Niz-Chavez v. Garland, U.S. Supreme Court, 04-20-21

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-863_6jgm.pdf

SYLLABUS BY COURT STAFF:

Syllabus

NIZ-CHAVEZ v. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 19–863. Argued November 9, 2020—Decided April 29, 2021

Nonpermanent resident aliens ordered removed from the United States under federal immigration law may be eligible for discretionary relief if, among other things, they can establish their continuous presence in the country for at least 10 years. 8 U. S. C. §1229b(b)(1). But the so- called stop-time rule included in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) provides that the pe- riod of continuous presence “shall be deemed to end . . . when the alien is served a notice to appear” in a removal proceeding under §1229a. §1229b(d)(1). The term “notice to appear” is defined as “written notice . . . specifying” certain information, such as the charges against the al- ien and the time and place at which the removal proceedings will be held. §1229(a)(1). A notice that omits any of this statutorily required information does not trigger the stop-time rule. See Pereira v. Ses- sions, 585 U. S. ___. Here, the government ordered the removal of pe- titioner Agusto Niz-Chavez and sent him a document containing the charges against him. Two months later, it sent a second document, providing Mr. Niz-Chavez with the time and place of his hearing. The government contends that because the two documents collectively specified all statutorily required information for “a notice to appear,” Mr. Niz-Chavez’s continuous presence in the country stopped when he was served with the second document.

Held: A notice to appear sufficient to trigger the IIRIRA’s stop-time rule is a single document containing all the information about an individ- ual’s removal hearing specified in §1229(a)(1). Pp. 4–12.

(a) Section 1229b(d)(1) states that the stop-time rule is triggered by serving “a notice,” and §1229(a)(1) explains that “written notice” is “re- ferred to as a ‘notice to appear.’ ” Congress’s decision to use the indef- inite article “a” suggests it envisioned “a” single notice provided at a

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NIZ-CHAVEZ v. GARLAND Syllabus

discrete time rather than a series of notices that collectively provide the required information. While the indefinite article “a” can some- times be read to permit multiple installments (such as “a manuscript” delivered over months), that is not true for words like “notice” that can refer to either a countable object (“a notice”) or a noncountable abstrac- tion (“sufficient notice”). The inclusion of an indefinite article suggests Congress used “notice” in its countable sense. More broadly, Congress has used indefinite articles to describe other case-initiating plead- ings—such as an indictment, an information, or a civil complaint, see, e.g., Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 7(a), (c)(1), (e); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 3—and none suggest those documents might be delivered by installment. Nor does the Dictionary Act aid the government, as that provision merely tells readers of the U. S. Code to assume “words importing the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things.” 1 U. S. C. §1. That provision means only that terms describing a single thing (“a no- tice”) can apply to more than one of that thing (“ten notices”). While it certainly allows the government to send multiple notices to appear to multiple people, it does not mean a notice to appear can consist of mul- tiple documents. Pp. 4–9.

(b) The IIRIRA’s structure and history support requiring the govern- ment to issue a single notice containing all the required information. Two related provisions, §§1229(e)(1) and 1229a(b)(7), both use a defi- nite article with a singular noun (“the notice”) when referring to the government’s charging document—a combination that again suggests a discrete document. Another provision, §1229(a)(2)(A), requires “a written notice” when the government wishes to change an alien’s hear- ing date. The government does not argue that this provision contem- plates providing “the new time or place of the proceedings” and the “consequences . . . of failing . . . to attend such proceedings” in separate documents. Yet the government fails to explain why “a notice to ap- pear” should operate differently. Finally, the predecessor to today’s “notice to appear” required the government to specify the place and time for the alien’s hearing “in the order to show cause or otherwise.” §1252(a)(2)(A). The phrase “or otherwise” has since disappeared, fur- ther suggesting that the required details must be included upfront to invoke the stop-time rule. Indeed, that is how the government itself initially read the statute. The year after Congress adopted IIRIRA, in the preamble to a proposed rule implementing these provisions, the government acknowledged that “the language of the amended Act in- dicat[es] that the time and place of the hearing must be on the Notice to Appear.” 62 Fed. Reg. 449 (1997). Pp. 9–13.

(c) The government claims that not knowing hearing officers’ avail- ability when it initiates removal proceedings makes it difficult to pro-duce compliant notices. It also claims that it makes little sense to re- quire time and place information in a notice to appear when that in- formation may be later changed. Besides, the government stresses, its own administrative regulations have always authorized its current practice. But on the government’s account, it would be free to send a person who is not from this country—someone who may be unfamiliar with English and the habits of American bureaucracies—a series of letters over the course of weeks, months, maybe years, each containing a new morsel of vital information. Congress could reasonably have wished to foreclose that possibility. And ultimately, pleas of adminis- trative inconvenience never “justify departing from the statute’s clear text.” Pereira, 585 U. S., at ___. The modest threshold Congress pro- vided to invoke the stop-time rule is clear from the text and must be complied with here. Pp. 13–16.

789 Fed. Appx. 523, reversed.

GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. KAVANAUGH, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and ALITO, J., joined.

 

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This is the type of case where I had hoped that Justice Gorsuch would “stick to his interpretative guns” by stopping the Government from basically redesigning clear statutory requirements “willy nilly” to suit their own purposes and disadvantage respondents. And, he came through! Big time! I’ve been critical of Justice Gorsuch in the past and am likely to be so again in the future. But, in this case, he did the right thing, and I, for one, am grateful!

Most encouraging, Justice Gorsuch “got” the way that the DHS and EOIR, with the deck already unfairly stacked in their favor, manipulate clear legal requirements for their own nefarious purposes and to the disadvantage of those struggling for justice in an inherently unfair system. There is absolutely no doubt that receiving “piecemeal notice” — incomplete and often sent to incorrect addresses or “personally served” without the proper reading and explanations — works to further disadvantage respondents.

Indeed, illegal, ineffective notices — some setting hearings on “phantom dates” and “imaginary times” — lead directly to an over abundance of “in absentia” orders and consequent illegal removals. Some unrepresented individuals understand how to reopen their hearings for lack of notice — but many are clueless; the Government system strives to keep them that way to “jack up the numbers,” meet “quotas,” and improve stats. Worse yet, Congress sometimes uses the “bogus stats” generated by DOJ and DHS to write legislation, conduct oversight, and establish policy. This is an astoundingly broken, dysfunctional, and intentionally unfair system — a disgrace to our entire justice system and our national conscience each day it is allowed to continue to operate in its abusive ways!

The majority in this case was both very interesting, and at least mildly encouraging, for those of us who believe in due process and fundamental fairness for all persons, including migrants, under law. In addition to Trump appointees Justice Gorsuch and Justice Barrett, another GOP conservative appointee, Justice Thomas, joined Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor in the majority!

And, although this case has (incorrectly) seemed “hyper technical” to some Supremes’ watchers unfamiliar with immigration, it will have huge impact — forcing reopening and “redos” in tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of cases in the already backlogged (1.3 million cases) Immigration Court. That will be the direct result of poor jurisprudence by the BIA, lousy court administration by EOIR, and horrible policy decisions by DHS.

Just another prime example of how “haste makes waste” enforcement gimmicks continue to cause unnecessary chaos in the system. Why not just appoint progressive experts as Immigration Judges and BIA Appellate Judges. Qualified jurists who will understand immigration law, due process, and  “get in right” in the first instance? Certainly seems like a reasonable approach. What is Judge Garland waiting for?

This, in turn should add to the already loud cries (from virtually everywhere outside Judge Garland’s universe and the restrictionist right) for sensible, readily available backlog reductions and accelerated movement toward better judges and independence in the Immigration Courts, not to mention better management in the DHS enforcement programs. 

Here’s my favorite quote from Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion:

In the end, though, all this speculation is beside the point. The dissent tries to predict how the government will react to a ruling that requires it to follow the law and then pro- ceeds to assess the resulting “costs” and “benefits.” Post, at 17, 20–21. But that kind of raw consequentialist calcula- tion plays no role in our decision. Instead, when it comes to the policy arguments championed by the parties and the dissent alike, our points are simple: As usual, there are (at least) two sides to the policy questions before us; a rational Congress could reach the policy judgment the statutory text suggests it did; and no amount of policy-talk can overcome a plain statutory command. Our only job today is to give the law’s terms their ordinary meaning and, in that small way, ensure the federal government does not exceed its statutory license. Interpreting the phrase “a notice to ap-pear” to require a single notice—rather than 2 or 20 docu- ments—does just that.

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At one level, today’s dispute may seem semantic, focused on a single word, a small one at that. But words are how the law constrains power. In this case, the law’s terms en- sure that, when the federal government seeks a procedural advantage against an individual, it will at least supply him with a single and reasonably comprehensive statement of the nature of the proceedings against him. If men must turn square corners when they deal with the government, it cannot be too much to expect the government to turn square corners when it deals with them.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir- cuit is

Reversed.

And, here’s some “immediate commentary” by Round Table spokesperson “Sir Jeffrey” Chase:

Victory!  This was the case in which our Round Table amicus brief was specifically referenced in oral argument.

Congrats to all involves, and Due Process Forever!

PWS

04-29-21