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THE LATEST FROM HON. JEFFREY S. CHASE: Rethinking Chevron In The Era Of Weaponized Immigration Courts Acting As Adjuncts Of DHS Enforcement, & Further Adventures Of The Round Table!

Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog

jeffreyschase.com

In the present climate, immigration lawyers must continue to present judges with creative, intelligent arguments; to present the public with proof of what is wrong with the current system; and to present those in power to change what is wrong with solutions.

I’ve added posts that address each these points. First, I discuss some recent articles in which scholars raise creative legal arguments as to the limits of Chevron deference in appeals to the federal courts. I have also posted a statement of our Round Table of Former Immigration Judges to the House Judiciary Committee, Immigration and Citizenship subcommittee that was made part of the record of its hearing last Wednesday on solutions to the present crisis in the immigration courts.

I have also posted the group statement of our Round Table on the one-year anniversary of the MPP, or “Remain in Mexico” policy that was drafted by former Immigration Judge Ilyce Shugall, who has volunteered her time to travel to Texas to observe MPP hearings that is meant to raise awareness of the need to end this awful program.

SUN, FEB 02

Rethinking Chevron?

The powers of the Attorney General and the Board of Immigration Appeals to influence law by issuing binding precedent decisions is greatly enhanced by what is known as Chevron deference. The principl

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TUE, JAN 28

Statement to the House Judiciary Committee on Immigration Court Reform

On Wednesday, January 29 at 9:30 am, the House Judiciary Committee, Immigration and Citizenship Subcommittee is holding a hearing entitled “Courts in Crisis: The State of Judicial Independence and

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TUE, JAN 28

Statement on the One Year Anniversary of the MPP Program

January 28, 2020

The Round Table of Former Immigration Judges is comprised of former immigration judges who are dedicated to due process in the immigration system. As former immigration judges, we

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Another article that ties in well with a critical re-examination of Chevron in immigration cases is Tess Hellgren’s recent wonderful short article: “Faced with the Trump Administration’s weaponization of the immigration courts against asylum-seeking individuals, the role of the federal courts is more important than ever.” I recently republished it here: https://immigrationcourtside.com/2020/02/01/tess-hellgren-innovation-law-lab-when-it-comes-to-the-captive-bia-weaponized-immigration-courts-the-article-iiis-need-to-put-away-the-rubber-stamp-restore-integrity-to-the-law-fac/

As we see the results of the regime’s Article III-enabled and encouraged nativist, racist policies like an expanded “Travel Ban” that now includes a large portion of Africa, new non-legislative restrictions on legal immigration, unmitigated expansion of the deadly “New American Gulag,” intentional mistreatment of children, and the continuing abrogation of both Due Process and our binding obligations to protect refugees at our Southern Border and elsewhere, Tess’s last sentence is particularly prophetic:

As the Attorney General and other executive officials attempt to expand their authority to define the terms of immigration adjudication, federal courts should heed the Seventh Circuit’s decision – and remember the foundational legal principle that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”

So far, the Supremes and the Circuits have largely “vacated the province and shirked their duties” to the nation and our laws by shrinking and cowering in the face of the regime’s continuing lawlessness, bullying, bias, and tyranny. Indeed, the Supremes have shown a disturbing favoritism to unjustified requests by Trump’s Solicitor General to short-circuit the litigation system and the rules that bind all others.

Not since the Eisenhower Administration’s “Operation Wetback” (obviously one of the regime’s “models” of lawless disregard for human and legal rights, not to mention basic morality) has our national Government shown such overt racism and contempt for migrants of color. Yet, rather than standing tall and delivering a united, powerful, intellectually courageous defense of our Constitution, the “GOP Gang of Five Supremes” backed the dehumanization and demonization of migrants on racial and religious grounds for transparent and invidious political reasons in the “Travel Ban case.” They basically invited and then approved a demonstrably false and “bad faith” national defense “pretext” which the Administration has “jumped on” to justify other attacks on the rule of law.

Now the “ban” has remarkably, but predictably, been extended to a large part of Africa, including its largest economy, Nigeria. Hardly a whimper as Trump disembowels both Constitutional norms and human decency. What’s next on the agenda, Supremes, a bogus Executive ban on all non-White, non-Christian immigration? Who’d be surprised at this point?

Of course, with “constitutional de-personification” well under way with Article III approval, the next targets will be US citizens of color and others who “dare to differ” like the LGBTQ community, women, political opponents, journalists, lawyers, and, finally, judges themselves once their usefulness to Trump and his authoritarian regime is exhausted. The all-powerful, unrestrained, “unitary Executive” has no need of legislature, judiciary, or the people except to “ratify” their authoritarian abuses.

The failure to defend and reinforce the courageous legal community challenging the regime’s authoritarian overreach and the pathetically weak defense of the integrity of judicial colleagues who have tried to hold the regime accountable by Roberts has done nothing but confirm and reinforce Trump’s pre-existing belief that courts are “his” tools and judges “his toadies.”

America deserves better from its life-tenured judiciary! What’s the purpose of a supposedly independent life-tenured judiciary that sides with powerful, dishonest, lawless, bullies over the rights of individuals and is unwilling to stand up for the rights and human dignity of the most vulnerable among us?

PWS

02-04-20

HON. JEFFREY S. CHASE: 6th Cir. Correctly Rejected BIA’s Disingenuous Approach To Res Judicata In Jasso! — Time To End The “Chevron Farce” In Immigration Cases!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/12/31/6th-cir-reverses-bia-on-res-judicata

JEFFREY S. CHASE OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGRATION LAW

Dec 31 6th Cir. Reverses BIA on Res Judicata

In the final days of 2017, the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a precedent decision in Matter of Jasso Arangure.1 The respondent in that case, a longtime permanent resident, had been convicted of first-degree home invasion under Michigan law. ICE had placed him into removal proceedings because it claimed the conviction constituted an aggravated felony as a “crime of violence” under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Although the immigration judge agreed with ICE, Mr. Jasso won his appeal because the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, in another case, found the concept that a crime that in itself was not violent (i.e. home invasion) could be considered a “crime of violence” because hypothetically, a violent confrontation could occur, was unconstitutionally vague. As a result, Mr. Jasso’s case was terminated because the government had not met its burden of proof.

Two days later, the government commenced another case against Mr. Jasso. It again charged him, on the basis of the exact same home invasion conviction, of being removable as an aggravated felon, but this time, instead of labeling it a crime of violence, ICE argued that it met the definition of an aggravated felony burglary offense under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Act. Mr. Jasso moved to terminate, arguing that the new proceedings were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, which forbids relitigating the same issue between the same parties where the matter has already reached a final judgment on the merits. The immigration judge did not terminate, and ordered the respondent removed.

On appeal, the BIA affirmed. The BIA had to acknowledge that res judicata had been found to apply in the administrative law context, and that the Board itself had applied the similar doctrine of collateral estoppel in its own precedent decisions. Nevertheless, the BIA concluded that it would be too burdensome “to require the DHS to present all possible bases for removal in a single proceeding.” That statement is remarkably misleading. In this case, it would have required the ICE attorney at most two extra minutes to add the additional charge of “burglary” to the original “crime of violence” charge. If ICE somehow neglected to do this in the original charging document, an ICE attorney could have added the additional charge later, a common practice.

The BIA added that “whether a particular offense is an aggravated felony is a legal determination affected by complex laws that are in constant flux,” the implication being how can we punish the poor DHS for not anticipating an unexpected change in law. But the same BIA proved the disingenuousness of this approach less than six months later, following former Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ decision in Matter of A-B-. Four days later, when the BIA decided an appeal that had been argued and decided while Matter of A-R-C-G- was still a precedent decision that was commonly relied on to grant domestic violence cases, the BIA did not say “a grant of asylum is a legal determination affected by complex laws that are in constant flux,” and remand the matter to allow the applicant to reformulate her arguments under the four-day-old decision. To the contrary, the Board said “the Attorney General has foreclosed the respondent’s arguments,” and dismissed the appeal with no meaningful analysis.2

Fortunately, Mr. Jasso appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which issued its decision in the final days of 2018. Under a concept known as Chevron deference, circuit courts must defer to the BIA’s interpretation of a statute if and only if the statutory language being interpreted is ambiguous. In recent years, the trend has been for the circuit courts to find the language ambiguous and accord such deference. In this case, it would have been particularly easy for the court to do so, because the Immigration and Nationality Act is completely silent as to whether the concept of res judicata should apply in removal proceedings.

However, the Sixth Circuit did something extraordinary. It first noted that the Supreme Court has recently taken the circuit courts to task for being too quick to find a statute ambiguous,3 and therefore decided to exercise due diligence before reaching such determination in the present case. And even though there was no statutory language at all, the court took the extra step of turning to “canons,” which it defined as “general background principles that courts have developed over time to guide statutory interpretation.” The court noted one such canon in particular, which presumes “that general statutory language incorporates established common-law principles (like res judicata) unless ‘a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.’” Pursuant to a lengthy, detailed analysis, the court concluded that the canon should properly be applied in removal proceedings, which renders the statute unambiguous, meaning that res judicata applies.

The Sixth Circuit next examined whether “a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.” The Court noted that the statutory burden of proof that Congress put on DHS to prove removability by “clear and convincing evidence” “would be rendered ‘largely meaningless’ if DHS could repeatedly bring one proceeding after another until it got the result it wanted.”

The BIA had tried to support its decision below by reading into the Act a clear Congressional intent to remove noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies and other crimes, determining that a concept such as res judicata shouldn’t apply where it would interfere with such a clear Congressional intent. The Board concluded that the purpose for res judicata, which it expressed as “the public interest in the finality of administrative judgments,” was no match for “Congress’ clear intent” to remove noncitizens convicted of crimes.

The Sixth Circuit had a wonderful reply, finding the Board’s approach “suggests courts can simply ignore the enacted text and instead replace it with an amorphous ‘purpose’ that happens to match with the outcome one party wants.” The court further pointed out the ridiculousness of the Board’s approach, as, since Congress always wants its statutes to be enforced, res judicata could always be viewed as an obstacle, and so such reading would have the effect of rendering the whole common-law presumption “meaningless.” The court wisely concluded that “statutes are motivated by many competing – and often contradictory – purposes” which “Congress addresses…by negotiating, crafting, and enacting statutory text. It is that text that controls, not a court’s after-the-fact reevaluation of the purposes behind it.”

Having ruled that res judicata could be applied, the court found that three of the four requirements for applying res judicata were met. The court concluded that both proceedings involved the same facts, as they were both based on the same Michigan conviction, and that the different basis for the aggravated felony charge lodged by DHS was not a new fact, but rather a different legal theory of a party. The court also found that there was no dispute that both proceedings involved the same parties, and that DHS could have lodged the burglary charge in the earlier proceedings. The only remaining question was whether the first proceeding concluded in a final judgment. As the court found it unclear from the record whether the termination of the initial proceedings was with or without prejudice, it remanded the record for the BIA to consider the question in the first instance.

Regardless of the outcome on remand, the decision is important, as the doctrine of res judicata will again be available (at least in the Sixth Circuit) to preclude ICE from subjecting noncitizens to multiple removal proceedings due to the Government’s lack of preparation. The decision might also signal the application of a tougher standard for determining whether Chevron deference is due to BIA precedent decisions. In a footnote, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that “many members of the Supreme Court” have questioned Chevron deference, including present Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a case concerning the continued viability of the related concept of Auer deference, according deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.4 Let’s hope that the circuit courts will in the future be less inclined to rely on Chevron to afford the BIA a free pass, and instead be more likely to take the Board to task for its poorly-reasoned, result-driven decisionmaking.

Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

Notes

27 I&N Dec. 178 (BIA 2017).

Matter of M-J- (unpublished decision, June 15, 2018).

See, e.g. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S.Ct. 2105, 2121 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

4. Kisor v. Wilkie, 899 F.3d 1360 ( cert. granted (U.S. Dec. 10, 2018) (No. 18-15).

JEFF CHASE

Jeffrey and I agree that the Circuit Courts like the 6th are finally taking a long-overdue more critical approach to giving the BIA so-called “Chevron deference.” By now, the Article III Courts should be catching on that the BIA recently has been stretching statutory interpretation in any way possible to favor the DHS’s view in almost all published cases. This is even when the alternate interpretation offered by the respondent is closer to the statutory language, would be more practical, and/or would produce a more reasonable outcome. In most cases, the consequences at stake for the individual respondent are far, far greater than those at stake for the DHS.

And, the concept that clearly biased “know nothing” enforcement zealots like Sessions and Whitaker should be given any deference whatsoever in their political roles as Attorney General is beyond preposterous. The “Supremes-created” doctrine of “Chevron deference” (a/k/a “Judicial Task Avoidance”) was based largely on the assumption of both an objective deliberative administrative process and a high degree of technical expertise. Neither of these apply any more to the BIA, let alone to hacks like Sessions and Whitaker.

I believe that the time has come for the Supremes to overrule “Chevron” and resume doing their primary judicial function of interpreting the law. That, of course, would not prevent the Article III Courts from deferring on a case-by-case to particularly persuasive or well-reasoned agency decisions (so-called “Skidmore deference” which was the predecessor to Chevron) where appropriate. But, even if Chevron deference continues as a general proposition, there are compelling reasons for no longer applying it to administrative adjudications under the immigration laws.

PWS

01-03-19

NO DEFERENCE DUE! – 6th CIR. SLAMS TWO BIA PRECEDENTS – MATTER OF KEELEY, 27 I&N DEC. 27 I&N DEC. 146 (BIA 2017) & MATTER OF JASSO ARANGURE, 27 I&N DEC. 178 (BIA 2017) BITE THE DUST! — Time To Put An End To Inappropriate “Chevron Deference” For “Captive” BIA!

6th-Keeley18a0270p-06

Keeley v. Whitaker, 6th Cir., 12-17-18, Published

PANEL: GRIFFIN and DONALD, Circuit Judges; BERTELSMAN, District Judge*

*The Honorable William O. Bertelsman, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.

OPINION BY: JUDGE BERNICE BOUIE DONALD

KEYQUOTE:

This case requires us to use the tools of statutory interpretation to determine whether a conviction for rape in Ohio is an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). The Fifth Circuit and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) previously considered this question and answered it in the negative. In the case before us, though, the BIA reversed course in a published decision and found that such a conviction is an aggravated felony under the INA. On review of all the relevant materials, we disagree with the BIA. A conviction for rape in Ohio can be committed by digital penetration, whereas the aggravated felony of rape under the INA cannot. Therefore, the Ohio conviction does not categorically fit within the federal definition, and the petitioner’sconviction is not an aggravated felony. Accordingly, we REVERSE.

. . . .

In its opinion, the BIA ignored the most important guiding factor to statutory interpretation—the language of the statute—which shows that Congress did not consider rape and sexual abuse to be coextensive. When a court discerns the intent of Congress, “[o]ur analysis begins with the language of the statute.” Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1569 (emphasis added) (quoting Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 8 (2004)). When defining what crimes constituted aggravated felonies in the INA, Congress included “rape” and “sexual abuse of a minor” separately. § 101(a)(43)(A). The only conclusion we can draw from this drafting is that Congress intended for the terms to describe different aggravated felonies.

The BIA’s approach is impermissible because it would strip meaning from the statute’s words. “Under accepted canons of statutory interpretation, we must interpret statutes as a whole,giving effect to each word and making every effort not to interpret a provision in a manner that renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous.” Menuskin v. Williams, 145 F.3d 755, 768 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lake Cumberland Trust, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 954 F.2d 1218, 1222 (6th Cir. 1992)). To accept the BIA’s position that Congress intended for rape and sexual abuse to be synonymous would render meaningless Congress’ decision to utilize the two different terms—rape and sexual abuse—to describe two different aggravated felonies.6 Congress clearly intended to penalize a more expansive set of sex crimes

No. 17-4210 Keeley v. Whitaker Page 7

committed against minors than against adults; and to effectuate that intent, Congress used the term “rape” as to adults and “sexual abuse” as to minors. The BIA ignored the language of the statute.7 Its holding cannot stand.

The primary error the BIA committed was to place the states’ treatment of the crime above the language of the statute. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (holding that we must discern the intent of Congress when interpreting a federal statute).8 Even accepting as true that many of the states treated rape and sexual abuse as “interchangeable” in 1996, we cannot impute such an understanding to Congress. The language of the INA prohibits us from doing so.

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Gee, the Fifth Circuit actually told the BIA the correct answer! And, initially, the BIA got it right!

But then, perhaps in an effort to ingratiate themselves with “Gonzo Apocalypto” Sessions, their “new boss,” the BIA screwed it up by trying to expand the reach of the removal provision so that more folks could be removed in violation of law. Sounds like just the kind of scofflaw thing Ol’ Gonzo encouraged and dreamed about. Looks to me like “job security” is overruling “justice” at “Justice!”

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172209.P Jasso-6th Cir18a0272p-06

Jasso Arangure v. Whitaker, 6th Cir., 12-18-18, Published

PANEL: THAPAR, BUSH, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges

OPINION BY: JUDGE THAPAR

KEY QUOTE:

Courts have always had an “emphatic[]” duty “to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). But all too often, courts abdicate this duty by rushing to find statutes ambiguous, rather than performing a full interpretive analysis. When dealing with agencies, this abdication by ambiguity is even more tempting—and even more problematic. Because, under Chevron, ambiguity means courts get to outsource their “emphatic” duty by deferring to an agency’s interpretation. But even Chevron itself reminds courts that they must do their job before applying deference: they must first exhaust the “traditional tools” of statutory interpretation and “reject administrative constructions” that are contrary to the clear meaning of the statute. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984). First and foremost, this means courts must analyze the statutory text. But when the text standing alone does not supply an answer, courts must consider canons of interpretation. Here, a canon makes the statute’s meaning clear. Thus, we reject the agency’s contrary interpretation.

. . . .

In this case, the Chevron analysis begins and ends with step one. The common-law presumption of res judicata makes the INA unambiguous. Res judicata doctrine applies in removal proceedings.

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“Preaching to the choir” here on “Chevron deference.” As my former students in RLP and ILP at Georgetown might remember, I referred to Chevron as “judicial task avoidance,” which is exactly what it is. It’s a gross violation of Marbury. Effectively, “TJ” dancing on the grave of John Marshall!

Chevron deference is particularly inappropriate in the case of the BIA, which these days functions as an enforcement appendage of the Attorney General (who, without authorization, has actually “re-assumed” many of the civil immigration enforcement functions of DHS). And, both Sessions and Whitaker have shown that if the BIA dares to render any semblance of a reasonable interpretation that might actually help a respondent in Removal Proceedings in any way it will be swiftly and mindlessly reversed.

Neither Sessions nor Whitaker had any chance of being confirmed as an Article III Judge. Indeed, Sessions was emphatically rejected for such a position by his own party because of his record of racially biased views (which he inflicted on the most vulnerable migrants during his toxic tenure as AG).

They have no business serving in a “quasi-judicial” capacity in any immigration proceeding. And, the Article III Courts have no business giving the BIA “deference” reserved for an impartial panel of subject matter experts. By no stretch of the imagination does that describe today’s “captive” BIA (which, incidentally, hasn’t had an “outside Government” appointment this century –even before Sessions, its jurisprudence had become very lopsidedly in favor of the DHS).

PWS

12-22-18

HERE’S WHY NIELSEN’S LATEST ATTACK ON REFUGEES AND THE RULE OF LAW COULD BACKFIRE! – ALSO, AN ADDENDUM: “MY MESSAGE TO THE NDPA”

WHY NIELSEN’S LATEST ATTACK ON REFUGEES COULD BACKFIRE

“The Devil is in the Details.” Typical for this group of incompetents, nobody at DHS or in the Mexican Government actually appears to be ready to implement this “historic change.”
Expect chaos. After all, the ink wasn’t even dry on Judge Sullivan’s order in Grace v. Whitaker for USCIS to rewrite its credible fear “Policy Memorandum” to comply with law. Want to bet on whether the “credible fear” interviews in Mexico or at the border will be lawful? How about the reaction of Judge Sullivan if they ignore his order? (Nielsen and her fellow scofflaws might want to consult with Gen. Flynn on that one. This is one judge with limited patience for high level Government officials who run roughshod over the law, are in contempt of court, or perjure themselves.)
By screwing around with procedures, the Administration opens itself up for systemic challenges in more U.S. District Courts instead of being able to limit litigation to Courts of Appeals on petitions to review individual removal orders.
Every “panic attack” by this Administration on the rule of law and the most vulnerable energizes more legal opposition. And, it’s not just within the immigration bar and NGOs any more. “Big Law” and many of the brightest recent graduates of top law schools across the country are getting involved in the “New Due Process Army.”
By concentrating asylum applicants at a limited number of ports of entry, pro bono legal groups could actually find it easier to represent almost all applicants.
Representation of asylum seekers generally improves results, sometimes by as much as 5X.
It could be easier for individuals who are free and authorized to work in Mexico to obtain counsel and prepare their cases than it is for individuals detained in substandard conditions in obscure locations in the U.S.
Freed of the intentionally coercive and demoralizing effects of DHS detention, more applicants will be willing to fully litigate their claims, including taking available administrative and judicial appeals.
As more cases reach the Courts of Appeals (primarily in the 5th & 9th Circuits) more “real” Article III Judges will “have their eyes opened” to the absolute travesty that passes for “justice” and “due process” in the Immigration Courts under Trump.
Shoddily reasoned “precedents” from the BIA and the AG are already failing in the Article III Courts on a regular basis. Three “bit the dust” just within the last week. Expect this trend to accelerate.
The 5th and 9th Circuits will find their dockets overwhelmed with Not Quite Ready For Prime Time (“NQRFPT”) cases “dumped” on them by DOJ and EOIR and are likely to react accordingly.
The last massive assault on Due Process in Immigration Court by the DOJ under Ashcroft basically caused a “mini-rebellion” in the Article III Courts. There were numerous “remands for redos” and Circuit Court rulings harshly reversing and publicly criticizing overly restrictive treatment of asylum cases by Immigration Judges and the BIA, particularly in the area of credibility determinations. Expect the Circuit Courts to “reverse and revise” many of the current anti-asylum precedents from the BIA and the AG.
With almost universal representation, a level playing field supervised by Article III Courts, and all Immigration Judges actually forced to fairly apply the generous standards for asylum enunciated by the Supremes in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, and by the BIA in the (oft cited but seldom actually applied) Matter of Mogharrabi, I wouldn’t be surprised to see grant rates for Northern Triangle applicants exceed 50% (where most experts believe they belong).
Overall, there’s a respectable chance that the end result of this ill-conceived policy will be an exposure of the rampant fraud, intellectual dishonesty, and disregard for the true rule of law in this Administration’s treatment of bona fide asylum seekers.
Inevitably, however, asylum seekers will continue to die in Mexico while awaiting hearings. DHS politicos probably will find themselves on a regular basis before enraged House Committees attempting to justify their deadly, cruel, and incompetent policies. This will be a “culture shock” for those used to the “hear no evil, see no evil” attitude of the GOP House.
The Administration appears to have “designed” another of their “built to fail” systems. If they shift the necessary Immigration Judges to the border, the 1.1 million backlog elsewhere will continue to mushroom. If they work on the backlog, the “border waiting line” will grow, causing extreme pressure from the Mexican Government, Congress, and perhaps the Article III Courts. Every death of an asylum seeker (there were three just within the last week or so) will be laid at DHS’s feet.

NOTE TO THE NDPA:

The outstanding historical analysis by Judge Emmet Sullivan in Grace v. Whitaker illustrates what we already know: For years, the Executive Branch through EOIR has been intentionally applying “unduly restrictive standards” to asylum seekers to artificially reduce the number of grants in violation of both the Refugee Act of 1980 and our international obligations. This disingenuous treatment has particularly targeted bona fide asylum seekers from the Northern Triangle, those asserting claims based on a “particular social group,” unrepresented individuals, women, and children.

Worse yet, this totally cynical and disingenuous Administration is using the intentionally and unlawfully “skewed system” and “illegal denials” as well as just downright fabricated statistics and knowingly false narratives to paint a bogus picture of asylum seekers and their lawyers as the “abusers” and the Government as the “defenders of the rule of law.” What poppycock, when we all know the exact opposite is the real truth! Only courageous (mostly pro bono) lawyers and some conscientious judges at both the Immigration Court and Article III levels are standing up for the real rule of law against a scofflaw Administration and its outrageous plan to send genuine refugees back into harm’s way.

Nowhere in the racially charged xenophobic actions and rhetoric of Trump, Sessions, and Whitaker, nor in the intentionally derogatory and demonstrably dishonest rhetoric of Nielsen, nor in the crabbed, intentionally overly restrictive interpretations of asylum law by today’s BIA is there even a hint of the generous humanitarian letter and spirit of the Refugee Act of 1980 and the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees or the “non-narrow” interpretation of “particular social group” so well described and documented by Judge Sullivan. On the contrary, we can well imagine folks like this gleefully and self-righteously pushing the refugee vessel St. Louis out to sea or happily slamming the door in the face of desperate Jewish refugees from Europe who would later die in the Holocaust.

Now is the time to force the Article III Courts and Congress to confront this Administration’s daily violations of law and human rights. We can develop favorable case precedents in the Article III Courts, block unethical and intentionally illegal interference by the Attorney General with Due Process in Immigration Court, and advocate changes in the law and procedures that will finally require the Executive Branch and the Immigration Courts to live up to the abandoned but still valid promise of “becoming the world’s best tribunals, guaranteeing fairness and Due Process for all.” And, the “all” certainly includes the most vulnerable among us: refugees claiming asylum!

In the end, through a combination of the ballot box, Congress, the Article III Courts, and informed public opinion we will be able to thwart the rancid White Nationalist immigration agenda of this Administration and return honest, reasonable Government that works within the Constitution and governs in the overall best interests of our country to the United States.

Thanks for all you do! Keep fighting the “good fight!”

Go for it!

Due Process Forever! Scofflaw Administration Never!

PWS

12-21-18

SCOFFLAWS THWARTED: U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE EMMET G. SULLIVAN EXPOSES SESSIONS’ S OUTRAGEOUSLY ILLEGAL WHITE NATIONALIST ATTACK ON U.S. ASYLUM LAW — MATTER OF A-B- EXCEEDED SCOFFLAW A.G.’S AUTHORITY — Grace v. Whitaker

Grace v. Sessions, U.S.D.C. D.D.C., 12-19-18, Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan, Published

Grace 106 12-19-18

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MY STATEMENT ON GRACE V. WHITAKER:

As a former United States Immigration Judge, Chair of the U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals, and Acting General Counsel and Deputy General Counsel of the “Legacy INS” involved in developing the Refugee Act of 1980, I am deeply gratified by the decision of U.S. District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan today in Grace v. Whitaker. Judge Sullivan strongly supports the rule of law and the generous humanitarian protections and procedural rights afforded by Congress to vulnerable asylum seekers against a lawless and unjustified attack by former Attorney General Sessions in Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (AG 2018) and the largely erroneous Policy Memorandum incorporating that decision issued by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).

Among the most important holdings, Judge Sullivan:

Reaffirmed the duty of the Executive Branch to comply with the rule of law as enacted by Congress to protect individuals fleeing persecution;
Reaffirmed the generous humanitarian intent of the asylum provisions of the Refugee Act of 1980;
Recognized the generous “well-founded fear” (10% chance) standard for asylum as enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1987 in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca;
Reaffirmed the “extraordinarily low” bar for applicants in “credible fear” interviews before DHS Asylum Officers: “to prevail at a credible fear interview, the alien need only show a ‘significant possibility’ of a one in ten chance of persecution, i.e., a fraction of ten percent;”
Found that Congress intended that the term “particular social group” must be interpreted generously in accordance with the United Nations’ guidance;
Rejected Sessions’s unlawful attempt to generally preclude domestic violence and gang-related claims from qualifying for asylum;
Reaffirmed the necessity of case-by-case determinations of credible fear and asylum;
Rejected Session’s unlawful attempt to engraft a “condoned or completely helpless” requirement on the interpretation of when a foreign government is “unwilling or unable” to protect an individual from persecution by a private party;
Reaffirmed Congress’s unambiguous understanding that persecution means “harm or suffering . . . inflicted either by the government of a country or by persons or an organization that the government was unable or unwilling to control;”
Rejected DHS’s misinterpretation of the “circularity requirement” in the Policy Memorandum;
Rejected the Department of Justice’s disingenuous argument that Article III Courts must “defer” to administrative interpretations of Article III Court decisions;
Rejected the Policy Memorandum’s illegal requirement that an asylum applicant (usually unrepresented) “delineate” the scope of a particular social group at the credible fear interview;
Emphatically rejected the Policy Memorandum’s attempt to elevate administrative precedents over the conflicting decisions of U.S. Courts of Appeals.

Judge Sullivan’s cogent decision dramatically highlights the problems with an U.S. Immigration Court system that is controlled by political officials, like former Attorney General Sessions, who are not fair and impartial judicial officials and whose actions may be (and in Sessions’s case definitely were) driven by political philosophies and enforcement objectives inconsistent with judicial responsibilities to insure that non-citizens are fairly considered for and when appropriate granted the important, often life-saving, protections conferred by law and guaranteed by due process. A clearly biased political official like Jeff Sessions should ethically never been permitted to act in a quasi-judicial capacity.

As a result of Sessions’s anti-immigrant bias, unlawful actions, and gross mismanagement of the Immigration Courts, innocent lives have been endangered and one of our largest American court systems has been driven to the precipice with an uncontrolled (yet unnecessary) backlog of over 1.1 million cases and crippling quality control issues. When it finally plunges over, it will take a large chunk of our American justice system and the Constitutional protections we all rely upon with it!

Congress must create an independent Article I United States Immigration Court to ensure that the immigration and refugee laws enacted by Congress are applied to individuals in a fair, efficient, and impartial manner.

Many, many thanks to the ACLU and all of the other wonderful pro bono lawyers who stood up for the rule of law and the rights of the most vulnerable among us against the intentionally illegal actions and unethical behavior of this Administration.

PWS

12-19-18

INSIDE EOIR: FOIA REVEALS THAT DURING “JUDICIAL TRAINING,” BIA APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGE ROGER PAULEY INSTRUCTED FELLOW JUDGES ON HOW TO FIND INDIVIDUALS REMOVABLE BY AVOIDING THE LAW!

https://www.hoppocklawfirm.com/foia-results-immigration-judges-conference-materials-for-2018/

)

Here’s what Attorney Matthew Hoppock, whose firm made the FOIA request, had to say about Judge Pauley’s presentation:

Developments in Criminal Immigration and Bond Law:

Slides – Developments in Criminal Immigration and Bond Law

This presentation is really striking, because Board Member Roger Pauley appears to be instructing the IJs not to apply the “categorical approach” when it doesn’t lead to a “sensible result.” The “categorical approach” is mandatory, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly had to reverse the BIA and instruct them to properly apply it. So, it’s definitely disheartening to see this is the instruction the IJs received at their conference this summer on how to apply the categorical approach:

****************************

Can’t say this is unprecedented. I can remember being astounded and outraged by some past presentations that essentially focused on “how to find the respondent not credible and have it stand up in court,” “how to deny claims establishing past or future persecution by invoking ‘no-nexus’ grounds,” and “how to find proposed ‘particular social groups non-cognizable’ under the BIA’s three-part test.”

I also remember a BIA Judge essentially telling us to ignore a previous “outside expert” panel that provided evidence that governments in the Northern Triangle were stunningly corrupt, politically beholden to gangs, and totally incapable of protecting the population against targeted gang violence.

Another colleague gave a stunningly tone-deaf presentation in which they referred to OIL and ICE as “us” and the respondents as “them.”

But, presentations like Judge Pauley’s are particularly troubling in the context of a so-called “training conference” where the “keynote speech” by the judges’ titular “boss” Jeff Sessions touted his decision removing asylum protections from battered women, warned judges to follow his precedents, emphasized increasing “volume” as the highest priority, and otherwise notably avoided mentioning the due process rights of respondents, the need to insure protection for asylum seekers, or the obligation to follow decisions of the Article III Courts (the latter has been, and remains, a chronic problem for EOIR).

Many of the Immigration Judges were recently hired, attending their first national conference. What message do you think they got about how to be successful in the “Age of Trump & Sessions?” What message did they get when a vocal minority of their colleagues improperly “cheered” the removal of protections for vulnerable refugee women? How would YOU like to be a foreign national fighting for your life in a system run by Jeff Sessions?

Right on cue, EOIR provides another powerful example of why Professor Maureen Sweeney was right in her recently posted article: the Article III Courts should NOT be giving the BIA or Sessions “Chevron deference.”

PWS

08-23-18

PROFESSOR MAUREEN SWEENEY ON WHY THE BIA DOESN’T DESERVE “CHEVRON” DEFERENCE – JEFF SESSIONS’S ALL OUT ATTACK ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDICIARY IS EXHIBIT 1!

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2018/08/immigration-article-of-the-day-enforcingprotection-the-danger-of-chevron-in-refugee-act-cases-by-mau.html

Go on over to ImmigrationProf Blog at the above link for all of the links necessary to get the abstract as well as the full article. Among the many current and former Immigration Judges quoted or cited in the article are Jeffrey Chase, Ashley Tabaddor, Dana Marks, Lory Rosenberg, Robert Vinikoor, and me. (I’m sure I’m missing some of our other colleagues; it’s a very long article, but well worth the read.)

In an article full of memorable passages, here is one of my favorites:

Full enforcement of the law requires full enforcement of provisions that grant protection as well as provisions that restrict border entry. This is the part of “enforcement” that the Department of Justice is not equipped to fully understand. The agency’s fundamental commitment to controlling unauthorized immigration does not allow it a neutral, open position on asylum questions. The foundational separation and balance of powers concerns at the heart of Chevron require courts to recognize that inherent conflict of interest as a reason Congress is unlikely to have delegated unchecked power on refugee protection to the prosecuting agency. In our constitutional structure, the courts stand as an essential check on the executive power to deport and must provide robust review to fully enforce the congressional mandate to protect refugees. If the courts abdicate this vital function, they will be abdicating their distinctive role in ensuring the full enforcement of all of our immigration law—including those provisions that seek to ensure compliance with our international obligations to protect individuals facing the danger of persecution.

This is a point that my friend and colleague Judge Lory Rosenberg made often during our tenure together on the BIA. All too often, her pleas fell on deaf ears.

The now abandoned pre-2001 “vision statement” of EOIR was “to be the world’s best administrative tribunals, guaranteeing fairness and due process for all.” Nothing in there about “partnering” with DHS to remove more individuals, fulfilling quotas, “sending messages to stay home,” securing the border, jacking up volume, deterring migration, or advancing other politically motivated enforcement goals. Indeed, the proper role of EOIR is to insure fair and impartial adjudication and Due Process for individuals even in the face of constant pressures to “just go along to get along” with a particular Administration’s desires to favor the expedient over the just.

Under all Administrations, the duty to insure Due Process, fairness, full protections, and the granting to benefits to migrants under the law is somewhat shortchanged at EOIR in relation to the pressure to promote Executive enforcement objectives. But, the situation under the xenophobic, disingenuous, self-proclaimed “Immigration Enforcement Czar” Jeff Sessions is a true national disgrace and a blot on our entire legal system. If Congress won’t do its job by removing the Immigration Courts from the DOJ forthwith, the Article III courts must step in, as Maureen suggests.

PWS

08-23-18

3RD CIRCUIT’S JULY 4 MESSAGE TO ABUSED LATINAS: YOUR LIVES DON’T MATTER! – S.E.R.L v. Att’y Gen., JULY 3, 2018 — PLUS MY ESSAY: How “Go Along To Get Along” Judging Costs Innocent Lives!

172031p — SERL

S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., No. 17-2031, 3rd Cir., July 3, 2018

HOLDING: Latinas fleeing persecution in the Northern Triangle can expect no protection under U.S. asylum laws in the Third Circuit.

PANEL: Circuit Judges Kent Jordan, Cheryl Ann Krause; Senior Circuit Judge Ira Morton Greenburg

OPINION BY: Judge Kent Jordan

KEY QUOTES:

S.E.R.L., a native of Honduras, seeks review of the denial of her application for asylum and statutory withholding of removal based on membership in a proposed particular social group that she characterizes as “immediate family members of Honduran women unable to leave a domestic relationship[.]”2 (Opening Br. at 21.) She fears persecution by two men, Jose Angel and Juan Orellana. Jose Angel abducted, raped, and continues to stalk one of S.E.R.L.’s daughters, K.Y.R.L. That daughter has already been granted asylum in the United States. Juan Orellana is S.E.R.L.’s stepfather and has repeatedly abused S.E.R.L.’s mother. S.E.R.L. fears that if she is removed to Honduras, both men will persecute her, Jose Angel because of her relationship to her daughter, and Juan Orellana because of her relationship to her mother. S.E.R.L. and two of her children fled here from Honduras in 2014. Within a month of their unlawful arrival, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings pursuant to INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i). S.E.R.L. conceded removability, and timely applied for asylum and statutory withholding of removal.4 In support of her claims for relief, she alleged past persecution and a fear of future persecution based on the relationships just noted.

. . . .

S.E.R.L. contends that the BIA’s change innomenclature from “social visibility” to “social distinction” is the only change the BIA has made to its test for assessing a“particular social group,” and, she says, that is a “distinction without a difference.” (Reply Br. at 5.) According to S.E.R.L., our decision in Valdiviezo-Galdamez forecloses application of the “particularity” and “social distinction”requirements. She also argues that the BIA plainly acknowledges that it has not changed course, nor has itprovided a “principled” explanation for why it continues to impose criteria we rejected in Valdiviezo-Galdamez. (Opening Br. at 31.)

In addition, those who have filed amicus briefs in this case point out that the BIA’s decisions in M-E-V-G- andW-G-R- could be read as inconsistent with certain other BIA decisions and contrary to the canon of ejusdem generis. Amici note, for example, that in W-G-R-, the BIA concludedthat “‘former members of the Mara 18 gang in El Salvadorwho have renounced their gang membership’ does not constitute a particular social group” in part because “the group could include persons of any age, sex, or background.”26 I. & N. Dec. at 221. Yet, even though the groups varied significantly across age, sex, and background, the BIA has also held that “Filipinos of Chinese [a]ncestry” constituted a “particular social group,” In re V-T-S-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 792, 798 (BIA 1997), and that “former member[s] of the national police” in El Salvador, Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 662, likewise could be cognizable.15 And although the BIA expressly justified its new requirements as “[c]onsistent with the interpretive canon ‘ejusdem generis,’” M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 234, amici highlight that some of the enumerated grounds for persecution, including “political opinion,” and “religion,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), may themselves be thought of as amorphous, diffuse, or subjective and therefore as insufficient bases for PSGs under M-E-V-G-’s requirements.

Those critiques raise legitimate concerns. The BIA has chosen to maintain a three-part test for determining the existence of a particular social group, and it has discussed how the revised particularity and social distinction requirements are not a departure from but a ratification of requirements articulated in its prior decisions. M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 234. And the arguable inconsistencies in its precedent highlight the risk that those requirements could be applied arbitrarily and interpreted to impose an unreasonably high evidentiary burden, especially for pro se petitioners, at the threshold. At the same time, however, we recognize thatM-E-V-G- is a relatively recent decision and clarity and consistency can be expected to emerge with the accretion of case law. That process is aided by M-E-V-G- itself, which addressed the specific concerns we raised in Valdiviezo- Galdamez, and explained why the particularity and social distinction requirements are different from one another and necessary. We now consider each of those requirements, beginning with social distinction, to explain why, notwithstanding our concerns, we conclude that the requirements are reasonable and warrant Chevron deference.

. . . .

Although S.E.R.L. also relies heavily on Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014), where the BIAhad held that “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” constituted a particular socialgroup, the Attorney General recently issued a decision overruling A-R-C-G-. See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).

. . . .

At the same time, we are mindful of the role that courts can and must play to ensure that agencies comply withtheir “obligation to render consistent opinions,” Chisholm v. Def. Logistics Agency, 656 F.2d 42, 47 (3d Cir. 1981), including, as relevant here, review of BIA decisions for inconsistent application of M-E-V-G’s requirements to similarly situated petitioners, routine rejection of proposed PSGs without reasoned explanation, and the imposition of insurmountable evidentiary burdens that would render illusory the opportunity to establish a PSG. However, just as we will carefully examine cases on petition for review to guard against such dangers, we anticipate that the BIA will scrutinize the IJ decisions that come before it with those considerations in mind and with an eye towards providing clear guidance and a coherent body of law in this area.

**************************************

3^RDCIRCUIT’S JULY 4 MESSAGE TO ABUSED LATINAS: YOUR LIVES DON’T MATTER! – S.E.R.L v. Att’y Gen., JULY 3, 2018 – How “Go Along To Get Along” Judging Costs Innocent Lives!

By Paul Wickham Schmidt

U.S. Immigration Judge (Ret.)

Judge Kent Jordan, Judge Cheryl Ann Krause, and Senior Judge Ira Morton Greenburg of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit got together in Philly, ”our nation’s birthplace,” on July 3, 2018 to deliver an early July 4 message for courageous Latinas fleeing the Northern Triangle: Your lives don’t matter; we’re OK with femicide, rape, torture, and abuse of you and your children as long as it’s out of sight, out of mind in some foreigncountry where we don’t have to listen to your screams or come across your mutilated bodies!

These judges’ names and faces are worth remembering, since they went to such great lengths to avoid taking or acknowledging any legal or moral responsibility for their own actions. Obviously, they don’t want anyone to put names and faces with consequences.

While you wouldn’t recognize it from their 43 pages of intentionally legalistic, opaque, de-humanized, gobbledygook, there is actually a simple straightforward human tragedy behind their obfuscation and task shirking. Since they won’t tell it, I will.

“Ms. S.E.R.L”. (I’ll call her “Susana”) is a native and citizen of Honduras. Honduras is a patriarchal “failed state” with a corrupt and incompetent government that does little or nothing to control gang violence and violence against women, even encouraging it or participating in the abuses in many cases. By 2015, femicides in Honduras had far surpassed “epidemic levels.” For example, in 2013, one Honduran woman was murdered every fourteen hours!

Jose Angel abducted, raped, and continued to stalk Susana’s daughter “Karla.” Susana’s stepfather, Juan Orellana repeatedly abused Susana’s mother without any interference from the government. Juan also threatened Susana personally. Having witnessed what these men did to her closest relatives, her daughter and her mother, Susana reasonably believed that she would be next. Karla was granted asylum in the U.S. Susana fled to the United States with two other daughters and applied for asylum.

Since Karla was granted asylum in the U.S., Susana expected the same humane treatment, particularly since our Supreme Court once said that asylum laws should be generously applied to those with as little as a 10% chance of being persecuted. After all, Honduran women are a distinct, well-recognized class subject to essentially uncontrolled specifically gender-based violence in a patriarchal society. Additionally, the family members closest to Susana had already suffered severe harm in Honduras at the hands of two specific men. And, her daughter Karla was being allowed to stay.

The Immigration Judge supposedly believed Susana. However, he came up with some creative ways, pioneered by the BIA, to deny her protection. First, he found that she had no reason to fear harm because she hadn’t actually been harmed or killed by either Jose or Juan, despite the threats to her from Juan who obviously was capable of inflicting severe harm. Second, he found she didn’t fit within any “particular social group,” whatever that might mean on a particular day. The went on to make the amazing finding that being a Honduran woman would have nothing to do with the harm anyway.

Perhaps, the judge believed that Honduran men suffered the same high rate of femicide as did women. Or, maybe he believed that guys like Jose and Juan and Honduran society in general wouldn’t recognize that Susana was a Honduran woman closely related to two previously abused Honduran women. The judge observed that refugee laws weren’t meant to protect women like Susana from “generalized violence,” even though Susana’s claim wasn’t based on generalized violence but rather specific violence directed at her.

The judge basically told Susana to buck up and accept her fate. The judge appeared to have no idea what actually happens to women like Susana in Honduras. Susana appealed to the BIA which had very recently found that a virtually identical situation qualified a woman for asylum. But, the other woman wasn’t Susana, and the BIA found some reasons why it was OK to send Susana back to where she might reasonably expect be killed, raped, or abused by Jose and/or Juan.

Susana appealed to a “real court”, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. Unlike the Immigration Judge and the BIA, judges on the Third Circuit don’t work for Attorney General Jeff Sessions. Jeff hates foreign nationals, women, and particularly brown-skinned foreign women fleeing from persecution in Central America. He thinks that they are all coming here for economic reasons and should just go stand in a line to immigrate. But, Jeff knows that the line doesn’t really exist, and that they will likely be killed or disabled shortly after return anyway. What Jeff really wants is an America where only nasty old White guys like him hold all the power and non-White folks stay away.

Judge Kent Jordan, Judge Cheryl Ann Krause, and Senior Judge Ira Morton Greenburg decided Susana’s case. They recognized that the BIA had rewritten asylum law so that fewer individuals would be protected and more rejected. They also recognized that Jeff Sessions had further rewritten the laws so that women like Susana would have no chance of protection. They also knew that there were lots of good arguments against what the BIA and Jeff were doing and in favor of protecting Susana.

But the judges found another Supreme Court case saying that they really didn’t have to decide legal questions if Jeff Sessions and his subordinates had done it for them. They thought that it made sense to rewrite protection law so that very few people, particularly women of color, would be protected. According to their thinking, the asylum law is intended to reject, not protect. They also thought that because these were relatively new interpretations, Jeff and the BIA should have a chance to kill or harm as many Latinas as possible before they as judges might think about whether it was a good idea. Of course, by then, it would be too late for Susana and others like her. And, these judges don’t really have any intent or will to hold Sessions accountable anyway.

So, Judge Jordan, Judge Krause, and Judge Greenburg told Susana that she should be separated from her daughter Karla and go back to Honduras with her other daughters to die, be raped, be beaten, or whatever. They knew that she would receive no help from the Government. But, they just didn’t care. Because Susana and her daughters were not their daughters or granddaughters and they wouldn’t have to hear her screams or look at their dead bodies. But, history has recorded what they did. Let the slaughter of innocents commence.

Better, more courageous judges might have said the obvious: that “women in Honduras” are a particularized, distinct, immutable/fundamental protected group; that Susana is a member of that group; and that any reasonable person in her position would have an objectively reasonable fear of persecution if returned to Honduras.

They also could have castigated the BIA and Jeff Sessions for intentionally manipulating asylum law so as not to grant protection to some of the most vulnerable and needy refugees among us. But, this “Gang of Three’ who decided Susana’s case would have been happy pushing the St. Louisand its cargo of Jewish refugees from Germany back out to sea again. Any of the judges who looked at Susan’s case could have had spoken out for saving her life and the lives of her daughters. None did!

After abdicating their judicial functions to hold the Executive accountable, this “Gang of Three” dishonestly expresses concerns about consistency and not creating “insurmountable evidentiary burdens.” Get serious!

Everyone knows Jeff Sessions is ordering Immigration Judges to crank out more removal orders with little or no Due Process. He has publicly stated his disdain for asylum seekers and women asylum seekers from the Northern Triangle. He has made it clear that he intends to “deconstruct:” the entire U.S. protection system until the only “consistency” will be that nobody gets asylum. And with cases like his decision in Matter of A-B-and spineless “go along to get along” precedents like this from the Article III courts, Sessions is implementing his real plan – insuring that nobody who comes to the border and seeks asylum passes “credible fear” and even gets to an Immigration Judge hearing.

Judges like these can shirk their responsibilities and hide behind mountains of hollow words and legal platitudes. But, they won’t escape the judgement of history for their lack of courage, backbone, integrity, and their unwillingness to stand up for human rights and human decency in the face of tyranny.

Happy July 4, 2018 from Judge Kent Jordan, Judge Cheryl Ann Krause, and Senior Judge Ira Morton Greenburg of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit! They can celebrate. But, for Susana, her family, and other vulnerable refugee like her, there will be no celebration. Indeed, they might not even live to see another July 4! That should make us all ashamed as a nation!

PWS

07-05-18

BETTER LATE THAN NEVER? – After 9 Years, The BIA Finally Completes The Supreme’s Remand – Creates A “Limited Duress Defense” To Persecutor Bar, With Judge Malphrus Dissenting – Matter of NEGUSIE, 27 I&N Dec. 347 (BIA 2018)

Matter of NEGUSIE, 27 I&N Dec. 347 (BIA 2018)

Here’s the link:

3930

BIA HEADNOTE:

(1) An applicant who is subject to being barred from establishing eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal based on the persecution of others may claim a duress defense, which is limited in nature.

(2) To meet the minimum threshold requirements of the duress defense to the persecutor bar, an applicant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he acted under an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to himself or others; (2) he reasonably believed that the threatened harm would be carried out unless he acted or refrained from acting; (3) he had no reasonable opportunity to escape or otherwise frustrate the threat; (4) he did not place himself in a situation in which he knew or reasonably should have known that he would likely be forced to act or refrain from acting; and (5) he knew or reasonably should have known that the harm he inflicted was not greater than the threatened harm to himself or others.

BIA PANEL: APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGES GRANT, GREER, MAPPHRUS

OPINION BY: Judge Edward R. Grant

CONCURRING & DISSENTING OPINION: Judge Garry d. Malphrus

KEY QUOTE FROM MAJORITY:

In a decision dated May 31, 2005, an Immigration Judge denied the applicant’s applications for asylum and withholding of removal but granted his request for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987; for the United States Apr. 18, 1988) (“Convention Against Torture”). On February 7, 2006, we dismissed the appeals of both the applicant and the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).1 This case is now before us on remand pursuant to a decision of the United States Supreme Court in

1 The DHS does not now challenge the applicant’s grant of deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture.

347

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 347 (BIA 2018) Interim Decision #3930

Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009). Having reviewed the record and the arguments presented by the parties and amici curiae, we will again dismiss the applicant’s appeal.2

We conclude that duress is relevant in determining whether an alien who assisted or otherwise participated in persecution is prevented by the so-called “persecutor bar” from establishing eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal under sections 101(a)(42), 208(b)(2)(A)(i), and 241(b)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(2)(A)(i), and 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) (2012), and for withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c) and (d)(2) (2018).3 In this decision, we set forth a standard for evaluating claims of duress in this context. Applying that standard to the uncontested findings of fact in the record, we conclude that the applicant has not established that he was under duress when he assisted in the persecution of prisoners who were persecuted under his guard in an Eritrean prison camp.

KEY QUOTE FROM DISSENT:

The United States Supreme Court remanded this case for us to make an “initial determination of the statutory interpretation question,” Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 524 (2009), “with respect to whether an alien who

ORDER: The applicant’s appeal is dismissed.

368

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 347 (BIA 2018) Interim Decision #3930

was coerced to assist in persecution is barred from obtaining asylum in the United States,” id. at 525 (Scalia, J., concurring). The remand directed us to interpret the statute anew based on principles of statutory construction, free of our prior assumption that Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981), definitively resolved this question. The majority decision is artfully drafted, but it does not engage in this analysis. Instead, the majority reads a duress exception into the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the United States Nov. 1, 1968) (“Protocol”), and, by extension, the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (“Refugee Act”), that simply does not exist. And it does so essentially by deferring to international expectations of how the Protocol should be interpreted. I cannot agree with this approach.

******************************************

Wow! Deferring to international interpretations and expert interpretations from the UNHCR that actually give an asylum applicant a very circumscribed break for actions he or she was forced to take. Very “Un-Boardy.” Could actually be “career threatening.” No wonder Judge Malphrus wanted to separate himself from any such rational and reasonable actions in the “Age of Sessions & Trump.”
9 years in the making, during which the DHS position changed several times, is a pretty good argument against “Chevron deference” (a/k/a “task avoidance by life-tenured Article III Judges”). What were Immigration Judges supposed to do during those 9 years?
Odds on whether or how long it will take “Gonzo” to intervene?

PWS

06-29-18

BLOCKBUSTER: ANOTHER SUPREME STOMP! — DOJ /DHS SCOFFLAWS LOSE AGAIN BY 8-1 MARGIN IN PEREIRA V. SESSIONS – Invalidates Hundreds Of Thousands Of “Haste Makes Waste” Notices To Appear – Real Costs To American Justice Of A “Captive” BIA That Functions Like DHS Toady Rather Than Independent Court Becoming Painfully Apparent – Risks In Having Biggest Federal “Court” System Run By Biased & Incompetent Attorney General Now Coming Into Focus!

Pereira v. Sessions, No. 17-459, June 21, 2018

Pereira17-459_1o13

MAJORITY OPINION: Justice Sotomayor for herself and seven others.

CONCURRING OPINION: Justice Kennedy

DISSENTING OPINION: Justice Alito

KEY QUOTE FROM MAJORITY:

Unable to find sure footing in the statutory text, the Government and the dissent pivot away from the plain language and raise a number of practical concerns. These practical considerations are meritless and do not justify departing from the statute’s clear text. See Burrage v.United States, 571 U. S. 204, 218 (2014).

The Government, for its part, argues that the “adminis- trative realities of removal proceedings” render it difficult to guarantee each noncitizen a specific time, date, and place for his removal proceedings. See Brief for Respond- ent 48. That contention rests on the misguided premise that the time-and-place information specified in the notice to appear must be etched in stone. That is incorrect. As noted above, §1229(a)(2) expressly vests the Government with power to change the time or place of a noncitizen’s removal proceedings so long as it provides “written notice . . . specifying . . . the new time or place of the proceedings” and the consequences of failing to appear. See §1229(a)(2); Tr. of Oral Arg. 16–19. Nothing in our decision today inhibits the Government’s ability to exercise that statu- tory authority after it has served a notice to appear specify- ing the time and place of the removal proceedings.

The dissent raises a similar practical concern, which is similarly misplaced. The dissent worries that requiring

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 19

Opinion of the Court

the Government to specify the time and place of removal proceedings, while allowing the Government to change that information, might encourage DHS to provide “arbi- trary dates and times that are likely to confuse and con- found all who receive them.” Post, at 8. The dissent’s argument wrongly assumes that the Government is ut- terly incapable of specifying an accurate date and time on a notice to appear and will instead engage in “arbitrary” behavior. See ibid. The Court does not embrace those unsupported assumptions. As the Government concedes, “a scheduling system previously enabled DHS and the immigration court to coordinate in setting hearing dates in some cases.” Brief for Respondent 50, n. 15; Brief for National Immigrant Justice Center as Amicus Curiae 30– 31. Given today’s advanced software capabilities, it is hard to imagine why DHS and immigration courts could not again work together to schedule hearings before send- ing notices to appear.

Finally, the dissent’s related contention that including a changeable date would “mislead” and “prejudice” nonciti- zens is unfounded. Post, at 8. As already explained, if the Government changes the date of the removal proceedings, it must provide written notice to the noncitizen, §1229(a)(2). This notice requirement mitigates any poten- tial confusion that may arise from altering the hearing date. In reality, it is the dissent’s interpretation of the statute that would “confuse and confound” noncitizens,post, at 8, by authorizing the Government to serve notices that lack any information about the time and place of the removal proceedings.

E

In a last ditch effort to salvage its atextual interpreta- tion, the Government invokes the alleged purpose and legislative history of the stop-time rule. Brief for Re- spondent 37–40. Even for those who consider statutory

20 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS Opinion of the Court

purpose and legislative history, however, neither supports the Government’s atextual position that Congress intended the stop-time rule to apply when a noncitizen has been deprived notice of the time and place of his removal pro- ceedings. By the Government’s own account, Congress enacted the stop-time rule to prevent noncitizens from exploiting administrative delays to “buy time” during which they accumulate periods of continuous presence.Id., at 37–38 (citing H. R. Rep. No. 104–469, pt. 1, p. 122 (1996)). Requiring the Government to furnish time-and- place information in a notice to appear, however, is en- tirely consistent with that objective because, once a proper notice to appear is served, the stop-time rule is triggered, and a noncitizen would be unable to manipulate or delay removal proceedings to “buy time.” At the end of the day, given the clarity of the plain language, we “apply the statute as it is written.” Burrage, 571 U. S., at 218.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

KEY QUOTE FROM JUSTICE KENNEDY’S CONCURRING OPINION:

In according Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpreta- tion, some Courts of Appeals engaged in cursory analysis of the questions whether, applying the ordinary tools of statutory construction, Congress’ intent could be dis- cerned, 467 U. S., at 843, n. 9, and whether the BIA’s interpretation was reasonable, id., at 845. In Urbina v.Holder, for example, the court stated, without any further elaboration, that “we agree with the BIA that the relevant statutory provision is ambiguous.” 745 F. 3d, at 740. It then deemed reasonable the BIA’s interpretation of the statute, “for the reasons the BIA gave in that case.” Ibid. This analysis suggests an abdication of the Judiciary’s proper role in interpreting federal statutes.

The type of reflexive deference exhibited in some of these cases is troubling. And when deference is applied to other questions of statutory interpretation, such as an agency’s interpretation of the statutory provisions that concern the scope of its own authority, it is more troubling still. See Arlington v. FCC, 569 U. S. 290, 327 (2013) (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting) (“We do not leave it to the agency to decide when it is in charge”). Given the con- cerns raised by some Members of this Court, see, e.g., id.,at 312–328; Michigan v. EPA, 576 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (THOMAS, J., concurring); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 3

KENNEDY, J., concurring

F. 3d 1142, 1149–1158 (CA10 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concur- ring), it seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an appropriate case, the premises that underlie Chevronand how courts have implemented that decision. The proper rules for interpreting statutes and determining agency jurisdiction and substantive agency powers should accord with constitutional separation-of-powers principles and the function and province of the Judiciary. See, e.g.,Arlington, supra, at 312–316 (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting).

*************************************

I filed an Amicus Brief, with the assistance of Eric Citron, Goldstein & Russell, of in behalf of Mr. Pereira.

PEREIRAVSESSIIONS,SCT,AMICUS17-459 tsac Former BIA Chairman & Immigration Judge Schmidt

Why is this so big:

In invalidates hundreds of thousands of defective Notices to Appear, thus potentially requiring massive “restarts” in an already out of control system.
Even with a more or less hand-picked Supreme Court, immigration reactionaries continue to lose case after case. So, it isn’t “liberal judges.” It’s inane, biased policies and lousy lawyering at the DOJ and DHS which goes back through the Obama and Bush II Administrations. It’s just reached its lowest conceivable level under Sessions. But, I’ll admit that every time I think Sessions can’t sink any lower on the legal and moral scale, he surprises me.
It makes tens of thousands of additional individuals who have now been here for 10 or more years eligible to apply for “Non-LPR Cancellation of Removal” because the “stop time rule” was not properly invoked by the service of the defective NTA in their cases. This could pour tens of thousands of Motions to Reopen and/or Reconsider into an already overwhelmed system.
Virtually every individual from El Salvador, Haiti, and Honduras whose TPS is going to be (bone-headedly) terminated by the Trumpsters will now be able to demand full hearings on Cancellation of Removal in U.S. Immigration Court. Thus, they aren’t going anywhere any time soon.
It illustrates the problems of giving improper “Chevron Deference” to a BIA that no longer functions as an expert tribunal and does not exercise independent judgement. Ever since the “Ashcroft Purge” the BIA has been an “inbred body” specifically structured and staffed to be a “shill” for DHS and the Administration’s enforcement policies. And, under Sessions, the BIA has been completely co-opted by his unethical and highly improper interference in what little was left of its independent decision-making function. “Justice” in today’s Immigration Courts is a total sham!
Chevron, as I have stated many times to my law school class, is a cowardly exercise of “judicial task avoidance” by the Supremes. Congress should eliminate it if the Supremes don’t. Article III Judges should be required to do their Constitutional duties, earn their pay, and decide legal issues de novo, even when that might be controversial, unpopular, or require more critical, analytical thinking than they care to do.
The Pereira debacle is entirely the fault of a totally screwed up and incompetent Executive Immigration function stretching back for nearly two decades. Fixing this problem properly should have been a “no brainer.” The “technology” (which probably could have been developed by a middle schooler sitting in her basement) was there more than a decade ago. But “haste makes waste” corner cutting combined with the assurance that the emasculated and enfeebled BIA would intentionally misread the plain meaning of the statute to screw the respondent and help the DHS produced a totally avoidable administrative nightmare.
“You ain’t seen nothin’ yet.” With White Nationalist xenophobe Sessions demanding that Immigration Judges deny, deny, deny, without hearings if necessary, to achieve their quota of removals without the inconvenience of Due Process and impartiality, cases are going to come rocketing back from the Courts of Appeals by the truckload. The whole system is going to collapse. And don’t anyone let the corrupt and biased Sessions get away with fobbing the blame off on others, as he and the rest of the Trump Regime are wont to do.
Sessions, Trump, Miller, Nielsen, Kelly, Homan and the rest of the scofflaw, White Nationalist, anti-Constitutional crowd might think that the Constitution doesn’t mean what it says. But, foreign nationals in the United States are entitled to fairness and due process. No matter how many corners the Trumpsters cut and how much bias they institutionalize into the already compromised Immigration Courts, they aren’t going to be able to eliminate Due Process.
We need a legitimate, independent, impartial, unbiased, Sessions-free, Due Process focused U.S. Immigration Court. Until that happens, the entire immigration justice system will continue to spiral downward under the immorality and toxic incompetence of Sessions and his cronies.

PWS

06-22-18

HON. JEFFREY CHASE: Sessions’s Abuses Of “Certification Power” Show Why It’s Past Time To End This Unfair, Unethical, & (Probably) Unconstitutional Mockery of Justice!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/3/29/the-ags-certifying-of-bia-decisions

Mar 29 The AG’s Certifying of BIA Decisions

The recent flurry of case certifications by Attorney General Jeff Sessions (he has certified four BIA decisions to himself since January) raises the question of the continued appropriateness of the practice. Certification allows a political appointee who heads an enforcement agency, and is subject to the policy agenda of the administration he or she serves, absolute authority to overrule or completely rewrite the decisions of an ostensibly neutral and independent tribunal comprised of judges possessing greater subject matter expertise.

The issue has only become a matter of legitimate concern under the two most recent Republican administrations. In her eight years as Attorney General during the Clinton Administration, Janet Reno decided a total of three cases pursuant to certification. Under the Obama administration, AGs Loretta Lynch and Eric Holder decided a comparable number of cases (four). The number is artificially inflated by the fact that two of those consisted of Holder vacating late-term decisions by his predecessor, Michael Mukasey. In one of the vacated decisions, Mukasey’s reasoning had been rejected by five separate U.S. circuit courts of appeal.

In contrast, during the eight year administration of George W. Bush, his three Attorneys General issued 16 precedent decisions through the certification process. Sessions so far seems to be on a similar pace.

One of Bush’s AGs, Alberto Gonzales, co-authored an article in 2016 defending the use of certification.1 As part of his argument, Gonzales traced the history of the practice to the BIA’s origins as an advisory-only panel in the Department of Labor in the 1920s and 30s. When the Board was transferred to the Department of Justice in 1940, it was provided only limited decision-making authority, but was required to refer to the AG certain categories of cases, including those “in which a dissent has been recorded” or where “a question of difficulty is involved.”

I will add that the early appointees to the BIA were career bureaucrats with no prior expertise or experience in the field of immigration law. To me, such history seems to provide no real justification for the continued practice. The BIA has for decades enjoyed the authority to independently decide a broad class of cases. It’s members all come to the Board with far more expertise and experience in the field of immigration law than the AG possesses (although since the 2003 purge by then-AG John Ashcroft, its make-up is far more conservative). Furthermore, whereas in the past, it was the BIA itself, and later, the Commissioner of INS, requesting certification, at present, the AG is handpicking the cases and certifying them to himself, sometimes in order to decide an issue that wasn’t part of the decision below.

Law Professor Margaret H. Taylor has noted that the practice of AG certification “might be seen as objectionable because it conflicts with a core value of our legal system: that disputes are resolved by an impartial adjudicator who has no interest in the outcome.”2 Taylor further points out that many such decisions were issued in the final days of an AG’s term, meaning that the AG “refers a controversial issue to himself and renders a decision upending agency precedent on his way out the door.”3

In an article calling for the implementation of procedural safeguards on the AG’s certification power, the author accurately notes that the practice of “agency head review” is common and non-controversial.4 However, Professor Stephen Legomsky has pointed out that the strongest arguments for agency head review – inter-decisional consistency, and agency control (by politically-accountable officials) over policy – don’t translate well to the process of deciding asylum applications, for example.5 This harks back to a point I made in an earlier article – that immigration judges (including BIA Board member) are the only judges in the otherwise enforcement-minded Department of Justice, and that the Department has never really grasped the concept of independent decision-makers existing under its jurisdiction.

Legomsky pointed out in the same article that the BIA, as an appellate authority, “can yield the same consistency as agency head review” through the issuance of en banc decisions; adding that the AG could require the Board to decide certain cases en banc.6 Interestingly, the BIA has given up the use of en banc decisions in recent years. It has not decided a precedent decision en banc even in cases of major import, or following remands from the AG or circuit courts.

Sessions’ use of certification thus far is unique in his redetermination of what the case he chooses is even about. In Matter of Castro-Tum, the DHS appealed an immigration judge’s decision to administratively close proceedings in which an unaccompanied minor did not appear on the grounds that it had met its burden of establishing proper notice of the hearing on the minor respondent. The BIA actually agreed with DHS and remanded the matter. However, Sessions has now turned the case into a referendum on whether any IJ or the BIA has the legal authority to administratively close any case, an argument that was never raised below. In Matter of A-B-, an immigration judge, in defiance of the BIA’s order to grant asylum on remand, refused to calendar the case for a hearing for an excessive length of time, and then disobeyed the Board’s order by denying asylum again for spurious reasons. Somehow, Sessions decided to certify this case to decide whether anyone seeking asylum based on membership in a particular social group relating to being a victim of private criminal activity merits such relief. His ultimate decision could curtail asylum eligibility for victims of domestic violence, members of the LGBTQ community, targets of gang violence, and victims of human trafficking.

Furthermore, two of the cases certified by Sessions involve tools of docket management, i.e. administrative closure and continuances. As immigration judges are the only judges within the Department, and as the BIA has set out uniform procedures for the proper use of these tools, how can the AG justify his need to weigh in on these issues, which clearly do not involve the need for intra-department consistency (as no other component of the department employs such tools), or for control by a politically-accountable official to ensure the coherent expression of agency policy?

Once again, the solution is to create an independent, Article I immigration court, allowing IJs to continue to decide cases with fairness and neutrality free from such policy-driven interference.

Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

Notes:

Alberto Gonzales and Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch Immigration Policy Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority, 101 Iowa L.Rev. 841 (2016).

Margaret H. Taylor, Midnight Agency Adjudication: Attorney General Review of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 18 (2016).

Id.

Laura S. Trice, Adjudication by Fiat: The Need for Procedural Safeguards in Attorney General Review of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1766 (2010).

Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to Consistency, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 413, 458 (2007).

6. Id.

JEFF CHASE

“GOOD ENOUGH FOR GOVERNMENT WORK” – 2d CIR. GIVES “CHEVRON DEFERENCE” TO BIA’S Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 516 (B.I.A. 2015) – Migrants Have No Right to Advance Notice Of Required Corroboration! – Wei Sun v. Sessions

CA2-WeiSunvSessions

Wei Sun v. Sessions, 2d Cir., 02-23-18, published

PANEL: LEVAL, LIVINGSTON, and CHIN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: Judge Chin

KEY QUOTE/SUMMARY:

Petitioner Wei Sun (“Sun”) seeks review of a June 26, 2015 decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying him asylum for religious persecution in China. Sun entered the United States on a visitor visa in 2007 and subsequently filed a timely application for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 and 1231(b)(3), respectively, and for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), see 8 C.F.R. § 208.16. The IJ and the BIA denied Sun’s petition on the ground that he failed to meet his burden of proof because of an absence of corroborating evidence.

The BIA interpreted the corroboration provision of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 303 (2005), as not requiring an IJ to give a petitioner specific notice of the evidence needed to meet his burden of proof, or to grant a continuance before ruling to give a petitioner an opportunity to gather corroborating evidence. On appeal, Sun argues that an IJ must give a petitioner notice and an opportunity to submit additional evidence when the IJ concludes that corroborating evidence is required, relying on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2011). We conclude that the REAL ID Act is ambiguous on this point, and that the BIA’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable and entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Accordingly, we deny the petition for review.

ANOTHER KEY QUOTE:

Moreover, the test is not whether the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation is plausible or “better” than the agency’s, as Sun suggests. Pet. Br. at 21. Rather, the test is whether the statute is “silent or ambiguous” and if so, then whether “‘the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute,’ which is to say, one that is ‘reasonable,’ not ‘arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.'” Riverkeeper Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 184 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44).

**********************************************

So, here’s what Chevron really says:

“As long as the agency has a minimally plausible interpretation, we couldn’t care less if it’s the best interpretation of the law.”

But, why shouldn’t high-ranking Federal Judges who are being paid to tell us what the law is be required to opine on what is the “best” interpretation? What are they being paid for? Sure sounds to me like a “doctrine of judicial task avoidance.”

And, of course, given a choice of possible interpretations these days, the BIA almost invariably chooses that which is most favorable to DHS and least favorable to the respondent.

Why shouldn’t a respondent, particularly one seeking potentially life or death relief like asylum, have notice of what the Immigration Judge expects him to produce to corroborate his otherwise credible testimony? For Pete’s sake, even the “Legacy INS” and the USCIS, hardly bastions of due process, gave applicants for benefits the infamous “Notice of Intent to Deny” (“NID”) setting forth the evidentiary defects and giving the applicant an opportunity to remedy them before a final decision is made. Seems like a combination of fundamental fairness and common sense.

There now is a conflict between the Ninth and Second Circuits, both of which get lots of Petitions to Review final orders of removal. Consequently, the issue is likely to reach the Supremes, sooner or later. Interestingly, Justice Gorsuch was a critic of Chevron deference, specifically in immigration cases, when he was on the 10th Circuit. We’ll see how he treats Chevron now that he is in a position to vote to modify or overrule it.

Here’s my previous post on Justice Gorsuch and Chevron:

https://wp.me/p8eeJm-eT

PWS

02-25-18

SUPREMES TAKE ON “STOP TIME” ISSUE FOR CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL – TO RESOLVE “CIRCUIT SPLIT” — COULD AFFECT MANY THOUSANDS OF REMOVAL CASES – PEREIRA V. SESSIONS!

Here’s what SCOTUS Blog has to say about the issue:

“Issue: Whether, to trigger the stop-time rule by serving a “notice to appear,” the government must “specify” the items listed in the definition of a “notice to appear,” including “[t]he time and place at which the proceedings will be held.”

Here’s a link to the SCOTUS Blog material on Cir:

http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/pereira-v-sessions/

Here’s a link to the First Circuit’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions, written by Judge Lipez which upheld the BIA’s ruling under so-called “Chevron deference:”

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/16-1033P-01A.pdf

And, here’s a “key quote” from Judge Lipez’s decision in Pereira that explains the issue a little more detail:

“The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) gives the Attorney General discretion to cancel the removal of a non-permanent resident alien if the alien meets certain criteria, including ten years of continuous physical presence in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). Under the “stop-time” rule, the alien’s period of continuous physical presence ends “when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a)” of the INA. Id. § 1229b(d)(1). In this case, we must decide whether a notice to appear that does not contain the date and time of the alien’s initial hearing is nonetheless effective to end the alien’s period of continuous physical presence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) answered this question affirmatively in Matter of Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644 (B.I.A. 2011). The BIA applied that rule in this case.

Joining the majority of circuit courts to address this issue, we conclude that the BIA’s decision in Camarillo is entitled to Chevron deference. We deny the petition for review.”

*************************************************

So, with the 1st Circuit joining the 2nd, 4th, 6th, 7th, and 9th Circuits in upholding Matter of Camarillo, 25 I&N Dec. 644 (BIA 2011); only the 3rd Circuit rejecting the BIA’s interpretation (Orozco- Velasquez v. Att’y Gen. United States, 817 F.3d 78, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2016)); and what is generally perceived as a “conservative leaning” Supreme Court, looks like a “slam dunk” for the Government, right? Not so fast!

On a question of statutory interpretation like this, I could definitely see some of the more conservative “strict constructionist” Justices teaming up with the “liberals” to reject the BIA’s interpretation by invoking the “plain meaning” rule of statutory construction to overcome “Chevron deference.” Indeed, quite interestingly, as I have noted in prior blogs, Justice Neil Gorsuch was an outspoken critic of Chevron while on the Tenth Circuit. Read his opinion in Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016) if you have any doubts! Here’s a link to that opinion: https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-9585.pdf

So, I wouldn’t assume at this point that Justice Gorsuch will be a “shill” or “pushover” for the Administration on all immigration issues, even if Trump thinks that’s the type of “loyalty” all his judicial appointments owe him. Actually, the oath of office that Federal Judges take requires them to uphold the Constitution of the United States, not the views and positions of President Trump, Attorney General Jeff Sessions, DHS Secretary Kristjen Nielsen, or anybody else of any importance whatsoever. That’s what real “judicial independence” (as opposed to the “captive” Immigration Judiciary) is all about!

And, you might ask what’s the “big deal” about this case? After all, even if the Supremes agree with the petitioner and the Third Circuit that the notice was defective, the BIA and DHS could easily cure the “problem” simply by specifying a “time, place, and date” for the Immigration Court hearing on the original Notice to Appear. Indeed, when I joined the Arlington Immigration Court in 2003 such a system, called “Interactive Scheduling” was in effect. But, like much else at EOIR it appears to have run into problems and been largely abandoned as the dockets mushroomed out of control. Many (not all) things about the administration of the Immigration Courts actually moved backward during my 13 year tenure in Arlington.

But, if the original Notice to Appear were held to be ineffective, then it would not serve to “Stop Time” for the 10 year period of “continuous physical presence” required to apply for the relief of “Cancellation of Removal.” This, in turn, would make thousands of individuals now in Immigration Court proceedings, perhaps tens of thousands, eligible to apply for Cancellation. And, it likely would require the reopening of thousands of already completed cases where the respondent was denied Cancellation of Removal based solely on the “Stop Time” rule. So, that’s why it’s worth the Supremes’ time to resolve this conflict among the lower Federal Courts.

PWS

01-13-18

AMERICA’S KANGAROO COURT SYSTEM: EOIR HELPING DHS COME UP WITH WAYS TO DUMP ON UNACCOMPANIED KIDS! — THE “THE FACADE OF JUSTICE AT JUSTICE” CONTINUES WHILE CONGRESS AND ARTICLE III COURTS ABDICATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR A SYSTEM THAT MOCKS DUE PROCESS AND THE CONSTITUTION! — CNN’S Tal Kopan With The Scoop!

http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/11/politics/trump-administration-dhs-immigration-policies/index.html

Tal reports:

“Washington (CNN)Even as the Trump administration is asking Congress to approve a tough overhaul of the nation’s immigration laws, the Department of Homeland Security is also quietly exploring ways it could transform the US immigration system on its own.

The department has been examining a range of subtle modifications to immigration policies that could have major consequences, including limiting protections for unaccompanied minors who come to the US illegally, expanding the use of speedy deportation proceedings, and tightening visa programs in ways that could limit legal immigration to the US, according to multiple sources familiar with the plans.
None of the policies being explored are finalized, according to the sources, and are in various stages of development. Any of them could change or fall by the wayside. Some of them are also included at least in part in the wish list of immigration priorities that President Donald Trump sent to Congress this week, and it’s unclear whether the administration will wait to see the results of negotiations over the future of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program that President Donald Trump has chosen to end.

Still, the proposals under consideration illustrate the extent to which the administration could attempt to dramatically change immigration in the US through unilateral executive action.
“Do you think Obama did a lot? That’s my answer,” said one former DHS official when asked how transformative the change could be. “They could do quite a bit.”
DACA itself was an example of how former President Barack Obama, frustrated with congressional inaction, sought to use executive authority to take action on immigration, putting in place the program to protect young undocumented immigrations brought to the US as children from deportation in 2012.
But the administration is now exploring rolling back more Obama-era policies, and changing even older systems.
DHS did not respond to a request for comment about the policies being explored or its process.
Targeting protections for unaccompanied minors
One effort underway is exploring what can be done about unaccompanied children (UACs), a category of undocumented immigrants who are caught illegally crossing the border into the US, are under age 18, and are not accompanied or met by a parent or guardian in the US. Those UACs, by law and legal settlement, are handed over to the Department of Health and Human Services for settling in the US, given protections from expedited removal proceedings and given special opportunities to pursue asylum cases in the US.
DHS and the Department of Justice have been exploring options to tighten the protections for UACs, including no longer considering them UACs if they’re reunited with parents or guardians in the US by HHS or once they turn 18.

In a previously unreported memo, obtained by CNN, the general counsel of the Executive Office of Immigration Review, which manages the nation’s immigration courts, wrote in a legal opinion that the administration would be able to decide a UAC was no longer eligible for protections — a sea change in the way the 2008 law granting those protections has been interpreted.
The Trump administration has portrayed the UAC protections as a loophole in the law that can be exploited by gangs, though experts have testified before Congress that the minors under the program are more likely to be victimized by gangs in the US due to a lack of a support network than to be gang members. The administration also has sought to crack down on parents who pay smugglers to bring their children into the US illegally, even to escape dangerous situations in Central America.
The White House also asked Congress to amend the 2008 law to restrict UAC protections.
In previously unreported comments made last month at a security conference in Washington, acting Immigration and Customs Enforcement Director Tom Homan said that ICE is actively looking at the adults HHS places UACs with, and if they are in the US illegally, they will be processed for deportation — and if a smuggler was paid, they could be prosecuted for human trafficking.
DOJ touts effects of surge of immigration judges sent to border
DOJ touts effects of surge of immigration judges sent to border
“You cannot hide in the shadows, you can’t be an illegal alien in the United States, have your undocumented child smuggled at the hands of a criminal organization, and stay in the shadows,” Homan said. “We’re going to put the parents in proceedings, immigration proceedings, at a minimum. … Is that cruel? I don’t think so. Because if that child is really escaping fear and persecution, he’s going to stand in front of an immigration judge to plead his case, his parents should be standing shoulder to shoulder with him. I call that parenting.”
DHS is also continuing to weigh its options to expand the use of expedited removal more generally — a speedier process of deportation that bypasses a lengthy court process in particular cases — as authorized by Trump’s January executive order on immigration.
Legal immigration tightening
Other efforts in the works include ways to tighten legal avenues to come to the US.
Two policies being looked at are the subject of litigation in the DC Circuit court — work authorizations for spouses of high-skilled visa holders and an expansion of a program that allows STEM students to stay in the US an extra two years for training.
Both policies were challenged in the courts, and now the administration is considering whether to roll them back.
On the spousal authorizations, DHS told the court as much in a filing last month, asking for extra time for the DHS review to finish.
That filing points to a DHS review of “all” of the agency’s immigration policies, citing the President’s Executive Order to “buy American and hire American.”
“Executive Order 13,788 is an intervening event necessitating careful, considered review of all of DHS’s immigration policies to ensure that the interests of US workers are being protected,” the attorneys wrote, citing the order’s instructions to create new rules, if necessary, “to protect the interests of United States workers in the administration of our immigration system.”
Trump admin quietly made asylum more difficult in the US
Trump admin quietly made asylum more difficult in the US
DHS has also moved to tighten asylum claim credibility thresholds, and is exploring asking Congress for more authority to do so. Another target is reportedly cultural exchange visas, which according to The Wall Street Journal are also under scrutiny after the “hire American” order.
Further unilateral moves wouldn’t even require policy changes, immigration attorneys fear. Attorneys who represent immigration clients fear that simply by slowing down the visa process, DHS could substantially decrease the number of immigrants admitted to the United States. US Citizenship and Immigration Services announced this summer it would begin requiring interviews for all green card applicants on employment and refugee grounds, and that it would roll out required interviews for other categories over time, adding a substantial and potentially lengthy hurdle to achieving legal permanent residency.
“If the wait time for naturalizations increases by three months, USCIS can naturalize 25% fewer people per year, which would mean millions of people over a four-year period,” said Leon Fresco, an immigration attorney and former Obama administration DOJ official. “Even without a policy change, the administration (can accomplish) dramatic reductions to legal immigration through increases in processing times and taking a hawkish approach to finding reasons for denials of immigration applications.”
DHS pointed CNN to statistics showing no increase in the rate of denials of immigration applications, though the backlog of pending applications has grown steadily over the past two years.
Internal jockeying
One-quarter of DACA renewals not in on deadline day
One-quarter of DACA renewals not in on deadline day
Sources familiar with the inner workings of DHS describe an environment where political appointees and policy staff with strongly held opinions circulate ideas that sometimes reach the press before front office and secretarial staff are even aware of the discussions.
While political appointees and career officials are not described as butting heads, some of policy ideas do end up moderated by career employees on practical grounds. One source also described some employees of USCIS, which administers DACA, as getting emotional when the plan was made to end the program.
“Once it gets to a senior level, there are pretty robust discussions,” another source familiar said. “And once it gets to that level there are folks with ideas, and then folks who have been around for a while who say, ‘That won’t work.'”
Those competing ideas are then ultimately decided on by the secretary and high-level decision makers, though sources say political appointees are sometimes in a position to have influence over what information flows to the front office and top officials.
“The secretary and the decision makers end up with that (dynamic),” the source said.”

******************************

Immigration “Courts” run and controlled by Political Enforcement Officials and actively engaged in looking for ways to diminish the rights of individuals coming before them are not “real courts” and are not capable for delivering fair, unbiased, and impartial justice in accordance with the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. This kangaroo court system, operating under false premises, is unconstitutional (in addition to be incompetently administered)!

Will the Article III Courts ever do their duty, put this corrupt and unlawful system out of its misery, and restore at least some semblance of due process and justice for immigrants? Or, will they “go along to get along” and thus make themselves part of one of the most shameful charades of justice In American Legal History?

7TH CIR. “SCHOOLS” BIA IN BIA’S OWN AUTHORITY TO GRANT WAIVER — ARTICLE III THWARTS BIA’S ATTEMPT TO “GET TO NO!” — Matter of KHAN, 26 I&N Dec. 797 (BIA 2016) BLOWN AWAY — BAEZ-SANCHEZ V. SESSIONS! — There’s Is Now A “Circuit Split” With The 3rd Cir., Which “Went Along To Get Along” With The BIA!

rssExec.pl

Baez-Sanchez v. Sessions, 7th Cir., 10-06-17 (published)

PANEL: Before BAUER, EASTERBROOK, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: Judge EASTERBROOK

KEY QUOTE:

“LDG addressed the question whether the Attorney Gen‐ eral has the authority to waive the inadmissibility of an alien seeking a U visa. We assumed that, in removal proceedings, IJs may exercise all of the Attorney General’s discretionary powers over immigration. The panel did not justify that as‐ sumption, because the parties had not doubted its correct‐ ness. But after LDG the Board concluded that the assumption is mistaken. In re Khan, 26 I&N Dec. 797 (2016), holds that IJs have only such powers as have been delegated and that the power to waive an alien’s inadmissibility during proceedings seeking U visas is not among them. The Third Circuit has agreed with that conclusion. Sunday v. Attorney General, 832 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2016). We must decide in this case whether to follow Sunday and Khan.
Delegation from the Attorney General to immigration judges is a matter of regulation, and arguably pertinent reg‐ ulations are scattered through Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The BIA in Khan observed, correctly, that the panel in LDG had not mentioned 8 C.F.R. §§235.2(d), 1235.2(d), which omit any delegation to IJs of the power to waive an alien’s admissibility. And that’s true, for those regu‐ lations concern the powers of District Directors rather than the powers of IJs. The principal regulation that does cover IJs’ authority is 8 C.F.R. §1003.10, which provides in part:
(a) Appointment. The immigration judges are attorneys whom the Attorney General appoints as administrative judges within the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge to conduct specified classes of proceedings, including hearings under section 240 of the [Immigration and Nationality] Act. Immigration judges shall act as the Attorney General’s delegates in the cases that come be‐ fore them.
(b) Powers and duties. In conducting hearings under section 240 of the Act and such other proceedings the Attorney General may assign to them, immigration judges shall exercise the powers and duties delegated to them by the Act and by the Attorney General through regulation. In deciding the individual cases be‐ fore them, and subject to the applicable governing standards, immigration judges shall exercise their independent judgment and discretion and may take any action consistent with their au‐ thorities under the Act and regulations that is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of such cases. Immigration judges shall administer oaths, receive evidence, and interrogate, exam‐ ine, and cross‐examine aliens and any witnesses. Subject to §§ 1003.35 and 1287.4 of this chapter, they may issue administra‐ tive subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the presenta‐ tion of evidence. In all cases, immigration judges shall seek to re‐ solve the questions before them in a timely and impartial man‐ ner consistent with the Act and regulations.

The Attorney General’s brief in this court observes that §1003.10(b) does not delegate to IJs any power to waive an alien’s inadmissibility. Sure enough, it doesn’t. But §1003.10(a) does. It says that “[i]mmigration judges shall act as the Attorney General’s delegates in the cases that come before them.” This sounds like a declaration that IJs may ex‐ ercise all of the Attorney General’s powers “in the cases that come before them”, unless some other regulation limits that general delegation. The BIA in Khan did not identify any provision that subtracts from the delegation in §1003.10(a). Nor did the Third Circuit in Sunday. Indeed, neither the BIA nor the Third Circuit cited §1003.10(a). We therefore adhere to the view of LDG that IJs may exercise the Attorney Gen‐ eral’s powers over immigration.”

*******************************

In the end, of course, the respondent didn’t win much. The 7th Circuit remanded the case to the BIA to “exercise Chevron authority” on the question of whether the Attorney General himself has been stripped of authority to grant these waivers by the legislation that established the DHS as a separate entity.

But, we already know the answer to that question. The BIA has no desire to exercise jurisdiction over this waiver. Indeed, to do so, could turn out to be “career threatening” if you work for notorious xenophobe Jeff Sessions.

Moreover, even before the advent of Sessions, the BIA abandoned any pretense of impartiality in exercising Chevron jurisdiction. The BIA usually looks for the interpretation least favorable to the respondent, that of the DHS, and adopts that as it “preferred interpretation.” To do otherwise could hamper any Administration’s efforts to achieve enforcement objectives, thereby endangering the BIA as an institution. Moreover, agreeing with the private litigant in a published decision could undermine the efforts of the DOJ’s Office of Immigration Litigation to facilitate successful defense of petitions for review removal orders in the Article III Courts.

If this sounds like a strange scenario for a supposedly fair, impartial, and unbiased “court” to adopt, that’s because it is! The BIA is there primarily to slap a “patina of due process” on removal orders without really interfering with the DHS’s “removal railroad.” And that’s useful because of Chevron and the ability of OIL and the DOJ to disingenuously claim that respondents receive “full due process” from the Immigration Courts and the BIA and that Article III Courts, therefore, ought not to worry themselves about the results. And, in a surprising number of cases, the Article IIIs oblige. They don’t want to be stuck having to redo tens of thousands of mass produced BIA appeals.

So, what’s not to like about this system? The Attorney General gets his wholly owned courts to churn out removal orders that look fair (but really aren’t in many cases). The BIA Appellate Judges get to keep their high paying jobs in the Falls Church Tower without having to personally “face up” to the poor folks they are railroading out of the country to places where their lives and futures are in danger. OIL gets to buttress its narrow readings of immigration statutes against immigrants with so-called “court decisions” from the BIA that really aren’t really decisions by independent decision makers. The DHS gets lots of removal orders to keep the “Enforcer In Chief” happy, plus they gain leverage to use against any U.S. Immigration Judge who keeps ruling in favor of respondents. “We’ll just take you to the BIA and get it reversed.” The Article IIIs get to largely avoid moral or legal responsibility for this facade of fairness and due process. Out of sight (which folks are when they get removed), out of mind. We’re just “deferring” to the BIA. Don’t blame us! And, don’t forget Congress! They get to pretend like none of this is happening and claim they are “solving” the problem just by throwing a few more positions and a little more money at EOIR. No need for meaningful oversight into the charade of due process in the U.S. Immigration Courts. And, there are a few guys over on the GOP side of the Hill who hate immigrants and despise due process as much as Sessions does. They undoubtedly see this as a model for the entire U.S. justice system, or better yet, have lots of ideas on how to avoid the Immigration Courts entirely and make the “removal railway” run even faster.

The only folks who aren’t served are the poor folks looking to the U.S. Immigration Courts as courts of last resort to save their lives, preserve their futures, or at least listen sympathetically to their case for remaining. Some of these poor fools actually believe all they stuff about Americans being fair and humane. Those guys were really discombobulated when I had to tell them that while I had absolutely no doubt that some very ”bad things” were going to happen to them upon return, that just doesn’t matter to the U.S. legal system. While I sometimes had the unenviable task of “telling it like it is,” the BIA, the DOJ, and the Federal Courts really couldn’t care less if migrants end up getting killed, raped, or maimed upon return or if their families in the U.S. have to go on welfare. There’s just no place for them in our system.

The other folks who might not come out so well are the rest of America — the non-xenophobes. Most Americans aren’t actually xenophobes in the Trump-Sessions-MIller-Bannon-GOP Restrictionist tradition. While those of us who know what’s happening might be powerless to stop it, we can document it for future generations. We’re making a record.

In the age of information, none of this is going away or going to be swept under an “eternal carpet.” Someday there will be a “day or recokening” for our descendants, just like the one for those of us whose current privilege was built on enslaved African American labor and its many benefits as well as by a century of “Jim Crow” laws which siphoned off African American Citizens’ Constitutional rights and human dignity and conferred them instead on undeserving white folks in both the South and the North.

We have certainly demonstrated that we can be “tone deaf” to both the motivations and the actual effects of our current broken immigration policies. Indeed, there can be no better evidence of that than the election of Trump and empowerment of his xenophobe racist cronies like Sessions and Miller.

But, in the end, we won’t escape the judgement of history, nor will they. The ugliness of our current immigration policies and practices, and the “false debate” about them (there, in fact is no legitimate case for the “restrictionist agenda” — just a racial and cultural one), might be buried in a barrage of alt-right media and “Sessions bogus law and fact free pronouncements.” But, someday, those are going to look just as “legit’ as Conferederate broadsides or the racially hateful rhetoric of Jefferson Davis do today outside the membership of various hate groups and the alt-right.

PWS

10-07-17

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