"The Voice of the New Due Process Army" ————– Musings on Events in U.S. Immigration Court, Immigration Law, Sports, and Other Random Topics by Retired United States Immigration Judge (Arlington, Virginia) and former Chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals Paul Wickham Schmidt. To see my complete professional bio, just click on the link below.
“Habib Al-Adily, a citizen of Iraq and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was late in returning his rental car to Thrifty-Rent-a-Car (Thrifty). He was indicted under a Michigan statute criminalizing the willful failure to timely return rental property, an offense to which he pleaded guilty and for which he was ordered to pay over $10,000 in restitution to Thrifty. Two Immigration Judges (IJs) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) concluded that these circumstances warranted Al-Adily’s deportation for having been convicted of an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). For the reasons set forth below, we GRANT Al-Adily’s petition for review, REVERSE the BIA’s decision, and REMAND to the BIA with instructions to terminate the removal proceedings against him. … A cursory review of Exhibit A reveals that Thrifty’s actual loss was clearly less than $10,000. And DHS certainly did not meet its burden of proving by “clear and convincing” evidence, see id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A)), that the loss exceeded that amount. … Despite admonitions by both the BIA and the Supreme Court that restitution orders must be considered with caution, especially where the restitution amount was initially determined under a lower evidentiary standard, the IJs and the BIA deferred uncritically to the state court’s determination in conflating the restitution amount with Thrifty’s actual loss. In denying Al-Adily’s motion to reconsider notwithstanding this error, the BIA abused its discretion.”
[Hats off to Frank G. Becker!]
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Although admittedly Circuit Judge Siler agreed with the BIA, I concur with Judge Gilman that this is more sloppy work on “the basics” coming out of EOIR.
EOIR has a severe, chronic “quality control/expertise/due process” problem that got much worse during the Trump years, when far too many Immigration Judges with questionable qualifications were elevated to the bench. Garland hasn’t solved this festering problem in the more than two years he has been in office.
And, it’s highly unlikely that just adding Immigration Judges — without a huge upgrade in qualifications, training, and supervision from a revamped, truly expert BIA — is going to solve these problems.
If anything, aimlessly adding more bodies to a mal-functioning system is just going to increase the chaos and the already unacceptable level of inconsistent results in life-or-death matters.
“Petitioner Wilber Agustin Acevedo Granados (“Acevedo”), a native of El Salvador, petitions for review of the decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an order of removal and the denial by the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) of Acevedo’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Acevedo’s petition is based on his fear that, if returned to El Salvador, he would face persecution or torture on account of his membership in a particular social group, defined based on his intellectual disability. The BIA rejected Acevedo’s claims on the ground that the proposed group definition was not cognizable. The BIA held that Acevedo’s proposed social group was not sufficiently particular, finding that the terms “intellectual disability” and “erratic behavior” rendered the proposed group “amorphous, overbroad, diffuse,[and]subjective.” The BIA further determined that the group was not a “meaningful social unit, distinct from the larger population of mentally ill individuals” in El Salvador. We conclude that the agency misunderstood Acevedo’s proposed social group, and thus grant the petition for review with respect to the claims for asylum and withholding of removal. The BIA and IJ treated the term “intellectual disability” as if it were applied by a layperson. Instead, that term as used in Acevedo’s application referred to an explicit medical diagnosis with several specific characteristics. Recognized that way, the clinical term “intellectual disability” may satisfy the “particularity” and “social distinction” requirements necessary to qualify for asylum and withholding of removal. However, because the IJ did not recognize the proposed social group before her, we remand to the agency for fact-finding on an open record to determine if the group is cognizable.”
[Hats off to Prof. Evangeline Abriel and her Certified Law Students Keuren A. Parra Moreno (argued) and Jared Renteria (argued)!]
2) 8th Cir. — BIA Goofs On “Aggravated Felony” Analysis
“In May 2017, an Immigration Judge (IJ) determined that Lopez-Chavez is ineligible for cancellation of removal because his 2006 federal conviction for illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 qualifies as an aggravated felony. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s ruling and dismissed Lopez-Chavez’s administrative appeal the following year. The question now before the court is whether Lopez-Chavez’s 2006 conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony under the INA, thus making Lopez-Chavez statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. We hold that it does not. … Because Lopez-Chavez’s 2003 Missouri marijuana conviction is not a categorical match for the corresponding federal offense in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B), the 2006 conviction for illegal reentry under § 1326 does not qualify as an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(O). Accordingly, Lopez-Chavez is not statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. We grant the petition for review, vacate the BIA’s order, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“[T]o decide whether his 2018 conviction renders him removable, we need to determine whether we can parse MMB-Fubinaca from those other drugs; we decide that by determining whether Penalty Group 2-A is divisible. The government says it’s divisible, Alejos-Perez says not. … Because the government has not shown that the modified categorical approach is called for, we apply the categorical approach. … Because Penalty Group 2-A is not a categorical match, we must identify the appropriate result. … Once it’s clear that Penalty Group 2-A is not a categorical match to its federal counterpart, AlejosPerez “must also show a realistic probability . . . that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of the crime” under federal law. We are unable to resolve that issue, because the BIA didn’t address it, and we can “only affirm the BIA on the basis of its stated rationale for ordering an alien removed from the United States.” … We thus remand for consideration of whether Alejos-Perez has shown a realistic probability that Texas would prosecute conduct that falls outside the relevant federal statute.”
Significantly, the 5th Circuit’s rejection of the BIA’s analysis was written by very conservative Circuit Judge Jerry Smith, a Reagan appointee. Judge Smith wrote the majority opinion upholding the legally questionable injunction against President Obama’s “DAPA Program” — something many scholars believe to have been a entirely legitimate exercise of prosecutorial discretion. (The case later was lamely affirmed w/o opinion by an evenly divided Supremes.)
Even conservative Federal Judges not known for sympathy to immigrants and their legal rights appear to have grown weary of the BIA’s consistently sloppy attempts to rule against foreign nationals, regardless of the merits. This is the second rejection by the normally reliably pro-Government 5th Circuit in the last several weeks!
Ironically, one (former) Federal Judge who appears not bothered by the BIA’s defective jurisprudence is the current Attorney General, Judge Garland. He’d better get himself a “tomato resistant”🍅 raincoat to wear at work. This is just the beginning. His reputation and credibility will diminish every day that he fails to replace the BIA with competent jurists who will give migrants the fair and impartial treatment that our Constitution demands, but the DOJ’s “captive court” constantly fails to deliver!
And, leaving aside the legal ineptitude, there can be no excuse for the stunning level of dysfunction and incompetence in how one of the nation’s largest so-called “court” systems is administered by EOIR under DOJ. No tribunal in America issues more potential “death sentences” with less due process! Not exactly what Mies Van Der Rohe had in mind when he famously said “the less is more.”
“Eyore In Distress” Once A Symbol of Fairness, Due Process, & Best Practices, Now Gone “Belly Up”
Poor “Belly-Up Eyore.” He was forlornly, and apparently vainly, hoping to be “put out to pasture” after Judge Garland took over the helm at DOJ. Such high expectations!
But, he is already exhausted again by all the continuing “calls to duty on Courtside” after just 22 days of Judge Garland’s “where’s Falls Church” approach to the ongoing EOIR disaster/travesty! Judge, here’s the key; just think like it wereyour children or grandchildren, actual human beings, being orbited into the abyss without much attention to the law, our Constitution, common sense, or human decency! Maybe starting each day with a briefing on each Article III case that was wrongly decided in your name by the BIA and a live reading of each outrageous media story about disorder in your Immigration Courts would help raise your consciousness? Maybe you should speak with a few of the “customers” of your “courts” that put public service last. Men, women, children, and their lawyers are being abused out there every day by EOIR and you are legally and morally responsible.
You can’t lead the fight for racial justice in America while running a bogus court system that denies and mocks it on a daily basis!
Hon. Merrick B. Garland Attorney General of The United States & Eyore’s Boss, Official White House Photo Public Realm
The Attorney General has issued a decision in Matter of REYES, 28 I&N Dec. 52 (A.G. 2020).
HEADNOTE:
(1) If all of the means of committing a crime, based on the elements of the statute of conviction, amount to one or more of the offenses listed in section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43), then an alien who has been convicted of that crime has necessarily been convicted of an aggravated felony for purposes of the INA.
(2) The respondent’s conviction for grand larceny in the second degree under New York Penal Law § 155.40(1) qualifies as a conviction for an aggravated felony for purposes of the INA. DHS charged that the respondent had been convicted of either aggravated-felony theft or aggravated-felony fraud, as defined in section 101(a)(43)(G) and (M)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) and (M)(i). Larceny by acquiring lost property constitutes aggravated-felony theft, and the parties do not dispute that the other means of violating the New York statute correspond to either aggravated-felony theft or aggravated-felony fraud.
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The DHS has the burden of proving removability. The DHS charges two distinct aggravated felonies. At trial and on appeal to the BIA, DHS can sustain neither charge. Therefore, according to Billy, to make the respondent removable, Immigration Judges should look for the generic elements of the respondent’s crime in any of the separate sections defining “aggravated felony” and combine them as necessary to create a new aggravated felony.
In other words, even if the respondent has not committed any listed “aggravated felony” under the so-called “categorical approach,” the judge must rewrite the statute as necessary to create new aggravated felonies that overcome the shortcomings and limitations of the actual statutory language used by Congress. The judge need not find that the respondent was convicted of any particular aggravated felony listed in the statute. It is enough that he or she committed the elements of some generic crime that would be some aggravated felony if we rewrote the definition as we think it should have been written to maximize deportations.
As my friends and colleagues Judge Jeffrey S. Chase (Jeffrey S. Chase Blog) and Dan Kowalski (LexisNexis Immigration Community) pointed out to me, this is not the first time that a GOP AG has decided to “diss” the Federal Courts by attempting to rewrite the “categorical approach” out of existence. AG Mukasey tried something similar with crimes involving moral turpitude during the Bush II Administration in Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. 24 I&N Dec. 608 (A.G. 2006). The Federal Courts didn’t agree, and Attorney General Eric Holder eventually vacated Mukasey’s lousy decision. http://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/AG-Order-Vacating-Silva-Trevino-2015.pdf
All of us who believe in due process and equal justice should look forward to a day when a future Attorney General and/or Congress will vacate all of the misguided, biased, anti-immigrant “precedents” by Billy the Bigot, Gonzo Apocalypto, and Whitaker and thereby restore some semblance of fairness, normalcy, and predictability to the law. In the meantime, we’ll see whether Billy’s attempt to undo the “categorical approach” fares any better than Mukasey’s with the Federal Courts.
Litigate litigate, litigate! It’s important that the Federal Courts feel and see the pain caused by the DOJ’s biased rewriting of established principles of immigration law to create unnecessary controversies where there previously were none. Immigration law has never been short of legitimate controversies for litigation. But this regime’s unprecedented attempt to rewrite immigration law by fiat has upset those areas that previously were settled, thereby creating new waves of avoidable litigation and controversy where previously there was some agreement and efficiency. No wonder the Immigration Court backlog has mushroomed out of control. Sadly, the regime’s maliciously incompetent approach to the Immigration Courts resembles its maliciously incompetent approach to the COVID-19 pandemic. Basically a total disaster!
I also credit Jeffrey with the “Do It Yourself” observation. Or, as Dan pointed out, Billy’s approach could be called “Tinker Toy Analysis” or“Legoland Analysis.”
Section 13-3407 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, which criminalizes possession of a dangerous drug, is divisible with regard to the specific “dangerous drug” involved in a violation of that statute.
You think this isn’t “Theater of The Absurd?” Let’s check out Fns 5 & 6 from the opinion:
5 We recognize that the Ninth Circuit, in whose jurisdiction this case arises, utilized a modified categorical inquiry in Alvarado, 759 F.3d at 1130–33, to discern whether an alien’s conviction under section 13-3407 involved a federally controlled substance and was therefore a predicate for removal under section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act. However, the Ninth Circuit did not expressly analyze the divisibility of section 13-3407 in that decision, nor did the court have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s articulation of divisibility in Mathis. Moreover, the circuit recently certified a similar issue to the Arizona Supreme Court. See Romero-Millan v. Barr, 958 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 2020) (asking the court to resolve whether Arizona statutes proscribing possession of drug paraphernalia and possession of a narcotic drug under sections 13-3415 and 13-3408 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, respectively, are divisible with respect to the identity of the drug involved in each offense). For these reasons, we do not consider Alvarado to be persuasive authority regarding the divisibility of section 13-3407, which, in light of Romero-Millan, we view as an unsettled issue in the Ninth Circuit.
6 We acknowledge that State v. Prescott, No. 1 CA-CR 15-0188, 2016 WL 611656, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2016), and State v. Castorina, No. 1 CA-CR 08-0816, 2010 WL 2450117, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. June 17, 2010), suggest that the identity of the “dangerous drug” involved in a violation of section 13-3407 is not an element of the statute. However, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona recently reviewed both cases, found that their reasoning was flawed, and concluded that Arizona case law fails to provide a “clear answer[] as to the divisibility” of section 13-3407. United States v. Sanchez-Murillo, No. CR-19-00795-PHX-SPL, 2019 WL 3858606, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 16, 2019) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Prescott or Castorina “definitively answer[s] whether the dangerous drug requirement of [section] 13-3407[] is divisible.” Gonzalez-Dominguez v. Sessions, 743 F. App’x 808, 811 (9th Cir. 2018).
So, how do you think that the unrepresented, almost certainly detained, respondent did on these issues, assuming that he even can read the BIA’s decision or have someone accurately read It to him?
The whole Immigration Court System has become a judicially and Congressionally-enabled “Due Process Farce” befitting a third word failed state that our country now resembles under the Trump kakistocracy.
NO, those who say our democratic institutions are “holding up” under Trump are living in a parallel universe!
PANEL: GRIFFIN and DONALD, Circuit Judges; BERTELSMAN, District Judge*
*The Honorable William O. Bertelsman, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
OPINION BY: JUDGE BERNICE BOUIE DONALD
KEYQUOTE:
This case requires us to use the tools of statutory interpretation to determine whether a conviction for rape in Ohio is an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). The Fifth Circuit and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) previously considered this question and answered it in the negative. In the case before us, though, the BIA reversed course in a published decision and found that such a conviction is an aggravated felony under the INA. On review of all the relevant materials, we disagree with the BIA. A conviction for rape in Ohio can be committed by digital penetration, whereas the aggravated felony of rape under the INA cannot. Therefore, the Ohio conviction does not categorically fit within the federal definition, and the petitioner’sconviction is not an aggravated felony. Accordingly, we REVERSE.
. . . .
In its opinion, the BIA ignored the most important guiding factor to statutory interpretation—the language of the statute—which shows that Congress did not consider rape and sexual abuse to be coextensive. When a court discerns the intent of Congress, “[o]ur analysis begins with the language of the statute.” Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1569 (emphasis added) (quoting Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 8 (2004)). When defining what crimes constituted aggravated felonies in the INA, Congress included “rape” and “sexual abuse of a minor” separately. § 101(a)(43)(A). The only conclusion we can draw from this drafting is that Congress intended for the terms to describe different aggravated felonies.
The BIA’s approach is impermissible because it would strip meaning from the statute’s words. “Under accepted canons of statutory interpretation, we must interpret statutes as a whole,giving effect to each word and making every effort not to interpret a provision in a manner that renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous.” Menuskin v. Williams, 145 F.3d 755, 768 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lake Cumberland Trust, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 954 F.2d 1218, 1222 (6th Cir. 1992)). To accept the BIA’s position that Congress intended for rape and sexual abuse to be synonymous would render meaningless Congress’ decision to utilize the two different terms—rape and sexual abuse—to describe two different aggravated felonies.6 Congress clearly intended to penalize a more expansive set of sex crimes
No. 17-4210 Keeley v. Whitaker Page 7
committed against minors than against adults; and to effectuate that intent, Congress used the term “rape” as to adults and “sexual abuse” as to minors. The BIA ignored the language of the statute.7 Its holding cannot stand.
The primary error the BIA committed was to place the states’ treatment of the crime above the language of the statute. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (holding that we must discern the intent of Congress when interpreting a federal statute).8 Even accepting as true that many of the states treated rape and sexual abuse as “interchangeable” in 1996, we cannot impute such an understanding to Congress. The language of the INA prohibits us from doing so.
Gee, the Fifth Circuit actually told the BIA the correct answer! And, initially, the BIA got it right!
But then, perhaps in an effort to ingratiate themselves with “Gonzo Apocalypto” Sessions, their “new boss,” the BIA screwed it up by trying to expand the reach of the removal provision so that more folks could be removed in violation of law. Sounds like just the kind of scofflaw thing Ol’ Gonzo encouraged and dreamed about. Looks to me like “job security” is overruling “justice” at “Justice!”
Jasso Arangure v. Whitaker, 6th Cir., 12-18-18, Published
PANEL: THAPAR, BUSH, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges
OPINION BY: JUDGE THAPAR
KEY QUOTE:
Courts have always had an “emphatic[]” duty “to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). But all too often, courts abdicate this duty by rushing to find statutes ambiguous, rather than performing a full interpretive analysis. When dealing with agencies, this abdication by ambiguity is even more tempting—and even more problematic. Because, under Chevron, ambiguity means courts get to outsource their “emphatic” duty by deferring to an agency’s interpretation. But even Chevron itself reminds courts that they must do their job before applying deference: they must first exhaust the “traditional tools” of statutory interpretation and “reject administrative constructions” that are contrary to the clear meaning of the statute. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984). First and foremost, this means courts must analyze the statutory text. But when the text standing alone does not supply an answer, courts must consider canons of interpretation. Here, a canon makes the statute’s meaning clear. Thus, we reject the agency’s contrary interpretation.
. . . .
In this case, the Chevron analysis begins and ends with step one. The common-law presumption of res judicata makes the INA unambiguous. Res judicata doctrine applies in removal proceedings.
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“Preaching to the choir” here on “Chevron deference.” As my former students in RLP and ILP at Georgetown might remember, I referred to Chevron as “judicial task avoidance,” which is exactly what it is. It’s a gross violation of Marbury. Effectively, “TJ” dancing on the grave of John Marshall!
Chevron deference is particularly inappropriate in the case of the BIA, which these days functions as an enforcement appendage of the Attorney General (who, without authorization, has actually “re-assumed” many of the civil immigration enforcement functions of DHS). And, both Sessions and Whitaker have shown that if the BIA dares to render any semblance of a reasonable interpretation that might actually help a respondent in Removal Proceedings in any way it will be swiftly and mindlessly reversed.
Neither Sessions nor Whitaker had any chance of being confirmed as an Article III Judge. Indeed, Sessions was emphatically rejected for such a position by his own party because of his record of racially biased views (which he inflicted on the most vulnerable migrants during his toxic tenure as AG).
They have no business serving in a “quasi-judicial” capacity in any immigration proceeding. And, the Article III Courts have no business giving the BIA “deference” reserved for an impartial panel of subject matter experts. By no stretch of the imagination does that describe today’s “captive” BIA (which, incidentally, hasn’t had an “outside Government” appointment this century –even before Sessions, its jurisprudence had become very lopsidedly in favor of the DHS).
