  It continued by noting that both direct and circumstantial evidence of motive should be considered, and that sometimes “a more nuanced evaluation” will be warranted.36

The Traditional “But For” Standard Applied to the Facts of L-E-A-

As the Supreme Court stated in Bostock,  “a but-for test directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes. If it does, we have found a but-for cause.”37

The traditional “but for” standard would thus remove the respondent’s familial relationship to his father from the equation.  We know that the cartel’s aim is to compel the respondent’s father into allowing them to sell drugs in his store.  The cartel would have no reason to kidnap the respondent as a means of coercing his father if not for the familial relationship; the leverage over the father derives entirely from his fear for the safety of his child.  The protected characteristic of family is thus not merely incidental or tangential.  It is one central reason for the persecution.

As noted above, under this standard, it doesn’t matter that the goal of selling drugs is the persecutor’s dominant motive; the hierarchy of reasons is irrelevant.  As we have seen, the Board itself conceded this point in Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-.  Nor does it  matter that when the gang isn’t focused on selling drugs in the father’s store, it treats the members of the family the same as everyone else.  Think of Bostock’s Yankees fan example, in which the fact that women as a group are treated equally to men by the employer until their offending Yankees loyalty is discovered, at which point only women who root for the Yankees are fired.  The fact that both the employer’s hatred of the Yankees in the Bostock example and the gang’s desire to sell drugs in the father’s store in L-E-A- are central reasons doesn’t preclude other “but for” causes.

The Board Applied a “The Central Motive” Test in L-E-A-

However, the traditional standard was not what the Board actually applied to the facts of the case. Instead, it first claimed that “nexus would be established based on family membership where a persecutor is seeking to harm the family members because of an animus against the family itself.”38  In that example, the persecution is caused by the hatred of the family itself, without a need for any further reason.  But that is an example of the family membership serving as “the central motive” for the harm.

The Board then went on in L-E-A- to address instances lacking such animus towards the family itself.  But in doing so, the Board never mentioned the “but for” test described above.  Instead, it made general statements from which it is difficult to discern a coherent test.  In finally denying the claim on the ground that the cartel’s motive was financial, the Board continued to apply an incorrect “the central motive” standard.

Importantly, the Board in L-E-A- never undertook the required exercise of removing the protected ground to see if it would cause a different result.  Instead, it concluded that because the motive was financial, the claim failed.  In summary, the Board again recounted one standard, but then applied something entirely different.  What the Board in fact applied was a “the central motive” test, in which the dominance of the financial motive eliminated all other reasons from consideration.

Conclusion

In spite of the clarity of the correct standard, the universality of its application, and the criticism from numerous circuit courts over the years for its failure to apply it correctly, the BIA has made no effort to correct its course in its application of the “on account of” standard.  The Board remains consistent in its citing of something close to the correct standard, but then applying an entirely incorrect test.  Whatever it claims to be doing, the Board’s test is for “the central motive,” in which nexus is denied whenever a dominant purpose may be identified that is not a statutorily protected ground for asylum.  Congress specifically rejected this standard in favor of the more generous “at least one central reason” test.  Furthermore, the “predicament approach” has never been mentioned, much less applied, by the Board, which has continued to focus on the persecutor’s motive as if Congress had not changed that word to “reason.”

There are many within the Department of Justice who must  be aware of this practice.  I would hope that Attorney General Garland, a longtime circuit court judge, is among them.  In light of the BIA’s refusal to self-correct, it is incumbent on the Department to impose a correction from above.  Otherwise, any forthcoming regulations relating to particular social group formulation will fail to have their desired impact on the outcomes of asylum claims.

Copyright Jeffrey S. Chase 2021.  All rights reserved.

Notes:

  1. Thanks to Dr. Alicia Triche for providing invaluable insight that was incorporated into the final version of this article.
  2. 28 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA 2021).
  3. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
  4. My use of the term “Traditional” is based on the Supreme Court’s reference in Bostock cited below to the “traditional” “but-for” test in cases with a “because of” or “on account of” requirement.
  5. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
  6. Id. at 1739.  Although no further explanation regarding the equivalency of the terms was provided in Bostock, in a prior decision, the Court had stated: “The words ‘because of’ mean ‘by reason of: on account of.’ 1 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 194 (1966); see also 1 Oxford English Dictionary 746 (1933) (defining ‘because of’ to mean ‘By reason of, on account of ‘ (italics in original)); The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 132 (1966) (defining ‘because’ to mean ‘by reason; on account’).”  Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009).
  7. Id. The Court has applied this same test in other cases, including FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., supra, in which it also referenced the description of the test found in W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 265 (5th ed. 1984) (“An act or omission is not regarded as a cause of an event if the particular event would have occurred without it”).
  8. Id.
  9. Id.
  10. Id. at 1741.
  11. Id. at 1742.
  12.  Deborah E. Anker, Law of Asylum in the United States (2021-2022 Ed.) (Thomson Reuters) at 409.
  13. See James C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status (2nd Ed.) (Cambridge) at 376.
  14. Id. at 276-77.
  15. Anker, supra at 390.
  16. Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 208, 214 (BIA 2007).
  17. Id. at 212, n.6.
  18. Ndayshimiye v. Attorney General of U.S., 557 F.3d 124, 129-30 (3rd Cir., 2009).
  19. See, e.g., Perez Vasquez v. Garland, 4 F.4th 213, 222 (4th Cir. 2021); Portillo Flores v. Garland, 3 F.4th 615, 630-31 (4th Cir. 2021) (en banc); Arita-Deras v. Wilkinson, 990 F.3d 350, 361 (4th Cir. 2021); Hernandez-Cartagena v. Barr, 977 F.3d 316, 322 (4th Cir. 2020);  Zavaleta-Policiano v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 241, 249-50 (4th Cir. 2017); Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944 (4th Cir. 2015).
  20. Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, supra at 949 (emphasis added).
  21. Id. at 950.
  22. Perez-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 935 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2019).
  23. Id. at 1158-59.
  24. Rodriguez Tornes v. Garland, 993 F.3d 743, 751 (9th Cir. 2021).
  25. Ghanem v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., No. 19-1475 (3rd Cir. Sept. 22, 2021).
  26. Matter of N-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 526, 531 (BIA 2011) (citing  Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2009)).
  27. Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 40, 43-44 (BIA 2017) (“L-E-A- I”).
  28. Matter of A-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 199, 208 (A.G. 2021) (“A-B- II”).
  29. See Matter of A-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 307 (A.G. 2021) (vacating both prior A.G. decisions in Matter of A-B-).
  30. Acharya v. Holder, 761 F.3d 289, 298 (2d Cir. 2014).
  31. The three earlier decisions cited in Acharya in which the BIA had committed the same error in applying a “the central reason” standard  were Castro v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010); Aliyev v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2008); and Uwais v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 478 F.3d 513 (2d Cir. 2007).
  32. Perez Vasquez v. Garland, supra at 222.
  33. Hernandez-Cartagena v. Barr, supra at 322 (citing Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 451, 459 (4th Cir. 2018).
  34. Matter of M-F-O-, supra at 412, n.6.
  35. Matter of L-E-A-, supra at 46, n.3.
  36. Id. at 43-44.
  37. Bostock v. Clayton Country, supra at 1739.
  38. Id. at 44.

DECEMBER 21, 2021

Reprinted by permission.

*************

I’d describe the BIA’s approach to nexus this way: 

  • Find any possible “non-protected” motivation (no matter how attenuated);
  • Characterize any “protected ground” as “tangential,” “marginal,” or “too attenuated” (even if, as in L-E-A-, it’s the direct or proximate cause of the harm or fear under conventional causation analysis — as Jeffrey points out, in L-E-A– not only was “family relationship” “at least one central reason” driving the gang’s interest, it was the only apparent reason for the gang’s interest in the respondent);
  • Deny asylum;
  • Hope that the refugee doesn’t seek judicial review or draws a circuit panel whose knowledge of asylum and commitment to humanity are as shallow as their own.

Let’s apply “BIA-think” to the infamous Krystal Nacht in Nazi Germany. It was “mere vandalism and crimes against against property,” albeit on a widespread basis. Sure, a few synagogues got burned to the ground. But, that was just an “unfortunate consequence” of their being in neighborhoods that were being randomly vandalized by hooligans.

Moreover, “arson” is a crime, not a “protected ground.” There were laws on the books in Germany punishing vandalism, so no “unwillingness or inability” to protect.

Of course it was hard tracing down the “alleged perps” because of the widespread nature of the crimes. The alleged perps were “non-government actors” not carrying out official policies. And police or other officials involved were merely “rogue officers” acting in violation of German law. Most significantly, the “alleged victims” never filed police reports. So how could the German Government be expected to act? Nothing to see here, really!

Moreover, if we grant one case, all the Jews in Nazi Germany might qualify for asylum. That would “open the floodgates.” Certainly not what Congress intended!

Krystal Nacht
“Widespread vandalism” but no persecution o/a/o any “protected ground” here!
Krystal Nacht
SOURCE: Holocaust Museum

Let’s face it, if the vessel St. Louis arrived at our shores today the Biden Administration wouldn’t even need to shove it back out to sea! They would use Title 42 to send the refugees back to death without any process at all, just as “Gauleiter Miller” told them to do!

The St.Louis
“No room at the inn! Go back and die in place, you ‘illegals.’”
The St Louis (1939)
Faces of the doomed
SOURCE: History.com

Jeffrey hits the nail on the head when he suggests that the BIA’s renewed vigor in “pushing” bogus nexus denials is prompted by the slow erosion of their Sessions/Barr inspired effort to define PSG out of existence as well as the Circuits’ increasingly critical treatment of the BIA’s often-specious adverse credibility findings (frequently improperly substituting their view for the IJ’s when necessary to sustain a DHS appeal) and their highly sanitized, “fantasyland” view of country conditions in the Northern Triangle and other major “refugee sending” countries. The latter probably reflects the many superior, authoritative tools for proving country conditions now available to advocates which highlight the “double speak, dumbing down, and overt polarization” of State Department Country Reports.

Manipulation and encouragement of wrongful nexus denials by IJs might be the “last line of defense” for the BIA against giving many more asylum seekers the protection they need and deserve under a fair and proper interpretation and application of asylum law!

Perhaps, we shouldn’t be surprised by Garland’s disinterest in making the progressive reforms necessary to restore some semblance of justice, order, and intellectual integrity to his disgracefully dysfunctional courts. While the GOP has been fixated on weaponizing Immigration Courts against migrants over the past two decades, Dems have shown little or no interest in fixing these glaring problems.

Poor policies and inattention to progressive judicial appointments @ EOIR during the Obama Administration started the exponential growth in backlog!

Now, in the words of one of my esteemed colleagues: “At this point, it just seems like a giant snowball careening down the mountain.”

Snowball
“Look out below, asylum seekers! Garland’s BIA is aiming for YOU!”
Public Realm

Litigating this mess to a standstill appears to be the only option Garland is leaving for those who believe that equal justice in America is for “all persons!”

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

12-21-21

☠️🤮👎🏽 3RD CIR. BADLY BUNGLES GUATEMALAN WOMEN PSG! — Chavez-Chilel v. Atty. Gen.

Woman Tortured
“Hey ladies, not every woman in Guatemala is hanging up there with you (yet), so what’s the problem,” says Circuit Judge Patty Shwartz of the 3rd. Cir.“ “She struggled madly in the torturing Ray”
Amazing StoriesArtist Unknown, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/211180p.pdf

Chavez-Chilel v. Atty. Gen., 3rd Cir., 12-09-21, published

PANEL: SHWARTZ, PORTER, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

OPINION: Judge Patty Shwartz

KEY QUOTE:

Chavez-Chilel’s proposed PSG lacks particularity. “[N]ot every immutable characteristic is sufficiently precise to define a [PSG],” id. at 552, and courts have concluded that a proposed PSG of all women in a particular country “is overbroad[] because no factfinder could reasonably conclude that all [of a country’s] women had a well-founded fear of persecution based solely on their gender,” Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994) (addressing Iranian women).8 Reasons to depart from this general rule are not present here. For example, in Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513 (8th Cir. 2007), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized the PSG of all Somali women because “all Somali females have a well-founded fear of persecution based solely on gender given the prevalence of” female genital mutilation. Id. at 518; see also Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797–98 (9th Cir. 2005) (same); In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365–66 (B.I.A. 1996) (recognizing PSG of “young women” in a particular tribe in Togo due to pervasive practice of female

8 In Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 668–69 (9th Cir. 2010), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the BIA’s conclusion that “all women in Guatemala” was too broad a group to qualify as a PSG and remanded for further analysis. That case rested on the Ninth Circuit’s two-part definition of a PSG, which recognized any group “united by a voluntary association, including a former association, or by an innate characteristic that is so fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members that members either cannot or should not be required to change it.” Id. at 666 (quotation marks and emphasis omitted). This definition is not consistent with our Court’s three requirements for a PSG, see S.E.R.L., 894 F.3d at 540, so we decline to follow the reasoning in Perdomo.

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genital mutilation). Here, by contrast, there is no record evidence that all Guatemalan women share a unifying characteristic that results in them being targeted for any form of persecution based solely on their gender. Cf. A.R. 170–73, 182 (Chavez-Chilel’s testimony that she knew of no other women who suffered sexual or domestic violence); A.R. 232 (report explaining that one-third more Guatemalan women experience sexual or domestic violence against them than women in Paraguay). Accordingly, while the size of the group standing alone would not disqualify a group from being a PSG, Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 674–75 (7th Cir. 2013), Chavez- Chilel has failed to demonstrate that her proposed PSG is sufficiently particularized. Thus, her alleged fear of persecution based upon membership in such a group does not provide a basis for asylum. Because Chavez-Chilel cannot prove her asylum claim, she cannot meet the higher standard to obtain withholding of removal. See Blanco v. Att’y Gen., 967 F.3d 304, 315 (3d Cir. 2020). As a result, the IJ and BIA correctly denied her request for asylum and withholding of removal.9

*****************

What total poppycock Judge Shwartz spews forth in the faces of abused and targeted refugee women! Guatemalan women suffer one of the highest femicide rates in the world! https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-work/femicide-and-gender-based-violence. Indeed, that rate increased dramatically, by 31%, in 2021! https://www.riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/mercosur/central-america/femicides-increase-by-31-in-guatemala-during-2021/. While Judge Shwartz and her colleagues are incapable of recognizing truth, persecutors in Guatemala are highly capable of recognizing “women in Guatemala” as a group to target because of their gender!

This is a seriously flawed analysis. The court conflates psg “particularity” with nexus. Obviously, not every woman in Guatemala need fear persecution for some to be persecuted on that basis!

Suppose a few Jews escaped Nazi persecution. Does that mean Jews weren’t a PSG? Suppose only 10% of Poles were killed by the Nazis because of their ethnicity. Does that mean Poles were not a PSG? Suppose only 40% of Roma in a particular country are exterminated? Does that make Roma not a PSG? What if every Catholic in a particular country doesn’t have the exact same fear of persecution? Does that mean that Catholics don’t have a “well-founded fear”of persecution? Does that mean that Catholicism isn’t “one central reason” for persecution? Of course not, except in the uninformed minds of Judge Shwartz and her panel colleagues!

Obviously “women in Guatemala” is 1) fundamental to identity; 2) particularized (it clearly excludes non-women); and 3) distinct in Guatemalan society (and every other country in the world). Indeed, like family “women” and “men” are among the oldest, most fundamental, readily recognizable “particular social groups” in human existence!

I’m not the only critic of this outrageous misconstruction of asylum law!

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges

“Sir Jeffrey” Chase of the Round Table 🛡⚔️ says:

The court completely misconstrued the standard for determining particularity:

Here, by contrast, there is no record evidence that all Guatemalan women share a unifying characteristic that results in them being targeted for any form of persecution based solely on their gender. 

Particularity of course is a clear marker for group inclusion, and does not require evidence that everyone in the group is being targeted for persecution – compare, e.g. family or land owners.

Professor Geoffrey Hoffman
Professor Geoffrey Hoffman
Immigraton Clinic Director
University of Houston Law Center

Our friend and “practical scholar” colleague, Professor Geoffrey Hoffman of the University of Houston Law Center, adds:

Appears also to ignore the “once central reason” asylum rule in that the court is erroneously say gender must be “sole” reason (page 15, use of word “solely”)

So court got it wrong on 2 counts – not “all” women in Guatemala must be persecuted to form a valid PSG and gender need not be “sole reason” for the persecution.

Another colleague who practices in the 3rd Circuit sums it up succinctly and bluntly: “Awful!”

Dan Kowalski
Dan Kowalski
Online Editor of the LexisNexis Immigration Law Community (ILC)

In addition to being legally wrong on a number of points, as pointed out by Dan Kowalski at LexisNexis Immigration Community, the court’s decision is horrible policy:

Note that the IJ DID grant CAT relief, and the government did NOT appeal that grant.

The “good news” is that the CAT grant prevents Ms. Chavez -Calel from being returned to torture and persecution in Guatemala. However, by misapplying asylum law, the court basically places her in an indefinite “limbo status.” 

She therefore is deprived of the right to fully integrate into our society by getting a green card and becoming a citizen. The court also strips her of any realistic path to exercising political rights! What sense does manipulating the law to intentionally create disenfranchised subclasses in American society make when better alternatives are available? 

To add insult to injury, in this decision the Third Circuit joined other Circuits and the BIA in giving DHS and EOIR a “pass” on their intentional decision not to comply with the INA requirements for issuing a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) to commence removal proceedings. 

Obviously, these “ivory towerists” have never experienced the actual mess that occurs when overworked, understaffed Immigration Court clerks manually mail out subsequent notices, by regular U.S. Mail, using addresses haphazardly entered by DHS personnel in the chaos that often exists at the border and upon release from DHS detention. 

Perhaps, in their exalted positions, these Article IIIs no longer have to rely on the ever-deteriorating service of the U.S. Postal service. This morning, I delivered a “mini-stack” of mis-delivered U.S. Mail to my next door neighbor. We seem to get mis-delivered mail on a weekly basis. And, I live in a reasonably “upscale” neighborhood, if I do say so myself — one where folks know all the neighbors and take the time to “re-route” misdirected mail. Think there are places America where that doesn’t happen?

What do these judges think “delivery accuracy” is in the communities and situations where most Immigration Court respondents live? Maybe, there was a good reason why Congress required the NTA, which, unlike subsequent EOIR notices, is often served personally, to contain accurate information on the time and place of their hearing.

Maybe, we need Federal Judges who live in the “real world” rather than abstract one they have constructed where the lives of migrants are at issue! Maybe, we need more Federal Judges who have seen and experienced the consequences of “poor and uninformed judging” on immigrant and ethnic communities in the U.S.!

At a time when the Supremes’ righty majority appears to be intent on dismantling half a century of established women’s rights, the Third Circuit’s wrong-headed decision is a further “body blow” to both the humanity and human rights of women throughout the world!

 Judge Schwartz is an Obama appointee. Her panel colleagues are GOP appointees. We deserve better from our life-tenured Federal Judiciary! Much, much better!

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

12-10-21

☠️⚰️👎🏽🤮 SHAFTOLA! — RIGHTY JUDGES USE UNREPRESENTED CASE TO STICK IT TO FEMALE REFUGEES PERSECUTED BY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE! — America’s Worst Circuit Strikes Again! — Jaco v. Garland

https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/20/20-60081-CV0.pdf

PANEL:  Jolly, Elrod, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.

OPINION: Jennifer Walker Elrod, Circuit Judge

KEY QOUTE:

We will start, as we did in Gonzales-Veliz, with the state of immigration law. In Matter of M-E-V-G-, the BIA synthesized prior BIA decisions addressing the definition of “particular social group.” 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 228 (BIA 2014). In doing so, it clarified that an applicant must show that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question. Id. at 237. Furthermore, there must

3 The Attorney General issued A-B-II to clarify questions arising from A-B-I. Matter of A-B-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 199 (A.G. 2021) (A-B-II).

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be a nexus between the particular social group and its persecution; the persecution must be “on account of” membership in the group. Id. at 242; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).

In clarifying these requirements, the BIA carefully distinguished between the existence of a social group and the nexus between that social group and its persecution. As to the existence of a social group, drawing on the language of the statute, prior BIA decisions, and federal circuit court decisions, the BIA stated that the “social group must exist independently of the fact of persecution,” and that “this criterion is well established in our prior precedents and is already a part of the social group analysis.” M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 236 n.11 (citing Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74 (BIA 2007) and Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 172 (3d Cir. 2003)); see also id. at 242 (referencing the text and structure of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)).

This does not mean that past persecution is irrelevant. Rather, it means that the group must be sufficiently defined and particularized by characteristics other than persecution. See W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 216 (“Circuit courts have long recognized that a social group must have ‘defined boundaries’ or a ‘limiting characteristic,’ other than the risk of being persecuted, in order to be recognized.”). To illustrate, the BIA considered a hypothetical group of former employees of a country’s attorney general. M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 242–43. The employees’ shared experience of working for the attorney general satisfied the requirement of an immutable characteristic. And the group would also be sufficiently particularized. But the group, without more, may not be considered sufficiently distinct in its society. In this case, government persecution may “cataly[ze] the society to distinguish the former employees in a meaningful way and consider them a distinct group.” Id. at 243. But “the immutable characteristic of their shared past experience exists independent of the persecution.” Id.

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In a decision released on the same day as M-E-V-G-, the BIA elaborated on the nexus requirement. W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (BIA 2014). In W-G-R-, the BIA stated that “membership in a particular social group [must be] a central reason for [the] persecution.” Id. at 224. This common-sense definition highlights the importance of the distinction between the existence of a group and the persecution that it suffers. In the BIA’s words: “The structure of the Act supports preserving this distinction, which should not be blurred by defining a social group based solely on the perception of the persecutor.” Id. at 218. To define a social group by its persecution collapses the “particular social group” and “persecution on account of membership” inquiries into the same question, contrary to the structure of the INA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).

Nevertheless, later in the same year the BIA decided A-R-C-G-. 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014). In A-R-C-G-, the petitioner claimed that “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” constituted a particular social group. Id. at 388–89. Whereas the IJ determined that the woman’s husband did not abuse her “on account of” her membership in this group, the BIA reversed on appeal. Professing to apply M-E-V-G-, it determined that the “immutable characteristics” of “gender,” “marital status,” and “the inability to leave the relationship” combined “to create a group with discrete and definable boundaries.” A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 393.

In 2018, however, the Attorney General overruled A-R-C-G- in A-B-I. 27 I. & N. Dec. at 316. After the BIA recognized the group “El Salvadoran women who are unable to leave their domestic relationships where they have children in common [with their partners],” the Attorney General directed the BIA to refer the decision for his review. Id. at 316–17, 321; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i). Upon review, the Attorney General reversed. He reiterated that “[t]o be cognizable, a particular social group must ‘exist

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independently’ of the harm asserted in an application for asylum or statutory withholding of removal.” Id. at 334 (citing M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 236 n.11, 243; W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 215; and a collection of federal circuit court cases). He reasoned that “[i]f a group is defined by the persecution of its members, then the definition of the group moots the need to establish actual persecution.” Id. at 335. For this reason, he concluded that “[g]enerally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify for asylum.” Id. at 320.

A-B-I, however, was itself overruled by the Attorney General in 2021. On February 2, 2021, the President issued an executive order directing the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security to address the definition of “a particular social group.” Exec. Order No. 14010, § 4(c)(ii), 86 Fed. Reg. 8267, 8271 (Feb. 2, 2021). Because A-B-I and A-B-II addressed that definition, the Attorney General vacated both decisions in anticipation of further rulemaking. He also instructed immigration judges and the BIA to follow “pre-A-B-I precedent, including A-R-C-G-.” A-B-III, 28 I. & N. Dec. at 307.

B.

Swept up in this flurry of overrulings is our decision in Gonzales-Veliz. In that case, we faced the question whether the group “Honduran women unable to leave their relationship”—defined identically to Jaco’s proposed social group—qualified as a particular social group. 938 F.3d at 223. Issued after A-B-I but before A-B-III, we relied in part on A-B-I in concluding that the group was not cognizable. Thus, keeping in mind our duty to exercise Chevron deference, we must determine whether the overruling of A-B-I gives us reason to depart from our decision in Gonzales-Veliz. We hold that it does not.

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In holding that the group in Gonzales-Veliz was not cognizable, we relied in part on A-B-I. Yet we relied on A-B-I not out of deference to it but based on the quality of its reasoning. Indeed, our decision hinged on the inherent circularity involved in defining a particular social group by reference to the very persecution from which it flees. We held that the group was “impermissibly defined in a circular manner. The group is defined by, and does not exist independently of, the harm—i.e., the inability to leave.” Id. at 232. For this reason, we concluded that such an interpretation would “render the asylum statute unrecognizable.” Id. at 235.

In contrast, we recognized that the Attorney General’s “interpretation of the INA in [A-B-I] is . . . a much more faithful interpretation” of the statute. Id. This interpretation was, we said, “a return to the statutory text as Congress created it and as it had existed before the BIA’s A-R-C-G- decision.” Id. That our conclusion had support in the overwhelming weight of BIA precedents shows only that our reading of the statute was correct, not that A-B-I or any other decision was necessary for our conclusion.

Nor does Chevron deference affect our conclusion here. Although we review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo, we grant Chevron deference to the BIA’s precedential decisions interpreting statutes that it administers. E.g., Rodriguez-Avalos v. Holder, 788 F.3d 444, 449 (5th Cir. 2015). Chevron entails a two-step process for determining whether deference is appropriate. First, the relevant statutory provision must be ambiguous. And second, the agency’s interpretation must be reasonable. E.g., Dhuka v. Holder, 716 F.3d 149, 154 (5th Cir. 2013). Here, even assuming arguendo that the phrase “particular social group” is ambiguous and that A-R-C-G- requires upholding the cognizability of Jaco’s group, that interpretation would be unreasonable for the reasons we gave in Gonzales-Veliz. Relying on circular reasoning is a logical fallacy. An interpretation that renders circular a

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statute’s reasoning is unreasonable and therefore unworthy of deference

under Chevron.4

In the alternative, we hold that even if Gonzales-Veliz were not good law, Jaco’s petition would still be denied.5 Following pre-A-B-I precedent, as A-B-III instructs, would not change the result. In A-B-III, the Attorney General instructed immigration judges and the BIA to follow “pre-A-B-I precedent, including [A-R-C-G-].” A-B-III, 28 I. & N. Dec. at 307. This was also the relevant law at the time of the IJ’s decision, and the IJ correctly distinguished Jaco’s case from that upheld in A-R-C-G-. Because A-R-C-G- is not clearly on point and did not overrule prior case law, we must

4 Our circuit has consistently refused to recognize particular social groups defined primarily by the persecution they suffer. This is true before and after both A-R-C-G- and Gonzales-Veliz. E.g., Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 518–19 (5th Cir. 2012); De Leon-Saj v. Holder, 583 F. App’x 429, 430–31 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam); Suate-Orellana v. Barr, 979 F.3d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 2020); Gomez-De Saravia v. Barr, 793 F. App’x 338, 339–40 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam); Serrano-de Portillo v. Barr, 792 F. App’x 341, 342 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam); Hercules v. Garland, 855 F. App’x 940, 942 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam); Argueta-Luna v. Garland, 847 F. App’x 260, 261 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).

This is true even after A-B-III. See Castillo-Martinez v. Garland, No. 20-60276, 2021 WL 4186411, at *2 (5th Cir. Sept. 14, 2021) (per curiam); Santos-Palacios v. Garland, No. 20-60123, 2021 WL 3501985, at *1–2 (5th Cir. Aug. 9, 2021); Temaj-Augustin v. Garland, 854 F. App’x 631, 632 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).

Some, but not all, of our sister circuits have agreed with this anti-circularity principle. Sanchez-Lopez v. Garland, No. 18-72221, 2021 WL 3912145, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 2021); Del Carmen Amaya-De Sicaran v. Barr, 979 F.3d 210, 217–18 (4th Cir. 2020); Amezcua-Preciado v. United States Attorney General, 943 F.3d 1337, 1345–46 & n.3 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam); but see Juan Antonio v. Barr, 959 F.3d 778, 789 n.2, 791–92 (6th Cir. 2020) (observing that “married indigenous women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” constitutes a cognizable particular social group); Corea v. Garland, No. 19-3537/20-3252, 2021 WL 2774260, at *3–4 (6th Cir. July 2, 2021) (remanding to the BIA to consider whether “Honduran women unable to leave their relationships” is a cognizable social group in light of A-B-III).

5 Alternative holdings are not dicta and are binding in this circuit. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 178 n.158 (5th Cir. 2015).

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read it in light of prior BIA decisions, including M-E-V-G-. Cf. Gonzales- Veliz, 938 F.3d at 235 (“[A-B-I] did not alter [prior immigration law]; it simply restated established legal principles and overruled A-R-C-G- because A-R-C-G- deviated from those principles.”).

Indeed, multiple factors counsel toward reading A-R-C-G- narrowly, including (1) the fact that DHS had conceded the existence of a particular social group, and (2) A-R-C-G-’s own statement that “where concessions are not made and accepted as binding, these issues will be decided based on the particular facts and evidence on a case-by-case basis as addressed by the Immigration Judge in the first instance.” 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392–93, 395. For these reasons, Jaco’s group would not be recognized even if Gonzales-Veliz were not the law of this circuit.

We also reject Jaco’s argument that intervening BIA decisions since the time of the IJ’s decision require a remand of her case. A-R-C-G- was the relevant law at the time of the IJ’s decision. Now that A-R-C-G- has been revived, a remand would place Jaco back where she started. And her claims have already been correctly rejected under that standard. Alternatively, regardless of the controlling decision, only an unreasonable interpretation of the INA can support her proposed group.

A remand is also inappropriate because it would be futile. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 210 F.3d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (declining to remand where a remand would be futile); see also Villegas v. Stephens, 631 F. App’x 213, 214 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (same). Applicants for asylum or withholding of removal must show that the government “is unable or unwilling to control” the applicant’s persecution. See Tesfamichael v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)). As the IJ held—and as the BIA affirmed in its first decision—Jaco failed to make this showing. Jaco received child support and

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a restraining order from the Honduran government against her former partner. While her former partner appeared to violate the restraining order on at least two occasions, Jaco reported only one occasion to the judge, and never informed the police. Rather than being unable or unwilling to protect her, the record reflects that the government was responsive to her fears when apprised of them. Therefore, even if Jaco could show membership in a cognizable particular social group, a remand would be futile because it would not change the disposition of her case.6

In holding that Jaco’s proposed group is not cognizable, we do not hold that women who have suffered from domestic violence are categorically precluded from membership in a particular social group. We hold only that a particular social group’s immutable characteristics must make the group sufficiently particularized and socially distinct without reference to the very persecution from which its members flee. E.g., Perez-Rabanales v. Sessions, 881 F.3d 61, 67 (1st Cir. 2018) (“A sufficiently distinct social group must exist independent of the persecution claimed to have been suffered by the alien and must have existed before the alleged persecution began.”); Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The individuals in the group must share a narrowing characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted.”).

Accordingly, even if Jaco’s group meets the immutable characteristic and nexus requirements, we still hold that her group is neither particularized nor socially distinct.7 In Gonzales-Veliz, we determined that—even as defined by the persecution that it suffers—the group “Honduran women unable to leave their relationships” lacked the requisite particularity and

6 See supra note 5. 7 See supra note 5.

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social distinction. 938 F.3d at 232; see also Suate-Orellana v. Barr, 979 F.3d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 2020); Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 521–22 (5th Cir. 2012). The same is true here. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that her group is neither particularized nor distinct. And without the illicit element of persecution, the group “Honduran women” is even less particularized. Jaco’s proposed group fails this test.

****************************

Judge Elrod’s opinion is as preposterous as it is intellectually dishonest and legally wrong. Of course “Honduran women” — whether in a relationship or not — are both socially distinct in society and “particularized” as it excludes men and women of other nationalities. And, there can be little doubt based on empirical reports about femicide and its causes that Honduran women suffer disproportionately.

Indeed, until the BIA went to work restricting the definition following the “Ashcroft Purge of ‘03” the “touchstone” for recognizing a particular social group was “immutability” (including “fundamental to identity”). See,e.g., Matter of Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357 (BIA 1996).

Indeed, most refugee NGOs and experts view the BIA’s departure from the “immutability test” as both improper and intellectually dishonest. “Social visibility” actually was put forward by the UNHCR as a way of expanding the refugee coverage by insuring the inclusion of groups that strictly speaking might not be “immutable” or “fundamental to identity.” 

Contrary to Judge Elrod’s claim, the 1951 Refugee Convention, upon which our Refugee Act of 1980 was modeled, was intended to protect, not reject, refugees to insure that there would be no repetition of the Western democracies’ disgraceful performance prior to and during the Holocaust!

The best comment I have seen so far is from my friend and immigration guru Dan Kowalski: 

This is a travesty.  For such an important case, the Court should have appointed counsel.  I hope pro bono counsel will step in to petition for rehearing and/or en banc review.

“Travesties of justice” are what right wing Federal Judges and White Nationalist restrictionist politicos stand for. The only question is when, if ever, is Congress finally going to act to put an end to this continuing national disgrace that actually harms and kills refugees?

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

10-27-21

⚖️🗽👩‍⚖️ U.S. CIRCUIT JUDGE BEVERLY MARTIN 🌟 “OUTS” TRUMPY COLLEAGUES’ INTELLECTUAL DISHONESTY, BIA’S MALICIOUS INCOMPETENCE IN STINGING DISSENT FROM BOGUS ASYLUM DENIAL! — Garland’s Failure To “Pull Plug” On “Miller-Lite BIA” Continues To Cost Innocent Lives,☠️⚰️ Undermine American Justice, 🏴‍☠️ Outrage Human Rights Experts!🤮   

Judge Beverly Martin
Honorable Beverly Martin
Circuit Judge, 11th Circuit Court of Appeals
PHOTO: Wikipedia

https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201913715.pdf

Murugan v. U.S. Atty Gen., 08-24-21, published

PANEL:   MARTIN (Obama), NEWSOM (Trump), and BRANCH (Trump), Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: Judge Branch

DISSENT: Judge Martin

KEY QUOTES FROM DISSENT:

The majority opinion gives no more consideration to Mr. Murugan’s claims

and individualized evidence than did the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Immigration Judge. That is to say not much consideration at all.

Mr. Murugan produced evidence that in October 2018, the Sri Lankan government changed drastically when the former president, who had been accused of authorizing war crimes and other human rights abuses against Tamils “blindsided” political observers and “sudden[ly]” returned as prime minister. Because Mr. Murugan is a member of the Tamil ethnic group, his attorney brought up these facts at the hearing before the IJ. But the IJ took no notice of this evidence, finding that Mr. Murugan’s country conditions evidence was outdated because it included materials related to the former president’s rule from 2014 to 2016. Mr. Murugan argued to the BIA that the IJ improperly disregarded these new facts, because they were relevant to what treatment the Tamils could expect from the newly returned prime minister. Even so, the BIA mechanically adopted the IJ’s decision that Mr. Murugan’s evidence was outdated. Mr. Murugan has now tried a third time, pointing out the significance of this evidence in his brief before this Court.

The majority opinion, like the IJ and the BIA, fails to engage with this

evidence. But I see it as substantial and highly probative evidence of a pattern or 19

USCA11 Case: 19-13715 Date Filed: 08/24/2021 Page: 20 of 34

practice of government persecution of Tamils. Because I believe Mr. Murugan met his burden of showing he had a well-founded fear of future persecution based on the Sri Lankan government’s practice of persecuting Tamils, I would grant him relief on this claim.

. . . .

When this Court is tasked with reviewing a decision of the BIA, we must

actually review it, albeit with deference. This majority opinion may condemn Mr. Murugan to extreme persecution in Sri Lanka because it failed to actually examine the evidence of recent political changes in that country. When a dictator with a well-documented history of persecuting an ethnic group returns to power, surely

33

USCA11 Case: 19-13715 Date Filed: 08/24/2021 Page: 34 of 34

our law does not require a member of that group wait to again experience persecution before he can claim asylum. Mr. Murugan has met his burden here. I respectfully dissent.

************

I encourage everyone to read Judge Martin’s complete dissent. By contrast, Judge Elizabeth Branch’s majority opinion is a vapid, disingenuous, piece of right-wing legal sophistry. As my colleague, Hon. “Sir Jeffrey” Chase observed, Branch was “Associate General Counsel for Rules and Legislation, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in 2004-2005,” during the Bush II Administration.

Judge Martin will retire from the bench on September 30, 2021, thus giving President Biden a chance to appoint her replacement. So, this might be her last immigration opinion.

Judge Martin calls out her intellectually dishonest Trumpy colleagues and accurately characterizes BIA review as no review at all. (Actually, it’s worse than no review, because the BIA sometimes reverses correct IJ asylum grants and rewrites decisions to make it easier for OIL to defend bad denials.)

No matter how poorly they perform their judicial duties (the majority decision in this case certainly stands out as one of many low points in recent American jurisprudence) Trump’s and McConnell’s far righty Article IIIs enjoy lifetime sinecures.

But, EOIR “judges,” particularly after the last two decades of political interference with any semblance of “judicial independence,” enjoy no such exalted lifetime protection. As DOJ keeps pointing out, they are “mere Government attorneys” who can be reassigned to a wide range of attorney positions at the discretion of the Attorney General. 

Thus Garland could, and should, remove and reassign poorly qualified judges and replace them with real, well-qualified expert progressive judges who understand asylum law, will fairly apply it, will issue some positive asylum precedents, and will control the “Asylum Deniers Club” operating in Immigration Courts throughout America. The dysfunction, institutionalized unfairness, and “worst practices,” are particularly acute after four years of poor judicial selections, a BIA packed with anti-asylum zealots, and defective training by biased, anti-asylum AGs under fatally flawed and discriminatory selection procedures

Judge Martin “gets it.” How come nobody on Team Garland does?

As we can see, from the Supremes to the “retail level” at the Immigration Courts, the consequences of poor right-wing judging fall most heavily on migrants, women, children, and people of color. Progressives could change that around at EOIR. But, Judge Garland doesn’t seem up to the job, as the opportunity for long overdue, systemic, life saving changes at EOIR continues to slip through his fingers!

But, I repeat myself, obviously to no avail.

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

08-24-21

‘SIR JEFFREY” CHASE: Garland’s “First Steps” To Eradicate Misogyny & Anti-Asylum Bias @ EOIR Are Totally Insufficient Without Progressive Personnel Changes — Regulations Will Only Be Effective If Drafted By Progressive Human Rights Experts Of Which There Currently Are NONE @ DOJ Save For Some Immigration Judges In The Field Whose Expertise, Intellectual Integrity, & Moral Courage Has Been Ignored By Team Garland! — There Will Be No Gender, Racial, Or Immigrant Justice @ Justice As Long As Garland Mindlessly Lets “Miller’s Club Denial” Operate @ BIA! — Progressives Must Turn Up The Heat On Garland To Reform & Remake EOIR With Qualified Expert Judges & Dynamic, Independent, Progressive Leaders!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2021/6/21/first-steps

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges

The latest from the Hon. “Sir Jeffrey:”

JEFFREY S. CHASE | OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGRATION LAW

Blog Archive Press and Interviews Calendar Contact

First Steps

On June 16, Attorney General Merrick Garland finally, mercifully vacated three decisions that formed a key part of the Trump administration’s unrelenting attack on the law of asylum.1  Matter of A-B-,  issued by Jeff Sessions in June 2018, took aim in particular at victims of domestic violence.2  Matter of L-E-A-, issued the following year by William Barr, sought to undermine protection for those targeted by gangs due to their familial ties.3  And on January 14, 2021, six days from the end of the Trump Administration, acting A.G. Jeffrey Rosen issued a second decision in A-B-, gratuitously criticizing the method for determining nexus in asylum claims employed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, while conveniently evading that court’s review of the original decision in the case through remand.4

Garland’s action restores the law to where it stood prior to June 11, 2018, but only for the time being.  Proposed rules on the subject (which Garland referenced) are due by October 30, when they will first be subjected to a period of public comment.  If final rules are eventually published, it will occur well into next year.

As we sigh in collective relief and celebrate the first steps towards correcting our asylum laws, let’s also take note of the imperfect place in which the case law stands at present.

As to domestic violence claims, the BIA’s 2014 decision in Matter of A-R-C-G- (which Matter of A-B- had vacated) has been restored as binding precedent.5  That decision was issued at a time when (as now) regulations addressing particular social groups were being contemplated by DHS and EOIR.6  While A-R-C-G- was an extremely welcome development, the Board used it to recognize a rather narrowly-defined group: “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.”  In a footnote to the decision, the Board declined to address the argument of several amici (including UNHCR) that a particular social group may be defined by gender alone.  Although A-R-C-G- led to many grants of asylum, some immigration judges relied on the limited scope of the group’s definition to deny claims involving slightly broader variations, in particular, where the victim was not legally married, but nevertheless in a domestic relationship that she was unable to leave.  While the BIA reversed some of those denials in unpublished decisions, it declined to speak to the issue through binding precedent.

As to Matter of L-E-A-, Garland’s recent action returns us to the BIA’s original opinion in that case.7  While the decision acknowledged that families constitute particular social groups (a point that was not in dispute, having been universally recognized for some 35 years and stipulated to by DHS), the BIA still denied asylum by invoking a legally incorrect standard for establishing nexus that it has continued to apply in all family-based asylum claims.

For these reasons, the content of the forthcoming regulations will be extremely important in determining the future of asylum in this country.  While a return to the test for social group cognizability expressed in the BIA’s 1985 precedent in Matter of Acosta tops most regulation wish lists, I will focus the discussion here on a couple of more specific items necessary to correct the shortcomings of Matter of A-R-C-G- and Matter of L-E-A-.

First, the regulations need to explicitly recognize that a particular social group may be defined by gender alone.  In its 2002 Gender Guidelines, UNHCR identified women “as a clear example of a social subset defined by innate and immutable characteristics, and who are frequently treated differently than men,” and whose “characteristics also identify them as a group in society, subjecting them to different treatment and standards in some countries.”8  However, over the nineteen years since those guidelines were issued, the BIA has consistently avoided considering the issue.

The peril of defining gender-based groups in the more narrow manner employed by the BIA has been addressed by two distinguished commentators, who explain that such practice results in “constant re-litigating of such claims,” sometimes creating “an obstacle course in which the postulated group undergoes constant redefinition.”9  And of course, that is exactly what has happened here, as A-R-C-G- gave way to A-B-, which led to differing interpretations among different courts until Garland’s recent reset.  The above-mentioned commentators further decried the “nitpicking around the margins of the definition” resulting from the narrow approach when the true reason for the risk of persecution to the applicant “is simply her membership in the social group of ‘women.’”10  Regulations recognizing gender alone as a particular social group would thus provide clarity to judges and asylum officers, eliminate the wastefulness of drawn out litigation involving “nitpicking around the margins,” and bring our laws into line with international standards.

But as L-E-A- demonstrates, recognition of a group alone does not guarantee asylum protection.  In order for a group’s recognition to be meaningful, the regs must also address an ongoing problem with the BIA’s method for determining nexus, or whether persecution is “on account of” the group membership.

The BIA is accorded deference by Article III courts when it reasonably interprets immigration laws, provided that the meaning of the language in question is ambiguous.  However, the “on account of” standard included by Congress in defining the term “refugee” is quite clear; its meaning is long established, and in fact, is not particular to immigration law.

The Supreme Court referenced this standard last year in a non-immigration case, Bostock v. Clayton County.  The Court explained that the test

incorporates the “‘simple’” and “traditional” standard of but-for causation…. That form of causation is established whenever a particular outcome would not have happened “but for” the purported cause….In other words, a but-for test directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes. If it does, we have found a but-for cause.11

In a 2015 decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied this exact test in the asylum context to conclude that persecution was on account of family, determining that the petitioner’s “relationship to her son is why she, and not another person, was threatened with death if she did not allow him to join Mara 18.”12  But for some reason, the BIA has felt entitled to reject this established standard outside of the Fourth Circuit in favor of its own excessively restrictive one.

Had the proper test for nexus been employed in L-E-A-, asylum would have been granted.  Under the facts of that case, once the familial relationship is removed from the equation, the asylum-seeker’s risk ceases to exist.  However, the BIA instead imposed an incorrect test for nexus requiring evidence of an “animus against the family or the respondent based on their biological ties, historical status, or other features unique to that family unit.”13

As a former circuit court judge, Garland is particularly qualified to recognize the error in the Board’s approach, as well as the need to correct its course.  The problem is compounded by the particular composition of the BIA at present.  For example, of the ten immigration judges who were promoted to the BIA during the Trump administration, nine denied asylum more than 90 percent of the time (with the tenth denying 85 percent of such claims).  Three had an asylum denial rate in excess of 98 percent.14

This matters, as those high denial rates were achieved in part by using faulty nexus determinations to deny asylum in domestic violence claims, even before the issuance of Matter of A-B-.  This was often accomplished by mischaracterizing the abuse as merely personal in nature, referencing only the persecutor’s generally violent nature or inebriated state.  The analysis in those decisions did not further examine whether gender might also have been one central reason that the asylum seeker, and not someone else, was targeted.

One BIA Member appointed under Trump recently found no nexus in a domestic violence claim by concluding that the persecutor had not targeted the asylum seeker because of her membership in the group consisting of “women,” but rather because she was his woman. There is no indication in the decision that the Board Member considered why the persecutor might view another human being as belonging to him and lacking the same rights he seems to enjoy.  Might it have been because of her gender?

Without a correction through published regulations, there is little reason to expect different treatment of these claims moving forward.  Let’s hope that the Attorney General views his recent action as only the first steps on a longer path to a correct application of the law.

Copyright 2021, Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved.

Notes:

  1. Matter of A-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 307 (A.G. 2021) (“A-B- III”); Matter of L-E-A-, 28 I&N Dec. 304 (A.G. 2021) (“L-E-A- III”).
  2. 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) (“A-B- I”).
  3. 27 I&N Dec. 581 (A.G. 2019) (“L-E-A- II”).
  4. 28 I&N Dec. 199 (A.G. 2021) (“A-B- II”).
  5. 26 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014).
  6. The regulations under consideration at that time were never issued.
  7. 27 I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 2017) (“L-E-A- I”).
  8. UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (May 2002) at para. 30.
  9. James C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status, Second Edition (Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 442.
  10. Hathaway and Foster, supra.
  11. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S.Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020).
  12. Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944, 950 (4th Cir. 2015).
  13.  L-E-A- I, supra at 47.
  14. See TRAC (Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse) Immigration Judge Reports https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judgereports/.Republished with permission.

 

*************************

Without progressive intervention, this is still headed for failure @ EOIR! A few things to keep in mind.

    • Former Attorney General, the late Janet Reno, ordered the same regulations on gender-based asylum to be promulgated more than two decades ago — never happened!
    • The proposed regulations that did finally emerge along the way (long after Reno’s departure) were horrible — basically an ignorant mishmash of various OIL litigation positions that would have actually made it easier for IJs to arbitrarily deny asylum (as if they needed any invitation) and easier for OIL to defend such bogus denials.
    • There is nobody currently at “Main Justice” or EOIR HQ qualified to draft these regulations! Without long overdue progressive personnel changes the project is almost “guaranteed to fail” – again!
    • Any regulations entrusted to the current “Miller Lite Denial Club” @ the BIA ☠️ will almost certainly be twisted out of proportion to deny asylum and punish women refugees, as well as deny due process and mock fundamental fairness. It’s going to take more than regulations to change the “culture of denial” and the “institutionalized anti-due-process corner cutting” @ the BIA and in many Immigration Courts.
    • Garland currently is mindlessly operating the “worst of all courts” — a so-called “specialized (not) court” where the expertise, independence, and decisional courage is almost all “on the outside” and sum total of the subject matter expertise and relevant experience of those advocating before his bogus “courts” far exceeds that of the “courts” themselves and of Garland’s own senior team! That’s why the deadly, embarrassing, sophomoric mistakes keep flowing into the Courts of Appeals on a regular basis. 
    • No regulation can bring decisional integrity and expertise to a body that lacks both! 
    • Any progressive who thinks Garland is going to solve the problem @ EOIR without “outside intervention” should keep this nifty “five month snapshot of EOIR under Biden” in mind:
      • Progressive judges appointed to BIA: 0
      • Progressive judges appointed to Immigration Court: 0
      • Progressives installed in leadership positions @ EOIR permanently or temporarily: 0
      • Billy Barr Selected Immigration Judges Appointed: 17
      • “Miller Lite” holdover individuals still holding key positions @ EOIR: many (only two removed to date)
      • Number of BIA precedents decided in favor of respondent: 2
      • Number of BIA precedents decided in favor of DHS: 9

That’s right, folks: Billy Barr and Stephen Miller have had more influence and gotten more deference from Garland at EOIR than have the progressive experts and advocates who fought tirelessly to preserve due process and to get the Biden Administration into office. How does that a make sense? 

Miller Lite
“Miller Lite” – Garland’s Vision of “Justice @ Justice” for Communities of Color — Finally vacating two grotesquely wrong anti-female, anti-asylum precedents hasn’t ended the “Miller Lite Unhappy Hour” for migrants and their advocates at Garland’s foundering DOJ!

Progressives, advocates, and NGOs must keep raising hell until we finally get the “no-brainer,” long overdue, obvious, personnel, legal, structural, institutional, and cultural changes at EOIR that America needs! Waiting for Judge Garland to get around to it is like “Waiting for Godot!” Perhaps worse — I don’t recollect that anyone died waiting for Godot!

🇺🇸Due Process Forever! The BIA Denial Club, Never!🏴‍☠️

PWS

06-22-21

🏴‍☠️☠️⚰️🤮👎IT JUST KEEPS GETTING WORSE @ GARLAND’S BIA — Plethora of Errors, Mischaracterizations, Misogyny, and Abuses Emanate From Garland’s Deadly, Out Of Control Star Chambers In Falls Church — How Many Deaths & Embarrassments Is It Going To Take For  Judge G. To Finally Pull The Plug 🔌 On This Dangerous, Incompetent Band Of Scofflaws?  — Issue = Asylum For Rape Victim/Abused Widow In India!

Woman Tortured
“When will it end, Judge G? When will it ever end?” –“She struggled madly in the torturing Ray”
Amazing StoriesArtist Unknown, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

 

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/06/21/18-72786.pdf

Kaur v. Garland, 9th Cir., 06-21-21, published

PANEL:Mary M. Schroeder and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges, and Salvador Mendoza, Jr.,* District Judge.

OPINION BY: Judge Mendoza

STAFF SUMMARY:

Granting Ravinder Kaur’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, and remanding, the panel held that the Board erred in concluding that Kaur failed to establish material changed circumstances to warrant an exception to the time limitation on her motion to reopen, and in concluding that she failed to establish prima facie eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention Against Torture.

Kaur sought to reopen her removal proceedings based on a combination of changed personal circumstances – the death of her abusive husband and his family’s threats that they would kill her if she returned to India because she was responsible for his death, and changed country conditions – including worsening conditions in India for women and widows.

The panel held that the Board mischaracterized the record and erred in concluding that Kaur presented evidence of only changed personal circumstances in support of reopening. The panel explained that while a self-induced change in personal circumstances does not qualify for the changed circumstances exception, that principle cannot apply rigidly when changed circumstances in the country of origin, while personal to the petitioner, are entirely outside her control, as was the case here. The panel further

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

   

KAUR V. GARLAND 3

explained that even where any change in personal circumstances is voluntary and did not originate in the country of nationality, the changed circumstances exception applies where changes in personal circumstances are made relevant due to changes in country conditions. The panel wrote that Kaur’s husband’s death, and his family’s death threats, were made relevant by increased violence in India against women, and in particular against widows. The panel further wrote that, contrary to the Board’s determination that Kaur provided evidence of only generalized conditions, Kaur presented evidence demonstrating that the prevalence and severity of human rights violations against women and widows had materially worsened in many respects.

The panel held that the Board also erred in concluding that Kaur failed to establish prima facie eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal relief. First, the panel concluded that the Board erred in determining that Kaur failed to establish that a protected ground, including her membership in a family social group, would be one central reason, or a reason, for the harm she fears. The panel wrote that a person may share an identity with a persecutor, and if a member of a particular social group is persecuted by other members of that same group because those members perceive the applicant as being “insufficiently loyal or authentic” to that group, she has been persecuted on account of a protected ground. Second, the panel concluded that the Board erred by requiring Kaur to show that her similarly situated family members had been mistreated. The panel explained that the safety of similarly situated members of the family who remained in the country of origin may be pertinent to a claim of future persecution, but does not itself disprove it, and in this case, the Board relied on the safety of Kaur’s daughter, who was not similarly situated. Third, the

 

4 KAUR V. GARLAND

panel concluded that the cultural context and Kaur’s evidence established more than a mere personal vendetta.

The panel held that the Board erred in concluding that Kaur failed to establish prima facie eligibility for CAT protection. First, the panel held that the Board erred in applying a “more likely than not” standard, rather than requiring Kaur to show a “reasonable likelihood” of meeting the statutory requirements for CAT protection. Moreover, the panel concluded that the Board abused its discretion in determining that Kaur did not meet the government consent or acquiescence requirement. The panel pointed out that Kaur presented evidence that her husband’s family is wealthy and has the means of carrying out their threats, that India suffers from widespread corruption, and that officials respond ineffectively to crimes, especially those against women. Based on that evidence, the panel concluded that the Board did not have substantial evidence to dismiss Kaur’s fears as speculation.

***********************

This is outrageous! In addition to raising issues about Garland’s failure to replace the “Killer BIA” with real progressive judges who are experts in human rights, due process, and immigration law, as almost every expert recommended, it raises serious concerns about Associate AG Vanita Gupta’s inexplicable failure to bring in litigation competence at OIL. Presenting and defending this mess as acceptable performance by DOJ quasi-judicial officials raises very serious ethical questions about both the “judges” and the attorneys defending their obviously defective, bias-based, anti-asylum, anti-female work product.   

As many of us have been saying ever since the election, the “thorough housecleaning” at DOJ can’t wait! There is plenty of evidence to get the government lawyers participating in this mockery of justice out of leadership and decision-making positions, at a minimum! The fact that this case was argued under the Trump regime does not change the unethical performance at OIL or the incompetence of the BIA. Folks who “go along to get along” with violations of law and ethics, particularly in support of a White Nationalist agenda, should not be holding responsible Government legal positions. PERIOD!

Every individual and group who believes in due process, equal justice, gender fairness, good government, humanity, racial justice, and legal ethical norms should be demanding that Garland, Monaco, Gupta, and Clarke change leadership at EOIR, immediately relieve and replace (even if on a temporary basis) the BIA, and bring ethics, expertise, and competence to OIL. 

Kristen Clarke, some the most outrageous “civil rights abuses” in America here taking place right at the DOJ — at EOIR and OIL! Others are “hidden in plain sight” at DHS, particularly in their “New American Gulag.” You’re NOT going to solve voting rights, police misconduct, or any other civil rights problem in America without first getting the DOJ’s house in order. And, that means standing up to your dawdling and, to date, remarkably ineffective “political bosses” and demanding immediate change!

It’s YOUR REPUTATION, along with the lives of refugee women like Ms. Kaur, that are on the line here!

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

06-21-21

😎WIN ONE, LOSE ONE☹️:  9TH CIR. ANNIHILATES MATTER OF ARMENDAREZ-MENDEZ (SUA SPONTE REOPENING), WHILE 11TH  CIR. WOODENLY ENDORSES 👎🏻 MATTER OF L-E-A- (NEXUS)!☠️⚰️

https://www.lexisnexis.com/LegalNewsRoom/immigration/b/insidenews/posts/ca9-on-departure-bar-sua-sponte-reopening-balerio-rubalcaba-v-garland#

CA9 on Departure Bar, Sua Sponte Reopening: Balerio Rubalcaba v. Garland

Balerio Rubalcaba v. Garland

“This case presents the question whether the departure bar limits an IJ’s ability to reopen immigration proceedings sua sponte. We have jurisdiction to review questions of law under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), and we conclude that the departure bar does not apply in the context of sua sponte reopening. That is, an IJ’s discretion to reopen a case on his or her own motion is not limited by the fact that a noncitizen has previously been removed or has departed from the United States. Therefore, we grant the petition for review.”

[Hats off to Elsa Martinez!]

pastedGraphic.png

*****************************

https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201915091.pdf

KELLY SANCHEZ-CASTRO,

versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                     ________________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals _______________________

(June 1, 2021)

Petitioner,

Respondent.

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, LUCK and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:

Kelly Sanchez-Castro, a native of El Salvador, petitions for our review after

she unsuccessfully sought relief from removal because a gang targeted her family based on the assumption that her father’s work in the United States made it

USCA11 Case: 19-15091 Date Filed: 06/01/2021 Page: 2 of 15

wealthy. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, and substantial evidence supports its decision. Sanchez-Castro is ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal because the gang that targeted her family did so only as a means to the end of obtaining funds, not because of any animus against her family. And she is ineligible for protection under the Convention Against Torture because she has not established that any harm she will suffer if returned to her home country will come with at least the acquiescence of a government official. We deny Sanchez-Castro’s petition for review.

. . . .

*************************

Woman Tortured
“Tough noogies, Baby! Chief Judge Pryor and his all-male, all White ivory tower panel don’t see any nexus here! So, suffer and die, Baby, suffer and die!” “She struggled madly in the torturing Ray”
Amazing StoriesArtist Unknown, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

To reach its incorrect and life-threatening endorsement of the BIA’s misconstruction of the nexus requirements (throwing out the normal rules of causation to achieve an anti-asylum-seeker result) the 11th Circuit panel eschewed a much better and more intellectually honest approach by the 4th Circuit in Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944, 950 (4th Cir. 2015).

Notwithstanding Chief Judge Pryor’s cavalier attitude about sending Ms. Castro-Sanchez back to possible death or dismemberment at the hands of gangs who operate with relative impunity in El Salvador, these are not “academic exercises.” They are serious life or death matters involving bad law produced by a (non) “court” (the BIA) controlled by a law enforcement official (the Attorney General) that is not comprised of judges who are recognized experts in asylum and immigration laws and has over recent history construed the law against immigrants at almost every opportunity! 

These two cases show the difference between this panel of the 9th Circuit that takes judicial review and what’s at stake seriously and the “indifferent to humanity” rubber-stamp approach applied by the 11th Circuit panel. We need better judges, progressives with expertise in due process, human rights, immigration, and racial justice at every level of our Federal Judiciary — from the Immigration Courts to the Supremes! Circuits like the 5th and the 11th with long and disgraceful records of relative indifference to the rights and lives of migrants, mostly those of color, are long, long  overdue for infusion of better qualified progressive “practical scholars” and advocates.

That makes the progressive outrage over Garland’s totally inappropriate “giveaway” of Immigration Judge positions he controls to Barr-selected, non progressive, candidates who applied under a flawed recruitment process designed to discourage diversity and exclude the best qualified expert candidates from the private sector, along with his failure to address skewed anti-asylum-seeker precedents like L-E-A- and A-B– all the more understandable! It also makes changes that will put more expert, progressive, due-process oriented judges who have experience representing individuals in court all the more urgent!

Cases like this wouldn’t get into the “Article III Life or Death Lottery” if Garland had dealt promptly and properly with L-E-A-, A-B-, and other Trump-era, anti-asylum, anti-migrant, anti-due-process, misogynist precedents!

Judge Merrick Garland
Attorney General Merrick B. Garland — His failure to institute long-overdue and obvious progressive due process reforms @ EOIR is costing Kelly Castro-Sanchez and other vulnerable refugee women their lives while enraging their advocates! It’s not an “academic exercise,” as Garland seems to think. There are real life consequences and irreparable harm from his failure to take due process, human rights, and racial justice seriously @ EOIR!
Official White House Photo
Public Realm

🇺🇸⚖️🗽🧑🏽‍⚖️Due Process Forever! Tell the Biden Administration that we need progressives, not more “regressives,” on the Federal Bench, starting with the Immigration Courts! End abusive judging by a non-diverse Federal Judiciary!

PWS

06-04-21

🏴‍☠️BIA’S MISOGYNISTIC, ANTI-ASYLUM, IGNORE THE EXPERTS & THE EVIDENCE APPROACH 🤮 REBUKED AGAIN — 9th Cir. Slams BIA Big Time In Rodriguez Tornes v. Garland! — “Concurring, Judge Paez wrote that in addition to ignoring evidence that Rodriguez was targeted on account of her feminist political opinion, the Board also ignored extensive record evidence from a leading authority on domestic violence that directly rejected the Board’s premise that domestic violence is presumed to be motivated by nothing more than the private dynamics of a ‘personal relationship.’”

Four Horsemen
BIA Asylum Panel In Action
Albrecht Dürer, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons
Woman Tortured
“Nothing to see here, fellas, just the private dynamics of a personal relationship! Tough noogies, baby! You should have been born a man. It’s your own fault! Ha! Mercy and compassion? Those aren’t in any of our precedents, are they?” Amazing StoriesArtist Unknown, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons
Kangaroos
“Expert, what expert? We’re the experts! That is, in misogyny, abuse of asylum seekers of color, and specious legal reasoning. And, Garland is letting us get away with it! Whew, for a moment I thought he might have been a ‘real’ judge, but seems he’s just like us. Think I’ll jump for joy! Four more years of unbridled abuse of the most vulnerable and helpless, and I’ll be eligible to retire! Shooting down female asylum seekers for no good reason is like shooting fish in a barrel, just like Jeffy Gonzo and Billy the Bigot taught us! Wonder how many we can kill this year? Happy hunting! But, let’s stay out of the 9th Circuit. It’s dangerous territory. I hear the 5th Circuit loves misogynists and White Nationalists!”
https://www.flickr.com/photos/rasputin243/
Creative Commons License

 

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/04/05/19-71104.pdf

Rodriguez Tornes v. Garland, 9th Cir., 04-05-21

PANEL: Susan P. Graber, M. Margaret McKeown, and Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: Judge Graber

CONCURRING OPINION: Judge Paez

COUNSEL: Elaine J. Goldenberg (argued), Munger Tolles & Olson LLP, Washington, D.C.; Sara A. McDermott, Munger Tolles & Olson LLP, Los Angeles, California; Richard Caldarone, Julie Carpenter, and Rachel Sheridan, Tahirih Justice Center, Falls Church, Virginia; for Petitioner.

Timothy Bo Stanton (argued), Trial Attorney; Sabatino F. Leo, Senior Litigation Counsel; Office of Immigration

  

ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND 5

Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.

Blaine Bookey, Karen Musalo, Neela Chakravartula, and Anne Peterson, Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, U.C. Hastings College of Law, San Francisco, California, for Amicus Curiae Center for Gender & Refugee Studies.

Betsey Boutelle, DLA Piper LLP (US), San Diego, California; Anthony Todaro, Jeffrey DeGroot, and Lianna Bash, DLA Piper LLP (US), Seattle, Washington; for Amicus Curiae National Immigrant Women’s Advocacy Project.

SUMMARY BY COURT STAFF:

Immigration

The panel granted Maria Rodriguez Tornes’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision reversing an immigration judge’s grant of asylum and withholding of removal, and remanded, holding that the evidence compelled the conclusion that Rodriguez established a nexus between her mistreatment in Mexico and her feminist political opinion.

The panel noted that under the Attorney General’s recent decision in Matter of A-B-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 199 (A.G. 2021) (“Matter of A-B- II”), in order to establish the requisite nexus for asylum relief, a protected ground (1) must be a but-for cause of the wrongdoer’s act; and (2) must play more than a minor role—in other words, it cannot be incidental or tangential to another reason for the act. The panel explained that this standard was substantively indistinguishable from this circuit’s precedent. The panel wrote that the fact that an unprotected ground, such as a personal dispute, also constitutes a central reason for persecution does not bar asylum. Rather, if a retributory motive exists alongside a protected motive, an applicant need show only that a protected ground is “one central reason” for his or her persecution.

Observing that this court has held repeatedly that political opinions encompass more than electoral politics or formal

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND 3

political ideology or action, the panel wrote that it had little doubt that feminism qualifies as a political opinion within the meaning of the relevant statutes. The panel concluded that Rodriguez’s testimony concerning equality between the sexes, her work habits, and her insistence on autonomy compelled the conclusion that she has a feminist political opinion. The panel also held that the record compelled the conclusion that Rodriguez’s political opinion was at least one central reason for her past persecution. The panel explained that some of the worst acts of violence came immediately after Rodriguez asserted her rights as a woman, and that the fact that some incidents of abuse may also have reflected a dysfunctional relationship was beside the point, as Rodriguez did not need to show that her political opinion—rather than interpersonal dynamics—played the sole or predominant role in her abuse. By demonstrating that her political opinion was “one central reason” for her persecution, the panel concluded that Rodriguez likewise established that her political opinion was “a reason” for her persecution for purposes of withholding of removal.

Because in granting relief under the Convention Against Torture the agency necessarily determined that Rodriguez carried her burden to prove the other elements of her claims for asylum and withholding of removal, the panel concluded that Rodriguez’s petition presented a recognized exception to the ordinary remand rule under I.N.S. v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002) (per curiam). The panel explained that because the agency concluded that Rodriguez met the higher burden of establishing that she is likely to be tortured, she necessarily met the lower burdens for asylum and withholding relief of establishing that she has a well-founded fear, or clear probability, of persecution. Similarly, because the Board determined that the Mexican government would acquiesce to

4 ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND

Rodriguez’s torture, the panel concluded that the Board had necessarily decided that the Mexican government would be unwilling or unable to protect Rodriguez from future persecution. The panel also concluded that because the Board determined that it would be unreasonable for Rodriguez to relocate within Mexico to avoid future torture, she likewise could not relocate to avoid future persecution.

The panel held that Rodriguez was thus eligible for asylum and entitled to withholding of removal, and it remanded for the Attorney General to exercise his discretion whether to grant Rodriguez asylum, and if asylum is not granted, to grant withholding of removal.

Concurring, Judge Paez wrote that in addition to ignoring evidence that Rodriguez was targeted on account of her feminist political opinion, the Board also ignored extensive record evidence from a leading authority on domestic violence that directly rejected the Board’s premise that domestic violence is presumed to be motivated by nothing more than the private dynamics of a “personal relationship.”

CONCURRING OPINION:

PAEZ, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I join Judge Graber’s fine opinion in full. I write separately on a point the court’s opinion does not address. In rejecting Ms. Rodriguez Tornes’s political opinion claim, the BIA suggests that the presence of a “personal relationship” motivation for intimate partner violence implies that there were no intersectional or additional bases for the violence Ms. Rodriguez Tornes experienced. The court’s opinion thoroughly documents the record evidence, which the BIA ignored, demonstrating how Ms. Rodriguez Tornes was targeted for violence by her domestic partners on account of her feminist political opinion. The BIA, however, also ignored extensive record evidence from expert witness Prof. Nancy Lemon, a leading authority on domestic violence, that directly rejects the BIA’s premise that domestic violence is presumed to be motivated by nothing more than the private dynamics of a “personal relationship.”

In contrast to the BIA’s “personal relationship” view of domestic violence,1 Prof. Lemon draws on more than three

1 The BIA cites Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316, 338–39 (A.G. 2018) as the basis for its assumption.

22 ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND

decades of research, writing, legal representation, and lawmaking to explain that “the socially or culturally constructed and defined identities, roles and responsibilities that are assigned to women, as distinct from those assigned to men, are the root of domestic violence.” She analyzes data from the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics and studies from leading medical and social science publications to highlight “compelling evidence that heterosexual domestic violence is, in significant part, motivated by bias against women and the belief that men are entitled to beat and control women.” Prof. Lemon summarizes cross-cultural studies within the United States and internationally that demonstrate “a correlation between patriarchal norms that support male dominance and violence against women by intimate partners.”

In her report, which the IJ referenced in her decision, Prof. Lemon provides a lengthy examination of social science research exploring how particular behaviors exhibited by male abusers—including emotional abuse, sexual abuse, marital rape, economic abuse, blaming, guilt and using children—are each tied to social belief systems that “men are entitled to dominate and control women because the male sex is considered superior” and operate to “exploit the traditional socially constructed roles, identities, duties and status of women in intimate relationships.” In describing the legal, social, cultural, and political structures that lay the foundations for intimate partner violence, Prof. Lemon explains that “domestic violence is not typically caused by behaviors unique to the victim or by inter-personal dynamics unique to the relationship between the abuser and the abused. . . . Rather, heterosexual male batterers have certain expectations of intimate relationships with regard to which partner will control the relationship and how control will be

ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND 23

exercised. These expectations are premised on a dogmatic adherence to male privilege and rigid, distinct, and unequal roles for women and men.”

The record evidence of Prof. Lemon’s rigorous expert analysis undermines the BIA’s unsubstantiated premise that, unless otherwise shown, domestic violence is a purely private matter. The BIA makes no mention of the record evidence of Prof. Lemon’s expert analysis, let alone the decades of publicly available social science research and public policy that all reject the BIA’s outdated view of domestic violence as a quirk within a “personal relationship.”2 Thus, the BIA’s assertion that domestic violence is presumptively a private matter is not supported by substantial evidence.

2 See e.g., Nina Rabin, At the Border Between Public and Private: U.S. Immigration Policy for Victims of Domestic Violence, 7 Law & Ethics Hum. Rts. 109, 111–12 (2013) (“Fifty years ago, domestic violence was widely understood to be a private matter, and the extent to which it was appropriate for the state to intervene was highly contested. Now, domestic violence shelters, state laws and policies specific to the prosecution of domestic violence crimes, and significant state and federal government support for efforts to eradicate domestic violence are all commonplace. Crucial to bringing about this shift in the state’s role vis-à- vis domestic violence victims has been the acknowledgment of the structural roots of domestic violence. When conceived of as a problem tied to gender subordination and pervasive inequality rather than interpersonal conflict, the violence at issue demands a state response.”); Violence Against Women: Victims of the System, 102d Cong., 63 (1991); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 Conn. L. Rev. 973 (1991); Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating As Prerogative and Privacy, 105 Yale L.J. 2117 (1996); Leslye E. Orloff & Janice v. Kaguyutan, Offering A Helping Hand: Legal Protections for Battered Immigrant Women: A History of Legislative Responses, 10 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 95 (2001); see generally Am. Br. of the National Immigrant Women’s Advocacy Project.

*******************

Congrats to all counsel involved for the “good guys.”

Another completely disastrous performance by the BIA!

Bias, sloppiness, legal errors galore, misuse of the appeals process, dissing experts, ignoring evidence, lousy analysis, an ethically questionable remand attempt by OIL, almost every aspect of the unmitigated professional disaster at the BIA and the failed DOJ is on display in this truly terrible parody of justice. These fundamental defects are what has helped generate incredible backlogs that EOIR and DOJ are attempting to cover up and shift blame to the individuals they systematically malign.

This disgraceful muck heap 🤮 won’t be cleaned up by bogus “case processing requirements!” What this system needs is expertise, fairness, due process, quality control, common sense, and human decency — in huge doses! A complete professional makeover!

Among the many good things about the Circuit decision is that it basically limited the impact of the atrociously wrong Sessions “precedent” in Matter of A-B-, even while overlooking the obvious ethical errors in his maliciously biased dicta and the glaring overarching constitutional problem in his improper interference and participation in the quasi-judicial process. This should be Exhibit 1 in why this process needs to be removed from the DOJ, placed in an independent Article I Court, and a new, qualified Appellate Division with real judges — capable of fairly and efficiently adjudicating asylum cases — selected to replace the BIA.

One particularly cruel, senseless, and inane aspect of the BIA’s attempt to “snuff” the respondent’s asylum application: Because of the essentially uncontested CAT grant, she was going to be allowed to remain in the U.S. anyway! So, this was all about illegally depriving an abused refugee woman of color of her ability to get a green card, become eligible for citizenship, and obtain full legal and political rights in our society! 

Compare the time and effort expended by the BIA in trying to deprive this woman of her human rights with the carelessness and sloppiness of their legal analysis. That’s what the racist-driven “any reason to deny” culture created by Sessions, Barr, and their toadies at EOIR does to our justice system! 

Imagine how much different the “retail level” of American justice would look with real judges and professional administrators, committed to due process, fundamental fairness, and best practices, in charge! Amazingly, that’s what the “EOIR Vision” once was, before the forces of darkness, ignorance, and bias took over the system.

Think of how different the skewed asylum statistics would look if we honored, rather than mocked, our legal obligations to asylum seekers. Think of how many more individuals could fairly and efficiently be welcomed into our country at our borders and abroad in a well functioning system, staffed with professionals, that adhered to the rule of law. Think of how a better, more honest, and more professional Immigration Court could provide positive guidance on how to grant needed protection, rather than gushing forth an endless stream of bogus “how to deny” precedents based on racial and gender bias and specious reasoning.

Professor Nancy Lemon
Professor Nancy Lemon
Hastings Law
Photo: law.hastings.com
Karen Musalo
Professor Karen Musalo
Director, Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, Hastings Law
Blaine Bookey
Blaine Bookey
Legal Director
Center for Gender & Refugee Studies @ Hastings Law
Photo: CGRS website

Obviously, experts like Professor Nancy Lemon, Professor Karen Musalo, and her colleague Blaine Bookey are the types of individuals who should be Appellate Judges at the BIA. The current BIA’s glaring lack of professional competence and its unconscionable abuse of vulnerable asylum seekers, particularly the institutional ignorance and shameless misogyny with which claims by women refugees are treated, has to be one of the darkest and most inexcusable chapters in modern American legal history!

Food for for thought:

  • How would an unrepresented individual, particularly one in detention or stuck on a street corner in Mexico, be able to prepare, document, and present a case like this to a biased court and then appeal successfully to the Circuit?
  • How is this system constitutional in any way, shape, or form?
  • How might the massive investment of resources, time, effort, and expertise in vindicating the legal and human rights of one individual in a broken system be redeployed to promote systemic fairness and efficiency in a court system that actually complied with constitutional due process?

And, we shouldn’t forget that the Biden Administration is still illegally killing off asylum seekers at the border with no due process at all! Cowardly inflicting human misery on the most vulnerable in violation of our Constitution, our laws, and our international obligations has become our “new national pastime!”

We might be averting our eyes from the slaughter now, but history will document and remember what the world’s richest nation did to our fellow humans seeking protection in their hour of direst need! No wonder we must dehumanize “the other” to go on with our daily lives. No wonder that racial and social justice remain elusive, unfulfilled concepts, throughout our society, in today’s “What’s in it for me” atmosphere promoted by many of our politicos!

🇺🇸⚖️🗽Due Process Forever!

PWS

04-06-21

☠️YET ANOTHER DEADLY,  ⚰️ RIDICULOUS 🤡 EOIR MELTDOWN 🤮 OUTED! — Conservative 5th Circuit Excoriates BIA & Immigration Judge For Litany Of Errors In 38-Page Smackdown — Another Wrongful Denial Of Asylum To Honduran Exhausts Patience Of Even Normally Pro-Gov. Circuit Court!

Star Chamber Justice
“Justice”
Star Chamber
Style
Four Horsemen
BIA Asylum Panel In Action
Albrecht Dürer, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons
EYORE
“Eyore In Distress”
Once A Symbol of Fairness, Due Process, & Best Practices, Now Gone “Belly Up”

https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/unpub/18/18-60251.0.pdf

Morales Lopez v. Garland, 5th Cir., 03-19-21, unpublished

PANEL: Southwick, Graves, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges

OPINION BY: James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge

KEY QUOTE:  

Morales Lopez argues that the IJ improperly determined that she did not make a sufficient showing of past persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution. Regarding past persecution, Morales Lopez argues that the IJ erroneously (1) required each incident of harm to rise to the level of persecution, (2) failed to consider all relevant incidents of harm, (3) required a showing of physical harm, and (4) failed to consider significant liberty deprivations suffered by Morales Lopez and her children. Morales Lopez further argues that (5) the substantial evidence compels a finding of past

10

Case: 18-60251 Document: 00515788451 Page: 11 Date Filed: 03/19/2021

No. 18-60251

persecution and (6) the IJ erred by failing to consider Morales Lopez’s psychological harm.

Regarding a well-founded fear of future persecution, Morales Lopez argues that the IJ erroneously (1) applied a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard instead of a reasonable-possibility standard; (2) failed to evaluate Morales Lopez’s fear of future persecution using the four-part test set forth in In re Mogharrabi; (3) conflated the past-persecution and well-founded-fear- of-future persecution analyses, (4) required Morales Lopez to offer direct proof of her persecutors’ motives, and (5) mischaracterized Ungar’s testimony. Morales Lopez further argues that (6) the substantial evidence compels a finding of a well-founded fear of future persecution.

Although we neither agree with nor reach all of Morales Lopez’s arguments, we agree with her overarching point: the IJ and the BIA improperly determined that Morales Lopez did not make a sufficient showing of past persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution. We address Morales Lopez’s arguments in turn.

**************

Judge James E. Graves, Jr.
Hon. James E. Graves, Jr.
U.S. Circuit Judge
Fifth Circuit
PHOTO: Wikipedia

Too bad this is unpublished. Once again, a Circuit Court has to provide the detailed analysis required by due process after the supposedly “expert” BIA commits error after error!

When they get below the “caption line” in an opinion, things go south fast for EOIR judges. I’d attribute that to a deadly combination of poor judicial selection, defective training, a “culture of prejudgement and denial,” large-scale overuse and misuse of the woefully inadequate and outdated “contemporaneous oral decision” format (not used by any other “court” for decisions of this importance and complexity), “haste makes waste” gimmicks, absurd “quotas,” inane “performance ratings,” constant political interference with decision-making, disastrously incompetent unprofessional docket management, and maliciously incompetent “leadership” from the DOJ. It’s an ungodly and inexcusable mess.

Sadly, my grim description doesn’t begin to capture just how embarrassingly unjust, unfair, dysfunctional, and just plain terrible EOIR’s “killer clown show” 🦹🏿‍♂️🤡 is. Not to mention that it is clearly unconstitutional, and a “living  repudiation of due process” as currently constituted and operated. Put this pathetic imitation of a “court system”out of its misery before it causes any more destruction of human lives and irreparable damage to our justice system!

Judge Garland, where, oh where, are you in American justice’s hour of need? Stop this disgraceful mockery of justice, humanity, and common sense! Now!

In the meantime, as I had warned, Judge Garland’s previously sterling record as a jurist 👨🏻‍⚖️ is being tarnished daily by association with some of the worst jurisprudence out there, courtesy of America’s Star Chambers,🏴‍☠️ a/k/a “Clown Courts,” 🤡🦹🏿‍♂️ now wholly owned by HIM, and “operated” in HIS name!

🇺🇸⚖️🗽Due Process Forever! Clown Courts🤡🦹🏿‍♂️ & Star Chambers☠️🏴‍☠️⚰️, Never!

PWS

03-21-21

⚖️🗽🛡RECOGNIZING WOMEN REFUGEES: Professor Karen Musalo @ ImmigrationProf Blog — Don’t Add A “6th Protected Ground” To The Statute; Get Some Better-Qualified Judges 🧑🏽‍⚖️ Who Will Respect & Follow Existing Law To Protect Those Already Covered, But Wrongfully Denied Refuge By Bad Judging & Restrictionist Policies!

 

Karen Musalo
Professor Karen Musalo
Director, Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, Hastings Law

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2021/03/guest-post-the-wrong-answer-to-the-right-question-how-to-address-the-failure-of-protection-for-gende.html

By Immigration Prof

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The Wrong Answer to the Right Question:  How to Address the Failure of Protection for Gender-Based Claims?

By Professor Karen Musalo, Bank of America Professor of International Law, Director of the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, UC Hastings

In 1996 I was honored to litigate the first case at the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), Matter of Kasinga,[1] that opened the door to protection for women fleeing gender-based harms.  To qualify for recognition as a refugee under U.S. law, an individual must establish “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution” on account of one of five grounds – “race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group.”[2]  This definition in the 1980 Refugee Act essentially adopts the standard set forth in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention[3] and its 1967 U.N. Refugee Protocol,[4] which the U.S. ratified in 1968.

The woman seeking asylum in the Kasinga case fled female genital cutting and forced marriage.  In a ground-breaking decision, the BIA ruled that cutting was persecution, and it was “on account of” her membership in a gender-defined social group.  In so ruling, the BIA was following the guidance that UNHCR has issued over a number of years, noting that the absence of gender as a protected ground should not impede protection for women fleeing persecution, because the particular social group ground encompasses gender-defined groups.[5]

The Kasinga decision was a breakthrough for women, and a highwater mark in U.S. adjudicators following international guidance.  It also raised expectations that U.S. law would continue to evolve and extend protection to women fleeing the many forms of gender-based violence to which they are subject.  However, that has not been the case, and there have been retreats from protection across administrations, although undoubtedly we witnessed the most dramatic attempts to end protection in gender claims during the Trump administration, which issued extremely limiting Attorney General decisions, such as Matter of A-B- I,[6] and Matter of A-B- II –[7] as well as regulations[8] – currently enjoined[9]—that explicitly rule out gender-based claims.

The Biden administration has committed itself to reviewing the issue of protection for those fleeing gender-based violence.[10]  As we consider how to remedy the issue, some argue for a legislative amendment to the refugee definition, adding gender as a sixth ground to the statute’s five protected grounds of race, religion, nationality, political opinion and membership in a particular social group.  This is the wrong solution.  It would not only repeat the errors of the past (amending the refugee definition in 1996, discussed below), but it would also fail to adequately protect survivors of gender-based violence.  At the same time, it would lead to the quite foreseeable consequence of leaving many deserving asylum seekers outside the ambit of refugee protection.  It is also likely to signal to other Convention State parties that unless they also add a sixth ground, they could deny protection to women and girls without running afoul of the treaty’s obligations.

In order to prescribe a remedy, one first has to diagnose the illness; in order to understand why the sixth ground solution is wrong, we need to examine what occurred after Kasinga that limited protection in subsequent claims involving women fleeing gender-based persecution. . . . .

**********************

Read the rest of Karen’s outstanding analysis at the link.

Here’s a question from last summer’s “Jeopardy style” final exam in Immigration Law & Policy @ Georgetown Law:

A: Judge Schmidt’s favorite case.

Q: What is Matter of Kasinga?

Happy to say that everyone got that one right! Of course, I wrote the decision in Matter of Kasinga!

Karen’s bottom line: “We should be working to bring the U.S. into compliance with UNHCR’s social group interpretation, rather than surrendering to its flawed interpretation, by adding a sixth ground.”

The key is better Federal Judges, from the Immigration Courts all the way up to the Supremes: Judges who are “practical scholars” in human rights and applied due process; judges who have represented asylum seekers, particularly women, and understand their plight.

This week, President Biden announced the creation of the White House Gender Policy Council. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/03/08/executive-order-on-establishment-of-the-white-house-gender-policy-council/

That’s a nice gesture. But, as I always say, actions are what really counts. So here are actions that Judge Garland can take immediately as Attorney General to finally fulfill the promise of Matter of Kasinga:

  • Vacate the atrocious, misogynist, perversion of asylum law (not to mention facts of record) by Sessions in Matter of A-B-;
  • Appoint some female “practical scholars in human rights” to appellate judgeships on the BIA.

That’s how to really honor Women’s History Month!

To understand the human impact of Sessions’s grotesque misconstruction of asylum law and the relevant facts in Matter of A-B-, check out this video short featuring Karen and others along with Ms. A-B-:   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QRQpXRWlQL0

I generally agree with Karen’s concerns about specific gender-based legislation potentially having an unintended negative effect. That is certainly the fate of past unsuccessful attempts to include gender-based asylum in the regulations.

They essentially were “hijacked” by DOJ litigators and enforcement-oriented policy officials looking for ways to facially appease women’s rights groups, while actually proposing to restrict eligibility and make it easier for OIL and the SG’s Office to defend denials of asylum. They also sought to create hyper-technical requirements that would have effectively made it impossible for any unrepresented individual to properly set forth a “cognizable particular social group.”

These, in and of themselves, are reasons for removing the Immigration Courts from the DOJ and creating an independent Article I structure. The “ultimate insult to injury” was when EOIR enthusiastically participated in Stephen Miller’s currently-enjoined attempt to completely write gender-based asylum out of the law. Absurdly, that came at a time when gender-based persecution has become endemic throughout the world!

Not surprisingly, the DOJ, a prosecutorial agency at heart, is most often interested in “litigation strategies” to make it easier for the Government to successfully defend the burgeoning immigration litigation in Federal Court, rather than guaranteeing justice for asylum seekers and other migrants. Quite ironically, what would really reduce the volume of civil immigration litigation is more practical, expert decision making from better qualified Immigration Judges at the “retail level” of the system.

Gimmicks to “game” the Federal Court system against asylum seekers and other migrants by skirting due process and fundamental fairness have actually contributed to, rather than reduced, the amount of civil immigration litigation the Circuits. It has also generated many avoidable “Circuit conflicts” that require attention on Supremes’ limited docket. The failure of the DOJ, the Immigration Courts, and the Federal Courts to recognize and protect the due process rights of asylum seekers and other migrants has directly carried over into the failure of our justice system to achieve equal justice under law for racial minorities.

“Institutionalized racism” is inextricably linked to “Dred Scottification” of migrants of color in the Immigration Courts! The Biden Administration can’t solve the former without addressing the latter!

Bad judging and skewed policies on the “retail level” create multiple problems that adversely affect the entire Federal Justice system. I guarantee that they will not be solved by more restrictionist gimmicks and and unduly narrow and tone-deaf interpretations by judges and policy officials who lack the necessary expertise in immigration and human rights laws and the real-life understanding and perspective of the human consequences of the choices that judges make on a daily basis.

But, I also think that in addition to better judges, it is important to revise the statutory language to make it more explicitly inclusive and clarify that gender-based asylum, family based asylum, and other protected groups are examples, but not limits, of those covered by “particular social group.” Also, the statute should reverse the BIA’s stilted restrictionist interpretations (all too often incorrectly given “deference” by Circuit Courts shirking their duty) of “nexus” as a vehicle to deny asylum rather than an expansive concept that can and should be used to extend life-saving protections where necessary.

Otherwise, as Trump, Sessions, Barr, and Miller demonstrated, needed protection becomes largely a matter of who is appointing the judges at any particular point in time. Protection must and should be more durable — for all refugees including, but not limited, to those seeking  gender-based protection!

Better Federal Judges are the beginning, but by no means the end, of what is needed to make due process, fundamental fairness, and genuine refugee protections the hallmarks of American law. They are also required to turn institutionalized racism into equal justice for all persons in America, regardless of race, religion, gender, or other defining personal characteristics.

🇺🇸⚖️🗽Due Process Forever! Asylum Laws Must Protect, Not Reject!🧑🏽‍⚖️🛡

PWS

03-10-21

LATEST FROM “SIR JEFFREY” 🛡⚔️ — “Determining Political Opinion: Problems and Solutions — Jeffrey S. Chase | Opinions/Analysis on Immigration Law”

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2021/3/7/determining-political-opinion-problems-and-solutions

JEFFREY S. CHASE | OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGRATION LAW

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Determining Political Opinion: Problems and Solutions

Regarding political opinion, the refugee law scholar Atle Grahl-Madsen famously explained that refugee protection “is designed to suit the situation of common [people], not only that of philosophers…The instinctive or spontaneous reaction to usurpation or oppression is [as] equally valid” as the “educated, cultivated, reflected opinion.”1  A  recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit provides an opportunity to reflect on this premise.

In Zelaya-Moreno v. Wilkinson, a young man was targeted for recruitment by MS-13.  On two occasions, Zelaya directly announced to the gang’s members his reason for refusing to join: because gangs were bad for his hometown and country.  Both times, the gang members responded by beating him, fracturing his arm the second time.  They also threatened to kill him if he continued to refuse to join.  The questions raised are whether Zelaya’s instinctive, simply-worded response expressed a political opinion, and if so, did that opinion form part of the reason for the beatings and threat?

The Immigration Judge recognized Zelaya’s statement to the gang to be a political opinion for asylum purposes.  However, the IJ wasn’t persuaded from the record that Zelaya’s opinion was why the gang beat him.  As expressed by the IJ, the beatings were caused by “Zelaya’s refusal to join the gang, irrespective of the reasons.”  It doesn’t seem that the IJ considered whether the gang members imputed a political opinion to the act of refusal per se.

On appeal, the BIA took a far more extreme position, stating  that because gangs are not political organizations and their activities are not political in nature, “expressing an opinion against their group is not expressing a political opinion.”  This happens to be a position that EOIR and DHS (in defiance of much circuit case law and expert opinion to the contrary) later sought to codify in regulations that fortunately remain enjoined at present.

The Second Circuit in Zelaya-Moreno rejected the Board’s narrow view of political opinion.  In fact, the court only last year, in its decision in Hernandez-Chacon v. Barr, recognized the act of resisting rape by members of the very same gang in El Salvador as the expression of a feminist, anti-patriarchy political opinion.  Significantly, the victim in that case hadn’t stated any opinion to the gang members; it was only years later in front of the immigration judge that she gave her reason for resisting as “because I have every right to.”

As it has done in other decisions, the Second Circuit emphasized the need for a “complex and contextual factual inquiry” in political opinion determinations.  It conducted a survey of cases in which political opinion was found, and of others in which it wasn’t.  Unfortunately, the majority upheld the decision that Zelaya had not expressed a political opinion to the MS-13 members, stating that “[s]o far as the record shows, his objection to them is not rooted in any sort of disagreement with the policies they seek to impose nor any ideology they espouse.”

“So far as the record shows” is critical.  I haven’t seen the record in this case, but I believe it might serve to demonstrate that while Grahl-Madsen correctly assigned equal validity to the opinions of the commoner and the intellectual, in practice, claims brought by members of the former group often require assistance from the latter in persuading adjudicators of the political nature of their words or actions.

For example, in Hernandez-Chacon, context for the petitioner’s resistance was provided by the affidavit of a lawyer and human rights expert who was able to articulate the patriarchal gender bias in Salvadoran society from which a political opinion could be gleaned from the asylum-seeker’s act of resistance alone.  In another decision cited by the court, Alvarez-Lagos v. Barr, the Fourth Circuit was able to rely on the explanation of two experts on Central American gangs that the petitioner’s refusal to comply with extortion demands would be viewed by the gang as “political opposition” and “a form of political disobedience.”

In Zelaya-Moreno, the dissenting judge (in an opinion worth reading) was able to draw a political inference from the facts alone.  It seemed that the two judges in the majority required more.  But in finding the statements or actions of an applicant alone to be insufficient, is our present system of refugee protection genuinely designed to suit the situation of common people as well as philosophers?

In the view of the dissenting judge, yes.  In that judge’s words, Zelaya “sought refuge here after standing up to MS members, refusing their demands that he join them, and informing them that he did not support them and considered them a blight on his native El Salvador. Our asylum laws protect individuals like Zelaya-Moreno who face persecution for such politically courageous stands.”

But in the view of the majority, Zelaya had expressed nothing “more than the generalized statement ‘gangs are bad.’ Thus, we cannot conclude that Zelaya holds a political opinion within the meaning of the statute, and therefore that the BIA erred in concluding that he was not eligible for asylum on this ground.”   Would additional documentation providing the complex, contextual analysis the court mentioned earlier in its decision have delivered the two judges in the majority to the place already reached by their dissenting colleague?

The United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees is a good reference source on such issues.  In its Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Victims of Organized Crimes, UNHCR stated at para. 45 that in its view, “political opinion needs to be understood in a broad sense to encompass “any opinion on any matter in which the machinery of State, government, society, or policy may be engaged.”  It continued at para. 47 that powerful gangs such as MS-13 may exercise de facto power in certain areas, and their activities  and those of certain State agents may be closely intertwined.  At para. 50, UNHCR stated that “rejecting a recruitment attempt may convey anti-gang sentiments as clearly as an opinion expressed in a more traditional political manner by, for instance, vocalizing criticism of gangs in public meetings or campaigns.”  And at para. 51, UNHCR added that “[p]olitical opinion can also be imputed to the applicant by the gang without the applicant taking any action or making a particular statement him/herself.  A refusal to give in to the demands of a gang is viewed by gangs as an act of betrayal, and gangs typically impute anti-gang sentiment to the victim whether or not s/he voices actual gang opposition.”

Had this document been included in the record, would it have been enough to persuade the majority that the BIA had erred in rejecting Zelaya’s claim that he was targeted on account of his political opinion?  If so, how many pro se asylum applicants would understand the need to supplement their claims to provide this context, or know what type of document would be sufficient, or how to find it?

The Seventh Circuit had foreseen this problem 15 years ago.  In a 2006 decision, Banks v. Gonzales, the court opined that Immigration Court needs its own country experts, who would operate much as vocational experts do in disability hearings before the Social Security Administration’s judges.  In my opinion, an alternative approach would be for EOIR to follow the example of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, which maintains National Documentation Packages that are referenced in all cases by adjudicators of refugee claims.

During my time in government, I oversaw the creation of country condition pages on EOIR’s Virtual Law Library, which were built, and continue to be updated, by EOIR’s Law Library staff.  However, EOIR did not see fit to make its contents part of the records of hearing in asylum cases.  It is for this reason that UNHCR’s Eligibility Guidelines For Assessing International Protection Needs of Asylum Seekers in El Salvador, which contains much of the same language as the Guidance Note quoted above, and which expresses the specific conclusion that “persons perceived by a gang as contravening its rules or resisting its authority may be in need of international refugee protection on the grounds of their (imputed) political opinion,”2 is found on EOIR’s own website on the country page for “El Salvador,” yet wasn’t even considered in Zelaya-Moreno.

Considering the growing number of pro se applicants, the lack of legal resources available to those held in remote detention facilities, and the short time frame to prepare for hearings in certain categories of cases, I can’t see why the EOIR country pages should not be made part of the hearing record here as in Canada.  It’s possible that such a policy would have led to a different result in Zelaya.

Furthermore, the BIA hears plenty of cases involving expert opinions supporting the conclusion that those resisting gangs such as MS-13 were harmed on account of their political opinion.  Issuing precedent opinions recognizing the context that politicizes statements and actions such as Zelaya’s would result in much greater efficiency, consistency, and fairness in Immigration Court and Asylum Office adjudications.

Realistically, I harbor no illusions that the recent change in administration will bring about such enlightened changes to asylum adjudication anytime soon.  But we must still continue to argue for such change.  As the dissenting opinion in Zelaya stated in its conclusion: “[w]hile it may be too late for Zelaya-Moreno, the BIA and the Department of Justice can right this wrong for future asylum seekers. I urge them to reconsider their approach to anti-gang political opinion cases to ensure those who stand up to fearsome dangers are welcomed into this country rather than forced back to face torture and death.”  As noted above, it wouldn’t take much effort on EOIR’s part to accomplish this.

Notes:

  1. Atle Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, 228, 251 (1966) (quoted in Deborah E. Anker, The Law of Asylum in the United States (2020 Ed.) § 5:17, fn. 3.
  2. UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines For Assessing International Protection Needs of Asylum Seekers in El Salvador at 29-30.

Copyright 2021 Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved.

Reprinted with permission.

************************

Truly wonderful, Jeffrey! One of your “best ever,” in my view! (And, they are all great, so that’s saying something.) 

Imagine what could be achieved at the BIA with real judges, experts in asylum law, thoughtful, practical analysis, intellectual leadership, and inspiration to a fairer future, rather than the current Clown Show 🤡🦹🏿‍♂️ inventing bogus ways to ”get to no!”

As Jeffrey demonstrates, we could choose to protect rather than to reject. There has always been a tendency to do the latter at the DOJ; but, under White Nationalist nativist Jeff Sessions and his successors it has gone “hog wild” — rejection has been falsely portrayed as a “duty” rather than an extremely poor choice and an abdication of moral and legal responsibility!

Today’s BIA is basically incapable of problem solving. Time and again their strained, stilted anti-immigrant, anti-due-process, pro-worst-practices interpretations not only spell doom for those coming before them, but also promote inefficiency and backlogs in an already overwhelmed system. They also send messages of disdain and disrespect for the rights and humanity of people of color that redounds throughout our struggling U.S. Legal System.

I’ll keep saying it: Whatever positive message Judge Garland and his team at DOJ intend to send about racial justice will be fatally undermined as long as “Dred Scottification” and disdain for the due process rights of migrants is the “order of the day” at the one Federal Court System the DOJ runs: The U.S. Immigration Court!  As long as EOIR is a “bad joke” the rest of Judge Garland’s reforms will fall flat!

The right judges 🧑🏽‍⚖️ at the BIA could turn this thing around! Remains to be seen if it will happen. But, it’s not rocket science. It just requires putting the right folks in charge, in place, and giving them the support and independence to engage in “creative problem solving.”

Judge Garland should be confirmed next week. And the confirmation hearings for Lisa Monaco (DAG) and Vanita Gupta (AAG) have been scheduled.

Some additional points:

  • The dissenter in the Second Circuit’s decision in Zelaya-Moreno v. Wilkinson is Judge Rosemary Pooler. Judge Pooler has had a long and distinguished career. Perhaps she would like to cap it off by becoming Chair of the BIA and leading by example;
  • Shows the importance of experts, which is probably why the BIA has gone out of its way to demean them and encourage IJs to ignore their evidence;
  • Jeffrey’s analysis supports my “Better BIA for a Better America” 🇺🇸program;
  • As Justice Sotomayor says: “It is not justice.” That’s my view on today’s EOIR!  

Due Process Forever! ⚖️🗽

PWS

03-07-21

🏴‍☠️BIA CONTINUES TO SPEW FORTH ERRORS IN LIFE OR DEATH ☠️ ASYLUM CASES, SAYS 4TH CIR. — “Three-In-One” — Improperly Disregarding Corroborating Evidence; Incorrect Legal Standard On Past Persecution; Wrong Nexus Finding! — Arita-Deras v. Wilkinson

Four Horsemen
BIA Asylum Panel In Action
Albrecht Dürer, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons
Kangaroos
“Oh Boy! Three material mistakes in one asylum case! Do you think our superiors in the enforcement bureaucracy will give us extra credit on our ‘move ‘em out without due process quotas?’ Being a Deportation Judge sure is fun!”
https://www.flickr.com/photos/rasputin243/
Creative Commons License

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/191978.P.pdf

Arita-Deras v. Wilkinson, 4th Cir., 03-05-21, Published

PANEL:  GREGORY, Chief Judge, and AGEE and KEENAN, Circuit Judges

OPINION BY: Judge Barbara Milano Keenan

KEY QUOTE: 

Maria Del Refugio Arita-Deras, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for review of a final order of removal entered by the Board of Immigration Appeals (the Board).1 The Board affirmed an immigration judge’s (IJ) conclusion that Arita-Deras was not eligible for asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Board: (1) agreed with the IJ that Arita-Deras failed to support her claims with sufficient corroborating evidence; (2) found that Arita-Deras failed to prove that she suffered from past persecution because she had not been harmed physically; and (3) concluded that Arita-Deras failed to establish a nexus between the alleged persecution and a protected ground.

Upon our review, we conclude that the Board improperly discounted Arita-Deras’ corroborating evidence, applied an incorrect legal standard for determining past persecution, and erred in its nexus determination. Accordingly, we grant Arita-Deras’ petition and remand her case to the Board for further proceedings.

***************************

After eight years of bouncing around the system at various levels THIS “Not Quite Good Enough For Government Work” error-fest is what we get from EOIR! As I keep saying, no wonder they are running a 1.3 million case backlog, clogging the Circuit Courts with incredibly shoddy work, and in many cases sending vulnerable refugees back to death or torture under incorrect fact findings and blatantly wrong legal interpretations!

Again, nothing profound about this claim; just basic legal and analytical errors that often flow from the “think of any reason to deny” culture. EOIR just keeps repeating the same basic mistakes again and again even after being “outed” by the Circuits!

This case illustrates why the unrealistically high asylum denial numbers generated by the biased EOIR system and parroted by DHS should never be trusted. This respondent, appearing initially without a lawyer, was actually coerced by an Immigration Judge into accepting a “final order” of removal with a totally incorrect, inane, mis-statement of the law. “Haste makes waste,” shoddy, corner cutting procedures, judges deficient in asylum legal knowledge, and a stunning lack of commitment to due process and fundamental fairness are a burden to our justice system in addition to being a threat to the lives of individual asylum seekers.

Only when she got a lawyer prior to removal was this respondent able to get her case reopened for a full asylum hearing. Even then, the IJ and the BIA both totally screwed up the analysis and entered incorrect orders. Only because this respondent was fortunate enough to be assisted by one of the premier pro bono groups in America, the CAIR Coalition, was she able to get some semblance of justice on appeal to the Circuit Court! 

I’m very proud to say that a member of the “CAIR Team,” Adina Appelbaum, program Director, Immigration Impact Lab, is my former Georgetown ILP student, former Arlington Intern, and a “charter member” of the NDPA! If my memory serves me correctly, she is also a star alum of the CALS Asylum Clinic @ Georgetown Law. No wonder Adina made the Forbes “30 Under 30” list of young Americans leaders! She and others like her in the NDPA are ready to go in and start cleaning  up and improving EOIR right now! Judge Garland take note!

Adina Appelbaum
Adina Appelbaum
Director, Immigration Impact Lab
CAIR Coalition
PHOTO: “30 Under 30” from Forbes

Despite CAIR’s outstanding efforts, Ms. Arita-Deras still is nowhere near getting the relief to which she should be entitled under a proper application of the law by expert judges committed to due process. Instead, after eight years, she plunges back into EOIR’s 1.3 million case “never never land” where she might once again end up with Immigration Judges at both the trial and appellate level who are not qualified to be hearing asylum cases because they don’t know the law and they are “programmed to deny” to meet their “deportation quotas” in support of ICE Enforcement.

Focus on it folks! This is America; yet individuals on trial for their lives face a prosecutor and a “judge” who are on the same side! And, they are often forced to do it without a lawyer and without even understanding the complex proceedings going on around them! How is this justice? It isn’t! So why is it allowed to continue?

Also, let’s not forget that under the recently departed regime, EOIR falsely claimed that having an attorney didn’t make a difference in success rates for respondents. That’s poppycock! Actually, as the Vera Institute recently documented the success rate for represented respondents is an astounding 10X that of unrepresented individuals. In any functional system, that differential would be more than sufficient to establish a “prima facie” denial of due process any time an asylum seeker (particularly one in detention) is forced to proceed without representation. 

🇺🇸⚖️🗽🧑🏽‍⚖️VERA INSTITUTE RECOMMENDS FEDERAL DEFENDER PROGRAM FOR IMMIGRANTS — Widespread Public Support For Representation In Immigration Court!

Yet, this miscarriage of justice occurs every day in Immigration Courts throughout America! Worse yet, EOIR and DHS have purposely “rigged” the system in various ways to impede and discourage effective representation.

To date, while flagging EOIR for numerous life-threatening errors, the Article IIIs have failed to come to grips with the obvious: The current EOIR system provides neither due process nor fundamental fairness to the individuals coming before these “courts” (that aren’t “courts” at all)! 

Acting AG Wilkinson has piled up an impressive string of legal defeats in immigration matters in just a short time on the job. It’s going to be up to Judge Garland to finally make it right. It’s urgent for both our nation and the individuals whose rights are being stomped upon by a broken system on a daily basis!

🇺🇸⚖️🗽Due Process Forever! Failed Courts Never!

PWS

03–05-21

🏴‍☠️PERSECUTED IN TWO COUNTRIES, SOMALIAN REFUGEE FEELS FULL BRUNT OF EOIR’S INCOMPETENCE 🤮 — Firm Resettlement, NGA Persecution, Past Persecution, Nexus, Misconstruction Of Regulations, Failure To Apply Circuit Precedent Among The “Comedy Of Errors” Inflicted By Imposters Masquerading As “Expert Judges” 🤡 — Aden v. Wilkinson, 9th Cir.  

 

Aden v. Wilkinson, 9th Cir., 03-04-21, published

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/03/04/17-71313.pdf

PANEL: Before: Richard A. Paez and Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

Circuit Judges, and George H. Wu,** District Judge. Opinion by Judge Paez;

Concurrence by Judge Rawlinson

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

** The Honorable George H. Wu, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.

SUMMARY BY COURT STAFF:

Immigration

Granting Abdi Ali Asis Aden’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ dismissal of his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s denial of his applications for asylum and withholding of removal from Somalia, and remanding, the panel held that the Board erred in concluding that Aden did not qualify for an exception to the firm resettlement bar, and that the evidence compelled the conclusion that he suffered past persecution in Somalia on account of a protected ground.

Aden asserted that he suffered persecution in Somalia by members of Al-Shabaab, a militant terrorist organization affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, after his brother refused their orders to shut down his theater showing American and Hindi movies and sports, which Al-Shabaab viewed as “Satanic” movies. The Board concluded that Aden was ineligible for asylum because he was firmly resettled in South Africa, and that he failed to establish that he suffered past persecution in Somalia on account of a protected ground.

The Board noted that Aden presented “ample evidence” of persecution in South Africa, but nonetheless determined that he failed to qualify for the restricted-residence exception to the firm resettlement bar because the persecution he faced was at the hands of private individuals, rather than the South

*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

   

ADEN V. WILKINSON 3

African government. The panel concluded that the Board erred in doing do, holding that the restricted-residence exception applies when the country’s authorities are unable or unwilling to protect the applicant from persecution by nongovernment actors.

The panel held that the evidence compelled the conclusion that Aden suffered past persecution in Somalia, where in addition to physically beating Aden, members of Al-Shabaab kept tabs on him by contacting his brother and warned they would kill Aden and his brother if they continued to disobey Al-Shabaab’s command to close their theater. The panel wrote that the chain of events revealed that Al-Shabaab intended to coerce Aden to submit to its new political and religious order, and used offensive strategies— beatings, destruction of property, and death threats—to achieve this goal. Further, the panel explained that continuing political and social turmoil caused by Al- Shabaab provided context for the harm and death threats that Aden experienced, which together with the past harm, compelled the conclusion that he suffered past persecution in Somalia.

The panel held that substantial evidence did not support the Board’s determination that Aden failed to establish that he was targeted on account of a protected ground because Al Shabaab was motived by their own political and religious beliefs, rather than Aden’s. The panel explained that Al- Shabaab’s accusation that the brothers were featuring Islamically forbidden, “Satanic” films provided direct evidence of their political and religious motive, and that even if the brothers did not feature the films out of their own political or religious convictions, Al-Shabaab at the very least imputed those beliefs to them. The panel wrote that the only logical explanation for Al-Shabaab’s treatment of Aden

 

4 ADEN V. WILKINSON

and his brother was that their actions were subversive to Al- Shabaab’s political and religious doctrine.

The panel remanded for the Board to consider, under the appropriate framework, whether Aden was firmly resettled in South Africa, and to give the government an opportunity to rebut the presumption of future persecution triggered by Aden’s showing of past persecution on account of a protected ground.

Concurring, Judge Rawlinson agreed that the case should be remanded for reconsideration of the firm resettlement issue. Judge Rawlinson noted that despite the fact that the IJ never addressed the issue of whether persecution by private actors may prevent application of the firm resettlement bar, the Board concluded that the firm resettlement bar applied to Aden because he did not introduce any evidence that the South African government imposed any restrictions on his residency such that the restricted-residence exception applied. Judge Rawlinson wrote that the Board’s conclusion was not supported by substantial evidence in the record, as reflected in the IJ’s factual findings. Judge Rawlinson also agreed that the Board erred in concluding that Aden failed to establish a nexus to a protected ground because, based on binding precedent, an applicant such as Aden, who disagrees with Al Shabaab’s view of the proper interpretation of Islam, can establish persecution on account of a protected ground by showing that others in his group persecuted him because they found him insufficiently loyal or authentic to the religious ideal they espouse.

 

ADEN V. WILKINSON 5

COUNSEL

Emery El Habiby, El Habiby Law Firm, Sun City, Arizona, for Petitioner.

Stephen J. Flynn, Assistant Director; Lynda A. Do, Attorney; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.

*********************

This case has been pending six years! Should have been granted by the IJ. No wonder EOIR is running a 1.3 million backlog! Attempts to turn “easy grants” into bogus denials is killing this system, not to mention the asylum seekers suffering the “triple whammy” of EOIR’S lack of expertise, lousy training, and a “denial culture.”

My good friend, colleague, and former NAIJ President Judge Dana Leigh Marks, who actually is an asylum expert, once told The NY Times that asylum cases are like the death penalty in traffic court. But, I suspect that many folks appearing in traffic court get significantly MORE due process than those on trial for their lives in our broken, biased, and dysfunctional Immigration Courts.

Judge Garland needs to fix this! Sooner, rather than later!

🇺🇸⚖️🗽Due Process Forever!

PWS

03-05-21

☠️⚰️MORE LIFE-THREATENING ERRORS — BIA’s (Absurd) Anti-Asylum Slant On Mexican Asylum Case Blown Away By 9th Cir. — “As we read its decision, the BIA recognized that property ownership was a cause—and moreover, the real reason—Garcia was targeted, but it still found that she was not targeted “on account of” property ownership.” — Naranjo Garcia v. Wilkinson

Four Horsemen
BIA Asylum Panel In Action
Albrecht Dürer, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons
Dan Kowalski
Dan Kowalski
Online Editor of the LexisNexis Immigration Law Community (ILC)

Dan Kowalski reports from LexisNexis Immigration Community:

https://www.lexisnexis.com/LegalNewsRoom/immigration/b/insidenews/posts/ca9-on-mexico-cartels-social-group-nexus-naranjo-garcia-v-wilkinson

CA9 on Mexico, Cartels, Social Group, Nexus: Naranjo Garcia v. Wilkinson

Naranjo Garcia v. Wilkinson

“Alicia Naranjo Garcia (“Garcia”) is a native and citizen of Mexico. Garcia petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Knights Templar, a local drug cartel, murdered Garcia’s husband, twice threatened her life, and forcibly took her property in retaliation for helping her son escape recruitment by fleeing to the United States. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we grant the petition in part and remand. … [W]e conclude that the BIA erred in its nexus analysis for both Garcia’s asylum claim and her withholding of removal claim. We remand with instructions for the BIA to reconsider Garcia’s asylum claim, and for the BIA to consider whether Garcia is eligible for withholding of removal under the proper “a reason” standard. We deny the petition as it relates to Garcia’s claim for relief under CAT.”

[Hats off to Sarah A. Nelson (argued), Certified Law Student; Thomas V. Burch and Anna W. Howard, Supervising Attorneys; University of Georgia School of Law, Athens, Georgia!]

************

This insanely nonsensical gibberish put forth by the BIA — and defended by OIL — is an insult to the entire American justice system! Obviously, EOIR and their DOJ “handlers” unethically assume that Article III Circuit Judges will just “take a dive” and defer to illegal and illogical removal orders. Because, after all, it’s only foreign nationals (mostly people of color) whose lives are at stake! Not “real human beings.” That’s exactly what “institutionalized racism” and “Dred Scottification” look like. Nothing worth breaking a sweat about in the “21st Century Jim Crow America!”

The BIA’s anti-asylum bias and massively incompetent adjudication — on life or death matters — continues to be exposed. There likely are many, many other legitimate asylum cases that are wrongfully rejected by the EOIR “denial factory.” That’s one of many reasons why the EOIR/DHS (intentionally) “cooked stats” on the bona fides of asylum seekers arriving at our Southern Border can never be trusted!

Not everyone is fortunate enough to have competent representation and get meaningful review by a Circuit panel not on “autopilot.” This is a corrupt and broken system, the continued existence of which in its current form is a repudiation of our Constitution, the rule of law, and human decency!

The Biden Administration can, and must, put an end to this ongoing national disgrace! “Any reason to deny” is not justice!

Wonder how the Georgia Law Clinic got involved in this 9th Circuit case? I have the answer, thanks to my friend Michelle Mendez, Director, Defending Vulnerable Populations @ CLINIC:

Thanks so much to CLINIC’s BIA Pro Bono Project for identifying and placing this case with the wonderful team at at University of Georgia School of Law!

Michelle Mendez
Michelle Mendez
Defending Vulnerable Populations Director
Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. (“CLINIC”)

The NDPA is everywhere! And, we’ll continue to be there until due process for all is achieved, regardless of the Administration!

Due Process Forever!

PWS

02-19-21