United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 23-1443
AMGAD SAMIR HALIM KHALIL,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Gelpí, Howard, and Rikelman,
Circuit Judges.
Saher J. Macarius, with whom Audrey Botros and Law Offices of Saher J. Macarius LLC were on brief, for petitioner.
Yanal H. Yousef, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, with whom Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, and Anthony P. Nicastro, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, were on brief, for respondent.
Julian Bava, with whom Adriana Lafaille, Sabrineh Ardalan, Tiffany Lieu, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Massachusetts, Inc., and Harvard Immigration & Refugee Clinical Program, were on brief, for amici curiae.
March 29, 2024
RIKELMAN, Circuit Judge.
. . . .
We turn, then, to Khalil’s argument that the factual record compels the conclusion that religion was at least one central reason for his beating. We review the factual finding
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against Khalil on this issue under the substantial evidence standard. Pineda-Maldonado, 91 F.4th at 87.
Here, a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude that Khalil’s religion qualifies as a central reason for the beating. Khalil’s attackers demanded he convert, beat him when he refused to do so, demanded again that he convert, and beat him more intensely when he again refused. The attackers’ own statements show that, regardless of whatever else prompted the beating, Khalil would not have been harmed had he agreed to convert. See Sanchez-Vasquez v. Garland, 994 F.3d 40, 47 (1st Cir. 2021) (deeming perpetrators’ statements essential to the nexus determination); Ivanov v. Holder, 736 F.3d 5, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2013) (determining persecutors were driven by a religious motive that they “recognized and gave voice to” during their attack of the applicant); Singh v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2008) (explaining that perpetrators’ statements “are a crucial factor” for determining the central reason for harm); cf. Esteban-Garcia v. Garland, 94 F.4th 186, 194 (1st Cir. 2024) (finding no nexus because persecutors “didn’t say anything” about the applicant’s protected ground).
The attackers’ demands that Khalil convert to another faith and their increased violence in response to his refusal to do so make this case unlike Sompotan v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2008), which the IJ relied on in finding that the beating was
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the result of a personal dispute only. In Sompotan, we held that the record did not compel the conclusion that those who robbed the petitioners and their restaurant while yelling “Chinese bastard, crazy Christian, crazy Chinese” were motivated by religious and racial animus rather than by a desire to rob because “[t]he fact that [robbers] would stoop to the level of using racial slurs is, unfortunately, not surprising.” 533 F.3d at 70. By contrast, the attackers here did not make just a passing reference to Khalil’s religion. Rather, they made religious demands on him during the attack and beat him more vigorously when he refused to cede to those demands.
The arguments the government offers as to why substantial evidence supports the agency’s no-nexus determination do not alter our conclusion. The government emphasizes that Khalil recounted his attackers’ demands that he convert only in his asylum interview and written declaration attached to his asylum application, but not in his testimony before the IJ. But in evaluating whether substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion, we are tasked with reviewing “the record as a whole.” Barnica-Lopez, 59 F.4th at 527. Further, at his hearing, Khalil described the beating exclusively during the government’s cross-examination, and the government strategically asked him only one question about what his attackers said during the beating: Did they reference the blood test results? The framing of the
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government’s questions on cross-examination does not change our assessment of the record as a whole. The government also contends that, because Khalil testified that the imam had no issue with him until the imam found out about the blood test results, religion did not motivate the attack. But that argument ignores the attackers’ own words and actions.
For all these reasons, we find that the record compels the conclusion that Khalil’s religion played more than an incidental role in his beating. We therefore grant the petition for review as to Khalil’s asylum claim premised on mixed-motive persecution.5
. . . .
This is another classic example of deficient scholarship and an “any reason to deny culture” that Garland, inexplicably, has allowed to flourish in some parts of EOIR on his watch!
“Revolution by evolution” is a meaningless piece of bureaucratic gobbledegook I sometimes heard during Dem Administrations to justify their often gutless, inept, and dilatory approach to due process at EOIR! What total poppycock! EOIR needs a dramatic “Due Process Revolution” from within! And, it needs it yesterday, with lives and the future of American justice on the line!
There’s an opportunity, open until April 12, 2024, to become a BIA Appellate Judge and start improving the trajectory of American justice at the “retail level!”
