⚖️SUPREMES: In 5-3 Decision By Justice Gorsuch, Respondent Has Burden Of Proof On Cancellation & Loses On Ambiguous Record Of Conviction!

Pereida v. Wilkinson, U.S., 03-04-21

Here’s the link to the full decision:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-438_j4el.pdf

MAJORITY: Justice Gorsuch (opinion), Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, Justice Kavanaugh

DISSENT: Justice Breyer (opinion), Justice Kagtan, Justice Sotomayor

NOT PARTICIPATING: Justice Barrett

SYLLABUS (by Court staff):

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 19–438. Argued October 14, 2020—Decided March 4, 2021

Immigration officials initiated removal proceedings against Clemente Avelino Pereida for entering and remaining in the country unlawfully, a charge Mr. Pereida did not contest. Mr. Pereida sought instead to establish his eligibility for cancellation of removal, a discretionary form of relief under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 8 U. S. C. §§1229a(c)(4), 1229b(b)(1). Eligibility requires certain nonper- manent residents to prove, among other things, that they have not been convicted of specified criminal offenses. §1229b(b)(1)(C). While his proceedings were pending, Mr. Pereida was convicted of a crime under Nebraska state law. See Neb. Rev. Stat. §28–608 (2008). Ana- lyzing whether Mr. Pereida’s conviction constituted a “crime involving moral turpitude” that would bar his eligibility for cancellation of re- moval, §§1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), the immigration judge found that the Nebraska statute stated several separate crimes, some of which involved moral turpitude and one—carrying on a business without a required license—which did not. Because Nebraska had charged Mr. Pereida with using a fraudulent social security card to obtain employment, the immigration judge concluded that Mr. Pereida’s conviction was likely not for the crime of operating an unli- censed business, and thus the conviction likely constituted a crime in- volving moral turpitude. The Board of Immigration Appeals and the Eighth Circuit concluded that the record did not establish which crime Mr. Pereida stood convicted of violating. But because Mr. Pereida bore the burden of proving his eligibility for cancellation of removal, the ambiguity in the record meant he had not carried that burden and he was thus ineligible for discretionary relief.

Held: Under the INA, certain nonpermanent residents seeking to cancel

2

PEREIDA v. WILKINSON Syllabus

a lawful removal order bear the burden of showing they have not been convicted of a disqualifying offense. An alien has not carried that bur- den when the record shows he has been convicted under a statute list- ing multiple offenses, some of which are disqualifying, and the record is ambiguous as to which crime formed the basis of his conviction. Pp. 5–17.

(a) The INA squarely places the burden of proof on the alien to prove eligibility for relief from removal. §1229a(c)(4)(A). Mr. Pereida accepts his burden to prove three of four statutory eligibility requirements but claims a different rule should apply to the final requirement at issue here—whether he was convicted of a disqualifying offense. Mr. Pereida identifies nothing in the statutory text that singles out that lone requirement for special treatment. The plain reading of the text is confirmed by the context of three nearby provisions. First, the INA specifies particular forms of evidence that “shall constitute proof of a criminal conviction” in “any proceeding under this chapter,” regardless of whether the proceedings involve efforts by the government to re- move an alien or efforts by the alien to establish eligibility for relief. §1229a(c)(3)(B). Next, Congress knows how to impose the burden on the government to show that an alien has committed a crime of moral turpitude, see §§1229a(c)(3), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), and yet it chose to flip the burden when it comes to applications for relief from removal. Fi- nally, the INA often requires an alien seeking admission to show “clearly and beyond doubt” that he is “entitled to be admitted and is not inadmissible,” §1229a(c)(2), which in turn requires the alien to demonstrate that he has not committed a crime involving moral turpi- tude, §1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Mr. Pereida offers no account why a rational Congress would have placed this burden on an alien who is seeking admission, but lift it from an alien who has entered the country ille- gally and faces a lawful removal order. Pp. 5–7.

(b) Even so, Mr. Pereida contends that he can carry the burden of showing his crime did not involve moral turpitude using the so-called “categorical approach.” Applying the categorical approach, a court considers not the facts of an individual’s conduct, but rather whether the offense of conviction necessarily or categorically triggers a conse- quence under federal law. Under Mr. Pereida’s view, because a person could hypothetically violate the Nebraska statute without committing fraud—i.e., by carrying on a business without a license—the statute does not qualify as a crime of moral turpitude. But application of the categorical approach implicates two inquiries—one factual (what was Mr. Pereida’s crime of conviction?), the other hypothetical (could some- one commit that crime of conviction without fraud?). And the Ne- braska statute is divisible, setting forth multiple crimes, some of which the parties agree are crimes of moral turpitude. In cases involving

Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2021) 3 Syllabus

divisible statutes, the Court has told judges to determine which of the offenses an individual committed by employing a “modified” categori- cal approach, “review[ing] the record materials to discover which of the enumerated alternatives played a part in the defendant’s prior convic- tion.” Mathis v. United States, 579 U. S. ___, ___. This determination, like many issues surrounding the who, what, when, and where of a prior conviction, involves questions of historical fact. The party who bears the burden of proving these facts bears the risks associated with failing to do so. This point is confirmed by the INA’s terms and the logic undergirding them. A different conclusion would disregard many precedents. See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575, 600. Just as evidentiary gaps work against the government in criminal cases where it bears the burden, see, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 559 U. S. 133, they work against the alien seeking relief from a lawful removal order. Congress can, and has, allocated the burden differently. Pp. 7– 15.

(c) It is not this Court’s place to choose among competing policy arguments. Congress was entitled to conclude that uncertainty about an alien’s prior conviction should not redound to his benefit. And Mr. Pereida fails to acknowledge some of the tools Congress seemingly did afford aliens faced with record-keeping challenges. See, e.g., §1229a(c)(3)(B). Pp. 15–17.

916 F. 3d 1128, affirmed.

GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.J.,andTHOMAS,ALITO,andKAVANAUGH,JJ.,joined. BREYER,J.,filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ., joined. BARRETT, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

KEY QUOTE FROM DISSENT:

Finally, it makes particularly little sense to disregard this core feature of the categorical approach here. See id., at 203–204. As already noted, cancellation of removal is discretionary. Thus, when a conviction is not disqualifying under the categorical approach, the Government may still deny the noncitizen relief. If it turns out that an individual with a record like the one here in fact violated the statute in a reprehensible manner, that can be accounted for during the discretionary phase of the proceedings, when the categorical approach does not apply.

***

In my view, the Court should follow Congress’ statute. Congress has long provided that immigration courts apply- ing the INA provision here, like sentencing courts applying ACCA, must follow the categorical approach. See Mellouli, 575 U. S., at 805–806. Our cases make clear how that approach applies in a case like this one. We should follow our earlier decisions, particularly Taylor, Shepard, and John- son. And, were we to do so, ineluctably they would lead us to determine that the statutory offense of which Mr. Pereida was “convicted” is not “necessarily” a “crime involving moral turpitude.”

Because the Court comes to a different conclusion, with respect, I dissent.

**********************

“When in doubt, throw ‘em out,” seems to be the majority’s refrain. As pointed out by Justice Breyer, a decision that allowed Mr. Pereida, who has lived in the U.S. for a quarter of a century, to apply for cancellation of removal because of the uncertainty as to whether his 2010 conviction for “attempted criminal impersonation” under Nebraska law involved “moral turpitude,” would not have guaranteed him relief. It merely would have allowed the Immigration Judge to weigh the substantial equities that Mr. Pereida and his family had developed against his decade-old criminal conviction.

The Immigration Judge could then have decided, on the basis of a fully developed record, in the exercise of discretion whether or not Mr. Pereida merited a “second chance” in the U.S. And, of course, if the application were granted, ICE would still have the ability to appeal to the BIA, which exercises “de novo” review on questions of discretion.

There is lots that needs to be changed about our current immigration system. It’s too bad that Congress appears too deadlocked to get the job done.

PWS

03-04-21

UPDATE:

”Sir Jeffrey” Chase just reminded me that our Round Table 🛡⚔️filed an amicus brief in support of the respondent’s position in this case. Sadly, we didn’t carry the day, here! ☹️

But, we’ll be heard from again on the “categorical approach.” I guarantee it!

🇺🇸⚖️🗽Due Process Forever!

PWS

03-04-21

🏴‍☠️RULE EXTENDING ASYLUM BARS TO BECOME FINAL NOV. 20, OVER OBJECTIONS OF ROUND TABLE, MANY OTHER EXPERTS — The Undoing Of U.S. Asylum Law Continues Full Speed Ahead!🤮

THE DEPARTMENTS OF JUSTICE AND HOMELAND SECURITY PUBLISH FINAL RULE TO RESTRICT CERTAIN CRIMINAL ALIENS’ ELIGIBILITY FOR ASYLUM

New Mandatory Bars Prevent Convicted Felons, Drunk Drivers, Gang Members, and Other Criminal Aliens from Receiving Asylum

WASHINGTON – Today, the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security announced the publication of a Final Rule amending their respective regulations to prevent certain categories of criminal aliens from obtaining asylum in the United States. The rule takes effect 30 days after publication of the Final Rule in the Federal Register, which is scheduled to occur on Wednesday, Oct. 21.

Asylum is a discretionary immigration benefit that generally can be sought by eligible aliens who are physically present or arriving in the United States, irrespective of their status, as provided in section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1158. However, in the INA, Congress barred certain categories of aliens from receiving asylum. In addition to the statutory bars, Congress delegated to the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority to establish by regulation additional bars on asylum eligibility to the extent they are consistent with the asylum statute, as well as to establish “any other conditions or limitations on the consideration of an application for asylum” that are consistent with the INA. To ensure that criminal aliens cannot obtain this discretionary benefit, the Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security have exercised their regulatory authority to limit eligibility for asylum for aliens who have engaged in specified categories of criminal behavior.

The new bars apply to aliens who are convicted of:

(1) A felony under federal or state law;

(2) An offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) or § 1324(a)(1)(2) (Alien Smuggling or Harboring);

(3) An offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (Illegal Reentry);

(4) A federal, state, tribal, or local crime involving criminal street gang activity;

(5) Certain federal, state, tribal, or local offenses concerning the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant;

(6) A federal, state, tribal, or local domestic violence offense, or who are found by an adjudicator to have engaged in acts of battery or extreme cruelty in a domestic context, even if no conviction resulted; and

(7) Certain misdemeanors under federal or state law for offenses related to false identification; the unlawful receipt of public benefits from a federal, state, tribal, or local entity; or the possession or trafficking of a controlled substance or controlled-substance paraphernalia.

Aliens who have committed certain domestic violence offenses, even if not convicted, will also be barred from asylum.

###

_________________________________________

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Office of Policy

Communications and Legislative Affairs Division

PAO.EOIR@usdoj.gov

703-305-0289

I adopt the comment of my friend and colleague Judge Ilyce Shugall, the “lead drafter” of the Round Table’s 🛡⚔️🗽⚖️comments in opposition:

This is so awful, but not unexpected. We will keep filing comments in the hopes that a new administration reads them carefully and can un-do the harm that has been done.

Hon. Ilyce Shugall
U.S. Immigraton Judge (Retired)
Director, Immigrant Legal Defense Program, Justice & Diversity Center of the Bar Assn. of San Francisco.

Due Process Forever!

PWS

10-20-20

BAD NEWS FOR BIGOTLAND: Even As Billy The Bigot Blatantly Bashes The “Categorical Approach,” 10th Cir. Blasts Billy’s Biased BIA’s Bogus Blowing Of Same To Illegally Deport Under CO Controlled Substances Law!

EYORE — “Eyore In Distress”
Once A Symbol of Fairness, Due Process, & Best Practices, Now Gone “Belly Up”

Dan Kowalski
Online Editor of the LexisNexis Immigration Law Community (ILC)

10th-Johnson-drugs19-9550

From: Dan Kowalski

Sent: Friday, July 31, 2020 4:16 PM
To: ICLINIC@LIST.MSU.EDU; Immigration Law Professors List
Subject: [immprof] FW: victory in Johnson v. Barr – Colorado possession statute overbroad and indivisble!!!

team,

a huge victory today for one of our clients, and hopefully many other folks in our community.

in Johnson v. Barr, the 10th circuit ruled that the Colorado statute of possession of a controlled substance is overboard as to the federal schedule and indivisible as to the particular controlled substance within a schedule.

the court honed in on the categorical approach, looking first to the plain language of the statute, the penalties assigned under the statute, its unpublished decision in Arellano, and persuasive state case law in deciding in our favor.

-this means that no conviction for possession of a schedule I or II CS can support the CS grounds of inadmissibility or deportability. this will hopefully help countless people who were found inadmissible, deportable, subject to mandatory detention, and ineligible for relief to seek redress of those legal errors.

-by extension, this decision is likely to apply to simply possession of a schedule III-V because it is also overbroad and structured nearly identically to the possession statute at issue in Johnson. moreover, due to legislative change last year classifying all PCS of schedule I-V CS as a DM1 offense starting in 2020, all future PCS offenses are likely also overbroad and indivisible.

this is definitely a day to celebrate. we will see whether the govt seeks rehearing or cert.

keep loving, keep fighting.

h

—

Hans Meyer

The Meyer Law Office, P.C.

—

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to immprof+unsubscribe@lists.ucla.edu.

Hans Meyer ESQ
Meyer Law
Denver, CO

****************

Congratulations, Hans!

As noted by Hans, this decision could have “big-time” impact and result in numerous motions to reopen and “redos.” It’s just another example of how the gimmicks and misinterpretations used and encouraged by the Trump regime as part of their “haste makes waste” deport everyone policies actually create backlogs and waste resources while doing grave injustices.

America needs an independent Article I U.S. Immigration Court with real expert judges, with a commitment to human rights and due process, dedicated to seeing that individual results are fair and just, rather than carrying out a perverted, race and hate driven nativist political agenda to maximize deportations in disregard of the law.

Due Process Forever!

PWS

08-02-20

🏴‍☠️🔨DO IT YOURSELF CORNER: Billy The Bigot Barr Tells You How To Design & Build Your Own “Aggravated Felony” — No Knowledge Or Tools Required — All You Need Is Some Unsustainable Charges, Evil 🦹🏿‍♂️ Imagination, & The Willingness To Ignore The Law To Start Your Very Own Deportation Factory! — Family Fun For Everyone! — Matter of Reyes

Matter of REYES, 28 I&N Dec. 52 (A.G. 2020)

The Attorney General has issued a decision in Matter of REYES, 28 I&N Dec. 52 (A.G. 2020).

HEADNOTE:

(1) If all of the means of committing a crime, based on the elements of the statute of conviction, amount to one or more of the offenses listed in section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43), then an alien who has been convicted of that crime has necessarily been convicted of an aggravated felony for purposes of the INA.

(2) The respondent’s conviction for grand larceny in the second degree under New York Penal Law § 155.40(1) qualifies as a conviction for an aggravated felony for purposes of the INA. DHS charged that the respondent had been convicted of either aggravated-felony theft or aggravated-felony fraud, as defined in section 101(a)(43)(G) and (M)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) and (M)(i). Larceny by acquiring lost property constitutes aggravated-felony theft, and the parties do not dispute that the other means of violating the New York statute correspond to either aggravated-felony theft or aggravated-felony fraud.

******************************

The DHS has the burden of proving removability. The DHS charges two distinct aggravated felonies. At trial and on appeal to the BIA, DHS can sustain neither charge. Therefore, according to Billy, to make the respondent removable, Immigration Judges should look for the generic elements of the respondent’s crime in any of the separate sections defining “aggravated felony” and combine them as necessary to create a new aggravated felony.

In other words, even if the respondent has not committed any listed “aggravated felony” under the so-called “categorical approach,” the judge must rewrite the statute as necessary to create new aggravated felonies that overcome the shortcomings and limitations of the actual statutory language used by Congress. The judge need not find that the respondent was convicted of any particular aggravated felony listed in the statute. It is enough that he or she committed the elements of some generic crime that would be some aggravated felony if we rewrote the definition as we think it should have been written to maximize deportations.

As my friends and colleagues Judge Jeffrey S. Chase (Jeffrey S. Chase Blog) and Dan Kowalski (LexisNexis Immigration Community) pointed out to me, this is not the first time that a GOP AG has decided to “diss” the Federal Courts by attempting to rewrite the “categorical approach” out of existence. AG Mukasey tried something similar with crimes involving moral turpitude during the Bush II Administration in Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. 24 I&N Dec. 608 (A.G. 2006). The Federal Courts didn’t agree, and Attorney General Eric Holder eventually vacated Mukasey’s lousy decision. http://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/AG-Order-Vacating-Silva-Trevino-2015.pdf

All of us who believe in due process and equal justice should look forward to a day when a future Attorney General and/or Congress will vacate all of the misguided, biased, anti-immigrant “precedents” by Billy the Bigot, Gonzo Apocalypto, and Whitaker and thereby restore some semblance of fairness, normalcy, and predictability to the law. In the meantime, we’ll see whether Billy’s attempt to undo the “categorical approach” fares any better than Mukasey’s with the Federal Courts.

Litigate litigate, litigate! It’s important that the Federal Courts feel and see the pain caused by the DOJ’s biased rewriting of established principles of immigration law to create unnecessary controversies where there previously were none. Immigration law has never been short of legitimate controversies for litigation. But this regime’s unprecedented attempt to rewrite immigration law by fiat has upset those areas that previously were settled, thereby creating new waves of avoidable litigation and controversy where previously there was some agreement and efficiency. No wonder the Immigration Court backlog has mushroomed out of control. Sadly, the regime’s maliciously incompetent approach to the Immigration Courts resembles its maliciously incompetent approach to the COVID-19 pandemic. Basically a total disaster!

I also credit Jeffrey with the “Do It Yourself” observation. Or, as Dan pointed out, Billy’s approach could be called “Tinker Toy Analysis” or “Legoland Analysis.”

Due Process Forever!

PWS

07-31-20

BIA SHOOTS UNREPRESENTED RESPONDENT ON “DIVISIBILITY” ANALYSIS — MATTER OF P-B-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 43 (BIA 2020) — Like Shooting Fish 🐟 In A Barrel 🛢!

MATTER OF P-B-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 43 (BIA 2020)

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1296956/download

BIA HEADNOTE:

Section 13-3407 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, which criminalizes possession of a dangerous drug, is divisible with regard to the specific “dangerous drug” involved in a violation of that statute.

PANEL: Board Panel: GREER and O’CONNOR, Appellate Immigration Judges; SWANWICK, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.

OPINION: O’CONNOR, Appellate Immigration Judge

*******************************

You think this isn’t “Theater of The Absurd?” Let’s check out Fns 5 & 6 from the opinion:

5 We recognize that the Ninth Circuit, in whose jurisdiction this case arises, utilized a modified categorical inquiry in Alvarado, 759 F.3d at 1130–33, to discern whether an alien’s conviction under section 13-3407 involved a federally controlled substance and was therefore a predicate for removal under section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act. However, the Ninth Circuit did not expressly analyze the divisibility of section 13-3407 in that decision, nor did the court have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s articulation of divisibility in Mathis. Moreover, the circuit recently certified a similar issue to the Arizona Supreme Court. See Romero-Millan v. Barr, 958 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 2020) (asking the court to resolve whether Arizona statutes proscribing possession of drug paraphernalia and possession of a narcotic drug under sections 13-3415 and 13-3408 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, respectively, are divisible with respect to the identity of the drug involved in each offense). For these reasons, we do not consider Alvarado to be persuasive authority regarding the divisibility of section 13-3407, which, in light of Romero-Millan, we view as an unsettled issue in the Ninth Circuit.

6 We acknowledge that State v. Prescott, No. 1 CA-CR 15-0188, 2016 WL 611656, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2016), and State v. Castorina, No. 1 CA-CR 08-0816, 2010 WL 2450117, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. June 17, 2010), suggest that the identity of the “dangerous drug” involved in a violation of section 13-3407 is not an element of the statute. However, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona recently reviewed both cases, found that their reasoning was flawed, and concluded that Arizona case law fails to provide a “clear answer[] as to the divisibility” of section 13-3407. United States v. Sanchez-Murillo, No. CR-19-00795-PHX-SPL, 2019 WL 3858606, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 16, 2019) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Prescott or Castorina “definitively answer[s] whether the dangerous drug requirement of [section] 13-3407[] is divisible.” Gonzalez-Dominguez v. Sessions, 743 F. App’x 808, 811 (9th Cir. 2018).

So, how do you think that the unrepresented, almost certainly detained, respondent did on these issues, assuming that he even can read the BIA’s decision or have someone accurately read It to him?

The whole Immigration Court System has become a judicially and Congressionally-enabled “Due Process Farce” befitting a third word failed state that our country now resembles under the Trump kakistocracy.

NO, those who say our democratic institutions are “holding up” under Trump are living in a parallel universe!

PWS

07-24-20

LATEST JOUSTING NEWS FROM THE ROUND TABLE – Amicus Brief Filed With Supremes In Pereida v. Barr (Categorical Approach) With Lots Of Help From Our Pro Bono Heroes @ PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP

Here’s the full brief:

Pereida-Supremes-Amicus-19-438 Amici Brief Former US Immigration Judges

Here’s a summary of our argument:

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This brief presents the view of former IJs and BIA members on an issue of vital importance to the functioning of our immigration system: how requiring IJs to assess inconclusive conviction records to determine whether a prior criminal conviction disqualifies a noncitizen from applying for relief from removal is contrary to longstanding application of the categorical approach, will create further delays in an already overburdened immigration system, and will deprive IJs of their discretionary power.

Mr. Pereida is correct that inconclusive state conviction records cannot satisfy the categorical approach’s requirement that the state conviction necessarily establishes federal predicate offenses. Affirming this interpretation of the categorical approach will promote the expeditious and fair adjudication of the hundreds of thousands of cases pending in immigration courts.

7

The Government incorrectly asserts that when the conviction record is inconclusive as to whether a conviction was for a disqualifying offense, a noncitizen does not carry his or her burden of proof to show statutory eligibility for relief. That argument is faulty because it would require IJs to conduct an inquiry, which the Government wrongly argues is governed by the Immigration and Nationality Act’s (“INA”) burden of proof allocation, focusing on the facts underlying the conviction. Moreover, rather than aid IJs in resolving cases, the Government’s position would impede the application of the modified categorical approach by forcing IJs to delay the proceedings. IJs will be forced to wait for the noncitizen to obtain and present criminal records that may not even exist or be obtainable and then examine those criminal records to make factual determinations the categorical approach is meant to avoid. The Government’s novel gloss on the modified categorical approach is antithetical to the analysis IJs have employed for decades and would preclude the exercise of discretion essential to the functioning of immigration courts.

Contrary to the Government’s contention, the modified categorical approach does not involve a separate factual inquiry. The requisite analysis is a legal one: whether the conviction rests upon nothing more than the minimum conduct necessary for a conviction. Deviating from the categorical approach’s sole focus on a direct and uncomplicated comparison between state and federal offenses, as the Government would require, threatens to disturb the uniformity of outcomes in similar circumstances that the categorical approach safeguards. Mr. Pereida’s interpretation of

8

the categorical approach would avoid this undesirable outcome.

For the reasons explained in the balance of this brief, Mr. Pereida’s solution is the correct one. Section I provides a real-world overview of how removal proceedings operate, focusing on the typical sequence of immigration court proceedings, how criminal records are introduced and considered, and the limited ability of noncitizens (many of whom are detained during such proceedings) to procure relevant records. Section II discusses the administrability of the categorical approach and its modified variant, highlighting the benefits of the approach, how Mr. Pereida’s position is in harmony with the way in which IJs apply the approach to reach just results, and how the Government’s interpretation would impede the workings of immigration courts. Finally, Section III explains how the Government’s position would curtail IJs’ discretionary power to analyze the facts of each case to reach a just result.

**************************************

Many, many, many thanks to David G. Keyko, Counsel of Record, Robert L. Sills, Matthew F. Putorti, Stephanie S. Gomez, Jihyun Park and the rest of the amazing pro bono team over at Pillsbury for their outstanding and timely research and writing.

And, as always, it’s a privilege and an honor to be listed with the rest of my friends and colleagues on our Round Table of Former Immigration Judges!

Knjightess — Knightess of the Round Table

Due Process Forever!

PWS

02-07-20

ROUND TABLE OF FORMER IMMIGRATION JUDGES CONTINUES TO HELP THE NEW DUE PROCESS ARMY SUCCEED: This Time It’s An Amicus Brief In Support Of Respondent’s Successful Cert. Petition In Pereida v. Barr

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2019/12/breaking-news-supreme-court-grants-review-in-criminal-removal-case.html

Dean Kevin R. Johnson reports for ImmigrationProf Blog:

Wednesday, December 18, 2019

BREAKING NEWS: Supreme Court Grants Review in Criminal Removal Case

By Immigration Prof

Share

The Supreme Court has accepted another criminal removal case for review. Today, t he Court granted cert in Pereida v. Barr. The issue in the case is whether a criminal conviction bars a noncitizen from applying for relief from removal when the record of conviction is ambiguous as to whether it corresponds to an offense listed in the Immigration and Nationality Act. The complaint in petitioner’s state criminal case alleged that he “use[d] a fraudulent Social Security card to obtain employment.” Petitioner pleaded no contest to the charge. The Board of Immigration Appeals found Pereida ineligible for cancellation for removal and the Eighth Circuit denied the petition for review.

KJ

***********************************

Many thanks to the pro bono team at Orrick for “helping us to help others.”

I’m proud to be a member of the Round Table and am deeply grateful for the efforts of Judges Jeffrey Chase, Lory Rosenberg, John Gossart, Carol King, and others who got this group organized and “up and running” and who keep track of all the (almost daily) requests for our assistance.

I can’t help wondering what would happen if we had an Administration that worked cooperatively with the available resources to solve problems, honored expertise, promoted justice, resisted evil, and made Due Process for all a reality!

Instead, we have an ugly, cruel group of racist inspired neo-fascists and their tone-deaf supporters actively working against our laws, our Constitution, and the best interests of our country. In other words, a kakistocracy that has institutionalized “malicious incompetence.”

Due Process Forever; “Malicious Incompetence Never!”

PWS

12-19-18

INSIDE EOIR: FOIA REVEALS THAT DURING “JUDICIAL TRAINING,” BIA APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGE ROGER PAULEY INSTRUCTED FELLOW JUDGES ON HOW TO FIND INDIVIDUALS REMOVABLE BY AVOIDING THE LAW!

https://www.hoppocklawfirm.com/foia-results-immigration-judges-conference-materials-for-2018/

)

Here’s what Attorney Matthew Hoppock, whose firm made the FOIA request, had to say about Judge Pauley’s presentation:

Developments in Criminal Immigration and Bond Law:

Slides – Developments in Criminal Immigration and Bond Law

This presentation is really striking, because Board Member Roger Pauley appears to be instructing the IJs not to apply the “categorical approach” when it doesn’t lead to a “sensible result.” The “categorical approach” is mandatory, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly had to reverse the BIA and instruct them to properly apply it. So, it’s definitely disheartening to see this is the instruction the IJs received at their conference this summer on how to apply the categorical approach:

****************************

Can’t say this is unprecedented. I can remember being astounded and outraged by some past presentations that essentially focused on “how to find the respondent not credible and have it stand up in court,” “how to deny claims establishing past or future persecution by invoking ‘no-nexus’ grounds,” and “how to find proposed ‘particular social groups non-cognizable’ under the BIA’s three-part test.”

I also remember a BIA Judge essentially telling us to ignore a previous “outside expert” panel that provided evidence that governments in the Northern Triangle were stunningly corrupt, politically beholden to gangs, and totally incapable of protecting the population against targeted gang violence.

Another colleague gave a stunningly tone-deaf presentation in which they referred to OIL and ICE as “us” and the respondents as “them.”

But, presentations like Judge Pauley’s are particularly troubling in the context of a so-called “training conference” where the “keynote speech” by the judges’ titular “boss” Jeff Sessions touted his decision removing asylum protections from battered women, warned judges to follow his precedents, emphasized increasing “volume” as the highest priority, and otherwise notably avoided mentioning the due process rights of respondents, the need to insure protection for asylum seekers, or the obligation to follow decisions of the Article III Courts (the latter has been, and remains, a chronic problem for EOIR).

Many of the Immigration Judges were recently hired, attending their first national conference. What message do you think they got about how to be successful in the “Age of Trump & Sessions?” What message did they get when a vocal minority of their colleagues improperly “cheered” the removal of protections for vulnerable refugee women? How would YOU like to be a foreign national fighting for your life in a system run by Jeff Sessions?

Right on cue, EOIR provides another powerful example of why Professor Maureen Sweeney was right in her recently posted article: the Article III Courts should NOT be giving the BIA or Sessions “Chevron deference.”

PWS

08-23-18

IT TOOK MANY YEARS AND LOTS OF EFFORT, BUT RESPONDENTS FINALLY WON ONE @ THE BIA — ON STALKING — Matter of Sanchez-Lopez, 27 I&N Dec. 256 (BIA 2018), overruling Matter of Sanchez-Lopez, 26 I&N Dec. 7 (BIA 2012)

Sanchez3924

Matter of Sanchez-Lopez, 27 I&N Dec. 256 (BIA 2018), overruling Matter of Sanchez-Lopez, 26 I&N Dec. 7 (BIA 2012)

BIA HEADNOTE:

The offense of stalking in violation of section 646.9 of the California Penal Code is not “a crime of stalking” under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2012). Matter of Sanchez-Lopez, 26 I&N Dec. 71 (BIA 2012), overruled.

PANEL: BIA APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGES PAULEY, GUENDELSBERGER, MALPHRUS

OPINION BY: JUGE JOHN GUENDELSBERGER

DISSENTING OPINION: JUDGE GARRY D. MALPHRUS

KEY QUOTE FROM MAJORITY:

Although the DHS appears to concede that stalking under section 646.9 is “overbroad” relative to the definition we outlined in Matter of Sanchez-Lopez, it asserts that we should broaden the definition of a “crime of stalking” under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Act to meet contemporary standards. Specifically, it argues that we should redefine the term “stalking” in the Act based on its commonly understood meaning, either in 2012 when we decided Matter of Sanchez-Lopez, or based on the common elements of State and Federal stalking statutes in 2017.

We recognize that the common elements of stalking have evolved since section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) was added to the Act in 1996, in that a number of States have broadened the term “stalking” to cover threats of nonphysical harm in an effort to afford greater protections to their citizens against stalkers. However, we are constrained to define offenses “based on the ‘generic, contemporary meaning’ of the statutory words at the time the

statute was enacted.” Matter of Cardiel, 25 I&N Dec. 12, 17 (BIA 2009) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990)); see also Matter of Alvarado, 26 I&N Dec. 895, 897 (BIA 2016). The DHS relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2281 (2016), which declined “to wind the clock back” to consider the common law in discerning whether the provision at issue reached reckless acts. But that case also looked to the legislative history and the “state-law backdrop” that existed at the time the statute was enacted. Id. at 2280–82. We are therefore unpersuaded to broaden the definition of the term “stalking” under section 237(a)(2)(E) of the Act to encompass the most contemporary understanding of that offense.

Upon reconsideration, we conclude that the offense of stalking in violation of section 646.9 of the California Penal Code is not “a crime of stalking” under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Act. We will therefore overrule our decision in Matter of Sanchez-Lopez and vacate all prior orders in this case to the extent they hold to the contrary. Accordingly, because the respondent is not removable, his appeal will be sustained and the removal proceedings will be terminated.

KEY QUOTE FROM DISSENT:

The legal landscape has changed since we published our decision inMatter of Sanchez-Lopez. This case illustrates the limitations of applying the categorical approach imposed by the Supreme Court in Descamps andMathis to provisions of the immigration laws enacted by Congress for the purpose of removing aliens convicted of serious criminal conduct. See Matter of Chairez, 27 I&N Dec. 21, 25–26 (BIA 2017) (Malphrus, concurring). Under this approach, only if section 646.9 is divisible can we look to the respondent’s conviction records to determine if his conduct involved an intent to cause the victim to fear death or bodily injury, as many such stalking cases do. Because of this strict categorical approach, many statutes that have since broadened the scope of protection for stalking victims may not qualify as a categorical match to section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Act. As a result, in California and many other States, an alien who was criminally convicted of stalking an innocent victim will not be removable under the Act, even though the record makes clear that he or she committed “a crime of stalking.” It is highly unlikely that Congress intended this result.

****************************************************

I liked the comment from Dan Kowalski over at LexisNexis Immigration Community: “It only took about 6 years and several trips up and down the administrative and judicial food chain.”

My point (that I make over and over) is that there is NO WAY that an unrepresented respondent (particularly in DHS detention where most respondents convicted of crimes end up) could have achieved this result. That means that unrepresented individuals are wrongfully deported by DHS every day.

The Immigration Court system already is failing in its duty to guarantee fairness and due process to all respondents. Outrageously, instead of doing what he should do — working to insure maximum representation and raising the quality of Immigration Judge and BIA decisions to insure Due Process — Jeff Sessions is doing just the opposite!

He’s putting “haste makes waste quotas” on Immigration Judges; encouraging judges to deny continuances needed to obtain counsel and adequately prepare defenses; locating Immigration Courts in detention centers which intentionally lack both public access and ready availability of pro bono counsel; using coercive, substandard detention and family separation to deter individuals from pursuing potentially successful claims and defenses; further skewing the law against asylum seekers; and suspending the essential “Legal Orientation Program” which helps unrepresented individuals in detention understand their rights and what will happen in Immigration Court before their first appearance before a judge.

PWS

04-20-18

NEW BIA PRECEDENT EXPLAINS WHY IN SOME CASES THE ATTEMPT MIGHT BE WORSE THAN THE CRIME – MATTER OF CERVANTES NUNEZ, 20 I&N DEC. 238 (BIA 2018)

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Matter of CERVANTES NUNEZ, 20 I&N Dec. 238 (BIA 2018)

BIA HEADNOTE:

The crime of attempted voluntary manslaughter in violation of sections 192(a) and 664 of the California Penal Code, which requires that a defendant act with the specific intent to cause the death of another person, is categorically an aggravated felony crime of violence under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2012), notwithstanding that the completed offense of voluntary manslaughter itself is not such an aggravated felony.

PANEL: BIA Appellate Immigration Judges Pauley, Guendelsberger, Wendtland

OPINION BY: Judge Roger A. Pauley

KEY QUOTE:

“Although perhaps counterintuitive, we therefore hold that the respondent’s offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter under sections 192(a) and 664 of the California Penal Code is categorically a crime of violence under § 16(a). Unlike the completed crime of voluntary manslaughter under California law, which encompasses reckless conduct and is therefore not categorically a crime of violence under Ninth Circuit law, attempted voluntary manslaughter requires the specific intent to kill. Although “physical force” is not an express element of attempted voluntary manslaughter, we deem it evident under Ninth Circuit law that the offense, which requires a “volitional,” or intentional, mental state and contemplates a direct act on the part of the accused that is capable of causing the death of another person, inherently presupposes the use of “physical force.” Since the respondent’s offense necessarily involves the intentional use of physical force, it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).”

***********************************************

In this particular case, the respondent was convicted of both the completed crime of voluntary manslaughter and the attempt under California law. But, there could be cases where in negotiating a plea bargain, counsel would be better off from an immigration standpoint pleading her client to the completed crime, not the attempt.

PWS

03-18-18

WRONG AGAIN: BIA ERRED IN FINDING THAT NV “CONSPIRACY TO POSSESS DRUGS” IS A BASIS FOR REMOVAL — VILLAVICENCIO V. SESSIONS

Julio Villavicienco Decision Published_

Villavicienco v. Sessions, 9th Cir., 01-05-18, published

STAFF HEADNOTE:

“The panel granted Julio Cesar Villavicencio’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals decision, concluding that Villavicencio was not removable for a controlled substance offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) because the statutes under which he was convicted of conspiracy to possess drugs, Nevada Revised Statutes §§ 199.480 and 454.351, are overbroad and indivisible.

The panel held that the Nevada conspiracy statute, NRS § 199.480, is overbroad when compared to the generic definition of conspiracy because the Nevada statute lacks the requisite “overt act” element. Therefore, the panel concluded that the categorical approach may not be used to determine removability. The panel also concluded that application of the modified categorical approach is foreclosed because this court has already determined that NRS § 199.480 is indivisible.

The panel further held that NRS § 454.351, which covers any drug which may not be lawfully introduced into interstate commerce under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, is categorically overbroad relative to the substances controlled under 21 U.S.C. § 802. The panel also concluded that, although the Nevada statute lists multiple means of violation, i.e., possessing, procuring, or manufacturing,

because jurors need not agree on the means of the violation, the statute must still be regarded as indivisible. Accordingly, the panel held that the statute cannot be used as a predicate offense to support removal

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.”

PANEL: Mary M. Schroeder and Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Circuit Judges, and William H. Stafford, Jr.,* District Judge.

* The Honorable William H. Stafford, Jr., United States District Judge for the Northern District of Florida, sitting by designation.

OPINION BY: Judge Rawlinson

KEY QUOTE:

“Villavicencio was not removable under 8 USC § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). N.R.S. §§ 199.480 and 454.351 are both overbroad. N.R.S. § 199.480 criminalizes a broader range of conduct than is described in the generic definition of conspiracy, and N.R.S. § 454.351 encompasses a wider range of substances than those set forth in the federal Controlled Substances Act. Because neither statute is divisible, the modified categorical approach was unavailable to determine if Villavicencio was convicted of a removable offense. As a result, Villavicencio is entitled to his requested relief reversing the determination of removability.”

******************************************

Admittedly, this is complicated stuff. But, the BIA is supposed to have “special expertise.”

Given the complexity of these determinations, how could an unrepresented immigrant ever hope to present a defense like this? (Look at the list of pro bono counsel who appeared for the respondent in this case!) How can Removal Hearings conducted where only the DHS is represented by counsel possibly comply with Due Process? (Particularly in light of the recent memo from the Chief Immigration Judge “reminding” Immigration Judges not to “act as counsel” for unrepresented respondents.) How can intentionally detaining immigrants and establishing so-called “courts” in detention centers in out-of-the-way locations where pro bono counsel are known to be generally unavailable possibly comply with Due Process? Why aren’t Immigration Judges and the BIA taking the time and doing the research to get cases like this right in the first place? How does Sessions’s exclusive emphasis on “peddling faster” and “churning out” more final removal orders effectively address the glaring systemic “quality control” problems exposed by cases like this?

PWS

01-06-17

BIA SAYS CATEGORICAL APPROACH INAPPLICABLE TO VIOLATION OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER — MATTER OF OBSHATKO, 27 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 2017)

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Matter of OBSHATKO, 27 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 2017)

BIA HEADNOTE:

“Whether a violation of a protection order renders an alien removable under section 237(a)(2)(E)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) (2012), is not governed by the categorical approach, even if a conviction underlies the charge; instead, an Immigration Judge should consider the probative and reliable evidence regarding what a State court has determined about the alien’s violation. Matter of Strydom, 25 I&N Dec. 507 (BIA 2011), clarified.”

PANEL: BIA APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGES PAULEY, MALPHRUS, GREER

OPINION BY: JUDGE PAULEY

*******************************

COMMON THREAD: The Respondent loses, even though he prevailed before the Immigration Judge.

PWS

11-18-17

BIA ISSUES NEW PRECEDENT SAYING ORE. BURGLARY OF A DWELLING IS CATEGORICAL CIMT: MATTER OF J-G-D-F-, 27 I&N Dec. 87 (BIA 2017) — Hon. Lory Rosenberg Says They Got It Wrong! — + My “Bonus Analysis!”

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/990986/download

Here’s the BIA’s Headnote:

“Burglary of a dwelling in violation of section 164.225 of the Oregon Revised Statutes is a crime involving moral turpitude, even though the statute does not require that a person be present at the time of the offense, provided that the dwelling is at least intermittently occupied.”

PANEL: BIA Appelllate Immigration Judges PAULEY, WENTLAND & O’CONNOR,

DECISION BY: Judge Pauley

Here’s what former BIA Appellate Immigration Judge Lory D. Rosenberg had to say about it on her blog Appeal Matters and on ILW.com:

Lory D. Rosenberg on Appeal Matters

BIA and Reprehensible Determinations

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Lrosenberg

, 08-18-2017 at 04:53 PM (600 Views)

In Matter of J-G-D-F-, 27 I&N Dec. 82 (BIA 2017), the BIA has ruled that the Oregon crime of burglary of a dwelling is a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) even though a defendant can be convicted of burglary under the Oregon statute for entering or remaining in an unoccupied home. The Board’s analysis is somewhat confounding, ultimately favoring a categorical conclusion that is clearly to the disadvantage of those in the respondent’s position.

(In one fell swoop, the BIA rejected the respondent’s request for withholding and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) on the basis that the respondent failed to identify an acceptable particular social group as the reason for the threat to his life or freedom and fear of torture, ruling that, “he asserted that he would be targeted by criminals because he would be recognized as someone who has lived in the United States for a long period of time based on his clothing and accent. However, this proposed group lacks particularity, because it is amorphous and lacks definable boundaries. As described, the proposed group could include persons of any age, sex, or background.” Id. at 86.)

There are two central issues presented: Does the Oregon statute in question and, if divisible, the crime of which the respondent was convicted under the Oregon statute, amount to a generic burglary? Assuming it amounts to a burglary, is the crime of which the respondent was convicted a CIMT, involving reprehensible conduct and some degree of scienter?

A few comments in response to the precedential aspects of this decision are warranted.

A conviction of the crime of burglary does not make removal inevitable, not only because there may be post-conviction remedies available, but because the underlying offense is not necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude or an aggravated felony conviction.

As we know, burglary convictions must be analyzed according to the state law under which the crime is defined. The elements of the offense described under state law must match the elements contained in the generic definition of burglary, i.e., unlawful entry into or remaining in a building or structure with the intent to commit a crime. Taylor v. U.S., 495 U.S. 575 (1990).

The respondent argued that the statute was overbroad. Although the respondent asserted that “a violation of the statute does not necessarily involve reprehensible conduct or a culpable mental state since it does not require that a defendant unlawfully enter a dwelling or intend to commit a crime involving moral turpitude at the time he or she enters the building,” id.at 83, the BIA rejected the respondent’s arguments.

The BIA concluded instead that the statute was divisible “with respect to whether a first degree burglary offense involved entering or remaining unlawfully in a dwelling, as opposed to a building other than a dwelling.” Id. at 84-85. Cf. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243,2249 (2016) (deeming a statute to be divisible if “it list[s] elements in the alternative, and thereby define[s] multiple crimes”)

Under section 164.205(2), the term “dwelling” means a building which regularly or intermittently is occupied by a person lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present. However, the BIA ruled that the statute was not divisible as to whether the building was occupied or not, cutting of any examination of the record with respect to that aspect of the crime.

The records in the instant case contained no equivocation regarding the nature of the respondent’s conviction. In fact, once the statute in the instant case was treated as divisible as to “entering or remaining unlawfully,” the record clearly identified the crime of which the respondent was convicted. As the BIA stated expressly, “the judgment and plea agreement for the respondent’s conviction show that he pleaded to “Burglary I” as charged in Count 2 of the charging document, which alleged that the offense occurred ‘in an occupied dwelling.’” Consequently, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s conclusion that, “according to the respondent’s record of conviction, he was convicted under the prong of section 164.225 that requires entering or remaining unlawfully in a “dwelling” with the intent to commit a crime.” Id. at 86.

But that begs the question.

Today’s decision in Matter of J-G-D-F-, expands on the BIA’s prior precedent in Matter of Louissaint, 24 I&N Dec. 754, 756 (BIA 2009), and distorts the longstanding BIA standard requiring that crimes involving moral turpitude must contain “two essential elements: reprehensible conduct and a culpable mental state,” Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I&N Dec. 826, 834 (BIA 2016). Prior to Louissant, the BIA honored the reasonable limitation that a crime was to be considered a CIMT only if the crime accompanying the unlawful entry was itself turpitudinous.

In Louissaint, the BIA held that the “conscious and overt act of unlawfully entering or remaining in an occupied dwelling with the intent to commit a crime is inherently ‘reprehensible conduct’ committed ‘with some form of scienter.’” Matter of F-G-D-F-, supra. at 87 (quoting Matter of Louissaint, 24 I&N Dec. at 758 (citation omitted)). The rationale underlying this conclusion was the fact that the building was occupied and the victim’s presence involved an expectation of privacy and security. By drawing the conclusion that every unlawful entry of a dwelling, whether occupied or not at the time of the offense, amounts to “reprehensible conduct” the BIA evades prior caselaw which had focused on the specific crime that was intended. Cf. Matter of M-, 2 I&N Dec. 721 (BIA, A.G. 1946).

c. 2017 Lory D. Rosenberg, www.Loryrosenberg.com

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Nolan Rappaport asked me what I think, pointing out that burglary is a serious crime. I agree that burglary is a serious crime, but that doesn’t necessarily answer the question of whether it involves moral turpitude.

As Lory points out, in an early precedent, Matter of M-, 2 I&N Dec. 721 (BIA, AG 1946), the BIA found that the key to moral turpitude in a burglary conviction is not the breaking and entering into the building itself, but the nature of the crime the individual intended to commit following the breaking and entering.

Later, in Matter of Louissaint, 24 I&N Dec. 754, 756 (BIA 2009), the BIA chipped away at the M- rule. The Board focused on the breaking and entering, rather than the crime, and held that burglary of an occupied dwelling is a categorical cimt, without regard to what crime the respondent might have intended.

In Matter of J-G-D-F-, 27 I&N Dec. 82 (BIA 2017) the BIA basically annihilated the M- rule by holding that entry into a dwelling that might be occupied was a categorical cimt without regard to the crime intended.

As a trial judge, I found the M- rule relatively straightforward and easy to apply (or as straightforward and easy to apply as anything in the convoluted cimt area). Applying that rule to the facts in J-G-D-F-, under the “categorical” approach, the “least possible crime” included in NC first degree burglary would be entry into an unoccupied dwelling in possession of burglary tools. I would find that not to be a cimt.

Applying the Louissaint expansion, I would have concluded because unlike Louissant the dwelling was unoccupied, there was still no cimt.

But, of course applying J-G-D-F-, I would have been required to find a cimt.

So, the current state of the law at the BIA appears to be this. First, apply M– to see if you can find a cimt.

If not, second, see if an occupied dwelling was involved so that the respondent has committed a cimt under Louissaint.

If not, third, see if an unoccupied dwelling might have been involved so that it’s a cimt under J-G-D-F-

Fourth, if all of the foregoing steps fail to produce a cimt, the judge should think of some other rationale for finding a cimt. Because, if the judge doesn’t and the DHS appeals, the BIA will find one anyway. After all, burglary sounds bad.

I find it interesting and somewhat ironic that after the Matter of M- approach gained acceptance from the 9th Circuit, where most petitions to review BIA decisions arise, the BIA has chosen to basically overrule M- without specifically saying so.

In the past decade and one-half, the BIA has often taken the most inclusive position on criminal removal statutes. As a result, the BIA is overruled with some regularity on petitions for review by the Federal Circuit Courts all the way up to the Supreme Court. The latter has been particularly critical of the BIA’s inclusive approach to minor drug convictions.

Notwithstanding this, I wouldn’t expect any change in the BIA’s “hard line approach” to criminal removal under the Sessions regime. After all, the “new mission” of EOIR is to churn out as many final removal orders as possible as quickly as possible with as little due process as possible. And, expansive readings of criminal removal statutes also helps produce more mandatory detention (which Jeff Sessions loves, along with those who are making a killing running private detention centers with substandard conditions).

So from a “job retention” standpoint, getting reversed on review by the Federal Courts probably won’t be a problem for Immigration Judges and Appellate Immigration Judges within DOJ as long as the reversals come in the context of expanding removals and restricting due process.

Finally, I’d never bet against Judge Lory Rosenberg’s analysis on any criminal immigration matter. Lory always had a much better handle on where the Federal Courts were going on criminal removal than the rest of us BIA Appellate Judges, including me. And, over the years since she was forced out of her judicial position, she has been proved right over and over by Federal Courts including the Supremes. Indeed, the Supremes cited one of her dissents in reversing the BIA in St. Cyr (check out FN 52). I’m not aware of any other BIA Appellate Judge who has been cited by name. (Although my good friend and beloved former colleague Judge Wayne Stogner of the New Orleans Immigration Court did get an individual “shout out” for his carefully analyzed trial decision in Nuegusie v. Holder.)

At this point, I’m thinking that Lory’s view will prevail in at least come Circuits. Time will tell.

PWS

08-25-17

GOBBLEDYGOOK CENTRAL: After 12 Years Kicking Around The System, 9th Circuit Declines Chevron Deference To Matter of Cortez Canales, 25 I. & N. Dec. 301 (BIA 2010) & Punts Issue Back To BIA — Lozano-Arredondo v. Sessions — Why “Chevron Must Go!” — Somewhere In This Judicially-Created Mess, It’s All About A 2-Decades Old “Petty Theft” Conviction!

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/08/08/11-72422.pdf

Key quote:

“We grant Lozano-Arredondo’s petition and remand to the BIA. We hold, first, that petit theft under Idaho law does not qualify categorically as a crime involving moral turpitude. We also hold that under the modified categorical approach, the record of conviction is inconclusive. Because the effect of that inconclusive record presents an open legal question now pending before another panel of this court, our analysis ends there. On remand, once this burden of proof question is resolved, the BIA should determine whether Lozano- Arredondo’s conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude under the modified categorical approach, unless the case is resolved on other grounds.

Second, we hold the BIA erred by deciding at Chevron step one that an “offense under” § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) does not include the within-five-years element. Because the BIA “erroneously contends that Congress’ intent has been clearly

24 LOZANO-ARREDONDO V. SESSIONS

expressed and has rested on that ground, we remand to require the agency to consider the question afresh.” Delgado, 648 F.3d at 1103–04 n.12 (quoting Negusie, 555 U.S. at 523) (internal quotation marks omitted); see INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16–17 (2002). In light of this holding and the explanations we have given, the BIA must reconsider its interpretation of the phrase “offense under” in § 1229b(b)(1)(C).”

PANEL: Circuit Judges William A. Fletcher, Raymond C. Fisher and N. Randy Smith

OPINION BY: Judge Fisher

*****************************************************************

Com’ on Man! This case has been around the system since 2005 — 12 years! The conviction is now two decades old. The case depends on two legal questions.

The 9th Circuit should answer the legal questions and either 1) affirm the BIA’s final order of removal, or 2) remand the case to the BIA to apply the law that has been determined by the 9th Circuit to the facts of this case. The court’s prose is impenetrable; the court’s rationale, based on Chevron, is irrational.

It’s time for Chevron to go and for Article III Courts to do their job of deciding legal questions rather than bogging down the system with infinite delays through needless remands to have the BIA pass on difficult legal questions. That’s the Article III Courts’ Constitutional function; they have been avoiding it for years under the Supreme’s judge-made facade of Chevron and Brand X.

(Yes, I know the 9th Circuit is only following Chevron, as they are bound to do. This is something the Supremes need to address, sooner rather than later. The result in this case is pure legal obfuscation.)

Oh yeah, while we’re at it, if there is an “open legal question” before another panel of the 9th Circuit, why remand the case to the BIA which can’t resolve that? Why not send this case to the “other panel” or ask your colleagues on the other panel if they could expedite their consideration of this issue?

PWS

08-08-17

11th Cir. — BIA GETS IT WRONG AGAIN ON MODIFIED CATEGORICAL APPROACH & AGFEL — GORDON V. ATTORNEY GENERAL

http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201513846.pdf

Key quote:

“Further, the Board’s conclusion that the crime was an aggravated felony because the sale or delivery was “for monetary consideration” is meritless. That the sale or delivery was “for monetary consideration” does nothing to assist us in determining “which of a statute’s alternative elements”—sale or delivery— “formed the basis of the defendant’s prior conviction.” Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2284. The Supreme Court has made clear time and time again that “[a]n alien’s actual conduct is irrelevant to the inquiry.” Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1986. As the Board did not appropriately determine that Gordon was convicted of an aggravated felony, we grant Gordon’s petition and reject the Board’s finding of removability.”

PANEL: Circuit,Judges Tjoflat, Wilson; District Judge Robreno

INION BY: Judge Tjoflat

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So, why does an “expert tribunal” like the BIA keep getting this fairly basic stuff wrong? And, why has the DOJ eliminated EOIR training?

PWS

07-13-17

🇺🇸⚖️🗽Due Process Forever!

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Here’s the full brief:

Here’s a summary of our argument:

Due Process Forever!

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Lory D. Rosenberg on Appeal Matters

BIA and Reprehensible Determinations

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