"The Voice of the New Due Process Army" ————– Musings on Events in U.S. Immigration Court, Immigration Law, Sports, Music, Politics, and Other Random Topics by Retired United States Immigration Judge (Arlington, Virginia) and former Chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals Paul Wickham Schmidt and Dr. Alicia Triche, expert brief writer, practical scholar, emeritus Editor-in-Chief of The Green Card (FBA), and 2022 Federal Bar Association Immigration Section Lawyer of the Year. She is a/k/a “Delta Ondine,” a blues-based alt-rock singer-songwriter, who performs regularly in Memphis, where she hosts her own Blues Brunch series, and will soon be recording her first full, professional album. Stay tuned! 🎶 To see our complete professional bios, just click on the link below.
“Petitioner Christian Alberto Santos Garcia, a native and citizen of El Salvador, has twice travelled unlawfully into the United States — first in 2012, and again in 2016. In both instances, Garcia fled threats to his life and attacks carried out against him by the 18th Street Gang and the Salvadoran police. After seeking protection from removal before an immigration judge (the “IJ”) in 2016, Garcia was afforded relief — in the form of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (the “CAT”) — by three separate IJ rulings. On each occasion, the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”) reversed the IJ rulings. Garcia, for his part, was removed to El Salvador in May 2022, and has awaited further developments in these proceedings from his home country. In this appeal, Garcia challenges and seeks reversal of three rulings made by the BIA — those being: (1) that the “particular social group” relied upon in connection with Garcia’s application for withholding of removal is not legally cognizable; (2) that Garcia was not persecuted in El Salvador on account of his political opinions; and (3) that Garcia failed to establish eligibility for CAT protection. As explained herein, we grant Garcia’s petition for review and reverse the BIA rulings in part, affirm them in part, and vacate them in part. We otherwise remand to the BIA for such further proceedings as may be appropriate.”
“Petitioner Juan Pablo Paucar petitions for review of a January 22, 2021 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision (1) affirming an Immigration Judge’s denial of his application for cancellation of removal and (2) denying his motion to remand. The BIA rejected Paucar’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, declined to remand for consideration of additional hardship relating to his cancellation application, and declined to remand to await adjudication of his U visa application. Paucar argues that the BIA (1) applied an incorrect standard when reviewing his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, (2) overlooked and mischaracterized his new hardship evidence, and (3) failed to follow precedent when denying his request for remand while awaiting the adjudication of his U visa application. We are persuaded by Paucar’s arguments. Accordingly, we GRANT Paucar’s petition for review, VACATE the BIA’s decision, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
In Santos-Garcia v. Garland, the BIA’s 6-year quest to wrongfully deny protection to Santos has been thwarted, for now. But, the matter remains far from finally resolved, even though an IJ has now properly granted Santos relief three separate times, only to be wrongly reversed by the BIA on each occasion!
Rather than insuring that individual justice is done, the BIA has acted to promote injustice, create needless delay, and demoralize IJ’s who are getting it right! In the meantime, the respondent has been removed to the country where he has a well-founded fear of persecution to await his fate. This is because the 4th Circuit denied a stay they should routinely have granted in an exercise of truly horrendous judicial misjudgment.
Now, the court majority fecklessly pontificates about the need for timely resolution (you’ve got to be kidding) while hinting, but not requiring, that the “Gang That Can’t Shoot Straight” should return the respondent now. Don’t hold your breath!
Here are three of my favorite quotes from Judge King’s majority opinion in Santos Garcia v. Garland.
Put simply, the BIA declined to “interact seriously” with the record before it in reviewing Garcia’s claim for CAT protection, and its failure in that regard requires a remand.
Should we not expect a supposed “expert tribunal” like the BIA should be to “seriously interact” with the record in life-or-death cases?Why aren’t Dems in Congress and everywhere else “all over Garland like a cheap suit” to stop this kind of judicial misbehavior in his “wholly owned courts?”
In closing, we recognize that Garcia’s removal proceedings have languished before the IJ and the BIA — and now this Court — for more than six years, leaving him in limbo and presently in harm’s way in El Salvador. We are also mindful that Garcia was only 15 years old when he sought to protect his cousin from the 18th Street Gang’s advances, setting off more than a decade of hardship and uncertainty. With that, we emphasize the “strong public interest in bringing [this] litigation to a close . . . promptly.” See Hussain v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 153, 158 (4th Cir. 2007). And although we do not direct the affirmative award of any relief, we acknowledge the compelling case for protection that Garcia has made. If, on remand, the BIA affirms either the IJ’s award of withholding of removal or the award of CAT relief, the DHS and the Attorney General should swiftly “facilitate [Garcia’s] return to the United States” from El Salvador. See Ramirez v. Sessions, 887 F.3d 693, 706 (4th Cir. 2018) (directing the government to facilitate previously removed petitioner’s return to the United States pursuant to an Immigration and Customs Enforcement Policy Directive). Moreover, if the BIA determines that Garcia’s “presence 24 is necessary for continued administrative removal proceedings” on remand, the authorities should see to his prompt return. Id.
So, after six years bouncing around the system and three separate grants of asylum by an Immigration Judge, the 4th Circuit essentially “begs” the BIA to get it right this time! This is after the court itself curiously denied the respondent’s application for stay notwithstanding the rather obvious risk of irreparable harm (e.g., death, torture) and the equally obvious substance of his timely filed appeal.
What a way to run a “justice system” (or, in this case, not)! Both the Executive and the Judiciary should be totally embarrassed by their gross mishandling of this case! But, I see resolve from neither Branch (nor the ever-absent Legislature) to put an end to this systemic mockery of due process, fundamental fairness, and simple common sense!
Here, discovering the BIA’s error in rejecting Garcia’s proposed social group of “young male family members of his cousin Emily” is no herculean task. Social groups based on family ties have been consistently approved by this Court as providing a sound basis for asylum or withholding of removal applications. See, e.g., Salgado-Sosa, 882 F.3d at 457; Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944, 949 (4th Cir. 2015); Cedillos-Cedillos v. Barr, 962 F.3d 817, 824 (4th Cir. 2020). Indeed, our pivotal 2011 decision on the matter — Crespin-Valladares v. Holder — recognized in no uncertain terms that “the family provides a prototypical example of a particular social group.” See 632 F.3d at 125. In tossing out Garcia’s proposed social group in March 2021, however, the BIA largely disregarded our precedent, providing no citation to or discussion of Crespin-Valladares. The BIA instead relied chiefly on its own then-existing precedent, set forth in the Attorney General’s 2019 L-E-A- II decision. As described above, L-E-A- II — which was vacated by the Attorney General in June 2021 and thus “lacks legal force” — “conflicted with [this Court’s] well-established precedent” recognizing families as cognizable social groups. See Perez Vasquez v. Garland, 4 F.4th 213, 227 n.11 (4th Cir. 2021). Surprisingly, the BIA paid little mind to L-E-A- II’s vacatur in its Reconsideration Order of 2022, doubling down on its earlier “particular social group” ruling and again inexplicably declining to apply Crespin-Valladares and its progeny.7
Notably, the “rule of Crespin-Valledares” — my case where the BIA erroneously reversed me — continues to have an impact! A dozen years post-Crespin and the BIA is still getting it wrong! Why are these guys still on the appellate bench, setting negative precedents and ignoring favorable precedents? In a Dem Administration? Seriously!
Michelle N. Mendez, ESQ Director of Legal Resources and Training National Immigration Project, National Lawyers Guild PHOTO: NIPNLG
My friend Michelle Mendez, Director of Legal Resources and Training over at National Immigration Project offered some commentary on the Second Circuit’s decision in Paucar v. Garland.
Congratulations and thank you for your superb work, Lindsay! This case offers so much and seems like the CA2 delivered.
Here are a couple of excerpts from the decision that stood out to me:
“In a January 14, 2020 written decision, the BIA dismissed Paucar’s appeal and denied his motion to reopen and remand. Three months later—after Paucar filed a petition to review the BIA’s decision in this Court—the BIA sua sponte reinstated Paucar’s appeal and motion, noting that it had not “consider[ed] all of the evidence submitted by [Paucar].” Id. at 124.” [Do we know why the BIA sua sponte reinstated the appeal and motion?] LINDSAY NASH RESPONDS: “The BIA only sua sponte reopened the appeal and motion because Paige Austin (co-counsel extraordinaire, copied here) filed a PFR and identified the missing evidence early on, prompting OIL to agree to a remand.”
“Finally, the BIA concluded that remand to await the adjudication of Paucar’s U visa petition was unnecessary because Paucar could request a stay of removal from USCIS.” [Does anyone know what the BIA was referencing here? Later on the decision says DHS and not USCIS so perhaps it is a typo.] LINDSAY NASH RESPONDS: “I think that the reference to USCIS that you flag was a typo and that it should have said DHS.”
“We conclude that the BIA should have applied the Sanchez Sosa factors in considering Paucar’s motion to remand as it pertains to his U visa or explained its reasoning for not doing so. [This is the first time that the CA2 answers the question of whether Sanchez Sosa applies to motions to remand or reopen filed during the pendency of an appeal where the noncitizen did not previously request such a continuance before the IJ].”
There is a great discussion on the BIA improperly applying Coelho (which they love to throw around in correctly) to the prejudice assessment and a paragraph discussing how the CA2 and other courts of appeals view unpublished BIA decisions.
Again, really great work and outcome! Thanks for sharing with all of us, Dan!
For a case distinguishing Coelho and applying a “reasonable likelihood of success” standard to a MTR, see Matter of L-O-G-, 21 I&N Dec. 436 (BIA 1996), written by me! The BIA ignores it or misapplies it in many cases. But, it’s still “good law!” Just another instance in which the BIA evades “older” precedents that could produce favorable outcomes for respondents!
In this case the IJ denied the respondent’s applications and ordered removal in May 2018, five years ago. Nobody contests that the respondent was ineffectively represented at that time.
Through new pro bono counsel, respondent Paucar filed a timely appeal with the BIA. Less than two months following the IJ’s decision, new counsel filed a copiously documented motion to the BIA to remand for a new hearing because of the ineffective representation.
Rather than promptly granting that motion for a new hearing, the BIA set in motion five years of dilatory effort on their part to avoid providing a hearing. Obviously, several new merits hearings could have been completed during the time occupied by the BIA’s anti-immigrant antics!
Along the way, according to the Second Circuit, the BIA “improperly imposed a heightened standard,” “erred by discounting the impact of counsel’s ineffectiveness,” “improperly relied] on the IJ’s tainted findings,” “overlooked and mischaracterized the record evidence,” “erred by overlooking or mischaracterizing evidence,” “overlooked and mischaracterized material evidence,” and failed, without explanation, “to follow its own precedent.” What else could they have screwed up? The file number?
This would be highly unacceptable performance by ANY tribunal, let alone one entrusted with making life or death decisions about human lives and whose decisions in some instances have been unwisely insulated from effective judicial review by Congress. Individuals appearing before EOIR deserve better! American justice deserves better! How long will AG Garland continue to get away with failing to “clean house” at America’s most dysfunctional court system and bring order, due process, fundamental fairness, legal expertise, and judicial professionalism to this long-overlooked, yet absolutely essential, foundation of our entire U.S. justice system!
Wasting time and resources looking for bogus ways to deny that which better, more expert, fairer judges could easily grant his had a huge negative impact on the EOIR backlog and is a driver of legal dysfunction throughout the immigration bureaucracy, and indeed throughout our entire legal system, all the way up to and including the Supremes!
Start by fixing “that within your control!” That’s a simple message that Dems, unfortunately, don’t seem to get when it comes to immigration, human rights, and racial justice in America!
Would you want this guy as your Immigration Judge or BIA “panel?” If not, tell Garland to “pull the plug” on his deadly and incompetent BIA! Public Domain
Sorto-Guzmán v. Garland, 4th Cir., 08-93-22, published
PANEL:KING and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
OPINION: Judge FLOYD
KEY QUOTE:
In sum, we hold that the IJ’s decision, which the BIA adopted, blatantly ignored our long line of cases establishing that the threat of death alone establishes past persecution. This was legal error, and therefore, an abuse of discretion. See Cordova v. Holder, 759 F.3d 332, 337 (4th Cir. 2014). We hold that Sorto-Guzman has established she was subjected to past persecution in El Salvador.2 She is thereby entitled to the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. Li, 405 F.3d at 176; 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). The IJ and the BIA erred in not affording Sorto-Guzman this presumption, which would
2 Sorto-Guzman argues, in the alternative, that the IJ and the BIA erred in finding that she failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. We will not answer that question today. Because we hold that she properly established past persecution, the proper remedy is to remand the case to the BIA to consider the question of whether DHS can rebut the presumption that Sorto-Guzman has a well-founded fear of future persecution.
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have then shifted the burden to DHS to rebut the presumption. Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir. 2004); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i).
*************
Sorto-Guzman is a life-long Catholic who regularly attended Catholic services in El Salvador. In December 2015, about five members of the Mara 18 gang accosted Sorto- Guzman in the street as she was leaving church. At the time, she was wearing a crucifix medallion around her neck. The gang members tore the chain from her neck, hit and kicked her, and threatened to kill her if she ever wore it or attended church again. Sorto-Guzman stopped attending church after the attack, fearing the gang and their threats.
A few weeks later in January 2016, a group of Mara 18 gang members—including some of the gang members from the December 2015 assault—stopped Sorto-Guzman, along with her sister and Rivas-Sorto, as she was coming home from a shopping trip. One of the men attempted to sexually assault Sorto-Guzman and had started to forcefully kiss her. He only stopped when her screams caught the attention of a neighbor. The gang members threatened to kill Sorto-Guzman and Rivas-Sorto if Sorto-Guzman did not join the gang and start living with them.
3
On February 13, 2016, some of the gang members from the prior incidents tracked where Sorto-Guzman lived and broke into her house carrying guns. The gang members viciously beat Sorto-Guzman, threatened her life, and robbed her. Sorto-Guzman’s neighbors called the police, but they did not come until several hours after the assault. Sorto-Guzman reported the assault and robbery to the officers who arrived at the scene. She also went to the local police station the next day to report the attack. The police made one attempt to investigate, but Petitioners were not home when the police arrived, and the officers never followed up. The day after, a gang member called Sorto-Guzman, warning her she would regret making the report to the police and that they would soon kill her, her son, and her sister.
Absurdly, an Immigration Judge found that this gross abuse and death threats by a gang with the ability and willingness to carry them out did not amount to “persecution.” Worse yet, on appeal, rather than reversing and directing the judge below to follow the law, the BIA agreed — invoking the outlandish “theory” that the death threats, on top of the savage beating, weren’t so bad because they had never come to “fruition.” In other words, the applicant hadn’t hung around to be killed. Then, to top it off, attorneys from the DOJ’s Office of Immigration Litigation (“OIL”) unethically defended this deadly nonsense before the Fourth Circuit! This is “justice” in Garland’s disgraceful, deadly, and dysfunctional “court” system!
Garland’s BIA Judges applying the “fruition” test. If she lives, it’s not persecution! Public Realm Source: Ancient Origins Website https://www.ancient-origins.net/history/trial-ordeal-life-or-death-method-judgement-004160
NOT, a “mere mistake.”
EOIR’s performance is this case, particularly the BIA’s absurdist conclusion that, essentially, death threats must result in death to constitute past persecution, is a contemptuous disregard for binding circuit precedent, a demonstration of gross anti-asylum bias, misogyny, and a clear example of judicial incompetence.
Would a heart transplant surgeon who “forgot” to install a new heart or neglected to sew up the patient’s chest be allowed to continue operating? Of course not! So, why is the BIA still allowed to botch life or death cases — the equivalent of open heart surgery?
If Garland allows his “delegees” to perform in this dangerous and unprofessional manner, in his name, what is he doing as Attorney General? This is a farce, not a “court system?” Those responsible need to be held accountable! And, OIL’s unethical defense of this deadly nonsense is indefensible!
“What are legal ethics? Not my friends or relatives whose lives as being destroyed by these ‘Kangaroo Courts.’ Just ‘the others’ and their dirty immigration lawyers! So, who cares? Why worry about professionalism, ethics, and due process in Immigration Court?” PHOTO: Wikipedia Commons
We’ve heard lots lately from Garland about “accountability.” Why doesn’t it apply to his own, wholly owned, totally dysfunctional, legally deficient, contemptuous, unprofessional “court system” that builds astounding, self-created backlogs while causing pain, suffering, and sometimes sending innocents to death?☠️
“EOIR Clown Show Must Go” T-Shirt Custom Design Concept
Additionally, in Kansas this week, women have shown the power of their just demand to be treated as humans, with rights, rather than dehumanized pawns just there to re-populate the world for the men in charge. So, why not unleash the same passion and rightful fury on Garland and his ongoing, illegal, misogynistic treatment of women (primarily women of color) at EOIR!
“She struggled madly in the torturing Ray” — AG Garland has failed miserably to engage with the plight of women, mostly those of color, being denied fundamental rights and abused daily by his lawless, anti-immigrant, anti-asylum, misogynistic “holdover” EOIR! Why are women putting up with his bad attitude and dilatory approach to justice? What happened to Lisa Monaco, Vanita Gupta, and Kristen Clarke? Are they “locked in a dark closet” somewhere in Garland’s DOJ? Amazing StoriesArtist Unknown, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons
The BIA fatally erred in deciding that Officer Bedoya had not established past persecution because the various threats were merely “written” and because Bedoya was never physically approached by FARC members. See Zavaleta-Policiano, 873 F.3d at 247; Crespin-Valladares, 632 F.3d at 126-27. We have recognized that “the threat of death alone constitutes persecution,” see Tairou v. Whitaker, 909 F.3d 702, 708 (4th Cir. 2018), and we have never required that a petitioner be physically harmed or personally approached
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in order for the threats to qualify as persecution.4 Moreover, our precedents in Zavaleta- Policiano and Crespin-Valladares demonstrate that death threats may be written. Indeed, written home-delivered death threats and text messages can easily be more menacing than verbal threats, in that they show that the writer and sender knows where his target lives and the relevant personal cellphone number.
The BIA also emphasized the period of time between the threats that Officer Bedoya received in 1996 and those he received in 2013. That period, however, is not dispositive of Bedoya’s asylum claim, in that he has clearly shown past persecution on the basis of the threats he received in 2013. The earlier incident in 1996 — where Bedoya’s friend Correa was killed for trying to protect Bedoya from FARC — simply bolsters Bedoya’s asylum claim and highlights FARC’s “penchant for extracting vengeance.” See Crespin-Valladares, 632 F.3d at 126-27. Moreover, if FARC is targeting former Colombian police officers for their past actions, there is inevitably going to be a time gap between the actions of such officers and when an officer retires.
In sum, Officer Bedoya received multiple threats of death and harm to himself and his family, and the BIA’s determination that Bedoya had not suffered past persecution was manifestly contrary to the law and constituted an abuse of discretion. See Tairou, 909 F.3d
4 Notably, in a recent unpublished opinion, we emphasized that “[w] Lopez-Orellana v. Whitaker, 757 F. App’x 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2018).
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e have never
adopted a requirement that an [asylum] applicant suffer physical harm [in order] to show
past persecution.” See
at 708; Crespin Valladares, 632 F.3d at 126. We therefore reverse the BIA’s ruling that Bedoya failed to establish that he was subject to past persecution.
*******************
Notably, the key 4th Circuit precedent that the BIA ignored here, Crespin-Valadares v. Holder, was my case at the Arlington Immigration Court. I had granted asylum, the BIA reversed me, and the 4th Circuit reversed the BIA. In other words, I was right and the BIA was wrong! But hey, who’s keeping score?
The continuing abuses by the BIA of asylum law and controlling Circuit precedents favoring asylum grants is in the “when will they ever learn” category. Instead of carefully and forcefully building a body of case law amplifying Crespin-Valladares and applying it broadly to insure more expeditious asylum grants at the “retail level” of our system — the Asylum Office and the Immigration Courts — the BIA insists on the illegal (not to mention immoral) “any reason to deny” approach improperly promoted by White Nationalist racist restrictionist AGs Sessions & Barr.
EOIR could function, as it was intended, as a model of scholarship, due process, fundamental fairness, and equal justice insuring the granting of the generous protection described by the Supreme Court in Cardoza in many more cases. EOIR could become a model of humane, practical, efficient, best practices jurisprudence that would reduce dockets by promoting correct results at the Asylum Office and trial levels and taking pressure off of the Circuit Courts by minimizing improper denials of relief that engender unnecessary litigation.
But, that’s not going to happen until the current group of deficient, biased EOIR Executives and BIA Judges is replaced by qualified “practical scholars” from the NDPA who are experts in asylum law and will ensure that necessary, life-saving protection is granted wherever possible.
The ruling does not, however, change an injunction issued last week by a federal judge in New York barring enforcement of the so-called public charge rule.
The Second Circuit affirmed the injunction but limited its scope to New York, Connecticut and Vermont. The appeals court found the government’s justification for the rule is “unmoored from the nuanced views of Congress.”
Perhaps, dissenting Judge Robert B. King best sums up his colleagues’ willingness to distort the law and pervert rationality in support of the regime’s racist-driven, White Nationalist Immigration agenda:
In the face of the extensive history accompanying the term “public charge,” to conclude that the DHS Rule’s definition of “public charge” is reasonable makes a mockery of the term “public charge,” “does violence to the English language and the statutory context,” and disrespects the choice — made consistently by Congress over the last century and a quarter — to retain the term in our immigration laws. See Cook Cty., 962 F.3d at 229. For those reasons, the Rule’s “public charge” definition ventures far beyond any ambiguity inherent in the meaning of the term “public charge,” as used in the Public Charge Statute, and thus fails at Chevron’s second step. In light of the foregoing, the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Rule is unlawful, and the majority is wrong to conclude otherwise.
Equal justice for all, due process, reasonableness, and non-racist judging aren’t “rocket science.” That’s why Wilkinson had to cloak his anti-immigrant bias with 71 pages of irrational nonsense and legal gobbledygook.
Just another example of the U.S. District Judge “getting it right” only to be undermined by bad judging from higher Federal Courts. Unwillingness of the Federal Judiciary to take a unified strand for equal justice and against institutionalized racism and the White Nationalist agenda of the Trump regime is literally ripping our nation apart as well as showing the fatal weakness of the Federal Judiciary as a protector of our democracy and our individual rights.
Folks like Wilkinson and Niemeyer are what they are. But, we have the power to elect a President and a Senate who will appoint judges who actually believe in Constitutional due process and equal justice for all, regardless of color or status. Judges who will “tell it like it is,” “just say no” to “Dred Scottification” of “the other,” and courageously stand up for an unbiased interpretation the law and for simple human decency, rather than pretzeling themselves to defend an indefensible Executive agenda of unbridled White Nationalism and racism.
This November vote like your life and the future of our nation depend on it. Because they do.
OPINION BY:Judge King, joined by Chief Judge Gregory and Judges Motz, Keenan, Wynn, Diaz, Floyd, Thacker, and Harris
DISSENTING OPINION: Judge Quattlebaum, in which Judges Wilkinson, Niemeyer, Agee, Richardson, and Rushing joined.
KEY QUOTES:
Felipe sought judicial review of the Agency’s rejection of his SIJ application, initiating these proceedings in October 2016 in the Western District of North Carolina against the Director of USCIS.1 In March 2018, the federal district court denied Felipe’s motion to set aside the Agency’s final action and granted the summary judgment motion of USCIS. Felipe then timely noted this appeal from the judgment of the district court. Unlike that court, we conclude that the Agency’s interpretation of the SIJ provision — that clause (i) requires a permanent custody order — is entitled to no deference, defies the plain statutory language, and impermissibly intrudes into issues of state domestic relations law. Consequently, we reverse the judgment and remand with instructions to grant Felipe’s motion to set aside the Agency’s final action denying him SIJ status.
. . . .
Perhaps the most egregious aspect of the dissent is that it accuses us of “plac[ing] this Court’s stamp of approval on a brazen scheme to game our federal immigration system.” See post 32. That is, despite the lack of any determination from the North
Carolina district court or even from USCIS that Felipe has acted dishonestly or corruptly, 27
the dissent boldly declares that Felipe engaged in an “obvious manipulation of the state juvenile court to circumvent federal immigration laws.” See id. The dissent specifically finds that Felipe “used, at best, dubious claims of an emergency to obtain an ex parte order at a time close enough to his eighteenth birthday that the order would never receive a proper review.” See id. And, as if it demonstrates bad intent, the dissent points to the request in Mateo Perez Perez’s complaint for custody of his brother Felipe “that the North Carolina court make the precise findings that would permit [Felipe] to apply for SIJ status and then apply for a permanent visa to remain in the United States.” See id. at 34 (commenting that the “benefits [of obtaining SIJ status] were far from lost on [Felipe]”).
The dissent’s endeavor to demonize Felipe is wholly inappropriate, unfair, and dispiriting. First of all, the principle “that appellate courts do not make factual findings” is an “axiomatic” one. See Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp., 599 F.3d 403, 419 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Columbus-Am. Discovery Grp. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 56 F.3d 556, 575-76 (4th Cir. 1995) (“It is a basic tenet of our legal system that, although appellate courts often review facts found by a judge or jury . . . , they do not make such findings in the first instance.”)). The dissent’s fact finding is particularly objectionable here because it tramples upon the exclusive authority of the North Carolina district court to adjudicate Felipe’s custody. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 656 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasizing that “domestic relations is an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Ojo v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 533, 539 (4th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “it is well understood that, in
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the United States, our various state courts exercise full authority over the judicial act of adoption”).
Furthermore, the dissent’s theory that Felipe acted dishonestly and corruptly is in no way compelled by the record. Indeed, many of the adverse inferences that the dissent draws against Felipe are patently unreasonable. For example, without acknowledging that Mateo filed his complaint for custody of Felipe nearly six months before Felipe turned eighteen, the dissent finds that Felipe plotted to obtain an unreviewable emergency custody order from the North Carolina district court within days of his eighteenth birthday. And although Felipe was required by federal regulation to submit to USCIS a state juvenile court order containing findings necessary to his SIJ application, see 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(d)(2), the dissent negatively cites the request for those findings made in Mateo’s complaint for custody of Felipe. The dissent even maligns Felipe for appreciating the benefits of SIJ status, as if a mere desire to live in the United States is evidence of immigration fraud.
There is no justification for the dissent’s dismal portrait of Felipe. The North Carolina district court certainly did not indicate that it thought itself manipulated in the custody proceedings, and USCIS did not attribute its rejection of Felipe’s SIJ application to any chicanery. Rather, the state court gave every indication it believed that Felipe was the victim of abuse, neglect, and abandonment by his biological parents in Guatemala and that placing him in the custody of Mateo was in Felipe’s best interests. Thereafter, USCIS denied Felipe SIJ status solely because he lacked the type of custody order — a permanent one — that the Agency has interpreted clause (i) of the SIJ provision to require. All we 29 say today is that, because USCIS’s clause (i) interpretation is not in accordance with law, the Agency must take another look at Felipe’s SIJ application.8
KEY QUOTE FROM THE DISSENT:
Finally, in addition to suffering from the legal deficiencies described above, I fear
our decision will have serious and far reaching ramifications. First, in adopting Perez’s arguments, we sanction a scheme to game United States immigration laws. As noted above, Perez’s brother alleged to a court of law and either Perez or his brother swore in an affidavit that temporary emergency custody of Perez was needed to protect Perez from imminent, serious physical harm from Perez’s parents. But at the time the motion containing this allegation and the supporting affidavit were filed, his parents were still in Guatemala. In
other words, Perez had been in the United States, over 2,700 miles from his parents, for 47
over a year. When asked by the panel at oral argument the basis of the purported emergency, counsel for Perez was unable to provide any explanation. He likewise provided none before the entire court sitting en banc. No one, at any time, has articulated any sort of emergency.3
If there was an actual emergency, one would expect Perez’s brother to have filed the motion for an emergency order at the time the complaint was filed, or even sooner. But he did not do so. Instead, he waited until June 2015, just weeks before Perez turned eighteen, to file the motion.4 By doing so, Perez was able to obtain the ex parte, emergency order without any meaningful examination of the allegations since the parents had no way to know the motion was even filed. And since Perez was about to turn eighteen on July 6, Perez and his brother knew the July 22, 2015 hearing the state court ordered would never happen. Perez’s scheme makes a mockery of the immigration laws passed by Congress. What’s more, by sanctioning this scheme, we are sending the clear message: Gaming the federal laws is fine with us. Keep doing it.
In insisting the record does not support my characterization of Perez’s conduct, the majority invokes John Adams’ famous reminder that “facts are stubborn things.” Indeed
3 The language cited by the majority at pages 6-7 of its opinion refer to circumstances that allegedly existed when Perez lived in Guatemala. Even if true, they offer no basis for an emergency, ex parte order hearing a year and a half after Perez left Guatemala and came to the United States.
4 Perez flip-flopped on this issue at the en banc oral argument. He first suggested that he promptly filed the motion and the delay was due to the slow pace of the North Carolina court. When pressed, however, he conceded that he had not filed the motion until six months later, in June.
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they are. The fact here is that the purported emergency on which Perez’s motion was based involves events that occurred years ago and thousands of miles away. J.A. 116-117. The fact here is that Perez’s brother waited until just before Perez turned eighteen to seek emergency relief. J.A. 88, 127. The fact here is that Perez’s brother sought emergency custody of Perez without providing any notice to their parents in Guatemala. J.A. 88-89, 129-130. The fact here is that the order on which Perez’s SIJ petition was based only preserved the status quo until a hearing with due process rights could be held. J.A. 130. All these facts are plainly in the record, and my good colleagues in the majority do not suggest otherwise. They simply come to a different, and in my view implausible, conclusion about them.5
5 In considering whether Perez’s conduct is part of a scheme to game our immigration laws, I note the remarkable similarities between the facts here and those of Reyes v. Cissna, 737 F. App’x 140 (4th Cir. 2018). There, Reyes lived with her grandparents from the time she was eleven until she was sixteen. Id. at 142. At age sixteen, she entered the United States unlawfully, was apprehended and, pending a removal hearing, was moved to North Carolina where her father lived. Id. Almost two years later, and four days before Reyes’ eighteenth birthday, Reyes’ father, represented by the same lawyers as Perez, filed an action in North Carolina state court to terminate the parental rights of Reyes’ mother. Id. Reyes’ father also filed a motion seeking emergency custody of Reyes because Reyes had been abandoned by her mother. Reyes’ father claimed he should be awarded custody of Reyes on an emergency basis even though the alleged abandonment took place seven years earlier when Reyes was eleven and even though Reyes lived with her grandparents from that time until she came to the United States illegally. The North Carolina state court granted the emergency relief and set a hearing just five days later to determine custody. Id. at 143. Like our case, however, Reyes turned eighteen just before the hearing, depriving the North Carolina state court of jurisdiction to make a custody determination. Despite that, Reyes used the emergency order, obtained without any due process provided to her mother, to petition for federal SIJ benefits. Id. at 143. Sound familiar?
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Second, our decision effectively transfers much of the responsibility of determining eligibility for SIJ benefits from the Agency—which is where Congress placed it—to state juvenile courts. In doing this, we pave the way for immigrants to seek orders from state juvenile courts in order to gain an immigration advantage. I agree that, as a general rule, neither federal agencies nor federal courts should wade into the waters of state domestic relations law. But the Agency did not make any state domestic relations law determinations. And giving appropriate respect to state courts in the area of domestic relations does not mean that the Agency must abdicate its role, rubber stamp a barebones set of “findings” or ignore the circumstances of an SIJ submission. Certainly nothing in the INA suggests that result.
Third, beyond the damage to our immigration laws, this scheme and our approval of it marginalizes the importance of parents having custody over their children. Our decision approves a scheme that terminated the custodial rights of Perez’s parents without a scintilla of due process. Here, although North Carolina law requires notice and a hearing for a custody determination, Perez made an end run around that requirement with his dubious claim of emergency. And although an emergency order normally only holds the status quo in place until a hearing of which all parties receive notice and are given an opportunity to be heard, Perez’s strategic timing of the emergency motion in relation to his eighteenth birthday assured that hearing would not take place. Then, the INA and its accompanying regulations, which assume that the state court order would have been carried out with due process protections, do not require the parents to be notified of the SIJ petition.
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Perez’s scheme, like a thief in the night, terminates his parents’ custodial rights without the parents even knowing.
Last, these results would be bad enough if they affected American citizens. But here, courts in the United States are being used to eviscerate the rights of citizens of Guatemala whose parental rights should be governed by the laws of that country. Imagine the outrage we would rightly feel if another country’s courts terminated the custodial rights of American citizen parents over an American child. International comity means nothing if these schemes are endorsed.
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I had significant experience with SIJS during my 13 years on the bench in Arlington. I also worked some on enactment of the original SIJS law that was part of IMMACT 90 during my days in private practice.
Leaving aside the facts of this particular case, whatever they might be, I found SIJS to be a “life saver” for many deserving young people who might well have been severely harmed or abused, perhaps killed or forced to “join gangs or die,” if returned to their home countries.
Some of them were individuals who should have been granted asylum, but were improperly excluded from that relief by intentional misinterpretations of asylum law directed against refugees from Central America which predated this Administration; such injustices obviously have been aggravated by the the Trump/Miller shameless White Nationalist agenda now being directed at asylum seekers of color, all too often with the wooden approval of life-tenured appellate judges who should know better.
