EGBERT v. BOULE
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 21–147. Argued March 2, 2022—Decided June 8, 2022
Respondent Robert Boule owns a bed-and-breakfast—the Smuggler’s Inn—in Blaine, Washington. The inn abuts the international border between Canada and the United States. Boule at times helped federal agents identify and apprehend persons engaged in unlawful cross-bor- der activity on or near his property. But Boule also would provide transportation and lodging to illegal border crossers. Often, Boule would agree to help illegal border crossers enter or exit the United States, only to later call federal agents to report the unlawful activity.
In 2014, Boule informed petitioner Erik Egbert, a U. S. Border Pa- trol agent, that a Turkish national, arriving in Seattle by way of New York, had scheduled transportation to Smuggler’s Inn. When Agent Egbert observed one of Boule’s vehicles returning to the inn, he sus- pected that the Turkish national was a passenger and followed the ve- hicle to the inn. On Boule’s account, Boule asked Egbert to leave, but Egbert refused, became violent, and threw Boule first against the ve- hicle and then to the ground. Egbert then checked the immigration paperwork for Boule’s guest and left after finding everything in order. The Turkish guest unlawfully entered Canada later that evening.
Boule filed a grievance with Agent Egbert’s supervisors and an ad- ministrative claim with Border Patrol pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Egbert allegedly retaliated against Boule by re- porting Boule’s “SMUGLER” license plate to the Washington Depart- ment of Licensing for referencing illegal activity, and by contacting the Internal Revenue Service and prompting an audit of Boule’s tax re- turns. Boule’s FTCA claim was ultimately denied, and Border Patrol took no action against Egbert for his use of force or alleged acts of re- taliation. Boule then sued Egbert in Federal District Court, alleging a Fourth Amendment violation for excessive use of force and a First Amendment violation for unlawful retaliation. Invoking Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, Boule asked the Dis- trict Court to recognize a damages action for each alleged constitu- tional violation. The District Court declined to extend Bivens as re- quested, but the Court of Appeals reversed.
Held: Bivens does not extend to create causes of action for Boule’s Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim and First Amendment retaliation claim. Pp. 5–17.
(a) In Bivens, the Court held that it had authority to create a dam- ages action against federal agents for violating the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. Over the next decade, the Court also fashioned new causes of action under the Fifth Amendment, see Davis v. Pass- man, 442 U. S. 228, and the Eighth Amendment, see Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14. Since then, however, the Court has come “to appreciate more fully the tension between” judicially created causes of action and “the Constitution’s separation of legislative and judicial power,” Her- nández v. Mesa, 589 U. S. ___, ___, and has declined 11 times to imply a similar cause of action for other alleged constitutional violations, see, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296; Bush v. Lucas, 462 U. S. 367. Rather than dispense with Bivens, the Court now emphasizes that rec- ognizing a Bivens cause of action is “a disfavored judicial activity.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U. S. ___, ___.
The analysis of a proposed Bivens claim proceeds in two steps: A court asks first whether the case presents “a new Bivens context”—i.e., is it “meaningfully different from the three cases in which the Court has implied a damages action,” Ziglar, 582 U. S., at ___, and, second, even if so, do “special factors” indicate that the Judiciary is at least arguably less equipped than Congress to “weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.” Id., at ___. This two-step inquiry often resolves to a single question: whether there is any reason to think that Congress might be better equipped to create a damages remedy. Further, under the Court’s precedents, a court may not fash- ion a Bivens remedy if Congress already has provided, or has author- ized the Executive to provide, “an alternative remedial structure.” Ziglar, 582 U. S., at ___. Pp. 5–8.
(b) The Court of Appeals conceded that Boule’s Fourth Amendment claim presented a new Bivens context, but its conclusion that there was no reason to hesitate before recognizing a cause of action against Agent Egbert was incorrect for two independent reasons. Pp. 9–13.
(1) First, the “risk of undermining border security provides reason to hesitate before extending Bivens into this field.” Hernández, 589 U. S., at ___. In Hernández, the Court declined to create a damages remedy for an excessive-force claim against a Border Patrol agent be- cause “regulating the conduct of agents at the border unquestionably has national security implications.” Id., at ___. That reasoning applies with full force here. The Court of Appeals disagreed because it viewed Boule’s Fourth Amendment claim as akin to a “conventional” exces- sive-force claim, as in Bivens, and less like the cross-border shooting in Hernández. But that does not bear on the relevant point: Permitting suit against a Border Patrol agent presents national security concerns that foreclose Bivens relief. Further, the Court of Appeals’ analysis betrays the pitfalls of applying the special-factors analysis at too gran- ular a level. A court should not inquire whether Bivens relief is appro- priate in light of the balance of circumstances in the “particular case.” United States v. Stanley, 483 U. S. 669, 683. Rather, it should ask “[m]ore broadly” whether there is any reason to think that “judicial intrusion” into a given field might be “harmful” or “inappropriate,” id., at 681. The proper inquiry here is whether a court is competent to authorize a damages action not just against Agent Egbert, but against Border Patrol agents generally. The answer is no. Pp. 9–12.
(2) Second, Congress has provided alternative remedies for ag- grieved parties in Boule’s position that independently foreclose a Bivens action here. By regulation, Border Patrol must investigate “[a]lleged violations” and accept grievances from “[a]ny persons.” 8 CFR §§287.10(a)–(b). Boule claims that this regulatory grievance pro- cedure was inadequate, but this Court has never held that a Bivens alternative must afford rights such as judicial review of an adverse determination. Bivens “is concerned solely with deterring the uncon- stitutional acts of individual officers.” Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U. S. 61, 71. And, regardless, the question whether a given remedy is adequate is a legislative determination. As in Her- nández, this Court has no warrant to doubt that the consideration of Boule’s grievance secured adequate deterrence and afforded Boule an alternative remedy. See 589 U. S., at ___. Pp. 12–13.
(c) There is no Bivens cause of action for Boule’s First Amendment retaliation claim. That claim presents a new Bivens context, and there are many reasons to think that Congress is better suited to authorize a damages remedy. Extending Bivens to alleged First Amendment vi- olations would pose an acute “risk that fear of personal monetary lia- bility and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the dis- charge of their duties.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 638. In light of these costs, “Congress is in a better position to decide whether or not the public interest would be served” by imposing a damages ac- tion. Bush, 462 U. S., at 389. The Court of Appeals’ reasons for ex- tending Bivens in this context—that retaliation claims are “well-estab- lished” and that Boule alleges that Agent Egbert “was not carrying out official duties” when the retaliation occurred—lack merit. Also lacking merit is Boule’s claim that this Court identified a Bivens cause of ac- tion under allegedly similar circumstances in Passman. Even assum- ing factual parallels, Passman carries little weight because it predates the Court’s current approach to implied causes of action. A plaintiff cannot justify a Bivens extension based on “parallel circumstances” with Bivens, Passman, or Carlson—the three cases in which the Court has implied a damages action—unless the plaintiff also satisfies the prevailing “analytic framework” prescribed by the last four decades of intervening case law. Ziglar, 582 U. S., at ___–___. Pp. 13–16.
998 F. 3d 370, reversed.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and ALITO, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion con- curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which BREYER and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
As cogently pointed out by Justice Sotomayor, the majority’s intentional misuse and mischaracterization of the “national security fiction” to immunize government conduct from meaningful review in a case that actually has little or nothing to do with national security or foreign relations should also be of grave concern to all of us. Right-wing judges’ propensity to use “fictions” and “pretexts” to mask their real intent and to arrive at preconceived results is a major exercise in intellectual dishonesty!
While many folks are too blind to see it, the lack of informed judicial oversight of the Constitutional performance of DHS, DOJ, DHS, DOS, DOL and the rest of the often underperforming USG immigration bureaucracy undermines the Constitutional rights of everyone in America, including citizens!
Life-tenured Federal Judges might act as if they are “immunized” and “above the fray” (also, to a disturbing extent, above the law and our Constitution, particularly where migrants are concerned). Meanwhile, it’s “the people’s rights” that are on the chopping block with an unprincipled “out of touch” far-right judiciary too often wielding the ax!
