Judge Anne Greer – immigrationcourtside.com

🤯JUDGE ANNE GREER’S “PLAIN LANGUAGE” DISSENT GETS LAW RIGHT, BUT DROWNED OUT BY PRO-DHS TRUMP HOLDOVERS! 🤬 — Matter of M-M-A-, 28 I&N Dec. 494 (BIA 2022) — At DHS “Partner’s” Request, BIA Wrongly Restricts IJ’s Independent Discretion To Do Justice!👎🏽

Kangaroos — “Oh, Great and Exalted Masters at DHS Enforcement, how high would you like your humble servants here at the BIA to jump?”
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https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1482556/download

Matter of M-M-A-, Respondent

Decided March 11, 2022

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

When the Department of Homeland Security raises the mandatory bar for filing a frivolous asylum application under section 208(d)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6) (2018), an Immigration Judge must make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law on whether the requirements for a frivolousness determination under Matter of Y-L-, 24 I&N Dec. 151 (BIA 2007), have been met.

FOR THE RESPONDENT: Elias Z. Shamieh, Esquire, San Francisco, California

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Jennifer L. Castro, Assistant Chief Counsel

BEFORE: Board Panel: WILSON and GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judges. Dissenting Opinion: GREER, Appellate Immigration Judge.

WILSON, Appellate Immigration Judge: [Opinion]

For those interested in what the law actually says (clearly an “endangered minority” @ Garland’s BIA), here’s key language from Judge Greer’s dissent:

In my view, when an Immigration Judge elects to undertake the analysis set forth in our precedent under Matter of Y-L-, either independently or at the request of the DHS, and determines that the application is frivolous, then the plain statutory language requires the entry of a frivolousness finding as part of the Immigration Judge’s decision. But whether the Immigration Judge must conduct that analysis in the first place because the DHS requests it is a different question. This key distinction was recognized by the Second Circuit in stating that Immigration Judges “regularly exercise discretion when deciding whether to initiate a frivolousness inquiry.” Mei Juan Zheng, 672 F.3d at 186.

Requiring the adjudicator, either independently or at the request of the DHS, to engage in this analysis because the respondent made a material misrepresentation upends current practice by creating a rigid structure not mandated by statute. It equates adverse credibility with frivolousness, which I view as conflicting with the case law. It also removes discretion from the Immigration Judge and transfers it to the DHS. Accordingly, the majority’s interpretation constitutes an unwarranted expansion of the frivolousness provisions.

Although the majority casts this question in terms of whether an Immigration Judge may “ignore” a mandatory bar to asylum, the question is whether the Immigration Judge has the authority to make a judgment about pursuing a frivolousness inquiry. This Immigration Judge did not ignore a request from DHS to consider frivolousness. Rather, she entertained it and made an independent judgment not to proceed based on particular facts and circumstances in this case after deliberation. As discussed, the DHS did not question the judgment she made, which is a critical distinction; rather the DHS questions the ability of the Immigration Judge to make this judgment at all.2

I interpret the language and structure of the statute and development of relevant case law, combined with the sequencing of the frivolousness inquiry and its consequences, to demonstrate the discretionary nature of the frivolousness inquiry. And, absent any challenge to how the Immigration Judge exercised her discretion in this case, which I consider to have been waived, I would dismiss the appeal.

2 The relevant factors for the Immigration Judge to assess in making a threshold determination whether to invoke the frivolousness inquiry are a separate issue not implicated by the posture of this case.

*********************

BIA to IJs: “When our overlords @ DHS tell you to jump, your duty is to say ‘how high, my masters!’”

Under Garland, the “Miller Lite Holdover BIA” continues to pile up some really wrong, one-sided, and poorly-reasoned decisions that intentionally skew the law against migrants and adversely affect human lives. Decisions that punctuate Judge Joan Churchill’s call for an independent Article I Immigration Judiciary. In an article I posted yesterday, Joan argued persuasively that that EOIR never had true quasi-judicial independence. Decisions like this illustrate her point. https://immigrationcourtside.com/2022/03/12/%e2%9a%96%ef%b8%8f%f0%9f%91%a9%f0%9f%8f%bb%e2%9a%96%ef%b8%8f%f0%9f%91%a9%f0%9f%8f%be%e2%9a%96%ef%b8%8f%f0%9f%97%bdfeature-the-latest-issue-of-the-abas-judges/

Here, a correct (basically, uncontested on the merits, as Judge Greer points out) grant of a waiver was reversed just because DHS wanted “control” over the judges. “How dare a ‘mere employee’ of the AG exercise discretion in the face of the ICE ACC’s demand? Do these guys think they are ‘real’ judges? Let’s tell our buddy Merrick to get his toadies back in line like they were under Sessions and Barr!” How does the “holdover” BIA’s steady stream of incorrect decisions, institutionalized bias, and “worst practices” advance justice?

The “Biden-Era BIA” is building a legacy of bad law, poor judging, and unnecessarily broken lives. Not exactly what the Biden Administration promised during the election! And, it goes without saying that requiring a fact-heavy “full Y-L- analysis” at the unilateral demand of the DHS will increase the backlog as Garland “shoots for 2 million” in his dysfunctional and chronically misdirected “courts.”

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

03-13-22

SPLIT EN BANC BIA MOVES TO LIMIT SUPREME’S PEREIRA RULING: Matter of MENDOZA-HERNANDEZ CAPULA-CORTES 27 I&N Dec. 520 (BIA 2019)

matter_of_mendoza-hernandez_capula-cortes_27_in_dec._520_bia_2019

Matter of MENDOZA-HERNANDEZ CAPULA-CORTES, 27 I&N Dec. 520 (BIA 2019)

HEADNOTE BY BIA STAFF:

A deficient notice to appear that does not include the time and place of an alien’s initial removal hearing is perfected by the subsequent service of a notice of hearing specifying that missing information, which satisfies the notice requirements of section 239(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2012), and triggers the “stop-time” rule of section 240A(d)(1)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(A) (2012). Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), distinguished; Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I&N Dec. 441 (BIA 2018), followed.

BIA EN BANC:

MAJORITY OPINION: BIA APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGE GREER, JOINED BY NEAL, Chairman; MALPHRUS, WENDTLAND, MULLANE, MANN, O’CONNOR, LIEBOWITZ, and KELLY, APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGES

DISSENTING OPINION: APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGE GUENDELSBERGER, JOINED BY ADKINS-BLANCH, Vice Chairman; COLE, GRANT, CREPPY, KENDALL CLARK, APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGES

KEY QUOTE FROM DISSENT:

Congress, in section 240A(d)(1)(A) of the Act defined the event that triggers the “stop-time” rule as “service of a notice to appear under section 239(a).” The Court in Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2114–15, held that Congress’ reference to “service of a notice to appear under section 239(a),” means a “notice to appear” as defined in section 239(a)(1) of the Act. The Court also held that, “[b]ased on the plain language of the statute, it is clear that to trigger the stop-time rule, the Government must serve a notice to appear that, at the very least, ‘specif[ies]’ the ‘time and place’ of the removal proceedings.” Id. at 2114 (alteration in original) (quoting section 239(a)(1) of the Act). As the Court concluded, “At the end of the day, given the clarity of the plain language, we ‘apply the statute as it is written.’” Id. at 2119–20. The plain language of the Act leaves no room for the majority’s conclusion that a subsequent notice of hearing can cure a notice to appear that fails to specify the time and place of the initial removal hearing.

For these reasons, neither the service of the notice to appear nor the subsequent service of a notice of hearing on the respondents triggered the “stop-time” rule for purposes of cancellation of removal under section 240A of the Act. We therefore respectfully dissent.

***********************************

It’s very unusual these days for the BIA to sit en banc. That means in most precedent cases we only know what the 3–Judge Panel thought and that at least 8 Judges on the en banc BIA agreed to publication (regardless of whether they agreed with the result).

This won”t happen at all under Barr’s new “Dumb Down the BIA Proposal.” The BIA will be diluted into “regional adjudication centers.” Any panel of three “Judges” (actually reduced to the role of DOJ adjudicators working for one of the Administration’s immigration enforcement politicos) could designate a precedent by majority vote. Thus, a two-Judge panel majority could create a precedent over the objection of a dissenting Judge and without dialogue with or approval of their many colleagues. Nice way to run the “railroad.”

Congrats to the six dissenting Judges who stood up for the better view of the law! It might not help your careers in today’s DOJ, but it is encouraging to know there is some internal resistance to Barr’s one-sided “deportation railway.”

If the dissenters are correct, the majority’s view could cause incredible additional disruption, “aimless docket reshuffling,” “do-overs,” and unfairness in an already dysfunctional system. That’s because tens of thousands of cases that would face summary denial for failure to meet the ten-year cutoff under the majority’s view would be entitled to full merits hearings on their cancellation of removal applications under the dissenters’ view.

Once again, lives will be in limbo while the Article III Courts work through all of the legal implications of EOIR’s acquiescence and participation in the DHS’s conscious decision to ignore the “Notice to Appear” requirements set forth by Congress in the INA.

PWS

05-03-19

BIA’S LATEST ON CAT DETACHED FROM REALITY – MATTER OF J-R-G-P, 27 I &N DEC. 482 (BIA 2018)

3944_ed

Matter of J-R-G-P-, 27 I & N Dec. 482 (BIA 2018)

BIA HEADNOTE:

Where the evidence regarding an application for protection under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987; for the United States Apr. 18, 1988), plausibly establishes that abusive or squalid conditions

n pretrial detention facilities, prisons, or mental health institutions in the country of removal are the result of neglect, a lack of resources, or insufficient training and education, rather than a specific intent to cause severe pain and suffering, an Immigration Judge’s finding that the applicant did not establish a sufficient likelihood that he or she will experience “torture” in these settings is not clearly erroneous.

PANEL: APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGES GREER and WENDTLAND; CROSSETT, TEMPORARY APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGE

OPINION BY: JUDGE ANNE GREER

*********************************************

BIA’S LATEST ON CAT DETACHED FROM REALITY – MATTER OF J-R-G-P, 27 I &N DEC. 482 (BIA 2018)

- - No dialogue, no dissent, on today’s BIA. And, yes, the reviewing courts have largely deferred to the BIA’s interpretation of “specific intent.”
  - But, there are other plausible constructions that actually are more consistent with the purpose of the CAT to prevent the use of torture. In her dissenting opinion in Matter of J-E-, 23 I &N Dec. 291 (BIA 2002) my former colleague Judge Lory Diana Rosenberg set forth a “better view” (note, I also filed a vigorous separate dissenting opinion in J-E-):
    - “The majority’s reading of the regulations functionally converts the Senate understanding that torture must be specifically intended into a “specific intent” requirement. I disagree. I can find no basis to conclude that the Senate understanding was intended to require proof of an intent to accomplish a precise criminal act, as the majority contends is required. See Matter of J-E-, supra, at 301 (defining “specific intent”). Rather, the plain language of the text of 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5) reflects only that something more than an accidental consequence is necessary to establish the probability of torture. Id. (stating plainly that unanticipated or unintended pain and suffering that is severe enough to constitute torture is not covered). Moreover, 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(4) states that a threat of infliction of severe physical pain or suffering may amount to torture.”
  - The J-R-G-P- opinion basically analogizes the intentionally pathetic efforts of the Mexican Government to deal with mental illness with the efforts of “poor countries like Haiti” at issue in Matter of J-E.
    - But, Mexico is actually the 14^th largest economy in the world (11^th by consumer buying power); Haiti rates 141^st. It appears Mexico in fact has more than adequate resources to deal with mental illness; it has just intentionally chosen not to do so, even knowing the severe harm constituting torture that choice intentionally inflicts on individuals.
  - The opinion also minimizes the evidence of the intentionally torturous conditions that exist in the Mexican institutional mental health system.
    - From the 2017 State Department Country Report on Mexico: Among the numerous human rights abuses: “lethal violence and sexual assault against institutionalized persons with disabilities;”
    - Here’s how the same Country Report addresses the specifically horrible treatment of institutionalized individuals with disabilities: “Abuses in mental health institutions and care facilities, including those for children, were a problem. Abuses of persons with disabilities included lack of access to justice, the use of physical and chemical restraints, physical and sexual abuse, trafficking, forced labor, disappearances, and illegal adoption of institutionalized children. Institutionalized persons with disabilities often lacked adequate medical care and rehabilitation, privacy, and clothing and often ate, slept, and bathed in unhygienic conditions. They were vulnerable to abuse from staff members, other patients, or guests at facilities where there was inadequate supervision. Documentation supporting the person’s identity and origin was lacking, and there were instances of disappearances.
    - As of August 25, the NGO Disability Rights International (DRI) reported that most residents had been moved to other institutions from the privately run institution Casa Esperanza, where they were allegedly victims of pervasive sexual abuse by staff and, in some cases, human trafficking. Two of the victims died within the first six months after transfer to other facilities, and the third was sexually abused. DRI stated the victim was raped repeatedly during a period of seven months at the Fundacion PARLAS I.A.P. and that another woman was physically abused at an institution in another state to which she was transferred.
  - Here’s the “real skinny” on how Mexico intentionally scrimps on budget and tortures those institutionalized for mental health disabilities: “THE NIGHTMARE THAT IS MEXICO’S MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM byAriel Jacoby from Medelita (https://www.medelita.com) | Thursday, Jan 21, 2016 tags: features (https://www.medelita.com/blog/category/features)health-feat-img.jpg&url=https://www.medelita.com/blog/the-nightmare-that-is-mexicos-mental– system/)
    - Though there are an estimated 10 million people with mental, visual, hearing or motor disabilities living in Mexico, the country’s mental health system is so dysfunctional that the unlucky patients under its care are colloquially referred to as “abandanodos (http://abcnews.go.com/Health/mexican-psychiatric-institution-hell/story?id=12267276)” – abandoned ones.
    - It’s an accurate description for these lost souls. A 93-page report from Disability Rights International (http://s3.amazonaws.com/nytdocs/docs/526/526.pdf) revealed the horrific living conditions at Mexican mental health facilities, which are a breeding ground for human rights violations and abuse of the handicapped patients that these institutions are meant to help. Many patients never received a clinical diagnosis of their condition and don’t have families to give them private care – these patients remain locked inside the hospitals indefinitely and become completely anonymous to the world.
    - Patients rock back and forth in urine soaked clothes or walk about soiled, feces-smeared floors without shoes. Bedsheets are an uncommon luxury; hygiene is an abstract concept in a Mexican mental hospital where some “patients and their caretakers could not fully explain how or why they were institutionalized” (New York Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/01/world/americas/01mexico.html)). Without proper oversight and the absence of any sort of registry system, it is not uncommon for mentally ill children to literally disappear from Mexican mental health facilities with no record of their name, age, or families.
    - In this dismal hole of human despair, atrocities are ubiquitous and plentiful (http://www.ipsnews.net/2011/01/appalling-conditions-in-mexicos-mental-health-institutions/). Many of the patients in these institutions have been detained against their will for years and will likely languish inside the walls of these torture chambers until their death. Psychotropic drugs are excessively relied upon to treat patients and the more aggressive patients who don’t respond to medication can be subject to forced lobotomies, which need only the approval of the facility director. Eric Rosenthal, the director of Disability Rights International, found that 1/4 of the mental health facilities were keeping patients in restraints for extended periods of time – an act that violates Article 1 of the United Nations convention against torture.

- - - - The concept of human rights has no real meaning or significance in these unregulated, inhumane environments. The investigation conducted by DRI revealed the severity and frequency of human rights violations within the walls of such state-run facilities. In one institution, a terrified blind patient admitted to being raped by one of the staff members – a claim that was quickly dismissed by Mexican officials.
      - In another facility, investigators discovered two young women who had been institutionalized at a young age, grew up in the hospital, and had been working as unpaid laborers for years. There exists no record of how or why these women were institutionalized and Mexican law requires no legal review to detain them indefinitely as modern-day slave laborers.
      - The director of Samuel Ramirez Hospital, one of the 31 state-run mental health facilities in Mexico, calls his own hospital “hell” and has voiced his belief that the mental health of every patient at his facility have been made worse by their institutionalization. He blames the lack of proper funding and a deficiency of properly trained personnel – at a different mental institution nearby, there are only two psychologists and one doctor to treat the 365 patients who have been institutionalized there.
      - The sad state of Mexico’s mental health system can be traced back to its government’s complex and deep-rooted political issues. Mexico’s budget for mental health makes up about 2.5% of its overall health spending. This is an improvement from the paltry 1.6% allocated to mental health a decade ago, but still significantly lower than the WHO’s recommendation of 10%. Without a significant electorate of mental health advocates, mental health lacks any real political sway in Mexico. Back in 2006, Mexico was among 96 countries who ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp? navid=13&pid=150). But it is clear that not much has changed within the system itself.

Bottom line: The BIA is using “legalese” to “normalize” sending an ill individual back to probable intentional torture in a “dismal hole of human despair.” After all, if being intentionally thrown in this kind of “torture chamber” by a country that has intentionally chosen to ignore, or in many cases aggravate, extreme human rights abuses, then who indeed could actually win protection under CAT? The message is clear — nobody! Use this case to deny ‘em all! Meet those quotas! Keep the assembly line moving!

Political officials of all Administrations have never been enthusiastic about complying with our international obligations under the CAT. Several Attorneys General, BIA Appellate Immigration Judges, and some Immigration Judges have found lots of creative ways to narrow the scope of protection, raise the standards of proof to near impossible levels, and to intentionally misconstrue country conditions against CAT applicants.

Undoubtedly, that gratifies and satisfies the desires of their political masters and handlers. Not surprisingly it comes as the Administration is denying access to asylum seekers and sending them into the CAT “reasonable fear” process.

What it doesn’t do is honestly live up to our solemn and binding international and human rights agreements, nor does it comply with Constitutional concepts of fundamental fairness and Due Process.

We need an independent U.S. Immigration Court System populated by Judges from diverse backgrounds with expertise in immigration and human rights laws, human empathy, and the courage and integrity to stand up for the full legal and human rights of the most vulnerable and endangered individuals in our legal system. Even when it could be “career threatening!”

PWS

11-16-18

SPLIT BIA FINALLY RULES ON “FINALITY” – MATTER OF J.M. ACOSTA, 27 I&N DEC. 420 (BIA 2018)

3934JM ACOSTA

Matter of J.M. ACOSTA, 27 I&N Dec. 420 (BIA 2018)

BIA HEADNOTE:

(1) A conviction does not attain a sufficient degree of finality for immigration purposes until the right to direct appellate review on the merits of the conviction has been exhausted or waived.

(2) Once the Department of Homeland Security has established that a respondent has a criminal conviction at the trial level and that the time for filing a direct appeal has passed, a presumption arises that the conviction is final for immigration purposes, which the respondent can rebut with evidence that an appeal has been filed within the prescribed deadline, including any extensions or permissive filings granted by the appellate court, and that the appeal relates to the issue of guilt or innocence or concerns a substantive defect in the criminal proceedings.

(3) Appeals, including direct appeals, and collateral attacks that do not relate to the underlying merits of a conviction will not be given effect to eliminate the finality of the conviction.

PANEL: BIA APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGES KELLY, GREER, AND MALPHRUS

OPINION BY: JUDGE EDWARD F. KELLY

CONCURRING & DISSENTING OPINION: JUDGE GARRY D. MALPHRUS

KEY QUOTE FROM JUDGE KELLY’S MAJORITY OPINION:

In holding that the finality requirement continues to apply after the enactment of the IIRIRA, we emphasize that a conviction does not attain a sufficient degree of finality for immigration purposes until the right to direct appellate review on the merits of the conviction has been exhausted or waived.11 Consequently, absent proof of a waiver of appeal rights, a conviction does not achieve finality for immigration purposes until the time for filing an initial direct appeal has expired under the laws of the applicable jurisdiction. However, once the DHS has established that a respondent has a criminal conviction at the trial level and that the time for filing a direct appeal has passed, a presumption arises that the conviction is final for immigration purposes.

To rebut that presumption, a respondent must come forward with evidence that an appeal has been filed within the prescribed deadline, including any extensions or permissive filings granted by the appellate court.12 He or she must also present evidence that the appeal relates to the issue of guilt or innocence or concerns a substantive defect in the criminal proceedings. See Matter of Marquez Conde, 27 I&N Dec. at 255 (reaffirmingMatter of Pickering and reiterating that “convictions that have been vacated based on procedural and substantive defects in the underlying criminal proceeding [are] no longer valid for immigration purposes”); see also Matter of Rodriguez-Ruiz, 22 I&N Dec. at 1379–80 (giving effect to the alien’s vacated conviction where there was evidence by way of a court order that the conviction was vacated on the legal merits of the underlying criminal proceedings).

Appeals, including direct appeals, and collateral attacks that do not relate to the underlying merits of the conviction will not be given effect to eliminate the finality of the conviction. Such appeals include those that relate only to the alien’s sentence or that seek to reduce the charges, to ameliorate the conviction for rehabilitative purposes, or to alleviate immigration hardships, and any other appeals that do not challenge the merits of the conviction. See Matter of Roldan, 22 I&N Dec. 512, 521–24 (BIA 1999) (holding that under the statutory definition of a “conviction” in section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, no effect is to be given in immigration proceedings to a State action that purports to expunge, dismiss, cancel, vacate, discharge, or otherwise remove a guilty plea or other record of guilt or conviction by operation of a State rehabilitative statute); see also Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. at 624–25 (holding that a conviction set aside for reasons solely related to post-conviction events such as rehabilitation or immigration hardships will remain a conviction for immigration purposes).13

In this case, the respondent submitted evidence indicating that he filed a motion for an extension of the appeal deadline and that the motion was granted and the appeal was permitted by the New York appellate court.14Under these circumstances, we will remand this case to the Immigration Judge to consider the status of the pending appeal and its basis and to determine whether a continuance may be appropriate. See Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. 405 (A.G. 2018). In this regard, the respondent and the DHS should be given an opportunity to present any additional documentary and testimonial evidence they wish to offer in assisting the Immigration Judge.

Accordingly, the appeal from the Immigration Judge’s determination that the respondent is removable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Act and from his denial of the respondent’s application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Act will be dismissed. The respondent’s motion to remand based on new evidence will be granted.

[Text of Footnotes Omitted]

KEY QUOTE FROM JUDGE MALPHRUS’S CONCURRING & DISSENTING OPINION:

Based on the plain language of the Act and the clear weight of authority in the circuit courts, I would conclude that “the first definition of ‘conviction’ in § [101](a)(48)(A) requires only that the trial court enter a formal judgment of guilt, without any requirement that all direct appeals be exhausted or waived.” Planes, 652 F.3d at 996. The majority errs by invoking congressional silence to convert the otherwise plain language at issue here into statutory ambiguity, thereby giving us license to resolve the ambiguity in the manner that we think is best. “Regardless of our view on the wisdom or efficacy of Congress’s policy choices, we are not free to read in additional elements where the legislature has declined to include them.”Id. (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216–17 (2007)).

I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to remand this case for further proceedings. I would deny the respondent’s motion to remand because the new evidence does not indicate that his conviction has been overturned or vacated, and he remains ineligible for relief under former section 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994). See Matter of Coelho, 20 I&N Dec. 464 (BIA 1992).

************************************

This is important guidance from the BIA on a recurring question before U.S. Immigration Judges. Congrats to Judge Kelly on what, by my calculation, is his first published precedent opinion. And, he and Judge Anne Greer appear to have gotten it right. I don’t understand Judge Malphrus’s contention (in a part of his opinion not quoted above) that an individual who is actually removed based on a conviction later vacated on appeal hasn’t suffered any unfairness or irreparable harm.

PWS

08-30-18

NEW PRECEDENT: Family Is A PSG, But Beware Of Nexus — Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 2017) — Read My “Alternative Analysis!”

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/969456/download

BIA Headnote:

“(1) Whether a particular social group based on family membership is cognizable depends on the nature and degree of the relationships involved and how those relationships are regarded by the society in question. (2) To establish eligibility for asylum on the basis of membership in a particular social group composed of family members, an applicant must not only demonstrate that he or she is a member of the family but also that the family relationship is at least one central reason for the claimed harm.”

PANEL: BIA Appellate Immigration Judges Greer, Malphrus, Liebowitz

OPINION BY: Judge Anne Greer

*****************************************************

I was the Immigration Judge in one of the leading “family as a PSG” cases cited by the BIA, the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 124−25 (4th Cir. 2011). In Crespin, I had granted asylum to a Salvadoran family comprising a PSG of “family members of those who actively oppose gangs in El Salvador by agreeing to be prosecutorial witnesses.”

The BIA reversed me on appeal, and the respondents sought judicial review in the Fourth Circuit. That Court (much to my delight and satisfaction, I must admit) reversed the BIA and agreed with me that the respondent’s PSG was valid.

Following that, family based PSGs came up frequently in the Arlington Immigration Court. However, in a number of cases, as in L-E-A-, in their haste to posit a valid family-based PSG, attorneys neglected to prove the nexus between the PSG and the harm, or, even more surprisingly, failed to show that the respondent was even a member of the proposed PSG. Details are important!

Nevertheless, since family-based PSG cases are often “grantable,” I can’t help wondering why the BIA selected a denial for the precedent, rather than putting forth a positive example of how family-based PSGs can be a legitimate means of granting protection under the law and thereby saving lives?

In L-E-A-, the PSG was the respondent’s membership in his father’s family. Gangs threatened him with harm because they wanted him to sell drugs in his father’s store, and he refused. The respondent’s membership in the family is immutable. Additionally, there is no reason to believe that the gangs would have threatened the respondent but for his membership in a family which ran a store where they wanted to sell drugs.

Consequently, the IJ and the BIA panel could just have easily found that “family membership” was at least one central reason for the threatened harm. To me, this seems like a better analysis. I find the panel’s observation that anyone who owned the store would have been threatened irrelevant. So what?

PWS

05-25-17

For those interested in what the law actually says (clearly an “endangered minority” @ Garland’s BIA), here’s key language from Judge Greer’s dissent:

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

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