⚖️MATTER OF A-B- REMAND: Many More To Follow! — But, Without Progressive Reforms By Garland, Due Process, Fundamental Fairness, & Best Practices Will Remain Elusive! 

 

Dan Kowalski reports on LexisNexis Immigration Community:

https://www.lexisnexis.com/LegalNewsRoom/immigration/b/insidenews/posts/unpub-ca6-on-honduras-social-group#

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Daniel M. Kowalski

7 Jul 2021

Unpub. CA6 on Honduras, Social Group: u

Corea Escoto v. Garland (unpub.)

“Given the BIA’s repeated reliance on A-B-, briefing on the effect of A-B-’s overruling is necessary. We remand to the BIA to reconsider Corea’s asylum claim in the first instance, this time under pre-A-B- caselaw.”

[Hats off to Sally M. Joyner!]

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********************

Garland has failed to :

  • Get rid of the “Miller Lite Denial Club @ EOIR;”
  • Bring in progressive immigration experts at the BIA and the Immigration Courts;
  • Generate long-overdue positive precedents on granting asylum to those persecuted by domestic violence and other forms of gender-based persecution.

Consequently, these remands (of many cases that should have been granted years ago) are likely to be yet another “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” disaster. The BIA was “all over the place” on A-R-C-G- domestic violence cases even prior to Session’s racist, misogynistic, intellectually dishonest atrocity in A-B-. Without a better qualified, courageous, expert BIA committed to due process and positive precedents on how to efficiently recognize and grant “gender-based” asylum cases, the backlog-building, due-process-denying, equal-justice-eroding deadly farce known as “refugee roulette” @ EOIR will continue!🤮☠️

Tell Garland you’ve had (more than) enough. Fix EOIR with real progressive judges and competent judicial (not bureaucratic) administrators! 🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

07-08-21

TRASVINA RESTORES “PD” @ ICE; 6TH CIR. REJECTS CASTRO-TUM! BUT GARLAND’S FAILURES @ EOIR CONTINUE TO HAMPER BIDEN ADMINISTRATION, CAUSE CONFUSION, INCREASE BACKLOGS!  — “In performing their duties, including through implementation of this memorandum, OPLA attorneys should remain mindful that ‘[i]mmigration enforcement obligations do not consist only of initiating and conducting prompt proceedings that lead to removals at any cost. Rather, as has been said, the government wins when justice is done.’” 

John D. Trasvina
John D. Trasvina
Principal Legal Adviser
ICE — Finally, some common sense, practical scholarship, leadership, and “good government” from someone in the Biden Administration’s Senior Immigration Team! Not surprisingly, it’s from one of the few who has actually “walked the walk” on the relationship between racial justice and immigrants’ rights. He appears to be the “right person” for ICE. Would he have been a better choice to clean up the mess at DOJ?
PHOTO: Wikipedia

 

https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/opla/OPLA-immigration-enforcement_interim-guidance.pdf

   MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM:

SUBJECT:

May 27, 2021 All OPLA Attorneys

John D. Trasvifia Principal Legal Advisor

JOHN D TRASVINA

DigitallysignedbyJOHN0 TRASVINA

Date:2021.05.27 07:04:19 -07’00’

Interim Guidance to OPLA Attorneys Regarding Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies and Priorities

On January 20, 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order (EO) 13993, Revision ofCivil Immigration Enforcement Policies and Priorities, 86 Fed. Reg. 7051 (Jan. 20, 2021), which articulated foundational values and priorities for the Administration with respect to the enforcement of the civil immigration laws. On the same day, then-Acting Secretary ofHomeland Security David Pekoske issued a memorandum titled, Review o fand Interim Revision to Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies and Priorities (Interim Memorandum).

The Interim Memorandum did four things. First, it directed a comprehensive Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department)-wide review of civil immigration enforcement policies. Second, it established interim civil immigration enforcement priorities for the Department. Third, it instituted a 100-day pause on certain removals pending the review. Fourth, it rescinded several existing policy memoranda, including a prior U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Office ofthe Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA) memorandum, as inconsistent with EO 13993.2 The Interim Memorandum further directed that ICE issue interim guidance implementing the revised enforcement priorities and the removal pause.

On February 18, 2021, ICE Acting Director Tae D. Johnson issued ICE Directive No. 11090.1,

1

On January 26, 2021, a federal district court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining DHS and its components from enforcing and implementing Section C ofthe interim Memorandum titled, Immediate JOO-Day Pause on Removals. See Texas v. United States, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2021 WL 247877 (S.D. Tex. 2021); see also Texas v. United States, 2021 WL 411441 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2021) (extending TRO to February 23, 2021). On February 23, 2021 , the district court issued an order preliminarily enjoining DHS from “enforcing and implementing the policies described in … Section C.” Texas v. United States, 2021 WL 723856 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2021). In light of the expiration of the 100-day period described in Section C, that case has been dismissed as moot. Similarly, in light ofthe preliminary injunction, and the fact that the 100-day period described in the Interim Memorandum has now expired, this interim OPLA guidance does not implement Section C of the Interim Memorandum.

2 The Interim Memorandum revoked, as inconsistent with EO 13993, the memorandum from former Principal Legal Advisor Tracy Short, Guidance to OPLA Attorneys Regarding the Implementation ofthe President’s Executive Orders and the Secretary’s Directives on Immigration Enforcement (Aug. 15, 2017). OPLA attorneys should no longer apply that prior guidance.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Office o fthe Principal Legal Advisor

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 500 12th Street, SW

Washington, DC 20536

U.S. Immigration

and Customs Enforcement

www.1ce.gov

1

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Interim Guidance: Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Priorities (Johnson Memorandum). And, on May 27, 2021, Acting General Counsel Joseph B. Maher issued a memorandum titled, Implementing Interim Civil Immigration Enforcement Policies and Priorities (Maher Memorandum). In accordance with these memoranda, and pending the outcome of the Secretary’s review and any resulting policy guidance, I am providing this additional interim direction to OPLA attorneys to guide them in appropriately executing the Department’s and ICE’s interim enforcement and removal priorities and exercising prosecutorial discretion.

Prosecutorial discretion is an indispensable feature of any functioning legal system. The exercise ofprosecutorial discretion, where appropriate, can preserve limited government resources, achieve just and fair outcomes in individual cases, and advance the Department’s mission of administering and enforcing the immigration laws ofthe United States in a smart and sensible way that promotes public confidence. In performing their duties, including through implementation ofthis memorandum, OPLA attorneys should remain mindful that “[i]mmigration enforcement obligations do not consist only of initiating and conducting prompt proceedings that lead to removals at any cost. Rather, as has been said, the government wins when justice is done.” 3 As a result, they are both authorized by law and expected to exercise discretion in accordance with the factors and considerations set forth in the Interim Memorandum, the Johnson Memorandum, the Maher Memorandum, and in this guidance at all stages of the enforcement process and at the earliest moment practicable in order to best conserve prosecutorial resources and in recognition o f the important interests at stake.

I. Enforcement and Removal Priority Cases

The Johnson Memorandum identifies three categories of cases that are presumed to be enforcement and removal priorities for ICE personnel. Subject to preapproval from supervisory personnel, other civil immigration enforcement or removal actions also may be deemed priorities. OPLA attorneys assigned to handle exclusion, deportation, and removal proceedings are directed to prioritize agency resources consistent with those presumed priorities and other matters approved as priorities under the Johnson Memorandum or by their Chief Counsel. The presumed priority categories are:

1. NationalSecurity.Noncitizens.4 whohaveengagedinoraresuspectedof

3 Matter ofS-M-J-, 21 l&N Dec. 722, 727 (BIA 1997) (en bane). In remarks delivered at the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys more than 80 years ago, Attorney General Robert H. Jackson said, “[n]othing better can come out of this meeting of law enforcement officers than a rededication to the spirit of fair play and decency that should animate the federal prosecutor. Your positions are ofsuch independence and importance that while you are being diligent, strict, and vigorous in law enforcement you can also afford to be just Although the government technically loses its case, it has really won ifjustice has been done.” Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUD. Soc’Y 18, 18-19 (1940).

4 Consistent with ICE guidance, this memorandum uses the word “noncitizen” to refer to individuals described in section 10l(a)(3) ofthe Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). See Memorandum from Tae Johnson, ICE Acting Director, Updated Terminologyfor Communications and Materials (Apr. 19, 2021). OPLA attorneys should familiarize themselves with this ICE guidance and use the appropriate terminology set forth therein when engaged in outreach efforts, drafting internal documents, and communicating with stakeholders, partners, and the general

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ten-orism or espionage or terrorism-related or espionage-related activities, or whose apprehension, arrest, or custody, is otherwise necessary to protect the national security ofthe United States..5

2. Border Security. Noncitizens who were apprehended at the border or a port ofentry while attempting to unlawfully enter the United States on or after November 1, 2020, or who were not physically present in the United States before November 1, 2020.

3. Public Safety. Noncitizens who have been convicted of an “aggravated felony,” as that term is defined in section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), or who have been convicted ofan offense for which an element was active pa1ticipation in a criminal street gang, as defined in

18 U.S.C. § 52 l(a), or who are not younger than 16 years of age and intentionally participated in an organized criminal gang or transnational criminal organization to further the illegal activity ofthe gang or transnational criminal organization; and are determined to pose a threat to public safety.6

Neither the presumed priorities nor the guidance regarding other priority cases subject to preapproval are intended to require or prohibit taking or maintaining a civil immigration enforcement or removal action against any individual noncitizen. Rather, OPLA attorneys are expected to exercise their discretion thoughtfully, consistent with ICE’s important national security, border security, and public safety mission. Civil immigration enforcement and removal efforts involving a noncitizen whose case fits within the three areas just listed are presumed to be a justified allocation ofICE’s limited resources. Enforcement and removal efforts may also be

justified in other cases, under appropriate circumstances. 7 Prioritization of finite agency

public. Formal legal terminology (e.g., “alien,” “alienage”) should continue to be used by OPLA attorneys when appearing before judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals, and when quoting or citing to sources of legal authority or other official documents like immigration forms.

5 For purposes of the national security presumed enforcement priority, the tenns “terrorism or espionage” and “terrorism-related or espionage-related activities” should be applied consistent with (I) the definitions of”terrorist activity” and “engage in terrorist activity” in section 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)-(iv) of the INA, and (2) the manner in which the term “espionage” is generally applied in the immigration laws. In evaluating whether a noncitizen’s “apprehension, arrest, and/or custody, or removal is otherwise necessary to protect” national security, officers and agents should determine whether a noncitizen poses a threat to United States sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interests, or institutions. General criminal activity does not amount to a national security threat.

6 In evaluating whether a noncitizen currently “pose[s] a threat to public safety,” consideration should be given to the extensiveness, seriousness, and recency ofthe criminal activity, as well as to mitigating factors, including, but not limited to, personal and family circumstances, health and medical factors, ties to the community, evidence of rehabilitation, and whether the individual has potential immigration relief available. See Johnson Memorandum at 5.

7 As reflected in the Johnson Memorandum, Field Office Director (FOD) or Special Agent in Charge (SAC) approval is generally required in advance ofcivil immigration enforcement or removal actions taken by ICE officers and agents in cases other than presumed priority cases. Where exigent circumstances and public safety concerns make it impracticable to obtain pre-approval for an at-large enforcement action (e.g., where a noncitizen poses an imminent threat to life or an imminent substantial threat to property), approval should be requested within 24 hours following the action. See Johnson Memorandum at 6.

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resources is a consideration in all civil immigration enforcement and removal decisions, including but not limited to the following:

• Deciding whether to issue a detainer, or whether to assume custody of a noncitizen subject to a previously issued detainer;

• Deciding whether to issue, reissue, serve, file, or cancel a Notice to Appear (NTA);

• Deciding whether to focus resources only on administrative violations or conduct;

• Deciding whether to stop, question, or arrest a noncitizen for an administrative violation of the civil immigration laws;

• Deciding whether to detain or release from custody subject to conditions or on the individual’s own recognizance;

• Deciding whether to settle, dismiss, oppose or join in a motion on a case, narrow the issues in dispute through stipulation, or pursue appeal in removal proceedings;

• Deciding when and under what circumstances to execute final orders of removal; and

• Deciding whether to grant defe1Ted action or parole.

This non-exhaustive list ofcivil immigration enforcement and removal decisions identifies opportunities at every stage ofthe process to ensure the most just, fair, and legally appropriate outcome, whether that outcome is a grant of relief, an order of removal, or an exercise of discretion that allows the noncitizen to pursue immigration benefits outside the context of removal proceedings. This memorandum provides interim guidance regarding the following enforcement decisions within OPLA’s purview: filing or canceling an NTA; moving to administratively close or continue proceedings; moving to dismiss proceedings; pursuing appeal;

joining in a motion to grant reliefor to reopen or remand removal proceedings and entering stipulations; and taking a position in bond proceedings, as discussed below..8 While discretion may be exercised at any stage of the process and changed circumstances for an individual denied prosecutorial discretion at one stage may warrant reconsideration at a later stage, discretion generally should be exercised at the earliest point possible, once relevant facts have been established to properly inform the decision.

8 While resources should be allocated to the presumed priorities enumerated above, “nothing in [the Interim M]emorandum prohibits the apprehension or detention ofindividuals unlawfully in the United States who are not identified as priorities herein.” Interim Memorandum at 3. See also Johnson Memorandum at 3 (“[J]t is vitally important to note that the interim priorities do not require or prohibit the atTest, detention, or removal ofany noncitizen.”); Maher Memorandum at 3 (“Neither the presumed priorities nor the guidance regarding other priority cases subject to preapproval are intended to require or prohibit taking or maintaining a civil immigration enforcement action against an individual noncitizen.”). OPLA may dedicate its resources to pursuing enforcement action against a noncitizen who does not fall into one of the presumed enforcement priorities where the FOD or SAC has approved taking enforcement action in the case, where the NTA-issuing agency has exercised its own discretion to prioritize the noncitizen for enforcement under the Interim Memorandum, or where the ChiefCounsel, in their discretion, decides that OPLA resources should be committed to the case.

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This memorandum is intended to provide guidance pending completion ofthe DHS-wide comprehensive review of civil immigration enforcement and removal policies and practices contemplated in the Interim Memorandum. To that end, additional guidance will be fo1thcoming.

II. Prosecutorial Discretion

OPLA will continue to fulfill its statutory responsibility as DHS’s representative before the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) with respect to exclusion, deportation, and removal proceedings. See 6 U.S.C. § 252(c). In that capacity, prosecutorial discretion plays an important role in OPLA’s enforcement decision making. The following general guidance on prosecutorial discretion should inform how OPLA attorneys apply the enforcement priorities of DHS and ICE.

OPLA attorneys may exercise prosecutorial discretion in proceedings before EOIR, subject to direction from their chain ofcommand and applicable guidance from DHS. In exercising such discretion, OPLA attorneys will adhere to the enduring principles that apply to all o f their activities: upholding the rule oflaw; discharging duties ethically in accordance with the law and professional standards of conduct; following the guidelines and strategic directives of senior leadership; and exercising considered judgment and doing justice in individual cases, consistent with DHS and ICE priorities.

Prosecutorial discretion is the longstanding authority o f an agency charged with enforcing the law to decide where to focus its resources and whether or how to enforce, or not to enforce, the law against an individual. In the context of OPLA’s role in the administration and enforcement of the immigration laws, prosecutorial discretion arises at different stages of the removal process, takes different forms, and applies to a variety ofdeterminations. As the Supreme Court explained more than two decades ago when discussing the removal process, “[a]t each stage the Executive has discretion to abandon the endeavor . . . .”.9

OPLA’s policy is to exercise prosecutorial discretion in a manner that furthers the security ofthe United States and the faithful and just execution ofthe immigration laws, consistent with DHS’s and ICE’s enforcement and removal priorities. While prosecutorial discretion is not a formal program or benefit offered by OPLA, OPLA attorneys are empowered to exercise prosecutorial discretion in their assigned duties consistent with this guidance. Among other decisions, the exercise of discretion also generally includes whether to assign an attorney to represent the department in a particular case. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.2(b) (creating expectation that DHS will assign counsel to cases involving mental competency, noncitizen minors, and contested removability, but that otherwise, “in his or her discretion, whenever he or she deems such assignment necessary or advantageous, the General Counsel may assign a [DHS] attorney to any other case at any stage of the proceeding”) (emphasis added). OPLA Chief Counsel are permitted to exercise this discretion on my behalf, in appropriate consultation with their chain of command.

In determining whether to exercise prosecutorial discretion, OPLA should consider relevant aggravating and mitigating factors. Relevant mitigating factors may include a noncitizen’s length

9 Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 47 1, 483-84 ( 1999). FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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of residence in the United States; service in the U.S. military; family or community ties in the United States; circumstances ofarrival in the United States and the manner oftheir entry; prior immigration history; current immigration status (where lawful permanent resident (LPR) status generally warrants greater consideration, but not to the exclusion ofother noncitizens depending on the totality ofthe circumstances); work history in the United States; pursuit or completion of education in the United States; status as a victim, witness, or plaintiff in civil or criminal proceedings; whether the individual has potential immigration relief available; contributions to the community; and any compelling humanitarian factors, including poor health, age, pregnancy, status as a child, or status as a primary caregiver ofa seriously ill relative in the United States. Relevant aggravating factors may include criminal history, participation in persecution or other human rights violations, extensiveness and seriousness ofprior immigration violations (e.g., noncompliance with conditions of release, prior illegal entries, removals by ICE), and fraud or material misrepresentation. Where a criminal history exists, OPLA should consider the extensiveness, seriousness, and recency ofthe criminal activity, as well as any indicia of rehabilitation; extenuating circumstances involving the offense or conviction; the time and length ofsentence imposed and served, ifany; the age ofthe noncitizen at the time the crime was committed; the length oftime since the offense or conviction occurred; and whether subsequent criminal activity supports a determination that the noncitizen poses a threat to public safety. These factors are not intended to be dispositive or exhaustive. Discretion should be exercised on a case-by-case basis considering the totality ofthe circumstances.

Requests for prosecutorial discretion may be made in accordance with the instructions provided in Section IX of this guidance. Where a request for prosecutorial discretion is made, the OPLA attorney handling the case must document that request in PLAnet, identifying the requester and the substance of the request and uploading any supporting documentation consistent with standard operating procedures (SOPs). 10 Based on my experience working with you over the past few months, I believe strongly in the professionalism, legal skill, and judgment of OPLA’s attorneys, working through their supervisors to advise our clients and manage an enormous workload with limited resources. I trust and expect that all OPLA field attorneys, under the leadership ofourChiefCounsel, will work strenuously to ensure the timely and appropriate exercise ofdiscretion in meritorious removal cases. That being said, given the tremendous importance of achieving just and correct outcomes on these issues, it is entirely pe1missible for any OPLA attorney to raise prosecutorial discretion decisions through their chain ofcommand to OPLA headquaiters (HQ) for additional review or discussion.

Appropriate exercises ofprosecutorial discretion are in the mutual interest of both the person benefitting from the exercise ofdiscretion and the government itself. This mutual interest is no less significant because a noncitizen does not affirmatively request prosecutorial discretion. In the absence of an affirmative request for prosecutorial discretion by a noncitizen or a noncitizen’s representative, OPLA attorneys should nonetheless examine the cases to which they are assigned to determine independently whether a favorable exercise ofdiscretion may be

10 If the case involves classified information, the OPLA attorney must transmit such information only in accordance with the DHS Office ofthe ChiefSecurity Officer Publication, Safeguarding Classified & Sensitive But Unclassified Information Reference Pamphlet (Feb. 2012, or as updated), and all other applicable policies governing the handling ofclassified information.

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appropriate. This affirmative duty to evaluate assigned cases is central to an OPLA attorney’s job. Chief Counsel should include in their local SOPs ways to address these cases including how

OPLA attorneys should document their affirmative consideration ofprosecutorial discretion in PLAnet.

III. Notices to Appear

When a legally sufficient, appropriately documented NTA has been issued by a DHS component consistent with the component’s issuing and enforcement guidelines, 11 it will generally be filed with the immigration court and proceedings litigated to completion unless the Chief Counsel exercises prosecutorial discretion based on their assessment of the case. 12 As prosecutorial discretion is expected to be exercised at all stages of the enforcement process and at the earliest moment practicable, it may be appropriate for the Chief Counsel to conclude that a legally

sufficient, a ro riatel documented administrative immi ration case warrants non-filin of an

NTA_ (b)(S) (b)(5)

(b)(S) Where an NTA is issued but not filed with the immigration court pursuant to this section, OPLA should document the reasoning for this position in PLAnet and the OPLA Field Location should work with its local Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) Field Office to cancel the NTA and inform the noncitizen of the cancellation. 13

IV. Administrative Closure and Continuance of Proceedings

In the past, OPLA had broad authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion by agreeing to

administrative closure of cases by EOIR. However, due to conflicting court of appeals decisions

11 This includes NTAs submitted to OPLA by ICE operational components as well as U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for review. “Appropriately documented” in this context means that, in OPLA’s litigation judgment, sufficient information has been provided by the NTA-issuing component to carry any DHS burden of proof. See INA§ 240(c), 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8.

12 Separate and apart from the enforcement priority framework outlined in the Interim Memorandum and Johnson Memorandum, certain noncitizens have an established right to be placed into removal proceedings. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. §§ 208. l4(c)(l) (requiring referral for removal proceedings ofa removable noncitizen whose affirmative asylum application is not granted by USCIS); 216.4(d)(2) (requiring NTA issuance to noncitizen whose joint petition to remove conditional basis ofLPR status is denied by USCIS); 216.S(f) (same; USCIS denial ofapplication for waiver of the joint petition requirement). In other cases, USCIS may issue an NTA on a discretionary basis to a noncitizen who wishes to pursue immigration benefits before the immigration court. Although such cases do not fall within the priority framework, absent an affirmative request by the noncitizen prior to the merits hearing for the favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion to dismiss removal proceedings, OPLA attorneys should generally litigate them to completion. If such noncitizens are ordered removed, requests for prosecutorial discretion would then most properly be made to ERO for evaluation in accordance with the Department’s and ICE’s stated priorities.

13 The NTA cancellation regulation vests immigration officers who have the authority to issue NTAs with the authority to also cancel them. 8 C.F.R. § 239.2(a). The regulation expresses a preference for certain NTAs to be cancelled by the same officer who issued them “unless it is impracticable” to do so. Id. § 239.2(b). Given the enormous size ofthe EOIR docket, current OPLA staffing levels, and complexities associated with routing any significant number ofNTAs back to specific issuing officers stationed around the country, it would be impracticable to require OPLA attorneys to do so. By contrast, the local ERO Field Offices with which OPLA Field Locations routinely interact are well suited to assist with this function promptly and efficiently.

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on the validity ofMatter ofCastro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018) (limiting administrative closure by EOIR adjudicators to circumstances where a previous regulation or judicially approved settlement expressly authorizes such an action), the availability ofadministrative closure as a form ofprosecutorial discretion for ICE and a tool ofdocket management for EOIR is limited in certain jurisdictions for certain types of cases. 14 Nevertheless, OPLA retains authority to handle pending cases on EOIR’s docket by deciding whether to agree to a continuance for “good cause shown” under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29, see also Matter ofL-A-B-R-, I&N Dec. 405 (A.G. 2018) (interpreting this regulation), and whether to seek, oppose, or join in a motion for dismissal of proceedings pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(c).

The presumed priorities outlined above will be a significant factor informing the position that OPLA attorneys take in response to continuance motions made by noncitizens in removal proceedings. Indeed, given the comprehensive review of immigration enforcement and removal policies and practices directed by Section A ofthe Interim Memorandum, OPLA attorneys are authorized to take the general position that “good cause” exists in cases in which noncitizens who fall outside the presumed priorities seek to have their cases continued to await the outcome of that comprehensive review. 15 Continuing cases in these circumstances may conserve OPLA resources in cases where the ultimate arrest, detention, and removal of a noncitizen are unlikely. Accordingly, while immigration judges (Us) will make case-by-case assessments whether continuance motions are supported by “good cause shown” under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29, and OPLA attorneys should assess each continuance motion on its own terms, in the absence ofserious aggravating factors, the fact that a noncitizen is not a presumed priority should weigh heavily in favor of not opposing the noncitizen’s motion. Before opposing a continuance in such cases, OPLA attorneys should confer with their supervisors. The reason for opposing the motion should also be documented in PLAnet.

V. Dismissal of Proceedings

With approximately 1.3 million cases on the immigration courts’ dockets nationwide, and the varied procedural postures of such cases, including many set for future merits hearings on re.lief or protection from removal, OPLA will cover, at a later date and in a comprehensive fashion, how to address the potential dismissal ofproceedings consistent with its limited resources and DHS and ICE guidance. The size ofthe court backlog and extraordinary delays in completing cases impede the interests ofjustice for both the government and respondents alike and underminepublicconfidenceinthis importantpillaroftheadministrationofthenation’s

14 Compare Hernandez-Serrano v. Barr, 981 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2020) (agreeing with Castro-Tum), with Arcos Sanchez, 2021 WL I774965, — F.3d — (3d Cir. 2021) (rejecting Castro-Tum and finding that EOIR regulations giving broad case management authority to its adjudicators includes administrative closure authority), Meza Morales v. Barr, 973 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2020) (Coney Barrett, J.) (same), and Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2019) (same). Notwithstanding this variation in circuit law, administrative closure remains available under Castro-Tum for T and V nonimmigrant visa applicants. See 8 C.F.R. §§ I214.2(a) (expressly allowing for administrative closure for noncitizens seeking to apply for T nonimmigrant status), 1214.3 (same; V nonimmigrant status).

15 This does not imply that “good cause” cannot exist in cases ofnoncitizens who fall into the presumed priority categories or are otherwise a civil immigration enforcement or removal priority. OPLA attorneys retain discretion to, as appropriate, agree to continuances in such cases.

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immigration laws. In advance of future guidance, cases that generally will merit dismissal in the absence of serious aggravating factors include:

I. MilitaryServiceMembersorImmediateRelativesThereof16

A favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion (i.e., concurrence with or non-opposition to a motion for dismissal ofproceedings without prejudice) generally will be appropriate if a noncitizen or immediate relative is a current or former member (honorably discharged) of the Armed Forces, including the U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Space Force, or a member of a reserve component of the Anned Forces or National Guard, particularly if the individual may qualify for U.S. citizenship under sections 328 or 329 ofthe I N A . _1 1

2. Individuals Likely to be Granted Temporary or Permanent Relief

When a noncitizen has a viable avenue available to regularize their immigration status outside of removal proceedings, whether through temporary or pennanent relief, it generally will be appropriate to move to dismiss such proceedings without prejudice so that the noncitizen can pursue that relief before the appropriate adjudicatory body. 18 This may be appropriate where, for instance, the noncitizen is the beneficiary of an approved Form 1-130, Petition for Alien Relative, and appears prima facie eligible for either adjustment of status under INA section 245 or an immigrant visa through consular processing abroad, including in conjunction with a provisional waiver of unlawful presence under 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(e), immediately or in the near future; appears prima facie eligible to register for Temporary Protected Status (TPS);.19 or is a child who appears prima facie eligible to pursue special immigrant juvenile status under INA section 101(a)(27) and 8 C.F.R. § 204.11. In such a circumstance, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion itselfcan help to promote the integrity ofour immigration system by enhancing the ability of certain noncitizens to come into compliance with our immigration laws.

3. Compelling Humanitarian Factors

The favorable exercise ofprosecutorial discretion- including agreeing to dismissal of proceedings without prejudice-generally will be appropriate when compelling humanitarian factors become apparent during NTA review or litigation of the case. While some factors will weigh more heavily than others, this can include cases where, for instance, the noncitizen has a serious health condition, is elderly, pregnant, or a minor; is the primary caregiver to, or has an

16 See Email from Kenneth Padilla, DPLA, Field Legal Operations, to all OPLA attorneys, Refresher Guidance Regarding United States Veterans and Military Service Members in Removal (Nov. 18, 2019).

17

citizenship. See ICE Directive 16001 .2, Investigating the Potential U S. Citizenship o fIndividuals Encountered by

Relatedly, OPLA attorneys must continue to follow ICE guidance related to the evaluation of claims to U.S. ICE (Nov. 10, 2015).

18 DHS regulations expressly contemplate joint motions to tenninate removal proceedings in appropriate cases in which the noncitizen is seeking to apply for U nonimmigrant status. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(I)(i).

19 Stipulation to TPS in such cases may also be an option, in the exercise ofdiscretion. Cf Matter ofD-A-C-, 27 I & N . D e c . 5 7 5 ( B I A 2 0 I 9 ) ( d i s c u s s i n g d i s c r e t i o n a r y a u t h o r i t y o f I J s t o g r a n t T P S ) ; S e c t i o n V I I , i n fr a .

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immediate family or household member who is, known to be suffering from serious physical or mental illness; is a victim ofdomestic violence, human trafficking, or other serious crime;.20 came to the United States as a young child and has since lived in the United States continuously; or is party to significant collateral civil litigation (e.g., family court proceedings, non-frivolous civil rights or labor claims).

4. Significant Law Enforcement or Other Governmental Interest

Where a noncitizen is a cooperating witness or confidential informant or is otherwise significantly assisting state or federal law enforcement, it may be appropriate in certain cases to agree to the dismissal ofproceedings without prejudice. “Law enforcement” in this context includes not only conventional criminal law enforcement, but also enforcement of labor and civil rights laws. In exercising discretion related to law enforcement equities, OPLA attorneys should be guided by the perspectives of the relevant investigating agency components (e.g., the Office ofInspector General, Office for Civil Rights and Civil Libe1ties, Depa1tmentofJustice Immigrant and Employee Rights Section, Department of Labor, National Labor Relations Board, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, other federal agencies, ERO, Homeland Security Investigations, and any relevant state counterparts). Additionally, such law enforcement entities may have tools at their disposal that OPLA does not, including stays of removal, deferred action, T and U nonimmigrant status law enforcement certification, and requests for S nonimmigrant classification. In any event, national security, border security, and public safety are paramount in deciding whether to continue litigating removal proceedings.

5. Long-TermLawfulPermanentResidents

A favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion should also be considered for LPRs who have resided in the United States for many years, paiticularly when they acquired their LPR status at a young age and have demonstrated close family and community ties. Dismissal ofsuch cases that do not present serious aggravating factors will allow the noncitizen to maintain a lawful immigration status and conserve finite government resources.

When OPLA agrees to dismissal of removal proceedings as an exercise ofprosecutorial discretion in the categories above, the reasoning for this position should be recorded in PLAnet.

VI. Pursuing Appeal

In our immigration system, DHS initiates removal proceedings while IJs and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) exercise the Attorney General’s delegated authority to adjudicate issues ofremovability and reliefand protection from removal. OPLA attorneys continue to possess the discretion to take legally viable appeals ofIJ decisions and make appropriate legal arguments in response to noncitizen appeals and motions..2 1 Appellate advocacy should generally

20 See generally ICE Directive No. 10076.1, Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs (June 17,2011).

21 OPLAheadquartersdivisionsshouldcontinuetocoordinatewithimpactedDHSOfficeoftheGeneralCounsel (OGC) headquarters and component counsel offices when preparing briefs and motions in significant litigation.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

   OPLA Guidance Regarding Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies and Priorities Page 11 of13

focus on priority cases- national security, border security, and public safety. Of course, other considerations, such as significant aggravating and mitigating factors and the need to seek clarity on an important legal issue, are appropriate for OPLA attorneys to take into account, consistent with direction from their respective Chief Counsel.

Consistent with any local guidance issued by their respective Chief Counsel,.22 OPLA attorneys may waive appeal in a case that is not a priority. OPLA attorneys may also decline to appeal where there is little likelihood ofsuccess before the BIA. While OPLA attorneys may reserve appeal to ensure the articulation ofa fully reasoned decision by an IJ to help inform whether the appeal should ultimately be perfected, OPLA attorneys may also waive appeal, where appropriate, in the interest ofjudicial efficiency and in recognition of limited resources.

OPLA Field Locations generally coordinate appellate advocacy before the BIA with the Immigration Law and Practice Division (ILPD)..23 OPLA Field Locations and ILPD should continue to work together, along with any other relevant OPLA HQ divisions, to craft strong and nationally consistent appellate work product. Again, in committing OPLA resources to perfecting appeal and drafting appellate pleadings, Field Locations and ILPD should focus their efforts on presumed priority cases. Furthermore, to ensure efficiency in litigation, OPLA attorneys should generally limit briefing schedule extension requests before the BIA and should not request briefing extensions in detained matters without prior approval from a supervisor. However, it is permissible to agree to briefing extension requests filed by non-detained noncitizens whose cases are not presumed priorities.

VII. Joining in Motions for Relief and Motions to Reopen and Entering Stipulations

In order to conserve resources and expedite resolution of a case- as well as where doing so would fulfill the duty to do justice and achieve the best outcome- OPLA attorneys have the discretion to join motions for relief (oral or written), consistent with any local guidance issued by their respective Chief Counsel. An OPLA attorney should be satisfied that the noncitizen qualifies for the reliefsought under law and merits reliefas a matter ofdiscretion or qualifies

22 ChiefCounsel should review existing local practice guidance to ensure that it confonns to current interim enforcement priorities and amend such guidance where necessary. Similarly, any new local practice guidance should conform to this memorandum and the presumed priorities.

23 See Gwendolyn Keyes Fleming, Promoting Excellence in OPLA ‘s Advocacy Before the Board o fimmigration Appeals (Feb. 22, 2016); Email Message from Kenneth Padilla and Adam Loiacono, Final Rule – Appella..t.,e,,.,..,,,,._ _,

Procedures and Decisional Finality in Immif!ration Proceedinf!s; Administrative Closure (Jan. 22, 2021).l(b)(S) b)(S)

(b)(S) IFurther, special procedures apply in the context ofnational security and human rights violator cases. See Email Message from Rjah Ramlogan, OPLA Supplemental Guidance on the Proper Handling ofNational Security and Human Rights Violator Cases (May 28, 2015), as supplemented and modified by OPLA Memorandum, Proper Handling o f OPLA National Security (NS) Cases (May 21, 2015) and OPLA Memorandum, Proper Handling ofOPLA Human Rights Violator (HRV) Cases (May 2I, 20I5).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

  OPLA Guidance Regarding Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies and Priorities Page 12of13

24

under law for protection from removal when agreeing to such motions.. Such decisions to join

in motions should be made in a manner that facilitates the efficient operation ofOPLA Field Locations in immigration court. The same applies with respect to narrowing disputed issues through stipulation in order to promote fair and efficient proceedings.

OPLA intends to address in future.guidance when to join in motions to reopen cases with final removal orders. In the meantime, OPLA should continue addressing requests for joint motions to reopen on a case-by-case basis, giving favorable consideration to cases that are not priorities and where dismissal would be considered under Section V, supra.

VIII. Bond Proceedings

OPLA attorneys appearing before EOIR in bond proceedings must follow binding federal and administrative case law regarding the standards for custody redeterminations. 25 OPLA attorneys should also make appropriate legal and factual arguments to ensure that DHS’s interests, enforcement priorities, and custody authority are defended. In particular, in bond proceedings OPLA attorneys should give due regard to custody determinations made by an authorized immigration officer pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 236. l(c)(8), while not relinquishing the OPLA attorney’s own responsibility to consider and appropriately apply the factors and considerations set forth in the Interim Memorandum, the Johnson Memorandum, the Maher Memorandum, and this guidance. Where a noncitizen produces new information that credibly mitigates flight risk or danger concerns, OPLA attorneys have discretion to agree or stipulate to a bond amount or other conditions of release with a noncitizen or their representative, and to waive appeal of an IJ’s order redetermining the conditions ofrelease in such cases..26

24 See, e.g., INA §§ 208 (asylum), 240A(a) (cancellation of removal for certain pennanent residents), 240A(b) (cancellation of removal and adjustment of status for certain nonpermanent residents), 240B (voluntary departure), 245 (adjustment ofstatus), 249 (registry). Additionally, OPLA attorneys represent DHS in cases where noncitizens apply for withholding of removal under INA section 241(b)(3) and protection under the regulations implementing U.S. obligations under Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). See, e.g. , 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16-.18. Withholding and CAT protection both impose significant burdens ofproof(i.e., qualifying mistreatment must be “more likely than not” to occur). When a noncitizen moves to reopen their proceedings to pursue such non-discretionary protection, and the motion is supported by evidence that strongly suggests the noncitizen will be able to meet their burden, OPLA attorneys should ordinarily not oppose reopening and can also consider joining in such motions, as resources permit

25 See, e.g., Matter ofR-A-V-P-, 27 l&N Dec. 803, 804-05 (BIA 2020) (assessing whether respondent had met burden to demonstrate that he did not pose a risk of flight in INA section 236(a) discretionary detention case); Matter ofSiniausl«is, 27 I&N Dec. 207 (BIA 2018) (addressing interplay between flight risk and dangerousness considerations in INA section 236(a) discretionary detention case involving recidivist drunk driver); Matter of Kotliar, 24 l&N Dec. 124 (BIA 2007) (discussing general parameters of INA section 236(c) mandatory detention).

26 DHS and EOIR regulations recognize that, as a prerequisite for even being considered for discretionary release by an ICE officer under INA section 236(a), a noncitizen “must demonstrate to the satisfaction ofthe officer that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the [noncitizen] is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.l(c)(S) (emphasis added). Additionally, prior to agreeing to non­ monetary conditions of release, OPLA attorneys should consult with their local ERO Field Offices to ensure that such conditions are practicable (e.g., GPS monitoring, travel restrictions).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

  OPLA Guidance Regarding Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies and Priorities Page 13 of13

IJ custody redetermination decisions that are factually or legally erroneous are subject to appeal to the BIA. Decisions on whether to appeal or to continue to prosecute an appeal should be guided by the presumed priorities and the sound use of finite resources. See Section VI, supra. It may also be appropriate for an OPLA Field Location to seek a discretionary or automatic stay under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l 9(i) in conjunction with a DHS bond appeal, particularly where issues of public safety are implicated. OPLA Field Locations should work closely with ILPD and other relevant OPLA HQ divisions to identify instances where use ofthis authority may be warranted..27

IX. Responding to Inquiries

Each OPLA Field Location should maintain email inboxes dedicated to receiving inquiries related to this memorandum, including requests for OPLA to favorably exercise its discretion, and socialize the existence and use ofthese mailboxes with their respective local immigration bars including non-governmental organizations assisting or representing noncitizens before EOIR. OPLA Field Locations and sub-offices should strive to be as responsive to such inquiries as resources permit.

X. Oversight and Monitoring

This memorandum serves as interim guidance, and OPLA’s experience operating under this guidance will inform the development of subsequent guidance aligning with the outcome of the comprehensive review directed by the Interim Memorandum. It is therefore critical that prosecutorial discretion decision-making information be promptly and accurately documented in PLAnet and that SOPs be implemented to ensure consistent PLAnet recordkeeping. Field Legal Operations (FLO) should issue such SOPs within two weeks ofthis memorandum. FLO’s regular review ofPLAnet and the SOPs will form the basis ofrecommendations on process improvements, if and as necessary.

Official Use Disclaimer

This memorandum, which may contain legally privileged information, is intended For Official Use Only. It is intended solely to provide internal direction to OPLA attorneys and staff regarding the implementation of Executive Orders and DHS guidance. It is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create or confer any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by any individual or other party, including in removal proceedings or other litigation involving DHS, ICE, or the United States, or in any other form or manner whatsoever. Likewise, this guidance does not and is not intended to place any limitations on DHS’s otherwise lawful enforcement of the immigration laws or DHS’s litigation

prerogatives.

27 Existing OPLA guidance on automatic and discretionary stays remains in effect. See, e.g., Barry O’Melinn, Revised Proceduresfor Automatic Stay ofCustody Decisions by Immigration Judges (Oct. 26, 2006).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

*************************

https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/

21a0127p-06.pdf

Garcia-DeLeon v. Garland, 6th Cir., 06-11-21, published

PANEL: MOORE, CLAY, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.

KEY QUOTE:

Here, we squarely confront this question and conclude that 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(e)(4)(iii), in conjunction with 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii), provides IJs and the BIA the authority for administrative closure to permit noncitizens to apply for and receive provisional unlawful presence waivers. Administrative closure is “appropriate and necessary” in this circumstance for the disposition of Garcia’s immigration case. Absent administrative closure, Garcia and other noncitizens in removal proceedings who are seeking permanent residency would be unable to apply for a provisional unlawful presence waiver despite the authorizing regulation.

Permitting administrative closure for the limited purpose of allowing noncitizens to apply for provisional unlawful presence waivers pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(e)(4)(iii) will not lead to non-adjudication of immigration cases. Thus, the concern raised in Hernandez-Serrano that a general authority to grant administrative closure results in non-adjudication of immigration cases is not present. Administrative closure for the purpose of applying for a provisional unlawful presence waiver “bring[s] an end to the removal process” and permits “the non-citizen [to] voluntarily depart the U.S. for an immigrant visa appointment abroad.” Pet. Br. at 14. Generally, a noncitizen will, upon USCIS’s approval of their provisional unlawful presence waiver, seek to recalendar and terminate their removal proceedings. See, e.g., Romero, 937 F.3d at 287 (“Romero advised that if his case were administratively closed, then once the waiver had been approved, he intended to move to re-calendar and terminate removal proceedings so that he could then go through the consular process in Honduras.”); see also Ariel Brown, Immigr. Legal Res. Ctr., I-601A Provisional Waiver: Process, Updates, and Pitfalls to Avoid, at 7 (June 2019), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/i- 601a_process._updates._and_pitfalls_to_avoid_june_2019.pdf (advising noncitizens to move to recalendar and then terminate their removal proceedings upon approval of their provisional unlawful presence waiver or upon receiving their immigrant visa). 

**********

After five months, John Trasvina is the first Biden Administration senior official in to take any responsible, practical steps to deal with the out of control Immigration Court backlog of 1.3 million that continues to grow under Garland’s flailing non-leadership at DOJ. But, he can’t do it by himself.

Without some progressive reforms at EOIR (and I’m NOT talking about an ill-thought-out uncoordinated “Dedicated Docket” or putting more Barr picks on the already compromised Immigration Bench, both of which are likely to build backlog and further reduce quality from its already “sub-basement levels”), the backlog and systemic denials of due process in Garland’s failed Immigration Courts will continue to grow.

That means some new progressive leadership at EOIR and some progressive judges at both the trial and appellate levels. Judges who know how to “leverage” PD with recalcitrant attorneys on both sides.

It also requires an immediate recession by Garland of Sessions’s abominable precedent Matter of Castro-Tum that has been panned by experts and rejected, at least in some form, by every Circuit that has considered it. Additionally, as a practitioner just reminded me, it will depend on whether Trasvina has the will, status, and power to force compliance on what are likely to be some resistant ICE Chief Counsels and Field Office Directors. In the past, local DHS officials have sometimes simply ignored or undermined PD policies with which they disagreed. So, stay tuned!

The quote from the Trasvina memo in the headline above comes from Matter of S-M-J-, 21 l&N Dec. 722, 727 (BIA 1997) (en banc), a leading “Schmidt BIA” case! Compare this with the White Nationalist absurdist nonsense put out by Sessions about prosecuting every case, no matter how absurd, marginal, or counterproductive, to a conclusion. Sessions spewed forth total, unadulterated BS! 💩

No, and I mean NO, other law enforcement agency in America (save the Trump DHS) operates in such an irresponsible, dishonest, and unrealistic manner! Particularly one whose bad policies and lack of self-restraint helped build a largely unnecessary backlog of 1.3 million cases. Indeed, according to the latest TRAC report, a simply astounding 96% of pending Immigration Court cases involve individuals without criminal charges! https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/quickfacts/?category=eoir. This suggests that with competent  leadership at DOJ and EOIR the backlog could be, and already should have been, dramatically slashed without adversely affecting ICE’s legitimate enforcement priorities!

“The  government wins when justice is done.” Wow! What a novel idea! Sounds like something right out of one of my old speeches to newly-hired INS prosecutors when I was the Deputy General Counsel at INS.

Probably, no coincidence that BIA Appellate Judge Michael J. Heilman, who wrote S-M-J-, once worked with me at INS General Counsel (although, as the record will show, by the time we both became “independent appellate judges” at a BIA that for a brief time functioned more like a “real court of independent experts” — as opposed to the current “deportation railroad” —  our views often diverged).

The 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 7th Circuits have rejected Sessions’s, malicious, racist, incorrect and idiotic, backlog-building decision in Castro-Tum. At the time of the Trasvina memo it appeared that the 6th Circuit was “trending in favor of” Castro-Tum, but the more recent 6th Circuit case featured above emphatically rejects Castro-Tum as applied to those seeking “provisional waivers.” 

So, the 6th is a little confusing. As I read it, there is no Administrative Closing for those approved for SIJS status and waiting for numbers. But, Administrative Closing is available for a “provisional waiver.” This doesn’t make any sense to me. But, what really doesn’t make sense is the unnecessary confusion caused by Garland’s failure to act and his continuation of improper White Nationalist, anti-due process, “worst practices” instituted by his Trumpist predecessors. 

To my knowledge, no Circuit has endorsed Castro-Tum in its entirety. Yet, Garland inexplicably and mindlessly has neither vacated Castro-Tum nor has he directed OIL to stop defending this legally incorrect, backlog-building, due-process-killing “Sessions-Miller” bogus “precedent.” “Part IV” of the Trasvina memo describes the unnecessary confusion and potential for more “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” caused by Garland’s failure to rescind Castro-Tum and reinstate “Administrative Closing” as an essential docket management (and due process) tool in Immigration Court.

Trasvina “gets it” (at least so far). Garland, Monaco, Gupta, Clarke, not so much! Maybe Trasvina should have been the AG!

As a practitioner recently put it:  “Repubs are bold, Dems are wimps when it comes to EOIR!” To date, Garland, Monaco, Gupta, and Clarke seem determined to follow in the footsteps of their ineffective predecessors! If they don’t get smarter, braver, bolder, and much more aggressively progressive, they will continue to fail American democracy in our hour of great need!

🇺🇸🗽⚖️Due Process Forever!

PWS

06-05-21

⚖️🇺🇸🗽👍🏼👨🏻‍⚖️JUSTICE GORSUCH LEADS 6-3 SUPREMES’ MAJORITY IN HANDING MIGRANTS HUGE VICTORY OVER DHS & EOIR INTRANSIGENCE/INCOMPETENCE IN “STOP TIME RULE” CASE —  Niz-Chavez v. Garland — “Round Table” Amicus Plays A Role In Success! — “A single notice—rather than 2 or 20 documents!”

Associate Justice Neil Gorsuch
Associate Justice Neil M. Gorsuch; photograph by Franz Jantzen, 2017.

Niz-Chavez v. Garland, U.S. Supreme Court, 04-20-21

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-863_6jgm.pdf

SYLLABUS BY COURT STAFF:

Syllabus

NIZ-CHAVEZ v. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 19–863. Argued November 9, 2020—Decided April 29, 2021

Nonpermanent resident aliens ordered removed from the United States under federal immigration law may be eligible for discretionary relief if, among other things, they can establish their continuous presence in the country for at least 10 years. 8 U. S. C. §1229b(b)(1). But the so- called stop-time rule included in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) provides that the pe- riod of continuous presence “shall be deemed to end . . . when the alien is served a notice to appear” in a removal proceeding under §1229a. §1229b(d)(1). The term “notice to appear” is defined as “written notice . . . specifying” certain information, such as the charges against the al- ien and the time and place at which the removal proceedings will be held. §1229(a)(1). A notice that omits any of this statutorily required information does not trigger the stop-time rule. See Pereira v. Ses- sions, 585 U. S. ___. Here, the government ordered the removal of pe- titioner Agusto Niz-Chavez and sent him a document containing the charges against him. Two months later, it sent a second document, providing Mr. Niz-Chavez with the time and place of his hearing. The government contends that because the two documents collectively specified all statutorily required information for “a notice to appear,” Mr. Niz-Chavez’s continuous presence in the country stopped when he was served with the second document.

Held: A notice to appear sufficient to trigger the IIRIRA’s stop-time rule is a single document containing all the information about an individ- ual’s removal hearing specified in §1229(a)(1). Pp. 4–12.

(a) Section 1229b(d)(1) states that the stop-time rule is triggered by serving “a notice,” and §1229(a)(1) explains that “written notice” is “re- ferred to as a ‘notice to appear.’ ” Congress’s decision to use the indef- inite article “a” suggests it envisioned “a” single notice provided at a

2

NIZ-CHAVEZ v. GARLAND Syllabus

discrete time rather than a series of notices that collectively provide the required information. While the indefinite article “a” can some- times be read to permit multiple installments (such as “a manuscript” delivered over months), that is not true for words like “notice” that can refer to either a countable object (“a notice”) or a noncountable abstrac- tion (“sufficient notice”). The inclusion of an indefinite article suggests Congress used “notice” in its countable sense. More broadly, Congress has used indefinite articles to describe other case-initiating plead- ings—such as an indictment, an information, or a civil complaint, see, e.g., Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 7(a), (c)(1), (e); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 3—and none suggest those documents might be delivered by installment. Nor does the Dictionary Act aid the government, as that provision merely tells readers of the U. S. Code to assume “words importing the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things.” 1 U. S. C. §1. That provision means only that terms describing a single thing (“a no- tice”) can apply to more than one of that thing (“ten notices”). While it certainly allows the government to send multiple notices to appear to multiple people, it does not mean a notice to appear can consist of mul- tiple documents. Pp. 4–9.

(b) The IIRIRA’s structure and history support requiring the govern- ment to issue a single notice containing all the required information. Two related provisions, §§1229(e)(1) and 1229a(b)(7), both use a defi- nite article with a singular noun (“the notice”) when referring to the government’s charging document—a combination that again suggests a discrete document. Another provision, §1229(a)(2)(A), requires “a written notice” when the government wishes to change an alien’s hear- ing date. The government does not argue that this provision contem- plates providing “the new time or place of the proceedings” and the “consequences . . . of failing . . . to attend such proceedings” in separate documents. Yet the government fails to explain why “a notice to ap- pear” should operate differently. Finally, the predecessor to today’s “notice to appear” required the government to specify the place and time for the alien’s hearing “in the order to show cause or otherwise.” §1252(a)(2)(A). The phrase “or otherwise” has since disappeared, fur- ther suggesting that the required details must be included upfront to invoke the stop-time rule. Indeed, that is how the government itself initially read the statute. The year after Congress adopted IIRIRA, in the preamble to a proposed rule implementing these provisions, the government acknowledged that “the language of the amended Act in- dicat[es] that the time and place of the hearing must be on the Notice to Appear.” 62 Fed. Reg. 449 (1997). Pp. 9–13.

(c) The government claims that not knowing hearing officers’ avail- ability when it initiates removal proceedings makes it difficult to pro-duce compliant notices. It also claims that it makes little sense to re- quire time and place information in a notice to appear when that in- formation may be later changed. Besides, the government stresses, its own administrative regulations have always authorized its current practice. But on the government’s account, it would be free to send a person who is not from this country—someone who may be unfamiliar with English and the habits of American bureaucracies—a series of letters over the course of weeks, months, maybe years, each containing a new morsel of vital information. Congress could reasonably have wished to foreclose that possibility. And ultimately, pleas of adminis- trative inconvenience never “justify departing from the statute’s clear text.” Pereira, 585 U. S., at ___. The modest threshold Congress pro- vided to invoke the stop-time rule is clear from the text and must be complied with here. Pp. 13–16.

789 Fed. Appx. 523, reversed.

GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. KAVANAUGH, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and ALITO, J., joined.

 

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This is the type of case where I had hoped that Justice Gorsuch would “stick to his interpretative guns” by stopping the Government from basically redesigning clear statutory requirements “willy nilly” to suit their own purposes and disadvantage respondents. And, he came through! Big time! I’ve been critical of Justice Gorsuch in the past and am likely to be so again in the future. But, in this case, he did the right thing, and I, for one, am grateful!

Most encouraging, Justice Gorsuch “got” the way that the DHS and EOIR, with the deck already unfairly stacked in their favor, manipulate clear legal requirements for their own nefarious purposes and to the disadvantage of those struggling for justice in an inherently unfair system. There is absolutely no doubt that receiving “piecemeal notice” — incomplete and often sent to incorrect addresses or “personally served” without the proper reading and explanations — works to further disadvantage respondents.

Indeed, illegal, ineffective notices — some setting hearings on “phantom dates” and “imaginary times” — lead directly to an over abundance of “in absentia” orders and consequent illegal removals. Some unrepresented individuals understand how to reopen their hearings for lack of notice — but many are clueless; the Government system strives to keep them that way to “jack up the numbers,” meet “quotas,” and improve stats. Worse yet, Congress sometimes uses the “bogus stats” generated by DOJ and DHS to write legislation, conduct oversight, and establish policy. This is an astoundingly broken, dysfunctional, and intentionally unfair system — a disgrace to our entire justice system and our national conscience each day it is allowed to continue to operate in its abusive ways!

The majority in this case was both very interesting, and at least mildly encouraging, for those of us who believe in due process and fundamental fairness for all persons, including migrants, under law. In addition to Trump appointees Justice Gorsuch and Justice Barrett, another GOP conservative appointee, Justice Thomas, joined Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor in the majority!

And, although this case has (incorrectly) seemed “hyper technical” to some Supremes’ watchers unfamiliar with immigration, it will have huge impact — forcing reopening and “redos” in tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of cases in the already backlogged (1.3 million cases) Immigration Court. That will be the direct result of poor jurisprudence by the BIA, lousy court administration by EOIR, and horrible policy decisions by DHS.

Just another prime example of how “haste makes waste” enforcement gimmicks continue to cause unnecessary chaos in the system. Why not just appoint progressive experts as Immigration Judges and BIA Appellate Judges. Qualified jurists who will understand immigration law, due process, and  “get in right” in the first instance? Certainly seems like a reasonable approach. What is Judge Garland waiting for?

This, in turn should add to the already loud cries (from virtually everywhere outside Judge Garland’s universe and the restrictionist right) for sensible, readily available backlog reductions and accelerated movement toward better judges and independence in the Immigration Courts, not to mention better management in the DHS enforcement programs. 

Here’s my favorite quote from Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion:

In the end, though, all this speculation is beside the point. The dissent tries to predict how the government will react to a ruling that requires it to follow the law and then pro- ceeds to assess the resulting “costs” and “benefits.” Post, at 17, 20–21. But that kind of raw consequentialist calcula- tion plays no role in our decision. Instead, when it comes to the policy arguments championed by the parties and the dissent alike, our points are simple: As usual, there are (at least) two sides to the policy questions before us; a rational Congress could reach the policy judgment the statutory text suggests it did; and no amount of policy-talk can overcome a plain statutory command. Our only job today is to give the law’s terms their ordinary meaning and, in that small way, ensure the federal government does not exceed its statutory license. Interpreting the phrase “a notice to ap-pear” to require a single notice—rather than 2 or 20 docu- ments—does just that.

*

At one level, today’s dispute may seem semantic, focused on a single word, a small one at that. But words are how the law constrains power. In this case, the law’s terms en- sure that, when the federal government seeks a procedural advantage against an individual, it will at least supply him with a single and reasonably comprehensive statement of the nature of the proceedings against him. If men must turn square corners when they deal with the government, it cannot be too much to expect the government to turn square corners when it deals with them.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir- cuit is

Reversed.

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges

And, here’s some “immediate commentary” by Round Table spokesperson “Sir Jeffrey” Chase:

Victory!  This was the case in which our Round Table amicus brief was specifically referenced in oral argument.

Knightess
Knightess of the Round Table

Congrats to all involves, and Due Process Forever!

PWS

04-29-21

⚖️🗽🧑🏽‍⚖️COURTS OF APPEALS CONTINUE TO THROW ROTTEN TOMATOES 🍅 @ BIA’S ANTI-ASYLUM BIAS — Basic Analytical, Legal Errors Continue From Weaponized, Non-Expert “Star Chamber” ☠️ Posing As ”Tribunal!” — Judge Garland Must Fix This Inexcusable, Unnecessary, Systemic Failure Now! — Justice For Persons Of Color & Migrants Can’t “Wait For Godot!”

Dan Kowalski
Dan Kowalski
Online Editor of the LexisNexis Immigration Law Community (ILC)

Two most recent recent rebukes, courtesy of Dan Kowalski at Lexis-Nexis Immigration Community:

https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/insidenews/posts/ca6-on-exceptional-circumstances-e-a-c-a-v-rosen

Immigration Law

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Daniel M. Kowalski

12 Jan 2021

 

  • More

CA6 on Exceptional Circumstances:

E.A.C.A. v. Rosen

“[W]e conclude that the BIA abused its discretion by denying E.A.’s motion to reopen. E.A.’s mother’s recent childbirth is a serious medical event, which coupled with E.A.’s minor age, her difficulty obtaining transportation, and her difficulty navigating the immigration system without assistance, constitute “exceptional circumstances” necessitating rescission of the in absentia removal order. … The BIA’s decision was also contrary to law, and therefore an abuse of discretion. … First, the BIA improperly considered E.A.’s age separately, rather than considering age alongside other factors, when determining that she had not shown that exceptional circumstances justified her failure to appear. Second, the BIA erred when it dismissed without adequate explanation E.A.’s evidence that she is eligible for SIJS. Finally, the BIA improperly stated that E.A. was required to present prima facie evidence that she was eligible for immigration relief as part of her motion to reopen. … For the foregoing reasons, we GRANT the petition for review, VACATE the removal order, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

[Hats way off to Rachel NaggarHere is a link to the audio of the oral argument.]

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https://www.lexisnexis.com/LegalNewsRoom/immigration/b/insidenews/posts/ca1-on-asylum-u-s-army-contractor-al-amiri-v-rosen

CA1 on Asylum, U.S. Army Contractor: Al Amiri v. Rosen

Al Amiri v. Rosen

“Salim Al Amiri, an Iraqi citizen, seeks relief from removal on the grounds of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). He premises his requests for such relief on the harm that he fears that he would be subjected to in Iraq at the hands of members of Iraq’s military or civilian insurgents operating in that country. Al Amiri contends that he has reason to fear he would be subjected to that harm on account of his work as a paid contractor for the United States Army during the war in Iraq, as in that role he educated U.S. soldiers about Iraqi customs and practices as they prepared for their deployment. We vacate and remand the ruling of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his claims for asylum and withholding of removal, but we deny his petition insofar as it challenges the BIA’s ruling rejecting his CAT claim.”

[Hats off to J. Christopher Llinas!]

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***************

  • Congrats to all involved!
  • Think how much better this system would function with expert  judges who treated asylum applicants fairly from the “git go,” granted protection wherever possible in accordance with the the Refugee Act of 1980 and the (more “woke”) Supremes’ precedent in Cardoza-Fonseca, provided clear, positive guidance on how valid claims could be documented and granted, and promoted and consistently applied best practices to achieve efficiency with maximum due process.
  • At first glance, although the issue is reopening rather than a continuance, E.A.C.A. undercuts McHenry’s nativist, insanely wasteful, and totally dishonest attempt to “raise the bar” for routine continuances for asylum applicants who need time to properly document and prepare their cases.
  • The “Deny – Deny Program” — deny due process, deny relief — that infects EOIR’s “Star Chambers” (impersonating “courts”) is a huge backlog builder that kills people and screws up Court of Appeals dockets in the process. 
  • Reopening cases that should be reopened, getting to the merits, and getting the many properly grantable asylum cases represented, documented, and prioritized would be a huge step in reducing EOIR’s largely self-created and unnecessary “bogus backlog.” 
  • Ultimately, many of the clearly grantable asylum cases being mishandled and wrongly denied at EOIR, at great waste of time and resources, not to mention unnecessary human trauma, could, with real expert judges at EOIR setting and consistently enforcing the precedents, be granted more efficiently and expeditiously at the Asylum Office and ultimately shifted to a more robust and properly run Refugee Program.
  • In the longer run, once EOIR is redesigned and rebuilt as a proper court with real, independent, expert judges, it might be appropriate to place the Asylum Offices under judicial supervision, given the grotesque abuses and corrupt, perhaps criminal, mismanagement of the Asylum Offices by USCIS toadies carrying out the regime’s racist, White Nationalist, unconstitutional agenda of hate and waste.
  • NOTE TO JUDGE GARLAND👨🏻‍⚖️: Please fix the EOIR mess, Your Honor, before it brings you and the entire US justice system crashing down with it! This is a national emergency, and a damaging national disgrace, NOT a “back burner” issue!

Here’s some additional E.A.C.A. analysis by my good friend and NDPA “warrior queen” 👸🏽Michelle Mendez @ CLINIC!

Michelle Mendez
Michelle Mendez
Defending Vulnerable Populations Director
Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. (“CLINIC”)

Subject: CLINIC MTR In Absentia Win at the CA6 on behalf of SIJS-Seeking UC (E. A. C. A. v. Jeffrey Rosen)

 

Greetings,

 

Sharing this win, E. A. C. A. v. Jeffrey Rosen, out of the CA6 by my amazing colleague Rachel Naggar who manages our BIA Pro Bono Project. This was an appeal of an IJ (Memphis) denial of an in absentia motion to reopen for a 13-year old unaccompanied child.

 

Interestingly, after oral argument, OIL filed a motion to remand the case (which Rachel opposed) and the CA6 denied that motion. Seems the CA6 really wanted to issue a decision on the merits and we are grateful for the decision. Here are some highlights from the decision:

 

SIJS

·       “Notably, the IJ’s decision does not mention E.A.’s claims that she was eligible for SIJS.”

·       FN 1: “As of the December 2020 Visa Bulletin, visas are available for special immigrants (category EB4) from El Salvador to adjust their status if their priority date is prior to February 2018. If DHS removes E.A. prior to approving her visa, she will be unable to apply for adjustment of status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).”

 

Totality of the Circumstances

·       “Based on the totality of the circumstances, including E.A. mother’s recent childbirth, E.A.’s young age, E.A.’s mother’s failed attempts to obtain counsel to help change the address of E.A.’s hearing, and E.A.’s inability to travel from New York to Memphis for the hearing, we hold that E.A. established exceptional circumstances.”

·       “Under the totality of the circumstances, E.A.’s young age is an important factor in determining whether exceptional circumstances exist.”

 

Exceptional Circumstances

·       “E.A.’s mother’s recent childbirth is a serious medical condition that supports reopening. The statute defining ‘exceptional circumstances’ that justify reopening an immigration proceeding lists the ‘serious illness of the alien, or serious illness or death of the spouse, child, or parent of the alien’ as an example. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1). Childbirth is a serious medical event that necessitates a recovery period.”

·       “Instead of recognizing that childbirth is a serious medical condition, the BIA minimized the seriousness of childbirth and its impact on E.A.’s mother’s ability to bring E.A. to Memphis. […] Recovery from childbirth is exactly the type of circumstance that § 1229a(e)(1) was intended to cover.”

 

Prima Facie Eligibility

·       “Finally, the BIA erred by stating that E.A. was required to prove prima facie eligibility for immigration relief. The BIA’s decision improperly states that E.A. is required to show at this stage prima facie eligibility for relief. The statute governing motions to reopen removal orders entered in absentia provides that the petitioner must ‘demonstrate[] that the failure to appear was because of exceptional circumstances.’ 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C). In general, we have stated that ‘[a] prima facie showing of eligibility for relief is required in motions to reopen.’ Alizoti, 477 F.3d at 451–52. In the case of a motion to rescind a removal order entered in absentia, however, the BIA has held that ‘an alien is not required to show prejudice in order to rescind an order of deportation” or removal. In re Grijalva-Barrera, 21 I. & N. Dec. 472, 473 n.2 (BIA 1996); see also In re Rivera-Claros, 21 I. & N. Dec. 599, 603 n.1 (BIA 1996). This is consistent with the statute governing motions to rescind removal orders entered in absentia, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C), which does not list a showing of prima facie eligibility for relief from removal as a requirement to rescind in absentia removal orders. Rivera-Claros, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 603 n.1; see also Galvez-Vergara v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 798, 803 n.6 (5th Cir. 2007) (declining ‘to affirm the IJ’s decision on the grounds that [the petitioner] has not shown that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s performance’ because ‘In re Grijalva-Barrera, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 473 n.2, provides that an alien need not demonstrate prejudice for his counsel’s erroneous advice to constitute an ‘exceptional circumstance’ justifying rescission of an in absentia removal order’); Lo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 934, 939 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003) (‘follow[ing] the BIA’s usual practice of not requiring a showing of prejudice’ to rescind an in absentia order of removal). We now join our sister circuits and hold that E.A. is not required to make a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief in order to obtain rescission under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5) of the in absentia order of removal.”

 

Thanks to our entire Defending Vulnerable Populations team for supporting Rachel on the briefing, oral argument, and negotiations with OIL.

 

Gratefully,

 

Michelle N. Mendez | she/her/ella/elle

Director, Defending Vulnerable Populations Program

Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. (CLINIC)

**********************

In addition to the “normal” overall White Nationalist, racist agenda that EOIR “management” has carried out under the defeated regime, there was a good deal of misogyny 🤮 involved in the BIA’s gross mishandling of the “pregnancy issue,” as described by the Sixth Circuit. This misogynistic trend can be traced back directly to the unconstitutional and unethical actions of mysogynist White Nationalist AG Jeff Sessions 🤮 🦹🏿‍♂️🤡in the “Matter of A-B- Abomination.” ☠️⚰️🏴‍☠️👎🏻

Biased, anti-migrant decision-making in support of bogus enforcement gimmicks and White Nationalist anti-democracy agendas builds backlogs and kills, maims, and tortures “real” people! Migrants are people and persons, not “threats” and “bogus statistics.” 

The “dehumanization” and “de-personification” of migrants, with the connivance of the tone-deaf and spineless GOP Supremes’ majority, is a serious, continuing threat to American democracy! It must stop! Justices who won’t treat migrants physically present in the U.S. or at our borders as “persons” under our Constitution — which they clearly are — do not belong on the Supremes! ⚖️🗽🇺🇸

I can also draw the lines connecting George Floyd, institutionalized racial injustice, voter suppression, riots at the Capitol, and the “Dred Scottification” of asylum seekers and other migrants by EOIR! 

HINT TO JUDGE GARLAND: Michelle Mendez would be an outstanding choice to lead the “clean up and rebuild” program at EOIR and the BIA once the “Clown Show” 🤡🦹🏿‍♂️ is removed!🪠🧹 Put experts with practical experience like Rachel Nagger and Christopher Linas onto the bench, on the BIA, the Immigration Courts, and the Article III Judiciary to get the American Justice system functioning again!

The “judicial selection system” for the Immigration Courts and the Article III Judiciary has failed American democracy — big time — over the past four years. Fixing it must be part of your legacy!

The folks who preserved due process and our Constitution in the face of tyranny are mostly “on the outside looking in.”  You need to get them “inside Government” — on the bench and in other key policy positions — and empower them to start cleaning up the ungodly mess left by four years of regime kakistocracy🤮☠️🤡⚰️👎🏻.  “Same old, same old” (sadly, a tradition of Dem Administrations) won’t get the job done, now any more than it has in the past! New faces for a new start!

And, it starts with better judges @ EOIR, which is entirely under YOUR control! An EOIR that actually fulfills its noble, one-time vision of “Through teamwork and innovation being the world’s best tribunals guaranteeing fairness and due process for all” will be a model for fixing our failing Federal Courts  —  all the way up to the leaderless and complicit Supremes who failed, particularly in immigration, human rights, voting rights, and racial justice, to effectively and courageously stand up to the Trump-Miller White Nationalist agenda of hate and tyranny!

We are where we are today as a nation, to a large extent, because of the Supremes’ majority’s gross mishandling of the “Muslim Ban” cases which set a sorry standard for complicity and total lack of accountability for unconstitutional actions, racism, dishonesty, cowardly official bullying, and abandonment of ethics by the Executive that has brought our nation to the precipice! Life tenure was actually supposed to protect us from judges who wouldn’t protect our individual rights. In this case, it hasn’t gotten the job done! Better judges for a better America!

🇺🇸⚖️🗽👍🏼Due Process Forever! The EOIR Clown Show🤡🦹🏿‍♂️ ☠️⚰️Never!

PWS

01-13-21

⚖️🗽🇺🇸LATEST IMMIGRATION CERT GRANT PRESENTS OPPORTUNITY FOR BIDEN & GARLAND TO CONFESS ERROR, ACHIEVE UNIFORMITY, & START APPLYING “PRACTICAL SCHOLARSHIP” TO ADJUST STATUS OF MANY DESERVING LONG-TIME TPS HOLDERS WHO NOW QUALIFY FOR PERMANENT STATUS! — Will The Biden Team & The Garland Group @ DOJ Finally Tap A Better Qualified, Ethical Solicitor General With An Understanding Of, & Firm Commitment To, A Progressive Use Of Immigration Laws To Further Human Rights, Achieve Equal Justice, & Stop Promoting Unnecessary, Wasteful, Avoidable “Circuit Spits?” — After Four Years Of Unmitigated Kakistocracy,🤮☠️ DOJ & DHS Both Need Immediate “De-Clownification” 🤡🦹🏿‍♂️ !

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2021/01/supreme-court-to-review-adjustment-of-statustps-case.html

Kevin R. Johnson
Kevin R. Johnson
Dean
U.C. Davis Law

Dean Kevin Johnson reports @ ImmigrationProf Blog:

Yesterday, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Sanchez v. Wolf, which presents the question under the Immigration and Nationality Act whether a Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipient may adjust his or her status to that of a lawful permanent resident.  The Third Circuit held that TPS recipients were not entitled to adjust their status because TPS status was not an “admission,” under 8 U.S.C. § 1255.   The Third Circuit decision in Sanchez conflicts with the rulings of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits.

********************

Here’s the government’s position in a nutshell: Notwithstanding the “plain language” of section 244(f)(4) which makes holders of TPS status eligible to adjust status in the U.S. if they meet all of the requirements for legal immigration (usually an an approved visa petition based on family ties or job skills), we have employed legal gobbledygook to refuse to adjust them. Thereby, we mindlessly keep them in “suspended animation” in the U.S. although they are long-time productive members of our society who have resided here with permission and work authorization and now meet our criteria for permanent immigration.

Sound pretty stupid? That’s because it is! I actually had this issue argued before me at the Arlington Immigration Court. Not surprisingly, the ICE Assistant Chief Counsel was unable to come up with any rational reason for circumventing the statutory language to achieve a nonsensical result that actually unnecessarily inflated the case backlog and served no legitimate government purpose. Needless to say, I ruled in the respondent’s favor.  

This isn’t “rocket science.” The new SG should join the petitioner’s counsel, JAIME W. APARISI (who regularly appeared before me in Arlington) and LISA S. BLATT (Williams & Connolly LLP) in agreeing that this issue was correctly resolved in the respondents’ favor by the Sixth & Ninth Circuits.

Then, ICE should ask the “new BIA” (real judges with immigration and human rights backgrounds appointed by AG Garland) to adopt this view nationwide.

Presto! 

  • No more bogus, contrived “circuit split;”
  • TPSers with adjustment eligibility can be taken out of EOIR’s ridiculous 1.1 – 1.5 million case backlog and returned to USCIS for routine adjustment of status;
  • Productive, long-time members of our society can become green card holders, get on the path to citizenship, and reach their full productive potential for both their benefit and the benefit of our society;
  • A win, win, win, instead of wasting time attempting to achieve an illegal, undesirable, yet fundamentally stupid, irrational, and counterproductive result;
  • And, unlike the stupidity going on now, it actually doesn’t require expenditure of funds (actually will save and perhaps even generate money from adjustment filing fees), major regulatory changes, new legislation, or protracted litigation. It’s “low hanging fruit” that the Trump immigration kakistocracy has let rot on the tree! Rational administration of the immigration laws can actually be quite efficient.

Is it any wonder that the EOIR bogus “court,” whose “guiding principle” is “always construe the law against the individual and in favor of DHS” is building uncontrollable backlog hand over fist, even with double the number of “judges?” This is “fraud, waste, and abuse” in action! 💸🤮 Not something I’d want to “own” if I were Judge Garland (which, of course, I’m not, and never will be)!

That’s how “practical scholarship” @ EOIR, DOJ, and ICE; smarter, better, more ethical progressive leadership at the DOJ; and the private/NGO/academic bar can work together to solve legal problems and stop wasting the time of the Federal Courts and the Supremes. Perhaps, with the time saved, the Williams Connolly LLP team can even take some more pro bono asylum cases, make the system work better at the “retail level,” and save some deserving lives of vulnerable individuals who have been mistreated by Miller and his neo-Nazi gang of thugs and the malicious incompetents now “running” EOIR (into the ground) in the process.

Not rocket science! But, it will require Judge Garland to bring in some members of the NDPA who actually understand the interrelated issues of immigration, human rights, due process, civil rights, equal justice, and practical problem solving to replace the current “Clown Show” 🤡🦹🏿‍♂️ at EOIR and the DOJ. (Not to mention, a comprehensive “de-clownification” 🦹🏿‍♂️🤡 of DHS by Secretary-designate Mayorkas and his team). All of those skills have been conspicuously absent from the Executive branch during the last four years of kakistocracy.

⚖️🗽🇺🇸Due Process Forever! Let the De-Clownifying 🤡🦹🏿‍♂️ Of Government Begin!

PWS

01-09-21

👹AS CURTAIN FALLS ON KAKISTOCRACY, BIA CLOWN SHOW 🤡 ROLLS ON TOWARD OBLIVION! — Latest Travesty Ignores Clear Statutory Language, Elevates AAO Over Circuits, Shafts TPSers Who Qualify For Legal Permanent Immigration, Makes Hash Out Of Uniform Administration Of Laws!🏴‍☠️☠️🤮

EYORE
“Eyore In Distress”
Once A Symbol of Fairness, Due Process, & Best Practices, Now Gone “Belly Up”
Kangaroos
All In A Day’s Work — BIA Members Unwind After Ignoring Statute, Dissing Three Circuits, Screwing TPS Holders, Beating Up Unrepresented Respondent, & Aiding Their “Partners” At ICE In Demeaning Justice
https://www.flickr.com/photos/rasputin243/
Creative Commons License

https://www.google.com/url?q=https://lnks.gd/l/eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJidWxsZXRpbl9saW5rX2lkIjoxMDAsInVyaSI6ImJwMjpjbGljayIsImJ1bGxldGluX2lkIjoiMjAyMDExMjMuMzA5ODM1ODEiLCJ1cmwiOiJodHRwczovL2dvLnVzYS5nb3YveDdmMjgifQ.3HiEf4LU6Bwc5S-T8jqxR2hmHX9AQ585LsaksbtbRnk/s/842922301/br/90293063224-l&source=gmail-imap&ust=1606764672000000&usg=AOvVaw3Fk5zcttz_HLhd3nxbHyiO

Matter of PADILLA RODRIGUEZ, 28 I&N Dec. 164 (BIA 2020)

BIA HEADNOTE:

(1) Where the temporary protected status (“TPS”) of an alien who was previously present in the United States without being admitted or paroled is terminated, the alien remains inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2018), and removal proceedings should not be terminated.

(2) An alien whose TPS continues to be valid is considered to be “admitted” for purposes of establishing eligibility for adjustment of status only within the jurisdictions of the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits.

BIA PANEL: MALPHRUS, Deputy Chief Appellate Immigration Judge; HUNSUCKER, Appellate Immigration Judge; GEMOETS, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge

OPINION BY: HUNSUCKER, Appellate Immigration Judge

**********************

For today’s BIA, it apparently doesn’t get any better than beating up on an unrepresented respondent who actually won before the Immigration Judge! Where was the “BIA Pro Bono Program” on this one?

It’s not rocket science: INA section 244(f)(4) says: “for purposes of adjustment of status under section 245 and change of status under section 248, the alien shall be considered as being in, and maintaining, lawful status as a nonimmigrant.”

So, clearly, an individual in TPS status who is eligible for permanent immigration can adjust statutus under INA section 245, right? Of course, unless you’re the BIA and stretching to find a way to deny. And, elevating the meanderings of the AAO over the considered opinions of three Circuit Courts of Appeals shows the level of intellectual honesty and scholarship on today’s BIA!

Now, lets look at the policy results produced by the BIA’s intentional misconstruction of the plain meaning of the statute.

First, it means that except in the 6th, 8th, and 9th Circuits, individuals in TPS status, basically long term residents who are going to be remaining, working, paying taxes, and raising families in the U.S., and who also are qualified to permanently immigrate (e.g., spouses of U.S. citizens) will be mindlessly barred from doing so.

But, wait, it gets even better! That’s only the case if they have the  misfortune to live in a Circuit other than the 6th, 8th, or 9th. Of course, if they are able, they could move to one of those circuits to adjust.

Make sense? Only if you’re part of the “Clown Show of Denial.” Then, you ignore the statute, diss the Circuit Courts, and go out of your way to promote a non-uniform interpretation of the law that will screw contributing members of our society residing here legally and arbitrarily block them from achieving the permanent status to which they are entitled.

Now you can see what a difference replacing the “Clown Show” with real judges from the NDPA could make — both for the human lives and futures at stake and for sane, lawful, and fiscally efficient administration of our immigration laws! 

REPEAT AFTER ME: Hey Hey, Ho Ho, Tell The Biden Team That The EOIR Clown 🤡 Show Has Got To Go!

EOIR clown Show Must Go T-Shirt
“EOIR Clown Show Must Go” T-Shirt Custom Design Concept

Due Process Forever! Clownocracy, never!

PWS

11-24-20

🛡⚔️⚖️ADVENTURES OF THE ROUND TABLE: Latest Amicus Brief To Supremes Weighs In On “Stop Time Rule” — Niz-Chávez v. Barr — Many Thanks to The Pro Bono Stars  @ Gibson Dunn!

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges
Knightess
Knightess of the Round Table

Niz-Chavez Amicus Brief TO FILE

No. 19-863 IN THE

    _______________

AGUSTO NIZ-CHAVEZ,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

                   _______________

On Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court of Appeals For the Sixth Circuit _______________

BRIEF OF THIRTY-THREE FORMER IMMIGRATION JUDGES AND MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

AS AMICI CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER _______________

RICHARD W. MARK

Counsel of Record

AMER S. AHMED

TIMOTHY SUN

DORAN J. SATANOVE

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP 200 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10166 (212) 351-4000 rmark@gibsondunn.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae 

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 

1

1

Amici curiae are thirty-three former immigration judges and members of the Board of Immigration Ap- peals (“BIA” or “Board”).2

Amici curiae have dedicated their careers to the immigration court system and to upholding the immi gration laws of the United States. Each is intimately familiar with the functioning of immigration courts and is invested in improving the fairness and effi- ciency of the United States immigration scheme. Amici curiae’s extensive experience adjudicating im- migration cases provides a unique perspective on the procedures and practicalities of immigration proceed- ings.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The straightforward question this case presents is one of enormous practical significance: Must the ini- tial written notice served on noncitizens to commence their removal proceedings provide—in one docu- ment—the “time and place at which the proceedings will be held” (along with charges and other specified information) in order to satisfy the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), or does the statute allow the govern- ment to cobble together the required elements of a “notice to appear” from multiple documents, issued at different times, some containing misinformation, and

1 All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Amici state that this brief was not authored in whole or in part by coun- sel for any party, and that no person or entity other than amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.

2 The appendix provides a complete list of signatories.

 

2

none of which alone contains all of the statutorily re- quired information?

Reversing the Sixth Circuit and holding that § 1229(a)’s requirements must be included in a single document will greatly reduce the procedural and bu- reaucratic errors attendant in a two-step process that detrimentally impact thousands of noncitizens law- fully seeking to remain in this country.

I. For noncitizens applying for cancellation of re- moval, service of a valid “notice to appear” under § 1229(a) triggers the so-called “stop-time” rule, which terminates the period of continuous presence required for cancellation eligibility. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(d)(1), 1229b(a)(2), 1229b(b)(1)(A). Separately but relatedly, for noncitizens ordered removed in ab- sentia, whether that “severe” penalty, Pereira v. Ses- sions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2111 (2018), is proper depends on whether the notice served on the noncitizen satis- fied the requirements of §1229(a). 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A). This Court’s decision will thus touch not only those like Petitioner who are seeking cancel- lation of removal, but also those who may not even have been provided sufficient notice to appear for their removal hearings—and potentially severely punished as a result.

II. The Sixth Circuit’s ruling approves a two-step notice process that involves: (i) the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) serving on a noncitizen a putative notice to appear lacking time-and-place in- formation (or, perhaps worse, that includes fake time- and-place information), and (ii) only after that notice to appear is filed and docketed with the immigration court, the immigration court separately sending a “no- tice of hearing” supplying the time-and-place infor- mation to the noncitizen.

3

Under this two-step process an initial notice lack- ing § 1229(a)’s time-and-place information languishes in a proverbial “No Man’s Land” until the notice is filed with an immigration court and entered into the court’s computer systems—a process that can take years. This delay increases the risk of procedural er- rors and lost filings, such as crucial Change of Address forms, which can result in noncitizens never receiving time-and-place information at all—potentially result- ing in wholly unjustified in absentia removal orders.

Sorting through those issues adds to immigration judges’ fact-finding burdens by requiring them to di- vert attention from the merits of a case to investigate collateral issues like whether time-and-place infor- mation was provided in a second document; whether that document was properly served; and whether a fil- ing like a Change of Address form was submitted but ultimately lost in “No Man’s Land.” When coupled with the pressure to complete cases—even if it means churning out in absentia removal orders without fully considering whether the noncitizen received adequate time-and-place notice—the result may be an increase in unwarranted removal orders.

These problems would be ameliorated if the gov- ernment simply provided the actual time-and-place information in a single document as required by § 1229(a).

III. Requiring DHS to work with the Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”) to obtain time- and-place information before serving a notice to ap- pear—and including such information in that docu- ment, as § 1229(a) and Pereira require—is practical and within the government’s capabilities.

4

A single-step notice process, consistent with this Court’s ruling in Pereira, furthers the due process ax- iom that a party charged to defend against a legal pro- ceeding must receive notice of the time and place of the proceeding and an opportunity to be heard.

*****************

Read the complete brief, with better formatting, at the link!

Of course we couldn’t have done this without the amazing talent and assistance of Amer S. Ahmed and the rest of the “Pro Bono All-Star Team” 🎖🏆 @ Gibson Dunn! Just another example of the essential contribution of pro bono lawyers to literally saving our legal system that has been featured on “Courtside” this week!

Due Process Forever!

PWS

08-14-20

MORE DEADLY ☠️ MISTAKES: 6th Cir. Finds BIA Ignored Relevant Evidence In Trying To Deny Asylum To Russian Whistleblower — Skripkov v. Barr

Dan Kowalski reports from LexisNexis Immigration Community:

Dan Kowalski
Dan Kowalski
Online Editor of the LexisNexis Immigration Law Community (ILC)

https://www.lexisnexis.com/LegalNewsRoom/immigration/b/insidenews/posts/ca6-on-asylum-russia-corruption-skripkov-v-barr#

CA6 on Asylum, Russia, Corruption: Skripkov v. Barr

Skripkov v. Barr

“Andrei Skripkov, a citizen of Russia, seeks review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upholding an Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) denial of his application for asylum and the withholding of removal. Skripkov asserted in his application that he was persecuted in his home country on account of his political opinion. He specifically contended that his anticorruption whistleblowing activities motivated Russian officials to persecute him. The IJ and the BIA, on the other hand, found that the officials were motivated solely by their pecuniary interest in furthering a corrupt scheme disrupted by Skripkov. In his petition for review, Skripkov argues that the BIA erred in disregarding evidence that he would be criminally prosecuted for his political opinion if he is returned to Russia. For the reasons set forth below, we GRANT Skripkov’s petition for review and REMAND the case to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

[Hats off to Brenna D. Duncan!]

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When the objective is to reject, not protect, mistakes are inevitable. This is just the tip of the iceberg. Most folks whose lives are being chewed up and spit out by the “designed to be unjust” Immigration Court system don’t have the good fortune to be represented by Brenna D. Duncan or someone of her caliber. 

Indeed, under the ongoing illegal travesty that now passes for “justice” in America, most legal asylum seekers are turned away at the border without any hearing or meaningful process at all.

Interestingly, Brenna D. Duncan, a rising superstar at the international commercial law firm of Perkins Coie appears to have practiced primarily in the area of commercial litigation. Yet, she clearly understands immigration and human rights law better than the Immigration Judge and the BIA Appellate Immigration Judges involved in this case. 

That’s why actual experience representing immigrants and asylum seekers is such a critical qualification for good Immigration Judges at both the trial and appellate levels as well as being something that should be a factor in appointing future Article III Judges at all levels right up to and particularly including the Supremes. Years of one-sided prosecutorial or law enforcement experience is often no substitute for the “real deal” of experience understanding immigrants and asylum seekers from their perspective.

The current Immigration Court system is intentionally and fatally skewed against asylum seekers, immigrants, due process, and fundamental fairness. Until that changes, equal justice under law will continue to be a cruel, unachieved illusion in our American justice system.

Due Process Forever!

PWS

07-22-20

“PEREIRA II” — SUPREMES TAKE ANOTHER “STOP TIME” IMMIGRATION CASE —  Niz-Chavez v. Barr

Amy Howe
Amy Howe
Freelance Journalist, Court Reporter
Scotusblog

https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/06/court-grants-immigration-case/

Amy Howe reports for SCOTUS Blog:

Court grants immigration case

This morning the Supreme Court issued orders from the justices’ private conference last week. The court added one new case to its merits docket for the term that begins in October. The justices once again did not act on two groups of high-profile petitions – one involving gun rights and the other involving qualified immunity – that they considered last week.

With the grant in Niz-Chavez v. Barr, the justices added another immigration case to their docket for next term. At issue in the case is the kind of notice that the government must provide to trigger the “stop-time rule,” which stops noncitizens from accruing the time in the United States that they need to become eligible for discretionary relief from deportation. Congress passed the “stop-time rule” to keep noncitizens from taking advantage of lengthy delays in deportation proceedings to continue to accrue time. Under the rule, a noncitizen’s time in the United States, for purposes of relief from deportation, ends when the government sends him a “notice to appear” containing specific information about a scheduled removal proceeding. The question that the justices agreed to decide today is whether all the necessary information must be provided in a single document in order to trigger the stop-time rule, as Agusto Niz-Chavez, who came to the United States from Guatemala in 2005, contends, or whether the government can trigger the rule by providing the information in multiple documents.

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Our Round Table has filed amicus briefs on this issue in a number of similar cases, although not in this particular case, which originated in the 6th Circuit.

At issue here is the BIA’s precedent in Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 520 (BIA 2019). There, in a now-rare en banc decision, the BIA majority basically “flicked off” the Supremes’ decision in Pereira v. INS,  138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018) and allowed the DHS to remedy a defective statutory Notice to Appear (“NTA”) with a later-issued EOIR notice of hearing providing the missing information to “fill in the blanks” from the original defective notice. 

In an even more unusual and potentially career-shortening move, six of the BIA’s then 15 Appellate Immigration Judges filed a strongly-worded dissent accusing their majority colleagues of ignoring both the words of the statute and the Court’s Pereira decision. Perhaps not surprisingly, three of the dissenting judges have since retired from the BIA and a fourth, the Vice Chair, was passed over for Acting Chair in a highly unusual personnel move by the DOJ, which controls the BIA. (One of the primary reasons for having a designated “Vice Chair” is to be the “Acting Chair” in the absence of the Chairman.) In their places, Barr has appointed some of the most notorious hard-line asylum denying Immigration Judges in the nation.

The Supremes have thus far tiptoed around the glaring unconstitutionality of a so-called “appellate tribunal” that is appointed, wholly controlled by, and answers to the chief prosecutor, the Attorney General. Not surprisingly, upon discovering the Constitution-nullifying power of a “captive court system,” that is not a court at all under any common understanding of the term, the Administration has leveraged it to the max as a tool for their White Nationalist anti-immigrant agenda. Indeed, all the recent BIA and Attorney General precedents have ruled in favor of the DHS position, even where statutory language, Article III court rulings, prior precedents, and common sense strongly supported the opposite results. 

And, many Courts of Appeals have continued to fictionalize that the highly politicized and “weaponized” BIA is an “expert tribunal” entitled to “Chevron deference.” Any true immigration law expert would say that proposition is absurd. Yet, it conveniently furthers the causes of  both “judicial task avoidance” and the White Nationalist agenda of the Administration.

Because the BIA now occupies itself not with fair and impartial, expert decision-making, but mostly with keeping the “deportation express” running and insuring that DHS prevails over the legal claims of migrants and asylum seekers to fair and humane treatment under the law, the Supremes are finding themselves in the middle of the “statutory and regulatory nitty gritty” of immigration law that was supposed to be the province of a competent and impartial BIA.

While that has occasionally, as in Pereira, worked to the advantage of individuals seeking justice, for the most part, the Supremes have been willing enforcers of the Administration’s abrogation of immigration laws without Congressional participation and “Dred Scottification” of “the other” in violation of our Constitution, and indeed, in violation of both international conventions and fundamental human decency.

Think of how much better and more efficiently the immigration system could run with a constitutionally-required independent Immigration Court utilizing fair and impartial judges selected on the basis of expertise and reputation for fairness and scholarship rather than commitment to DHS enforcement goals.  Think of how much better off our society would be if the Supremes stood up for equal justice for all, rather than enabling a far-right would-be authoritarian scofflaw regime following a  racially-biased agenda of dehumanization, degradation, and deportation.

Due Process Forever!

PWS

06-08-20

RIGGED “COURTS” – BIA’S ANTI-ASYLUM BIAS “OUTED” AGAIN, AS 6TH CIR. BLASTS BOGUS DENIAL OF ASYLUM TO GUATEMALAN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVOR – Says Sessions’s “Reasoning” in A-B- “Abrogated” By Judge Sullivan’s Ruling in Grace v. Whitaker — Juan Antonio v. Barr

 

https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/20a0156p-06.pdf

 

Juan Antonio v.  Barr, 6th Cir., 05-19-20, published

 

PANEL: COLE, Chief Judge; BOGGS and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges

OPINION BY: Judge Gibbons

CONCURRING OPINION: Judge Boggs

KEY QUOTES:

Footnote 3:

3Matter of A-R-C-G was overruled by Matter of A-B, which held that the Board in Matter of A-R-C-G- did not conduct a rigorous enough analysis in its determination that the particular social group was cognizable. See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 331 (A.G. 2018) (noting that because DHS conceded that particular social group was cognizable, “the Board performed only a cursory analysis of the three factors required to establish a particular social group”). Our sister circuits have determined that this change counsels remand. See Padilla- Maldonado v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 751 F. App’x 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2018) (“While the overruling of A-R-C-G- weakens [the applicant’s] case, it does not automatically defeat her claim that she is a member of a cognizable particular social group. As we remand to the BIA to remand to the IJ, the IJ should determine whether [the applicant’s] membership in the group . . . is cognizable . . ..”); Moncada v. Sessions, 751 F. App’x 116, 118 (2d Cir. 2018) (“This Court, like the BIA, applies the law as it exists at the time of decision. And, where, as here, intervening immigration decisions from the executive branch alter the applicable legal standards, we have previously exercised our discretion to remand the matter to the BIA to apply the new standards in the first instance. Recognizing the wisdom of this practice, we take the same tack here and remand this case ‘for the BIA to interpret and apply the standards set forth in [Matter of A-B-] in the first instance.’” (quoting Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 278 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted)).

However, Matter of A-B- has since been abrogated. See Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2018). Grace found that the policies articulated in Matter of A-B- were arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. See id. at 126–27 (holding that there is no general rule against claims involving domestic violence as a basis for membership in a particular social group and that each claim must be evaluated on an individual basis under the statutory factors). The district court’s decision in Grace is currently on appeal to the D.C. Circuit. We acknowledge that we are not bound by Grace but find its reasoning persuasive. Because Matter of A-B- has been abrogated, Matter of A-R-C-G- likely retains precedential value. But, on remand, the agency should also evaluate what effect, if any, Matter of A-R-C-G- and Grace have had on the particular social group analysis. See Bi Xia Qu, 618 F.3d at 609 (“When the BIA does not fully consider an issue, . . . the Supreme Court has instructed that a reviewing court ‘is not generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed.’ Rather, ‘the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the [BIA] for additional investigation or explanation.’” (quoting Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006))).

. . . .

When an asylum claim focuses on non-governmental conduct, the applicant must show that the alleged persecutor is either aligned with the government or that the government is unwilling or unable to control him. See Khalili, 557 F.3d at 436. An applicant meets this burden when she shows that she cannot “reasonably expect the assistance of the government” in controlling her perpetrator’s actions. Al-Ghorbani, 585 F.3d at 998. For example, in In re S-A, the Board found that an applicant was eligible for asylum when she suffered domestic abuse at the hands of her father. In re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328 (BIA 2000). Relying on evidence showing that “in Morocco, domestic violence is commonplace and legal remedies are generally unavailable to women,” and that “‘few women report abuse to authorities’ because the judicial procedure is skewed against them,” the Board held that “even if the respondent had turned to the government for help, Moroccan authorities would have been unable or unwilling to control her father’s conduct.” Id. at 1333, 1335 (quoting Committees on International Relations and Foreign Relations, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1997 1538 (Joint Comm. Print 1998)).

Here, both the immigration judge and Board agreed that the beatings, rape, and threats Maria suffered were severe enough to constitute persecution, but that she failed to show that the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control Juan. In support of its conclusion,

No. 18-3500 Juan Antonio v. Barr Page 16

the Board noted that the government issued a restraining order against Juan, the mayor fined Juan for beating their daughter, and that Maria and their children were able to remain in their home for the year before she left Guatemala. AR 5, BIA Decision. Maria argues on appeal that the Board’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. We agree with her.

Taken as a whole, the record compels the conclusion that Maria cannot “reasonably expect the assistance of the government” in controlling Juan. Al-Ghorbani, 585 F.3d at 998. First, the Board’s conclusion that the restraining order effectively controlled Juan is clearly contradicted by the evidence. Maria testified that Juan “did not obey [the restraining order] because there [was] no police” and “[h]e wasn’t afraid” of any consequences, AR 180, Immigration Ct. Tr., and that at some time that year, Juan came to Maria’s home and beat their oldest child with his belt. She further testified that she went to the police station to file a complaint, but the police never investigated the crime. Second, the Board’s conclusion that “the respondent and her children were able to live legally in the family house” for a year does not paint an accurate picture of that year. AR 5, BIA Decision. The year was not a “period of calm,” as the Board characterized it, but rather, a year which affirmed that the Guatemalan government had not effectively gained control over Juan. Id at 5 n.2. Throughout the course of the year, Maria received threats that Juan “was going to kill [her], and if not[,] that he would pay someone to do something.” AR 188, Immigration Ct. Tr. Juan’s girlfriend also “began threatening [Maria] about once a week, yelling at [her] . . . that she and Juan would kill [her] if [she] didn’t move out of the house.” AR 332, I-589 Appl. In May 2014, Juan’s sister told Maria that “Juan had bought a gun and that he planned to kill [Maria].” Id. at 333. The events of that year indicate that the government had not effectively gained control over Juan.

Moreover, that Juan received a fine of approximately $200 for beating up their oldest child (from a judge who no longer works in town, at a courthouse that has since been destroyed) may indicate some willingness of the Guatemalan government to control Juan but it does not indicate its ability to do so. The concurrence points to the restraining order and fine as evidence

No. 18-3500 Juan Antonio v. Barr Page 17

Guatemala is willing to enforce its laws but may not always be successful.4 While the concurrence would emphasize what Guatemala did, it is more important to look at the numerous instances when the government failed to act or even respond as well as the harm the government failed to prevent. The death threats Maria received continued even after Juan was fined. And Juan’s purchasing of a gun—which ultimately led Maria to flee—came after Juan was fined. Moreover, the police failed to respond to Maria’s calls for help on two occasions when Juan came to Maria’s house and threatened her and/or their children. In reviewing this evidence, the immigration court opined that it “would be left to wonder if Juan intended to kill the respondent, the mother of his four children, why would he not have done so.” AR 70, Immigration Ct. Order. But it cannot be that an applicant must wait until she is dead to show her government’s inability to control her perpetrator.

The supplemental evidence regarding Guatemala’s country conditions corroborates that Maria could not “reasonably expect the assistance of the government” in controlling Juan’s actions. Al-Ghorbani, 585 F.3d at 998; see In re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328 (BIA 2000). The evidence Maria submitted shows that “[t]he systemic marginalization of indigenous communities . . . continues with no meaningful efforts by the government to overcome it.” AR 285, State of the World’s Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2015—Guatemala. It also indicates that “[i]mpunity for perpetrators remain[s] very high,” AR 255, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016, and that for Mayan indigenous women, there is “increased vulnerability and gender-based violence . . . exacerbated by a weak state apparatus that struggles to implement laws and programming to protect these groups.” AR 274, Guatemala Struggles to Protect Women Against Endemic Violence. Indigenous Mayan women are particularly unable to seek help from the government because they speak a different language from most of the country’s authorities. To be sure, the supplemental material does not indicate no willingness on behalf of the Guatemalan government—indeed, the country has taken some steps to codify laws prohibiting violence against women—but rather, the material reinforces the country’s lack of

4The concurrence’s reference to the enforcement of domestic abuse law violations in this country is both inapt and irrelevant.

 

No. 18-3500 Juan Antonio v. Barr Page 18 resources and infrastructure necessary to protect indigenous Mayan women from their perpetrators.

Further, the Board’s conclusion that Maria did not meet her burden of showing that the Guatemalan government was “helpless” relies on a standard that has since been deemed arbitrary and capricious. AR 5, BIA Decision. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that the “complete helplessness” standard is arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, and “not a permissible construction of the persecution requirement.” Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 130 (D.D.C. 2018).

Thus, the Board’s conclusion that Maria did not demonstrate that the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control Juan is not supported by “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Zhao, 569 F.3d at 247 (quoting Koulibaly, 541 F.3d at 619). Maria’s testimony about her experiences, corroborated by supplemental evidence of the conditions for indigenous Mayan women in Guatemala, compels a contrary conclusion to that of the Board. See Mandebvu, 755 F.3d at 424. Based on the evidence in the record, Maria could not “reasonably expect the assistance of the government” in controlling Juan’s actions. Al-Ghorbani, 585 F.3d at 998. We therefore vacate the Board’s finding that Maria did not show that the government was unable or unwilling to protect her and remand so the agency can reconsider her application consistent with this opinion.

 

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Thanks to my Round Table colleague Judge Jeffrey Chase for spotting this decision and sending it my way.

And congratulations to Margaret Wong, Esquire, of Cleveland, OH, who represented the respondent so ably before the 6th Circuit. Margaret and the attorneys from her firm appeared before me numerous times during the many years that I was assigned to the Cleveland docket part-time from Arlington, with most of the hearings taking place by televideo.

Margaret W./ Wong
Margaret W./ Wong
Senior PartnerMargaret W. Wong & Associates LLC

The BIA’s bogus “helpless standard” came directly from Matter of A-B-Sessions’s unethical, legally incorrect, and misogynistic attempt to write female domestic violence victims from Central America out of refugee protections as part of his White Nationalist agenda. Judge Gibbons’s opinion found persuasive U.S. District Judge Sullivan’s (D. D.C.) conclusion in Grace v. Whitaker that Sessions’s A-B- atrocity was “arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law.”  

This further confirms the problems of a politicized and weaponized Immigration Court system controlled by anti-asylum politicos. How many more “Marias” are out there who are arbitrarily denied protection by the Immigration Courts and the BIA, but lack the ability to obtain competent counsel to assist them and/or are not fortunate enough to have a Court of Appeals panel that takes their case seriously, rather than just “deferring” to the BIA? For example, the Fifth Circuit has “tanked” on the A-B- issue. And, today, the Trump regime is being allowed to turn away asylum seekers at the border in violation of law and without any meaningful opportunity whatsoever to present a claim.

Disgraceful as the BIA’s performance was in this case, worse happens every day in the broken Immigration Court system and the abusive, scofflaw enforcement system administered by the Trump regime. And those charged with putting an end to such blatant violations of law and human rights – the Article III Judiciary – have largely shirked their duty to put an end to this unconstitutional, illegal, unethical, and inhumane “bad joke” of a “court system” and to stop the regime’s illegal abrogation of U.S. asylum laws.

Due Process Forever!

PWS

05-19-20

 

 

 

EOIR WRONG AGAIN: Split 6th Cir. Says BIA Screwed Up Corroboration, Nexus Requirements In Mexican PSG Withholding Case — GUZMAN-VAZQUEZ v. BARR!

Dan Kowalski
Dan Kowalski
Online Editor of the LexisNexis Immigration Law Community (ILC)

Dan Kowalski report from LexisNexis Immigration Community:

https://www.lexisnexis.com/LegalNewsRoom/immigration/b/insidenews/posts/ca6-on-corroboration-social-group-guzman-vazquez-v-barr

CA6 on Corroboration, Social Group: Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr

Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr

“Manuel Guzman, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an immigration judge’s denial of his application for withholding of removal. Because the IJ and BIA erred in failing to give Guzman an opportunity to explain why he could not reasonably obtain certain corroborative evidence, because substantial evidence does not support the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and BIA’s determinations regarding the unavailability of evidence to corroborate Guzman’s claim about abuse by his stepfather, and because the BIA incorrectly required Guzman to demonstrate that his membership in a particular social group was “at least one central reason” for his persecution, we GRANT the petition for review, VACATE the BIA’s order, and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

[Hats off to R. Andrew Free!]

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PANEL: MERRITT, MOORE, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

OPINION: Judge Moore

DISSENT: Judge Murphy

In looking for ways to deny protection, the BIA continues to “blow the basics.” That’s going to continue to happen as long as EOIR is allowed to operate as a branch of DHS Enforcement rather than a fair-minded, impartial court system with true expertise and which grants needed protection in meritorious cases, rather than searching for specious “reasons to deny.”

No wonder the EOIR backlog is mushrooming out of control when those responsible for doing justice waste countless time and resources “manufacturing denials,” rather than just promptly granting relief in many meritorious cases.

PWS

05-18-20

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LAW YOU CAN USE: As 6th Cir. Veers Off Course To Deny Asylum To Refugee Who Suffered Grotesque Past Persecution, Hon. Jeffrey Chase Has A Better Idea For An Approach To “Unwilling Or Unable To Control” That Actually Advances The Intent Of Asylum Law!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/4/21/a-better-approach-to-unable-or-unwilling-analysis

 

A Better Approach to “Unable or Unwilling” Analysis?

“K.H., a Guatemalan native and citizen, was kidnapped, beaten, and raped in Guatemala when she was seven years old.”  That horrifying sentence begins a recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denying asylum to that very same youth.

In that case, DHS actually stipulated that the applicant was persecuted on account of a statutorily protected ground.  But the insurmountable hurdle for K.H. was her need to establish that the government of Guatemala was unable or unwilling to control the gang members who had persecuted her.

Asylum is supposed to afford protection to those who are fleeing something horrible in their native country.  Somehow, our government has turned the process into an increasingly complex series of hoops for the victim to jump through in order to merit relief.  Not long after Congress enacted legislation in 2005 making it more difficult for asylum seekers to be found believable, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that “asylum hearings are human events, and individuals make mistakes about immaterial points…Basing an adverse credibility finding on these kinds of mistakes appears to be more of a game of ‘gotcha’ than an effort to critically evaluate the applicant’s claims.”  Sankoh v. Mukasey, 539 F.3d 456, 470 (7th Cir. 2008).  More recent developments have extended the game of “gotcha” beyond credibility determinations and into substantive questions of law.

It is recognized that one can qualify for asylum where the persecutors are not part of the government, provided that the government is either unable or unwilling to control them.  In a recent amicus brief, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) correctly stated what seems obvious: that “the hallmark of state protection is the state’s ability to provide effective protection, which requires effective control of non-state actors.”  As the whole point of asylum is to provide humanitarian protection to victims of persecution, of course the test must be the effectiveness of the protection.  UNHCR continued that the fact that a government has enacted laws affording protection is not enough, as “even though a particular State may have prohibited a persecutory practice…the State may nevertheless continue to condone or tolerate the practice, or may not be able to stop the practice effectively.”

When I was an immigration judge, I heard testimony from country experts that governments were often inclined to pass laws or even create government agencies dedicated to the protection of, e.g. religious minorities solely for cosmetic reasons, to give the appearance to the international community that it was complying with international human rights obligations, when in reality, such laws and offices provided no real protection.  But UNHCR recognizes that even where there is good intent, “there may be an incongruity between avowed commitments and reality on the ground. Effective protection depends on both de jure and de facto capability by the authorities.”

Yet U.S. law has somehow recently veered off course.  In unpublished decisions, the BIA began applying what seems like a “good faith effort” test, concluding that the asylum applicants had not met their burden of establishing that the government was “unable or unwilling to protect” if there was evidence that the government showed some interest in the issue and took some action (whether entirely effective or not) to provide protection.  Such approach wrongly ignored whether the government’s efforts actually resulted in protecting the asylum seeker. Next, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions weighed in on the topic in his decision in Matter of A-B-, in which he equated a government’s unwillingness to control the persecutors (which could potentially be due to a variety of factors, including fear, corruption, or cost) with the much narrower requirement that it “condone” the group’s actions.  He further opined that an inability to control requires a showing of “complete helplessness” on the part of the government in question to provide protection. These changes have resulted in the denial of asylum to individuals who remain at risk of persecution in their country of origin.

In K.H., it should be noted that the evidence that convinced the BIA of the Guatemalan government’s ability to afford protection included a criminal court judge’s order that the victim be moved to another city, be scheduled for regular government check-ins as to her continued safety there (which the record failed to show actually occurred), and the judge’s further recommendation that the victim seek a visa to join her family in the U.S.  A criminal court judge’s directive to move to another city and then leave for a safer country hardly seems like evidence of the Guatamalan government’s ability or willingness to provide adequate protection; quite the opposite. But that is how the BIA chose to interpret it, and somehow, the circuit court found reason to let it stand under its limited substantial evidence standard for review.

Challenges to these new interpretations are reaching the circuit courts.  Addressing the issue for the first time, the Sixth Circuit in K.H. created a rather involved test.  The court first set out two broad categories, consisting of (1) evidence of the government’s response to the asylum seeker’s persecution, and (2) general evidence of country conditions.  WIthin broad category (1), the court created three subcategories for inquiry, namely: (1) whether the police investigated, prosecuted, and punished the persecutors after the fact; (2) the degree of protection offered to the asylum seeker, again after the fact of their being persecuted, and (3) any concession on the part of the government, citing a Third Circuit decision finding a government’s relocation of a victim to Mexico as an admission by that government of its own inability to provide adequate protection.  (Somehow, the criminal judge’s order to relocate K.H. to another city and then seek a visa to the U.S. was not viewed as a similar concession by the BIA.)

Under broad category (2) (i.e. country conditions), the court established two subcategories for inquiry, consisting of (1) how certain crimes are prosecuted and punished, and (2) the efficacy of the government’s efforts.

Some shortcomings of this approach jump out.  First, many asylum applicants have not suffered past persecution; their claims are based on a future fear of harm.  As the Sixth Circuit approach is based entirely on how the government in question responded to past persecution, how would it apply to cases involving only a fear of future persecution?

Secondly, and more significantly, the Sixth Circuit’s entire approach is to measure how well a government acted to close a barn door after the horse had already escaped.  The test is the equivalent of measuring the owner of a china shop’s ability to protect its wares from breakage by studying how quickly and efficiently it cleaned up the broken shards and restocked the shelves after the fact.

I would like to propose a much simpler, clearer test that would establish with 100 percent accuracy a government’s inability or unwillingness to provide effective protection from a non-state persecutor.  The standard is: when a seven year old girl is kidnapped, raped, and beaten, the government was presumably unable to provide the necessary effective protection.

If this seems overly simplistic, I point to a doctrine commonly employed in tort law, known as res ipsa loquitur, which translates from the Latin as “the thing speaks for itself.”  It is something all lawyers learn in their first year of law school. I will use the definition of the concept as found on the Cornell Law School website (which is nice, as I recently spoke there), which reads:

In tort law, a principle that allows plaintiffs to meet their burden of proof with what is, in effect, circumstantial evidence.  The plaintiff can create a rebuttable presumption of negligence by the defendant by proving that the harm would not ordinarily have occurred without negligence, that the object that caused the harm was under the defendant’s control, and that there are no other plausible explanations.

The principle has been applied by courts since the 1860s.

So where the government has stipulated that the respondent suffered persecution on account of a protected ground, should we really then be placing the additional burden on the victim of having to satisfy the “unable or unwilling” test through the above line of inquiry set out by the Sixth Circuit?  Or would it be more efficient, more, humane, and likely to reach a more accurate result that conforms to the international law standards explained by UNHCR, to create a rebuttable presumption of asylum eligibility by allowing the asylum applicant to establish that the persecution would not ordinarily have occurred if the government had been able and willing to provide the protection necessary to have prevented it from happening?  The bar would be rather low, as seven year olds should not be kidnapped, raped, and beaten if the police whose duty it was to protect the victim were both able and willing to control the gang members who carried out the heinous acts. The standard would also require a showing that such harm occurred in territory under the government’s jurisdiction (as opposed to territory in which, for example, an armed group constituted a de facto government).

Upon such showing, the burden would shift to DHS to prove that the government had the effective ability and will to prevent the persecution from happening in the first place (as opposed to prosecuting those responsible afterwards) by satisfying whatever complex, multi-level inquiry the courts want to lay out for them.  However, DHS would not meet its burden through showing evidence of the government’s response after the fact. Rather, it would be required to establish that the Guatemalan government provides sufficient protection to its citizens to prevent such harm from occurring in the first instance, and that what happened to the asylum applicant was a true aberration.

Shifting the burden to DHS would make sense.  It is often expensive to procure a respected country expert to testify at a removal proceeding.  As more asylum applicants are being detained in remote facilities with limited access to counsel, it may be beyond their means to retain such experts themselves.  The UNHCR Handbook at para. 196 recognizes the problems asylum seekers often have in documenting their claims.  It thus concludes that “while the burden of proof in principle rests on the applicant, the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant facts is shared between the applicant and the examiner. Indeed, in some cases, it may be for the examiner to use all the means at his disposal to produce the necessary evidence in support of the application.”

  Furthermore, ICE attorneys who should welcome the role of such experts in creating a better record and increasing the likelihood of a just result  have taken to disparaging even highly respected country experts, sometimes subjecting them to rather hostile questioning that slows down proceedings and might discourage the participation of such experts in future proceedings.  Therefore, letting ICE present its own experts might prove much more efficient for all.

Incidentally, UNHCR Guidelines published last year state that while the Guatemalan government has made efforts to combat gang violence and has demonstrated some success, “in certain parts of the country the Government has lost effective control to gangs and other organized criminal groups and is unable to provide protection…”  The report continued that some temporary police operations have simply caused the gangs to move their operations to nearby areas. The report further cited the problem of impunity for violence against women and girls, as well as other groups, including “human rights defenders, legal and judicial professionals, indigenous populations, children and adolescents, individuals of diverse sexual orientations and/or gender identities, journalists and other media workers.”    The same report at pp. 35-36 also references corruption within the Guatemalan government (including its police force) as a “widespread and structural problem.”  DHS would have to present evidence sufficient to overcome such information in order to rebut the presumption triggered by the fact of the persecution itself.

Another  benefit of the proposed approach would be its impact on a victim’s eligibility for a grant of humanitarian asylum, which may be granted based on the severity of the past persecution suffered even where no fear of future persecution remains.  A child who was kidnapped, raped, and beaten by gang members at the age of seven, and who will certainly suffer psychological harm for the rest of her life as a result, should clearly not be returned against her will to the country in which she suffered such horrific persecution.  Yet the Sixth Circuit upheld the BIA’s denial of such humanitarian protection, because in affirming the Board’s conclusion that K.H. had not met her burden of showing the Guatemalan government was unable and unwilling to protect her (based solely on its after-the-fact response), it also upheld the BIA’s finding that K.H. did not meet all of the requirements necessary for her to have established that she suffered past persecution.  This in spite of the fact that DHS stipulated that she did suffer past persecution on account of a statutorily protected ground. As only an applicant who established past persecution is eligible for humanitarian asylum, this very convoluted approach successfully blocked such remedy.

However, if the standard were to assume that the harm suffered by the asylum applicant triggers the presumption that the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to prevent it, the evidence that government’s subsequent efforts to prosecute those responsible and protect the victim would not serve to rebut the presumption.  Rather, it would be considered as possible evidence of changed conditions in the country of origin sufficient to show that after suffering past persecution, the asylum applicant would now have no further fear of returning there. This critical distinction would then allow K.H. to be granted humanitarian asylum even if the government prevailed in its arguments, as opposed to facing deportation that would return her to the scene of such extreme persecution.

Copyright 2019 Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved.

 

The Immigration Court: Issues and Solutions

 

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Jeffrey S. Chase is an immigration lawyer in New York City.  Jeffrey is a former Immigration Judge, senior legal advisor at the Board of Immigration Appeals, and volunteer staff attorney at Human Rights First.  He is a past recipient of AILA’s annual Pro Bono Award, and previously chaired AILA’s Asylum Reform Task Force.

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But, here’s the deal, complicit and complacent judges! We’re now governed by folks who have no respect for judges, the Constitution, the law, and no use for judges unless they are doing  the bidding of the “Great Leader” and his flunkies. So, maybe your time will come too, when your rights or your family’s rights become dispensable to the powers that be.
But, there won’t be any Due Process or legal system left to protect you. And, whose going to stand up for your rights as they are trashed and trampled when you lacked the courage, scholarship, and integrity to stand up for the rights of others, particularly the most vulnerable among us?
More bad news for you irresponsible “judicial dudes.”  “No reasonable adjudicator” could have reached the conclusion you did in this case!
Like Judge Chase, I’ve done enough of these cases, at both the trial and appellate level, to know a clear grant when I see one. Indeed, on this record, the idea that the Guatemalan government is willing or able to protect this young lady is preposterous.  It doesn’t even pass the “straight face” test. So much for hiding behind your “standards of review” fiction.  Think of K.H. as your daughter or granddaughter rather than
“a mere stranger” and then see how your “head in the sand” legal analysis works out.
The questionable conduct of the judges at all three levels in this case shows why our current Immigration Court system is so screwed up. Individuals who could efficiently be granted protection at the lowest levels in an honest, well-functioning, and professional system are instead made to ”run the judicial gauntlet” while various “black robes” work hard and occupy time looking for reasons to “stiff” their valid claims for protection. Indeed, in a well-functioning system, cases like this would be granted at the Asylum Office level and wouldn’t clog the courts in the first place.
An independent judiciary with courage and integrity is essential to the survival of our democracy. Sadly, this case is a prime example of a system in failure — at all levels.
PWS
04-25-19

HON. JEFFREY S. CHASE: 6th Cir. Correctly Rejected BIA’s Disingenuous Approach To Res Judicata In Jasso! — Time To End The “Chevron Farce” In Immigration Cases!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/12/31/6th-cir-reverses-bia-on-res-judicata

6th Cir. Reverses BIA on Res Judicata

In the final days of 2017, the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a precedent decision in Matter of Jasso Arangure.1  The respondent in that case, a longtime permanent resident, had been convicted of first-degree home invasion under Michigan law.  ICE had placed him into removal proceedings because it claimed the conviction constituted an aggravated felony as a “crime of violence” under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.  Although the immigration judge agreed with ICE, Mr. Jasso won his appeal because the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, in another case, found the concept that a crime that in itself was not violent (i.e. home invasion) could be considered a “crime of violence” because hypothetically, a violent confrontation could occur, was unconstitutionally vague.  As a result, Mr. Jasso’s case was terminated because the government had not met its burden of proof.

Two days later, the government commenced another case against Mr. Jasso.  It again charged him, on the basis of the exact same home invasion conviction, of being removable as an aggravated felon, but this time, instead of labeling it a crime of violence, ICE argued that it met the definition of an aggravated felony burglary offense under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Act.  Mr. Jasso moved to terminate, arguing that the new proceedings were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, which forbids relitigating the same issue between the same parties where the matter has already reached a final judgment on the merits.  The immigration judge did not terminate, and ordered the respondent removed.

On appeal, the BIA affirmed.  The BIA had to acknowledge that res judicata had been found to apply in the administrative law context, and that the Board itself had applied the similar doctrine of collateral estoppel in its own precedent decisions.  Nevertheless, the BIA concluded that it would be too burdensome “to require the DHS to present all possible bases for removal in a single proceeding.” That statement is remarkably misleading.  In this case, it would have required the ICE attorney at most two extra minutes to add the additional charge of “burglary” to the original “crime of violence” charge. If ICE somehow neglected to do this in the original charging document, an ICE attorney could have added the additional charge later, a common practice.

The BIA added that “whether a particular offense is an aggravated felony is a legal determination affected by complex laws that are in constant flux,” the implication being how can we punish the poor DHS for not anticipating an unexpected change in law.  But the same BIA proved the disingenuousness of this approach less than six months later, following former Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ decision in Matter of A-B-.  Four days later, when the BIA decided an appeal that had been argued and decided while Matter of A-R-C-G- was still a precedent decision that was commonly relied on to grant domestic violence cases, the BIA did not say “a grant of asylum is a legal determination affected by complex laws that are in constant flux,” and remand the matter to allow the applicant to reformulate her arguments under the four-day-old decision.  To the contrary, the Board said “the Attorney General has foreclosed the respondent’s arguments,” and dismissed the appeal with no meaningful analysis.2

Fortunately, Mr. Jasso appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which issued its decision in the final days of 2018.  Under a concept known as Chevron deference, circuit courts must defer to the BIA’s interpretation of a statute if and only if the statutory language being interpreted is ambiguous.  In recent years, the trend has been for the circuit courts to find the language ambiguous and accord such deference. In this case, it would have been particularly easy for the court to do so, because the Immigration and Nationality Act is completely silent as to whether the concept of res judicata should apply in removal proceedings.

However, the Sixth Circuit did something extraordinary.  It first noted that the Supreme Court has recently taken the circuit courts to task for being too quick to find a statute ambiguous,3 and therefore decided to exercise due diligence before reaching such determination in the present case.  And even though there was no statutory language at all, the court took the extra step of turning to “canons,” which it defined as “general background principles that courts have developed over time to guide statutory interpretation.” The court noted one such canon in particular, which presumes “that general statutory language incorporates established common-law principles (like res judicata) unless ‘a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.’”  Pursuant to a lengthy, detailed analysis, the court concluded that the canon should properly be applied in removal proceedings, which renders the statute unambiguous, meaning that res judicata applies.

The Sixth Circuit next examined whether “a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.”  The Court noted that the statutory burden of proof that Congress put on DHS to prove removability by “clear and convincing evidence” “would be rendered ‘largely meaningless’ if DHS could repeatedly bring one proceeding after another until it got the result it wanted.”

The BIA had tried to support its decision below by reading into the Act a clear Congressional intent to remove noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies and other crimes, determining that a concept such as res judicata shouldn’t apply where it would interfere with such a clear Congressional intent.  The Board concluded that the purpose for res judicata, which it expressed as “the public interest in the finality of administrative judgments,” was no match for “Congress’ clear intent” to remove noncitizens convicted of crimes.

The Sixth Circuit had a wonderful reply, finding the Board’s approach “suggests courts can simply ignore the enacted text and instead replace it with an amorphous ‘purpose’ that happens to match with the outcome one party wants.”  The court further pointed out the ridiculousness of the Board’s approach, as, since Congress always wants its statutes to be enforced, res judicata could always be viewed as an obstacle, and so such reading would have the effect of rendering the whole common-law presumption “meaningless.”  The court wisely concluded that “statutes are motivated by many competing – and often contradictory – purposes” which “Congress addresses…by negotiating, crafting, and enacting statutory text.  It is that text that controls, not a court’s after-the-fact reevaluation of the purposes behind it.”

Having ruled that res judicata could be applied, the court found that three of the four requirements for applying res judicata were met.  The court concluded that both proceedings involved the same facts, as they were both based on the same Michigan conviction,  and that the different basis for the aggravated felony charge lodged by DHS was not a new fact, but rather a different legal theory of a party.  The court also found that there was no dispute that both proceedings involved the same parties, and that DHS could have lodged the burglary charge in the earlier proceedings.  The only remaining question was whether the first proceeding concluded in a final judgment. As the court found it unclear from the record whether the termination of the initial proceedings was with or without prejudice, it remanded the record for the BIA to consider the question in the first instance.

Regardless of the outcome on remand, the decision is important, as the doctrine of res judicata will again be available (at least in the Sixth Circuit) to preclude ICE from subjecting noncitizens to multiple removal proceedings due to the Government’s lack of preparation.  The decision might also signal the application of a tougher standard for determining whether Chevron deference is due to BIA precedent decisions.  In a footnote, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that “many members of the Supreme Court” have questioned Chevron deference, including present Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh.  The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a case concerning the continued viability of the related concept of Auer deference, according deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.4  Let’s hope that the circuit courts will in the future be less inclined to rely on Chevron to afford the BIA a free pass, and instead be more likely to take the Board to task for its poorly-reasoned, result-driven decisionmaking.

Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved.

Notes

  1. 27 I&N Dec. 178 (BIA 2017).
  2. Matter of M-J- (unpublished decision, June 15, 2018).
  3. See, e.g. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S.Ct. 2105, 2121 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

4. Kisor v. Wilkie, 899 F.3d 1360 ( cert. granted (U.S. Dec. 10, 2018) (No. 18-15).

 

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Jeffrey S. Chase is an immigration lawyer in New York City.  Jeffrey is a former Immigration Judge, senior legal advisor at the Board of Immigration Appeals, and volunteer staff attorney at Human Rights First.  He is a past recipient of AILA’s annual Pro Bono Award, and previously chaired AILA’s Asylum Reform Task Force.

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Jeffrey and I agree that the Circuit Courts like the 6th are finally taking a long-overdue more critical approach to giving the BIA so-called “Chevron deference.”  By now, the Article III Courts should be catching on that the BIA recently has been stretching statutory interpretation in any way possible to favor the DHS’s view in almost all published cases. This is even when the alternate interpretation offered by the respondent is closer to the statutory language, would be more practical, and/or would produce a more reasonable outcome.  In most cases, the consequences at stake for the individual respondent are far, far greater than those at stake for the DHS.
And, the concept that clearly biased “know nothing” enforcement zealots like Sessions and Whitaker should be given any deference whatsoever in their political roles as Attorney General is beyond preposterous. The “Supremes-created” doctrine of “Chevron deference” (a/k/a “Judicial Task Avoidance”) was based largely on the assumption of both an objective deliberative administrative process and a high degree of technical expertise. Neither of these apply any more to the BIA, let alone to hacks like Sessions and Whitaker.
I believe that the time has come for the Supremes to overrule “Chevron” and resume doing their primary judicial function of interpreting the law. That, of course, would not prevent the Article III Courts from deferring on a case-by-case to particularly persuasive or well-reasoned agency decisions (so-called “Skidmore deference” which was the predecessor to Chevron) where appropriate. But, even if Chevron deference continues as a general proposition, there are compelling reasons for no longer applying it to administrative adjudications under the immigration laws.
PWS
01-03-19

NO DEFERENCE DUE! – 6th CIR. SLAMS TWO BIA PRECEDENTS – MATTER OF KEELEY, 27 I&N DEC. 27 I&N DEC. 146 (BIA 2017) & MATTER OF JASSO ARANGURE, 27 I&N DEC. 178 (BIA 2017) BITE THE DUST! — Time To Put An End To Inappropriate “Chevron Deference” For “Captive” BIA!

6th-Keeley18a0270p-06

Keeley v. Whitaker, 6th Cir., 12-17-18, Published

PANEL: GRIFFIN and DONALD, Circuit Judges; BERTELSMAN, District Judge*

*The Honorable William O. Bertelsman, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.

OPINION BY: JUDGE BERNICE BOUIE DONALD

 KEYQUOTE: 

This case requires us to use the tools of statutory interpretation to determine whether a conviction for rape in Ohio is an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). The Fifth Circuit and the Board  of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) previously considered this question and answered it in the negative. In the case before us, though, the BIA reversed course in a published decision and found that such a conviction is an aggravated felony under the INA. On review of all the relevant materials, we disagree with the BIA. A conviction for rape in Ohio can be committed by digital penetration, whereas the aggravated felony of rape under the INA cannot. Therefore, the Ohio conviction does not categorically fit within the federal definition, and the petitioner’sconviction is not an aggravated felony. Accordingly, we REVERSE.

. . . .

In its opinion, the BIA ignored the most important guiding factor to statutory interpretation—the language of the statute—which shows that Congress did not consider rape and sexual abuse to be coextensive. When a court discerns the intent of Congress, “[o]ur analysis begins with the language of the statute.” Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1569 (emphasis added) (quoting Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 8 (2004)). When defining what crimes constituted aggravated felonies in the INA, Congress included “rape” and “sexual abuse of a minor” separately. § 101(a)(43)(A). The only conclusion we can draw from this drafting is that Congress intended for the terms to describe different aggravated felonies.

The BIA’s approach is impermissible because it would strip meaning from the statute’s words. “Under accepted canons of statutory interpretation, we must interpret statutes as a whole,giving effect to each word and making every effort not to interpret a provision in a manner that renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous.” Menuskin v. Williams, 145 F.3d 755, 768 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lake Cumberland Trust, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 954 F.2d 1218, 1222 (6th Cir. 1992)). To accept the BIA’s position that Congress intended for rape and sexual abuse to be synonymous would render meaningless Congress’ decision to utilize the two different terms—rape and sexual abuse—to describe two different aggravated felonies.6 Congress clearly intended to penalize a more expansive set of sex crimes

No. 17-4210 Keeley v. Whitaker Page 7

committed against minors than against adults; and to effectuate that intent, Congress used the term “rape” as to adults and “sexual abuse” as to minors. The BIA ignored the language of the statute.7 Its holding cannot stand.

The primary error the BIA committed was to place the states’ treatment of the crime above the language of the statute. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (holding that we must discern the intent of Congress when interpreting a federal statute).8 Even accepting as true that many of the states treated rape and sexual abuse as “interchangeable” in 1996, we cannot impute such an understanding to Congress. The language of the INA prohibits us from doing so.

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Gee, the Fifth Circuit actually told the BIA the correct answer! And, initially, the BIA got it right!

But then, perhaps in an effort to ingratiate themselves with “Gonzo Apocalypto” Sessions, their “new boss,” the BIA screwed it up by trying to expand the reach of the removal provision so that more folks could be removed in violation of law. Sounds like just the kind of scofflaw thing Ol’ Gonzo encouraged and dreamed about. Looks to me like “job security” is overruling “justice” at “Justice!”

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172209.P Jasso-6th Cir18a0272p-06

Jasso Arangure v. Whitaker, 6th Cir., 12-18-18, Published

PANEL: THAPAR, BUSH, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges

OPINION BY: JUDGE THAPAR

KEY QUOTE:

Courts have always had an “emphatic[]” duty “to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). But all too often, courts abdicate this duty by rushing to find statutes ambiguous, rather than performing a full interpretive analysis. When dealing with agencies, this abdication by ambiguity is even more tempting—and even more problematic. Because, under Chevron, ambiguity means courts get to outsource their “emphatic” duty by deferring to an agency’s interpretation. But even Chevron itself reminds courts that they must do their job before applying deference: they must first exhaust the “traditional tools” of statutory interpretation and “reject administrative constructions” that are contrary to the clear meaning of the statute. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984). First and foremost, this means courts must analyze the statutory text. But when the text standing alone does not supply an answer, courts must consider canons of interpretation. Here, a canon makes the statute’s meaning clear. Thus, we reject the agency’s contrary interpretation.

. . . .

In this case, the Chevron analysis begins and ends with step one. The common-law presumption of res judicata makes the INA unambiguous. Res judicata doctrine applies in removal proceedings.

*********************************************

“Preaching to the choir” here on “Chevron deference.”  As my former students in RLP and ILP at Georgetown might remember, I referred to Chevron as “judicial task avoidance,” which is exactly what it is.  It’s a gross violation of Marbury. Effectively, “TJ” dancing on the grave of John Marshall!

Chevron deference is particularly inappropriate in the case of the BIA, which these days functions as an enforcement appendage of the Attorney General (who, without authorization, has actually “re-assumed” many of the civil immigration enforcement functions of DHS). And, both Sessions and Whitaker have shown that if the BIA dares to render any semblance of a reasonable interpretation that might actually help a respondent in Removal Proceedings in any way it will be swiftly and mindlessly reversed.

Neither Sessions nor Whitaker had any chance of being confirmed as an Article III Judge. Indeed, Sessions was emphatically rejected for such a position by his own party because of his record of racially biased views (which he inflicted on the most vulnerable migrants during his toxic tenure as AG).

They have no business serving in a “quasi-judicial” capacity in any immigration proceeding. And, the Article III Courts have no business giving the BIA “deference” reserved for an impartial panel of subject matter experts. By no stretch of the imagination does that describe today’s “captive” BIA (which, incidentally, hasn’t had an “outside Government” appointment this century –even before Sessions, its jurisprudence had become very lopsidedly in favor of the DHS).

PWS

12-22-18

GOV WINS A “BIGGIE:” 6th Cir. Defers To BIA’s Interpretation Of “Pereira Notice” in Matter of Bermudez-Cota — Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker!

Hernandez-Perez-6th-18a0269p-06

Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker, 6th Cir., 12-18-18, Published

PANEL: GUY, WHITE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges

OPINION BY: JUDGE JANE B. STRANCH

KEY QUOTE:

On the other hand, importing Pereira’s holding on the stop-time rule into the jurisdictional context would have unusually broad implications. According to the Government, “almost 100 percent” of NTAs issued during the three years preceding Pereira did not include the time and date of the proceeding. Id. at 2111.

Pereira’s emphatically “narrow” framing, id. at 2110, 2113, counsels in favor of distinguishing between the two contexts. Pereira confronted a specific question: “If the Government serves a noncitizen with a document that is labeled ‘notice to appear,’ but the document fails to specify either the time or place of the removal proceedings, does it trigger the stop-time rule?” Id. at 2110. Hernandez-Perez’s case does not present the same narrow question; no one disputes that he satisfies the ten-year requirement regardless of when the stop- time rule was triggered. We find persuasive the Board’s reasoning that, “[h]ad the Court intended to issue a holding as expansive as the one advanced . . ., presumably it would not have specifically referred to the question before it as being ‘narrow.’” Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 443.

No. 18-3137 Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker Page 10

Other components of Pereira counsel against applying its NTA rule in the context of jurisdiction. Like the BIA, we find it significant that, in Pereira, “the Court did not purport to invalidate the alien’s underlying removal proceedings or suggest that proceedings should be terminated.” Id.; see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012) (requiring courts to examine their own jurisdiction even if the parties “have disclaimed or have not presented” theissue). If Pereira’s holding applied to jurisdiction, there also would not have been jurisdiction in in Pereira itself. But the Court took up, decided, and remanded Pereira without even hinting at the possibility of a jurisdictional flaw.

We agree with the Board that Pereira is an imperfect fit in the jurisdictional context and it does not mandate a different conclusion than the one already reached by this court and all our sister circuits. See Herrera-Orozco, 603 F. App’x at 473–74 (collecting cases). We therefore conclude that jurisdiction vests with the immigration court where, as here, the mandatory information about the time of the hearing, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), is provided in a Notice of Hearing issued after the NTA.

********************************************

Points of interest;

  • The 6th Circuit is the first circuit to rule on Bermudez-Cota;
  • The court noted that approximately 100% of the cases commenced by ICE over the past three years did not contain the specific notice of date. time and place of hearing set forth in the statute;
  • Even assuming that Bermudez is upheld, the way in which cases have been processed by DHS and EOIR has made tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands of individuals eligible for “Cancellation of Removal;”
  • What does this say about the management competency of both agencies?
  • Contrary to the drift of the BIA and the 6th Circuit, initial proper notice of time, place, and date of hearing is critically important;
    • Whereas “Notices to Appear” are sometimes served in person, the subsequent “Notice of Hearing” by EOIR never is — this significantly increases the chances for improper “in absentia” hearings based on faulty notice from EOIR;
    • Most notices in Immigration Court are served manually by regular U.S. Mail, an incredibly error-fraught process given the state of disorder in the Immigration Courts (which has been mindlessly ramped up under Sessions’s gross mismanagement);
    • Thus, failing to provide accurate initial notice actually greatly increases the chances of improper in absentia orders and actual removals if an individual is picked up and can’t figure out how to file a “Motion to Reopen and Rescind” the in absentia order;
    • Would you be able to do that?” Would most Article III judges (particularly if operating in a different language, from ICE Detention, with no lawyer)?
  • Although “winning” on the “big issue,” the DHS actually lost this case; it was remanded because the BIA screwed up in denying the respondent’s Motion to Reopen;
  • As one of my former colleagues pointed out to me recently, if the BIA is wrong in Bermudez-Cota, it could potentially invalidate not only almost every removal order and pending removal proceeding, but most affirmative grants of relief by Immigration Judges;
    • So, maybe this is a case where the practical consequences will shape the legal interpretation;
    • But, then, there’s always the issue of retroactivity — could an invalidation of Bermudez be applied “prospectively only” to new and pending proceedings or in some other manner that did not disrupt “settled expectations;”
  • Historical Trivia:  I wrote Matter of L-O-G-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 413, 413 (B.I.A. 1996) (en banc) which was extensively discussed by the 6th Circuit.

PWS

12-18-18