Tag: Judge Blair T. O’Connor

“So while I do not disagree with the point made by the majority and the DHS about avoiding absurd results, I unfortunately do not find it to be persuasive. This statement alone is a sad commentary on the state of affairs when it comes to making criminal law determinations in immigration proceedings and is an earnest call for a congressional fix to the mess we currently find ourselves in. See United States v. Fish, 758 F.3d 1, 17–18 (1st Cir. 2014) (collecting cases that call on Congress to “rescue the federal courts from the mire into which . . . [the] ‘categorical approach’ [has] pushed [them]” (quoting Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 131–32 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring))); Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2258 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting the “continued congressional inaction in the face of a system that each year proves more unworkable”).

Finally, it bears noting that the Third Circuit has already found § 860 to be the proper Federal analogue to section 2C:35-7, albeit in an unpublished decision. See Chang-Cruz, 659 F. App’x 114. In that decision, the Government conceded that this was the case, and having lost the divisibility battle there, the DHS now seeks to use § 841 to argue that section 2C:35-7 is categorically an aggravated felony drug trafficking crime. Although I do not disagree with the majority that such an approach is permissible, I do so with reservations over how much more complicated categorical determinations may become for adjudicators who must now decide what is an “appropriate Federal analogue” and consider that analogue, or any permissible combination of such analogues, in discerning whether a State offense is a felony under the Controlled Substances Act. These determinations are difficult enough for an immigration system that is already overburdened. In the words of Justice Alito, “I wish them good luck.” Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2268 (Alito, J., dissenting).”

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Bottom line:

• The respondent loses (of course);
• The law is too complicated; and
• Judge O’Connor thinks it should be unnecessary to go through all this rigmarole because this is a “bad guy” whom Congress clearly intended to kick out without recourse.

If anyone can explain the legal gibberish in this case further to me in plain English in 25 words or fewer, please do!

I get the point that the law has become too complex. But, this discussion seems to bypass the real problem in cases like this that has been “lost in space.”

How would an unrepresented, detained individual who doesn’t speak English properly defend him or herself in a case like this. The clear answer: they couldn’t, since even the “expert judges” in the Ivory (or Glass) Towers with their teams of cracker-jack law clerks are struggling with this stuff. Therefore, in the absence of counsel, appointed if necessary, these hearings before the Immigration Judges are nothing but judicial farces, theaters of the absurd, that mock due process and fairness and trample our Constitution. Samuel Beckett, Luigi Pirandello, Friedrich Dürrenmatt, and friends would be proud of what’s been accomplished in our 21st Century immigration system!

That’s the problem to which both Congress and the Article III Appellate Courts need to wake up before it’s too late. In the meantime, please explain to me just how Sessions’s “pedal faster, schedule more, cut corners” approach to the Immigration Courts is helping to solve this problem?

PWS

03-14-18