"The Voice of the New Due Process Army" ————– Musings on Events in U.S. Immigration Court, Immigration Law, Sports, and Other Random Topics by Retired United States Immigration Judge (Arlington, Virginia) and former Chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals Paul Wickham Schmidt. To see my complete professional bio, just click on the link below.
Anybody remember the last time we interpreted the law or facts in favor of a human? https://www.flickr.com/photos/rasputin243/ Creative Commons License
“The question in this case is whether the categorical approach requires a petitioner seeking cancellation of removal to demonstrate both that the state offense he was convicted of is broader than the federal offense and that there is a realistic probability that the state actually prosecutes people for the conduct that makes the state offense broader than the federal offense. We conclude that it does not. … Because the BIA’s decision relied on a misinterpretation of the realistic probability inquiry, we grant the petition for review, vacate, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
Lastly, the government argues that we should defer to the decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) in Matter of Zamora-Molina, 25 I. & N. Dec. 606, 611 (B.I.A. 2011), in which the BIA adopted the same interpretation as the Department of State. Even assuming, without deciding, that Chevron deference applies when one agency (the Department of State) seeks to rely on the interpretation of another agency (the Department of Justice), we agree with the district court and with the Ninth Circuit that Chevron deference does not apply here because “the intent of Congress is clear.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984); see also id. at 842–43 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”); Tovar, 882 F.3d at 900 (declining to apply Chevron deference to Zamora-Molina because “traditional tools of statutory construction” and “the irrationality of the result sought by the government” combine to “demonstrate beyond any question that Congress had a clear intent on the question at issue”). As discussed above, the text, structure, and
33
legislative history of the CSPA conclusively show the “unambiguously expressed intent of Congress” to protect beneficiaries like Diaz. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.7
3) Ignoring Previous Circuit Ruling On Related Case — 10th Cir.
After we determined that conditions in China had materially worsened for Christians, Mr. Ni moved again for reopening. Despite our opinion in his wife’s case, the Board of Immigration Appeals concluded
2
again that Mr. Ni had failed to show a material change in country conditions.
This conclusion is unsupportable. Mr. Ni’s evidence of worsening
conditions in China largely mirrored his wife’s evidence, which had led us
to grant her petition for review. Mr. Ni’s evidence was even stronger than
his wife’s because China had recently adopted a regulatory crackdown on
practicing Christians. We thus grant Mr. Ni’s petition for review.
“To support his case for reopening, Mr. Lucaj submitted an affidavit complaining in particular about two events that occurred after his removal proceeding in 2006: The Socialist party took power in 2013, and then in 2019 the Socialists’ corruption and connections with organized crime deterred the opposition party from even participating in the 2019 elections. Mr. Lucaj provided, among other things, the State Department’s 2018 Human Rights Report on Albania, the Freedom House “Freedom in the World 2018” Report on Albania, and articles from 2018 and 2019 about corruption in Albania and the Socialist Party’s success in recent elections. We do not know whether those submissions show materially worsening conditions for Democratic Party members in Albania, however, because the BIA refused to compare those reports to available evidence of conditions from 2006, claiming that Mr. Lucaj had not “explained how the proffered . . . country condition documentation show[s] qualitatively different conditions from 2006.” Plainly, though, he did so by pointing out the two cited, post-2006 events as evidence of changed conditions. The BIA’s failure to assess whether those changes were sufficient was arbitrary and capricious. … Therefore, we reverse the decision by the BIA and remand Mr. Lucaj’s case so that the BIA can review available evidence to examine whether conditions for members of the Democratic Party in Albania have deteriorated since 2006 and, if so, whether Mr. Lucaj has established a prima facie case for relief.”
America and humanity deserve better from a supposed “expert tribunal” which actually functions more like a “denial factory” without much, if any, “quality control.” No wonder these guys are running an out of control, ever-expanding 1.3 million case backlog!
Denying continuances, not closing cases that belong at USCIS, rushed briefing, IJ’s “certifying” BIA remands to the Director (who should have no judicial role), dismissing applications for failure to fill in irrelevant blanks, raising fees, and a host of other nonsensical proposals that EOIR has had shot down by the Article III Courts recently won’t reduce the backlogs. They actually will make it worse, as have all the other “gimmicks” tried by EOIR to eradicate due process and dehumanize migrants over the past four years!
Who ever heard of lower court judges providing “quality control” for appellate judges, working through a bureaucrat who (at the time the proposal was supposedly “finalized”) had never presided over a case in Immigration Court? And, let’s remember, these are haphazardly selected trial judges, a decidedly non-diverse, non-representative group, whose own qualifications, expertise, judicial temperament, and training have been widely criticized by experts in the field.Few of today’s Immigration Judges and BIA Judges would be “household names” among immigration, human rights, and constitutional law experts and scholars!
The current mess is largely the result of Aimless Docket Reshuffling imposed on the Immigration Courts by unqualified politicos at the DOJ and their equally unqualified toadies at EOIR HQ. Also, DHS has more often than not ignored the realities of good docket management and the prudent exercise of prosecutorial discretion. It is not the fault of the vulnerable migrants and their lawyers victimized by this absurdly politicized, biased, and mal-administered system!
Restoration of justice at EOIR will require radical due process oriented changes starting with new, professional leadership from “practical scholars” in immigration and human rights as well as replacing BIA Judges with better qualified jurists selected from the ranks of those “practical scholars.” Quality control, expertise, competence, common sense, and human understanding are all lacking at today’s EOIR!
Determining Political Opinion: Problems and Solutions
Regarding political opinion, the refugee law scholar Atle Grahl-Madsen famously explained that refugee protection “is designed to suit the situation of common [people], not only that of philosophers…The instinctive or spontaneous reaction to usurpation or oppression is [as] equally valid” as the “educated, cultivated, reflected opinion.”1 A recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit provides an opportunity to reflect on this premise.
In Zelaya-Moreno v. Wilkinson, a young man was targeted for recruitment by MS-13. On two occasions, Zelaya directly announced to the gang’s members his reason for refusing to join: because gangs were bad for his hometown and country. Both times, the gang members responded by beating him, fracturing his arm the second time. They also threatened to kill him if he continued to refuse to join. The questions raised are whether Zelaya’s instinctive, simply-worded response expressed a political opinion, and if so, did that opinion form part of the reason for the beatings and threat?
The Immigration Judge recognized Zelaya’s statement to the gang to be a political opinion for asylum purposes. However, the IJ wasn’t persuaded from the record that Zelaya’s opinion was why the gang beat him. As expressed by the IJ, the beatings were caused by “Zelaya’s refusal to join the gang, irrespective of the reasons.” It doesn’t seem that the IJ considered whether the gang members imputed a political opinion to the act of refusal per se.
On appeal, the BIA took a far more extreme position, stating that because gangs are not political organizations and their activities are not political in nature, “expressing an opinion against their group is not expressing a political opinion.” This happens to be a position that EOIR and DHS (in defiance of much circuit case law and expert opinion to the contrary) later sought to codify in regulations that fortunately remain enjoined at present.
The Second Circuit in Zelaya-Moreno rejected the Board’s narrow view of political opinion. In fact, the court only last year, in its decision in Hernandez-Chacon v. Barr, recognized the act of resisting rape by members of the very same gang in El Salvador as the expression of a feminist, anti-patriarchy political opinion. Significantly, the victim in that case hadn’t stated any opinion to the gang members; it was only years later in front of the immigration judge that she gave her reason for resisting as “because I have every right to.”
As it has done in other decisions, the Second Circuit emphasized the need for a “complex and contextual factual inquiry” in political opinion determinations. It conducted a survey of cases in which political opinion was found, and of others in which it wasn’t. Unfortunately, the majority upheld the decision that Zelaya had not expressed a political opinion to the MS-13 members, stating that “[s]o far as the record shows, his objection to them is not rooted in any sort of disagreement with the policies they seek to impose nor any ideology they espouse.”
“So far as the record shows” is critical. I haven’t seen the record in this case, but I believe it might serve to demonstrate that while Grahl-Madsen correctly assigned equal validity to the opinions of the commoner and the intellectual, in practice, claims brought by members of the former group often require assistance from the latter in persuading adjudicators of the political nature of their words or actions.
For example, in Hernandez-Chacon, context for the petitioner’s resistance was provided by the affidavit of a lawyer and human rights expert who was able to articulate the patriarchal gender bias in Salvadoran society from which a political opinion could be gleaned from the asylum-seeker’s act of resistance alone. In another decision cited by the court, Alvarez-Lagos v. Barr, the Fourth Circuit was able to rely on the explanation of two experts on Central American gangs that the petitioner’s refusal to comply with extortion demands would be viewed by the gang as “political opposition” and “a form of political disobedience.”
In Zelaya-Moreno, the dissenting judge (in an opinion worth reading) was able to draw a political inference from the facts alone. It seemed that the two judges in the majority required more. But in finding the statements or actions of an applicant alone to be insufficient, is our present system of refugee protection genuinely designed to suit the situation of common people as well as philosophers?
In the view of the dissenting judge, yes. In that judge’s words, Zelaya “sought refuge here after standing up to MS members, refusing their demands that he join them, and informing them that he did not support them and considered them a blight on his native El Salvador. Our asylum laws protect individuals like Zelaya-Moreno who face persecution for such politically courageous stands.”
But in the view of the majority, Zelaya had expressed nothing “more than the generalized statement ‘gangs are bad.’ Thus, we cannot conclude that Zelaya holds a political opinion within the meaning of the statute, and therefore that the BIA erred in concluding that he was not eligible for asylum on this ground.” Would additional documentation providing the complex, contextual analysis the court mentioned earlier in its decision have delivered the two judges in the majority to the place already reached by their dissenting colleague?
The United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees is a good reference source on such issues. In its Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Victims of Organized Crimes, UNHCR stated at para. 45 that in its view, “political opinion needs to be understood in a broad sense to encompass “any opinion on any matter in which the machinery of State, government, society, or policy may be engaged.” It continued at para. 47 that powerful gangs such as MS-13 may exercise de facto power in certain areas, and their activities and those of certain State agents may be closely intertwined. At para. 50, UNHCR stated that “rejecting a recruitment attempt may convey anti-gang sentiments as clearly as an opinion expressed in a more traditional political manner by, for instance, vocalizing criticism of gangs in public meetings or campaigns.” And at para. 51, UNHCR added that “[p]olitical opinion can also be imputed to the applicant by the gang without the applicant taking any action or making a particular statement him/herself. A refusal to give in to the demands of a gang is viewed by gangs as an act of betrayal, and gangs typically impute anti-gang sentiment to the victim whether or not s/he voices actual gang opposition.”
Had this document been included in the record, would it have been enough to persuade the majority that the BIA had erred in rejecting Zelaya’s claim that he was targeted on account of his political opinion? If so, how many pro se asylum applicants would understand the need to supplement their claims to provide this context, or know what type of document would be sufficient, or how to find it?
The Seventh Circuit had foreseen this problem 15 years ago. In a 2006 decision, Banks v. Gonzales, the court opined that Immigration Court needs its own country experts, who would operate much as vocational experts do in disability hearings before the Social Security Administration’s judges. In my opinion, an alternative approach would be for EOIR to follow the example of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, which maintains National Documentation Packages that are referenced in all cases by adjudicators of refugee claims.
During my time in government, I oversaw the creation of country condition pages on EOIR’s Virtual Law Library, which were built, and continue to be updated, by EOIR’s Law Library staff. However, EOIR did not see fit to make its contents part of the records of hearing in asylum cases. It is for this reason that UNHCR’s Eligibility Guidelines For Assessing International Protection Needs of Asylum Seekers in El Salvador, which contains much of the same language as the Guidance Note quoted above, and which expresses the specific conclusion that “persons perceived by a gang as contravening its rules or resisting its authority may be in need of international refugee protection on the grounds of their (imputed) political opinion,”2 is found on EOIR’s own website on the country page for “El Salvador,” yet wasn’t even considered in Zelaya-Moreno.
Considering the growing number of pro se applicants, the lack of legal resources available to those held in remote detention facilities, and the short time frame to prepare for hearings in certain categories of cases, I can’t see why the EOIR country pages should not be made part of the hearing record here as in Canada. It’s possible that such a policy would have led to a different result in Zelaya.
Furthermore, the BIA hears plenty of cases involving expert opinions supporting the conclusion that those resisting gangs such as MS-13 were harmed on account of their political opinion. Issuing precedent opinions recognizing the context that politicizes statements and actions such as Zelaya’s would result in much greater efficiency, consistency, and fairness in Immigration Court and Asylum Office adjudications.
Realistically, I harbor no illusions that the recent change in administration will bring about such enlightened changes to asylum adjudication anytime soon. But we must still continue to argue for such change. As the dissenting opinion in Zelaya stated in its conclusion: “[w]hile it may be too late for Zelaya-Moreno, the BIA and the Department of Justice can right this wrong for future asylum seekers. I urge them to reconsider their approach to anti-gang political opinion cases to ensure those who stand up to fearsome dangers are welcomed into this country rather than forced back to face torture and death.” As noted above, it wouldn’t take much effort on EOIR’s part to accomplish this.
Notes:
Atle Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, 228, 251 (1966) (quoted in Deborah E. Anker, The Law of Asylum in the United States (2020 Ed.) § 5:17, fn. 3.
UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines For Assessing International Protection Needs of Asylum Seekers in El Salvador at 29-30.
Copyright 2021 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.
Reprinted with permission.
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Truly wonderful, Jeffrey! One of your “best ever,” in my view! (And, they are all great, so that’s saying something.)
Imagine what could be achieved at the BIA with real judges, experts in asylum law, thoughtful, practical analysis, intellectual leadership, and inspiration to a fairer future, rather than the current Clown Show 🤡🦹🏿♂️ inventing bogus ways to ”get to no!”
As Jeffrey demonstrates, we could choose to protect rather than to reject. There has always been a tendency to do the latter at the DOJ; but, under White Nationalist nativist Jeff Sessions and his successors it has gone “hog wild” — rejection has been falsely portrayed as a “duty” rather than an extremely poor choice and an abdication of moral and legal responsibility!
Today’s BIA is basically incapable of problem solving. Time and again their strained, stilted anti-immigrant, anti-due-process, pro-worst-practices interpretations not only spell doom for those coming before them, but also promote inefficiency and backlogs in an already overwhelmed system. They also send messages of disdain and disrespect for the rights and humanity of people of color that redounds throughout our struggling U.S. Legal System.
I’ll keep saying it:Whatever positive message Judge Garland and his team at DOJ intend to send about racial justice will be fatally undermined as long as “Dred Scottification” and disdain for the due process rights of migrants is the “order of the day” at the one Federal Court System the DOJ runs: The U.S. Immigration Court! As long as EOIR is a “bad joke” the rest of Judge Garland’s reforms will fall flat!
The right judges 🧑🏽⚖️ at the BIA could turn this thing around! Remains to be seen if it will happen. But, it’s not rocket science. It just requires putting the right folks in charge, in place, and giving them the support and independence to engage in “creative problem solving.”
Judge Garland should be confirmed next week. And the confirmation hearings for Lisa Monaco (DAG) and Vanita Gupta (AAG) have been scheduled.
Some additional points:
The dissenter in the Second Circuit’s decision in Zelaya-Moreno v. Wilkinson is Judge Rosemary Pooler. Judge Pooler has had a long and distinguished career. Perhaps she would like to cap it off by becoming Chair of the BIA and leading by example;
Shows the importance of experts, which is probably why the BIA has gone out of its way to demean them and encourage IJs to ignore their evidence;
Jeffrey’s analysis supports my “Better BIA for a Better America” 🇺🇸program;
As Justice Sotomayor says: “It is not justice.” That’s my view on today’s EOIR!
“Willian Rubio Barahona petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) upholding the denial of his request for asylum and withholding of removal, based on a finding that serious reasons exist to believe Barahona committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States. We hold that the “serious reasons for believing” standard requires a finding of probable cause before an alien can be subject to the mandatory bar set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii), and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2). Because no such finding was made below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.”
“Plaintiff-Appellant New York Legal Assistance Group (“NYLAG”) seeks access to non-precedential “unpublished opinions” issued by Defendant-Appellee the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) in immigration cases. NYLAG wants to consult the opinions, which are not routinely made available to the public, to aid in its representation of low-income clients in removal and asylum proceedings. NYLAG asserts that the BIA’s failure to make the opinions publicly available violates the agency’s affirmative obligation under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2), to “make available for public inspection in an electronic format final opinions . . . [and] orders, made in the adjudication of cases.” In this action under FOIA’s remedial provision, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), which authorizes district courts “to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant,” NYLAG seeks an order requiring the BIA to make available to the public all unpublished opinions issued since November 1, 1996, as well as future unpublished opinions. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Paul A. Crotty, J.) dismissed the case, concluding that FOIA’s remedial provision does not authorize district courts to order agencies to make records publicly available. We conclude that FOIA’s remedial provision authorizes the relief NYLAG seeks. FOIA’s text, read in light of its history and purpose, empowers district courts to order agencies to comply with their affirmative disclosure obligations under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2), including the obligation to make certain documents publicly available. We therefore VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
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Why would the BIA even want to withhold unpublished decisions or bar someone from asylum based on less than probable cause? Why would anyone want to further impede the already difficult task of representing the most vulnerable in Immigration Court? What if the resources wasted on litigation to diminish due process were “repurposed” to working with NYLAG and other pro bono all-stars to achieve universal representation? Much of what EOIR does these days makes little or no sense unless looked at from a White Nationalist nativist perspective.
When will it end? The Biden Administration proclaimed a “new day” on immigration and human rights issues. But, you sure can’t tell from the junk continuing to come out of the BIA and being defended in court by OIL. No matter how welcome the change in tone from the President is, it requires concerted action and getting better judges, administrators, and litigators in place to actually change policies, produce fairer results, and save lives!
Congrats to Allison Heimes and the good folks at Fair Trials Americas.
Also, congrats to my former Georgetown Law superstar, Arlington Intern, & NY JLC, Elizabeth Gibson (“The Gibson Report”) and her colleagues at the NY Legal Assistance Group!
Elizabeth Gibson Attorney, NY Legal Assistance Group Publisher of “The Gibson Report”
🇺🇸🗽⚖️Due Process Forever! We need “a little less talk and a lot more action!”
“Eyore In Distress” Once A Symbol of Fairness, Due Process, & Best Practices, Now Gone “Belly Up”“Justice” Star Chamber StyleBIA Members: “Hey, let’s celebrate! We just sent a refugee to death for not being able to describe some obscure insignia irrelevant to the case. But, the big thing is we found ‘any reason to deny’ asylum making our handler ‘Billy the Bigot’ happy! He’s out to set new killing records before Jan. 20! Maybe he’ll find us jobs at Breitbart then!” https://www.flickr.com/photos/rasputin243/ Creative Commons LicenseHon. Jeffrey S. Chase Jeffrey S. Chase Blog Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges
On November 24, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an unpublished decision in Malonda v. Barr. In that case, the asylum-seeker was attacked by armed soldiers when they raided his family’s home in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The soldiers raped and killed three of his sisters, and abducted his father and brother, all due to the father’s membership in an opposition political party.
The Immigration Judge acknowledged the voluminous documentation and detailed testimony in support of the claim. However, asylum was denied because Malonda couldn’t identify the soldiers’ uniforms with absolute certainty, although he stated “they were working for the government, I can say.” And because he did not credit the attackers as working for the government, the judge did not find that the attack was necessarily motivated by the family’s political opinion, but could have simply been an act of random violence not protected under asylum law.
Malonda was not the only recent agency decision to employ this thought pattern. In the BIA’s precedent decision in Matter of O-F-A-S-, an applicant for protection under the Convention Against Torture testified that he was beaten, robbed, and threatened by five men wearing police uniforms bearing the insignia of a government law enforcement agency, who were armed with high-caliber weapons and handcuffs. The Immigration Judge determined that the respondent had not met his burden of establishing that the five were police officers, as the uniforms could have been fake, and criminals also carry weapons. The IJ further noted that the five did not arrive in an official police car, and immediately departed when they heard that a police car was en route in response to the disturbance. Of course, real police officers engaging in extracurricular criminal activity would behave the same way. Nevertheless, the BIA found no clear error on appeal.
In another recent decision presently pending at the Second Circuit, asylum was denied because the applicant was unable to state with certainty from the details of the uniform he wore that one of his persecutors was certainly a police officer, although he believed that he was. The IJ therefore did not conclude that police were involved, instead considering the persecutors to be non-state actors, from whom the respondent hadn’t proven that the police were unwilling or unable to protect him. The BIA affirmed in an unpublished decision. Obviously, a finding that a police officer participated in the persecution of the asylum applicant could well have led to a different finding as to the government’s willingness to protect.
In each of the above cases, the respondent was found to be a credible witness. There are only two types of witnesses in court proceedings: fact (or “lay”) witnesses and experts. Asylum applicants are fact witnesses, describing what they experienced. Although the Federal Rules of Evidence are not binding on immigration judges, they provide the best guidance available, as the Immigration Courts have no such evidentiary rules of their own. Rule 701 of the FRE allows a lay witness to express an opinion provided that it is (1) rationally based on their own perception; (2) helpful to clearly understand the testimony or to determine a fact in issue; and (3) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge reserved for expert witnesses. In the above cases, the asylum seekers’ opinions that the uniformed, armed attackers were government officials fit clearly within the parameters of Rule 701.
Of course, asylum applicants are not experts on uniforms worn by the various government forces in their home countries. I doubt most country experts who testify in asylum cases would possess such specific expertise. Even if they did, those experts weren’t present to witness the event in question to be able to affirm that the uniform was in fact the official government issue. So what is the solution in cases in which the Immigration Judge harbors doubt regarding the attackers?
The UNHCR Handbook at para. 196 advises that despite all efforts, “there may also be statements that are not susceptible of proof. In such cases, if the applicant’s account appears credible, he should, unless there are good reasons to the contrary, be given the benefit of the doubt.” The following paragraph adds that evidentiary requirements should not be applied too strictly to asylum seekers. But the Handbook sets limits on this practice, adding that “[a]llowance for such possible lack of evidence does not, however, mean that unsupported statements must necessarily be accepted as true if they are inconsistent with the general account put forward by the applicant.”1
It would seem that requiring absolute confirmation of the authenticity of the attacker’s uniform (which psychologists have testified is not one’s focus during a traumatic experience) places an insurmountable burden on asylum applicants. Given the purpose of asylum laws, where an asylum applicant expresses the reasonable opinion that attackers who look and behave like government officials are in fact government officials, in the absence of the type of inconsistencies flagged by the Handbook, the benefit of the doubt should be allowed to carry the day.
Addressing this issue in Malonda, the Second Circuit focused on the fact that the identity issue was tied to the question of political opinion. The court referenced its decision from earlier this year in Hernandez-Chacon v. Barr, in which it cited language from the BIA’s excellent 1996 decision in Matter of S-P- holding that political opinion is established by direct or circumstantial evidence.
The Second Circuit pointed to circumstantial evidence in Malonda’s testimony that the attackers were government soldiers motivated by the family’s political opinion. Such evidence included the facts that Malonda’s home was the only one attacked, and his father was the only resident of the street who was an active opposition party member. Furthermore, the likelihood of the attackers being anti-government rebels was undermined by Malonda’s testimony that the rebels ability to reach his neighborhood was impeded by the presence of state security forces, and that his brother, who was abducted by the attackers, was brought to a camp where he was trained to fight against (rather than for) the rebels.
In a footnote, the court noted that the BIA had added its own insinuation to the contrary by referencing general reports of rebel involvement in “widespread violence and civil strife” in the country. But the Second Circuit pointed out that such general information failed to consider that Malonda’s own region was protected by the government, and “more importantly, does not explain why the rebels would have targeted only Malonda’s house for such violence.”
The Second Circuit’s opinion in Malonda emphasizes the starkly different approaches of the 1996 BIA and its current iteration. In Matter of S-P- (an en banc decision which remains binding precedent on immigration judges and the BIA), the Board noted the difficulty in determining motive where “harm may have been inflicted for reasons related to government intelligence gathering, for political views imputed to the applicant, or for some combination of these reasons.” But the Board emphasized the importance of keeping “in mind the fundamental humanitarian concerns of asylum law,” which are “designed to afford a generous standard for protection in cases of doubt.”2
S-P- also included a reminder that a grant of asylum “is not a judgment about the country involved, but a judgment about the reasonableness of the applicant’s belief that persecution was based on a protected ground.” As the scholar Deborah Anker has emphasized, such reasonableness determinations require “that the adjudicator view the evidence as the applicant – or a reasonable person in his or her circumstances – would and does not simply substitute the adjudicator’s own experience as the vantage point.”3 In its decision in Sotelo-Aquije v. Slattery, the Second Circuit similarly emphasized the importance of vantage point by describing the standard as what a reasonable person would find credible “based on what that person has experienced and witnessed.”
Applying this standard, what reasonable person who had experienced and witnessed what Malonda did would say: “You know, I was pretty certain the attackers were government soldiers punishing us for my father’s political activities. But since you pointed out that I’m not completely certain about the uniforms, I guess I was mistaken. It was probably just a random incident. In which case, I can’t see any reason to fear return?”
Remarkably, that appears to have been the BIA’s approach in Malonda. Its decision lacked any indication of adopting the asylum applicant’s vantage point or applying the benefit of the doubt as described above. And while Matter of S-P- set out a rather complex set of elements for identifying motive through the types of circumstantial evidence pointed to by the Second Circuit, the present BIA pointed instead to whatever generalized information it could find in the record to justify affirming the asylum denial.
Although an unpublished decision involving a pro se petitioner that could easily evade our attention,4 Malonda underscores the need for a uniform application of the principles emphasized in the BIA’s decision in Matter of S-P-, instead of a “uniform” approach based on the ability to identify uniforms.
Notes:
Although not binding, the Supreme Court has recognized that “the Handbook provides significant guidance in construing the Protocol, to which Congress sought to conform [and] has been widely considered useful in giving content to the obligations that the Protocol establishes.” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n. 22 (1987). The BIA reached a similar conclusion in Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985) (finding the Handbook to be a useful tool “in construing our obligations under the Protocol”).
The majority opinion in Matter of S-P- was authored by now retired Board Member John Guendelsberger. Three current members of the Round Table of Immigration Judges, Paul W. Schmidt (the BIA Chairperson at the time), Lory D. Rosenberg, and Gustavo Villageliu, joined in Judge Guendelsberger’s opinion.
Deborah E. Anker, Law of Asylum in the United States (2020 Edition) (Thomson Reuters) at 76.
Thanks to attorney Raymond Fasano for bringing this decision to my notice.
Copyright 2020, Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.
Reprinted With Permission.
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Obviously, the BIA could resume court-like functions, provide scholarly, rational guidance and enforce uniformity for Immigration Judges (too many of whom lack true expertise in asylum laws), help cut backlogs, increase efficiency, and put an end to frivolous litigation by DHS which too often these days seeks to encourage IJs to deny cases where asylum grants clearly are warranted. (There was a time, at least in Arlington, when DHS Counsel actually worked cooperatively with the private bar and the Immigration Judges to promote fairness and use court time wisely on asylum cases. Those days are now long gone as the system has regressed horribly and disgracefully under the maliciously incompetent, White Nationalist, nativist, leadership of the current regime at DHS and DOJ).
But, due process, fundamental fairness, and best practices, can’t and won’t happen until the current “BIA Clown Court” 🤡 is replaced with a new group of expert Appellate Judges ⚖️👨🏻⚖️🧑🏽⚖️ from the NDPA who are “practical scholars” in immigration and human rights laws.
“EOIR Clown Show Must Go” T-Shirt Custom Design Concept
Hon. “Sir” Jeffrey S. Chase Jeffrey S. Chase Blog Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration JudgesKnightess of the Round Table
Hi all: A few outcomes right before the holiday (two good, one bad):
(1) The Fourth Circuit just granted the motion for rehearing en banc in Portillo-Flores v. Barr, in which the Round Table filed an amicus brief. This was a decision with a very problematic unwilling/unable determination by two judges (the petitioner, who was 14 when the events occurred, stated on the third time he was asked that it was possible the police might have taken some action), and a very strongly worded dissent.
(2) In a bond case in the Second Circuit in which we also filed an amicus brief in a case represented by Legal Aid., Arana v. Barr, the petitioner was released from custody today after having two prior requests denied. Legal Aid believes our brief was helpful in achieving that result. Counsel is expecting a stipulation for dismissal without prejudice.
(3) The bad news: in a petition to the 4th Circuit in support of CAIR Coalition involving Matter of A-B- issues, the 4th Cir. denied the petition for review, but did so in an unpublished decision.
Wishing everyone a very safe and happy Thanksgiving!
All my best, Jeff
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Thanks, Sir Jeffrey!
I’m so thankful for all of the fantastic work that you and our other knightesses and knights of the Round Table do to keep due process and best practices on the forefront and spread truth in the face of tyranny, lies, and false narratives. While we often focus on the weekly amicus briefs we file with tribunals across the nation, the work also goes on in analysis, public speaking, media interviews, teaching, political involvement, video appearances, and grass roots pro bono and community work.
For example, our amazing colleague Judge Charlie Pazar of Tennessee just reported that he was featured on a CLE panel entirely devoted to the work and impact of our Round Table! Way to go Charlie! You are one of those who tirelessly works to improve American justice on all levels and you are certainly “super generous” in sharing your time, knowledge, expertise, and perspective!
Just recently, Sir Jeffrey, along with Round Table knightesses Judge Denise Slavin and Judge Sue Roy, in addition to yours truly and our friend NAIJ President Judge Ashley Tabaddor, were quoted by Suzanne Monyak in a Law360 article about the future of the NAIJ and the Immigration Court in a Biden Administration. Sadly, the article is “hidden behind the pay wall,” but those with access can read it in its entirety.
Compare these unselfish, teamwork-oriented, effective, expert professional activities aimed at improving the justice system and access to it for everyone with the disgraceful, ignorant, divisive, counterproductive, and often downright racist and illegal actions of the current regime’s immigration kakistocracy, starting, but by no means ending, with the deadly ☠️⚰️🏴☠️ “EOIR Clown Show” 🤡!
Think what a “Better EOIR” and a “better bureaucracy,” led by members of the NDPA could do to solve problems, promote the rule of law and best practices, and make “equal justice for all” a reality rather than a false promise that is intentionally never fulfilled! It isn’t rocket science. But, it does take replacing the kakistocracy, on all levels, throughout Government with experts from the NDPA committed to achieving “good government in the public interest.”
The Government appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Carter, J.), granting Carlos Alejandro Velasco Lopez’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Velasco Lopez was detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides for discretionary detention of noncitizens during the pendency of removal proceedings. His habeas petition challenged the procedures employed in his bond hearings, which required him to prove, to the satisfaction of an immigration judge, that he is neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk. We hold that the district court correctly granted the petition, and provided the correct remedy by ordering a new bond hearing in which the Government bore the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that Velasco Lopez was either a danger or a flight risk.
KEY QUOTE:
The irony in this case is that, in the end, all interested parties prevailed. The Government has prevailed because it has no interest in the continued incarceration of an individual who it cannot show to be either a flight risk or a danger to his community. Velasco Lopez has prevailed because he is no longer incarcerated. And the public’s interest in seeing that individuals who need not be jailed are not incarcerated has been vindicated.
**********************************
Judge Parker is correct insofar as he cogently states what should be a “win-win-win” under a functioning Government. I wholeheartedly join lead counsel Julie Dona of the Legal Aid Society, NY, in appreciating and recognizing Judge Parker’s understanding of the grim realities of today’s mal-functioning Immigration Courts and the important Constitutional rights being abridged by DHS & EOIR (essentially one and the same under the Trump kakistocracy).
But, that statement of how Government should be functioning glosses over the unfortunate reality of the Trump regime’s lawless, White Nationalist, nativist immigration agenda. The Trump regime doesn’t seek to create “win-win-win” situations! Instead, they seek to make political statements, dehumanize and degrade “the other,” and promote the biases of their “base” over sound public policy that benefits the common good.
The purpose of imprisonment in the Trump Gulag all too often has little or nothing to do with the legal criteria of danger to the community or flight risk. Rather, detention in the Gulag is used by the Trump regime’s DHS, with the connivence of the DOJ and often the courts, to punish individuals who choose to assert their legal rights; make it more difficult for them to obtain effective representation; and to coerce them into abandoning viable claims for relief, appeals, and judicial review. It’s all about punishment and deterrence, not mainly about the public interest, which is ill-served by most of Trump’s biased and counterproductive immigration policies.
DHS detention in the Trump era primarily serves Trump’s political interests and the interests of those running the for-profit prisons comprising much of Trump’s New American Gulag. Any time Trump’s policies match up with a legitimate national interest, it’s purely happenstance, not part of some overall plan to govern in the public interest.
Miller’splans are so explosively ugly, overtly racist, and anti-American that they are being kept under wraps (for now) because of a (quite legitimate) fear that they could drive the small, yet potentially significant, minority of voters of color that Trump needs to have any chance of extending his rule to do something rational and in their self-interest: Vote for Biden-Harris. Look for things like eliminating birthright citizenship, eradicating all refugee and asylum laws, making it difficult or impossible for family members and people of color to immigrate legally, a wave of summary deportations, deporting “Dreamers,” and exterminating every last ounce of compassion and humanity from our laws. If you think that Black Lives don’t matter much to Trump and his cronies, just wait until he turns the Gruppenfuhrer loose! Think the Federal Courts will stop him? Just look at Trump’s “wholly owned and proud to brag about it” Supremes’ majority! And, he’s also “stacked” — effectively “packed” — the lower Federal Courts with loyalist ideologues.
America can no longer afford life-tenured judges who treat Trump as “normal” and are unwilling or incapable of “connecting the dots” among the dehumanization and demonization of migrants, institutionalized racism, and the end of American democracy. Immigrants’ rights are human rights; human rights are Constitutional rights; dehumanization of “the other” dehumanizes us all!
It’s past time that America stopped granting the privilege and responsibilities of life-tenure to those who won’t publicly adhere to those fundamental truths! Not rocket science! Just basic Constitutional law and human decency! Better judges for a better America! It all starts with a better President and a better Senate! That’s why this election might be our final chance to take back our country and preserve our democracy!
I am pleased to announce a big win today before the Second Circuit. The Opinion is attached.
The Court held that the government is equitably estopped from denying an application for adjustment of status where: (1) it commits “affirmative misconduct” by failing to comply with an affirmatively required procedure – in this case, the failure to issue a Receipt or Rejection Notice in response to an attempted filing; (2) the applicant reasonably relies on the agency’s misconduct/inaction; and (3) the applicant is prejudiced thereby.
The interesting twist in this case is that the Court declined to reach the underlying statutory issue – concerning the CSPA – on which the District Court ruled in our favor. My take, having litigated and argued the case in both courts, is that the panel was genuinely flabbergasted that the government was pursuing the appeal and took the opportunity to stick it to DHS and issue a ruling on estoppel. The District Court did not even address estoppel, which was my alternative argument and occupied less than 5% of my briefing. My understanding is that the District Court decision – affirmed on other grounds – can still be cited for the substantive/legal conclusions it made regarding the CSPA. (Please correct me if I am wrong).
__________________________________
Jeffrey A. Feinbloom
FEINBLOOM BERTISCH LLP
***********************
Thanks, Jeffrey. The term “Affirmative Misconduct” could be used to describe the overall conduct of DHS and the entire immigraton kakistocracy under the Trump regime.
Historical Footnote: I worked on Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 301, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that government official’s “noncompliance with an affirmatively required procedure” constituted “severe” misconduct, and reversing Board of Immigration Appeal’s (“BIA”) order of deportation without remanding to agency for fact-finding or further proceedings) when I was a young attorney in the “Legacy INS” Office of General Counsel, then headed by the legendary immigration guru Sam Bernsen, in 1976.
The Corniel-Rodriguez case led directly to the eventual creation of the section 212(k) waiver for innocent misrepresentations on visa applications as part of a larger “INS Efficiency Bill” proposed by our Office and eventually enacted by Congress. Just shows that there was a time when those running the U.S. immigration system actually “did the right thing,” at least on some occasions. Perhaps not surprisingly, “doing the right thing” often also proved to be the “efficient thing” by promoting justice and avoiding unnecessary, and often losing, litigation.
Those days, of course, are long gone. The Government immigration system is now run by hacks lacking both expertise and values and who, with the assistance of the DOJ, intentionally clog the Federal Courts with litigation that likely would have been deemed frivolous, unethical, or at least not in the best interests of the public in earlier times.
It also highlights a severe deterioration in the performance of the Solicitor General’s Office in the DOJ. That office used to encourage all Federal agencies to develop administrative solutions in cases where, after review of the Article III Courts’ “adverse decisions,” the agency position below appeared to be indefensible in future litigation.
Now, the Solicitor General is actually a “cheerleader” for some racially motivated appeals against lower court decisions correctly favoring immigrants and asylum seekers. These appeals are often “supported” by very obvious pretexts for invidious actions by the regime. Given the lack of integrity, courage, and commitment to racial justice on the current Supremes’ majority, the “bad guys” sometimes improperly prevail.
But, it’s actually no more mystery to outgoing Solicitor General Noel Francisco what motivates Stephen Miller & co. than it is to the rest of us. It’s just that Francisco has consciously chosen to be “part of the problem,” something that should be remembered when the history of his disgraceful tenure in office is written.
It also shows that whenever we finally get a return to “Good Government,” a “cleanout” of EOIR and creation of an Article I Immigration Court needs to be the first thing on the list; but, a thorough re-examination of the role of every part of a corrupt DOJ that has failed to act independently and has furthered a program of overt racism, inequality, and injustice, and often argued disingenuously for “worst practices and worst interpretations,” is also an absolute necessity.
To state the obvious, the fairness and efficiency of our immigration system as well as our entire U.S. Justice system is actually in full throttle reverse under the Trump kakistocracy.
“Mario Ordonez Azmen petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to remand and dismissing his appeal of the denial of his asylum and statutory withholding claims under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The BIA did not adequately explain its conclusion that Ordonez Azmen’s proposed social group of former gang members in Guatemala was not particular. Nor did the BIA adequately explain its reasons for denying Ordonez Azmen’s motion to remand based on evidence of new country conditions. Finally, we hold that under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D), changed circumstances presenting an exception to the one-year deadline for filing an asylum application need not arise prior to the filing of the application, and the BIA erred when it refused to consider Ordonez Azmen’s alleged changed circumstances on the ground that the change occurred while his application was pending. We GRANT the petition, VACATE the BIA’s decision, and REMAND for reconsideration of Ordonez Azmen’s application for asylum and statutory withholding of removal and his motion to remand, consistent with this opinion.”
[Hats off to Zachary A. Albun, Albert M. Sacks Clinical Teaching & Advocacy Fellow, Harvard Immigration & Refugee Clinical Program, Harvard Law School, who writes: “The Court found the INA unambiguously provides that “material changed circumstances” excepting the one year filing deadline need not precede filing of the asylum application (i.e., you can rely on a changes that occur during proceedings). The court further held that W-G-R- & M-E-V-G- do not create a per se rule that “former gang member” PSGs lack cognizability. Another important point is that the Court relied on two unpublished BIA decisions that we’d submitted in determining it need not defer to the agency, but instead decide the case based on its own reading of the governing statute and regulations. Major credit and a huge thanks goes to my co-counsel at the University of Minnesota Federal Immigration & Litigation Clinic and the National Immigrant Justice Center, and to my colleagues and students at HIRC.”]
“Maria Cared Millan-Hernandez petitions for review of a 2018 Board of Immigration Appeals decision dismissing her appeal of an Immigration Judge’s denial, without an evidentiary hearing, of her motion to suppress evidence. On appeal, we consider whether Millan-Hernandez provided sufficient evidence of an egregious Fourth Amendment violation to warrant an evidentiary hearing. We conclude that she did and that the agency applied an incorrect standard in determining otherwise. Accordingly, the petition for review is GRANTED and the cause REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.”
[Hats off to AADHITHI PADMANABHAN, The Legal Aid Society, New York, NY (Nicholas J. Phillips, Joseph Moravec, Prisoners’ Legal Services of New York, Buffalo, NY, on the brief), for Petitioner!]
“Carlos Rendon began living in the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1991. Then in 1995, he pled guilty to resisting a police officer with violence. Under immigration law this offense qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”). At the time, Mr. Rendon’s sentence of 364 days in state custody did not affect his status as a lawful permanent resident. But Congress later changed the law. In 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) made him deportable based on his CIMT conviction. And in 1997, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) created the “stop-time rule,” which meant people convicted of certain crimes were no longer eligible for a discretionary form of relief known as cancellation of removal. Approximately 25 years after his guilty plea, an immigration judge found Mr. Rendon removable and ruled he was no longer eligible for cancellation of removal on account of the stop-time rule. On appeal, Mr. Rendon now argues that it was error to retroactively apply the stop-time rule to his pre-IIRIRA conviction. After careful review, we conclude that Mr. Rendon is right. We reverse the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals and remand for further proceedings.”
[Hats off to Anthony Richard Dominquez at Prada Urizar, PLLC!]
“David Nunez-Vasquez seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) finding that he was removable because he had been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”)—a conviction for leaving an accident in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 46.2–894 and a conviction for use of false identification in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2–186.3(B1). We hold that neither conviction is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. We therefore grant Nunez-Vasquez’s petition for review, vacate the BIA’s order of removal, order the Government to return Nunez-Vasquez to the United States, and remand to the BIA for further proceedings.”
[Hats off to Ben Winograd, Trina Realmuto, Kristin Macleod-Ball, Nancy Morawetz and Samantha Hsieh!]
“In these tandem cases, Jervis Glenroy Jack and Ousmane Ag each petition for review of decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ordering them removed based on their New York firearms convictions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (a)(2)(C). We principally conclude that the statutes of conviction, sections 265.03 and 265.11 of the New York Penal Law, criminalize conduct involving “antique firearms” that the relevant firearms offense definitions in the Immigration and Nationality Act do not. This categorical mismatch precludes the petitioners’ removal on the basis of their state convictions. We therefore GRANT the petitions, VACATE the decisions of the BIA, and REMAND both causes to the agency with instructions to terminate removal proceedings.”
[Hats off to Nicholas J. Phillips, Joseph Moravec, Prisoners’ Legal Services of New York, Buffalo, NY; Alan E. Schoenfeld, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, New York, NY, for Jervis Glenroy Jack, Petitioner in No. 18-842-ag., Stephanie Lopez, Neighborhood Defender Service of Harlem, New York, NY; Alan E. Schoenfeld, Andrew Sokol, Beezly J. Kiernan, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, New York, NY, for Ousmane Ag, Petitioner in No. 18-1479-ag.!]
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Remember, unlike most so-called “civil litigation,”lives and futures are at stake in every one of these cases. It’s like sending in brain surgeons trained by the “American Academy of Morticians.” Over and over, the Trump DOJ has shown itself more interested in “upping the body count” than on fairness, due process, and just results at EOIR. Is there a “breaking point” at which the Article IIIs will finally get tired of correcting the BIA’s mistakes and doing their work for them?
Good thing the BIA isn’t sitting for the final exam in my “Immigration Law & Policy” course at Georgetown Law. Even “the curve” might not be enough to save them.
“Patricia Xiomara Martinez De Artiga challenges the denial of her 26 application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 27 Convention Against Torture (CAT). Martinez listed her son as a derivative 28 beneficiary on her application. The Immigration Judge (IJ) found that Martinez 29 testified credibly regarding serious, individualized threats against her and her 30 children by the infamous Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) gang. Nevertheless, the IJ 31 denied Martinez’s claims for asylum and withholding, concluding that the 32 gang targeted Martinez because she had frustrated the gang’s recruitment 33 efforts and not on account of membership in her son’s family. On the issue of 34 CAT protection, the IJ determined that Martinez failed to meet her burden for 35 relief because she fled El Salvador promptly after MS-13 threatened her. We 36 hold that the IJ erred as a matter of law when it penalized Martinez for her prompt flight, and we cannot confidently predict that a remand would be 2 futile. We therefore DENY the government’s motion for summary denial, 3 GRANT Martinez’s petition for review, and REMAND the case.”
Let’s see. Woman credibly threatened with torture by group known to have capability, often aided and/or abetted by a corrupt and often complicit government, and renowned for leaving a trail of headless corpses behind. She does what any reasonable human might do in the same position: flees immediately for her life. It’s an “open and shut” case for CAT protection — should have been granted by stipulation between the parties.
Instead, in the warped, twisted, irrational, misogynist, and racially biased world of EOIR, a Latino women’s rational actions become a judge’s reason to deny her clearly warranted protection. According to this judge, she had to be dumb or unfortunate enough to wait to be tortured or killed to get protection. Of course it’s absurd! But, what’s even more absurd is that a corrupt, unconstitutional system that daily metes out this type of deadly utter nonsense to vulnerable humans seeking legal protection is allowed to continue to operate in our nation at all.
Can it really get any worse! It raises the obvious question of why the “appellate immigration judges” who approved this ludicrous abomination of illegality and “counter logic” are still on the bench rather than in remedial training or looking for other jobs.
It’s no surprise that a fundamentally unjust and unconstitutional system that wastes time looking for ways to deny cases that should easily be granted is running an uncontrolled backlog of at least 1.4 million cases. It’s obvious that under Sessions, Whitaker, and Barr, the already stressed, reeling, and mismanaged Immigration “Courts” have become hotbeds of misogyny, anti-immigrant bias, anti-asylum bias, anti-Latino bias, pro-DHS favoritism, unprofessionalism, grotesque mismanagement and waste of taxpayer funds, and just all around horrible judging. They are America’s Star Chambers, pure and simple.
Remanding individual cases is not going to fix these systemic problems that are bringing down our Constitution and de-legitimizing our entire justice system. But, shutting down the system and requiring that it be administered by an independent judicially-appointed monitor to return some semblance of due process and fundamental fairness is not only within the Article III Courts’ power, but is actually constitutionally required to halt this Administration’s systemic abuses of justice. Or, send the cases that actually need to be tried at this point in time to U.S. Magistrate Judges for real due process hearings.
The Courts of Appeals constantly expose the elementary mistakes, illegality, outright irrationality, the widespread, intentional denials of due process, fundamental fairness, and the gross failures of basic judicial expertise by the “EOIR Subdivision” of DHS Enforcement. But, you can be sure that this is just the “tip of the iceberg.”
Some Court of Appeals panels use the same “rubber stamp” techniques as the BIA, hiding their own deficiencies behind a shield of “undue deference” to a failed and unconstitutionally biased agency. And, even more individuals with potentially valid claims are unfairly turned down because they can’t find competent lawyers or don’t have the wherewithal to get to the Court of Appeals at all.
Then there are those who can’t stand the pain and torture inflicted by the “New American Gulag” so give up viable claims without full litigation. Or they are sent to rot and die in Mexico waiting for a purposely unfair hearing system stacked against.
Now, tens of thousands, many with potentially valid claims for protection, are simply being turned back at the border in clear violation of our statutes, our Constitution, and international obligations, not to mention our obligations to our fellow humans. They are denied access to the system. The Administration fabricates numerous lies and false myths to justify its actions, most rooted deeply in the anti-Hispanic racism and misogyny of Trump, Miller, and their accomplices.
The reasons given by the regime for this racist misconduct are phony as a three dollar bill. Yet, some equally dishonest authorities, including judges who should know better, will accept them without critical examination of their fraudulent nature.
Complicity comes in many forms and can often be hidden in the present. But, the the massive, intentional, human rights violations, fueled by the inherent racism of the Trump Administration and its toadies, will someday come out. The full extent of the entirely unnecessary human carnage inflicted on humanity by our nation and the invidious reasons behind it will be documented.
Then, future generations will ask: Where were the Federal Courts while this was happening? Why didn’tprivileged and supposedly independent life-tenured judges stop the “slaughter of innocents?” Why did they allow baby jails, kids in cages, family separation, torture in the New American Gulag, Star Chambers, andNazi-style abuses by corrupt U.S. border guards to continue, unabated? Why were they complicit in the dehumanization of people of color by an overtly racist and scofflaw regime? What is it about Trump’s and Miller’s racist agenda that they were too dim or intellectually dishonest to understand?
Justice will be too late for the dead, tortured, maimed, dehumanized, and destroyed. But, the reputations of these “Modern Day Confederates, Jim Crows, and their enablers” eventually will come tumbling down just like the statutes of their morally and intellectually bankrupt predecessors who also fought for or advanced the cause of racism and man’s inhumanity to men, women, and particularly, children. They had their own flimsy excuses, fabrications, myths, and B.S. justifications which have crumbled over time leaving just the nakedness and ugly truth of their racism and/or complicity for others to see.
This is not a “normal Administration” and falsely treating it as such by approving or failing to stand up to their attacks on our Constitution, human rights, and human dignity is not “normal behavior” for Federal Judges, legislators, and other public officials who allow this grotesque system to continue to destroy lives. “Deferring” to patently racist schemes and overtly biased officials isn’t legal, even when the “cover” of some other legal pretext is offered.
Those who are witness to the many abuses must insure that those who operate and allow this thoroughly corrupt system to persist don’t escape with the “Nuremberg Defense” of “just following orders” or “just following the law.”
Actually, equal justice for all isn’t just a slogan. Our Constitution clearly requires it, and it’s the job of Federal Judges to insure that it happens. Judges who won’t do that, don’t belong on the bench. Certainly, when there is regime change, no future Federal Judge or Justice should be appointed or confirmed unless he or she has demonstrated a commitment to equal justice for all supported by a record of opposing the systemic racial injustice and other invidious discrimination inflicted by the Trump regime through its program of “Dred Scottification” of the other.
There is no national emergency more important right now than the failure of our justice system to provide and enforce equal justice for all. The many who are enabling this regime’s toxic agenda by insuring that justice is unequal and that the system discriminates against and demeans immigrants, asylum applicants, and others of color are themselves operating outside the law, not to mention humanity. There will be a reckoning! Count on it!
Due Process Forever. Complicity in Racist Abuses, Never!
CHRISTOPHER T. CASAMASSIMA Partner Wilmer Hale Los AngelesSOUVIK SAHA Counsel Wilmer Hale Washington, D.C.Knightess of the Round Table
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici curiae have served as Immigration Judges and as members of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Amici are invested in the resolution of this case because they have dedicated their careers to improving tghe fairness and
2
efficiency of the U.S. immigration system. Through their centuries-long collective experience, amici have adjudicated hundreds—if not thousands—of immigration detention hearings. Amici have substantial knowledge of immigration detention issues, including the practical impact of the burden of proof in such hearings.
INTRODUCTION AND ARGUMENT SUMMARY
Under the Fifth Amendment, “[n]o person” shall “be deprived of … liberty … without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. V. The “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). This liberty is so fundamental that the law tolerates its restraint only in limited circumstances.
1
Amici are invested in the resolution of
2
efficiency of the U.S. immigration system. Through their centuries-long collective experience, amici have adjudicated hundreds—if not thousands—of immigration detention hearings. Amici have substantial knowledge of immigration detention issues, including the practical impact of the burden of proof in such hearings.
INTRODUCTION AND ARGUMENT SUMMARY
Under the Fifth Amendment, “[n]o person” shall “be deprived of … liberty … without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. V. The “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). This liberty is so fundamental that the law tolerates its restraint only in limited circumstances.
1
Amici are invested in the resolution of this case because they have dedicated their careers to improving the fairness and
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).
Amici have filed substantially similar briefs in other cases involving burden of proof issues in proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Here, no party or party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, nor contributed money to preparing or submitting this brief. Only amici or their counsel contributed money to prepare or submit this brief. The parties have consented to the filing of this brief.
2
A complete list of amici is included in this brief’s addendum.
Case 19-3220, Document 116, 06/03/2020, 2854056, Page13 of 56
Such restraint violates the Due Process Clause “unless the detention is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural protections, or, in certain special and narrow nonpunitive circumstances, where a special justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Yet, federal law provides far greater protections to criminal defendants than it does to noncitizens in civil proceedings—even though the distinctions between criminal and non-criminal proceedings mean very little to a person sitting behind bars.
Accordingly, noncitizens already face significant hurdles in detention proceedings brought under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). At issue in this appeal is whether another, even higher and more fundamental, barrier to due process can be erected in this Circuit: do noncitizens bear the burden of justifying their freedom from detention? For noncitizens, the answer to this question is no mere technicality—it can mean the difference between freedom and confinement. This burden’s allocation, therefore, “reflects the value society places on individual liberty.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
Given their collective experience in adjudicating immigration bond hearings, amici are particularly well-suited to address the monumental question in this case. To that end, amici wish to share the following observations for this Court’s benefit:
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Case 19-3220, Document 116, 06/03/2020, 2854056, Page14 of 56
First, noncitizens already enjoy fewer procedural protections than criminal defendants. We contrast the procedural rules for detaining criminal defendants and noncitizens to underscore the challenges that noncitizens face in immigration bond hearings, and to highlight the need for a presumption against detention as one of the last remaining bulwarks to protect noncitizens’ liberty.
Second, detention of noncitizens consumes the government’s already- limited administrative and judicial resources. Amici highlight the staggering costs that are associated with immigration detention, as well as the strain on immigration courts resulting from the unnecessary detention of noncitizens.
Third, contrary to the government’s position, placing the burden of proof on the government would not generate fiscal or administrative hardship. Amici advance that position with confidence because the government previously shouldered that exact burden over a fifteen-year period. Several of the amici served as Immigration Judges within that period and found that this older system did not cause additional costs or administrative hurdles.
Fourth, in amici’s experience, detaining noncitizens actually increases the burden on the immigration court system. While in detention, noncitizens face significant challenges in adequately preparing their cases. Further, the Executive Branch now utilizes “performance metrics” to encourage Immigration Judges to accelerate the fact-finding process in detention proceedings. With less time for
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Case 19-3220, Document 116, 06/03/2020, 2854056, Page15 of 56
individualized fact-finding, noncitizens will have even less opportunity to marshal the facts needed to satisfy the burden to avoid detention. Reallocating the burden of proof in immigration bond hearings, therefore, would reduce costs.
Fifth, and finally, amici offer alternatives to noncitizen detention that would inject much-needed resources to the immigration court system. The government’s aversion to such alternatives rest on a single statistic suggesting that the vast majority of noncitizens abscond upon release on bond. That statistic, however, is misleading and inconsistent with other available data, and bears little resemblance to the reality that amici encountered in years of adjudicating immigration cases.
Together, these observations should lead this Court to conclude that due process requires the government to make some sort of individualized showing before it may place noncitizens under lock and key.
Thanks again not only to the signatory members of our Round Table, but especially to CHRISTOPHER T. CASAMASSIMA, SOUVIK SAHA, and the other members of their pro bono team over atWILMER HALE.Without assistance like yours, the “Voices of the Round Table” would not be heard in support of justice in so many cases throughout our nation!
PANEL: PARKER, CHIN, and SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges.
OPINION BY: Judge Barrington D. Parker
DISSENTING OPINION: Judge Richard Sullivan
KEY QUOTE FROM MAJORITY:
Tomas Mendez was admitted to the United States in 2004 as a lawful
17 permanent resident. In 2010, he was convicted of misprision of a felony in
18 violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4. That section makes it a crime for one with knowledge
19 of the commission of a federal felony to conceal it and not promptly report it to
20 the appropriate authorities. 18 U.S.C § 4.
21 In 2016, upon returning from a trip abroad, the Department of Homeland
22 Security charged him, based on his misprision conviction, as inadmissible under
23 § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, because he was a
24 noncitizen convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”). The
25 immigration judge sustained the charge, and the Board of Immigration Appeals
2
1 (“BIA”) affirmed. The BIA concluded that the violation of § 4 meant that he had
2 committed a CIMT. Matter of Mendez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 219, 225 (BIA 2018).
3 The BIA defines a CIMT as crime that is “inherently base, vile, or
4 depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and duties owed
5 between persons or to society in general.” Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 60, 63
6 (2d Cir. 2006).1 For decades, the BIA never considered misprision a CIMT. Matter
7 of Sloan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 840, 842 (BIA 1966) (holding misprision does not
8 constitute a CIMT).
9 However, in 2002, the Eleventh Circuit held in Itani v. Ashcroft that a
10 conviction under § 4 is categorically a CIMT “because it necessarily involves an
11 affirmative act of concealment or participation in a felony, behavior that runs
12 contrary to accepted societal duties and involves dishonest or fraudulent
1 Unless otherwise indicated, in quoting cases all internal quotation marks, alterations, emphases, footnotes, and citations are omitted.
3
1 activity.” 298 F.3d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2002).2 Following the Eleventh Circuit’s
2 lead, the BIA did an about face and determined in a case arising in the Ninth
3 Circuit that misprision was a CIMT. In re Robles-Urrea, 24 I. & N. Dec. 22, 25 (BIA
4 2006).
5 The Ninth Circuit rejected the BIA’s conclusion. The court held that
6 because § 4 required only knowledge of the felony and did not require an intent
7 to defraud, or conceal, or to obstruct justice, the statute encompassed conduct
8 that was not inherently base or vile. Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702, 710-12
9 (9th Cir. 2012). The Ninth Circuit reasoned that “[n]othing in the statute
10 prohibiting misprision of a felony references the specific purpose for which the
11 concealment must be undertaken,” let alone a purpose sufficient to qualify
12 misprision as a categorical CIMT. Id. at 710.
2 In 2017, the Fifth Circuit joined the Eleventh Circuit to hold that misprision is categorically a CIMT. Villegas-Sarabia v. Sessions, 874 F.3d 871, 878 (5th Cir. 2017). We respectfully decline to follow the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit’s approach. We believe that neither Itani nor Villegas-Sarabia satisfactorily supports the assertion that specific intent, or intent to defraud, can be read into § 4, especially when Congress did not include such a requirement and has shown elsewhere in the criminal code that it knows how to include such a requirement if it so chooses. The Eleventh Circuit in Itani reasoned only “that misprision of a felony is a crime of moral turpitude because it necessarily involves an affirmative act of concealment or participation in a felony, behavior that runs contrary to accepted societal duties and involves dishonest or fraudulent activity.” 298 F.3d at 1216. We are reluctant to adopt this reasoning because, “any crime, by definition, runs contrary to some duty owed to society” and “[i]f this were the sole benchmark for a crime involving moral turpitude, every crime would involve moral turpitude.” Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702, 709 (9th Cir. 2012). We are also unpersuaded by Villegas-Sarabia, where the Fifth Circuit relied almost exclusively on Itani’s reasoning.
4
1 Mendez moved to terminate removal proceedings and for cancellation of
2 removal, arguing that misprision is not a CIMT. Relying on the BIA’s decision in
3 Robles-Urrea, the IJ found Mendez removable as charged. The IJ also pretermitted
4 Mendez’s application for cancellation of removal, concluding that because his
5 2010 misprision conviction constituted a CIMT, it stopped the clock for
6 calculating length of residency and prevented him from establishing the required
7 seven years of continuous residency. In February 2018, the BIA issued a
8 precedential decision in this case. Matter of Mendez, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 219. It
9 reaffirmed its holding that misprision is a CIMT and declined to follow the Ninth
10 Circuit’s rejection of its reasoning in Robles-Urrea.
11 Mendez petitions for review. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252
12 (a)(2)(D). Mendez argues that a conviction for misprision is not a CIMT because
13 it does not categorically involve conduct that is inherently base, vile, or
14 depraved. He also argues that, contrary to the BIA’s contention, its decision is
15 not entitled to Chevron deference. We agree on both points.
16 DISCUSSION
17 The dispositive issue is whether misprision is a CIMT. Because the BIA has
18 no particular expertise in construing federal criminal statutes (as opposed to the
19 INA), we owe no deference to its construction of § 4. United States v. Apel, 571 5
1 U.S. 359, 369 (2014); Mendez v. Mukasey 547 F.3d 345, 346 (2d Cir. 2008).
2 Accordingly, we review de novo the BIA’s conclusion that Mendez’s conviction
3 under § 4 is a conviction for a CIMT. Rodriguez, 451 F.3d at 63.
. . . .
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There is a “Circuit split:” The 5th & 11th Circuits agree with the BIA’s decision in Matter of Mendez; the 9th and 2d Circuits reject it. That means it’s likiely to eventually be up to the Supremes to decide who’s right.
Court says Trump administration can withhold money from NYC, 7 states in ‘sanctuary cities’ fight
Updated 1:07 PM EST February 26, 2020
The Trump administration can withhold federal money from seven states, as well as New York City, over their cooperation on immigration enforcement, a federal appeals court ruled Wednesday.
The decision by the 2nd US Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a lower court ruling that blocked the Justice Department from withholding a key law enforcement grant the department said was available only to cities that complied with specific immigration enforcement measures.
The federal appeals court ruling comes amid an ongoing feud between the Trump administration and so-called “sanctuary cities,” which limit cooperation between local law enforcement and federal immigration authorities. Over recent weeks, the administration has stepped up its fight against sanctuary jurisdictions and taken measures like barring New York residents from enrolling in certain Trusted Traveler programs, such as Global Entry.
Judge Reena Raggi, writing on behalf of the unanimous 3-judge panel, acknowledged the divisive nature of the issue at hand, writing: “The case implicates several of the most divisive issues confronting our country and, consequently, filling daily news headlines: national immigration policy, the enforcement of immigration laws, the status of illegal aliens in this country, and the ability of States and localities to adopt policies on such matters contrary to, or at odds with, those of the federal government.”
The city of New York is a plaintiff in the lawsuit, along with New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Washington, Massachusetts, Virginia and Rhode Island.
In July 2017, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced that applicants for Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grants would have to comply with federal immigration enforcement. States pushed back and sued over the move.
. . . .
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Read the complete article at the above link. Thanks for keeping us up to date, Priscilla! Love your timely and accessible reporting!
My “Quick Takes:”
This one is headed to the Supremes, as there is now a “Circuit split.”
Don’t expect this to have much effect on actual immigration enforcement.
Coercing states and localities is unlikely to foster much meaningful cooperation.
It’s more likely to simply channel resistance to the regime elsewhere.
The affected jurisdictions always have the option of just taking a “pass” on “Byrne Grants.”
In any event, interior apprehensions are a minuscule part of the DHS civil enforcement program.
They accounted for fewer than 100,000 removals during the last fiscal year.
At that rate, it would take more than a century for DHS to remove the estimated 10+ million undocumented U.S residents.
On the other hand, this is a major “propaganda victory” for the regime. And, make no mistake, this was always about anti-immigrant propaganda not legitimate law enforcement.
The Administration will be able to tout that Second Circuit Judge Reena Raggi bought their disingenuous “enforcement policy” argument “hook line and sinker.” (The DHS “Community Terrorism” program has actually been shown to inhibit legitimate law enforcement by making it much less likely that victims of domestic violence and gang crimes will report them to local law enforcement.)
However, more thoughtful judges in the 7th Circuit and elsewhere have exposed the weaknesses of Judge Raggi’s reasoning.
It’s unlikely that the Supremes will resolve this before the November election.
If Trump wins, the “Roberts Five” have already demonstrated their obsequiousness in the face of Trump’s war on immigrants.
On the other hand, a Democratic Administration would be likely to withdraw this “punishment initiative” completely and try to reach a more harmonious working relationship with state and local law enforcement on immigration issues, thus “mooting” this litigation.
The Freudian concept of psychological projection refers to the behavior of people who, unable to acknowledge their own weaknesses, ascribe those same failings to others. President Trump provides a striking example in his multiple post-impeachment rants calling those who sought his removal “vicious” and “mean.” His choice of the word “mean” caught my attention, because I’ve been thinking for some time now that the United States has become a mean country.
There has been meanness, and worse, in the world, of course, long before there was a President Trump. But it doesn’t require suffering from the agitation of Trump derangement syndrome to observe that something toxic has been let loose during these past three years.
Much of it has to do with immigration: the separation of families at the border and the effort to terminate DACA, the program that protects from deportation undocumented young people brought to the United States as children. Removing this protection for hundreds of thousands of productive “Dreamers,” now pursuing higher education or holding jobs (or both), is an obvious lose-lose proposition for the country. It is also simply mean.
And the meanness radiates out from Washington. The mayor of Springfield, Mass., one of the biggest cities in one of the bluest states, has taken the president up on his offer to let local officials veto the resettlement of refugees in their communities. Tennessee enacted a law to cut off state money to cities that declare themselves “sanctuaries” from federal immigration enforcement. (At the same time more than a dozen counties in Tennessee have endorsed a growing “Second Amendment sanctuary” movement for gun rights.)
The meanness spreads to the lowest ranks of the country’s judiciary. USA Today reported two weeks ago that a common pleas judge in Hamilton County, Ohio, has adopted the practice of summoning ICE whenever he has a “hunch” that the defendant standing before him is an undocumented immigrant. “I’m batting a thousand. I haven’t got one wrong yet,” Judge Robert Ruehlman boasted.
In the Arizona desert, where thousands of border-crossing migrants have died from exposure and dehydration in the past decade, Border Patrol agents have been filmed kicking over and emptying bottles of water left for the migrants by volunteers. (This practice evidently preceded the Trump administration; the Border Patrol, in its union’s first-ever presidential endorsement, endorsed Mr. Trump’s candidacy in 2016, deeming him “the only candidate who actually threatens the established powers that have betrayed our country.” )
The United States attorney’s office in Tucson has been prosecuting people who enter the Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge without a permit to leave lifesaving bottles of water and cans of food along common migratory routes. In 2018, a federal magistrate judge, in a nonjury trial, convicted four people for illegal entry and abandoning property in the desert wilderness. The four are volunteers for No More Deaths/No Más Muertes, a ministry of the Unitarian Universalist Church of Tucson.
In their appeal before a federal district judge, Rosemary Márquez, the four invoked the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, arguing that their actions were driven by their faith and their belief in the “sanctity of human life.” The government responded that the four had simply “recited” religious beliefs “for the purpose of draping religious garb over their political activity.” (I’m not holding my breath for the Trump administration to similarly ridicule the religious claims of employers who say they can’t possibly include the birth-control coverage in their employee health plans, as the Affordable Care Act requires, lest they become complicit in the sin of contraception.)
The administration met its match in Judge Márquez. On Jan. 31, finding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act barred the prosecution, she overturned the convictions. Her 21-page opinion noted that human remains were regularly found in the area, and she had this to say about that fact:
“The government seems to rely on a deterrence theory, reasoning that preventing clean water and food from being placed on the refuge would increase the risk of death or extreme illness for those seeking to cross unlawfully, which in turn would discourage or deter people from attempting to enter without authorization. In other words, the government claims a compelling interest in preventing defendants from interfering with a border enforcement strategy of deterrence by death. This gruesome logic is profoundly disturbing.”
The headline on this column promises some thoughts about the Supreme Court, so I’ll now turn to the court. The country’s attention was focused elsewhere two weeks ago when five justices gave the Trump administration precisely what it needed to put into effect one of the most meanspirited and unjustified of all its recent immigration policies. This was the radical expansion of the “public charge” rule, which bars from admission or permanent residency an immigrant who is “likely at any time to become a public charge.”
The concept of “public charge” in itself is nothing new. It was part of the country’s early efforts to control immigration in the late 19th century, where it was used to exclude those likely to end up in the poor house or its equivalent. That historic definition — “primarily dependent on the government for cash assistance or on long-term institutionalization” — was codified in 1999 “field guidance” issued to federal immigration officers.
Last August, the administration put a new definition in place. Any immigrant who receives the equivalent of 12 months of federal benefits within a three-year period will be deemed a public charge, ineligible for permanent residency or a path to citizenship. The designated benefits include nutrition assistance for a child under the SNAP program; receipt of a Section 8 housing voucher or residence in public housing; and medical treatment under Medicaid. The new rule, titled Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, aggregates the benefits — that is, three of the benefits received in a single month count as three months of the 12.
States, cities, and nonprofit organizations around the country promptly filed lawsuits, with varying preliminary outcomes. The plaintiffs argued that the drastic change in definition was “arbitrary and capricious,” violating the Administrative Procedure Act’s core requirement of “reasoned decision making.”
In October, a federal district judge in New York, George Daniels, ruled in favor of two sets of plaintiffs, one group headed by New York State and the other, a coalition of nonprofit organizations. Judge Daniels noted that the government was “afforded numerous opportunities to articulate a rational basis for equating public charge with receipt of benefits for 12 months within a 36-month period, particularly when this has never been the rule,” but that its lawyers “failed each and every time.” He explained that “where an agency action changes prior policy, the agency need not demonstrate that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one. It must, however, show that there are good reasons for the new policy.”
And Judge Daniels added: “The rule is simply a new agency policy of exclusion in search of a justification. It is repugnant to the American dream of the opportunity for prosperity and success through hard work and upward mobility.” Noting that the policy would immediately cause “significant hardship” to “hundreds of thousands of individuals who were previously eligible for admission and permanent residence in the United States,” he issued a nationwide injunction to block its implementation.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit put the government’s appeal on a fast track but refused, in the interim, to grant a stay of the injunction. So, predictably, the administration turned to its friends at the Supreme Court and, equally predictably, got what it wanted. By a vote of 5 to 4, the court granted a stay of the injunction to last through a future Supreme Court appeal.
Granting a stay at this point was a breathtaking display of judicial activism. The Second Circuit will hear the case promptly; briefs are due on Friday. More to the point, the court’s summary action, without full appellate review, changes the lives of untold numbers of people for the worse, people who immigrated legally to the United States and who have followed every rule. Being kicked off the path to citizenship puts them directly on the path to deportation, without any explanation from the highest court in the land of why this should be the case.
Of the five justices in the majority — Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh — only Justices Gorsuch and Thomas deigned to write anything. In a four-page concurring opinion, they made clear their determination to hold up this case, Department of Homeland Security v. New York, as an example of “the gamesmanship and chaos” that they said was attendant on “the rise of nationwide injunctions.”
I don’t remember such hand-wringing a few years back when anti-immigrant states found a friendly judge in South Texas to issue a nationwide injunction against President Barack Obama’s expansion of the DACA program to include parents of the “Dreamers.” The Supreme Court let that injunction stand.
Do the justices realize how they are being played? I started this column by mentioning psychological projection, a distorted view of others engendered by a distorted view of oneself. That’s Donald Trump, seeing himself the innocent victim of attacks from vicious and mean people. There’s another kind of projection, the image reflected when light strikes a mirror. Who do these five justices see when they look in their mental mirrors? Could it be Donald Trump?
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Eventually, the New Due Process Army will win the war to restore justice, Due Process, and the rule of law to our Republic. And one of the lessons should be: Better Federal Judges driven by fairness, scholarship, practicality, compassion, kindness, respect for all persons, and the courage to speak out for the rights of the people against tyranny and corruption.
In reality, judges were among those inside Germany who might have effectively challenged Hitler’s authority, the legitimacy of the Nazi regime, and the hundreds of laws that restricted political freedoms, civil rights, and guarantees of property and security. And yet, the overwhelming majority did not. Instead, over the 12 years of Nazi rule, during which time judges heard countless cases, most not only upheld the law but interpreted it in broad and far-reaching ways that facilitated, rather than hindered, the Nazis ability to carry out their agenda.
— United States Holocaust Museum, Law, Justice, and the Holocaust, at 8 (July 2018)
How soon we forget!
Yes, Linda, I think the Supremes’ Justices and other Article IIIs who aid the “dehumanization” and “Dred Scottification” of migrants, asylum seekers, and “the other” by the regime know full well that they are “being played.” They are willing, sometimes as in the case of the recent totally gratuitous nonsense about targeting nationwide injunctions flowing off the pens of Gorsuch and Thomas actually eager, to “go along to get along” — even when it often means hanging braver lower court colleagues who had the courage to speak truth to power and stand up to tyranny “out to dry.”
Like judges during the Jim Crow era and other disastrous episodes of legal history, they think they can hide out in their ivory towers behind legal gobbledygook that most first-years law students can recognize as the nonsense “cop out” that it is. They also knowingly and intentionally betray the legions of courageous, ethical lawyers, many working pro bono in dangerous and unhealthy conditions, to uphold the rule of law in America and to defend human rights and human decency.
Hopefully, our Republic will survive this dark time, and these folks “working at the retail level,” many “charter members” of the New Due Process Army, will form the core of a future, better judiciary that will put Due Process and humanity first, above party loyalty and bizarre, often nonsensical, right wing theories used to justify lawlessness, injustice, unfairness, and invidious discrimination.
Many, many thanks to pro bono superheroes CHRISTOPHER T. CASAMASSIMA and SOUVIK SAHA and all of our other great friends over at WILMER CUTLER for once again “making us look smart!”
And here’s a summary of our argument excerpted from our brief:
INTRODUCTION AND ARGUMENT SUMMARY
Under the Fifth Amendment, “[n]o person” shall “be deprived of … liberty … without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. V. The “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). This liberty is so fundamental that the law tolerates its restraint only in limited circumstances.
1
Amici have filed substantially similar briefs in other cases involving burden of proof issues in proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Here, no party or party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, nor contributed money to preparing or submitting this brief. Only amici or their counsel contributed money to prepare or submit this brief. The parties have consented to the filing of this brief.
2
A complete list of amici is included in this brief’s addendum.
Case 19-2284, Document 93, 02/11/2020, 2776030, Page13 of 55
Such restraint violates the Due Process Clause “unless the detention is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural protections, or, in certain special and narrow nonpunitive circumstances, where a special justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Yet, federal law provides far greater protections to criminal defendants than it does to noncitizens in civil proceedings—even though the distinctions between criminal and non-criminal proceedings mean very little to a person sitting behind bars.
Accordingly, noncitizens already face significant hurdles in detention proceedings brought under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). At issue in this appeal is whether another, even higher and more fundamental, barrier to due process can be erected in this Circuit: do noncitizens bear the burden of justifying their freedom from detention? For noncitizens, the answer to this question is no mere technicality—it can mean the difference between freedom and confinement. This burden’s allocation, therefore, “reflects the value society places on individual liberty.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
Given their collective experience in adjudicating immigration bond hearings, amici are particularly well-suited to address the monumental question in this case. To that end, amici wish to share the following observations for this Court’s benefit:
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Case 19-2284, Document 93, 02/11/2020, 2776030, Page14 of 55
First, noncitizens already enjoy fewer procedural protections than criminal defendants. We contrast the procedural rules for detaining criminal defendants and noncitizens to underscore the challenges that noncitizens face in immigration bond hearings, and to highlight the need for a presumption against detention as one of the last remaining bulwarks to protect noncitizens’ liberty.
Second, detention of noncitizens consumes the government’s already- limited administrative and judicial resources. Amici highlight the staggering costs that are associated with immigration detention, as well as the strain on immigration courts resulting from the unnecessary detention of noncitizens.
Third, contrary to the government’s position, placing the burden of proof on the government would not generate fiscal or administrative hardship. Amici advance that position with confidence because the government previously shouldered that exact burden over a fifteen-year period. Several of the amici served as Immigration Judges within that period and found that this older system did not cause additional costs or administrative hurdles.
Fourth, in amici’s experience, detaining noncitizens actually increases the burden on the immigration court system. While in detention, noncitizens face significant challenges in adequately preparing their cases. Further, the Executive Branch now utilizes “performance metrics” to encourage Immigration Judges to accelerate the fact-finding process in detention proceedings. With less time for
-3-
Case 19-2284, Document 93, 02/11/2020, 2776030, Page15 of 55
individualized fact-finding, noncitizens will have even less opportunity to marshal the facts needed to satisfy the burden to avoid detention. Reallocating the burden of proof in immigration bond hearings, therefore, would reduce costs.
Fifth, and finally, amici offer alternatives to noncitizen detention that would inject much-needed resources to the immigration court system. The government’s aversion to such alternatives rest on a single statistic suggesting that the vast majority of noncitizens abscond upon release on bond. That statistic, however, is misleading and inconsistent with other available data, and bears little resemblance to the reality that amici encountered in years of adjudicating immigration cases.
Together, these observations should lead this Court to conclude that due process requires the government to make some sort of individualized showing before it may place noncitizens under lock and key.
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Once again it’s an amazing honor and privilege to join my wonderful sisters and brothers in our continuing team effort to restore and enhance Due Process in our U.S. Immigration Courts.
Hernandez-Chacon v. Barr, 2d Cir., 01-23-20, published
PANEL: WESLEY, CHIN, and BIANCO, Circuit Judges
OPINION BY: Judge Chin
KEY QUOTE:
2. Political Opinion
To demonstrate that persecution, or a well‐founded fear of
persecution, is on account of an applicantʹs political opinion, the applicant must show that the persecution ʺarises from his or her own political opinion.ʺ Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 2005). Thus, the applicant must ʺshow, through direct or circumstantial evidence, that the persecutorʹs motive to persecute arises from the applicant’s political belief.ʺ Id. (emphasis added). The
See Vega‐Ayala v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2016) (ʺVega‐Ayalaʹs general reference to the prevalence of domestic violence in El Salvador does little to explain how ʹSalvadoran women in intimate relationships with partners who view them as propertyʹ are meaningfully distinguished from others within Salvadoran society.ʺ). But see Alvarez Lagos v. Barr, 927 F.3d 236, 252‐55 (4th Cir. 2019) (remanding for agency to consider whether ʺgroup of unmarried mothers living under the control of gangs in Honduras qualifies as a ʹparticular social group,ʹʺ where record contained evidence that gang in question did ʺindeed target victims on the basis of their membership in a socially distinct group of unmarried mothersʺ).
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5
persecution may also be on account of an opinion imputed to the applicant by the persecutor, regardless of whether or not this imputation is accurate. See Delgado v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 2007) (ʺ[A]n imputed political opinion, whether correctly or incorrectly attributed, can constitute a ground for political persecution.ʺ (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Chun Gao v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir. 2005)). The BIA has explained that persecution based on political opinion is established when there is ʺdirect or circumstantial evidence from which it is reasonable to believe that those who harmed the applicant were in part motivated by an assumption that [her] political views were antithetical to those of the government.ʺ Matter of S‐P‐, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 494 (B.I.A. 1996); see also Vumi v. Gonzalez, 502 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2007).
Here, Hernandez‐Chacon contends that if she is returned to El Salvador she will be persecuted by gang members because of her political opinion ‐‐ her opposition to the male‐dominated social norms in El Salvador and her taking a stance against a culture that perpetuates female subordination and the brutal treatment of women. She argues that when she refused to submit to the violent advances of the gang members, she was taking a stance against a culture of male‐domination and her resistance was therefore a political act.
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There is ample evidence in the record to support her claim.6 Gangs control much of El Salvador, including the neighborhood in which Hernandez‐ Chacon lived. The law enforcement systems that would normally protect women ‐‐ police, prosecutors, judges, officials ‐‐ do not have the resources or desire to address the brutal treatment of women, and the Salvadoran justice system ʺfavors aggressors and assassinsʺ and ʺpunish[es] victims of gender violence.ʺ Cert. Adm. Rec. at 147. Yet, Hernandez‐Chacon testified that when the first gang member tried to rape her, she resisted ʺbecause [she had] every right to.ʺ Id. at 193. Three days later, when the same man and two other gang members attacked her, she again resisted, to the point where they beat her until she lost consciousness. She argues that the men targeted her for the second attack ‐‐ and beat her so brutally ‐‐ because she had resisted the advances of an MS gang member and they believed she needed to be punished for her act of defiance. Her now husband likewise stated in his affidavit that Hernandez‐ Chacon will be attacked if she returns to El Salvador because ʺ[s]he has managed to fight them off twice, but that just makes them angrier and if she shows her face again, I think they could kill her.ʺ Id. at 269.
At oral argument, the government forthrightly conceded that it was a ʺpermissibleʺ inference that Hernandez‐Chacon was persecuted for her feminist political ideology, though it argued that the record did not compel that result.
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6
While the IJʹs decision was thorough and thoughtful overall, her
analysis of Hernandez‐Chaconʹs political opinion claim was cursory, consisting of the following:
[Hernandez‐Chacon] has also claimed that she had a political opinion. I cannot conclude that her decision to resist the advances of an individual is sufficient to establish that she has articulated a political opinion. In trying to analyze a political opinion claim, the Court has to consider the circumstances under which a respondent not only possessed a political opinion, but the way in which the circumstances under which she articulated that political opinion. In this case she did not advance a political opinion. I find that she simply chose not to be the victim and chose to resist being a victim of a criminal act.
Id. at 153‐54.
The BIA dismissed Hernandez‐Chaconʹs political opinion argument
in a single sentence, in a footnote, rejecting the claim ʺfor the reasons stated in the [IJʹs] decision.ʺ Id. at 5 n.3. The analysis of both the IJ and the BIA was inadequate. See Yueqing Zhang, 426 F.3d at 548‐49 (granting petition for review and remanding case to agency where IJ failed to undertake the ʺcomplex and contextual factual inquiryʺ necessary to determine if persecution was on account of political opinion). We have three areas of concern.
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First, the agency concluded that Hernandez‐Chacon ʺdid not advance a political opinion.ʺ Cert. Adm. Record at 154. But this Circuit has held that the analysis of what constitutes political expression for these purposes ʺinvolves a ʹcomplex and contextual factual inquiryʹ into the nature of the asylum applicantʹs activities in relation to the political context in which the dispute took place.ʺ Castro v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Yueqing Zhang, 426 F.3d at 548). We have held, for example, that resisting corruption and abuse of power ‐‐ including non‐governmental abuse of power ‐‐ can be an expression of political opinion. See Castro, 597 F.3d at 100 (noting that ʺopposition to government corruption may constitute a political opinion, and retaliation against someone for expressing that opinion may amount to political persecutionʺ); Delgado, 508 F.3d at 706 (holding that refusing to give technical assistance to the FARC in Columbia can be expression of political opinion); Yueqing Zhang, 426 F.3d at 542, 546‐48 (holding that retaliation for opposing corruption of local officials can constitute persecution on account of political opinion); Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1029‐31 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that ʺunion activities [can] imply a political opinion,ʺ and not merely economic position). The Fourth Circuit has recently recognized that the refusal to acquiesce to gang violence can constitute
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an expression of political opinion. See Alvarez Lagos, 927 F.3d at 254‐55 (where record contained evidence that gang in question would view refusal to comply with demand for sex as ʺpolitical opposition,ʺ refusal to acquiesce to gang violence and flight to United States could demonstrate imputed anti‐gang political opinion that constitutes protected ground for asylum). Here, the agency did not adequately consider whether Hernandez‐Chaconʹs refusal to acquiesce was ‐‐ or could be seen as ‐‐ an expression of political opinion, given the political context of gang violence and the treatment of women in El Salvador.
Second, the IJ concluded that Hernandez‐Chacon ʺsimply chose to not be a victim.ʺ Cert. Adm. Rec. at 154. But even if Hernandez‐Chacon was motivated in part by her desire not to be a crime victim, her claims do not necessarily fail, as her political opinion need not be her only motivation. See
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (ʺThe applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.ʺ (emphasis added)); Osorio, 18 F.3d at 1028 (ʺThe plain meaning of the phrase ʹpersecution on account of the victimʹs political opinion,ʹ does not mean persecution solely on account of the victimʹs political opinion.ʺ); see also Vumi, 502 F.3d at 158 (remanding to
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agency where BIA failed to engage in mixed‐motive analysis). While Hernandez‐Chacon surely did not want to be a crime victim, she was also taking a stand; as she testified, she had ʺevery rightʺ to resist. As we have held in a different context, ʺopposition to endemic corruption or extortion . . . may have a political dimension when it transcends mere self‐protection and represents a challenge to the legitimacy or authority of the ruling regime.ʺ Yueqing Zhang, 426 F.3d at 547‐48. Here, Hernandez‐Chaconʹs resistance arguably took on a political dimension by transcending mere self‐protection to also constitute a challenge to the authority of the MS gang.
Third, the agency did not consider whether the gang members imputed a political opinion to Hernandez‐Chacon. This Circuit has held that ʺan imputed political opinion, whether correctly or incorrectly attributed, can constitute a ground of political persecution within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act.ʺ Vumi, 502 F.3d at 156 (citations omitted); see Chun Gao, 424 F.3d at 129 (in case of imputed political opinion, question is ʺwhether authorities would have perceived [petitioner] as [a practitioner of Falun Gong] or as a supporter of the movement because of his activitiesʺ). Here, the IJ erred in her political opinion analysis by only considering whether Hernandez‐
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Chacon ʺadvance[d]ʺ a political opinion. Cert. Adm. Rec. at 154. The IJ failed to consider whether the attackers imputed an anti‐patriarchy political opinion to her when she resisted their sexual advances, and whether that imputed opinion was a central reason for their decision to target her. See Castro, 597 F.3d at 106 (holding that to properly evaluate a claim of political opinion, IJ must give ʺcareful consideration of the broader political contextʺ). In fact, as the gang members attacked her the second time, one of them told her that because she would not ʺdo this with him in a good way, it was going to happen in a bad way,ʺ Cert. Adm. Rec. at 186, which suggests that the gang members wanted to punish her because they believed she was taking a stand against the pervasive norm of sexual subordination.
We note that the Fourth Circuit recently granted a petition for review in a case involving a woman in Honduras who was threatened by a gang in similar circumstances. The Fourth Circuit concluded that if, as the petitioner alleged, the gang had imputed to her ʺan anti‐gang political opinion, then that imputed opinion would be a central reason for likely persecution if she were returned to Honduras.ʺ See Alvarez Lagos, 927 F.3d at 251. The court held that the IJ erred by not considering the imputed political opinion claim, that is,
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whether the gang believed that the petitioner held an anti‐gang political opinion. Id. at 254. Likewise, here, the agency did not adequately consider Hernandez‐ Chaconʹs imputed political opinion claim.
Accordingly, we hold that the agency erred in failing to adequately consider Hernandez‐Chaconʹs claim of persecution or fear of persecution based on actual or imputed political opinion.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the petition is GRANTED with respect to Hernandez‐Chaconʹs political opinion claim and the case is REMANDED to the BIA for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Heather Axford Senior Staff Attorney Central American Legal Assistance Brooklyn, NY
To state the obvious:
Many more women from El Salvador should be getting mandatory relief under CAT based on “torture with government acquiescence,” regardless of “nexus” which is not a requirement in CAT cases. Indeed, in a properly functioning and fair system these could probably be “blanket grants” provided the accounts are credible and documented (or they could be the basis for a TPS program for women fleeing the Northern Triangle, thus reducing the burden on the Immigraton Courts);
Compare the accurate account of the horrible conditions facing women inEl Salvador set forth by the Immigration Judge and the Second Circuit in this case with the fraudulent and largely fictionalized account presented by unethical Attorney General Sessions in his Matter of A-B– atrocity. Here are some excerpts from Judge Chin’s opinion which shows the real horrors that women face in El Salvador as opposed to he largely fictionalized version fabricated by Sessions:
In her decision, the IJ reviewed relevant country conditions in El Salvador, including the prevalence of violence against women and ʺthe dreadful
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practice of El Salvadorʹs justice system to favor aggressors and assassins and to punish victims of gender violence.ʺ Id. at 147. The IJ relied on the declaration of Aracely Bautista Bayona, a lawyer and human rights specialist, who described ʺthe plight of women in El Salvador,ʺ id.,3 and recounted the following:
One of ʺthe most entrenched characteristics of Salvadoran society is machismo, a system of patriarchal gender biases which subject women to the will of men. Salvadorans are taught from early childhood that women are subordinate.ʺ Id. Salvadoran society ʺaccepts and tolerates men who violently punish women for violating these gender rules or disobeying male relatives.ʺ Id. Indeed, in El Salvador, ʺfemicide remain[s] widespread.ʺ Id. at 148; see also U.S. Depʹt of State, Bureau of Democracy, H. R. and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 for El Salvador (2015) (ʺCountry Reportʺ). Gangs in El Salvador view women as the property of men, and gang violence against women outside the gang ʺmanifest[s] itself in a brutality that reflects these extreme machismo attitudes.ʺ Cert. Adm. Rec. at 148.
3
The IJ noted that Bayona had ʺfor more than two and a half decades worked and advocated for the rights of women, children, adolescents and youth in the migrant population in El Salvador.ʺ Cert. Adm. Rec. at 138.
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ʺEl Salvador has the highest rate in the world [of femicide] with an average of 12 murders for every 100,000 women.ʺ Id. at 148‐49. As an article on El Salvadorʹs gangs concluded, ʺin a country terrorized by gangsters, it is left to the dead to break the silence on sexual violence . . . , to the bodies of dead women and girls pulled from clandestine graves, raped, battered and sometimes cut to pieces. They attest to the sadistic abuse committed by members of street gangs.ʺ Id. at 149 (quoting El Salvadorʹs Gangs Target Women and Girls, Associated Press, Nov. 6, 2014).
As the State Department has found, rape, sexual crimes, and violence against women are significantly underreported because of societal and cultural pressures on victims and fear of reprisal, and the laws against rape ʺare not effectively enforced.ʺ Country Report at 7. Police corruption in El Salvador is well‐documented, including involvement in extra‐judicial killings and human rights abuses. See id. at 1. The judicial system is also corrupt. While the law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, ʺthe government d[oes] not implement the law effectively, and . . . officials, particularly in the judicial system, often engage[] in corrupt practices with impunity.ʺ Id. at 6. ʺLike Salvadoran society as a whole, law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and judges
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discriminate against women, reduce the priority of womenʹs claims, and otherwise prevent women from accessing legal protections and justice. This results in impunity for aggressors, which reinforces aggressorsʹ perception that they can inflict violence without interference or reprisal.ʺ Cert. Adm. Rec. at 300‐ 01.
The IJ observed that Hernandez‐Chaconʹs experiences were ʺgenerally consistent with the background materials she has submitted in regards to pervasive brutal attacks by El Salvadoran gangs.ʺ Id. at 149‐50.
. . . .
There is ample evidence in the record to support her claim [of political; persecution].6 Gangs control much of El Salvador, including the neighborhood in which Hernandez‐ Chacon lived. The law enforcement systems that would normally protect women ‐‐ police, prosecutors, judges, officials ‐‐ do not have the resources or desire to address the brutal treatment of women, and the Salvadoran justice system ʺfavors aggressors and assassinsʺ and ʺpunish[es] victims of gender violence.ʺ Cert. Adm. Rec. at 147. Yet, Hernandez‐Chacon testified that when the first gang member tried to rape her, she resisted ʺbecause [she had] every right to.ʺ Id. at 193. Three days later, when the same man and two other gang members attacked her, she again resisted, to the point where they beat her until she lost consciousness. She argues that the men targeted her for the second attack ‐‐ and beat her so brutally ‐‐ because she had resisted the advances of an MS gang member and they believed she needed to be punished for her act of defiance. Her now husband likewise stated in his affidavit that Hernandez‐ Chacon will be attacked if she returns to El Salvador because ʺ[s]he has managed to fight them off twice, but that just makes them angrier and if she shows her face again, I think they could kill her.ʺ Id. at 269.
At oral argument, the government forthrightly conceded that it was a ʺpermissibleʺ inference that Hernandez‐Chacon was persecuted for her feminist political ideology, though it argued that the record did not compel that result.
Here are some additional thoughts about the larger problem exposed by this case:
WHY “NIBBLING AROUND THE EDGES” BY ARTICLE IIIs WON’T SOLVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL & HUMAN RIGHTS DISASTERS IN OUR IMMIGRATION COURTS NOR WILL IT RELIEVE THE ARTICLE IIIs FROM RESPONSIBILITY
By Paul Wickham Schmidt
Exclusive for Courtside
Jan. 29, 2020
The Second Circuit’s decision in Hernández-Chacon v. Barr exposes deep fundamental constitutional flaws in our Immigration Court system. While the instructive language on how many women resisting gangs could and should be qualifying for asylum (and many more should be getting relief under the CAT) is refreshing, the remedy, a remand to a failed and constitutionally defective system, is woefully inadequate.
Indeed, just recently, a fellow Circuit, the Seventh, ripped the BIA for contemptuously disobeying a direct court order. Maybe the Board will pay attention to the Second Circuit’s directive in this case, maybe they won’t. Maybe they will think of a new reason to deny as all too often happens on Circuit Court remands these days.
I actually have no doubt that the Immigration Judge involved in this case, who recognized the dire situation of women in El Salvador, and grated CAT withholding, will “do the right thing” and grant asylum with the benefit of Judge Chin’s opinion. But, today’s BIA has a number of dedicated “asylum deniers” in its ranks; individuals who as Immigration Judges denied approaching 100% of the asylum claims coming before them, some of them notorious with the private bar for particular hostility to claims from women from the Northern Triangle.
That appeared to be their “selling point” for AG Billy Barr in elevating them to the BIA: Create the same reliable “Asylum Free Zone” at the BIA that has been created by these judges and others like them in other parts of the country. It’s a great way to discourage bona fide asylum claims, which. appears to be the key to the “Barr plan.”
One might ask what Billy Barr is doing running something purporting to be a “court system” in the first place. Outrageous on its face! The short answer: Article III complicity and dereliction of Constitutional duty! But, I’ll get to that later.
What if a panel of “Three Deniers” gets the case on remand? Will Ms Hernandez-Chacon finally get justice? Or, will she and her pro bono lawyer Heather Axford once again have to appeal to the Second Circuit just to force the BIA to finally “get the basics right?”
Individual case remands, even published ones, fail to address the serious underlying issues plaguing our Immigration Courts and threatening the very foundations of our justice system:1) lack of fundamental knowledge of asylum law on the part of the BIA and the Immigration Courts; 2) an unconstitutional system run, and sometimes staffed, by biased, unethical anti-asylum zealots who consistently send out false or misleading messages; and 3) the inherent unfairness in a system that denies adequate access to counsel and permits the use of coercive detention and outright statutory and constitutional abrogation to consistently harm asylum seekers and others seeking justice.
I. Glaring Lack Of Asylum Legal Competence & Expertise
The Second Circuit noted three major errors in the BIA’s analysis: 1) failing to recognize that the respondent was advancing a “political persecution” argument; 2) misuseof the concept of “victimization” as a pretext for denying a potentially valid asylum claim; and 3) failure to recognize and address the respondent’s “imputed political opinion.”
None of these mistakes is new. Advocates would tell you that the BIA and Immigration Judges make them all the time.
Nor is getting these things right “rocket science.” Really, all it would take is a body knowledgeable in and committed to the fair and generous interpretation of asylum law intended by the 1951 Convention from which our law stems and reinforced by the Supreme Court in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca in 1987. The correct view has also been reflected in the Second Circuit’s own published jurisprudence, which the Board again ignored in this case.
For example, the Second Circuit instructed the BIA “that that the analysis of what constitutes political expression for these purposes ʺinvolves a ʹcomplex and contextual factual inquiryʹ into the nature of the asylum applicantʹs activities in relation to the political context in which the dispute took place.ʺ Castro v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Yueqing Zhang, 426 F.3d at 548).”
This is hardly a new concept. For example, Yueqing Zhang was published in 2005, a decade and a half ago, and reinforced by the Second Circuit on several occasions since then. Yet, both the BIA and Immigration Judges continue to ignore it when it suits their purposes. So, why would the Second Circuit believe that the Immigration Courts had suddenly “gotten religion” and would now pay attention to their admonitions on asylum law?
As pointed out by the Second Circuit, the “mere victim” rationale, often insidiously used by the BIA and some Immigration Judges as an “easy handle” to summarily deny asylum claims, is a disingenuous hoax. All successful asylum applicants are “victims” even if not all “victims” necessarily qualify for asylum. Refugees, entitled to asylum, are a very large subset of “victims.” In this and many other cases, the BIA totally “blew by” the well established, statutorily required “mixed motive” analysis that is “Asylum Law 101.”
Also, the BIA’s failure to recognize and consider the well-established doctrine of “imputed political opinion” is inexcusable in a supposedly “expert” tribunal.
The “Article III blowoff” documented in this case is virtually inevitable in a system where the “judges” at all levels, are subject to arbitrary, unethical, and unconstitutional “performance quotas” and receive “performance evaluations” influenced by biased political officials with an interest in the outcome of cases. Indeed, former Attorney Session essentially told “his” judges that it’s “all about production.” Fairness, Due Process, and scholarship that individuals are entitled to before a tribunal simply don’t enter into the equation.
The Immigration Judge in this case has an outstanding reputation and actually did a careful job in many respects. A competent appellate tribunal would have caught the judge’s mistake on political opinion and remanded for further consideration. The case never should have reached the Second Circuit (think efficiency and why the Immigraton Courts have built unmanageable backlogs).
Moreover, an error like this by a competent and careful judge indicates the need for further positive guidance to judges on recognizing valid asylum claims. Why hasn’t the BIA published precedents reinforcing the very points made by Judge Chin in his Hernández-Chacon opinion and showing how they apply to granting asylum in real life, recurring situations, particularly those involving women from the Northern Triangle?
Instead, and in direct contradiction of the law and controlling jurisprudence, Attorney General Sessions in Matter of A-B- gave an unethical, misogynistic, and intentionally factually distorted suggestion that most women’s claims arising from persecution at the hands of gangs and abusive partners in the Northern Triangle should be “denied” on any available ground, whether warranted or not. Some Immigration Judges have correctly viewed this as “mere dicta.” But, others have viewed it as a potentially “career enhancing tip” about how “the big boss” wanted asylum seekers from the Northern Triangle treated: like dirt, or worse.
Dehumanization has always been a “key part of the plan” for Sessions, his acolyte Stephen Miller, and others of like mind in this Administration. Why have the Article III courts enabled, and in some cases approved, this neo-fascist approach to the law and humanity? That’s a great question to which the answer is not obvious. What’s the purpose of life tenure in office if it doesn’t promote courage to stand up for the rights of vulnerable individuals against invidious intentional Government tyranny ands systemic abuses?
By ignoring the “pattern or practice” of failure by the BIA and the Immigration Courts to institutionalize the Second Circuit’s many years of prior commands for fair asylum adjudication, while ignoring the glaring, intentional barriers to fair judicial performance put in place by the political controllers of this system, the Second Circuit and the other Article IIIs simply advertise their own fecklessness and also, to some extent, intellectual dishonesty.
II. Institutional Bias Against Asylum Seekers
Both Attorney General Barr and his predecessor Jeff Sessions are biased “cheerleaders” for DHS enforcement; they are totally unqualified to act in a quasi-judicial capacity or to supervise quasi-judicial adjudicators. Their participation in and interference with fair and impartial decision making is a clear violation of Due Process and a mockery of judicial and legal ethics.
A private lawyer who so blatantly “thumbed his or her nose” at prohibitions on conflicts of interest undoubtedly would face discipline or disbarment. Yet, the Second Circuit and their fellow Circuits, as well as the Supremes, have failed to act on these obvious ethical improprieties by the DOJ and its leadership that have a direct negative impact on constitutional Due Process.
Under Trump, Attorneys General have issued number of anti-asylum “precedents” reversing prior law and practice. New Immigration Judges are selected by the Attorney General almost exclusively from the ranks of prosecutors and other Government attorneys. Those with private sector experience or experience representing migrants and asylum seekers are systematically excluded from the judiciary. How is this a fair system?
The Administration and DOJ spew forth an endless stream of anti-immigrant and anti-asylum, propaganda. They also use “performance work plans”and “numerical quotas” to drum into “judges” their responsibility to follow and implement “agency policies” rather than fairly and impartially consider the cases coming before them. This message certainly does not encourage fair and impartial adjudication. The “default message” clearly is “deny, deny, deny.”
One very fundamental problem resulting from this institutional bias against asylum seekers: The BIA’s (and now AG’s) “precedents” providing guidance to Immigration Judges fail to set forth rules and circumstances for granting asylum in meritorious cases. The need for such rules should be obvious from the Supreme Court’s 1987 decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca (directing the BIA to implement a generous interpretation of “well-founded fear” standard for asylum) and the BIA’s initial response to Cardoza in Matter of Mogharrabi (directing that asylum could be granted even where the objective chance of persecution is “significantly less than . . . probable”). Most, if not all, Circuit Courts of Appeals followed suit with a series of decisions criticizing the BIA for an “overly restrictive reading” of asylum law, not true to Cardoza and their own precedent in Mogharrabi, in many unpublished cases.
But, quite intentionally in my view, the BIA and Attorney General have now strayed far from these judicial admonitions and abandoned the BIA’s own precedent in Mogharrabi. Instead, today’s administrative “precedents” read like a “how to course” in denying asylum claims. Indeed, from examining these one-sided precedents (no individual has prevailed in an “Attorney General precedent” under this Administration — DHS wins every time), one comes away with the pronounced view that asylum could almost never be granted by an Immigration Judge, no matter how great the harm or compelling the circumstances.
I once participated in an academic conference attended by Circuit Court of Appeals Judges from across the country. Most were astounded to learn how many asylum cases were actually granted by Immigration Judges. From their review of unfailingly negative BIA decisions (skewed, of course, by the Government’s inability to appeal from the BIA, another problem with the current system) they had the impression that asylum was denied nearly 100% of the time (which actually does happen in some Immigration Courts these days, as noted above).
The only way to describe this is “gross institutional corruption” starting at the top with the DOJ and the Attorney General. Even now, under these intentionally restrictive rules, more than 30% of asylum cases are granted at merits hearings before Immigration Judges, although with the lack of effective positive guidance from the BIA those rates are highly inconsistent among judges.
Within the last decade, the majority of cases were actually being granted as the system was slowly progressing toward toward realizing the “spirit of Cardoza and Mogharrabi” However, that progress intentionally was reversed by improper political pressure to deny more Central American cases (a message that actually began under the last Administration and has been “put on steroids” by the current Administration).
III. An Inherently Unfair System
Notwithstanding the need for careful record building and detailed fact-finding as described by the Second Circuit, individuals are not entitled to appointed counsel in Immigraton Court. Through use of intentionally coercive and inhumane detention and “gimmicks” like “Remain in Mexico” the Administration strives to deny fair access to pro bono counsel and to prevent individuals from preparing and documenting complex cases.
The Article IIIs recognize the complexity of asylum cases, yet fail to “connect the dots” with the intentional systemic impediments to fair preparation and presentation thrown up by the government. The “hostile environment” for aliens and their counsel intentionally created in Immigration Court by the DOJ also works to discourage individuals from pursuing claims and getting representation.
The whole system is essentially a judicially-enabled farce. Does the Second Circuit, or anybody else, seriously think that Ms. Hernandez-Chacon would have gotten this far without the time-consuming and outstanding assistance of her pro bono lawyer, Heather Axford, of Central American Legal Assistance in Brooklyn, NY? She’s one of the top asylum litigators in the nation who used to appear before me in Arlington at the beginning of her amazing career!
How many of those “detained in the middle of nowhere,” told to “Remain in Mexico,” or, worse yet, orbited to “failed states” by Border Agents under bogus “Safe Third Country Agreements” have access to someone like Heather Axford? (It doesn’t take much imagination after reading the truth about how women are treated in El Salvador to see the outright fraud committed by the Trump Administration in entering into bogus “Safe Third Country” agreements with El Salvador and other dangerous, failing states). About none! How can the courts allow a system to keep out grinding out systemic abuse to vulnerable human beings without insisting that the essentials for fair hearings be put in place and maintained?
IV.Conclusion
When obvious legal, analytical, and institutional problems remain unfixed more than a decade after they surfaced, the system is broken! The current Immigration Court system is patently unfair and unconstitutional. By ignoring the glaring systemic unfairness, Article III Courts become part of the problem and subject themselves to charges of fecklessness and dereliction of duty.
It’s long past time for theArticle IIIs to take decisive actions to end the national disgrace and humanitarian disaster unfolding in our Immigration Courts daily. History is watching your actions and will be your judge!
