☠️⚖️FAILNG JUSTICE:  IMMIGRATION JUDGES 👩🏽‍⚖️ NEED INDIVIDUAL LAW CLERKS, NOT MORE FALLS CHURCH BUREAUCRACY & FAILED GIMMICKS! — With “Garland’s Courts” Flunking 😰 “All Three Prongs Of Due Process,” Law Clerks Would Immediately Improve Quality & Save Lives!

Nicholas Bednar
Nicholas Bednar,JD
PhD Candidate
Vanderbilt University
PHOTO: SSRN Author Webpage

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4189963

The Public Administration of Justice

93 Pages Posted: 19 Aug 2022

Nicholas Bednar

Vanderbilt University, Department of Political Science

Date Written: August 14, 2022

Abstract

Adjudicatory agencies decide who receives social-welfare benefits, which inventions deserve patents, and which immigrants get to remain in the United States. Scholars have argued that agency adjudication lacks sufficient structural and procedural protections to ensure unbiased decision-making. Yet these critiques miss a key problem with agency adjudication: the lack of adjudicatory capacity. This Article argues that low-capacity agencies cannot satisfy the Due Process Clause’s demand for accurate decision-making. To produce accurate decisions, adjudicatory agencies need sufficient levels of capacity: (1) material resources, (2) expert adjudicators, and (3) support staff. When agencies lack these resources, their adjudicators rely on various coping mechanisms to manage their workloads. They shorten hearings, make assumptions about respondents’ claims based on appearance, or take other steps to reduce the cognitive burdens associated with a high workload. Yet these coping mechanisms introduce error into the decision-making process. Often, these errors are not random and, instead, bias against one party to the dispute.

This Article uses the Immigration Courts as a case study of this phenomenon. The Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR)—the agency charged with adjudicating the removal of noncitizens from the United States—suffers from severe understaffing and has amassed a backlog of over 1.7 million cases. Analyzing over 1.5 million removal proceedings and 32,000 personnel records, this Article uses causal and statistical methods to examine the effect that one element of adjudicatory capacity (i.e., law clerks) has on outcomes in the Immigration Courts. This analysis finds that providing an Immigration Judge with one law clerk decreases the likelihood of removal by 5.2 percentage points and increases the likelihood of an asylum grant by 4.4 percentage points. These effects are significant and exceed the effect sizes of other known contributors to bias, such as the IJ’s prior employment and appointing president.

Why do adjudicatory agencies, like EOIR, appear starved for resources? This Article argues that neither Congress nor the president have sufficient electoral incentives to invest in these agencies. As a result, adjudicatory agencies will continue to make systematic errors without intervention. However, the Due Process Clause demands accurate systems of agency adjudication. If Congress and the president will not uphold their duty to build capacity within these agencies, then courts must reform administrative-law doctrine to promote due process. By reimagining the law of agency adjudication from a public-administration perspective, courts can provide agencies with the flexibility they need to manage their workloads while protecting the due-process rights of the respondents who appear before agency adjudicators.

Keywords: Administrative Law, Immigration, Due Process, Bureaucratic Capacity

Suggested Citation:

Bednar, Nicholas, The Public Administration of Justice (August 14, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4189963 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4189963

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I agree with Bednar’s “bottom line:” With neither Congress nor the Executive motivated to bring EOIR into line with Constitutional Due Process, the task falls to the Article IIIs. Some judicial decisions have exposed the glaring, unacceptable constitutional and quality-control flaws in EOIR’s embarrassing and life-threatening dysfunction. Sadly, however, for the most part Article IIIs, starting with the Supremes, have failed to take the decisive action necessary to end the unjust nonsense at EOIR and require even minimal systemic reforms.

Notably, a PhD candidate with a JD knows exactly how to begin addressing the massive due process failure @ EOIR in a practical, easily achievable manner! But, nearing the midpoint of the Biden Administration, a distinguished former Federal Judge, once only a Mitch McConnell away from the Supremes, doesn’t “get it?” 

On the DC Circuit, Garland had four individual Judicial Law Clerks. https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-chicagoans-clerked-for-merrick-garland-03-18-20160324-story.html.

And, with due respect, 1) he issued far fewer opinions annually than an average Immigration Judge (fewer than 50 compared with 700+); 2) few of his decisions involved the potential “life of death” or at least “life-determining” consequences of decisions in Immigration Court. See generally, https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/10/empirical-scotus-the-singular-relationship-between-the-d-c-circuit-and-the-supreme-court/

One individual, personally selected, law clerk for each Immigration Judge seems like a very “modest ask.” Why hasn’t Garland “picked this low hanging fruit?”

Perhaps he needs to listen to Nicholas Bednar rather than out of touch politicos and bureaucrats at DOJ and EOIR! As Bednar points out, EOIR is a prime model of disastrous, horrible, failed “public administration of justice.” The public and the individuals whose lives hang in the balance deserve much better!

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

08-31-22

☹️👎 EXECUTIVE BRANCH “JUDGES” ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROBLEMATIC: EOIR Might Be The Worst, But By No Means The Only Agency Where Quasi-Judicial Independence Is Compromised By Politicos & Their Subservient “Managers!”  — Reuters Reports!

 

https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/us-watchdog-says-pressure-patent-officials-affected-agency-rulings-2022-07-21/

U.S. watchdog says pressure from patent officials affected agency rulings

Blake Brittain July 21, 20224:11 PM EDTLast Updated a day ago

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(Reuters) – U.S. Patent and Trademark Office administrators improperly influenced decisions by the office’s patent-eligibility tribunal for years, the U.S. Government Accountability Office said in a preliminary report released Thursday.

The report said two-thirds of judges on the PTO’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board felt pressure from higher-ups at the office to change aspects of their decisions, and that three-quarters of them believed the oversight affected their independence.

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While the report said management “rarely” influenced decisions on whether to cancel a patent, it said it did affect judges’ rulings on questions like whether to review a patent.

A PTO spokesperson said the report “reflects GAO’s preliminary observations on past practices,” and that current director Kathi Vidal has “prioritized providing clear guidance to the PTAB regarding the director review process” since taking office in April.

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The U.S. Supreme Court decided last year that the PTO director should be able to review board decisions.

The PTAB allows parties to challenge the validity of patents based on preexisting inventions in “inter partes review” proceedings.

A committee of volunteer judges began peer reviewing decisions in such cases for style and policy consistency and flagging them for potential management review in 2013, the report said. PTAB management began informally pre-reviewing board decisions on important issues and offering suggestions in 2017, and management review became official PTO policy in 2019.

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Some PTAB judges said their decisions had been affected by fears of negative career consequences for going against the suggestions. One judge said in the report that the review policy’s “very existence creates a preemptive chilling effect,” and that management’s wishes were “at least a factor in all panel deliberations” and “sometimes the dominant factor.”

The report said the internal review policies were not made public until May.

Republican Congressman Darrell Issa of California said during a U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee hearing Thursday that the report of officials influencing PTAB decisions “behind closed doors” was “disturbing.”

Andrei Iancu was appointed PTO director by former President Donald Trump and took charge of the office in 2018. Iancu, now a partner at Irell & Manella, had no comment on the report.

Issa, the subcommittee’s ranking member, and its chairman, Democratic Congressman Hank Johnson of Georgia, called on the GAO last year to investigate the PTO director’s potential influence on PTAB cases.

(NOTE: This story has been updated with comment from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.)

Read more:

U.S. Supreme Court reins in power of patent tribunal judges

U.S. Senators Leahy, Tillis introduce bill to revamp patent review board

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Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Thomson Reuters

Blake Brittain reports on intellectual property law, including patents, trademarks, copyrights and trade secrets. Reach him at blake.brittain@thomsonreuters.com

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While it might once have seemed like a great idea, after more than a half-century the so-called “Administrative Judiciary” has proved to be a failure. It often delivers watered-down, sloppy, political, expedient, or “agency friendly” decisions with the “window dressing” of due process and real judicial proceedings.

Moreover, contrary to the original purpose, in most cases it is neither truly “expert” not “efficient.” Indeed, the Immigration Courts have built “one of the largest backlogs known to man!” That just leads to more misguided “gimmicks” and pressure to “speed up the quasi-judicial assembly line!” Individual lives and rights are the “big losers.”

To make matters worse, under the “Chevron doctrine” and its “off the wall” progeny “Brand X,” the Article IIIs “cop out” by giving “undue deference” to this deficient product.

It’s time for all Federal Judicial tribunals to be organized under Article III or Article I of the Constitution and for the legal profession and law schools to take a long, critical look at the poor job we now are doing of educating and preparing judges. We need to train and motivate the “best, brightest, and fairest” to think critically, humanely, and practically. Then, encourage them to become judges — out of a sense of public service, furthering the common good, promoting equal justice for all, and a commitment to vindicating individual rights, not some “ideological litmus test” as has a become the recent practice.

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

07-22-22

🤮☠️⚰️👎THE UGLY ROLE OF RACISM IN THE AMERICAN “RULE OF LAW” FICTION — Administrative Law & The Administrative State Deeply Rooted In Racism — When You Hear Racists Like Trump, Miller, Barr, Wolf, & Cotton Refer To The “Rule Of Law” They Actually Mean The Rule Of White Supremacy!

🏴‍☠️

https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/the-racial-roots-of-the-federal-administrative-state-by-jonathan-weinberg/

The Racial Roots of the Federal Administrative State, by Jonathan Weinberg

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Federal administrative agencies have existed since this nation’s founding – the First Congress created the Patent Office, the Departments of War, Foreign Affairs, and Treasury, and more. But in the century that followed, Congress rarely tasked any of those agencies with adjudicating the status of individuals so as to hand out benefits and burdens.[1]  The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, to be sure, broke that pattern. It established a set of federal commissioners to make the most consequential determination of individual status possible – a ruling that a person was or was not an escaped slave, to be handed over to a purported owner or his agent. The procedure established for that determination bore no relation to anything we would think of as modern administrative law. Slaveholders provided testimony ex parte, and the alleged slaves could say nothing; commissioners received higher fees for ruling in slaveholders’ favor than for ruling against them.

The next important time the federal government set up an agency to adjudicate the legal status of individuals, its methods were different. Like the Fugitive Slave Act, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 enabled a system of racial oppression. But in contrast to the Fugitive Slave Act, which covered freewheeling lawlessness with the barest fig leaf of administrative legality, the Chinese Exclusion Act gave rise to a body of administrative law, and a body of administrative mechanisms and methods, that survived and lie at the root of today’s administrative state.[2]

The Chinese Exclusion Act reflected deep racial prejudice. U.S. Congress members and others attacked Chinese people as disease-ridden, dishonest, degraded, and incapable of self-government; “a race of people,” in the words of the California Supreme Court, “whom nature has marked as inferior.” Legislatures enacted legal attacks including state laws (many struck down in court) forbidding them from securing business licenses, working for corporations, fishing in public waters, owning real estate, working mining claims, or indeed entering the state. Mobs engaged in anti-Chinese mass violence, such as the burning of Seattle’s Chinatown in 1885.

The 1882 federal statute forbade the entry of most Chinese into the United States, and directed the deportation of any Chinese person who had entered in violation of its requirements. This performance of racism, though, required a new bureaucracy facing new challenges.  The U.S. had never before enacted a large-scale restriction on entry of free persons. It had no passport or visa infrastructure; the law would not require white noncitizens arriving on our shores to present passports for another 35 years. So the bureaucracy had to break new ground in enforcing the statute and the fine distinctions it drew.

How were officers to adjudicate whether a person seeking to enter the U.S. was a forbidden Chinese laborer or a permitted upper-class “merchant”? a forbidden new entrant or a permitted returning resident?[3] or, indeed, whether the person was a U.S. citizen, since lower courts had ruled as early as 1884 that anyone born in the U.S. was a citizen with full rights to leave the U.S. and return?

For that matter, how were federal officers to know whether any ethnically Chinese person living in the U.S. had legal status? The system’s underlying assumptions, repeated over and over by policy-makers, were first, that Chinese people would routinely lie to gain immigration benefits; and second, that they were physically nearly indistinguishable from one another. What sort of bureaucracy could be put in place to make their status visible?

To answer those questions, Congress and the agency (first the Customs Bureau, then the Bureau of Immigration in the Treasury Department, then the same Bureau in the Department of Commerce and Labor) developed new techniques of bureaucratic investigation and control.  They provided for initial adjudications by line personnel with the possibility of internal administrative appeal. They provided for agency rulemaking and federal-state partnerships.  Their targets brought challenges in sometimes-sympathetic courts, leading to battles over the availability of judicial review, exhaustion, the “jurisdictional fact” doctrine, burdens of proof, standards of review, and the demands of due process. There were controversies over the scope of government’s enforcement discretion in light of resource constraints.

We can see, in other words, the seeds of nearly all of modern administrative law in the administration of Chinese exclusion. To bolster that system, Congress mandated that every Chinese migrant in the U.S. carry federally-issued identification papers with his or her photograph and identifying information. The Bureau put in place increasingly elaborate, searchable and cross-referenced, databases of information about Chinese individuals, to be used in connection with systematic and standardized interviews of would-be entrants and applicants for immigration benefits. For a time, it mandated that some Chinese individuals be subject to a system of precise body measurement developed for identifying criminals.

The Chinese exclusion regime worked badly, and was never very good at achieving its stated goals. It was effective in enforcing racial domination.  If you were an ethnically Chinese person in the U.S. in that time period, you lived subject to the possibility of arrest on suspicion of illegal presence. The exclusion laws enabled, on a broad scale, the humiliation, labelling, and arbitrary detention of individual Chinese.

But the system of Chinese exclusion was not just an exercise in domination and humiliation. It was conceived, rather, as embedding racial hierarchy within the rule of law. Its framers hoped to achieve accurate determinations, within a legal structure, regarding the racially-motivated categories into which individuals should be sorted. That legal structure incorporated the possibility of judicial review. It required a functioning system of federal administrative law. To that end, racial exclusion laid the groundwork for much of modern public administration and administrative law. That’s our heritage. Our current system grew from that soil.

Jon Weinberg is Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Professor of Law at Wayne State University Law School. Follow him on Twitter here.

[1]           One exception: the U.S. military pension system: Congress as early as 1776 legislated pensions for disabled Revolutionary War veterans. In 1818, it extended pension eligibility to anyone who had served in the Continental Army and needed public assistance. This required it to develop procedures for determining whether claimants were disabled, whether their injuries were incurred as part of their service, whether they were indigent, and more. Most of that work, though, was done by local judges sitting as benefits adjudicators.

[2]           Gabriel (Jack) Chin first made this point in his pioneering Regulating Race: Asian Exclusion and the Administrative State, 37 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (2002).

[3]           Initially, the law allowed Chinese people already resident in the U.S. to leave here and return; the government would close that door in 1888 (stranding many U.S. residents outside the country), and then partially reopen it in 1894.

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Obvious solutions:

  • All Administrative “Courts” are inherently unconstitutional and should be abolished forthwith;
  • An expanded Article I independent judiciary;
  • Demonstrated commitment to equal justice under law and rejecting racism in all forms as an absolute requirement for future Article III Judicial appointments.

PWS

07-24-20