http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/181330.P.pdf
Perez Perez v. Cooch, 4th Cir., En Banc, 02-10-20, published
BEFORE: GREGORY, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, MOTZ, KING, AGEE, KEENAN, WYNN, DIAZ, FLOYD, THACKER, HARRIS, RICHARDSON, QUATTLEBAUM, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
OPINION BY: Judge King, joined by Chief Judge Gregory and Judges Motz, Keenan, Wynn, Diaz, Floyd, Thacker, and Harris
DISSENTING OPINION: Judge Quattlebaum, in which Judges Wilkinson, Niemeyer, Agee, Richardson, and Rushing joined.
KEY QUOTES:
Felipe sought judicial review of the Agency’s rejection of his SIJ application, initiating these proceedings in October 2016 in the Western District of North Carolina against the Director of USCIS.1 In March 2018, the federal district court denied Felipe’s motion to set aside the Agency’s final action and granted the summary judgment motion of USCIS. Felipe then timely noted this appeal from the judgment of the district court. Unlike that court, we conclude that the Agency’s interpretation of the SIJ provision — that clause (i) requires a permanent custody order — is entitled to no deference, defies the plain statutory language, and impermissibly intrudes into issues of state domestic relations law. Consequently, we reverse the judgment and remand with instructions to grant Felipe’s motion to set aside the Agency’s final action denying him SIJ status.
. . . .
Perhaps the most egregious aspect of the dissent is that it accuses us of “plac[ing] this Court’s stamp of approval on a brazen scheme to game our federal immigration system.” See post 32. That is, despite the lack of any determination from the North
Carolina district court or even from USCIS that Felipe has acted dishonestly or corruptly, 27
the dissent boldly declares that Felipe engaged in an “obvious manipulation of the state juvenile court to circumvent federal immigration laws.” See id. The dissent specifically finds that Felipe “used, at best, dubious claims of an emergency to obtain an ex parte order at a time close enough to his eighteenth birthday that the order would never receive a proper review.” See id. And, as if it demonstrates bad intent, the dissent points to the request in Mateo Perez Perez’s complaint for custody of his brother Felipe “that the North Carolina court make the precise findings that would permit [Felipe] to apply for SIJ status and then apply for a permanent visa to remain in the United States.” See id. at 34 (commenting that the “benefits [of obtaining SIJ status] were far from lost on [Felipe]”).
The dissent’s endeavor to demonize Felipe is wholly inappropriate, unfair, and dispiriting. First of all, the principle “that appellate courts do not make factual findings” is an “axiomatic” one. See Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp., 599 F.3d 403, 419 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Columbus-Am. Discovery Grp. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 56 F.3d 556, 575-76 (4th Cir. 1995) (“It is a basic tenet of our legal system that, although appellate courts often review facts found by a judge or jury . . . , they do not make such findings in the first instance.”)). The dissent’s fact finding is particularly objectionable here because it tramples upon the exclusive authority of the North Carolina district court to adjudicate Felipe’s custody. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 656 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasizing that “domestic relations is an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Ojo v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 533, 539 (4th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “it is well understood that, in
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the United States, our various state courts exercise full authority over the judicial act of adoption”).
Furthermore, the dissent’s theory that Felipe acted dishonestly and corruptly is in no way compelled by the record. Indeed, many of the adverse inferences that the dissent draws against Felipe are patently unreasonable. For example, without acknowledging that Mateo filed his complaint for custody of Felipe nearly six months before Felipe turned eighteen, the dissent finds that Felipe plotted to obtain an unreviewable emergency custody order from the North Carolina district court within days of his eighteenth birthday. And although Felipe was required by federal regulation to submit to USCIS a state juvenile court order containing findings necessary to his SIJ application, see 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(d)(2), the dissent negatively cites the request for those findings made in Mateo’s complaint for custody of Felipe. The dissent even maligns Felipe for appreciating the benefits of SIJ status, as if a mere desire to live in the United States is evidence of immigration fraud.
There is no justification for the dissent’s dismal portrait of Felipe. The North Carolina district court certainly did not indicate that it thought itself manipulated in the custody proceedings, and USCIS did not attribute its rejection of Felipe’s SIJ application to any chicanery. Rather, the state court gave every indication it believed that Felipe was the victim of abuse, neglect, and abandonment by his biological parents in Guatemala and that placing him in the custody of Mateo was in Felipe’s best interests. Thereafter, USCIS denied Felipe SIJ status solely because he lacked the type of custody order — a permanent one — that the Agency has interpreted clause (i) of the SIJ provision to require. All we 29 say today is that, because USCIS’s clause (i) interpretation is not in accordance with law, the Agency must take another look at Felipe’s SIJ application.8
KEY QUOTE FROM THE DISSENT:
Finally, in addition to suffering from the legal deficiencies described above, I fear
our decision will have serious and far reaching ramifications. First, in adopting Perez’s arguments, we sanction a scheme to game United States immigration laws. As noted above, Perez’s brother alleged to a court of law and either Perez or his brother swore in an affidavit that temporary emergency custody of Perez was needed to protect Perez from imminent, serious physical harm from Perez’s parents. But at the time the motion containing this allegation and the supporting affidavit were filed, his parents were still in Guatemala. In
other words, Perez had been in the United States, over 2,700 miles from his parents, for 47
over a year. When asked by the panel at oral argument the basis of the purported emergency, counsel for Perez was unable to provide any explanation. He likewise provided none before the entire court sitting en banc. No one, at any time, has articulated any sort of emergency.3
If there was an actual emergency, one would expect Perez’s brother to have filed the motion for an emergency order at the time the complaint was filed, or even sooner. But he did not do so. Instead, he waited until June 2015, just weeks before Perez turned eighteen, to file the motion.4 By doing so, Perez was able to obtain the ex parte, emergency order without any meaningful examination of the allegations since the parents had no way to know the motion was even filed. And since Perez was about to turn eighteen on July 6, Perez and his brother knew the July 22, 2015 hearing the state court ordered would never happen. Perez’s scheme makes a mockery of the immigration laws passed by Congress. What’s more, by sanctioning this scheme, we are sending the clear message: Gaming the federal laws is fine with us. Keep doing it.
In insisting the record does not support my characterization of Perez’s conduct, the majority invokes John Adams’ famous reminder that “facts are stubborn things.” Indeed
3 The language cited by the majority at pages 6-7 of its opinion refer to circumstances that allegedly existed when Perez lived in Guatemala. Even if true, they offer no basis for an emergency, ex parte order hearing a year and a half after Perez left Guatemala and came to the United States.
4 Perez flip-flopped on this issue at the en banc oral argument. He first suggested that he promptly filed the motion and the delay was due to the slow pace of the North Carolina court. When pressed, however, he conceded that he had not filed the motion until six months later, in June.
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they are. The fact here is that the purported emergency on which Perez’s motion was based involves events that occurred years ago and thousands of miles away. J.A. 116-117. The fact here is that Perez’s brother waited until just before Perez turned eighteen to seek emergency relief. J.A. 88, 127. The fact here is that Perez’s brother sought emergency custody of Perez without providing any notice to their parents in Guatemala. J.A. 88-89, 129-130. The fact here is that the order on which Perez’s SIJ petition was based only preserved the status quo until a hearing with due process rights could be held. J.A. 130. All these facts are plainly in the record, and my good colleagues in the majority do not suggest otherwise. They simply come to a different, and in my view implausible, conclusion about them.5
5 In considering whether Perez’s conduct is part of a scheme to game our immigration laws, I note the remarkable similarities between the facts here and those of Reyes v. Cissna, 737 F. App’x 140 (4th Cir. 2018). There, Reyes lived with her grandparents from the time she was eleven until she was sixteen. Id. at 142. At age sixteen, she entered the United States unlawfully, was apprehended and, pending a removal hearing, was moved to North Carolina where her father lived. Id. Almost two years later, and four days before Reyes’ eighteenth birthday, Reyes’ father, represented by the same lawyers as Perez, filed an action in North Carolina state court to terminate the parental rights of Reyes’ mother. Id. Reyes’ father also filed a motion seeking emergency custody of Reyes because Reyes had been abandoned by her mother. Reyes’ father claimed he should be awarded custody of Reyes on an emergency basis even though the alleged abandonment took place seven years earlier when Reyes was eleven and even though Reyes lived with her grandparents from that time until she came to the United States illegally. The North Carolina state court granted the emergency relief and set a hearing just five days later to determine custody. Id. at 143. Like our case, however, Reyes turned eighteen just before the hearing, depriving the North Carolina state court of jurisdiction to make a custody determination. Despite that, Reyes used the emergency order, obtained without any due process provided to her mother, to petition for federal SIJ benefits. Id. at 143. Sound familiar?
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Second, our decision effectively transfers much of the responsibility of determining eligibility for SIJ benefits from the Agency—which is where Congress placed it—to state juvenile courts. In doing this, we pave the way for immigrants to seek orders from state juvenile courts in order to gain an immigration advantage. I agree that, as a general rule, neither federal agencies nor federal courts should wade into the waters of state domestic relations law. But the Agency did not make any state domestic relations law determinations. And giving appropriate respect to state courts in the area of domestic relations does not mean that the Agency must abdicate its role, rubber stamp a barebones set of “findings” or ignore the circumstances of an SIJ submission. Certainly nothing in the INA suggests that result.
Third, beyond the damage to our immigration laws, this scheme and our approval of it marginalizes the importance of parents having custody over their children. Our decision approves a scheme that terminated the custodial rights of Perez’s parents without a scintilla of due process. Here, although North Carolina law requires notice and a hearing for a custody determination, Perez made an end run around that requirement with his dubious claim of emergency. And although an emergency order normally only holds the status quo in place until a hearing of which all parties receive notice and are given an opportunity to be heard, Perez’s strategic timing of the emergency motion in relation to his eighteenth birthday assured that hearing would not take place. Then, the INA and its accompanying regulations, which assume that the state court order would have been carried out with due process protections, do not require the parents to be notified of the SIJ petition.
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Perez’s scheme, like a thief in the night, terminates his parents’ custodial rights without the parents even knowing.
Last, these results would be bad enough if they affected American citizens. But here, courts in the United States are being used to eviscerate the rights of citizens of Guatemala whose parental rights should be governed by the laws of that country. Imagine the outrage we would rightly feel if another country’s courts terminated the custodial rights of American citizen parents over an American child. International comity means nothing if these schemes are endorsed.
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I had significant experience with SIJS during my 13 years on the bench in Arlington. I also worked some on enactment of the original SIJS law that was part of IMMACT 90 during my days in private practice.
Leaving aside the facts of this particular case, whatever they might be, I found SIJS to be a “life saver” for many deserving young people who might well have been severely harmed or abused, perhaps killed or forced to “join gangs or die,” if returned to their home countries.
Some of them were individuals who should have been granted asylum, but were improperly excluded from that relief by intentional misinterpretations of asylum law directed against refugees from Central America which predated this Administration; such injustices obviously have been aggravated by the the Trump/Miller shameless White Nationalist agenda now being directed at asylum seekers of color, all too often with the wooden approval of life-tenured appellate judges who should know better.
Human lives are at stake here!
PWS
02-11-20
